Vietnam War: Nuclear Weapon Use Options and considerations Department of Defense, White House, CIA Files, and White House Secret Audio Recordings



After Saigon airport, the most attractive targets seem to be troop concentrations, particularly the barracks areas at Pleiku, Da Nang, and An Khe. Here, a mortar attack would probably be called for (particularly at An Khe, which is closed to Vietnamese), but, although risky, this is far from impossible. A 10- to 20-KT explosion in each one of these three bases would kill perhaps 5000 American troops, equivalent to one year's casualties at the current rate.


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
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Vietnam War: Nuclear Weapon Use Options and considerations Department of Defense, White House, CIA Files, and White House Secret Audio Recordings



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Vietnam War: Nuclear Weapon Use Options and considerations Department of Defense, White House, CIA Files, and White House Secret Audio Recordings

2,156 pages of Department of Defense, White House, National Security Council, CIA files, Nixon and Johnson secret White House audio recordings that address the nuclear question faced during the Vietnam War. Some material in this collection was not declassified until 2016.

OPERATION VULTURE

The first plans by the United States for possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam dates back to 1954. When the Eisenhower Administration developed a conceptual plan called Operation Vulture to rescue French forces during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The plan included the option to use up to three small atomic weapons on the Viet Minh positions. Eisenhower scuttled the plans because he did not Want to escalate U.S. involvement in the war, and he anticipated disapproval from Congress.

This collection includes 35 pages excerpted from the Pentagon Papers concerning the history of Operation Vulture and 3 pages from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 Volume XIII, Part 1 Indochina.

CIA FILES

54 pages of CIA files related to the consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia

Includes:

A CIA Board of National Estimates Memorandum of Conversation, February 1, 1966, in which CIA director McCone asks the Board of National Estimates to research the repercussions of U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. The board would in 45 days report that, “in the field of international affairs [there is] probably no more universal opinion than that which holds the use of nuclear weapons to be abhorrent.”

A twelve-page Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates report dated March 18, 1966 titled, "Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Vietnam War." This report is in response to the request mentioned above. "Use of nuclear weapons by the US in the Vietnam War would be one of the most important events of modern history," is the first line of the report. Other comments from the report, “widespread and fundamental. revulsion that [it] had broken the 20-year taboo on the use of nuclear weapons,” and "wave of fear and anger.”

A January 10, 1968 page report, "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh." It was the negative outlook of this battle that lead Westmoreland to hatch OPLAN Fracture Jaw.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A 60-page report commissioned by the Department of Defense and completed in March 1967. The only known systematic study of the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the war, conducted by four civilian scientists consulting for the U.S. government as part of the JASONs, a

group of some forty young scientists who met each summer since 1959 to consider defense-related problems for the Pentagon.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the military consequences of a U.S. decision to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that the war remains theater-limited and that no strategic exchange occurs. The study is divided into two main parts. (1) possible targets for U.S. TNW, and effects of nuclear bombardment on the ground war if the use of TNW remains unilateral; and (2) possibility and effectiveness of enemy retaliation with nuclear weapons supplied by the Soviet Union or China. The report provides its conclusions regarding unilateral use of tactical nuclear weapons, the vulnerability of U.S. forces to enemy tactical nuclear weapons, the use of tactical nuclear weapons by insurgents elsewhere and political consequences.

Topics and Sub-topics in the report include:

ADVANTAGES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ATTAINMENT OF U.S. MILITARY OBJECTIVES: Catalog of Targets for U.S. Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Troop Concentrations, Headquarters and Communication Centers, Supply Lines, Airfields and SAMS Sites, Mountain Passes and Trails. Characteristics and Effects of TNW on These Targets: Prompt Effects, Delayed Effects, Duration of Fallout Patterns in Maintaining Interdiction of Supply Routes, Continuous-Front Barriers. Examination and Criticism of Relevant War Games. Scenarios for Use of TNW in Escalation of Current Operations in the Vietnam War: Use of TNW Against VC Bases in South Vietnam, Use Against Chinese Troops Moving Through Passes, Use for Long-Term Interdiction of Supply Routes.

THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST U.S. FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: The U.S. Order of Battle in Vietnam. Means of Delivering TNW.

The Effect of Nuclear Attacks on U.S. Forces. Countermeasures. Weapons Requirements Against U.S. Forces in SVN.

EFFECTIVENESS OF TNW IN THE HANDS OF INSURGENTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: Escalation. Long-Range Consequences.

MCNAMARA PAPERS. STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES. SUBJECT: THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

147 pages of draft reports, dating from October 1965 to January 15, 1969, from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Lyndon Johnson, concerning theater nuclear forces. A continuing review of theater nuclear and related chemical and biological forces. Covering nuclear strategy concerning Europe, Asia, the Soviet Union threat, and the China threat.

Included in one of the memoranda to President Johnson is the role of nuclear weapons in Asia. In the drafts can be found discussion of conditions under which nuclear weapons would be used in Asia. Includes comments on under what circumstance the use of Chinese conventional forces in Vietnam might warrant the use of nuclear weapons. One passage on this topic begins with, "In the event that a major Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia indicates that the U.S. might have to face a decision to use nuclear weapons, it is clear that the decision could be taken more deliberately than a similar decision against the Soviet Union in Europe."

Other topics in the drafts include: The Threat to Korea. The Role of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Nuclear Defense against a

Conventional Invasion in the Center Region with Effects Limited to NATO Territory. Nuclear Defense Against Invasion in the Center Region Using Discrete Fire. Mix of Theater Nuclear Forces. The Short Tactical Nuclear Battle. Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs). ADMs are nuclear charges designed to delay an advancing army by placing obstacles in its path. The Tactical Nuclear Campaign. The Extended Tactical Nuclear War. Chemical and Biological Warfare Forces. Incapacitating Chemicals (Including Riot Control Agents). The General Nuclear War Problem.

OPLAN FRACTURE JAW - LYNDON B. JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE FILES

122 pages of Lyndon B. Johnson White House files covering OPLAN Fracture Jaw. Fracture Jaw was a top-secret U.S. military contingency plan in which General William C. Westmoreland sought to ensure that nuclear weapons would be available for use in the Vietnam War.

“OPLAN Fracture Jaw has been approved by me,” General Westmoreland wrote to Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., the American commander in the Pacific, on Feb. 10, 1968. Later the same day as Westmoreland had told the American commander in the Pacific that he approved the operation, President Johnson’s national security adviser, Walt W. Rostow, alerted President Johnson in a February 10, 1968 memorandum. Despite Westmoreland's moves towards activating the plan, the project was abandoned in when it was discovered by the White House. Two days later, Admiral Sharp sent out the order to “discontinue all planning for Fracture Jaw.” Sharp ordered that all the planning material, “including messages and correspondence relating thereto, under positive security.” They remained top secret until 2016. In 2018 they were discovered by

author and historian Michael Beschloss while working on his book, "Presidents of War."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY 8, 1972 MEETING MEMORANDUM

A 22-page memo. In a conversation largely concerning North Vietnam's 1972 Spring Offensive, Nixon briefly discussed nuclear weapons, he said, "Obviously, we are not going to use nuclear weapons." however he did address the use of a nuclear threat against North Vietnam.

DUCK HOOK - NIXON WHITE HOUSE FILES

89 pages of files related to "Duck Hook" plans. National Security Council Files dating from September 29, to October 2, 1974.

When President Richard Nixon took office in January of 1969, a high priority was seeking an end to the Vietnam War in a way that was favorable to the United States. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger produced a strategy, combining diplomacy and the threat of greater strategic bombing. Henry Kissinger set-up a special NSC staff planning committee referred to as the "September Group," also known as the "contingency group," to evaluate the secret plans prepared by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and military planners in Saigon. The military planners expanded Kissinger's strategy into "Duck Hook".

Duck Hook (code-named "Pruning Knife" by the military) was the White House code-name of an operation President Nixon was given to

consider unleashing against North Vietnam, if North Vietnam did not yield to Washington's terms at the Paris peace negotiations. Some historians believe Duck Hook called for the possible nuclear bombing of military and economic targets in and around Hanoi, the mining of Haiphong and other ports, air strikes against North Vietnam's northeast line of communications as well as passes and bridges at the Chinese border, and air and ground attacks on other targets throughout Vietnam.

Documents include a September 29, 1969 memorandum from Henry Kissinger aides Roger Morris and Anthony Lake to Captain Rembrandt Robinson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council's military liaison unit in the White House. Robinson had earlier prepared the Duck Hook plans for attacks on North Vietnam. Lake and Morris criticized the plan saying it should "make it clear that" the September Group believed the President should be prepared to accept two operational concepts: Duck Hook "must be brutal and sustainable" and "self-contained." Regarding the latter requirement, the president would need to decide in advance "the fateful question of how far we will go. He cannot, for example, confront the issue of using tactical nuclear weapons in the midst of the exercise. He must be prepared to play out whatever string necessary in this case." The memo goes on to say that the plan should state, "clearly and fully all the implications of the action, should the President decide to do it."

An attachment to an October 2, 1969 memo from Henry Kissinger to Nixon asked, "Should we be prepared to use nuclear weapons?" The memo warned that "Since we cannot confidently predict the exact point at which Hanoi could be likely to respond positively, we must be prepared to play out whatever string necessary." Kissinger's memo also stated that "To achieve its full effect on Hanoi's thinking, the action must be brutal." ["the action must be brutal" is underlined for emphasis in original document]

The earlier memo from the two Kissinger's aides, Roger Morris and Anthony Lake, stated that the President must be prepared "to decide beforehand, the fateful question of how far we will go. He cannot, for example, confront the issue of using tactical nuclear weapons in the midst of the exercise. He must be prepared to play out whatever string necessary in this case." The identical wording in the Kissinger memo makes some historians believe that Kissinger was referring to the nuclear question when he called for playing out "whatever string necessary."

Files include the outlining of the types of targets in North Vietnam that would be targeted. The outlining of the military concept involving a number of air and naval actions, grouped into intense phases of short duration. "These actions would be markedly different from the previous air and naval operations against NVN," says a report indented for the president.

Included in the files is a draft of an eighteen-page address to be made by President Nixon to the American people on the day Duck Hook was to begin. While no mention of the use of tactical nuclear weapons is made in this draft of the speech, the speech points to a course of action over a short period time, meant to cause a great shock to the North. Wording in the speech points to at least near extreme action. This never used speech is believed by some to be a pre-announcement to the American public of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

A passage in the speech states, "This warning was privately confirmed to Hanoi's chief negotiator in Paris at the beginning of August. He was informed that if no major progress toward a settlement of the war had been made by the first of November, we would be compelled to take measures of the greatest consequence. "But tonight - - after months of

the most thorough study and deliberation - - I must report to you that Hanoi has indeed made a tragic miscalculation of our will and purpose. They have not heeded our clear warnings. They have refused to credit the word of the United States." Later in the speech, the wording turns to finality, "That decision had to be my responsibility. It is our common responsibility - - yours and mine - - to demonstrate our unflinching resolve to end this war."

Topics included in these files: Conceptual Plan of Military Operations. Assessment of Military Actions: Conduct Major Air Strikes Against NVN Counter-Air Capability, Mining NVN Ports, Interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line and Air Strikes Against Other Key Targets, Breaching of the Levee System in the Red River Delta. NVN Actions and U.S. Courses of Action: Hanoi's Estimate of U.S. Intentions, Hanoi's Ability to Continue to Receive Outside Economic Aid, Hanoi's Estimate of Internal Political Conditions, Political Objectives to be Gained from Military Operations. Soviet Actions and U.S. Courses of Action. Chinese Communist Actions and U.S. Courses of Action. Integrated Diplomatic and Military Scenarios.

Four days after the Kissinger memo, on October 6, 1969, Nixon decided against Duck Hook.

The reasons for this are believed to be: there were reservations about Duck Hook's potential effectiveness; public support for the war continued to decline; there were signs of political slippage; and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers opposed military escalation. Others believe that the goals of Duck Hook, hitting a target once without the need to return for more bombings, a show of force so extreme it would drive the North to negotiate an end to the war with terms favorable to U.S. in an operation lasting only four days would require using tactical nuclear weapons, so the plan was rejected.

At the same time that President Nixon cancelled Duck Hook, it seems that Nixon embarked on a new strategy to start a series of increased nuclear alert measures designed to convey to the Soviets an increasing readiness by U.S. strategic forces. This became known as the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test."

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF READINESS TEST - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & WHITE HOUSE FILES

60 pages of Department of Defense and White House files covering the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test.

On October 10, 1969, General Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a top secret message to American commanders around the world; the order said it had come down from a higher authority to raise their posture to prepare to respond to possible confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In October of 1969 President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force and Navy to engage in exercises to raise their level of nuclear preparedness. This set of maneuvers became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test. The purpose of this move was to get the Soviet Union's reconnaissance network to notice the moves. Nixon hoped the Soviet Union would then press the North Vietnamese to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War, because of concern the United States was preparing to use nuclear weapons in the conflict.

In his 1978 memoir, Nixon's chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman wrote that President Nixon believed that President Dwight Eisenhower convinced North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union to end the Korean War by

issuing a nuclear threat. Haldeman wrote of a conversation with Nixon during the summer of 1968, in which he quotes Nixon as saying, "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I've reached the point that I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he is angry, and he has his hand on the nuclear button and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace."

In one of the moves taken during the Readiness Test, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) ordered a stand-down of training missions to increase the number of nuclear armed B-52's ready for deployment. On October 27, 1969, SAC ordered eighteen B-52 bombers armed with nuclear weapons to launch from bases in California and the state of Washington, to cross Alaska, were they were refueled in mid-air by KC-135 air tankers, while flying an oval pattern around the polar ice cap toward the Soviet Union and back for eighteen hours.

On October 28, 1969 the order was sent out to end the Readiness Test.

Highlights among the files include: A transcript of a closed meeting between President Nixon and French President Charles de Gaulle, where Nixon mentions the level of influence Nixon believes the Soviets have with the North Vietnamese. A transcript of a closed meeting between President Nixon and Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu, where Nixon tells Ceaucescu, who Nixon believed to have some influence with the North Vietnamese, that North Vietnam should not make the grave mistake of not taking his threats seriously. "I don't make idle threats," Nixon told Ceaucescu. A report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into favorable actions at the Paris peace talks. Included is the option: "A plan for actual or feigned technical escalation of war against the

North,” followed in parenthesis’s “Nuclear." A memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon dated October 1, 1969, concerning Kissinger's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Kissinger reports telling Dobrynin that there would be no special treatment for the Soviet Union until Vietnam was solved. "The train had just left the station and was heading down the tracks," Kissinger told Ambassador Dobrynin. A hand-written diary entry by H.R. Haldeman dated Friday October 17. Haldeman wrote that Kissinger told him that he was engaging in signal-type activity around the world to try to jar Soviets and North Vietnam.

President Johnson White House Telephone Conversations Recordings

45 minutes of President Johnson's White House telephone recordings. Participants include president Johnson, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, George Reedy and former president Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Among the subjects of conversations in this collection are Barry Goldwater’s statement on authorization for military commanders to use nuclear weapons during Tonkin Gulf incident, LBJ'S press conference response to Goldwater’s charge that LBJ authorized use of nuclear weapons in Tonkin Gulf incident, procedures for use of nuclear weapons, cable to Eisenhower about use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam and unsuitability of using tactical nuclear weapons in Khe Sanh.

President Richard M. Nixon's Madman Theory

213 pages of documents related to Nixon's Madman theory as applied to the Vietnam War and possible use of nuclear weapons. The madman theory is a political theory commonly associated with an aspect of U.S. President Richard Nixon's foreign policy. He and his administration tried to make the leaders of hostile Communist Bloc nations think Nixon was irrational and volatile. Applied to Vietnam War, Nixon wanted the Soviet Union and North Vietnam to believe that he had not taken the use of atomic weapons off the table. In a 1972 memo Kissinger explains to Defense Department official Gardner Tucker that Nixon's strategy was to make "the other side ... think we might be 'crazy' and might really go much further."

Documents in this section Include:

A March 2, 1969 memorandum from Al Haig to Henry Kissinger, enclosing a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to Kissinger, 21 February 1969.

Laird's memorandum to Kissinger notes that in late January, they had discussed "potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks." Laird sent Kissinger a Joint Staff paper that reviewed possible options, including "technical escalation," a plan for the feigned nuclear escalation against North Vietnam. In the reply to Laird, Kissinger asked for actions with a "lower profile" and less risk on the grounds that "actual or feigned military action" might produce "international and domestic turbulence."

A March 1969 memorandum from President Nixon to Kissinger, in which Nixon writes, "we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control."

The April 1969 Navy's "Duck Hook" plan for a mining of Vietnamese readiness test designed to create a "state of indecision" among the North Vietnam leadership whether Washington intended to launch mining operations.

A May 1969 statement by Kissinger's to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, in which Kissinger says, Nixon "was prepared to accept any political system in South Vietnam, provided there is a fairly reasonable interval between conclusion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system."

A July 16, 1969 memorandum about sending Jean Sainteny on a diplomatic mission to Hanoi, to give the North the message that if a deal is not made by November, Nixon "regretfully find himself obliged to have recourse to measures of great consequence and force... He will resort to any means necessary."

An August 3, 1969 memorandum of conversation between Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu and Richard Nixon. During the meeting Nixon said that "I don't make idle threats" and that the Vietnamese were "making a grave mistake if they think they can wait us out." it is believed that Nixon expected Ceaucescu to pass the message on to North Vietnam.

An October 1, 1969 memo from Kissinger to Nixon, enclosing a memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Kissinger. In the meeting with Dobrynin Kissinger said the "train had just left the station and was heading down the tracks."

An October 10, 1969 briefing paper prepared for a meeting with President Nixon broadly outlined actions for implementation around the world. "Initial actions have been taken to achieve readiness

posture. With selected US forces for the period 12-25 October 1969. "Posture will be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening."

An October 17, 1969 entry in the diaries of H. R. Haldeman disclosing Nixon's intent in ordering the readiness test, "he has all sorts of signal-type activity going around the world to try to jar Soviets + NVN [North Vietnam]."

A 1972 Kissinger memorandum in which Kissinger explains to Defense Department official Gardner Tucker that Nixon's strategy was to make "the other side ... think we might be 'crazy' and might really go much further.

Excerpts from MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973

31 pages excerpted from Graham A. Cosmas's book, "MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973." These excerpts include coverage of nuclear weapons and Operation Fracture Jaw. Fracture Jaw was a top-secret U.S. military contingency plan in which General William C. Westmoreland sought to ensure that nuclear weapons would be available for use in northern Quang Tri if necessary, to prevent a major defeat.

U.S.S. Ozbourn (DD-846) Possible Nuclear Incident

7 pages of files related to a possible nuclear incident involving the U.S.S. Ozbourn (DD-846) . On March 25, 1967 the U.S.S. Ozbourn was hit by several North Vietnamese mortar shells. Two mortars damaged the Ozbourn’s ASROC [anti-submarine rocket] storage area, igniting

rocket motors and forcing the crew to flood the magazine. ASROCs were nuclear-capable weapons so explosions in a magazine raised the possibility, at a minimum, of radioactive materials scattering about the ship. A heavily redacted memo by the U.S. Navy's National Military Command Center, indicated the possibility that armed nuclear weapons were on board the Ozbourn, The subject of the March 25, 1967 report is ""Report of Nuclear Incident." The report was sent to the White House the same day.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXIV, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1969–1972

This 1,233-page volume, prepared by the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, documents U.S. national security policy in the context of the Vietnam War and the changing Cold War strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. When President Richard Nixon assumed office in January 1969, he was confronted with the fact that the United States no longer held commanding military superiority over its superpower rival.

Includes coverage of the October 1969 Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, in which Nixon secretly placed on alert portions of the United States military, including its nuclear forces, and Duck Hook.

NIXON SECRET PRESIDENTIAL AUDIO RECORDINGS

A six-hour and six-minute Nixon White House audio tape recorded at the Old Executive Office Building. Included on this tape is an April 25,

1972 exchange between President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, in which Nixon breaches the subject of the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Although not considered by Nixon scholars to a serious proposal for the use of nuclear weapons, the exchange shows Nixon's frustration with the Vietnam War days before he launched an escalation of the war. "I'd rather use the nuclear bomb," President Nixon told Kissinger. "That, I think, would just be too much," National Security Advisor Kissinger replied. Nixon responded, "The nuclear bomb. Does that bother you?" Later Nixon remarked, “I just want you to think big."


Other subjects mentioned on this tape recorded between April 20 at 3:09 PM and April 25, 1972 at 3:35 PM include public opinion and the Vietnam War, the strategy of increased bombing of North Vietnam, the progress of the war and U.S./Soviet relations. Other participants on this tape include Alexander M. Haig, H. R. Haldeman, Alexander P. Butterfield and Ronald L. Ziegler.

The files contain an embedded text transcript of all computer recognizable text, in the graphic image of each page of each document, creating a searchable finding aid.

NOTES

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711.5611/4–954

Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] April 7, 1954.

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

Captain George Anderson (Special Assistant to Admiral Radford) asked to see me this morning on a "delicate matter". He gave me the following information on a most confidential basis, which he said Admiral Radford wished conveyed to Secretary Dulles:

The "advance study group"[1] in the Pentagon has been making an estimate of whether atomic weapons could be used to clean up the Vietminh in the Dien Bien Phu area. It has reached the conclusion that three tactical A-weapons, properly employed, would be sufficient to smash the Vietminh effort there.[2] [Page 1271]

This study in turn raised in Admiral Radford's mind the question of whether in the event of establishment of a coalition in Southeast Asia, in which the US participates and commits forces, we could use atomic weapons on the Vietminh if this seemed the best means of smashing them and cleaning up Indochina.

In the event we are successful in forming a coalition in Southeast Asia, Admiral Radford wondered whether we could not go to the French and get their approval for using atomic weapons in Indochina if this became necessary when the coalition was participating in operations. His feeling was that if we could get French acceptance of the principle of the use of such weapons, the whole conception of gaining acceptance of their use would be assisted. Furthermore, if we got French approval in principle after the coalition was formed but before we actively committed forces to Indochina, we could later use such weapons when our forces (air) were engaged.

Admiral Radford had discussed this briefly with Secretary Wilson, who said Admiral Radford should lay the matter before Secretary Dulles and seek his views.

Captain Anderson on a personal basis asked me if I had any reactions and I said that it raised in my mind very serious questions affecting the whole position of US leadership in the world. My own frank guess would be that the French Government would not agree or accept the responsibility for using an A-bomb. Furthermore, if we approached the French, the story would certainly leak and become public knowledge. The fact that we were considering such steps in Indochina would in turn cause a great hue and cry throughout the parliaments of the free world, and particularly among some of our NATO allies, notably the UK. This in turn might result in parliamentary pressures on governments to seek assurances from us that we would not use A-weapons without consultation, particularly in those countries that were joined with us and had forces contributed to collective defense arrangements such as NATO. Furthermore, in addition to the Soviet propaganda, many elements in the free world would portray our desire to use such weapons in Indochina as proof of the fact that we were testing out weapons on native peoples and were in fact prepared to act irresponsibly and drop weapons of mass destruction on the Soviet Union whenever we believed it was necessary to do so. The state of mind in the UK, at least, on this general subject had been demonstrated in the parliamentary debate of last Monday. Finally, I said that if there were collective effort in Indochina and the Chinese Communists then intervened overtly, that would be a different matter, but the proposition which was in Admiral Radford's mind to use these weapons in Indochina itself obviously raised questions which the Secretary would have to consider and inform Admiral Radford of his views. I emphasized, of course, that the above reactions were purely my own personal reactions to the proposition. [Page 1272]

It was left that when the Secretary could see Admiral Radford he would let him know.[3]

Because of the sensitivity of this matter, I made only this original of this memo and one copy (which is in the hands of S/S). I have asked that the copy in S/S be shown to the Under Secretary, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Bowie, and Mr. Robertson on a hand-carry eyes only basis.[4]

Douglas MacArthur II

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1. Reference is to the Joint Advanced Study Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The records of the Committee have not been found.↩
2. In his memoirs, Richard Nixon writes the following: "In Washington the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under their Chairman, Adm. Arthur Radford, devised a plan, known as Operation Vulture, for using three small tactical atomic bombs to destroy Vietminh positions and relieve the garrison. Both Eisenhower and Dulles, however, felt that nothing less than overt

Chinese Communist aggression would be sufficient provocation for our going into Vietnam in any such a direct and unilateral way." (Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 150)↩

3. *The source text is accompanied by an undated handwritten note by O'Connor of S/S to MacArthur which read as follows: "Sec did not want to raise this now with Adm R—& the latter I gather did not raise it with the Sec." The source text is attached to a memorandum for the file by MacArthur dated Apr. 9, which read as follows: "I called Captain George Anderson (Special Assistant to Admiral Radford). I said I was leaving with Secretary Dulles for Europe tomorrow and wanted him to know I had passed on to the Secretary the information Captain Andersonhad given me (see attached memorandum). I said that the Secretary had said an opportunity to talk to Admiral Radford about this would undoubtedly occur some time and I thought we could leave it to the two of them to get together when appropriate."*↩
4. *Chits accompanying the source text indicate that a copy was transmitted to Under Secretary Smith on Apr. 7 and had been seen by Murphy, Merchant, Bowie, and Robertson by May 5.*↩

Memorandum for the File by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(Radford)

[Paris,] 24 April 1954.

On arrival in Paris today, I was met at the airport by General Ely and we made an arrangement to meet at 1015 on Sunday morning.[1]At about 1830 today I received a request from General Ely to meet with him as soon as possible, preferably before Mr. Dulles left for Geneva. I was unable to meet him before 2040, and of course Mr. Dulles had departed for the airport at that time.

General Ely stated that he came to me as a representative of the French Government and as a consequence of a Cabinet Meeting today. I gathered that this was at the direction of Messrs. Pleven and Bidault, and that they had decided that Ely should come to me as a military man to talk to another military man on the situation as he saw it. He stated he came to ask for American intervention, well realizing that such intervention could have no direct bearing on the situation at Dien Bien Phu, but that the point which he wanted to stress was that in his opinion, and I gathered this was also the consensus of opinion of the Cabinet, American aid should be rendered before Dien Bien Phu fell for the psychological effect not only on opinion in France but also because of its effect on public opinion in Indo-China. [Page 1397]

His personal and private opinion of the French Cabinet was that a few members were strong, and he named Messrs. Laniel, Bidault, Pleven, and at least by inference inferred that the balance of the Cabinet was weak. He said this was no time to criticize General Navarre for what he had done or not done. In answer to a question, he assured me that GeneralNavarre had complete freedom of action in Indo-China and further stated that he, Ely, would back him up even if Navarre were to receive a court-martial later. In other words, he had to approve Navarre's action up to this time.

While not specific, I felt that General Ely was in effect telling me that the consequences of a refusal on the part of the U.S. to render aid at a critical time could have very severe implications in regard to relationships between France and the United States.

He discussed how long Dien Bien Phu could hold out. I mentioned my latest information when I left Washington indicated 3 to 5 days in terms of food and ammunition. He said that was probably a little better now, that they had been able to drop more supplies and ammunition within the last 24 hours. However, he could not be very optimistic as to the number of days Dien Bien Phu could hold out. I asked him if it would be possible for General Navarre to drop troops south of Dien Bien Phu and possibly in sufficient numbers to influence favorably the situation there, and he said he did not think it would be possible. He kept stressing that Operation Vulture must be carried out regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu and prior to the capitulation or loss of that position. When I asked him what Operation Vulture was, he said that it was the name of the operation given to U.S. air intervention, and was surprised that I had not heard about it before. He went on further to say that this indicated a lack of close contact between the Americans and the military in Indo-China which distressed him and he thought he would have to do something about that.

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1. Apr. 25.↩

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naval action "against all suitable military targets in China," when possible in conjunction with British and French forces. 8/

In prescribing these recommended actions, the NSC focused on the less likely contingency of a Chinese intervention rather than the more likely contingency of the continued deterioration of the French position in Indochina itself. It did so despite the fact that NSC 124/2 conceded that the "primary threat" was the situation in Indochina itself (increasing subversive efforts by indigenous communist forces, increased guerrilla activity, and increased Viet Minh civil control over population and territory). Apparently, the NSC wanted to make clear that direct U.S. involvement in Indochina was to be limited to dealing with direct Chinese involvement. In the absence of this contingency, however, and to meet the existing situation in Indochina, the NSC recommended that the United States increase its level of aid to French Union forces but "without relieving the French authorities of their basic military responsibility for the defense of the Associated States." 9/

4. Republican Administration and Far East

Two events in 1953 served to deepen the American commitment in Indochina. The first was the arrival of a Republican Administration following a long period in which the G.O.P. had persistently accused the Truman Administration of being responsible for the "loss" of China to communism. The writings and speeches of John Foster Dulles before the election left no doubt that he regarded Southeast Asia as a key region in the conflict with communist "imperialism", and that it was important to draw the line of containment north of the Rice Bowl of Asia -- the Indochina peninsula. 10/ In his first State of the Union Message on February 3, 1953, President Eisenhower promised a "new, positive foreign policy." He went on to link the communist aggression in Korea and Malaya with Indochina. Dulles subsequently spoke of Korea and Indochina as two flanks, with the principal enemy -- Red China -- in the center. A special study mission headed by Representative Walter Judd, a recognized Republican spokesman on Asia, surveyed the Far East and reported on its view of the high stakes involved:

> "The area of Indochina is immensely wealthy in rice, rubber, coal, and iron ore. Its position makes it a strategic key to the rest of Southeast Asia. If Indochina should fall, Thailand and Burma would be in extreme danger, Malaya, Singapore and even Indonesia would become more vulnerable to the Communist power drive....Communism would then be in an exceptional position to complete its perversion of the political and social revolution that is spreading through Asia....The Communists must be prevented from achieving their objectives in Indochina." 11/

The Republican Administration clearly intended to prevent the loss of Indochina by taking a more forthright, anti-communist stand.

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5. Impact of Korean Armistice

Second, the armistice in Korea created apprehension that the Chinese Communists would now turn their attention to Indochina. President Eisenhower warned in a speech on April 16, 1953, that any armistice in Korea that merely released armed forces to pursue an attack elsewhere would be a fraud. Secretary Dulles continued this theme after the Korean armistice in a speech on September 2, 1953, on the war in Indochina. After noting that "a single Communist aggressive front extends from Korea on the north to Indochina in the south" he said:

> "Communist China has been and now is training, equipping and supplying the Communist forces in Indochina. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own Army into Indochina. The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. I say this soberly...in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation." 12/

Underlying these warnings to China was the belief that the difference between success or failure in avoiding a takeover of all Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh probably depended upon the extent of Chinese assistance or direct participation. Signaling a warning to China was probably designed to deter further Chinese involvement. Implicit in the signals was the threat that if China came into the war, the United States would be forced to follow suit, preferably with allies but, if necessary, alone. Furthermore, the Eisenhower Administration implied that in keeping with its policy of massive retaliation the United States would administer a punishing nuclear blow to China without necessarily involving its land forces in an Asian war.

6. Deepening of U.S. Commitment to Containment

In addition to the new mood in Washington created by the strategic perceptions of a new Administration and the Korean armistice, the Viet Minh invasion of Laos in the spring of 1953 and the deepening war weariness in France served to strengthen those who favored a more assertive policy in Indochina. The United States rushed supplies to Laos and Thailand in May 1953 and provided six C-119's with civilian crews for the airlift into Laos. 13/ It increased substantially the volume and tempo of American military assistance to French Union forces. For fiscal year 1954, $460 million in military assistance was planned. Congress only appropriated $400 million, but following the presentation by the French of the Navarre Plan an additional $385 million was decided upon by the NSC. 14/ No objection was raised when France asked our views in August, 1953, on the transfer of its battalion in Korea to Indochina and subsequently took this action. 15/ The Navarre Plan, by offering a format for victory which promised success without the direct involvement of American military forces, tended, because of its very attractiveness, to have the effect of enlarging our commitment to assist the French towards achieving a military solution.

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In the last NSC paper approved before the Indochina situation was totally transformed by the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference, the "successful defense of Tonkin" was said to be the "keystone of the defense of mainland Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya." 16/ NSC 5405 took some, but probably not sufficient, account of the deterioration in the French position which had occurred since NSC 124/2 was approved eighteen months earlier. It, nevertheless, repeated the domino principle in detail, including the admonition that "such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading to submission to, or an alignment with, communism by the remaining countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia." The document also noted that:

> "In the conflict in Indochina, the Communists and non-Communists worlds clearly confront one another in the field of battle. The loss of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia and South Asia, would therefore have the most serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests in Europe and elsewhere."

The subject of possible negotiations was broached in NSC 5405, following the observation that political pressures in France may impel the French Government to seek a negotiated rather than a military settlement. It was noted (before Dien Bien Phu) that if the Navarre Plan failed or appeared doomed to failure, the French might seek to negotiate simply for the best possible terms, irrespective of whether these offered any assurance of preserving a non-communist Indochina.

In this regard the NSC decided the U.S. should employ every feasible means to influence the French Government against concluding the struggle on terms "inconsistent" with the basic U.S. objectives. The French should be told that: (1) in the absence of a marked improvement in the military situation, there was no basis for negotiation on acceptable terms; (2) the U.S. would "flatly oppose any idea" of a cease-fire as a preliminary to negotiations, because such a cease-fire would result in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in Indochina; (3) a nominally non-communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United States or the United Kingdom. /Emphasis Added/

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, two comments can be made:

a. With the growing perception of a Chinese threat to Indochina, and, therefore, to all of Southeast Asia, the U.S. Government tended to concentrate on the military rather than the political aspects of the French-Viet Minh struggle. In consequence, American attention focused on (1) deterring external intervention from China, and (2) assisting the French

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in successfully prosecuting the war through the implementation of the Navarre Plan. The result of this was that the encouragement and support of the non-communist nationalist governments in the Associated States was almost inadvertently given lower priority. The United States was reluctant to press the French too strongly on taking measures to foster Vietnam nationalism because of its overriding interest in halting the potential sweep of communism through Southeast Asia. Moreover, it was easier to develop a policy for dealing with the external threat of intervention than to meet the internal threat of subversion, or the even more difficult process of finding and sustaining a genuine nationalist alternative to the Viet Minh.

b. The "domino theory" and the assumptions behind it were never questioned. The homogeneity of the nations of Southeast Asia was taken as a given, as was the linkage in their ability to remain democratic, or at an acceptable minimum, non-communist, nations. Undoubtedly, in the first decade of the cold war there existed an unfortunate stereotype of a monolithic communist expansionary bloc. It was reinforced by a somewhat emotional approach on the part of many Americans to communism in China and Asia. This "syndrome" was, in part, the result of the "fall" of China, which some felt could have been averted, and a few hoped would still be reversed.

Accordingly, not sufficient cognizance was taken of the individuality of the states of Southeast Asia and the separateness of their societies. Probably there was some lack of knowledge in depth on the part of Washington policy-makers about the area. No one before World War II had expected that the United States would be called upon to take a position of leadership in these remote colonial territories of our European allies. In hindsight, these shortcomings may have led to the fallacious belief that a neutralist or communist Indochina would inevitably draw the other states of Asia into the communist bloc or into neutralism. But the "fallacy" was neither evident then, nor is it demonstrable now in retrospect.

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II. A. 3. FOOTNOTES

1. NSC 48/1, "A Report on...The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," December 23, 1949 (TOP SECRET).

2. NSC 64, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina," February 27, 1950 (TOP SECRET).

3. Historical Office, Dept. of State, Research Project No. 370, "United States Policy on Indochina, 1945-1954," p.6.

4. NSC 124/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," June 25, 1952 (TOP SECRET).

5. NIE-5, "Indochina: Current Situation and Probable Developments," December 29, 1950 (SECRET).

6. NIE-35, "Probable Developments in Indochina during the Remainder of 1951," August 7, 1951 (SECRET).

7. NIE-35/1, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1952," March 3, 1952 (SECRET).

8. NSC 124/2.

9. Ibid.

10. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1950), p. 231; Melvin Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 25-26.

11. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Special Study Mission to Pakistan, India, Thailand and Indochina, pursuant to H. Res. 113, H. Rpt. No. 412, 83d long., 1st Sess., May 6, 1953, p. 53, as quoted in Gurtov, op.cit., p. 26.

12. Speech before the American Legion, St. Louis, Missouri, September 2, 1953.

13. Memorandum to Secretary of State from Asst Secy for Far East, Mr. Walter E. Robertson, April 28, 1953 (SECRET); AmEmbassy Paris telegram to Dept. State, No. 5766, May 3, 1953 (SECRET).

14. Historical Office, State Dept., Research Project No. 354, Summary, pp. 8-9.

15. Memorandum of Conversation, Acting Secretary Walter Bedell Smith and Minister Doridau, French Embassy, August 8, 1953 (SECRET).

16. NSC 5405, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," January 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

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B. TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

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II. B. TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

SUMMARY

Among the more frequently cited misapprehensions concerning U.S. policy in Vietnam is the view that the Eisenhower Administration flatly rejected intervention in the First Indochina War. The record shows plainly that the U.S. did seriously consider intervention, and advocated it to the U.K. and other allies. With the intensification of the French-Viet Minh war and the deterioration of the French military position, the United States was forced to take a position on: first, a possible U.S. military intervention in order to avert a Viet Minh victory; second, the increasingly likely contingency of negotiations between Paris and Ho Chi Minh to end the war through a political settlement. In order to avoid a French sell-out, and as an alternative to unilateral U.S. intervention, the U.S. proposed in 1954 to broaden the war by involving a number of allies in a collective defense effort through "united action."

The U.S. Government internal debate on the question of intervention centered essentially on the desirability and feasibility of U.S. military action. Indochina's importance to U.S. security interests in the Far East was taken for granted. The Eisenhower Administration followed in general terms the rationale for American interest in Indochina that was expressed by the Truman Administration. With respect to intervention, the Truman Administration's NSC 124 of February 1952 recognized that the U.S. might be forced to take some military action in order to prevent the subversion of Southeast Asia. In late 1953 - early 1954, as the fall of Indochina seemed imminent, the question of intervention came to the fore. The Defense Department pressed for a determination by highest authority of the size and nature of the forces the U.S. was willing to commit in Indochina. Some in DOD questioned the then operating assumption that U.S. air and naval forces would suffice as aid for the French. The Army was particularly concerned about contingency planning that assumed that U.S. air and naval action alone could bring military victory, and argued for realistic estimates of requisite land forces, including the degree of mobilization that would be necessary. The State Department thought that Indochina was so critical from a foreign policy viewpoint that intervention might be necessary. But DOD and the JCS, estimating that air-naval action alone could not stem the surging Viet Minh, recommended that rather than intervening directly, the U.S. should concentrate on urging Paris to train an expanded indigenous army, and should exert all possible pressures -- in Europe as well as in Asia -- to motivate the French to fight hard for a military victory. Many in the U.S. Government (the Ridgway Report stands out in this group) were wary that U.S. intervention might provoke Chinese Communist intervention. In the latter case, even a considerable U.S. deployment of ground forces would not be able to stem the tide in Indochina. A number of special high-level studies were unable to bridge the evident disparity between those who

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held that vital U.S. interests were at stake in Indochina, and those who were unwilling to make a firm decision to intervene with U.S. ground forces to assure those interests. Consequently, when the French began pressing for U.S. intervention at Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower Administration took the position that the U.S. would not intervene unilaterally, but only in concert with a number of European and Far Eastern allies as part of a combined force. (Tab 1)

This "united action" proposal, announced publicly by Secretary Dulles on March 29, 1954, was also designed to offer the French an alternative to surrender at the negotiating table. Negotiations for a political settlement of the Franco-Viet Minh war, however, were assured when the Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting in February at Berlin placed Indochina on the agenda of the impending Geneva Conference. Foreign Minister Bidault insisted upon this, over U.S. objections, because of the mounting pressure in France for an end to the seemingly interminable and costly war. The "peace faction" in Paris became stronger in proportion to the "peace feelers" let out by Ho Chi Minh, and the lack of French success on the battlefield. U.S. policy was to steer the French away from negotiations because of the fear that Indochina would thereby be handed over to the communist "empire."

Secretary Dulles envisaged a ten-nation collective defense force to take "united action" to prevent a French defeat -- if necessary before the Geneva Conference. Dulles and Admiral Radford were, at first, inclined towards an early unilateral intervention at Dien Bien Phu, as requested by the French (the so-called "Operation Vulture"). But Congressional leaders indicated they would not support U.S. military action without active allied participation, and President Eisenhower decided that he would not intervene without Congressional approval. In addition to allied participation, Congressional approval was deemed dependent upon a public declaration by France that it was speeding up the timetable for independence for the Associated States.

The U.S. was unable to gather much support for "united action" except in Thailand and the Philippines. The British response was one of hesitation in general, and flat opposition to undertaking military action before the Geneva Conference. Eden feared that it would lead to an expansion of the war with a high risk of Chinese intervention. Moreover, the British questioned both the U.S. domino principle, and the belief that Indochina would be totally lost at Dien Bien Phu and through negotiations at Geneva. As for the French, they were less interested in "united action" than in immediate U.S. military assistance at Dien Bien Phu. Paris feared that united action would lead to the internationalization of the war, and take control out of its hands. In addition, it would impede or delay the very negotiations leading towards a settlement which the French increasingly desired. But repeated French requests for direct U.S. intervention during the final agony of Dien Bien Phu failed to alter President Eisenhower's conviction that it would be an error for the U.S. to act alone.

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Following the fall of Dien Bien Phu during the Geneva Conference, the "domino theory" underwent a reappraisal. On a May 11 press conference, Secretary Dulles observed that "Southeast Asia could be secured even without, perhaps, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia." In a further remark that was deleted from the official transcript, Dulles said that Laos and Cambodia were "important but by no means essential" because they were poor countries with meager populations. (Tab 2)

DISCUSSION

II. B. Tab 1 - The Interagency Debate over U.S. Intervention in Indochina

Tab 2 - The Attempt to Organize "United Action"

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II. B. 1.

THE INTERAGENCY DEBATE OVER U.S. INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA

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II. B. 1. THE INTERAGENCY DEBATE OVER U.S. INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA

1. The General Policy Context

The debate over the wisdom and manner of American intervention in Indochina was based primarily on the desirability of military involvement, not on questions concerning Indochina's value to United States security interests in the Far East. The Eisenhower Administration was in general agreement with the rationale for American interest in Indochina expressed by the Truman Administration. The United States Government first came to full grips with the question of intervention in late 1953 -- early 1954 as the fall of Indochina seemed to become imminent.

a. The Final Truman Program (NSC 124)

NSC 124 (February, 1952) considered imperative the prevention of a Communist take-over in Indochina. It recognized that even in the absence of "identifiable aggression" by Communist China, the U.S. might be forced to take some action in order to prevent the subversion of Southeast Asia. In case of overt Chinese intervention, NSC 124 recommended: (1) naval, air and logistical support of French Union forces; (2) naval blockade of Communist China; (3) attacks by land and carrier-based aircraft on military targets in Mainland China. It stopped short of recommending the commitment of U.S. ground forces in Indochina. 1/

b. Eisenhower Administration's "Basic National Security Policy"

NSC 162/2, adopted in October, 1953, ten months after the Republican Administration took office, was the basic document of the "New Look." After commenting on U.S. and Soviet defense capabilities, the prospect of nuclear parity and the need to balance domestic economic policy with military expenditures, it urged a military posture based on the ability "to inflict massive retaliatory damage" on the enemy. Indochina was listed as an area of "strategic importance" to the U.S. An attack on such important areas "probably would compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor." The use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional war situations was recommended, but they were not specifically suggested for use in Indochina. 2/

2. The Question of Intervention with Ground Forces

a. The Problem is Presented

In late 1953, the Army questioned prevalent assumptions that ground forces would not be required in Indochina if the area was as important to U.S. security interests as the NSC papers stated. The Army urged that the issue be faced squarely in order to provide the best possible preparation for whatever courses of action might be undertaken. The Plans Division of the Army General Staff pointed out that under current

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programs the Army did not have the capability of providing divisional forces for operations in Indochina while maintaining its existing commitments in Europe and the Far East. Army also suggested a "reevaluation of the importance of Indochina and Southeast Asia in relation to the possible cost of saving it." 3/

With the deterioration of the French military situation in Indochina, the first serious attention came to be given to the manner and size of a U.S. intervention. The question to be faced was: how far was the U.S. prepared to go in terms of force commitments to ensure that Indochina stayed out of Communist hands? The Defense Department, though not of a single mind on this question, pressed for an early determination of the forces the U.S. would be willing to dispatch in an emergency situation. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert Anderson, proposed to Secretary of Defense Wilson on January 6, 1954, that the U.S. decide immediately to employ combat forces in Indochina on the "reasonable assurance of strong indigenous support of our forces," whether or not the French Government approved. 4/ But Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs in OSD , wrote:

> ". . . Involvement of U.S. forces in the Indochina war should be avoided at all practical costs. If, then, National Policy determines no other alternative, the U.S. should not be self-duped into believing the possibility of partial involvement -- such as 'Naval and Air units only.' One cannot go over Niagara Falls in a barrel only slightly."

Admiral Davis then went on:

> "Comment: If it is determined desirable to introduce air and naval forces in combat in Indochina it is difficult to understand how involvement of ground forces could be avoided. Air strength sufficient to be of worth in such an effort would require bases in Indochina of considerable magnitude. Protection of those bases and port facilities would certainly require U.S. ground force personnel, and the force once committed would need ground combat units to support any threatened evacuation. It must be understood that there is no cheap way to fight a war, once committed." 5/

b. NSC: State and Defense Views

The evident disparity between, on the one hand, our high strategic valuation of Indochina, and on the other, our unwillingness to reach a firm decision on the forces required to defend the area became the subject of the NSC's 179th meeting on January 8, 1954. At this meeting the Council discussed NSC 177 on Southeast Asia, 6/ but it decided not to take up the Special Annex to NSC 177 which laid out a series of choices which might face the United States if the French military position in Indochina continued to deteriorate. Nevertheless, the NSC at that time did make some headway on the problem it had posed for itself.

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According to summary notes taken of the meeting, 7/ State and Defense were at considerable variance on what should be done in either of two contingencies: first, French abandonment of the struggle; second, a French demand for substantial U.S. forces (ground, sea, and air). The State view considered the French position so critical already as (in the rapporteur's words) to "force the U.S. to decide now to utilize U.S. forces in the fighting in Southeast Asia." The Defense representative refused to underwrite U.S. involvement. He reportedly stated that the French could win by the spring of 1955 given U.S. aid and given "improved French political relations with the Vietnamese... The commitment of U.S. forces in a 'civil war' in Indochina will be an admission of the bankruptcy of our political policies re Southeast Asia and France and should be resorted to only in extremity." He urged that every step be taken to avoid a direct American commitment.

The Council meeting reached two important conclusions, both fully in keeping with the Defense position. First, it decided that a discussion of contingencies for U.S. involvement missed the essential point that the French were capable of winning provided they gained native political and military cooperation. Second, NSC 177 was, as Defense suggested, inadequate in that the study failed to come to grips with the fact that eventual success in Indochina depended upon French ability to solve the problem of how to obtain Vietnamese support for the war effort.

c. The JCS View

The NSC meeting of January 8 still left open the question of U.S. action in the event troops were indisputably necessary to prevent the "loss" of Indochina. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept their options open. The Chiefs thought that the Navarre Plan was fundamentally sound, but was being steadily undercut by the gulf separating the French from the Vietnamese, by General Navarre's failure to implement U.S. recommendations, and by hesitancy in Paris over the necessary political concessions to the Bao Dai government. Yet JCS refused either to rule out the use of U.S. combat forces or to back unequivocally their employment. 8/

d. Formation of Special Working Group on Indochina

Dissatisfaction with NSC 177 and the NSC's subsequent failure in NSC 5405 9/ to resolve the ground force commitment issue led to the formation of a working group to evaluate the French military effort, to make recommendations concerning future U.S. contributions to it, and to devote attention to the various contingencies under which the U.S. might be called upon to intervene directly in the war. The working group, under the chairmanship of General G. B. Erskine (USMC, Ret.), was composed of representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and CIA. The group was responsible to NSC through General W. Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, who had been appointed by the Council to head the Special Committee on the U.S. and Indochina.

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e. The Erskine Report, Part I: Motivate the French

The first section of Erskine's two-part report, dated February 6, 1954, was based on the assumption that U.S. policy toward Indochina would not require resort to overt combat operations by U.S. forces. Within that framework, the report adhered closely to the Defense Department position that the French, if properly motivated, could win in Indochina, but that their failure to carry through on needed reforms would require U.S. consideration of active involvement. The report noted that:

> "There is in Indo-China, or programmed for Indo-China..., a sufficient amount of equipment and supplies and a potential manpower pool sufficient eventually to defeat the Communists decisively if properly utilized and maintained and if the situation continues to permit this manpower to be converted into military effectiveness. Success will ultimately be dependent upon the inspiration of the local population to fight for their own freedom from Communist domination and the willingness of the French both to take the measures to stimulate that inspiration and to more fully utilize the native potential."

The Erskine Report (Part I) recommended: (1) augmentation of the French air force, but not using American personnel; (2) additional U.S. military assistance support of $124 million (supplementing FY 1954 commitments of $1.115 billion); (3) elevation of MAAG's status to that of Military Mission, with expanded personnel and advisory authority over training and planning; (4) assignment of additional U.S. personnel with the mission of acting as instructors and performing other key duties within the French forces; (5) Presidential letters to the Heads of State of the Associated States reaffirming our support of their independence and explaining our motivations in assisting them through the French; (6) an effort be undertaken to persuade Bao Dai to take a more active part in the anti-Viet Minh struggle. The report concluded that the program of recommended changes could bring about victory over the Viet Minh if it received full French approval and barring Chinese intervention.

f. The Erskine Report, Part II: Intervention Only After Geneva?

The second part of the Erskine Report did not appear until March 17, 1954, and unlike the first, was the responsibility only of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs, with the State Department position "reserved." The report confirmed previous determinations that the loss of Indochina would be a major military and political setback for the United States. It recommended that prior to the start of the Geneva Conference, the U.S. should inform Britain and France that it was interested only in military victory in Indochina and would not associate ourselves with any settlement which falls short of that objective. It further recommended that in the event of an unsatisfactory outcome at Geneva, the U.S. should

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pursue ways of continuing the struggle in concert with the Associated States, the United Kingdom, and other allies. The National Security Council was therefore requested to determine the extent of American willingness to commit combat forces to the region with or without French cooperation. But with the Dien Bien Phu siege just beginning, and the Geneva Conference six weeks away, the Erskine Report suggested that the United States influence and observe developments at the Geneva Conference before deciding on active involvement.

g. NSC 177 Annex Raises Intervention Question Anew

Following the second part of the Erskine Report, the President evidently decided that the Special Annex to NSC 177, which had been withdrawn in January 1954, should be redistributed for consideration by the Council's Planning Board. 10/ The Annex to NSC 177 posed the fundamental choice between (a) acceptance of the loss of Indochina, which would be followed by U.S. efforts to prevent further deterioration of our security position in Southeast Asia, or (b) direct military action to save Indochina before the French and Vietnamese became committed to an unacceptable political settlement at Geneva.

Among the alternative courses of action outlined in the Annex, two in particular -- both geared to direct U.S. action prior to a Geneva settlement -- were discussed. Under the first, based on French consent to continue fighting, the U.S. was urged to (1) seek a Franco-Vietnamese settlement of the independence issue, (2) insist upon a build-up of indigenous forces with U.S. advisory and material support, (3) demand the maintenance of French forces in the field at their then present level, and (4) prepare to provide sufficient U.S. forces to make possible the success of a joint effort. Full internationalization of the war would be discussed with the French later, thereby discounting immediate action in concert with the British or Asian nations.

The second alternative assumed a French pull-out. In such a case the United States could either accept the loss of Indochina, or adopt an active policy while France gradually withdrew its troops. Should we accept the latter course, our "most positive" step offering "the greatest assurance of success" would be, NSC estimated, to join with indigenous forces in combatting the Viet Minh until they were reduced "to the status of scattered guerrilla bands." U.S. land, sea, and air forces would be involved.

The Annex was based upon assumptions that U.S. involvement against the Viet Minh would not provoke massive Chinese intervention, would not lead to direct Soviet involvement, and that there would be no resumption of hostilities in Korea. It acknowledged that any change in these assumptions would seriously jeopardize the success of the alternatives proposed. In particular, it noted that U.S. participation heightened the risk of Chinese intervention, and Chinese entry would alter radically both the immediate military situation and U.S. force requirements.

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h. Army Questions Feasibility of Air-Naval Intervention and Outlines Ground Forces Requirements

The principal result of the discussions on the NSC 177 Special Annex was to bring into the open the issue of the costs in manpower and materiel of a U.S. involvement. The Army was critical of contingency planning that was based on the assumption that U.S. air and naval forces could be used in Indochina without the commitment of ground combat forces. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, later wrote in his Memoirs that he was quite disturbed at talk in high government circles about employing air-naval power alone in Indochina. An Army position paper submitted to the NSC in the first week of April, 1954, argued as follows:

"1. U.S. intervention with combat forces in Indochina is not militarily desirable...

"2. A victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. intervention with air and naval forces alone.

"3. The use of atomic weapons in Indochina would not reduce the number of ground forces required to achieve a victory in Indochina.

"4. Seven U.S. divisions or their equivalent, with appropriate naval and air support, would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists do not intervene. However, U.S. intervention plans cannot be based on the assumption that the Chinese Communists will not intervene.

"5. The equivalent of 12 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina, if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists intervene.

"6. The equivalent of 7 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French remain and the Chinese Communists intervene.

"7. Requirements for air and naval support for ground force operations are:

a. Five hundred fighter-bomber sorties per day exclusive of interdiction and counter-air operations.

b. An airlift capability of a one division drop.

c. A division amphibious lift.

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"8. Two U.S. divisions can be placed in Indochina in 30 days, and an additional 5 divisions in the following 120 days. This could be accomplished without reducing U.S. ground strength in the Far East to an unacceptable degree, but the U.S. ability to meet its NATO commitment would be seriously affected for a considerable period. The amount of time required to place 12 divisions in Indochina would depend upon the industrial and personnel mobilization measures taken by the government..." 11/

i. Defense-JCS "Solution": Rectify French Deficiencies

Faced with estimates that U.S. air-naval action could not turn the tide, and that U.S. ground forces of appropriate size would impinge upon other commitments, DoD and the JCS took the position that an alternative military solution existed within the reach of the French which required no U.S. intervention. DoD argued that the three reasons for France's deteriorating position were (1) lack of the will to win; (2) reluctance to meet Indochinese demands for true independence; (3) refusal to train indigenous personnel for military leadership. Defense believed that premature U.S. involvement would therefore beg the basic question of whether the U.S. was prepared to apply the strongest pressure on France, primarily in the European context, to attempt to force the French in Paris and in Indochina to take appropriate measures to rectify these deficiencies. Only if these measures were forthcoming, DoD held, should the U.S. seriously consider committing ground forces in defense of the interests of France and the Associated States. The net effect of the Defense-JCS position was to challenge the notion that a quick U.S. military action in Indochina would be either feasible or necessary.

3. The New Approach: "United Action"

At this juncture the Eisenhower Administration began giving serious consideration to broadening any American military intervention in Indochina by making it part of a collective venture along with its European and Asian allies. Secretary of State Dulles in a speech on March 29 warned the public of the alarming situation in Indochina and called for "united action" -- without defining it further -- in these words:

"Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that the possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today." 12/

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Under Secretary of State W. Bedell Smith's Special Committee on the U.S. and Indochina, to which the Erskine working group had reported, issued a study on April 2. This report went beyond the question of holding Indochina and agreed that whatever that area's fate, the U.S. should begin developing a system of mutual defense for Southeast Asia. For the short term, the Smith Committee favored American sponsorship of a mutual defense treaty directed against Communist aggression in Indochina and Thailand. In the long run, it recommended promotion of a "regional and Asian mutual defense arrangement subscribed and underwritten by the major European powers with interests in the Pacific." 13/

The State Department's thinking in early April 1954 was not greatly at variance from that of Defense and the Smith Committee. Perhaps more so than Defense, State was concerned about the Chinese reaction to a U.S. military intervention. It urged caution and suggested that in any type of "united action" the U.S. make clear to both the Chinese and the allies that the intervention would not be aimed at the overthrow or destruction of the Peking regime. State recommended: (1) no U.S. military intervention for the moment, nor should it be promised to the French; (2) planning for military intervention continue; (3) discussions with potential allies on possibility of forming a regional grouping in the event of an unacceptable settlement at Geneva. 14/

a. Presidential Decision to Support Only "United Action"

Meanwhile, the President decided, following a meeting of Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, with Congressional leaders on April 3, that the U.S. would not undertake a unilateral intervention. Any U.S. military involvement in Indochina would be contingent upon (1) formation of a coalition force with U.S. allies to pursue "united action"; (2) declaration of French intent to accelerate independence of Associated States; (3) Congressional approval of U.S. involvement (which was thought to be dependent upon (1) and (2)).

These policy guidelines undoubtedly influenced the NSC which, at a meeting on April 6, developed the somewhat incompatible objectives that the U.S. (a) "intervene if necessary to avoid the loss of Indochina, but advocate that no steps be left untaken to get the French to achieve a successful conclusion of the war on their own" and (b) support as the best alternative to U.S. intervention a regional grouping with maximum Asian participation. 15/

The President accepted the NSC recommendations but decided that henceforth the Administration's primary efforts would be devoted toward: (1) organizing regional collective defense against Communist expansion; (2) gaining British support for U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia; (3) pressing France to accelerate its timetable for Indochinese independence. The President would seek Congressional approval for U.S. participation in a regional arrangement, if it could be put together, and meanwhile contingency planning for mobilization would commence. 16/

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b. Rejection of Unilateral Intervention

Thus, as the curtain began to fall on the French effort at Dien Bien Phu, and the question of what the U.S. would do became critical, the U.S. Government backed away from unilateral intervention. The Defense Department was reluctant to intervene following the Army's presentation of the view that air-naval action alone would not do the job and ground forces would be needed. The very recent experience of the Korean War mitigated strongly against another American involvement in an Asian land war. Furthermore, the President was not willing to enter into such a venture unless it was cloaked with Congressional approval. Such approval, in turn, depended upon the participation of the allies. Hence, Secretary Dulles undertook the task of persuading Britain, France and the Asian allies to participate in a coalition for "united action" in Indochina.

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II. B. 1. FOOTNOTES

1. NSC 124, A Report to the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia, February 13, 1952 (TOP SECRET).

2. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2), October 30, 1953 (TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE). The Report was adopted October 29, 1953, at the 168th Council meeting.

3. Memorandum from Col. George W. Coolidge (GS, Acting Chief, Plans Division) to Defense Member, NSC Planning Board (att: Col Bonesteel), December 8, 1953 (TOP SECRET).

4. Anderson to Wilson, January 6, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

5. Davis letter to Bonesteel, January 5, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

6. NSC Planning Board, A Report to the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 177), December 30, 1953 (TOP SECRET).

7. Summary and Comments of the 179th NSC meeting, January 8, 1954.

8. See memorandum from Lt. Gen. F. F. Everest (USAF), for the JCS, to the Secretary of Defense, January 15, 1954 (TOP SECRET); also, the comments of Radford as reported in a memorandum from Capt. G. W. Anderson, Jr. (USN) to Lt. Gen. Jean Valluy, French Military Mission to the U.S., January 30, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

9. United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5405), January 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET). NSC 5405 differs from NSC 177 in only two respects: a paragraph on the U.S. response to a Chinese move into Thailand, and a deleted reference in the earlier paper to France's decline as a world power, with repercussions on her position in Europe and North Africa, if Indochina should be lost.

10. The Annex was recirculated on March 29, 1954.

11. Army Position on NSC Action No. 1074A, undated (early April 1954).

12. Department of State Press Release No. 165, March 29, 1954.

13. Draft: Special Committee Report on Southeast Asia - Part II, April 2, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

14. See the undated State Department position paper apparently written between April 2 and 5, just prior to the French request made through

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Dillon for direct U.S. air intervention at Dien Bien Phu. The State paper, with minor changes, became NSC Action No. 1074A, April 5, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

15. Summary and Content of 192nd NSC Meeting, April 6, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

16. Secretary Wilson memorandum to the JCS and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretaries, April 15, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

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II. B. 2. THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE "UNITED ACTION"

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II. B. 2. THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE "UNITED ACTION"

1. The Berlin Conference of 1954

Negotiations for a political settlement of the French-Viet Minh war were practically assured when it was decided at the Big Four meeting in Berlin in February 1954 that the Indochina question would be added to the agenda of an upcoming international conference at Geneva which was to discuss primarily a settlement of the Korean War. The period between the Berlin and Geneva conferences (i.e., between February and May 1954) unexpectedly witnessed a denouement of the Indochina drama with the siege and fall of Dien Bien Phu, the U.S. decision not to intervene, and the unsuccessful U.S. attempt to rally its allies together in order to form a collective force in pursuance of "united action."

a. Viet Minh Strategy and French Attitudes

The half-year before the Berlin Foreign Ministers conference of February 1954 saw both a marked step up of Viet Minh military activity and the presentation of a peace feeler from Ho Chi Minh. The Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA) began to change its strategy against the French from guerrilla activities to conventional battle deployments. This was accompanied by an increase in the amount of Chinese military assistance, no doubt facilitated by the end of armed conflict in Korea. Thus, the Viet Minh appeared to be showing a newly found strength and confidence, although at the time the French refused to recognize this either publicly or to themselves.

Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh put out a peace feeler in late November 1953 in reply to a questionnaire submitted by a correspondent for the Swedish newspaper Expressen. The one pre-condition set by Ho for negotiations was French recognition of Vietnamese independence. In subsequent weeks, the peace feeler was repeated on several occasions, but each time it failed to indicate the place at which talks might be held, nor did it propose a scope for the talks. 1/

Nothing resulted directly from these peace feelers, but indirectly they added to the mounting public and political sentiment in France for an end to the seemingly interminable and costly war. The armistice agreement negotiated at Panmunjom in July 1953 served as an example which many Frenchmen hoped could be followed in the negotiation of a cease-fire with the DRV. A widespread disenchantment with the Indochina war pervaded France. This was reflected in public statements by Prime Minister Laniel that Paris would be satisfied with an "honorable solution" to the war.

The French then adopted a policy toward the war of "keep fighting -- seek talking." There was an increase in French military activity and confidence stimulated by the Navarre Plan, but this was offset by a growth in the size and influence of the peace faction in

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France, as indicated by the "dovish" votes of the National Assembly favoring an early settlement of the protracted war. Premier Laniel and French officials told the U.S. Embassy that they considered the Ho Chi Minh offer pure propaganda, but said also that Ho's move had produced the intended impact on public and military circles in France and Indochina. Laniel mentioned that President Vincent Auriol had become so excited by Ho's proposal that he told Laniel "to consult representatives of three Associated States immediately with view to seeking earliest possible opening of negotiations with representatives of Ho Chi Minh. Laniel had flatly refused..." But American officials were skeptical. The U.S. Embassy reported that a Laniel speech of November 24, 1953, "left considerable latitude for negotiations," and that Ho's offers had increased the pressure for a settlement. 2/

b. Early U.S. Opposition to Negotiations

The consistent U.S. policy was to attempt to steer the French clear of the negotiating table pending substantial military gains on the battlefield. In bilateral U.S.-French talks in July, 1953, while the Korean armistice was being discussed at Panmunjom, Foreign Minister Bidault told Secretary Dulles that parallel talks should be pursued on Indochina. Bidault explained that the French public would never understand why negotiations were fit and honorable for Korea but were not for Indochina. A cease-fire in Korea, with nothing similar in prospect for Indochina, would make his government's position "absolutely impossible."

Secretary Dulles in reply stressed that "negotiations with no other alternative usually end in capitulation." In the Korean case, Dulles said, the alternative was the U.S. threat of "other and unpleasant measures" which the Communists realized we possessed. He urged the French to adopt the Navarre Plan, not only for military reasons, but because it would improve the French negotiating position. Dulles made it clear that the U.S. felt it was inadvisable to have the Indochina war inscribed on the agenda of a post-armistice political conference on Korea. 3/ The U.S. position at this time foreclosed negotiating on Indochina until after a Chinese decision to eliminate or cut down aid to the Viet Minh. 4/ In general, the U.S. sought to convince the French that military victory was the only guarantee of diplomatic success.

Dulles wished the French to continue the war because of his deep conviction that Indochina was a principal link in the line of the containment of Communism. In addition, Washington was undoubtedly influenced by optimistic reports on the progress of the war. General O'Daniel reported from Saigon that a French victory was likely if U.S. material support was forthcoming. On February 6, 1954, it was announced that forty B-26 bombers and 200 U.S. technicians to service them would be sent to Indochina. Admiral Radford told a House Foreign Relations Subcommittee, a month before the siege of Dien Bien Phu began (March, 1954), that the Navarre Plan was "a broad strategic concept which within a few months should insure a favorable turn in the course of the war." 5/

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At the Berlin Quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting in February, however, Secretary Dulles was forced to give in on the French demand that Indochina be placed on the Geneva agenda. Bidault pressured the U.S. by threatening to scuttle the project for the European Defense Community which then was at the top of U.S. priorities. Dulles could not block Paris' determination to discuss Indochina at Geneva for it was, in the last analysis, France's war. He must have realized that the Laniel Government could not completely avoid negotiations without alienating itself from popular opinion and bringing about its downfall at the hands of the anti-war opposition parties.

The United States successfully opposed Soviet efforts at Berlin to gain for Communist China the status of a sponsoring power, and successfully held out, furthermore, for the inclusion in the Berlin communiqué of a statement that no diplomatic recognition, not already accorded, would be implied either in the invitation to, or the holding of, the Geneva Conference. 6/

2. The Ely Mission (March 20 - 24)

a. Dien Bien Phu Begins

On March 13, 1954, the VPA, under the direct command of General Giap, began its assault upon Dien Bien Phu. This fortress in Northern Vietnam was to take on a political and psychological importance far out of proportion to its actual strategic value because of the upcoming Geneva Conference. The Viet Minh correctly foresaw that a show of decisive force, not to mention a victory, would markedly strengthen their hand at the conference. Further, a defeat of the French Union forces would sap the will of the French nation to continue the struggle. The Viet Minh were greatly helped by a substantial increase in the level of Chinese military aid including artillery and radar. 7/ As the battle developed, the optimism which had pervaded Washington statements, public and private, on the war was replaced with the conviction that unless new steps were taken to deal with Chinese aid, the French were bound to go under.

General Paul Ely, French Chief of Staff, arrived in Washington on March 20 to confer with U.S. officials on the war situation. Ely's principal aims were to obtain American assurance of air intervention in the event of Chinese aerial attack, and to obtain further U.S. material assistance, especially B-26 bombers. Dulles told Ely that he could not then answer regarding U.S. response to Chinese air intervention. 8/ Ely subsequently contended in his Mémoires that he received a promise from Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to push for prompt American approval of interdiction should the contingency arise. 9/ As to the supply of bombers, twenty-five additional B-26's were promised.

b. Operation Vulture (Vautour)

According to subsequent French reports, General Ely was asked to stay 24 hours longer than planned in Washington, during which time Admiral Radford made an informal but major proposal to him. Radford is said to have suggested a nighttime raid against the perimeter of

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Dien Bien Phu by aircraft of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. The plan, named Operation Vulture, called for about sixty B-29's to take off from Clark Field near Manila, under escort of 150 fighters of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, to conduct a massive strike against VPA positions on the perimeter of Dien Bien Phu. 10/

Operation Vulture, according to French sources, was conceived by a joint American-French military staff in Saigon. It is admitted to have been an informal proposal which had not as yet received full U.S. Government backing as policy. No record of Operation Vulture has been found in files examined. In an interview in 1965, Admiral Radford stated that no plans for "Operation Vulture" existed, since planning to aid Dien Bien Phu by an air strike never proceeded beyond the conceptual stage. 11/ Nevertheless, such an operation probably was the subject of informal discussions both in Vietnam, and between Radford and Ely.

3. "United Action" as an Alternative to Either Negotiations or to Unilateral U.S. Intervention

a. Formulation of U.S. Policy

By late March the internal debate within the Eisenhower Administration had reached the point where it was recognized that: (a) unilateral U.S. intervention in the Indochina War would not be effective without ground forces; (b) the involvement of U.S. ground forces was logistically and politically undesirable; (c) preferably, "free world" intervention in Indochina to save the area from communism would take the form of a collective operation by allied forces. This was the import of the NSC deliberations, the Ridgway Report, the Report of Under Secretary of State W. Bedell Smith's Special Committee on the U.S. and Indochina, and President Eisenhower's general train of thought (see Tab 1).

Accordingly, Secretary Dulles in his discussions with General Ely went beyond the question of immediate assistance to the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu and broached the possible establishment of a regional defense arrangement for Southeast Asia.

This proposal was given public exposure in Secretary Dulles' speech of March 29 before the Overseas Press Club. Dulles described the importance of resisting communist aggression in Indochina in these words:

> "If the Communist forces were to win uncontested control over Indo-China or any substantial part thereof, they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against the other free peoples in that area.
>
> "The propagandists of Red China and of Soviet Russia make it perfectly apparent that the purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia.

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> "Now Southeast Asia is an important part of the world. It is the so-called 'rice bowl' ... It is an area that is rich in many raw materials ...
>
> "And in addition to these tremendous economic values, the area has great strategic value ... Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand ... The entire western Pacific area, including the so-called 'offshore island chain,' would be strategically endangered."

He then went on call for "united action," and after noting Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh, prophesied that aggression would "lead to action in places by means of the free world's choosing, so that the aggression would surely cost more than it would gain." 12/

In the following weeks the aim of U.S. diplomacy was to secure allied agreement to a collective defense pact consisting of ten nations: the U.S., France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and the three Associated States. Secretary Dulles presented his proposal in discussions with British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins and French Ambassador Henri Bonnet. President Eisenhower addressed a personal message to Prime Minister Churchill explaining the proposed coalition. The President noted that:

> "Geneva is less than four weeks away. There the possibility of the Communists driving a wedge between us will, given the state of mind in France, be infinitely greater than at Berlin. I can understand the very natural desire of the French to seek an end to this war which has been bleeding them for eight years. But our painstaking search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the conclusion that there is no negotiated solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would not be either a face-saving device to cover a French surrender or a face-saving device to cover a Communist retirement. The first alternative is too serious in its broad strategic implications for us and for you to be acceptable....
>
> "Somehow we must contrive to bring about the second alternative."

President Eisenhower went on to outline the need for a coalition willing to fight the Communists, if this proved necessary. He concluded with a historical question certain to appeal to Churchill:

> "If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unit and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?..." 13/

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In these discussions the United States sought generally to stiffen the will of the free nations in the Indochina crisis. It emphasized both the avowed intention of France to grant real independence to the Associated States, and the condition accepted by the French at Berlin for the United States' agreeing to discuss Indochina at Geneva. That condition was that France would not agree to any arrangement which would directly or indirectly result in the turnover of Indochina to the Communists. The United States sought solid support for this position, especially from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Although the possibility was held out of future involvement of the United Nations in the Indochina problem, there was no thought of immediate UN action.14/

b. Initial Allied Reaction to "United Action"

Thailand and the Philippines gave a favorable response to the call for united action. The British response was one of caution and hesitancy. Churchill accepted Eisenhower's suggestion that Secretary Dulles go to London for further talks, but the British saw dangers in pressing for a defensive coalition before the Geneva conference. Eden was determined not to be "hustled into injudicious military decisions." As Eden later wrote:

> "I welcomed the American proposal for the organization of collective defence in South-East Asia, since this would contribute to the security of Malaya and Hong Kong and would remove the anomaly of our exclusion from the A.N.Z.U.S. Pact, to which the United States, Australia and New Zealand were party. But I felt that to form and proclaim a defensive coalition, before we went to the conference table, would be unlikely to help us militarily and would harm us politically, by frightening off important potential allies. By the beginning of May, the rains would be starting in Indo-China and extensive campaigning by either side would be impossible for several months. Since the complete collapse of the French military effort before then was improbable, I did not think that concern for the immediate military situation should be the guiding factor in our policy." 15/

c. French Call for U.S. Intervention at Dien Bien Phu (April 4-5)

The French response to the proposal for united action was overtaken by military events at Dien Bien Phu. Foreign Minister Bidault contended on April 5 that the time for a coalition approach had passed and that the fate of Dien Bien Phu would be decided in the next ten days. 16/ The previous day Ambassador Douglas Dillon was called to an emergency Sunday cabinet meeting and was informed by Bidault, in the company of Laniel, that "immediate armed intervention of U.S. carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation." Bidault, reporting Navarre's desperate state in the field and the extent of Chinese

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intervention in support of General Giap's forces, asked the Ambassador point-blank for U.S. action, saying that "the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu," and that "Geneva would be won or lost depending on outcome" of the battle. 17/ The United States was now being called upon to act quickly and unilaterally to save a local situation, rather than, as Dulles desired, in concert with Asian and Western Allies.

d. U.S. Decision Not to Intervene Unilaterally

In the first week of April it became clear that the question of U.S. intervention was now crucial. Fighting at Dien Bien Phu reached major proportions as Chinese-supplied artillery pounded the French and drove them backwards. Without an early intervention by an external power, or group of powers, the French position at Dien Bien Phu was likely to be overrun. In anticipation of the French request for intervention, the Eisenhower Administration decided to consult with Congressional leaders. The President appears to have thought that Congressional support was vital for whatever active role the U.S. might now take in Indochina.

Available Government documents do not provide details of the two meetings to be described below. However, on the basis of seemingly reliable published sources, it appears that on April 3 Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford met with eight Congressmen (three Republicans and five Democrats) at the State Department. 18/ Radford apparently outlined a plan for an air strike on the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) at Dien Bien Phu using 200 planes from the aircraft carriers Essex and Boxer, stationed on maneuvers in the South China Sea. An unsuccessful air strike might need to be followed by a second air strike, but ground forces were not envisaged at this stage. It has been averred that there were atomic bombs on the aircraft carriers which could be delivered by the planes, but there is no indication that there was any serious consideration given to using nuclear weapons at Dien Bien Phu or elsewhere in Indochina. In the event of a massive Chinese troop intervention, however, it is quite possible that the U.S. would have retaliated with strategic nuclear weapons against targets in China.

The Congressional leaders raised questions about the amount of allied support for such an action, about the position of the other Joint Chiefs, about the need for ground forces if a second air strike also failed, and about the danger of a mammoth Chinese intervention which could transform Indochina into another Korean-type war. Radford apparently was forced to admit that he was the only one of the Joint Chiefs who favored the intervention plan. Dulles conceded that the allies had not as yet been consulted. In consequence, Dulles, who had been thinking of a joint Congressional resolution authorizing Presidential use of U.S. air-naval power in Indochina (which it is alleged he had ready in his pocket) left the meeting without the vital support he needed. The Congressional leaders laid down three conditions necessary for their support: (a) formation of an allied "coalition"-type force; (b) a French declaration

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indicating an intent to accelerate independence for the Associated States; (c) French agreement to continue their Expeditionary Corps in Indochina. Thus Congressional opposition put the brake on a possible unilateral U.S. intervention. 19/ According to a subsequent State Department Summary:

> "It was the sense of the meeting that the U.S. should not intervene alone but should attempt to secure the cooperation of other free nations concerned in Southeast Asia, and that if such cooperation could be assured, it was probable that the U.S. Congress would authorize U.S. participation in such 'United Action.'" 20/

The following day, April 4, Dulles and Radford met with the President at the White House. The President reached the decision to intervene only upon the satisfaction of the three conditions necessary for the U.S. "to commit belligerent acts" in Indochina. There would have to be a coalition "with active British Commonwealth participation"; a "full political understanding with France and other countries," and Congressional approval. 21/

President Eisenhower clearly did not want the U.S. to intervene alone. He also was very concerned with having broad Congressional support for any step which might involve the U.S. in a war. As Sherman Adams later observed:

> "Having avoided one total war with Red China the year before in Korea when he had United Nations support, he /Eisenhower/ was in no mood to provoke another one in Indo-China by going it alone in a military action without the British and other Western Allies. He was also determined not to become involved militarily in any foreign conflict without the approval of Congress. He had had trouble enough convincing some Senators that it was even necessary to send small groups of noncombatant Air Force technicians to Indo-China." 22/

e. British Oppose "United Action"

From April 11 to 14, Secretary Dulles visited London and Paris to attempt to obtain British and French commitments to support his proposal for "United Action." According to President Eisenhower, Dulles felt that he had been given assurance of Congressional support for "United Action" if the allies approved his plan. 23/

Dulles found the British opposed to any type of collective military action prior to the Geneva Conference. Dulles explained, according to Eden's account, that the U.S. had concluded that the French could no longer deal with the situation in Indochina, militarily or politically, alone. If the French position in Indochina collapsed, the consequences in the rest of Southeast Asia would be grave. U.S. air and naval forces were

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ready to intervene and some aircraft carriers had already been moved from Manila to the Indochina coast. On reflection, said Dulles, he had thought that the U.S. should not act alone in this matter and that an ad hoc coalition might be formed which might develop later into a Southeast Asia defense organization. This in itself would deter China from further interference in Indochina and would strengthen the western position at Geneva by giving evidence of solidarity. 24/

Eden was not convinced. He drew a distinction between the long term issue of collective security in Southeast Asia -- which might well be guaranteed by treaty after Geneva -- and the more immediate question of "united action" in Indochina. He was opposed to any military action or warning announcement before Geneva. The British were willing to provide the French with full diplomatac support at Geneva, either as a guarantor of the final settlement or as a participant in multilateral talks if a settlement failed to materialize. In the latter case, the British were prepared to discuss a collective defense formula that would comprehend any non-Communist portion of Indochina formed as the result of the Geneva deliberations. But they would not, prior to Geneva, commit themselves to united action.

Britain's distinction between the appropriateness of a united approach after, as opposed to before, the Conference was founded on serious doubts about the true import of united action. As Dulles correctly judged, behind Britain's push for a settlement was the "fear that if fighting continues, we will in one way or another become involved, thereby enhancing risk of Chinese intervention and possibility further expansion of war." 25/ Eden charged that action prior to the Conference would not only destroy chances for a peaceful settlement, but would critically raise the risk of a wider war. American planning admitted the strong possibility of direct Chinese intervention, and his own intelligence staff had concluded that Western involvement would bring on the Chinese by land and air once the Viet Minh effort became "seriously endangered." 26/

Thus, while Dulles was angered at the way he felt the British were writing off Indochina, Eden was highly pessimistic about Dulles' militancy in an area of uncertain value for which the United States had ambiguous, high-risk plans. There was considerable difference, in Eden's mind, between warnings to Communist China against direct intervention before the fact (which the British went along with in mid-1953) and united action, which would, despite any allied assurances to Peking, be interpreted by the Chinese as provocatory. 27/

British suspicions, furthermore, were an extension of the belief that Indochina need not be entirely lost at Geneva in the absence of united action. London was apparently puzzled by American talk of the "loss" of Indochina, for to 10 Downing Street, "French cannot lose the war between now /April 1954/ and the coming of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it." 28/ While Dulles kept telling the British that only united action through the formation of a coalition could ensure

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against a complete Communist diplomatic triumph at Geneva, Eden was equally convinced that the best way to assure continuation of the war would be united action, and that the French, even after Dien Bien Phu, were still strong enough to prevent the Communists from gaining all Indochina.

Even before Dulles' April flight to London to sound out the British on united action, the Churchill government was closely questioning American evaluations of Indochina. In an April 1 cable, for instance, Dulles vented his disturbance at Britain's refusal to accept the view that the loss of Indochina would ultimately affect their security interests in Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand. 29/ This was indeed the case, as Dulles discovered for himself once he talked to Eden in London and later at Geneva. Eden steadfastly refused to buy Dulles' analogy between Indochina and Malaya, retorting that the situation in Malaya was "well in hand" while that in Indochina was clearly not. 30/ Admiral Radford concluded in late April from talks with the British chiefs of staff that the U.K. policy seemed "to be on a very narrow basis strictly in terms of local U.K. interest without regard to other areas of the Far East such as Japan." 31/

The British simply could not accept the domino principle even as they admitted Southeast Asia's security value to the free world. By the opening of the Geneva Conference, the U.S.-U.K. relations had reached a low point: Dulles was insisting that the British were the major roadblock to implementation of united action, while Eden was clinging to the notion that a negotiated settlement leading to partition would be the best outcome of an impossibly complex politico-military situation in Indochina.

f. French Oppose "United Action"

Secretary Dulles fared little better in selling "united action" in Paris than he did in London, but for somewhat different reasons. The French were seeking a quick action to avoid an imminent military defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles, however, refused to be torn from a collective allied approach to the Indochina War. The French feared that a coalition arrangement would lead to an internationalization of the war and take control of it out of their hands. They, therefore, only desired local assistance at Dien Bien Phu along the lines of Operation Vulture.

Furthermore, another objection to "united action" from the French viewpoint was that it would only delay or impede the very negotiations leading towards a settlement which the French increasingly desired. The U.S. objective was to keep alive the French determination to continue the war. Dulles feared that the French would use Geneva to find a face-saving formula for a French surrender. Premier Laniel reaffirmed to Dulles in Paris that his government would take no action which directly or indirectly turned Indochina over to the Communists. But he also called attention to the increasing desire on the part of many in France to get out of Indochina at any cost. The French stressed that it was necessary

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to await the results of the Geneva Conference and that they could not give the impression in advance that they believed Geneva would fail. 32/

g. Aborted Working Group on Collective Defense in Southeast Asia (April 20)

Immediately upon returning to Washington on April 15 Secretary Dulles invited representatives of the United Kingdom, France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand to attend a meeting on the 20th to set up an ad hoc defense group for the Southeast Asia region. The delegates were to work on a draft for a future organization. The Secretary had been under the impression from his talk in London with Eden that the U.K., while rejecting immediate "united action" in Indochina, would have no objection to such a preliminary meeting.

On April 18, just two days before the scheduled meeting, the British Ambassador informed Dulles that there would be no British participation. The reasons: no understanding on the part of the British Foreign Secretary that the working group would go forward at once, and no agreement concerning membership. The Department expressed amazement, but in view of the British attitude the April 20 meeting was transformed into a general briefing for the nations comprising the allied side at the Geneva Conference. In a later explanation of the shift in British attitude, Foreign Secretary Eden said that in agreeing to informal working group talks he had overlooked the pending Colombo Conference and that he felt that it would have been most undesirable to give any public indication of membership in a program for united action before the end of the Colombo discussions. 33/ It is now clear that the British were restrained by India and by a fear that British attendance at the meeting would be construed as assent to "united action." 34/ Moreover, London could not have been reassured by a "trial balloon" speech of Vice President Nixon on April 17 in which he suggested that the U.S. might have to "take the risk now by putting our boys in" in order to avoid "further Communist expansion in Asia and Indochina." 35/

h. Continued French Prodding for U.S. Intervention (April 21-25)

In preparation for the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, tripartite discussions (U.S., U.K., France) took place in Paris in mid-April. In these discussions, the French contended that a successful Geneva settlement was dependent on a favorable outcome of the battle at Dien Bien Phu and that their participation in a Southeast Asian coalition might not be possible if Dien Bien Phu fell. There could be no guarantee what position France would take in the event of a collapse at Dien Bien Phu. The French argued that only large-scale United States air and naval intervention could retrieve the situation in Indochina. They made no formal request for intervention in the tripartite discussions, but on several occasions suggested or implied to the Americans that such action was necessary. 36/

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

20 May 1957

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 28-57

SUBJECT: Proposed Terms of Reference for a Special Estimate on Sino-Soviet Reactions to the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons by the US into Countries on the Periphery of the Bloc

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the manner in which the Sino-Soviet Bloc would probably react to a build-up of nuclear weapons in countries adjacent to or near its borders.

SCOPE NOTE

The purpose of this estimate is to determine the manner in which the Sino-Soviet Bloc would probably react to a build-up of nuclear weapons in countries adjacent to or near its borders. In particular, consideration should be given to possible retaliatory measures against individual host countries, to possible effects on Sino-Soviet policy toward the divided countries (Germany, Korea, Vietnam), and to possible effects on the Soviet approach to disarmament.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Briefly what have been the Sino-Soviet Bloc reactions to the deployment of US nuclear weapons to countries bordering on the Bloc?

2. What will be the probable Sino-Soviet reaction to possible future deployments of such weapons? In this respect consideration should be given to such factors as:

a. the area involved (e.g., NATO countries, particularly West Germany, the Baghdad Pact Countries, Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea);

b. the recipient of the weapons and control of the nuclear war heads (e.g., US forces in being in a particular country, new deployment of US forces accompanying deployment of the weapons, forces of third country ally in area, or indigenous forces);

c. the general type of delivery system involved (e.g., a purely tactical system such as 280 mm. cannon or a long range guided missile system).

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NSC BRIEFING

23 July 1958

25X1

SINO-SOVIET AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO U.S. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WAR IN FAR EAST (SNIE 100-7-58)

I. Background. Of particular interest in connection with Item 3, you will recall that on 26 June NSC, when discussing State-Defense Study on U.S. and Allied limited war capabilities, requested NIE on Sino-Soviet reactions if U.S. used nuclear weapons in responding to local aggression in Far East.

A. State-Defense study assumed that U.S. responded selectively with nuclear weapons from outset in cases of Communist attacks on South Korea, Taiwan, Quemoy-Matsu, and Vietnam/Laos.

B. However, study assumed Communists would not use nuclear weapons, since their employment construed as overt involvements of Soviet forces and, under current U.S. strategic concept, such a direct U.S.-Soviet clash would no longer be limited war.

II. In essence, NSC asked us whether this assumption consistent with probable Communist intentions. Intelligence community concluded:

A. If U.S. used nuclear weapons in meeting Bloc local aggression in Far East, grave risk that Communists would retaliate in kind. This is key conclusion.

B. Though USSR determined to avoid gravely risking general war, it probably calculates that its own growing military capabilities make U.S. too increasingly unlikely to take such risks. Therefore Soviets and Chinese Communists, if they launched FE aggression at all, would probably estimate that their reaction with nuclear weapons in response to U.S. use of them would not necessarily lead to expansion hostilities into general war.

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C. If Communists did use nuclears, they would attempt to do so in such manner as to limit such risks of general war. USSR would prefer to avoid open involvement by providing nuclear weapons to its FE allies, though still under Soviet control. Commies would also probably confine their use of nuclear weapons within limits comparable to those observed by U.S.

D. Likelihood of Communist nuclear reaction greatest if U.S. mounted nuclear attacks deep into China. Moscow and Peiping would almost certainly feel compelled to respond by nuclear attacks on U.S. bases and nuclear capable forces in Far East.

III. NSC also asked us to estimate Free World reactions to our use of nuclear weapons.

A. While many Free World governments and countries would be impressed by prompt U.S. resistance to aggression, this would be overshadowed in most countries by widespread fear of general war and wide popular condemnation of U.S., especially in Asia, for having used nuclear weapons.

B. This generally adverse reaction would be mitigated if U.S. response quickly halted aggression without large civilian casualties; respect for U.S. power would be enhanced. On other hand if Communist nuclear retaliation led to prolonged or expanded hostilities fears of general war would rise even higher and great pressure would be exerted on us to reach a settlement.

C. Of course these broad estimates of Free World reactions necessarily conjectural. As DDI Joint Staff pointed out in dissent, many other factors, e.g., U.S. statements at the time, clarity of aggression--would affect Free World reaction at the time.

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IV. But clear implication of NIE is that:

A. U.S. cannot expect to use nuclear weapons in local war without grave risk similar Communist retaliation. We cannot assume enemy would be deterred by fear of general war.

B. We would have to count on a generally adverse Free World reaction, largely because of fears of general war.

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fered by our servicemen are a result of hepatitis, malaria, and countless jungle diseases.

This new bill would retain the educational, vocational training, and on-farm training, job counseling and placement, and loan features of the bill which I introduced earlier this year.

I believe, Mr. Speaker, that this new bill will have a better chance of final passage because it will have more widespread support in the Congress and among veterans' organizations.

Use of Nuclear Weapons in Vietnam War Is Inadvisable

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CRAIG HOSMER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, January 31, 1966

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, as the chairman of its Nuclear Affairs Committee, I have issued to the House GOP conference the following communication which may be of interest to others also:

INADVISABILITY OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Frequently Members of Congress receive letters recommending that atomic weapons be used against North Vietnam "to win the war." As chairman of your Nuclear Affairs Committee I have made an analysis of this proposition which concludes that this type of weapon is unsuitable for use under present circumstances.

The President and other administration officials have directly or indirectly indicated these reasons for not using such weapons in Vietnam: (a) Fear that this degree of escalation would cause North Vietnam's Communist nuclear allies, the U.S.S.R. and Red China, to come into the war with their nuclears and a general escalation into nuclear world war III, could ensue; (b) reluctance to even talk much about atomic weapons use because it might impede the administration's drive for a nonproliferation treaty.

Reason (a) is an application of the "no threshold theory" which assumes that any nuclear weapons use, no matter how limited and discrete, will grow into a general holocaust. The theory is far from universally accepted. Reason (b) is an arguable assumption—the effect might be just the opposite.

Sounder reasons for rejecting use of atomic weapons at this stage of the war include—

1. Tropical forest areas are not particularly suitable ones for effective use of nuclear explosives.

2. Urban areas of North Vietnam, even including Hanoi and Haiphong, are of insufficient size to indicate any advantage of nuclear over conventional explosives.

3. Radioactive aftereffects of nuclear explosives are a nuisance which is unnecessary to create in order to accomplish desired military objectives.

4. Psychological attitudes—justified or unjustified—relating to nuclear weapons would provide opportunities for worldwide anti-American propaganda of greater detriment to our cause than benefits calculable from using them.

5. Even the use of conventional explosives against a backward, underdeveloped country like Vietnam has proved only marginally productive. Employment of a "bigger bang" cannot be expected to remedy this difficulty.

Of course, should Red China enter the war openly with large military forces, all bets would be off and the use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons most probably would be indicated.

In order to make this study on nuclear weapons vis-a-vis the Vietnam war it has been necessary to make a careful analysis of the nature of the war itself, both in the north and in the south. This study reveals several major miscalculations by President Johnson and Secretary McNamara which appear to support charges that the U.S. effort is being seriously and tragically mismanaged at the very top by these civilian chiefs of our Military Establishment. This topic will be discussed in subsequent communications.

Community College System Can Be a Model for Nation, Conferees Told

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CARL D. PERKINS
OF KENTUCKY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, January 31, 1966

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Speaker, the University of Kentucky under Dr. John Oswald is making great strides in bringing higher education to added thousands of young Kentuckians. The following story from the Louisville Times illustrates what scholars from the State of Florida think about our great community college system. I ask unanimous consent to insert the article in the Appendix of the RECORD:

[From the Louisville (Ky.) Times, Jan. 6, 1966]

COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM CAN BE A MODEL FOR NATION, CONFEREES TOLD

LEXINGTON.—A Florida college administrator says the Kentucky system of community colleges is on its way to becoming one of the best in the Nation and a model for other States.

Dr. Robert Wiegman, director of the Kellogg junior leadership program at the University of Florida, addressed some 300 delegates yesterday at a community college conference sponsored by the University of Kentucky here this week. UK oversees the community colleges.

Dr. Raymond Schultz of Florida State University praised the community college as offering a way to overcome the deficiencies of huge senior colleges. He said it offers a liberal education for students who do not plan to go on to a senior college as well as training students who do expect to transfer to one.

Florida's community colleges had nearly 75,000 students last year, nearly two-thirds of its total college enrollment.

Wiegman noted that three factors indicate Kentucky's community college system is going to succeed:

The commitment to the program by Dr. John W. Oswald, UK president.

The selection of blue-ribbon people for advisory boards at each of the community colleges, bringing existing community leadership to bear on the problems they face.

The imminent construction of community college service centers at each of the existing schools.

The conference brings together directors, faculty members and advisory board members from the nine community colleges in the University of Kentucky system.

Where Is L.B.J.'s Old Realism?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, January 31, 1966

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, Mr. John Chamberlain's column in the Washington Post of January 29 emphasizes the change which has taken place in President Johnson's attitude from the time that he was Senate majority leader. This is a thought-provoking analysis worthy of study. His column follows:

THESE DAYS: WHERE IS L.B.J.'S OLD REALISM?
(By John Chamberlain)

When Lyndon Johnson was boss of the U.S. Senate, he had an exquisitely tuned sense of realism. He knew when WAYNE MORSE, the wild man of Oregon, could be driven in tandem with, say, DICK RUSSELL, of Georgia. He knew how to alter a phrase in a bill to win a kingdom. As Tommy Corcoran of New Deal days fame said of the old conjuror, "If a veto is needed, Lyndon can find it in a rathole."

The Presidency, however, seems to be doing something to veil the eyes of the old master. He is pressing too hard to clinch victories that he has already won, and he is neglecting to push at some barriers that are ready for toppling.

The change was apparent in the emphases of his state of the Union message. There was all that strain to assure the liberal community that even if he had to mastermind an accelerated war in southeast Asia, there would be no important diminution in the push to the Great Society.

The net effect of this was to scare half the people into thinking that we are on the threshold of terrifying deficiency appropriations which will lead to a bad inflation, while the other half was frightened into thinking that we must cut and run in South Vietnam in order to save up enough money to purify the Hudson River and rebuild 30 major cities.

The old Lyndon Johnson wouldn't have risked the confusion and the dispiriting cross arguments that have resulted from promising to get a million and one extra things out of an economy that is already employing just about everybody who is capable of adding to the gross national product. Realism would have impelled the President to say that, since mass unemployment was disappearing, many of the problems of 1964 and early 1965 were vanishing, too. In other words, many of the Great Society goals were being brought within the reach of individuals for the simple reason that they now had money in their pockets to pay for what they needed, including beautifying their yards to please Lady Bird.

The old Lyndon would have taken all the credit in the world for the current prosperity. He would have gone on from there to congratulate the teenagers who had found jobs. Addressing himself to the school dropouts among them, he would have advised them to spend some of their new wages on make-up courses in night school, warning them against the day when the job market might shrink. And he would have said something reassuring about the advantage accruing to the Federal budget when businesses are in a position to recruit and train their own work forces without asking for Government assistance.

The old Lyndon Johnson would have had a word to say about the easing of the civil rights problem that must come when jobs are plentiful. He would have pointed to the

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Mr. Kent

TS# 185925
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1 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR CONVERSATION

1. The Director wants us to think ahead to the possibility that the US will use nuclear weapons in the context of the war in Vietnam.

2. Assume a situation like this: the Chinese elect to broaden the conflict. Chinese combat units come into the DRV. They may also appear in Laos and Thailand. There is a massing of Chinese and PAVN forces in the southern reaches of MR-4. The DMZ is violated. American forces find themselves unevenly matched north and south of the DMZ. Large numbers of Chinese are on the way to re-enforce the Communist side in this fighting. Things look bad for our side. We use nuclear weapons. It may be that the first ones are low-yield tactical weapons employed in the above combat area. Going on from there, the US might use tactical nuclear weapons on airfields in the DRV and south China. Then with no sign of Chinese retreat, the US drops larger-yield weapons on targets deep in China. These might be the nuclear installations as a starter.

3. What has happened as the US goes up this road? Obviously the reactions of the USSR are the most important to speculate about.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Cy 13

18 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Vietnam War

CONCLUSIONS

A. Use of nuclear weapons by the US in the Vietnam war would be one of the most important events of modern history. World reactions would be affected to some extent by the circumstances in which the US resorted to their use, and the targets attacked. But almost independent of these factors would be a widespread and fundamental revulsion that the US had broken the 20-year taboo on the use of nuclear weapons.

B. Among the consequences would be intense agitation in Japan, probably leading to a restriction on US use of Japanese facilities and possibly to denunciation of the US-Japan defense treaty; probably some accelerated momentum toward nuclear proliferation; accompanied, however, by international pressure for disarmament in the nuclear field, with scant patience for the technicalities of verification; a probable resolution of condemnation in the UN; and a marked diminution of such public support as US policy in Vietnam now has.

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~ [redacted]

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C. It is possible that once the US had used nuclear weapons the Chinese Communists might move to disengage, but we think it more likely that they would not do so, but would hope that accumulating US losses and mounting world pressures would force the US to back down. The DRV would have been reduced to a secondary role. The USSR would act vigorously against the US on the political and propaganda front; we do not believe that it would enter the war or support the Chinese with nuclear weapons.

DISCUSSION

I. SCENARIO

1. It will be argued in this paper that foreign reactions to US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam war would be determined far more by the fact that the weapons were nuclear than by the circumstances in which they were used or the provocations which might have led the US to use them. Nevertheless, the circumstances would make some difference, at least in certain quarters. The following short list of conceivable scenarios begins with one in which US use of nuclear weapons would appear least justifiable in the eyes of the world generally and least in accord with Communist expectations, and proceeds to the one which is at the other extreme in these respects.

(a) The military situation in South Vietnam remains essentially as at present; the US employs nuclear weapons out of sheer frustration at its inability to obtain any decision by conventional means.

(b) The US invades North Vietnam, either overland or by amphibious assault, or both; the Chinese Communists intervene in large combat force, either overtly or with "volunteers," and the US forces in North Vietnam find themselves threatened with destruction.

(c) The US does not invade North Vietnam. But the PAVN, plus Chinese Communist ground forces, launch the largest scale overt invasion of South Vietnam of which they are capable, across and around the demilitarized zone. They may also come into northern Laos in strong force. US and South Vietnamese forces may or may not be seriously endangered; in any event a new phase of the war is opened by Chinese and DRV initiative.

(d) The area of conflict is expanded by Chinese Communist initiative, involving invasions of Laos, Thailand, and perhaps Burma.

(e) The Chinese Communists themselves first use a nuclear weapon.

2. Neither the first nor the last of these scenarios appears worth serious consideration; they are both so highly unlikely as to be virtually out of the question, and they are included only to illustrate the possibility of situations different from those which we shall discuss. Within each of the three middle scenarios there are, no doubt, a large number of possible attendant circumstances which would have some bearing on the situation and might modify to

some small degree the judgments which the world made of the US nuclear response, and alter the reactions to it. Because the effect of such variations would almost certainly be minor it does not seem useful to attempt to explore any of them in detail. The discussion which follows applies principally to situation (c) -- a large-scale Communist invasion of South Vietnam -- but we have included some references to the differences in reaction which might be expected in situations (b) or (d).

II. REACTIONS IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD

3. In the non-Communist world there are a good many people who neither know nor care much about nuclear weapons and would not react one way or the other if the US used them in Vietnam, particularly so long as the danger seemed remote from themselves. There are governments which, whatever their public pronouncements on the subject, would in the light of their particular national interests be glad to see the Chinese Communist regime destroyed by this means. There are also individuals and governments who would consider the United States weak if it allowed substantial numbers of its armed forces to be destroyed without attempting to save them by the use of nuclear weapons. And there are some who would consider the United States foolish to accept defeat or even compromise in the Vietnam struggle without having recourse to its most formidable element of military power.

4. Granting these and perhaps some other exceptions, there is in the field of international affairs probably no more universal opinion than that which holds the use of nuclear weapons to be abhorrent. Any use of nuclear weapons by the US in the Vietnam war would be viewed as among the most fearful and fateful events of modern history. World reactions would be affected to some extent by the conditions under which the US resorted to their use and the kinds of weapons and targets involved. But almost independent of these factors would be a fundamental revulsion that the US had broken the 20-year taboo on the use of nuclear weapons.

5. The use of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945 is still condemned by many, not only abroad but within the US. Most informed opinion, however, recognizes that it was intended to hasten the end of a long and bloody world war. Most important, it is seen as a bad moment of history that occurred nearly a generation ago and must never be repeated.

6. Over the years, world opinion has been generally surprised and relieved to discover that the US-Soviet nuclear race, rather than precipitating a war between the two powers, has tended to make

such a war "unthinkable." Nuclear bombs and warheads thus tend to be looked upon as weapons which will never be used except in a world bent on self-destruction. It has come to be felt that the chances of a nuclear holocaust have significantly receded in recent years because the two super-powers are led by responsible governments which are prepared to go to great lengths to see that nuclear weapons will never again be employed.

7. Their use in Vietnam, regardless of the circumstances, would send a wave of fear and anger through most of the informed world. The general feeling would be that, once the taboo had been broken, there would remain no effective barrier to expanded use of such weapons. People would fear that the Communists would respond in kind if they had, or could acquire, a nuclear capability. Behind all this would lie a fear that the use of nuclear weapons might lead to a general nuclear war endangering the world at large.

8. Most friends of the US would condemn it for having dragged the world into a new and terrible phase of history in which nuclear weapons had become the working weapons of the times. Resolutions of condemnation would be introduced in the UN with the likelihood of winning a majority vote. NATO would be badly shaken. Such public support as US policy in Vietnam now receives from a number of governments, especially in Europe, would be ended.

9. A British government which failed to make a public condemnation of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Vietnam fighting would probably fall. In Japan, memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would make the people especially resentful of a second use of US nuclear weapons against Asians. At a minimum, Prime Minister Sato would feel compelled to end his support of US policy, and, in particular, to restrict the US use of Japanese facilities. More likely, the Liberal-Democratic Party would replace Sato with someone less identifiably pro-US in his views. It is possible that, under leftist prodding, the popular reaction would force a move to close US bases or even to denounce the US-Japan defense treaty. Most opinion in India and the Indian government would strongly condemn the US action, though some Indian leaders would be relieved to see the Chinese Communists set back, and some would be secretly pleased if Chinese nuclear facilities were destroyed. The general Indian condemnation would be somewhat reduced if the nuclear weapons were used to stop a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia.

10. A very limited use of tactical weapons in only the immediate battle area would cause a less violent reaction in sophisticated circles than would the nuclear bombing of Chinese

airfields, rail centers, and nuclear production sites. But to much of the world the distinction would not be significant; the important thing would be that these weapons had been used at all. The circumstances under which the weapons were used would also have some effect on reactions. The most severe reaction would occur if the US had invaded North Vietnam (case 'b'); on the other hand, the negative reactions would be reduced if nuclear weapons were employed as a last resort to stop the Communist Chinese from overwhelming the whole of Southeast Asia. Indeed, in this case some positive support would be manifested.

11. Beyond these direct reactions, there would be other effects having a growing impact on the future. There would probably be a wave of international pressure for immediate disarmament in the nuclear field. Most of this would be aimed at the US as the only nation to have used such weapons, and there would be little patience with continued US insistence on the need for inspection. It is possible, however, that some of this pressure could be diverted to the Soviets in the form of demands for "real" and "verified" disarmament.

12. Yet, paradoxically, there would probably also be an accelerated momentum toward nuclear proliferation. A US use which

"legitimatized" nuclear weapons and demonstrated their critical importance and practicability in today's wars would lead some governments to feel they must have such weapons in their arsenals. At the same time, the US argument against proliferation would lose moral credit and encounter cynical reactions.

III. REACTIONS OF THE KEY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

13. Communist China. The Chinese Communist leaders are quite conscious of the potent nuclear arsenal of the US. In adopting a policy involving the probability of war with the US, they would have considered the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used. They might have concluded that international and domestic pressures would prevent the US from using nuclear weapons under any conditions short of a direct threat to its national survival. They could not be certain of this, however, and their plans would have included courses to follow if nuclear weapons were used.

14. It is possible that once the US used nuclear weapons, the Chinese might move to disengage, particularly if they had not expected the US to do so. We think it more likely, however, that once committed, the Chinese would attempt to continue in spite of nuclear weapons. In the belief that they could eventually prevail,

they would probably press on, accepting the military consequences while trying to minimize them by dispersal, close-embrace battlefield tactics, and an intensification of guerrilla warfare behind the US lines. They would hope thus to prolong the struggle to the point where accumulating US losses and mounting world pressures would force the US to back down.

15. The USSR. Moscow would be alarmed at the prospect of continued escalation which might force it into a nuclear confrontation with the US. It would take steps on all fronts to reduce the likelihood of such a development. It would act vigorously on the propaganda and political front, striving to generate sufficient international pressure in and out of the UN to force the US to pull back from its escalation. The Soviets would probably feel compelled to warn the US that the USSR would support China with military aid. At the same time, however, they would make it clear to Peking not to count on Soviet nuclear weapons. They would almost certainly not provide any nuclear weapons to the Chinese.

16. The DRV. With the war having expanded to the point where the Chinese were directly involved and nuclear weapons had been introduced, the DRV would have been reduced to a secondary role. The PAVN/VC would retain a significant capability in the

South, but in the big picture they would have become an adjunct of the Chinese forces. In the event that the use of nuclear weapons so alarmed the DRV as to lead it to wish to quit the war, the Chinese involvement and presence would probably have foreclosed this option. They could end the war only if Peking concurred.

IV. LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS

17. If the tactical use of nuclear weapons succeeded in turning back the Chinese and helped lead to a quick and advantageous settlement in Vietnam, there would be many gains for the US to set against the losses mentioned above. "Nothing succeeds like success," and many would forgive the US once the danger receded. Asian allies of the US would feel much more secure against Chinese encroachments. Peking, badly set back, would lose prestige, and this might lead to a reappraisal of the leadership by the masses and the younger party leaders. The Soviets would gain new fear and respect for the US hard liners; their conviction of the danger of "wars of national liberation" would be confirmed. At the same time, those in the USSR who advocate greater stress on military development and are unenthusiastic about detente would have their hands strengthened.

18. If the US used nuclear weapons with some persistence and still failed to turn back the Chinese or bring a quick end to the war, the results would be serious indeed. The comparative impotence of the US and of its most vaunted weapons in coping with a "revolutionary struggle" would have been demonstrated to Peking's satisfaction and advantage. At the same time, the US would pay the whole political cost of having used these weapons in the first place.

19. There remains, of course, the question of the consequences of not using nuclear weapons, and of accepting a military disaster, perhaps extending to loss of the war, which these weapons might have averted. Such a development would have profound implications for the standing of the US in the world and for the balance of power in Asia. Examination of these implications, however, would involve consideration of the whole subject of US objectives and policies in Southeast Asia, and does not come within the scope of this paper.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

[redacted]

ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman

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S-E-C-R-E-T

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

7 January 1966

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 2-66

SUBJECT: Communist Chinese Intervention in the Vietnam War

NOTE FOR THE BOARD

This is a redraft of the Memo the Board reviewed on 21 December. It is intended to become a Memorandum for the Director in response to his request for a paper on this subject.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

7 January 1966

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 2-66

SUBJECT: Communist Chinese Intervention in the Vietnam War

THE PROBLEM

In this paper we assume that Communist China intervenes in the Vietnamese war with substantial numbers of combat ground or air forces. We examine Chinese intentions and world reactions.

DISCUSSIONS

I. CHINESE INTENTIONS

1. The Communist Chinese have promoted two apparently contradictory lines regarding the probable future course of the US in the Vietnam war. For a long time, especially within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, they have insisted that the US is a paper tiger lacking the stamina to maintain a prolonged

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counter-insurgency effort. They argue that a properly conducted "people's war" can defeat the US forces and US-supported local forces without serious risk of a major international war. They also contend, however, that the US is desperately trying to expand the war and is determined to destroy the DRV and to attack China. This line, which is directed especially at Western Europe, Japan, and domestic opinion in the US, has recently been stressed in Chinese propaganda and conversationswith foreign visitors.

2. We believe that China's leaders give both lines some credence. They almost certainly still cling to the belief that US presistance will crumble in a prolonged test of wills. But they have had to extend their estimate of the breaking point further up the line of escalation than they had once expected. They appear to be increasingly anxious that the US may be determined to go a long way, possibly including attacks on China. Nevertheless, they cling to their hope that world and domestic US opinion will force the US to halt before a Sino-US war develops, and they have scrupulously avoided initiatives likely to provoke US attacks on China.

3. The assumed intervention by Chinese combat forces might take a wide variety of forms and occur in a wide variety of

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circumstances. Basically, however, the Chinese would be pursuing one of two alternative strategies. The first is a limited course of generating controlled pressures on the US/GVN while avoiding outright war with the US; probably this would require China to limit its intervention to the territory of North Vietnam. The second is a course of deliberately seeking out and trying to defeat US forces in battle on the ground in the South and, perhaps, in Laos and Thailand and/or in the air over the North. Quite different Chinese analyses of the situation and calculations of risk would underly the two strategies.

4. The Limited Strategy. As long as Peking clings to its paper-tiger estimate of the US, it might believe that a substantial movement of Chinese Communist combat forces into North Vietnam would produce a combination of pressures on the US/GVN sufficient to force an end to the conflict on terms favorable to the Communists. This move would involve the release of large PAVN forces for use in the South, confronting the US with the prospect of increased casualties and an indefinite prolongation of the war there. Beyond this, the Chinese Communist leaders would calculate that the heightened prospect of a Sino-US war would spread such alarm both within the US and abroad that enormous pressures would be brought upon the US Government to temporize in Vietnam.

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5. In adopting such a course of action, the Chinese would probably have estimated that, as long as their troops remained in North Vietnam, the chances of precipitating a direct Sino-US war were small. They would be consciously accepting some risk of such a war, however, and would have made preparations for it.

6. The Strategy of Direct Combat. Alternatively, Peking might choose to intervene in a direct effort to defeat US forces in the field. If the Chinese Communists embarked on this strategy, it would probably indicate that they had concluded the US was determined to continue escalating and that a Sino-US war was inevitable. Under these conditions, the Chinese leaders might deem it wise to choose the time and place of fighting and to try to keep at least the ground war as far from Chinese territory as possible.

7. The implementation of such a strategy could take a range of forms. At the low end would be limited Chinese incursions into Northern Laos and Northern Thailand, designed to force the US to come and meet them in response to its existing commitments. Peking would hope that this would dissipate US Southeast Asian strength over a wide area on long supply lines, while the specter of a prolonged and indefinitely enlarged war would multiply international and domestic pressures on the US to pull out.

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8. At the upper end of the range of possibilities is a Chinese offensive to drive the US out of Southeast Asia by engaging it heavily over a wide front in an all-out war. The Chinese would face formidable logistic difficulties in executing such a campaign. These difficulties have weighed heavily in our previous estimates that the chances of direct Chinese intervention are less than even and that a massive Chinese attack on US forces in South Vietnam is highly unlikely. But we cannot be certain that Chinese strategists take the same view. In deciding to challenge the US as assumed here, they might have judged that they could operate on a highly austere basis, that prepositioned supplies in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia would meet many of their requirements, and that the enemy could not sustain a prolonged conflict.

9. In any case, the direct use of Chinese troops against US forces would involve the prospect of US attacks on Communist China. By adopting such a course, Peking would have indicated it was prepared to accept such attacks. The Chinese leaders would probably estimate that the US would begin by using conventional weapons on the transportation choke points in south China and air installations there and on Hainan Island. This, they would expect, would be accompanied by a blockade of

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south-bound Chinese Communist shipping and, perhaps, attacks on Chinese ports of entry. As the Chinese expanded the scale of their movement southward to involve sending major forces into Laos and Thailand, they would probably estimate the US response would be a wider-ranging conventional attack on Chinese military and economic targets and advanced weapons facilities. They might also see some chance that the US would attempt an invasion of the Red River Delta area of North Vietnam.

10. Beyond this, the Chinese Communists would foresee the possibility of a US nuclear attack, perhaps first with tactical weapons on military tergets, then with strategic weapons. They would probably believe, however, that the US would be extremely reluctant to once again initiate the use of nuclear weapons for any reason short of imminent peril to the safety of the US itself. Additionally, they might rely to some extent on their professed belief that such weapons are not so decisive as to make it too costly to drive the US out of Southeast Asia, considering the changed balance of power this would bring about.

11. In any case, even in this more belligerent scenario, the Chinese leaders would count heavily on their belief that fear of a nuclear Third World War would have generated irresistable

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pressures on the US Government to end its escalation somewhere far short of the stages where the use of nuclear weapons became likely.

II. FOREIGN REACTIONS

12. The first news of a major movement of Chinese combat forces southward would produce a wave of extreme consternation and would generate heavy pressure on the US to do whatever was necessary to avert a Sino-American war. A major exception would be the GRC, where hopes of a return to the mainland would soar. There would also be attempts by various nations to get Peking to call off its troop movements, but none consider themselves in a position to exert much influence there. The Soviet Union has the greatest capability. It could warn that it would not come to the rescue if China provoked a nuclear bombing, and it could even maneuver troops along the Sino-Soviet border. Whether Moscow would apply such pressures would depend in large part upon what led up to the Chinese action and whether the Soviets believed China would and could control the situation sufficiently to avoid a Sino-US war. Australia and Canada might threaten to cut off grain supplies, but they would be unlikely to take action much, if any, prior to the onset of open war between China and the US. Peking would have to expect to lose those imports if war did break out.

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13. If it became clear after a time that China's move was limited, the reactions would abate somewhat. But only somewhat; anxiety about escalation would remain at a high level, and the US would be urged, repeatedly and vigorously, to make concessions.

14. In the event that China chose to precipitate a direct war with the US, the specter of a nuclear war would move US allies in West Europe to make strenuous efforts to bring the hostilities to an end through negotiation and compromise. All NATO governments would seek to exercise whatever influence they might have in Moscow, Washington, the UN, Peking, and Hanoi to this end. Very few would be willing to contribute to the US military effort, although Germany, the UK, possibly Italy, and others would continue to provide the US general diplomatic support. There would be genuine concern of the war spreading beyond Southeast Asia and escalating into a general war involving Europe, and even into a general nuclear war.

15. By applying extensive pressure, the US could probably get some token military support from the UK, and perhaps from one or two other NATO allies. If the allies, particularly the UK, believed that their participation could somehow prevent the possibility of the US using nuclear weapons their incentive to come in would be greater. Germany might provide token

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numbers of troops if the legal problems could be overcome. France would not support the US, but would make strenuous diplomatic efforts to get the conflict to the conference table.


16. Australia and New Zealand, feeling their own security involved, would probably greatly increase their military participation, as would South Korea. The GRC on Taiwan would seek to use its forces on the mainland. Japan, on the other hand, would be severely shaken by the course of events. It would try to avoid being involved and would probably refuse the use of its territory for support of US military actions against China.

17. In short, there is little likelihood that the US could generate anything approaching the kind of international backing it received in the Korean War.

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The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 January 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh

Summary

In the past several weeks there have been a number of indications that the enemy is building up its forces in the Laotian panhandle west of the Demilitarized Zone.

The target primarily threatened by these forces appears to be the allied base at Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam. Enemy reconnaissance and probing activity near Khe Sanh has increased markedly in the last few weeks. 25X1 25X1 25X1 The Communists could be using the time between now and the Tet holidays to complete their concentration around Khe Sanh in preparation for an offensive after Tet.

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The Communists could muster a total force of over 20,000 should they decide at some point to commit all personnel from the elements of the four divisions now in the general area. This is considerably more than they would need merely to take Khe Sanh. Their primary objective in attacking Khe Sanh would be to draw US reinforcements into the area, tie them down to static defensive positions, and inflict maximum casualties on US forces over a period of time.

The buildup of forces in Laos and western Quang Tri Province also strengthens North Vietnamese defense of the Laos corridor. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

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The Current Situation

1. Developments in recent days strongly suggest that the Vietnamese Communists intend once again to increase military pressure against the strategically placed outpost at Khe Sanh, on Route 9 in Quang Tri Province.

2. The post, approximately nine miles from the Laotian border, is used as a base for observation and interdiction of enemy infiltration activities in the area. It was last beseiged in the winter of 1967, following the movement of the North Vietnamese 325C Division into the western DMZ area. Elements of the 325C have again moved into the region, after a period of rest and refitting in North Vietnam. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

3. The units mentioned above probably would take the primary role in any Communist effort to step up action at Khe Sanh. However, recent Communist deployments have put the enemy in a position to throw in substantial elements of the North Vietnamese 304th and 320th divisions in any major assault. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] If the Communists should decide at some point to commit all personnel from the elements of the four divisions now in the general area, they would be able to muster a total force of over 20,000.

[redacted] 25X6

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is tenuous evidence that battlefield preparations are being made by the 29th and 812th regiments.

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[redacted]

5. [redacted] also indicates that the Communists are preparing for an offensive around Khe Sanh. Photography [redacted] of an area about five miles northwest of Khe Sanh revealed 21 foxholes, two fortified hilltops, and heavy trail activity. On 26 and 27 December, an unknown force twice attempted to penetrate the defensive perimeter of friendly forces on Hill 861. On 27 December, a friendly reconnaissance team contacted an estimated 15-20 enemy four miles northeast of Khe Sanh. On 2 January, an enemy force of about six men engaged a Marine squad at a listening post about two miles north of Khe Sanh. The next day a patrol was grenaded; the patrol also observed lights on a trail near Route 9. These incidents all point to increased enemy reconnaissance against the Khe Sanh combat base.

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Enemy Objectives

6. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the buildup around Khe Sanh is that the enemy may hope to wipe out the US garrison there and the Civilian Irregular Defense Corps (CIDG) camp at Lang Vei, about five miles to the southwest on Route 9. The Communists have long regarded Khe Sanh, located near the infiltration corridors in Laos, as a thorn in their side. According to the latest

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available information, the garrison at Khe Sanh is defended by three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion of the 26th Marine Regiment. The CIDG camp at Lang Vei has about 320 men.

7. The Communists, however, do not need a force of upwards of 22,000 men to take Khe Sanh and Lang Vei. If the buildup is as extensive as suspected, and all of these units are destined to be committed to an offensive in the area, the primary purpose of the Communists may prove to be much broader. By attacking Khe Sanh, they would hope to draw US reinforcements into the area, tie them down to static defensive positions, and inflict maximum casualties on US forces over a period of time. By occupying the high ground around Khe Sanh and setting up ambushes along Route 9, the only overland route into the area, the enemy could make resupply and reinforcement a difficult and costly proposition, especially if he has developed an effective antiaircraft capability. Monsoon rains have closed large portions of Route 9, compounding the problem and making resupply largely dependent on airlift.

8. A final objective of the Khe Sanh buildup would be to harass and foil the strongpoint barrier system which is being implemented in the DMZ north of Khe Sanh and in the infiltration corridors in Laos.

9. Enemy strategy as outlined above fits in with the enemy strategy during 1967 of fighting the main force war partly from peripheral areas adjacent to border sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. By positioning his forces in these areas, the Communists seek to lure US units away from populated areas, disperse them, and inflict a maximum number of casualties in the process. This relieves pressure on main force units operating in populated areas and enables them to coordinate with local force units to disrupt the pacification program and attack allied outposts and base camps around urban areas. Since the start of the "winter-spring campaign" in October,

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the enemy has employed this strategy in II Corps and III Corps. In II Corps he has concentrated his forces operating in the highlands under a Front

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to direct ground action from border sanctuaries in Cambodia. A similar situation exists in III Corps, where a new Military Region (MR), designated MR 10 and consisting of the border provinces of Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Quang Duc, was established in 1967. The establishment of MR 10 was followed by a rapid buildup of Communist forces in the area and attacks on targets near the Cambodian border, like Loc Ninh, Bu Dop, and Bo Duc. It is possible, therefore, that the buildup of Communist forces in the Khe Sanh area presages the establishment of a new Front headquarters to conduct operations in the border areas of Tri-Thien Military Region (Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces).

10. In summary, the enemy's objectives in any sustained offensive in the Khe Sanh area would be, at a minimum, to force the abandonment of the Khe Sanh base and the Lang Vei CIDG camp and to inflict heavy casualties. At the maximum, the Communists would hope to draw substantial US reinforcements from other areas in South Vietnam and tie them down in the Khe Sanh area. Their objective would be to give the other NVA units which operate in the Tri-Thien Military Region (the 5th, 6th, and 9th regiments) greater mobility to operate against the populated areas along the coast of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. It would also give the Communists greater freedom of action along the DMZ. Whatever course of action is open to the enemy, he will be striving in addition to obtain that often touted major psychological victory against the allies.

11. There is a possibility that the deploying elements of the 304th and 320th divisions may merely intend to reinforce the 325C in operations around Khe Sanh before moving to infiltrate into South Vietnam farther south. Such a pattern occurred in the overrunning of A Shau in March 1966

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
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by the 95B and 101C regiments of the 325th Division, which later moved to reinforce the B-3 Front in the highlands. Indeed, several units originally involved in the October-November highlands campaign--the 88th, 101st, and possibly elements of the 33rd regiment--have since moved farther south to reinforce the northern III Corps.

12. The current locations of Communist units involved in the Khe Sanh buildup are as follows:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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25 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat with Enemy Tactical Means of Nuclear Attack in Offensive Operations

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought". This article assigns to the front the task of destroying enemy operational-tactical and tactical means of nuclear attack following an initial massive nuclear strike. Because of their rapid deployment capability, tactical means must be destroyed while they are still located at a distance exceeding their range. The author gives various possible formulas for the destruction of tactical nuclear means and examples of how such tactical means have been deployed by the enemy in Vietnam. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967.

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2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the Codeword

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William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB - 312/03013-74

DATE OF INFO. Early-1967

DATE 25 October 1974

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat with Enemy Tactical Means of Nuclear Attack in Offensive Operations

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are General-Leytenant V. Petrenko, Colonel V. Ryabchuk and Colonel M. Belovskiy. This article assigns to the front the task of destroying enemy operational-tactical and tactical means of nuclear attack following an initial massive nuclear strike. Because of their rapid deployment capability, tactical means must be destroyed while they are still located at a distance exceeding their range. The author gives various possible formulas for the destruction of tactical nuclear means and examples of how such tactical means have been deployed by the enemy in Vietnam.

End of Summary

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Comment:

General-Leytenant V. Petrenko wrote several articles for the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", the most recent was: Issue No. 1 (86) for 1969 (FIRDB-312/03083-74). Colonel V. Ryabchuk and Colonel M. Belovskiy co-authored an article "Combat with the Tactical Means of Nuclear Attack of the Enemy in Offensive Operations", Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967. Colonel V. Ryabchuk also wrote an article in Krasnaya Zvezda 20 July 1967, "Logic of a Commander's Decision".

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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Combat with Enemy Tactical Means of Nuclear Attack in Offensive Operations

by

General-Leytenant V. Petrenko
Colonel V. Ryabchuk
Colonel M. Belovskiy

The preemptive destruction of enemy nuclear attack means plays a major role in the successful conduct of a ground forces offensive and in effecting the total defeat of an enemy under the conditions of modern war. This mission will undoubtedly be carried out in the initial massive nuclear strike of a front.

But, as training exercises and calculations show, far from all of the enemy operational-tactical, and particularly his tactical, nuclear means may be put out of action simultaneously by such a nuclear strike. Under these conditions, undestroyed nuclear means can only be destroyed by the front in the course of combat operations.

When this is the case, a different approach is necessary in the organization of combat with operational-tactical and tactical nuclear means. The point is that operational-tactical means have a great range, but it takes considerable time for them to prepare a strike from their launch site. Most tactical nuclear means can fire (launch) literally in a few minutes after occupying their firing (launch) site. However, because of their limited range of fire, they have to draw near our forces before firing. A fundamental deduction follows from this. In order to preempt the delivery of strikes by tactical nuclear means, we must strive to destroy them while they are still located at a distance exceeding their range.

It seems to us that in order to carry out this task it is advisable to define three lines of danger or of approach, which we have as yet designated only tentatively.

Line No. 1 (sketch 1) will probably extend from the enemy forward edge to a distance somewhat greater than the range of the tactical nuclear means having the greatest range (if the enemy has Honest John rockets, the distance will be about 30 kilometers, and with the adoption of the Lance

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missile system it will be 60 kilometers). Before the troops of our first army echelon advance to this line, our reconnaissance must discover, and our rocket troops and supporting aviation destroy, a large part of the enemy nuclear means whose range extends to this line. A front has at its disposal the means necessary to accomplish this.

Line No. 2 will obviously be 8 to 12 kilometers from the forward edge of the enemy defense, i. e., at a distance equal to the range of his nuclear artillery. Before the large units of the first echelon of our attacking forces advance to this line, a large part of the remaining enemy nuclear artillery within the zone of the front must be destroyed or reliably neutralized. This task, too, can be fully accomplished if there is efficient and timely concentration of the efforts of the reconnaissance elements and the means of destruction of the divisions, the armies, and the front.

Line No. 3 can be fixed at 2 to 3 kilometers from the line of contact of the two sides, i. e., at a distance equal to the range of weapons of the Davy Crockett type. This is also the line of attack for our forces. With their advance to this line, our attacking forces must use all of their fire means to destroy the tactical nuclear antitank means which have survived our nuclear strikes and must go over to a vigorous attack in order to effect a total rout of the enemy.

Thus, before the large units of the first echelon of our attacking forces approach to within 60 to 65 kilometers of the enemy, tactical nuclear means of the Lance type must be revealed and destroyed; this distance is respectively 30 to 35 kilometers for the Honest John and 10 to 14 kilometers for most of the 155-mm howitzers. In this case, then successive destruction, starting with the long-range means, will enable us to preempt the enemy delivery of nuclear strikes and to preserve our forces and means.

As long as our probable enemies had an insignificant number of tactical nuclear means, our side correctly considered the division to be the focal point for operating against them. Now, however, when the quantity of these means has increased sharply and they have become a factor of operational importance, it is possible to carry out the preemptive destruction of enemy tactical nuclear means (those which survive our initial nuclear strike) only through the combined efforts of operational-tactical forces and means. In this case it is advisable to establish the army as the level for organizing and carrying on combat not only against enemy operational-tactical nuclear means but also against his

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subunits of tactical missiles and nuclear artillery.

The methodology we propose for organizing combat against tactical nuclear weapons in an operation stipulates that they be reconnoitered and destroyed not only when we are attacking an enemy who is on the defensive but also when the forces of the two sides are approaching each other and when the enemy is advancing to attack or to deliver a counterstrike. The main point is the necessity to reconnoiter (make a final reconnaissance of) the target nuclear weapon and to organize its destruction before our forces come within its range.

In support of combat against enemy tactical nuclear means, we should tentatively designate two zones, as the opposing sides approach each other, directly in front of the main forces of the first echelon of combined-arms large units: a zone of deep reconnaissance, in which nuclear weapons must be discovered; and a zone of final reconnaissance and destruction for refining our information and destroying these weapons before our forces come within their range.

The zone of deep reconnaissance must be large enough to provide for discovering tactical nuclear means before they reach the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction. The minimum distance of its outer limit (G_{razv}) from our troops can be expressed by the equation

$$G_{razv} = D_p + (V_p + V_n)(t_{razv} + t_{inf} + t_{resh} + t_{got} - t_{pr}),$$

where D_p - range of enemy tactical nuclear means;
V_n^p - speed of advance of enemy tactical nuclear means;
V_n^p - rate of advance of our forces;
t_{razv} - time necessary to reconnoiter a given type of enemy tactical nuclear means;
t_{inf} - time needed to receive and process reconnaissance data and report to the formation commander;
t_{resh} - time required for formulating a plan, making preparations, and transmitting orders for destruction;
t_{got} - time needed for our means to prepare and deliver a strike;
t_{pr} - time needed for a given enemy means to prepare for a strike.

The outer limit of the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction (G_{dp}) will be separated from our forces by a distance equal to the range of the enemy tactical nuclear means plus the distance which our forces (or the enemy means of nuclear attack, or the two together) will cover in the time spent on final reconnaissance, the transmittal of reconnaissance

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information, the formulation of a plan, and the destruction of the nuclear means. The equation has the following form:

$$G_{dp} = D_p + (V_p + V_n)(t_{inf} + t_{resh} + t_{got} - t_{pr}).$$

The specific figure for the depth of the reconnaissance zone or the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction under different conditions can be determined using the nomogram (sketch 2).

One of the ways enabling us to reveal the enemy in time to deliver a preemptive strike with tactical nuclear weapons is the purposeful organization of reconnaissance with a periodicity which has been calculated in advance.

Considering the short fire (launch) preparation time of this type of weapon and the limited range, the periodicity of reconnaissance must be such as to assure the capability of discovering tactical nuclear weapons while they are still in transit, before they enter the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction. This can be achieved if the repeated observations of the routes of advance of enemy forces take place within the time interval P, which must be less than the time necessary for the enemy to negotiate the zone of deep reconnaissance. The time P is determined as the quotient of dividing the depth of the reconnaissance zone by the speed with which the enemy nuclear weapon is approaching our forces. For example, if the concentration area of the enemy army reserve is located 100 kilometers from our forces, if the reserve is advancing at 20 kilometers per hour, and if the depth of the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction is 20 kilometers, then reconnaissance of the tactical nuclear means in the reserve must be conducted to a depth of 100 - 20 = 80 kilometers, with a periodicity

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$$P \leqslant \frac{80}{20} = 4 \text{ hours}.$$

The methodology will be similar in determining the periodicity of reconnoitering tactical nuclear means if both sides are moving toward each other. In this case, however, the size of the zone of deep reconnaissance changes continuously, and the intervals between successive observations of this zone will be unequal. The maximum allowable time P between each two successive observations must be determined individually by finding the difference between the distance separating the two sides at a given moment and the depth of the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction and then dividing this figure by the speed with which the enemy tactical nuclear means and our forces are approaching each other. If, for example, the

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original distance between the sides is 150 kilometers and the size of the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction of a given type of nuclear weapon is 30 kilometers, then if both sides are advancing at 20 kilometers per hour the interval for observing possible routes of advance of the means must be

$$P \leq \frac{150 - 30}{20 + 20} = 3 \text{ hours.}$$

Second to reconnaissance as a major task in operating against enemy tactical nuclear means of attack is organizing their destruction. Of the many means and methods of destroying nuclear weapons, let us devote our attention to the capabilities of detachments transported by helicopter.

It is known that the employment of airborne landings for this purpose presents certain complications because of the time needed to prepare a landing operation, the difficulties of overcoming enemy air defense during the flight and landing, and the characteristics of conducting combat actions in the rear. The organization, preparation, and landing of airborne forces usually take several hours. Thus, according to the experience of training exercises, 15 to 20 minutes are spent in enplaning a battalion-sized tactical airborne landing force without its combat equipment, 40 to 50 minutes in loading and lashing down heavy combat equipment, and about an hour in flying the landing force a distance of up to 150 kilometers. At least 4 to 5 hours are required for a landing, from the moment the task is received until the actual landing of the force, assuming that the crews have been formed in advance. Therefore, a landing force can hardly destroy such mobile means of nuclear attack as, for example, operational-tactical missiles, in a given area before their launch, let alone tactical nuclear means.

The appearance of helicopters equipped with various systems of missile, fire, and other weapons, will make it possible to utilize motorized rifle subunits capable of carrying out the above-mentioned tasks within a short time. Such subunits, in our opinion, will be the most suited to operations under modern conditions. They can carry out attacks from the air, and after landing can alternate movement by air with actions on the ground.

In our view, armed helicopters will provide not only for continuous transportation of personnel but also for carrying out fire missions from the air. Their armament may consist of a fixed or movable missile complex, antitank guided missiles, grenade launchers, various incendiary means, smoke-generating equipment to blind the enemy, etc. Helicopter gun ports

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and hatches should be equipped so that the fire means of subunits being transported can be employed from the air.

To equip a motorized rifle company acting as such a detachment will require 5 to 6 helicopters of the V-8 and V-2 type or 10 to 12 helicopters of the MI-4 and MI-1 type. It is obvious that this type of detachment will usually be drawn from a division at the present time. As shown by the experience of training exercises and war games, a front may have one to two helicopter regiments at its disposal and an army may have a helicopter squadron. If an army is reinforced with an additional one or two squadrons of helicopters, one or two of the above-indicated detachments may be formed in divisions of the first echelon; as the stock of helicopters increases, detachments may reach the numerical strength of a motorized rifle battalion, and to equip them will require 20 to 25 helicopters of the V-8 and V-2 type or 40 to 50 of the MI-4 and MI-1 type.

The promising prospects of helicopter detachments for combat, first and foremost against tactical nuclear means, are caused not only by the special importance of this task but also by the high combat effectiveness of the detachments because of their mobility and their relative independence of terrain conditions and zones of destruction, fires, floods, and radioactive contamination which may develop there. The maneuverability of the detachments if they fly into the area of their task, which is usually not at great depth, will enable them, coming in at very low altitudes, to exploit terrain irregularities and thus substantially reduce the effectiveness of enemy air defenses.

If such detachments are at full combat readiness they can attack nuclear objectives on an average of 20 to 30 minutes after being assigned the task (boarding helicopters and landing will take 6 to 8 minutes for a subunit of company strength, the takeoff of a squadron will take 1 minute, and a flight to a distance of 20 to 30 kilometers will take 10 minutes).

For operating convenience, a detachment may be divided into two groups: an assault group made up of motorized rifle subunits aboard 3 or 4 helicopters to attack objectives from the air or after landing; and a fire group made up of 2 or 3 detachments aboard 2 or 3 helicopters to support the assault group and cover it from surprise enemy attacks. Helicopters of the fire group must carry an increased supply of munitions in order to make repeated fire runs on enemy objectives.

As a result of the shallow deployment of tactical nuclear means from the line of contact of the two sides, the operating depth of such a

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detachment may be put at 15 to 30 kilometers. The inclusion in a detachment of helicopters with powerful onboard armament makes it possible to count on a minimum allotment of means to support and cover the detachment's actions. Thus, the experience of training exercises has established that two MI-4 and four MI-1 helicopters equipped with missiles are able to neutralize the enemy over an area of 4 to 6 hectares with one salvo.

As is shown by the experience of American forces combat operations in South Vietnam, where armed helicopters are in fairly wide use, fire strikes are delivered from them at a distance of 35 meters or more in front of the advancing forces. In this case, the coordinates of the targets which must be destroyed first are transmitted by radio from the ground to the commander of the group of armed helicopters. Part of the objectives are hit from the air as they are discovered by the crews. The great effectiveness of firing from helicopters served as the basis for development by the Americans of the so-called "air fire system" - a large high-speed helicopter, armored and heavily armed.

The inclusion in the helicopter detachments we are proposing of similar "air fire systems" would probably prove an effective means of destroying nuclear objectives and supporting motorized rifle subunits.

In discussing the role and significance of existing and new means and methods for combat against enemy nuclear weapons, and the long-range prospects for their development, it must be taken into account that we can achieve the goal of this combat through close coordination in the employment of all the forces and means which are, or in the near future will be, at the disposal of the front, the army, and the division for conducting operations and combat.

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
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t_{got} = preparation time
t_{upr} = preemption time
t_{pr} = time for enemy weapon to prepare strike
D_p = range of enemy tactical nuclear means
G_{razv} = reconnaissance line
G_{dp} = limit of zone of final reconnaissance and destruction

SKETCH 2

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
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RGSN (Army) = Special reconnaissance group

GGR = In-depth reconnaissance group

RG = Reconnaissance group

Msd = Motorized rifle division

Msp = Motorized rifle regiment

S = Sergeant

SKETCH 1 Sequence of Reconnaissance and Preemptive Destruction of Enemy Tactical Nuclear Means

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STUDY S-266

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)

F J Dyson
R Gomer
S Weinberg
S C Wright

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADM	atomic demolition munition
ASM	air-to-surface missile
CEP	circular error probable
CPR	Chinese People's Republic (Communist China)
DMZ	demilitarized zone
HE	high explosive
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
KT	kiloton(s)
km	kilometer(s)
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile
NVN	North Vietnam(ese)
NW	nuclear weapon
POL	petroleum, oils and lubricants
RAC	Research Analysis Corporation
REB	research earth borer
rem	roentgen equivalent man
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
ST	short tons
SVN	South Vietnam(ese)
TNW	tactical nuclear weapon
VC	Viet Cong
VN	Vietnam

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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)

F. J. Dyson[1]
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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the military consequences of a U.S. decision to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that the war remains theater-limited and that no strategic exchange occurs. The study divides into two main parts. (1) possible targets for U.S. TNW, and effects of nuclear bombardment on the ground war if the use of TNW remains unilateral; and (2) possibility and effectiveness of enemy retaliation with nuclear weapons supplied by the USSR or China.

Among both military experts and the general public, there is wide agreement that the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia would offer the U.S. no military advantage commensurate with its political cost. This opinion is usually based on an intuitive judgment, however, rather than on detailed analysis.

---

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There is some disagreement as to whether the use of nuclear weapons would still remain unprofitable if China openly intervened with large ground forces in the Vietnam war. It therefore seemed worthwhile to make a study of the consequences that would follow from a U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons in tactical operations in Southeast Asia.

We have arbitrarily excluded strategic nuclear operations from the study. This means that we assume the annihilation of the civilian economy of North Vietnam (NVN) or China to be outside our terms of reference. Nuclear weapons are to be used tactically in the strict sense, that is to say, only on military targets, only within the theater of ground combat, and while avoiding civilian casualties so far as practicable. The reason for limiting the study to tactical use is that we wish to stay as much as possible in the realm of technical military analysis and to avoid involvement with political and moral judgments.

The study has involved four men working for a total of three man-months. Such a small effort cannot deal adequately with so large a subject. Almost all our conclusions are tentative, and they should be investigated further by professional experts. We regard our study as only a beginning.

This report is divided into seven sections; Sections III and IV contain the major part of the work. Section III discusses the military consequences of the U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that this use remains unilateral and that the enemy response is purely defensive. The questions that arise are: What kind of targets exist, how many weapons of what yields could be profitably expended, and how great would be the effects on enemy ground operations? Section IV discusses the feasibility and effectiveness of enemy use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces. Here, the emphasis is on the logistic difficulties of supplying nuclear weapons and the means of delivery from the USSR or China

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to guerrillas in Vietnam, as well as on the vulnerability of U.S. military bases. Section V briefly discusses the long-term effects that may arise if guerrillas in other parts of the world acquire nuclear weapons. Section VI deals with the political consequences of U.S. use of nuclear weapons, but without any attempt at a complete political analysis.

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II. CONCLUSIONS

A. UNILATERAL USE OF TNW (See Section III)

The use of TNW on troop targets would be effective only in stopping the enemy from moving large masses of men in concentrated formations. So long as the enemy moves men in small groups and uses forest cover, he would offer few suitable troop targets for TNW.

Viet Cong (VC) base areas in South Vietnam (SVN) could be effectively destroyed with TNW, but this would require large numbers of weapons and an accurate location of targets by ground patrols.

Bridges, airfields, and missile sites make good TNW targets.

TNW can be used very effectively to block roads and trails in forested areas by blowdown of trees, but a vigorous effort to cut through the fallen trees could reopen most of the roads in approximately one month. After the trails are reopened, further nuclear strikes are much less effective in interdicting movement, since a tree can only be blown down once.

From the point of view of cost-effectiveness, the use of TNW against troops in the open compares unfavorably with the use of bomblet-canister ordnance.

Fallout from groundburst weapons cannot by itself provide a long-lasting barrier to the movement of men and supplies, without endangering civilian populations at up to a distance of 200 miles. It can provide, at most, a complicating factor in the reconstruction of damaged facilities.

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War games played at RAC and RAND exaggerate the effectiveness of TNW in Southeast Asia, mainly because of the short duration of the campaigns. The games are set up so that large forces are committed and engaged in intense battles within a few days, thus offering excellent targets for TNW. The machinery of game playing makes it impossible to stage a long and indecisive campaign.

We estimate that any of the RAC and RAND games, if played on a long time scale, would end in a stalemate, with the enemy forces retiring into the forests and the U.S. nuclear bombardment running into the law of diminishing returns. So long as the U.S. force is numerically inferior, with or witnout TNW, the stalemate will not be broken.

The use of TNW for an interdiction of lines of communication in NVN, similar to the ROLLING THUNDER operation, could be highly effective, but it would require a huge number of weapons. A RAND targeting study indicates that, in such a mixed interdiction campaign, one TNW is, on the average, equivalent to about 12 nonnuclear attack sorties. This means that a completely nuclear ROLLING THUNDER campaign would require about 3000 TNW per year.

B. VULNERABILITY OF U.S. FORCES TO ENEMY TNW (See Section IV)

U.S. forces now in Vietnam are concentrated in 14 highly vulnerable bases.

The bases contain a total of about 70 target areas, each having a diameter of about two miles and each packed with men, stores, equipment, or vehicles.

Enemy units can approach on foot close to the perimeter of almost any of the bases, although undetected approach by motor vehicles is unlikely. The six coastal bases are easily approached by small boats (sampans), but any large boat is likely to be challenged and searched.

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To smuggle TNW inside a U.S. base would be a high-risk operation, requiring some luck for its success.

The known Soviet TNW are all heavy and high-yield weapons designed for large-scale mechanized warfare. The smallest of them have warheads in the 1000-pound class, which would be extremely difficult for guerrilla forces to handle. However, [redacted] A mortar or recoilless rifle weighing a few hundred pounds would be a possible delivery system with a range of a few miles.

(b)(1) DTRA

If we assume that the USSR has manufactured a supply of TNW [redacted] these weapons could be shipped from the USSR to South Vietnam and distributed to launch points even in the face of U.S. nuclear interdiction attacks. The transportation through Vietnam would necessarily be by foot, and it might take several months to complete the trip. Larger TNW could probably not be brought further than North Vietnam.

(b)(1) DTRA

TNW of megaton yield could be brought into harbors from a boat or submarine lying a few miles off shore, the weapon being enclosed in a buoyant container and pulled by a frogman riding a sea sled.

If about 100 weapons of 10-KT yield each could be delivered from the base perimeters onto all 70 target areas in a coordinated strike, the U.S. fighting capability in Vietnam would be essentially annihilated. In the more likely contingency that only a few weapons could be delivered intermittently, U.S. casualties would still be extremely high and the degradation of U.S. capabilities would be considerable.

It is not feasible to disperse U.S. forces in Vietnam sufficiently to make TNW attacks on them ineffective. Given

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sufficient time, it would be possible to protect a high percentage of U.S. forces against attacks of the magnitude described in Section III-C by hardening the bases (building blast shelters for troops, planes, and supplies) at a cost which is not unreasonably high.

A megaton weapon delivered by sea sled could cause essentially total destruction of a harbor and its associated facilities. A kiloton weapon delivered in this way could, at most, sink a fraction of the shipping in the harbor and interrupt operations for a few weeks.

If TNW are provided by the USSR, a sustained campaign against U.S. forces will not impose any strain on the Soviet stockpile. If China is the provider, only enough weapons for sporadic attacks can be available during the next few years.

In addition to the main parts (Sections III and IV) of the study, brief attention was given to two other items (Sections V and VI).

C. USE OF TNW BY INSURGENTS ELSEWHERE (See Section V)

The use of TNW in Southeast Asia is likely to result in greatly increased long-term risk of nuclear guerrilla operations in other parts of the world. U.S. security would be gravely endangered if the use of TNW by guerrilla forces should become widespread.

D. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (See Section VI)

The use of TNW in Southeast Asia would be highly damaging to the U.S. whether or not the use remains unilateral.

The overall result of our study is to confirm the generally held opinion that the use of TNW in Southeast Asia would offer the U.S. no decisive military advantage if the use remained unilateral, and it would have strongly adverse military effects if the enemy were able to use TNW in reply. The military

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advantages of unilateral use are not overwhelming enough to ensure termination of the war, and they are therefore heavily outweighed by the disadvantages of eventual bilateral use.

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III. ADVANTAGES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ATTAINMENT OF U.S. MILITARY OBJECTIVES

A. CATALOG OF TARGETS FOR U.S. USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Troop Concentrations

The majority of nuclear strikes in all the war games that we have studied were made against troop concentrations. In the two OREGON TRAIL games[1], the average number of enemy casualties per strike was about 100. This average was achieved against troops actively engaged in large-scale fighting with conventional armor and artillery. If the North Vietnamese army or a Chinese invading force should fight in this style, there is no reason to doubt that they could be defeated by U.S. employment of tactical nuclear weapons. The number of nuclear strikes required would be large (several hundred at least).

In reality, it is extremely unlikely that a return of 100 casualties per strike could be maintained in Southeast Asia. The OREGON TRAIL studies showed that the outstanding difficulty in the use of TNW lies in locating troop targets accurately and striking before the location becomes obsolete. A dramatic example of this difficulty was provided by exercise FLORIDA ISLAND (OREGON TRAIL, Vol. 10, Annex I) in which a two-seater airplane (OV-1B MOHAWK) was searching for targets while flying at 180 knots and 500-ft altitude. In eight sorties flying

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[1]Project OREGON TRAIL, Final Report, USACDC No. USC-6, February 1965.
Volume 1, Main Report, TOP SECRET RD.
Volume 8, Annexes E and F, War Games by RAC, SECRET RD.
Volume 10, Annex I, Troop Evaluations, SECRET RD.
Volume 17, Annex P, Political Considerations, SECRET RD.

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over 354 targets (e.g., an infantry company in defensive position, an artillery battery in firing position, a tank company in an assembly area, a missile site, a command post, and a line target consisting of about ten 2-1/2-ton trucks) and using both visual and photographic reconnaissance, not a single target was picked up. A BIRD DOG plane flying at 90 knots was able to pick up only 31 percent of 72 target items in three sorties.

It seems likely that the introduction of TNW in Southeast Asia would not radically change the present vulnerability of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (VC) ground forces in the field. The limiting factor in the U.S. capability to destroy them is target acquisition, rather than firepower. In many situations where the enemy employs hit-and-run tactics, the necessarily cumbersome command-and-control routine will make the use of TNW impossible.

In summary, the use of TNW on troop targets would be effective only in stopping the enemy from moving large masses of men in concentrated formations or in confined spaces. So long as the enemy continued to operate as he does at present, moving men in small groups and making good use of forest cover, he would offer U.S. forces few opportunities to use TNW effectively.

Headquarters and Communication Centers

The permanent VC base areas in South Vietnam (SVN), for example, Zone C and Zone D, would be suitable targets for TNW. However, their area is so great (about 1000 square miles each) that they could not be attacked blindly. It would be necessary to locate targets within the base areas by ground patrolling or aerial reconnaissance, as is done for the current B-52 ARC LIGHT attacks. When a target is located, it could be destroyed with TNW rather more thoroughly than with conventional bombs, provided that the use of TNW introduced no additional

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delay. With groundburst TNW, it would be possible to destroy even deep tunnel systems, but this would require that the positions of the tunnels be known to within a few hundred feet. The tunnel systems are so extensive that many groundburst TNW would be needed, and this would give rise to serious fallout problems, either in Saigon or in Cambodia, depending on which way the wind was blowing.

There is a new type of weapon under development,[2] called research earth borer (REB) which is an airdropped bomb that penetrates the ground to a desired depth. The bomb is optimized for a given yield, and the crater diameter is about double that of a surfaceburst of the same yield. Alternatively, the depth can be chosen so that the explosion is almost contained and fallout practically eliminated. [redacted] delete [redacted], while in the second case the limit is about [redacted] (S) OTRA

REB would be a useful weapon for dealing with the deep VC tunnel systems. The destructive range would not be much increased over that of a surfaceburst, so that a large number of weapons and accurate location of targets would still be needed. Elimination of long-range fallout, if REB actually performs up to specifications, would make a nuclear attack on tunnel HQ a relatively inconspicuous operation.

Supply Lines

A large fraction of the current ROLLING THUNDER air attacks on NVN is directed at supply lines, particularly road and rail traffic. Most of the targets are dispersed or mobile, and

[2] W. N. Caudle, et al, "The Sandia Program for Earth Penetrating Systems," Sandia Corporation, SC-WD-65-201, May 1965, SECRET RD; C. Young and G. Ozanne, "Low Velocity Penetration Study," Sandia Corporation, SC-RR-66-118, July 1966, CONFIDENTIAL.

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therefore they are unsuitable for TNW. The best supply-line targets for TNW are bridges, of which 42 had been attacked up to March 1966. Attacks on the bridges with conventional bombs are generally unrewarding, and the damage is either quickly repaired or circumvented. Groundburst TNW could destroy bridges with much greater certainty and thoroughness, but accurate delivery would still be essential (within a few hundred feet for complete destruction by a kiloton-range bomb). It is possible that the introduction of an accurate homing air-to-surface missile (ASM) with high explosive (HE) warhead, viz., WALLEYE, would be almost as effective as TNW in keeping bridges unserviceable.

The combination of REB weapons with controlled dive gliding as in the BAYONET system[3] makes possible accurate delivery from low-flying planes, since the weapon does not skip on the surface as in conventional low-level delivery. Thus, BAYONET, with either conventional or nuclear warheads, could be very effective against bridges, and it is not clear on which side the greater advantage would be.

Airfields and SAM Sites

Airfields are ideal targets for TNW and are expensive targets for conventional bombing. At present there are 14 airfields in NVN, of which four are unserviceable as a result of ROLLING THUNDER attacks. Introduction of TNW would quickly remove the remaining ten airfields from operation.

SAM sites could also be destroyed effectively with TNW, but it is possible that the enemy would learn to operate SAM from dispersed and camouflaged positions which would be relatively invulnerable to TNW. The elimination of SAM would be

[3] SC-WD-65-201, op cit, pp. 32, 56,
The BAYONET System SCWD-66-458, 1966, SECRET RD.

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very advantageous to U.S. air operations, since it would enable aircraft to fly at an altitude out of the effective range of light AAA.

Mountain Passes and Trails

TNW of higher yields are extremely effective in blowing down trees. [redacted] (b)(1) DTRA It would be possible with a few hundred such weapons to block all mountain passes and trails between NVN and China, or between NVN and Laos. Important routes could be blocked by forest blowdown over distances of tens of miles. Large-scale movement of men and supplies could be stopped for a considerable time. The interdiction could be maintained even longer if, after an initial nuclear strike, repair work on the trails were harassed by continued air attack with the use of nonnuclear ordnance.

The main weakness of tree blowdown as a method of interdiction is that a tree can only be blown down once. Once the trees are down and the enemy has cut a new trail through the fallen trunks, further TNW strikes will be relatively ineffective. In fact, the fallen trunks will give excellent cover against the blast and heat effects of subsequent strikes. Therefore, the main question in assessing the usefulness of tree blowdown is how long will it take the enemy to cut a trail through a blown down forest. If the time taken to cut a trail is short compared to the duration of the war, the blowdown will not have a decisive effect on the outcome.

A careful study would be needed to determine the trail-cutting time, which would depend strongly on details of logistics and topography as well as on the size and taxonomy of the trees. Presumably, the job could be done with a liberal use of HE much more rapidly than with hand saws. If caches of food and HE were prepositioned along the trails, the work of

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trail cutting could proceed simultaneously at many points within the blown down area. Men could climb in over the trees and work independently of outside supplies.[4]

Just for purposes of illustration, without any basis in detailed study, we consider the figure of ten feet per man-day[5] as a possible figure for the length of trail that could be cut through blown down forest. [redacted] (b)(1) DTRA This estimate is only a guess, but it gives an idea of the order of magnitude of effort required for trail-cutting. If the U.S. delivered several hundred 100-KT weapons in a major interdiction strike, we could expect at least a substantial fraction of the trails to be reopened by 50,000 men working for a month or two.

From this very rough estimate, we conclude that the duration of interdiction by forest blowdown would be measured in weeks or months, rather than in years. Unless the U.S. had some assurance of ending the war within a year, the interdiction could not be decisive. Further study is, of course, required to confirm this judgment.

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[4] It is possible that a freshly cut trail through fallen forest would be more conspicuous and, hence, more vulnerable to aerial attack than a trail through standing forest. On the other hand, when the forest had originally been dense, the fallen trees would be piled on top of one another, and the new trail might be cut through the undermost trunks, leaving the overlying trunks undisturbed. Thus, the effect of blowdown might be to make trails through sparse forest more vulnerable and trails through dense forest more invulnerable. The vulnerability of major roads and railway lines, which are visible from the air anyhow, would not be much affected by blowdown and subsequent clearing.

[5] This figure is based only on an intuitive feeling that 1 foot per man-day is too little and 100 feet per man-day is too much. We consider it probable that 10 feet per man-day is in fact an underestimate.

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TNW can be used for interdiction of passes and trails, independently of tree blowdown. Effects of fallout will be considered separately in Section III-B. Effects of blast, heat, and fire will only be felt by men who happen to be on the trails at the time of the burst; these effects are subject to the limitations already discussed in the section on troop targets. In conclusion, it appears that interdiction of passes and trails by TNW can be effective only against massive enemy movements on a short time scale, but not against dispersed movements extending over many months or years.

B. CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS OF TNW ON THESE TARGETS

Prompt Effects

The main question in judging the utility of TNW against troop targets is the relative effectiveness of TNW, as compared with BLU-3B and other bomblet-canister ordnance now being introduced in B-52 ARC LIGHT attacks. Detailed comparisons of effectiveness are made in the OREGON TRAIL report[6], assuming conditions of large-scale warfare in the European theater. The OREGON TRAIL comparisons do not apply in detail to operations in Southeast Asia. In general, they indicate that TNW are more cost-effective than bomblets against tanks and armored vehicles, but bomblets are more cost-effective against troops in the open. In Southeast Asia, strikes against troop targets will usually be made under conditions that make TNW relatively ineffective.

The effect of TNW upon tunnels in the VC base areas will depend on unknown details of the tunnel system, particularly upon the nature of the rock or soil through which the tunnels are dug. From Glasstone, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,"

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[6] Project OREGON TRAIL, Final Report, Vol. 1 (USACDC No. TSC-6, February 1965, TOP SECRET RD), page 307.

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1962 Ed., page 300, it appears that, in general, a tunnel will survive a groundburst TNW at a distance of four times the crater radius. [redacted] (b)(1) OTRA change this conclusion.

Delayed Effects, Duration of Fallout Patterns in Maintaining Interdiction of Supply Routes

We consider two types of fallout barriers, those which aim to block movement across a continuous front and those which block movement along individual roads or trails. The two types fail to be useful, for rather different reasons.

Continuous-Front Barriers

Fallout can be an effective barrier to movement of troops and supplies on a short time scale. The actual dose rates and distributions obtainable from groundburst weapons are extremely sensitive to local conditions and meteorology. It is therefore helpful to calculate upper limits to the effectiveness of fallout under the assumption of an optimal distribution.

Suppose that Y megatons of fission products are distributed uniformly over a rectangular area of width L and depth D (i.e., we are considering a barrier along a front of width L and depth D, both expressed in miles). Suppose that, T days after the explosion or explosions, a man crosses the front without any shielding at V miles per hour. According to S. Glasstone, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," 1962 Ed., Chapter 9, the dose rate at three feet above ground, when perfectly level ground and uniform distribution are assumed, is

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$$d = 6 \times 10^4 (Y/LDT^{1.2}) \text{ rem/hour.}$$

The total dose to the man crossing the barrier is then

$$\Delta = 6 \times 10^4 \ (Y/LDT^{1.2}) \text{ rem,}$$

and this is independent of the depth of front.

Consider, for example, a barrier that is two weeks old ($T = 14$, $T^{1.2} = 24$) and a man walking across with $V = 3$. Then

$$\Delta = 800 \ (Y/L).$$

Suppose we take $\Delta = 40$ rem as a dose that is low enough to be acceptable (a man could then walk across the barrier twice without noticeable effects). Then the barrier requires

$$Y = (L/20),$$

that is, one megaton per 20 miles of front, and this must be repeated every two weeks. For a 100-mile front, the total fission yield required is 130 MT per year[7]. This is a minimum value, because unavoidable irregularities in the distribution and the topography will allow people crossing the barrier to choose routes where the dose would be less than average. If we chose a time interval, T, less than 14 days, the total yield required per year would be reduced by a factor $(T/14)^{0.2}$. The reduction is less than 50 percent even if the barrier is relaid every day ($T = 1$).

[7] This assumes that accumulation of fallout products beyond two weeks can be neglected because of leaching, countermeasures, etc. If complete accumulation of fallout is assumed, the required one-year yield is reduced by a factor of about three.

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It seems unlikely that the U.S. would be willing to expend more than 1000 nuclear weapons per year for a 100-mile barrier. Therefore, the average fission yield per weapon must be 130 kilotons (KT) or greater. The job simply cannot be done with low-yield weapons.

Now let us estimate the effects of the fallout on civilian populations and U.S. forces at a distance from the barrier. These effects are even more sensitive to meteorology than the local effects. Since we are dealing with yields of 130 KT or greater, the fission products will fall from heights of around 40,000 feet and the fallout patterns will be something like the idealized pattern shown in Glasstone, page 449. Let us assume a value of 15 miles per hour for the component of wind speed that is perpendicular to the front, averaged from sea level to the 40,000-foot altitude. Such a velocity component can be expected to occur fairly often under operational conditions. Then, from Glasstone, pages 429 and 449, we find a total fallout dose between one day and 14 days after the explosions which is, on the average,

$$\Delta' = 600\ (Y/L)\ \text{rem}$$

at a distance of 200 miles downwind from the barrier. If we assume, as before, that $Y = (L/20)$, then $\Delta' = 30$ rem. So the population at a distance of 200 miles from the barrier is exposed to 30 rem in two weeks every time the average wind happens to be blowing in its direction. If the barrier is maintained for a year at two-week intervals, and if the wind direction is bad roughly half the time, then the population at a 200-mile distance receives about 400 rem[8]. This figure is

[8] Assuming no cumulative effects from previous doses. If complete accumulation is assumed the figure would be approximately 500 rem.

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an extremely gross average, and large variations up and down are certain to occur. We may therefore assert a definite conclusion as follows: Any fallout barrier that is effective in stopping men from walking across it at three miles per hour would constitute a lethal threat to a population living permanently within a distance of 200 miles on either side of it. If the people were "friendly," they would have to be evacuated; if they were "enemy," the barrier would be primarily an anti-population, rather than a tactical, operation.

Point Barriers

Since continuous-front barriers appear to be unfeasible, we consider the opposite situation, where fallout is used to block a single road or trail. If the fallout is to be localized, weapons in the kiloton range must be used.

The condition $Y \geq (L/20)$ still applies, where L now is the spread of the fallout perpendicular to the trail. Since meteorology is always variable, L will also be roughly equal to the length of contamination along the trail. Expressing L in feet, now, and Y in kilotons, we have

$$L \leq 100\ Y$$

for a barrier that is effective for two weeks. Since, for the fallout to be localized [redacted] (b)(1) 07RA In fact, the optimum situation for the barrier will occur when most of the fallout is contained in material splattered around the bomb crater.

In the majority of circumstances, the barrier will be easily circumvented by the building of a new road or trail for a few hundred yards around the crater. This could be done in many cases within a few days (or nights). In places where the topography makes an alternative route impossible, it will

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usually be possible to make a passable road right through the bomb crater. Twenty-four inches of earth over the floor, with a sandbag wall on each side, will reduce the radiation dose on the trail by a factor of 100 (Glasstone, page 651). Since the heavily contaminated section cannot exceed 1000 feet in length, a large number of men working in relays could certainly build a shielded trail within two weeks without exposing themselves to lethal radiation doses.

It would of course be possible to block a road or trail by exploding nuclear weapons on it at intervals more frequent than two weeks. But in this case the barrier would be due mainly to the prompt effects of the weapons (killing people who were on the trail at the time of the explosion, and excavating the ground), and the fallout would only be a complicating factor. The use of fallout to constitute by itself a long-lasting barrier is unfeasible, whether the barrier is intended to cover a continuous front or to block individual passes or trails.

C. EXAMINATION AND CRITICISM OF RELEVANT WAR GAMES

The only way to estimate with any degree of precision the effectiveness of TNW in military operations is to conduct detailed war games. Since we have neither the competence nor the facilities to conduct games ourselves, we have confined ourselves to examining the results of past games carried out at RAC and RAND.

RAC Games, [redacted]

As a part of the OREGON TRAIL study, two games were played by RAC in 1964, one studying [redacted] Full details are to be found in Vol. 8, Annexes E and F of the OREGON TRAIL

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report. The weapons and organization of the U.S. forces are not those that now exist; the games were played primarily to test the performance of various alternative future force structures. From the point of view of evaluating the effectiveness of TNW, the differences between the game forces and actual U.S. forces are probably not crucial. The differences lie mainly in the direction of simplifying command and control problems and permitting a more rapid and flexible use of TNW. Thus, the results of the games probably represent an upper limit to the effectiveness of TNW under current operational conditions.

Both games were played with the unilateral use of TNW by U.S. forces.

[redacted]

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[redacted] (3)(C) DTRA Phase 1 ends at this point, with the invaders in possession of the cities and airfields and with the remnants of the defenders retreating into the forested interior of the island.

Phase 2 takes place a month later. U.S. forces are deployed in a "search and destroy" operation, the defending forces being dispersed, Viet Cong style, in the hills. The U.S. forces are successful in surrounding some Chinese units and destroying an infantry battalion; and the game ends, after 29 hours, in a very inconclusive fashion. The report states: "The ability of the (U.S.) division to accomplish its mop-up operation with nuclear weapons was not impressive."

From these games, much can be learned concerning the effectiveness of TNW in a short, intense campaign. The fundamental defect of such games is their short duration. In order to play the battles through with adequate attention to detail, many days of real time are required for each day of game time. For example, the play [redacted] which totalled 72 hours of game time, required three months. It is totally impracticable to play through a war of realistic length at this level of detail. One is almost in as bad a situation as Tristram Shandy, who started to write his autobiography but took a year to describe the events of the first day.

RAND Games, Vietnam and Laos[9]

The RAND games that we have studied are of older vintage than the RAC games, and they were played at a higher level of

[9] E.W. Paxson, et al., "Limited War in Indochina," The RAND Corporation, RM-2050, March 1957, SECRET; G.C. Reinhardt, "Escalation of Limited War in Laos," The RAND Corporation, (Footnote continued on next page.)

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aggregation, i.e., with forces lumped together in larger units. This makes the results of the games less reliable as to details, but has the compensating advantage that wars of longer duration can be played.

The game, Vietnam-3, was played in 1957 and staged in 1958. Red forces invaded South Vietnam across the DMZ and from Laos. In a campaign of 26 days, the invasion was repelled and 33,000 Red troops were killed with 34 TNW.

The game, Seasia-1, was played in 1961 and staged in 1963. A large Red force (310,000 men) invaded Laos and Thailand. Blue replied with heavy interdiction strikes, using TNW to block the mountain passes in northern Laos. Forests were extensively blown down and large Red forces were trapped. In a 30-day campaign, 140,000 Red troops were killed with 208 TNW. The game ended before the fate of the surviving Red forces could be decided.

Both of these RAND games make TNW appear very much more effective than the RAC games do. There are several reasons for the discrepancy. The main reason seems to be that the RAC players allowed the Red forces to react intelligently to the nuclear environment, while the RAND players did not. In particular, the RAND scenario of 310,000 men marching through the mountain passes within a few days seems highly improbable. If these men had moved in small groups over a period of months, as the NVN army in fact does at present, they would never have laid themselves wide open to TNW attack. We conclude that the RAC estimates of TNW effectiveness are the best available and that the RAND estimates are probably too high by a factor of ten.

(Footnote continued from previous page.)
RM-2854-PR, June 1962, SECRET RD; G.C. Reinhardt, "Nuclear Weapons in Limited Warfare -- A Review," The RAND Corporation, RM-3838-PR, January 1964, SECRET RD.

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There are three fundamental weaknesses in all the games we have studied, if they are supposed to have predictive value. First, they ignore the possibility that the use of TNW may be two-sided; we discuss the two-sided situation in Section IV of this report. Second, they do not credit the enemy with the ability to hide and maneuver in the jungle, an ability that he has already demonstrated in Vietnam. Third, they are played on much too short a time scale; the proper time scale for war in Southeast Asia is almost certainly years, rather than days or months, with or without TNW.

Attempt to Guess What Would Happen if These Games Were Conducted on a Longer Time Scale

Nobody can claim the wisdom to predict what would happen in reality after the use of TNW in Southeast Asia had begun. An effort was made in the course of the OREGON TRAIL study to include worldwide political repercussions in a TNW war game. To quote from the OREGON TRAIL report[10], "Project OREGON TRAIL conducted one politico-military war game and sought to construct another, in an effort to test the potential politico-military utility of a capability for tactical nuclear war. The game that was played fell short of achieving its purpose, and the one under construction was aborted, largely because of gamers' disbelief that there was any objective short of national survival for which the United States and the Soviet Union would be prepared to employ TNW, and their equal disbelief that either would let his national survival be determined by the outcome of an arbitrarily limited battle." This unwillingness of professional experts to include long-range political factors within the scope of their predictions shows that they have a proper awareness of the limitations of their discipline.

[10] Project OREGON TRAIL Final Report, Volume 17, page P-7.

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A more modest type of prediction may be more allowable. We may ask, not what would happen in real life after the introduction of TNW, but what would happen if one of the RAC or RAND war games were played according to the same rules for a much longer time. That is to say, we assume that the war remains limited and confined to the local theater, that the use of TNW remains unilateral, and that the military struggle continues without change of political objectives. What, then, will happen after two or five years?

When we ask ourselves this question, we find ourselves always coming back, perhaps because of lack of imagination, to the same answer. We find that, after an initial success, the further use of TNW brings diminishing returns and the situation gradually reverts to the status quo. [redacted] the enemy retires into the jungles, presents few targets for TNW, and continues to operate more or less in the way the Viet Cong have been operating for the last few years. In the end, there is a stalemate that can only be broken by introducing larger U.S. forces or other extraneous factors into the game. So long as the game is played with the postulated forces, the stalemate persists, and a numerically inferior U.S. force with or without TNW cannot break it.

D. SCENARIOS FOR USE OF TNW IN ESCALATION OF CURRENT OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

Use of TNW Against VC Bases in SVN

We discussed this use in Section III-A. TNW can be very effective if the positions of bases are known accurately, especially if attacks can be delivered without warning. Attacks, to be useful, must be preceded by ground patrolling and

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followed by ground mop-up operations. In these respects, the use of TNW will require the same sort of coordination as the current ARC LIGHT attacks. If accurately delivered, TNW can dig out tunnel systems that are impervious to ARC LIGHT.

In summary, the use of TNW in SVN would be helpful, but in no sense decisive. It would be equivalent to a major increase in the strength of the B-52 bombardments.

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Use Against Chinese Troops Moving Through Passes

Provided their movements are dispersed in space and time, there is no reason why Chinese troops in the passes should be particularly vulnerable to TNW. The most important effect of TNW on a Chinese force invading Southeast Asia would probably be in limiting its size. A force that is too large to live off the country would be subject to disaster, through interruption of its supply lines. It is therefore reasonable to think of TNW as having a decisive effect only in the conventional scenario of a Chinese "horde," a million strong, walking into Southeast Asia. A more probable scenario would have a Chinese army of two or three hundred thousand moving south in small groups, in support of NVN or against Thailand, and keeping under cover of the jungle most of the time. Their vulnerability to TNW would then be not much greater than that of the Viet Cong.

Use for Long-Term Interdiction of Supply Routes

We saw in Section III-B that the specific long-lasting effects of nuclear explosions (e.g., fallout) are not capable by themselves of long-term interdiction. What can be done in the way of long-term interdiction is to repeatedly attack roads, railways, bridges and waterways, vehicles, and petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) in the same style as the current ROLLING THUNDER attacks in NVN, but with TNW to increase the effectiveness. Such attacks will certainly reduce the movement of

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vehicular supply to a very low level, if TNW can be used in sufficient numbers. Still, the numbers of TNW required will be very large over a period of time. At least one TNW is required for each target, and the targets are mostly small and fleeting. A reasonable guess at the order of magnitude of weapon requirements for a nuclear ROLLING THUNDER operation would be ten per day or 3000 per year.[11] This is an extravagant use of the U.S. stockpiles, especially when other stockpiles in the world are not being correspondingly depleted. And in spite of it all, the basic Viet Cong system of supply by man-hauling and bicycle would not be destroyed. VC units could continue to fight at a reduced level, ready to spring back as soon as the nuclear bombardment should slacken.

[11] During the year from March 1965 to February 1966, 28,640 attack sorties were flown in operation ROLLING THUNDER (Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, DIA-ISIC, DIAIS-105-66, April 1966, SECRET). There were three categories of targets: 134 major (JCS-designated), 6100 small fixed (bridges, ferry facilities, military barracks, and supply facilities), and 3400 mobile (trucks, trains, and boats). A RAND targeting study (T. T. Connors and M. G. Weiner, "Target Study: Weapons, Sorties and Time Requirements for Four Alternative Force Employment Concepts," The RAND Corporation, RM-4537-PR, September 1965, SECRET RD), comparing the effectiveness of nonnuclear air attack with TNW in the [redacted] destruction of the entire military target system, reached the conclusion that approximately 12 nonnuclear sorties are equivalent to one TNW. Applying this conversion ratio to the ROLLING THUNDER sorties, we reach the figure of 2400 TNW for a year which included the 37-day bombing pause. Thus, 3000 TNW per year of full-scale interdiction is not a highly inflated estimate.

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IV. THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST U.S. FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The employment of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces in Vietnam raises the question of a Russian or Chinese nuclear response, either directly or by supplying North Vietnam and/or the Viet Cong with nuclear weapons. In the case of Russia, three considerations may compel action:

- Competition with China for the leadership of the Communist world and revolutionary movements in the "third world." At present, Russia is the only Communist country capable of responding in kind to a nuclear attack on an ally; failure to do so might be considered by Soviet leadership as an intolerable loss of prestige and lack of revolutionary fervor.
- Credibility of the Soviet deterrent. Soviet leaders may feel that any failure to challenge the use of even tactical nuclear weapons by the U.S. would be construed in America as evidence of Russian weakness and lack of determination. Since the Cuban missile crisis constituted a backdown by the USSR, it may be felt that a show of determination in Vietnam is that much more important.
- Denying carte blanche to the U.S. The Soviets may wish to demonstrate that unilateral use of nuclear weapons for crushing revolutions will not be countenanced.

In the case of China, similar motives may exist, modulated by the fact that China possesses no strategic deterrent and only a very small weapons stockpile. It is anybody's guess how China would weigh the advantages and disadvantages of using its nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

Finally, a word about first use of TNW by Communist forces in Vietnam is in order. The conclusions of this section indicate that U.S. forces in SVN offer a number of well-defined, lucrative targets. Despite this, the first use of nuclear weapons by Communist forces appears quite unlikely for the following reasons, even if the time should come when the VC despair of winning:

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- Russian unwillingness to risk escalation, either through tactical use or through use on unauthorized targets (e.g., Saigon).
- Russian unwillingness to risk the theft of nuclear weapons (NW) by China.
- Chinese fear of retaliation on Chinese targets (e.g., nuclear facilities).

The remainder of this section is devoted to an estimate of the possibilities and results of a nuclear attack on U.S. forces in SVN. Although troop concentrations per se might on occasion offer substantial targets, the existence of a small number of densely packed U.S. bases offers stationary targets of immense value, and we therefore restrict ourselves to considering attacks on bases.

A. THE U.S. ORDER OF BATTLE IN VIETNAM

American ground forces in SVN are concentrated in 13 main bases (pages 26 and 28 of the S.E. Asia Military Fact Book, DIAIS-105-66, April 1966). Of these, six are located in the coastal plain (Hue, Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, Phan Rang), five in the southern lowlands (Saigon, Bien Hoa, Cu Chi, Ben Cat, Phuoc Vinh), and two in the central highlands (Pleiku, An Khe). Air/naval forces are located in nine bases, of which only one, Cam Ranh Bay, is not included in the above list. Table 1 shows the locations, contents, perimeters of the bases.

Approach distances are based on the following considerations. Foot infiltration by small units up to the actively defended perimeter of all bases is an acknowledged fact. Undetected approach by motor vehicles, on the other hand, is improbable, if only because it has, to the best of our knowledge, not been attempted. This is not to exclude the use of trucks in urban areas -- Saigon or Hue, for instance -- as long as the truck contents are sufficiently small to permit camouflage.

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Table 1. SUMMARY OF U.S. BASES IN SVN

Base	Location	Ground HQ	Planes or Specialty	Diameter of Perimeter (miles)	[redacted]
Hue	Coastal Plain	Regiment		5 to 8	2 to 3
Qui Nhon	Coastal Plain	Division	Major logistic support	25	7 to 8
Da Nang	Coastal Plain	Corps	119	25	7 to 8
Nha Trang	Coastal Plain	Division	25	10	4 to 6
Vung Tau	Coastal Plain			10	4 to 6
Phan Rang	Coastal Plain	Brigade	18	5 to 8	2 to 3
Cam Ranh Bay	Coastal Plain		72	25	7 to 8
Saigon	Southern Lowlands	Army MACV		Many small enclaves	[redacted]
Bien Hoa	Southern Lowlands	Division	81	5 to 8	2 to 3
Cu Chi	Southern Lowlands	Division		5 to 8	2 to 3
Ben Cat	Southern Lowlands	Brigade		5 to 8	2 to 3
Phuoc Vinh	Southern Lowlands	Brigade		5 to 8	2 to 3
Pleiku	Central Highlands	Brigade	18	10	4 to 6
An Khe	Central Highlands	Division	Large no. of helicopters	1 1/2	1

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The coast is patrolled in 10-mile sectors by fast motorboats (Swifts), which are capable of intercepting all coastal traffic. At present, all large junks (40 to 50 ft and 5 to 10 tons) are inspected. It is unlikely that such a vessel would have a mean free path greater than five miles, and its approach to within 5 to 10 miles of a base is thus unlikely. On the other hand, there are thousands of small sampans of about 20-ft length and about 1-ton capacity, only a fraction of which are now routinely inspected, and sea or river approach to within a few miles by such vessels is possible at present. It may be possible to enforce a perimeter of several-mile radius around each base, which could be entered by any vessel only after inspection; this would be very difficult where bases are located near rivers or civilian harbors, e.g., Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Saigon.

B. MEANS OF DELIVERING TNW

Delivery Systems

Table 2 lists some characteristics of known Soviet tactical and medium-range missiles. Table 3 lists characteristics of Soviet fighter and medium bomber aircraft. The missile systems cover a wide spectrum of ranges (from 10 to 2000 miles) and are characterized by fairly heavy warheads, even in the case of the mobile tactical FROG systems, suggesting yields in the multi-kiloton range for all systems. Very little seems to be known about the existence of TNW designed specifically for infantry

[redacted]

To give a feeling for what the Soviets might do along these lines, Table 4 lists characteristics of some relevant U.S. systems. [redacted]

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Table 2. SOME SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEMS

	Missile							Launch Vehicle			
	Length (ft)	Weight (lb)	Maximum Diameter (in)	Warhead Weight (lb)	Type	CEP	Range (n mi)	Weight (ST)	Range (mi)	Speed (mph)	Type
Scud-A (SS-1b)	--	--	--	2860	Inertial BM	0 5 n mi	80	--	--	--	Stalin tank
Scud-B (SS-1c)	--	--	--	2000	Inertial BM	0 4 n mi	150	--	--	--	Stalin tank
Sibling (SS-2)	(essentially a V-2)			3300	Radio/ Inertial BM	3 4 n mi	300	(Fixed site)			
Shyster (SS-3)	--	--	--	1800 to 3000	Radio/ Inertial BM	1 0 n mi	620	(Fixed site)			
Sandal (SS-4)	(single-stage storable propellant)			2200	Inertial BM	1 5 n.mi	1020	(Fixed site)			
Skean (SS-5)	(storable propellant)			3500	Inertial BM	1 0 n mi	2200	(Fixed site)			
Shaddock (SSC-1)	(cruise-type Mach 1 2 at <3000-ft altitude)			1000 to 1500	Cruise	500 ft	150 and 3000	(Fixed site)			
Short-range cruise	(Mach 0 9 cruises at 2000 to 3000 ft)			1000 to 1500	Beam rider w term homing	150 ft	40	(Transport-launcher)			
FROG-1	--	--	--	--	--	--	13 to 17 5	(Tracked vehicle)			
FROG-2	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	--	--	--	--
FROG-3	35	4700	21	1320	Solid prop rocket	450 yd	17 5	18 6	155	25	PT-76 amphibious tank
FROG-4	34	4200	16	820	Solid prop rocket	750 yd	29	18 6	155	25	PT-76 amphibious tank
FROG-5	30	4200	--	820	Solid prop rocket	750 yd	29	18 6	155	25	PT-76 amphibious tank
FROG-6	18 to 20	--	--	est 510 KT	--	--	12 to 17	--	--	--	ZIL 157 truck
SS-N-4	--	--	--	1500	Inertial	1 to 2 n mi	350	(Surfaced submarine)			
SS-N-5	--	--	--	1500	Inertial	1 to 2 n mi	700	(Submerged submarine)			

SOURCE Soviet Threat Relating to SAM-D Weapon System, 1970-80, NIO-CR-17-02-65, June 1965, SECRET NOFORN

the DAVY CROCKETT warhead fro[redacted] by [redacted]

[redacted]

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Table 3. SOME SOVIET AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

Type	Combat Radius with Bomb Load (n mi.)		Bomb Load (lb)	Ceiling (kft)	Max Speed (knots)	
	High-Low-High	Low-Low-Low			Sea Level	50,000 ft or Ceiling
MIG-15 (Fighter)	230	85	550	51	585	505
MIG-17 (Fighter)	210	90	550	54	605	550
MIG-19 (Fighter)	440	140	550	55	650	635
MIG-21 (Fighter)	425	150	550	61	660	1150
TU-16 Badger (Medium Bomber)	2000	2000	10,000 or 2 AS-1[a] or 1 AS-2[b]	47	380	475
Blinder (Medium Bomber, Supersonic)	~1500 to 2000	~750 to 1000	3,300 or 1 AS-4[c]	47	560	850

SOURCE "Soviet Threat Relating to SAM-D Weapon System, 1970-80," MID-CR-17-02-65, June 1965, SECRET NOFORN

[a]Cruise missile, range 55 n.mi., speed Mach 0 9

[b]Cruise missile, range 100 n mi , speed Mach 2 0

[c]Boost-glide missile, range 280 n.mi , speed Mach 5.3 (max.).

(b)(1)
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[redacted] The weight of such a mortar tube is probably 500 to 1000 lb, which makes it cumbersome for guerrilla use. However, it is certainly within Soviet or Chinese technological capabilities to build sectioned mortar tubes, particularly since each tube need only be fired a few times, at most.

Relatively little seems to be known about the existence of Soviet atomic demolition munitions (ADM). Since such devices are small and light in weight and are emplaced by hand, this

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Table 4. SOME U.S. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

System	Launcher	Range (km)	Warhead (lb)	Yield (KT)
LITTLE JOHN	2-1/2-ton truck takes four	[redacted]		
DAVY CROCKETT	120mm recoilless 155mm recoilless			
ADM 59	--			
ADM 50	--			
SADM	--			

[a]Motor 860.

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may merely indicate a gap in intelligence. There is no doubt that the USSR is capable of either designing ADM or adapting weapons from stockpile to ADM with little difficulty. The characteristics of some U.S. ADM are shown in Table 4.

Modes of Employment

Tables 1 and 3 show that all U.S. bases are within range of Soviet bomber aircraft based on Hainan or the Chinese mainland. MIG fighter-bombers based on Hainan can make the round trip to all but the southern bases and can reach all bases if the crews bail out over Cambodia or Laos. While planes stationed in NVN could reach U.S. bases, it is unlikely that a U.S. first strike would leave operational airfields in NVN.

The data of Tables 1 and 2 indicate that all U.S. bases in SVN are within range of the sea-launched Soviet SS-N-4 and SS-N-5 missiles, within range of the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) SS-3 and SS-4 located in NVN, within range of the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) SS-5 located in China, within range of the short-range missiles SS-1b, SS-1c, and SSC-1 located in Laos, and within range of short-range mobile FROG rockets, mortars, or recoilless rifles suitably located in SVN.

The ease with which these systems can be deployed may vary inversely with political desirability, at least from the Soviet point of view, since a response in Vietnam (as contrasted to an attack on Europe or the U.S.) implies a desire to avoid escalation and keep the conflict localized. There is little doubt that Russian submarines can approach to within range of all U.S. bases in Vietnam. However, their offensive use would constitute an overt Soviet attack on U.S. forces and, therefore, it has great potential for escalation. The installation of Soviet IRBM or aircraft in China with relative ease is technically feasible, but this would require a considerable shift in

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Sino-Soviet relations, and it also involves a serious risk of escalation. The emplacement of MRBM in NVN without detection by U.S. aerial reconnaissance is difficult, but probably not impossible, if missiles are located singly rather than in batteries, and deployed beneath forest canopy (which could be removed before firing). This course involves less risk of escalation than the first two alternatives. Least escalatory is the deployment of TNW in SVN for use by or in conjunction with guerrilla forces.

The deployment of FROG systems offers considerable difficulties, because the transportation problems into and within SVN are formidable. Normally, 80 to 100 pounds are carried on human backs along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The maximum feasible disassembly of FROG rockets probably leaves pieces in the 2000-pound range.[12] It must be remembered, however, that the Viet Minh managed to emplace twenty 105mm artillery pieces at Dien Bien Phu. (Weight of cannon, 1064 pounds; total weight of weapon, 4475 pounds.) It would not be necessary to use the conventional FROG rocket carriers, which are 18-ton tank chassis or heavy trucks. The actual launch mechanism is probably sufficiently demountable to offer no serious problems of transportation.

While the possibility of a FROG attack cannot be neglected, a more probable mode of attack is one with nuclear weapons fired from mortars or recoilless rifles. If sectioned barrels and lightweight projectiles (250-pound) are used, the approach and emplacement problems would not differ significantly from logistic problems now solved successfully by the VC.

Since a large number of U.S. bases are located on the coast, the possibility of short-range, sea-launched attacks

[12] Very large weights have in the past been moved by primitive means. Robert F. Heinze [Science 153, 821 (August 19, 1966)] states that a group of men using poles can carry a load of 3000 pounds at a walking pace.

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must be considered. It is unlikely that vessels large enough to carry FROG missiles could make their way from NVN down the coast without being detected, or that they could be equipped with FROG rockets in SVN at sufficient distances from U.S. bases to make the sea approach worthwhile. The capacity of sampans small enough to avoid routine inspection is insufficient to carry FROG rockets, but such vessels armed with recoilless rifles could probably approach to within firing range at several bases, especially those near harbors or rivers.

Finally, the possibility of clandestine delivery into U.S. bases must be considered. Since the risks of capture of the weapon or death of the agent are high, this method may seem unsatisfactory, but it offers a real possibility for determined guerrillas to emplace heavier, higher yield weapons than can be delivered by mortar or recoilless rifle. Such attacks could be particularly effective against storage facilities and harbors.

Enemy Supply Problems

Potentially, the most difficult problem of all is getting TNW into NVN or SVN in the first place. A U.S. first strike would eliminate at least all known airfields and, probably, railroad connections with China at Lao Cay and Dong Dang. To make the most unfavorable case for supply, let us assume that harbor facilities at Haiphong and the remaining 12 secondary ports are also destroyed, although this would require a massive attack and, in the case of Haiphong, the risk of destroying a considerable quantity of nonbelligerent shipping. Under these stringent conditions, it might still be possible to introduce MRBM into NVN from China by rail shipment to the border at Lao Cay, followed by road transportation into the NVN mountains at night. In view of the considerable difficulties of introducing a large number of MRBM in this manner, sea shipment and off-loading without benefit of dock facilities might also be attempted. In fact, however, the main emphasis might not be on

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MRBM emplacements in NVN, but rather on supplying nuclear mortars, recoilless cannon, and ADM to VC elements in SVN. In view of their small sizes and weights, introduction of these weapons into NVN and subsequent transportation along the Ho Chi Minh Trail into SVN offers only minimum difficulties, although it would probably take several months to deliver 50 to 100 weapons in this way. For this reason, direct shipment to SVN by submarine and landing via sea sled become a possibility if only a few weapons for a rapid initial response are desired. (In many places, the 20-fathom line, which is the approximate limit for submerged submarines lies ≲1 mile offshore.) Thus, there seems to be little question that, even under the most favorable circumstances from the U.S. point of view, heavy nuclear attacks on U.S. bases could be launched from either NVN or from within SVN, within three to six months of U.S. first use, while a lighter attack could be launched within a few weeks.

C. THE EFFECT OF NUCLEAR ATTACKS ON U.S. FORCES

Table 5 lists the effective radii of severe destruction for various target categories from airbursts and surfacebursts of [redacted] For groundbursts, roughly the same results would be achieved by weapons of twice the yield.

Most of the targets ir U.S. bases consist of subunits of 1- to 2-mile diameter, spaced sufficiently far apart to require separate attack by weapons in the kiloton range. [redacted] depending on the details of each target. In the case of a soft, concentrated target like the helicopter park at An Khe, which measures about 4000 x 3000 feet, one 10-KT groundburst would suffice to destroy all parked helicopters.

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Table 5. RADIUS OF SEVERE DAMAGE (FEET) FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Target	Airburst				Surfaceburst			
	1-KT Yield	10-KT Yield	20-KT Yield	100-KT Yield	1-KT Yield	10-KT Yield	20-KT Yield	100-KT Yield
Trucks (7 psi)	1800	4000	4,900	8,400	1200	2600	3000	5,500
Airplanes, Unprotected (3 psi)	3200	7000	8,700	15,000	1900	4200	5300	9,100
Airplanes, Revetted	1400	3100	4,000	6,700	1000	2200	2750	4,600
Ships, Commercial	600	1500	1,800	3,000	600	1500	1800	3,000
Oil Tanks, Half-Full (4 psi)	2600	5800	7,200	12,500	1700	3600	4500	7,600
Unprotected Troops (3 psi)	3200	7000	8,700	15,000	1900	4200	5300	9,100
Dug-in Troops (20 psi)	900	2000	2,500	4,400	700	1500	1900	3,300
2nd Degree Burns on Bare Skin	2600	8000	10,000	21,000	2100	6400	8000	17,000
	Temporary flash blindness will occur at much greater ranges							

SOURCE S Glasstone, "Effects of Nuclear Weapons," U S. EAC, 1962

Unprotected troops would suffer lethal radiation doses (taken as 1000 rem) at 1100 yards from ground zero from a 10-KT airburst, inflammable stores would be destroyed at about 1000 yards.

In the following paragraphs, we examine various attacks.

Coordinated MRBM Strike on All U.S. Bases

Despite the rather large CEP of most Soviet MRBM (see Table 2), the relatively high yields -- about 100 KT to more than 1 MT -- make it certain that all bases could be destroyed within one-half to two hours by 15 to 20 missiles, depending on whether the attack is by land or sea, or a combination of both.

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The average number of troops on base at a given time has been variously estimated at from 30 percent to 80 percent of total complement. The number of planes on base at night is probably closer to 100 percent, while only about 30 percent of all helicopters are generally at the main bases, the rest being deployed in widely scattered forward areas. The effect of a heavy simultaneous attack, timed to within about one-half hour, would thus wipe out a large fraction of the U.S. troops and planes, as well as almost all installations, food supplies, POL, and ammunition. A time scale of two hours would have very similar effects, except for the immediate survival of most personnel if rapid dispersal were carried out. There is no need to carry this scenario further.

Air Strike from Hainan or the Chinese Mainland

An air strike provides the quickest nuclear response, and it might be undertaken for this reason. A massive, simultaneous attack, by BADGER or BLINDER medium bombers runs the risk of radar detection and interception by U.S. aircraft before reaching its targets. Further, such an attack, unlike a missile strike from NVN, would constitute a direct U.S.-China confrontation. Nevertheless, it could be very effective, particularly if standoff air-to-surface missiles (ASM) were used. Perhaps sneak raids on individual bases by one or two low-flying aircraft are more likely. The chances of penetrating air defenses in this mode of attack are fairly high.

Coordinated Attack with Low-Yield (10 to 20 KT) Weapons

If a coordinated nuclear mortar or recoilless rifle attack were launched simultaneously (to within 1 to 2 hours) on all U.S. bases by enough low-yield weapons, much the same result as in a heavy MRBM attack would be achieved. Such an attack

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would require the approach and simultaneous firing of one or two 10-KT weapons per target, or roughly 10 to 20 weapons per base (see Table 1), i.e., a total of about 70 to 100 weapons. While such an attack cannot be ruled out, it would require great coordination and run some risks of degradation by premature firing or partial discovery.

Drawn-Out Attack by Low-Yield Weapons

A somewhat more piecemeal attack by guerrilla units, spaced out over weeks or months, seems a more probable mode of response to U.S. use of TNW, for instance, an attack on a helicopter park, followed a week later by destruction of a harbor or a POL storage facility, and so on. Attacks of this kind are likely to include as much "mix" as the VC are capable of providing -- mortar attack by infiltrating units and clandestine delivery by truck or boat.

"Revenge" Attacks

It may be that the VC and NVN forces would be unable to mount a full-scale, tactical, nuclear counterattack of the sort discussed above, particularly if they must rely on weapons supplied by the CPR. What sort of revenge attack could they make with a few nuclear weapons of moderate yield?

Perhaps the most attractive single target in South Vietnam is the Saigon airport. Besides the large number of planes and landing facilities that would be destroyed, a single well-placed explosion could also destroy the new intelligence center and kill several thousand Americans. The airport is on the outskirts of Saigon, in an area of sufficiently low population density to qualify as a military target, and the usual wind conditions would not carry fallout directly over Saigon. The present level of security would not keep out suitcase bombs.

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After Saigon airport, the most attractive targets seem to be troop concentrations, particularly the barracks areas at Pleiku, Da Nang, and An Khe. Here, a mortar attack would probably be called for (particularly at An Khe, which is closed to Vietnamese), but, although risky, this is far from impossible. A 10- to 20-KT explosion in each one of these three bases would kill perhaps 5000 American troops, equivalent to one year's casualties at the current rate.

Since installations, harbors, storage facilities, and the like are immobile, they are hostage to piecemeal or revenge attacks almost as much as to a massive, coordinated strike. Troops and helicopters and, to a lesser extent, fixed-wing aircraft (which must be on some airfield) can be dispersed on a short-term basis, and thus, they might be much less severely hit in a piecemeal, guerrilla-style attack. However, even a very modest attack would tend to paralyze the fighting efficiency of these bases and to disrupt air support and logistic operations.

The importance of logistic support for troops in the field cannot be exaggerated, so that the net effect of even a light nuclear attack on one or two main bases would be very great. To illustrate that such an attack is possible with relatively modest means and on a short time scale, two illustrative scenarios are described in the appendix to this section.

In addition to the physical effect on U.S. forces, the news of a successful nuclear attack on a U.S. base would have enormous propaganda value for the Communists, not only in Vietnam, but in all of Asia and Africa.

D. COUNTERMEASURES

It is pertinent to inquire how and to what extent the U.S. forces in SVN can be protected against nuclear attacks or counterattacks. Two main possibilities must be considered -- dispersion and hardening.

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Dispersion

A highly dispersed permanent deployment of U.S. forces in SVN in anticipation of nuclear attack would seriously degrade their effectiveness for many reasons. Since U.S. forces operate in a hostile environment, which requires active defense of all positions, large-scale dispersal would mean a vast increase in purely defensive effort. For example, if a major base like Da Nang, with a diameter of 25 miles, were to be dispersed into ten units of the same aggregate area, the defended perimeter would be three times as long. If the split were into 20 units the increase in perimeter would be fivefold. The difficulties of supply would be aggravated at least linearly with dispersion. In addition, the aggressive potential of each smaller unit would be degraded, since a sizable fraction of the troops at any base would be required for defense. Further, present U.S. facilities in SVN represent a large investment in money and effort, so that dispersal by a factor of more than two or three would be very difficult from the point of view of cost and time. While some dispersal, particularly of airplanes and helicopters, is undoubtedly possible, the feasibility of large-scale overall dispersion is highly questionable.

Hardening

While hardening against a massive Soviet missile attack with megaton weapons is infeasible, except for a few key targets like important HQ, many components can be partially protected against attacks with kiloton weapons.

Troops

A high degree of protection for troops can be obtained by hardening sleeping quarters to about 100 psi. [redacted] so that the kill radius is reduced by a factor of eight by hardening

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to this pressure. This provides not only nighttime protection for most of the base population, but it might also permit the personnel of all but the first target to seek shelter, if a base-wide attack is spaced out over a few minutes. If we take a rough figure of 10 sq ft/man for living space at a cost of $50/sq ft at 100-psi hardening (taken from civil defense estimates), the cost of providing living space for 500,000 men is $250 million. If this space figure were quadrupled to include some working space, the cost would not exceed about $1 billion. This estimate is exceedingly rough, but at least the figure for living space seems reasonable.

Aircraft

If we take the figure of $50/sq ft and assign 3000 sq ft to an airplane, the cost of protecting a plane is about $150,000 or about 6 percent of the original airplane cost. There is no present means of protecting runways, but the use of nuclear weapons to attack these seems uneconomical for guerrilla forces.

Storage Facilities

If we assume $6 per cu yd as the cost of excavating in rock, the cost of excavation for providing underground facilities of 10^6 cu yd would be of the order of $6 million. The total cost of providing 1 million cu yd of storage space would probably not exceed this figure by more than a factor of ten.

Extended Perimeters

In sparsely populated regions, bases could be protected against short-range attacks by an extension of the defense perimeter, for instance, by extensive devegetation. If the cost of clearing one acre of forest is taken as being $500, the cost of clearing a 10-mile-radius circle is $80 million.

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Thus, the protection of major portions of U.S. bases is possible in principle, at a cost of about 10 percent of the present total investment ($10 billion to $15 billion). However, major efforts at hardening take time and are conspicuous, and they would serve notice to the enemy that we expected nuclear weapons to be used.

E. WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS AGAINST U.S. FORCES IN SVN

The 14 main bases of our forces in SVN can be divided into subunits requiring one or two 10-KT airbursts for more or less complete destruction. There are about 70 of these units. If allowance for capture, malfunction, or redundant use is made by assigning each weapon an a priori effectiveness of 0.5, then 150 10-KT weapons would suffice for a crippling blow at U.S. forces.

At present, this seems quite beyond Chinese capabilities, but it represents only a minor demand on the Soviet stockpile, as far as fissionable material is concerned. It is not known to us how many actual weapons in the 10-KT range are available to the Soviets. Since 1962, there have been detonated about a dozen weapons in this range. It is known that MRBM and FROG warheads exist in very large numbers relative to VN requirements.

Thus, there are no stockpile limitations and probably no weapon limitations on repeated attacks on U.S. forces with Soviet-supplied TNW.

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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF TNW IN THE HANDS OF INSURGENTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

A very serious long-range problem would arise if the U.S. use of TNW in Southeast Asia were countered by Soviet supply of TNW to North Vietnam, and if the effectiveness of guerrilla attack with TNW against U.S. forces were as great as we have estimated in Section IV. Insurgent groups everywhere in the world would take note and would try by all available means to acquire TNW for themselves. The USSR might decide, having once taken the plunge in Southeast Asia, that there would be no particular harm in giving TNW to her friends in South America or Africa. Even if the USSR should hold the line against further dissemination of TNW, there would still be an ever-increasing series of opportunities for guerrilla forces to acquire nuclear weapons as the worldwide nuclear power industry expands during the next decade. For example, the presently programmed civilian nuclear power stations in India alone[13] will produce material for about 500 bombs during the next ten years. During the 1980s there will be vast quantities of fissionable material produced in many countries, and leakage into unauthorized channels will be difficult to prevent. It is therefore of tremendous long-range importance to avoid setting a precedent for the use of TNW by guerrilla forces.

It is clear on general grounds that forces of law and order will be at a grave disadvantage in dealing with insurgents

[13] The Indian reactor output is planned to rise approximately linearly to 2980 megawatts (electric) by 1976 (Nucleonics, March 1966, p. 25). The output of plutonium is estimated at 300 grams per megawatt-year (electric) (Nucleonics, April 1966, p. 17), giving a total of 4000 kg in ten years.

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willing to make ruthless and irresponsible use of TNW. A small minority of dissidents with a supply of TNW could blackmail and ultimately destroy any but the most resolute government. If this were to happen, the U.S. would probably be faced with a choice between two evils, either to allow nuclear blackmail to succeed or to intervene with military force under very unfavorable circumstances. Just as in Vietnam, the U.S. forces will be very much more vulnerable than the insurgents to nuclear attack.

We conclude this section by mentioning a few places where dissident groups armed with TNW could do particularly grave damage.

- Panama. A few weapons could destroy the locks and put the canal out of operation for a considerable time. In addition, the U.S. base areas in the Canal Zone are highly vulnerable.
- Venezuela. Oil pipelines and storage facilities are very vulnerable. The oil industry is vital to the Venezuelan economy and also important to the U.S.
- The Middle East. It is easy to imagine a group of Arab extremists acquiring some TNW and using them to precipitate an all-out Arab-Israeli war by demolishing, say, Tel Aviv.
- South Africa. The urban economy of white South Africa is a perennially tempting target for any black nationalists who may come into possession of nuclear weapons.

In all of these areas, the danger of nuclear guerrilla activity is likely to arise in some degree during the next 20 years, independently of anything the U.S. may do. But the dangers will certainly become more acute if the U.S. leads the way by initiating tactical nuclear war in Southeast Asia.

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VI. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

A. ESCALATION

The use of nuclear weapons represents in itself a major escalation, if only politically, and it is quite impossible to predict with any certainty what the results of such a step might be. It is possible that the danger of general war would deter the USSR and China from making any nuclear response whatever to a U.S. first use of TNW. On the other hand, as pointed out in the introduction to Section IV, there would be strong pressure on the USSR to make a dramatic reply. Despite these large uncertainties, it is worthwhile to examine possible modes of further escalation, if only because this gives some estimate of the relative probabilities of various Communist responses to U.S. first use.

Nuclear Attack by VC Units in SVN

A likely counterresponse by the U.S. would be a very heavy attack, possibly with megaton weapons, on War Zones C and D. If the VC attack were very damaging, our response could well be an attack on NVN strategic targets, including harbors and population centers. Whether this would in turn provoke direct Soviet or Chinese nuclear intervention or would terminate the war is a matter for speculation.

MRBM Attack Launched from North Vietnam

An attack on U.S. forces by MRBM carrying high-yield warheads would undoubtedly be very damaging. The U.S. responses would probably include all the options described above and an attempt to destroy the enemy launch sites.

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IRBM Attack from China

The immediate response would undoubtedly be an attempt to eliminate the launch sites. There is the possibility that attacks against Chinese nuclear installations would be launched as well. In addition, blows against War Zones C and D and against NVN also seem likely.

It is not obvious what the results of an attack on Chinese territory would be. It might or might not result in immediate Soviet involvement; in any case, the probability of general U.S.-Chinese war in these circumstances is high. This could lead in turn to a general U.S.-Soviet war, particularly if a strategic attack on China is launched by the U.S.

Air Strikes from China

Essentially, the arguments given for the IRBM attack apply.

Soviet Submarine-Launched Missile Attack

This would constitute a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The minimum counter, in addition to blows at the VC and at NVN, would be an attack on Soviet submarines in Southeast Asian waters and probably anywhere on the high seas. However, an attack on military targets in the Soviet Union, leading to general war, cannot be excluded.

Two additional points must be made. First, the use of NW by either side in VN could elicit from the other side a much stronger response than suggested here, or an ultimatum containing the threat of strong response. The ultimate outcome *is impossible to predict; we merely point out that general* war could result, even from the least provocative use of NW that either side can devise.

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Second, our scenarios presuppose that the source of an attack can be determined with reasonable certainty, so that there is at least the option of a minimum response. In practice, this may not be the case. Sea-launched missiles could probably be picked up by coastal radar during launch phase if the radar were switched on and the crews were alert. IRBM or MRBM might not be detected before impact. Short-range weapons might or might not appear on antimortar radars; but even if they did, this information might not get out of the attacked base. Consequently, the U.S. responses could exceed those sketched here, because of uncertainty about the source and intent of the attack.

B. LONG-RANGE CONSEQUENCES

Even if massive escalation did not result, U.S. first use of TNW in Vietnam would have many serious long-range effects. The most important of these is probably the crossing of the nuclear threshold. As Herman Kahn[14] points out, abstention from the use of any NW is universally recognized as a political and psychological threshold, however rational or irrational the distinction between "nuclear" and "nonnuclear" may be. Crossing it may greatly weaken the barriers to proliferation and general use of nuclear weapons. This would be to the ultimate disadvantage of the U.S., even if it did not increase the probability of strategic war.

Whether or not U.S. first use of TNW is countered by the Communists, the effect of first use on world opinion in general and on our Allies in particular would be extremely unfavorable. With the exception of Thailand and Laos, the action would almost certainly be condemned even in Asia and might result in the abrogation of treaty obligations by Japan.

[14] H. Kahn, "Conditions Under Which the Introduction of TNW by the U.S. Would Clearly Be to Its Ultimate Advantage or Disadvantage," HI-443-D (HI-TS-58), September 1964,,TOP SECRET RD.

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The effect on public opinion in the U.S. goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is probably safe to assume that first use of TNW would be extremely divisive, no matter how much preparation preceded it.

In sum, the political effects of U.S. first use of TNW in Vietnam would be uniformly bad and could be catastrophic.

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VII. APPENDIX TO SECTION IV

Harbors, airfields, and staging areas offer attractive targets for TNW. Could the VC smuggle nuclear explosives into these? Suppose we use TNW to interdict the supply lines from NVN and Russia decides to supply nuclear weapons to the VC. While our interdiction would be difficult to maintain, it would certainly slow the overland delivery of bombs for clandestine use. An alternative route, much used in the last world war, is submarine delivery. In numerous places, the SVN 20-fathom line (about the limit for submerged subs) is within one mile of shore. A sea sled for ferrying weapons in neutral buoyancy containers from a submarine to a secret cache on some remote section of the coast would make detection unlikely. The final step in the smuggling from cache to within a U.S. base is a much more dangerous and uncertain project. Each base presents its own problems and possibilities to the guerrilla. We sketch here two possible scenarios:

A. HELICOPTER PARK AT AN KHE

The plan to destroy the helicopter port at An Khe might be the following (no Vietnamese are allowed on this base):

- Prepare a camouflaged garage in the jungle or in a village under VC control.
- Capture two standard trucks of a type commonly used on the base and hide them in the prepared garage. These trucks should have high, closed cabs to mask the nationality of the drivers when they enter the base.
- When and if searches for the trucks by U.S. forces have proved fruitless, a 10-KT weapon will be brought from the bomb cache to the hideout and installed in one of the trucks.

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- The two trucks, appearing innocuous, finally enter the base. The weapon carrier is left within a half mile of the helicopter park. Its crew sets the bomb timer for five minutes and boards the other truck. They are two miles away at the time of the explosion and escape in the confusion that follows.

[redacted]

This will severely damage helicopters and repair and maintenance shops, and it will destroy partially filled gas storage tanks. A raid like the one described would neutralize An Khe for some months.

B. HARBOR AT DA NANG

For a second example, we give a fictional plan for damaging the harbor at Tourane (Da Nang). The bay approximates a 6-mile-diameter circle with a 4-mile-wide opening to the sea. At the two sides, there are steep hills, but straight inland the ground is low. The 6-fathom line is over a mile from shore in most parts. It is assumed that supply ships are anchored near this line and are unloaded by lighter.

- A 10-KT bomb in its neutral buoyancy container is towed by a sampan to within seven miles of the harbor, arriving at dusk.
- At this point, a skin diver will transfer the bomb to a sea sled, tow it to an active section of the harbor, and anchor it to the bottom near a freighter. Firing will be set for the next morning long after the sea sled and junk have left the scene.

[redacted]

Unloading facilities, low-lying warehouses, open stockpiles, etc., could be badly damaged by waves and floods, depending on the bay topography. Radiation hazards could be serious for several days.

A weapon towed by sea sled or carried by sampan could just as well be in the megaton range. In that case, the attack would not only clean out all shipping and shore installations,

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but it would so contaminate the area that rebuilding would be delayed for months. Attacks of this magnitude in all of the existing coastal harbors would be catastrophic for our forces, which depend on heavy logistic support.

These two examples are meant to emphasize the contention that U.S. bases in general are subject to punishing attacks if TNW are available. The VC have carried out numerous daring attacks when the damage they could or did cause was small. They are unlikely to desist, if they get weapons that can hamstring the U.S. effort.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

4 DEC 2002

Ref: 98-F-1857

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98T56

Mr. Hans Kristensen
The Nautilus Institute
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94710-1616

Dear Mr. Kristensen:

This responds to Timothy L. Savage's July 22, 1998, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

The enclosed document is responsive to the Nautilus Institute's request. Mr. Edmund F. McBride, an Initial Denial Authority for the Joint Staff and Mr. William R. Faircloth, an Initial Denial Authority, Chief of Staff for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), have determined that the release of portions of the document must be denied pursuant to 5 USC § 552(b)(1), which applies to material which is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958. In this instance, some of the denied information is classified according to Section 1.5(a) and (d), concerning military plans, weapons or operations and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources. Further, this information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.4(b)(5) and (6) of Executive Order 12958.

Some information must be denied pursuant to 5 USC § 552(b)(3), which applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. In this instance, the statutes are 42 USC § 2162(a) which provides withholding of Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (valid statute by court action); and 2168(a)(1)(C) which provides withholding Formerly Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These portions have been withheld by Mr. Finn K. Neilsen, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear and National Security Information, U.S. Department of Energy.

You have the right to appeal the decisions to deny these portions. Any such appeal should offer justification to support reversal of the initial denial and should be forwarded within 60 calendar days of the date of this letter, to this Directorate.

There are no assessable fees for this response.

Sincerely,

H. J. McIntyre
Director

Enclosure:
As stated

80-F01-967
AF Dir

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Tentative
Record of Decision

January 15, 1969

426

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Theater Nuclear Forces (U)

Excised Under the Provisions of (The Freedom of Information Act) 5USC552 (b)(1)

Our continuing review of theater nuclear and related chemical and biological forces leads us to the following major conclusions:

1. We buy theater nuclear forces primarily to deter limited nuclear war. If deterrence should fail, these forces give us options to fight such a war. Our recommended forces are generally appropriate in number and mix for the tasks we have identified.

2. The most serious limited war tactic the Pact could use in NATO's Center Region is a tactical nuclear attack using terrain fire against NATO's front-line forces. Unless it is clear to the Pact that NATO's theater nuclear forces could survive such an attack and inflict unacceptable damage on Pact forces, NATO's forces might not deter the Pact. We need to consider terrain fire exchanges between Pact and NATO forces, particularly those initiated by the Pact, to evaluate our deterrent. Our recommended forces and warheads, if properly deployed, should provide an adequate deterrent.

FOI CASE NO. 80-F01-967
Document ___ of ___ Documents

3. Tactical nuclear weapons are not a substitute for conventional forces. If we are losing a conventional war in NATO's Center Region, we may have a nuclear option to counter the advance, but we cannot count either on stopping the advance if the other side also uses nuclear weapons or on limiting further escalation if we initially succeed.

4. It is unlikely that we would need to consider using nuclear weapons in Asia unless the Chinese use them first or assist their allies with massive land forces and we cannot possibly hold conventionally. Even under the latter circumstances, we must carefully weigh the objections to the use of nuclear weapons against the net military benefits we might gain. Now that China has some nuclear capability, we cannot expect to use nuclear weapons in Asia without retaliation.

6. We need only enough lethal chemical capability to deter the Soviets from using chemicals in Europe. If deterrence should fail, this lethal chemical capability will provide us with an option to fight a limited conflict using chemcial weapons. We need some incapacitating chemicals, but only for use in those situations where civilians are mingled with enemy troops.

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Record of Decision

January 15, 1969

We recommend:

A summary of theater nuclear forces and warheads is shown on page 5. Detailed tables are attached.

I. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE

A. The Role of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Our basic military objective in Europe is to deter any kind of Warsaw Pact aggression. NATO's conventional forces are approximately in balance with those of the Pact and should be sufficient to deter a conventional attack or contain one if deterrence fails. Our strategic nuclear forces deter a general nuclear war involving attacks on U.S. cities or those of our European allies.

We also want to deter limited nuclear attacks on our theater forces. The Pact might hope to gain an advantage by initiating a limited nuclear attack and quickly destroying a large part of the NATO land forces without destroying much of Germany. If we could destroy 25% to 50% of the Pact land forces in a restrained nuclear retaliation, we could deny them this option. Unless it is clear to the Pact that NATO's theater nuclear forces could survive such an attack and inflict unacceptable damage on Pact forces, NATO forces might have little effect in deterring the Pact.

A further potential objective, but one we could not count on achieving, is defeating the Pact by using theater nuclear weapons if a conventional defense failed. Our analysis shows we cannot expect to remove the Pact's capability to destroy NATO's military forces or society. Thus, we cannot count on controlling territory without having it destroyed. At best we could plan on destroying enough of the Pact forces to prevent them from controlling NATO countries. not deleted

We plan our Europe-oriented theater nuclear forces primarily for deterrence. In doing so, we provide an adequate war-fighting capability. However, we should not buy more forces to provide the capability to fight a limited nuclear war of long duration. It is unlikely that any war in which thousands of nuclear weapons were used could remain limited. We should concentrate new investments on conventional rather than theater nuclear forces. Conventional forces, which compete for the same resources as theater nuclear forces, provide a much better chance of avoiding a nuclear holocaust.

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January 15, 1969

DMS TABLE 118 — U.S. AND ALLIED THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES AND WARHEADS a/
(End of Fiscal Year)

	FY 61	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 7
Tactical Aircraft														
Aircraft, Dual Equipment (UE)														
Bombs/Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs)														
Tactical Missiles														
Corporal														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Mace														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Honest John b/														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Little John														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Pershing c/														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Sergeant														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Davy Crockett														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Lance														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Subtotal Tactical Missile Launchers														
Subtotal Tactical Missile Warheads														
Nuclear Artillery														
8" Howitzer														
Tubes														
Warheads														
155mm Howitzer														
Tubes														
Warheads														
Subtotal Nuclear Artillery Tubes														
Subtotal Nuclear Artillery Warheads														
Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs)														
Teams														
Warheads														
Air Defense														
Falcon														
Aircraft (UE)														
Warheads														
Nike-Hercules														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Subtotal Air Defense Aircraft/ Launchers														
Subtotal Air Defense Warheads														
Total Aircraft/Launchers/ Tubes/Teams d/														
Total Bombs/ASMs/Warheads d/														

Our stockpile needs for the Center Region are examined below. In the coming year we will analyze our needs in Europe's Southern Region in a similar manner. We have included a discussion of a new concept -- the initial defensive use of nuclear weapons restricted to NATO territory -- which we are asking the JCS and the Services to do additional work on in the future. We are also asking the JCS and the Services to do additional work on the nuclear terrain fire concept.

B. Land Forces in Europe's Center Region

We currently estimate that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could have the following land forces in the Center Region by M+90 in FY 72: NATO--42 division forces (1.4 million men) and the Pact--90 divisions (1.1 million men). The nuclear capabilities of these land forces, excluding ADMs and air defense, are shown below.

Delivery System
Tactical Missiles
Tactical Rockets
Tube Artillery
Totals

C. Nuclear Defense Against a Conventional Invasion in the Center Region With Effects Limited to NATO Territory

If the Warsaw Pact attacked NATO forces with conventional weapons and NATO could not hold, as a minimum level of limited nuclear war we might consider using nuclear weapons in NATO territory alone. Restricting the use of nuclear weapons to friendly territory might be less likely to lead to escalation than attacking targets in East Germany or other Pact countries.

The following scenario illustrates the possible use of nuclear weapons in West Germany to repulse a Pact conventional attack. It is assumed that the Pact attacks in one to three thrusts, NATO forces are pushed back from their main defensive positions, and the local force ratios are such that NATO cannot repulse the attacks conventionally. When the Pact forces have penetrated about 50 kilometers (km) into West Germany, NATO uses nuclear weapons, but only on the Pact divisions (assumed to be about 15 in each thrus that are in NATO territory. NATO is assumed to have about 18 divisions in th 0 to 50 km zone opposing the three thrusts, so only about half of the Pact divisions would have to be defeated to reduce the force ratio to the point where the attack would be stopped.

If nuclear weapons were only used on Pact forces in West Germany, the Pact could not respond with nuclear weapons against NATO forces unless they used them on NATO territory. They would either have to: (1) cease the attack, (2) continue attacking conventionally by bringing in additional forces, (3) escalate the conflict by using nuclear weapons on NATO forces in NATO territory, or (4) combine courses of action (2) and (3). Their forces, are not as well-designed for limited discrete fire attacks as NATO's forces, and any Pact retaliation would appear to be a terrain fire attack over a large area. To deter such a response, NATO must have a survivable theater nuclear capability, or be ready to use strategic weapons in the theater at this point.

D. Nuclear Defense Against Invasion in the Center Region Using Discrete Fire

The discrete fire concept has traditionally been the basis for analyzing our theater nuclear capability. The essence of this concept is that we must accurately locate and hit a target to destroy it.

The discrete target concept permits us to estimate the stockpile we would need if we could fight such a war. Such a stockpile includes enough nuclear weapons for restricted use, limited to NATO territory, if we decided to use them that way. We cannot count on fighting a prolonged nuclear war using thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, providing more weapons than needed to defeat the Warsaw Pact with discrete fire would not improve our capability. Other factors such as command and control limitations, destruction of our support means, and possible escalation of the conflict would do more to determine the outcome of a war than additional nuclear warheads.

E. Nuclear Defense Against Invasion in the Center Region Using Terrain Fire

A massive Pact nuclear attack, using terrain fire along the entire Center Region front (that is, covering the area where enemy troops are most likely to be located with the lethal effects of air-burst nuclear weapons*) probably constitutes the most serious tactic the enemy could use against our forces. We should assess our capability to deter such an attack. Such a capability would include longer range tactical delivery systems which could survive a Pact attack on our front-line forces and then be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on Pact forces. Assuming they are properly deployed, our recommended Pershing and Lance systems should provide an adequate terrain fire capability.

As shown in the table on page 6, the Pact has concentrated its nuclear capability in longer range, mobile missiles and rockets. These systems are relatively invulverable to discrete fire attacks because they would be far from the front lines and difficult to find. Terrain fire is an option we should consider because it reduces the problem of locating targets. More important, we need to consider the terrain fire concept to evaluate our capability to deter the Warsaw Pact.

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*Includes an overpressure of at least 10 pounds per square inch (psi), an initial gamma radiation dose of 500 roentgens (1,000 roentgens for a yield of less than 200 KT), and 11 calories per square centimeter of thermal radiation (50 calories per square centimeter for yields of more than 60 KT).

By estimating the tactical deployment of NATO and Pact land forces, we can calculate the geographical area they would be likely to occupy in a conventional war-fighting posture and in a dispersed posture. Only some 30% of the total area in the Center Region is suitable for concealing mechanized forces, so only that portion would have to be covered with terrain fire. The fraction of Pact and NATO forces that would survive various terrain fire attacks provides a measure of each side's retaliatory capability.

In a conventional war-fighting posture, we assume that NATO and the Pact would have over 60% of their forces concentrated in the first 50 km on each side of the front lines. Each side would have about 600,000 troops in the area of the three thrusts and to a depth of 50 km. The next table shows the initial forces and capabilities on each side in the Center Region and those remaining after limited terrain fire attacks by each side. The attacks are restricted to the area of the three thrusts and to a depth of 50 km from the front lines.

	Initial Forces and Capabilities a/	Capability Remaining After A Limited Terrain Fire Exchange b/
Men (Thousands)		
Nuclear Launchers		
Nuclear Warheads		
Lethal Area (Km^2)		

a/ Excludes tactical air, air defense, and strategic forces (Polaris and MR/IRBMs).

b/ The results are based on a lethal area coverage (10 psi) degraded by the overlapping of multiple weapons and by those nuclear effects that fall outside the targe area (60% for a 440-KT warhead).

If the forces were concentrated as they would be for fighting a conventional war, NATO would have enough retaliatory capability to destroy 45% of the Pact's manpower using only a limited terrain fire attack. This should deter the Pact from using nuclear weapons against NATO forces in such a situation since they could not count on achieving a major advantage by doing so. The table on the preceding page includes a first strike by NATO to show that the Pact also has a retaliatory capability.

In the nuclear terrain fire exchange considered above, the total area covered by each side's terrain fire attack is about 7,500 sq are km, or about 3% of the total area of West Germany. Total civilian casualties could be about five million. The use of nuclear weapons, especially terrain fire, is not attractive in such a situation. However, terrain fire would use longer range systems more effectively than discrete fire would for destroying Pact forces, and we need to consider terrain fire as well as discrete fire, to evaluate our theater nuclear deterrent.

If both the NATO and Pact forces were in a dispersed posture to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear attacks, fewer forces would be destroyed in limited terrain fire attacks, since only about 15% and 10% of the Pact and NATO manpower, respectively, might be in the first 50 km zone of the three thrusts. The Pact and NATO would, however, have additional troops along the front and to a greater depth. In a dispersed posture, we assume each side might have about 60% of its troops in the 0 to 100 km zone along the whole German front. With both forces dispersed and with unlimited terrain fire attacks using all tactical land force weapons, the results could be as shown in the next table.

	Initial Forces and Capabilities a/	Capability Remaining After an Unlimited Terrain Fire Exchange
Men (Thousands)		
Nuclear Launchers		
Nuclear Warheads		
Lethal Area (Km^2)		

a/ Excludes tactical air, air defense, and strategic forces (Polaris and MR/IRBMs).

NATO could not cover the whole front (about 750 km) with nuclear terrain fire to as great a depth as the Pact, but NATO forces could still destroy 20% of the Pact manpower in retaliation. On the other hand, the Pact could not count on gaining an advantage by using such a dispersed

posture because in their view NATO might attack first with nuclear weapons to pre-empt a Pact terrain fire attack and destroy about 35% of the Pact manpower (more, if the attack occurred before the Pact forces were well-dispersed). Even if the Pact believed that NATO would not strike first, they would have to consider the possibility of retaliatory U.S. attacks with strategic nuclear forces since terrain fire attacks to a depth of 80 km (destroying as much as 25% of Germany) would not necessarily be considered limited nuclear war.

The foregoing analysis suggests the following conclusions:

1. A survivable theater nuclear capability which could inflict unacceptable damage on Pact forces should deter the Pact from using tactical nuclear weapons. Terrain fire is an option to consider for retaliation to a massive Pact attack which could destroy NATO's front-line forces. Terrain fire could cause more damage to European society than limited discrete fire. However, we cannot reasonably expect a war to stay limited if thousands of nuclear weapons are used for discrete fire.

System	Maximum Range	Percent of Launchers that Might Survive a Terrain Fire Attack Along the Whole Front to Various Depths
Pershing		
Sergeant		
Honest John		
Tube Artillery		

Theater Nuclear Requirements for the Center Region

We cannot plan to fight a limited nuclear war of long duration, using thousands of nuclear weapons in either discrete or terrain fire, because of the vulnerability of most of our warheads and delivery systems, the probable destruction of our support means by enemy attacks, limitations on command and control, and the great pressures to escalate the conflict. We need only enough nuclear weapons to be able to respond up to the point where continued limitation of a nuclear conflict would be very improbable. When additional discrete fire would do as much damage to European society as more effective limited terrain fire attacks, we should consider using terrain fire.

Tactical Bombs
Mace
Pershing
Sergeant
Honest John
Tube Artillery
ADMs
Air Defense
ASW Depth Bombs
Total Nuclear Warheads

Our theater nuclear capabilities are limited far more by our lack of adequate command, control, and support than by the size of our nuclear stockpile. Considering these limitations and the competing demands on our resources, we do not need to maintain such a large stockpile in Western Europe.

G. Allied Support

We have committed ourselves to support certain allied units and we should continue to do so. At the same time we should reduce the number of bombs with which we support each allied squadron from about 1.1 to 1 per Unit Equipment (UE) aircraft. We cannot count on using tactical aircraft in a nuclear war except in a pre-emptive strike by NATO, and one bomb per UE aircraft is enough to cover such a possible but unlikely situation. We should continue discussions with our allies about Lance, but defer a decision on support until we know if the system works and whether we will in fact procure it. Our detailed recommendations on support ceilings and ceilings for discussion with our allies are shown in the table on page 28.

II. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN ASIA

A. Role of Nuclear Weapons in Asia

We maintain nuclear forces in Asia for two broad objectives. First, we want to deter the use of nuclear weapons by the Chinese. We also wish to assure our Asian allies that we will use nuclear weapons in their defense if the Chinese attack them with nuclear weapons. Second, should deterrence fail, we want a nuclear war-fighting option to defend against a Chinese invasion. Korea presents the worst threat of a major invasion where we might have to consider using nuclear weapons. Unless the Chinese assist their allies with massive land forces, we should not have to consider using nuclear weapons against the other Asian Communist land forces. Our programmed forces can satisfy these two objectives.

Current estimates of China's nuclear capability are shown in the next table.

	China's Nuclear Forces a/		
	FY 68	FY 72	FY 77
Strategic Forces			
ICBMs, MRBMs, and SLMs			
Bombers			
Nuclear Bombs and ASMs			
Air Defense Launchers			
Air Defense Warheads			
General Purpose Forces			
Nuclear-Capable Aircraft			
Nuclear Bombs and ASMs			
Frog Missiles			
Total Nuclear Warheads			

Now that China has some nuclear capability, we cannot use nuclear weapons without risk of retaliation. Even in a pre-emptive strike, we could not be sure of destroying all of China's nuclear capability. With just a few surviving weapons, the Chinese could destroy some of our important bases, airfields, and ports. Loss of these facilities could substantially reduce our logistic and air advantages. Thus, there are offsets to the military advantage we might gain from initiating the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the resulting deaths and destruction and their long-range political consequences could outweigh the advantages we might gain by using nuclear weapons. Thus, there are potentially compelling military and political reasons to avoid the use of nuclear weapons except under extreme circumstances.

The threat of a conventional Soviet invasion in Asia is small, and the Soviets' use of tactical nuclear weapons against free Asian countries is unlikely. Soviet interests in Asia are probably not important enough to risk using nuclear weapons in limited conflicts. In any case, our nuclear options against the Chinese should be adequate against the Soviets.

B. The Threat to Korea

The North Koreans have a force of about 281,000 men; the Chinese could deploy about 650,000 men into Korea by M+70. The narrow mountainous peninsula probably restricts the effective deployment of land forces (excluding coolies) to about one million (the maximum used during the Korean war), but the Chinese might allocate more troops to an invasion. China has 2.3 million men in its active land forces and about 100 million men for potential army use.

The Chinese may also be limited by their willingness to accept casualties. In the Korean War, however, the Communists suffered about 1.5 million casualties. The peak casualty rate occurred in April-May, 1951, when they lost 250,000 men (killed, wounded, and captured) in five weeks. After that they fought for two more years and lost 400,000 more men.

We often think of the Chinese army as a large mass of men, thus as an ideal nuclear target. This concept is highly misleading because the Chinese apply the "massed human wave" tactic in a very specific way. They mass only when they find one of our weak or isolated company positions, preferably using a 4 to 1 manpower ratio. The Chinese do not need to concentrate more than a few hundred meters from the front lines since they are not dependent on mechanized equipment. Moreover, dispersing is to their advantage because it makes them less vulnerable to our artillery and air attacks. Their dispersal behind the front lines is also consistent with our experience during the Korean War. Reconnaissance pilots were often unable to identify troops on the ground, although other facts later confirmed that the troops were there.

C. Conventional Defense Against an Invasion

The Republic of Korea (ROK) land forces alone should be able to defend successfully against a North Korean attack. Even against a combined Chinese/North Korean attack, it appears that they provide a substantial deterrent and a capability for initial defense. By furnishing equipment to the ROK rear area security divisions, we could improve the manpower ratio of Chinese/North Korean forces to ROK/U.S. forces to less than 1.5 to 1 (the ratio in 1951 when we stopped a Communist offensive). Moreover, the ROK forces are more effective now than they were in the 1950s. Thus, our conventional forces may be enough to stop a combined Chinese/North Korean attack, and we should not plan on necessarily initiating the use of nuclear weapons in this contingency.

D. Nuclear Defense Against an Invasion Using Discrete Fire

If we could not hold conventionally against a Chinese/North Korean attack, we might use discrete fire with nuclear weapons against targets at depths greater than one or two km in an attempt to inflict casualties at a high rate over a few days and destroy their will to fight. Typical targets for discrete fire would be company-sized units containing an

average of about 100 men. Because most company-sized targets more than one km from the front would be widely dispersed, we could not find more than a few hundred such targets in a few days. By maintaining about 500 land force weapons and tactical bombs, which would be sufficient to kill 50,000 soldiers, we can provide an option to inflict casualties at a very high rate over a few days. We could not take away the ability of the Chinese to continue an invasion by using nuclear weapons this way, but we might destroy their will to fight.

To take away the ability of the Chinese to continue a determined invasion, we would have to consider destroying a million or more troops. To do this using discrete fire would require using 10,000 or more nuclear warheads over a period of months, not days, assuming we could locate that many worthwhile targets. Even if we could locate targets, we would still not be sure of stopping a determined invasion. Thus, we should not calculate our requirements for Korea on the assumption that we can destroy the war-fighting capability of the Chinese by using discrete nuclear fire in an extended conflict.

E. Nuclear Defense Against an Invasion Using Terrain Fire

If we cannot hold against the Chinese conventionally, and if we cannot destroy their will to fight by causing a very high casualty rate with discrete nuclear fire, we might consider using nuclear terrain fire. However, it would be terribly destructive because the enemy forces would be widely dispersed and we would have to cover all the terrain.

We cannot count on destroying the war-fighting capability of the Chinese by using terrain fire to a limited depth beyond our front lines. The Korean peninsula is about 180 km wide near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). To provide terrain fire to a depth of 50 km would require covering about 9,000 square km. For a greater depth of fire, the area would be proportionately larger. The numbers of tactical nuclear bombs that would be needed for terrain fire of this magnitude are shown in the following table.

Potential Communist Troop Casualties	Depth of Fire on Peninsula (Km) a/	Number of Delivered Weapons b/	Area Covered with at Least 10 Psi (Square Km) c/
[redacted]			

a/ Pyongyang is about 150 km north of the DMZ and the Yalu River is about 400 km north of it.
b/ Using a mix of tactical bombs based on the current tactical bomb stockpile, excluding about 500 with the lowest yields.
c/ The total land area of North Korea is about 120,000 square km.

Using terrain fire to a depth of about 400 km to get the maximum number of troop casualties, we would kill most of the 12 million North Korean civilians and probably some friendly civilians as well. This would clearly be undesirable.

Instead of using terrain fire from the front lines to various depths, we could consider using it in the 50 to 150 km zone to destroy the local reserves and supplies. Our conventional forces should be able to defeat a front-line force of 200,000 to 300,000 men in such a situation.

F. Interdicting Logistics to Reduce Supply

An on-line force of about 300,000 North Koreans and Chinese might require about 1,400 tons of ammunition plus other supplies per day. With no interdiction, about 18,000 men would be needed to operate the transportation system. If we could keep all major choke points (about 100) destroyed permanently, the Chinese could overcome the obstacles with about a million coolies to hand-carry supplies around the choke points. However, we could not keep all major choke points destroyed, even with nuclear weapons.

G. Theater Nuclear Requirements for Korea

The above analysis suggests the following conclusions:

1. We cannot count on defeating a determined Chinese invasion by using nuclear weapons, and we should not plan on using them initially, though we should have concepts and contingency plans for their use. We should improve the conventional capabilities of our allies and rely on them as much as possible to stop conventional attacks.

3. We could consider resorting to terrain fire, but only if our conventional defense failed and the Chinese did not come to terms after we had used limited nuclear discrete fire. Even then we could not be certain of stopping a determined invasion, and we might kill as many as five million North Korean civilians. If we decided to use terrain fire in Korea, we could use high-yield strategic bombs.

4. Though we may use nuclear weapons in an interdiction role, we cannot count on stopping an invasion by interdicting logistics, and we should not stockpile nuclear warheads for this purpose.

Our end-FY 68 stockpile of nuclear warheads in Korea and the stockpile we recommend for Korea in FY 70 are shown below.

	FY 68	Recommended for FY 70
Sergeant Tactical Bombs, Honest John, and Tube Artillery		
Davy Crockett		
ADMs		
Nike Hercules		
Total Nuclear Warheads		

H. Peacetime Deployments to Korea

III. MIX OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

In developing and procuring new tactical nuclear weapon systems, we should stress survivable, longer range, mobile missile systems in order to

A. Tactical Bombs

B. Low-Yield, Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM's)

C. 155mm Howitzers

million more than that required to maintain the current warheads.

D. Sergeant

Subject to negotiations with the Italians, we recommend phasing out the Sergeant battalion in Italy in FY 70. We also recommend phasing out the Sergeant battalion in Korea in FY 71 for an annual savings of $6.3 million. We do not need Sergeant in Korea for limited discrete fire, and if we decide to use terrain fire, we can rely on air-delivered weapons in Asia. Finally, we recommend retiring the Sergeant battalions in Germany and the United States (starting in FY 73) when Lance is deployed.

E. Lance and Honest John

F. Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs)

ADMs are nuclear charges designed to delay an advancing army by placing obstacles in its path. While the military benefits of using ADMs can be sensitive to the timeliness of their release and we should keep a capability to use them forward of our main battle positions, the possible severe reaction to the first detonation of any nuclear device cautions against early use of ADMs except under the most extreme circumstances.

We have asked the JCS and the Services to study an ADM employment concept in which we would consider using ADMs primarily to the rear of the main defensive positions in the event we are not able to defend conventionaly against a conventional attack. Under this concept, we would not plan on using ADMs between the borders of enemy territory and our own main defensive positions. In order to avoid using nuclear weapons if at all possible, we would plan to test our conventional forces in the main defensive positions before using nuclear weapons. Then, if it appeared that we were not able to defend conventionally, we would consider using ADMs (which, being defensive weapons, could be considered less escalatory than other nuclear systems) to help stop the attack. Thus, the primary region where we would consider using ADMs would be in the area from about 25 to 100 km behind our initial main defensive positions--behind the place where we could first really test our conventional defenses and in front of the region where other nuclear responses would clearly be more appropriate. This concept would not preclude the possible use of ADMs in other areas, such as along the main defensive positions rather than further to the rear, and it would be consistent with our flexible response strategy and the new strategy adopted by NATO.

IV. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FORCES

A. Lethal Chemicals

Lethal chemicals can kill many unprotected troops quickly. Casualties are very low against protected troops, but the combat effectiveness of troops in protective clothing is degraded.

We estimate that the Soviets have about 275,000 tons of lethal chemical agents, compared to about 35,000 tons for the United States. (The composition of the U.S. stockpile is shown in the table on page 29.) For defense, we have masks and, to prevent absorption of chemicals through the skin, some old individual protection suits and collective protection devices.

In Soviet doctrine, lethal chemicals are usually considered in conjunction with nuclear weapons. The Soviets could escalate a conventional conflict in Europe by using nuclear weapons or chemicals, or both. Our theater nuclear capability helps to deter their use of nuclear weapons. To deter the Soviets from using chemicals alone, we must be able to prevent them from gaining a significant advantage from their use. To do this we need enough defensive capability to prevent a large number of casualties and an offensive capability to force the Soviets to take protective measures.

Europe is the only area where we need a deterrent against the use of lethal chemicals. The Soviets seem intent on avoiding the use of nuclear weapons in limited conflicts in other areas and probably would also forego the use of chemicals. We have no evidence that the Chinese have a significant lethal chemical war-fighting capability. Our conventional forces provide sufficient alternatives against other countries.

For the defensive component of our lethal chemical deterrent in Europe, we need individual protection (masks and protective suits) for our land forces and forward air bases, some warning capability, and protective shelters for forward medical units. Large numbers of warning devices and protective shelters would contribute to our ability to fight a prolonged war, but would increase our deterrent very little. For the offensive component of our chemical deterrent in NATO's Center Region, we need enough chemical capability to expose unprotected front-line troops to a 10% casualty rate per day for about 10 days of intense combat (equivalent to a 20 to 90 day war, depending on usage rates).

For NATO's Center Region, the approximate additional 10-year costs for equipment and munitions (above our current inventories) to provide a lethal chemical deterrent, which would give us some war-fighting capability, are shown in the next table.

Capability	Additional 10-Year Cost a/ (In $ Millions)
Defensive Protection for 11 U.S. Division Forces (DFs) and 5 Forward Air Bases	$ 400
Offensive Capability for the U.S. and Allied Sectors	140
Total Costs	$ 540

a/ Provides individual protection for troops and a 10-day offensive capability at 750 tons per day.

We should procure the additional equipment to provide a deterrent capability for NATO's Center Region, giving priority to improvements in our defenses against lethal chemicals. We recommend against procuring a chemical capability to fight a prolonged war. Any extensive use of lethal chemicals would probably lead to a nuclear war. We will address our lethal chemical needs for other NATO regions in the coming year.

B. Incapacitating Chemicals (Including Riot Control Agents)

We might benefit from using incapacitating chemicals in situations where civilians are mingled with enemy troops and we do not have reasonable conventional alternatives. For such situations, we could benefit from improvements that would increase the duration of the effects now available with tear gas. However, we should not use incapacitants which make people irrational and unpredictable. Nor should we use presently available chemical incapacitants in ordinary combat against any enemy forces because: (1) feasible conventional alternatives are almost always available, (2) we do not want to risk enemy retaliation with lethal chemicals, and (3) we do not want to risk lowering the barriers to chemical warfare.

For the post-Vietnam Baseline Force, we should stockpile a 30-day supply of tear gas for one DF with air support and one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). This is enough for counterinsurgency operations. In addition, we should stockpile enough tear gas for civil disturbances. We should not increase our stockpiles of any other incapacitants until further research and development is done on improved agents.

We recommend disapproving the JCS proposal to buy a chemical incapacitating capability for all land and air forces at a 10-year cost of $440 million (excluding costs for research, development, and operations in Vietnam).

TACTICAL / THEATER

AF Div

Tentative
Record of Decision

January 15, 1969

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Theater Nuclear Forces (U)

Excised Under the Provisions of (The Freedom of Information Act) 5USC552 (b)(1)

FOI CASE NO. 80-D01-967
Document ___ of ___ Documents

Our continuing review of theater nuclear and related chemical and biological forces leads us to the following major conclusions:

1. We buy theater nuclear forces primarily to deter limited nuclear war. If deterrence should fail, these forces give us options to fight such a war. Our recommended forces are generally appropriate in number and mix for the tasks we have identified.

2. The most serious limited war tactic the Pact could use in NATO's Center Region is a tactical nuclear attack using terrain fire against NATO's front-line forces. Unless it is clear to the Pact that NATO's theater nuclear forces could survive such an attack and inflict unacceptable damage on Pact forces, NATO's forces might not deter the Pact. We need to consider terrain fire exchanges between Pact and NATO forces, particularly those initiated by the Pact, to evaluate our deterrent. Our recommended forces and warheads, if properly deployed, should provide an adequate deterrent.

3. Tactical nuclear weapons are not a substitute for conventional forces. If we are losing a conventional war in NATO's Center Region, we may have a nuclear option to counter the advance, but we cannot count either on stopping the advance if the other side also uses nuclear weapons or on limiting further escalation if we initially succeed.

4. It is unlikely that we would need to consider using nuclear weapons in Asia unless the Chinese use them first or assist their allies with massive land forces and we cannot possibly hold conventionally. Even under the latter circumstances, we must carefully weigh the objections to the use of nuclear weapons against the net military benefits we might gain. Now that China has some nuclear capability, we cannot expect to use nuclear weapons in Asia without retaliation.

6. We need only enough lethal chemical capability to deter the Soviets from using chemicals in Europe. If deterrence should fail, this lethal chemical capability will provide us with an option to fight a limited conflict using chemcial weapons. We need some incapacitating chemicals, but only for use in those situations where civilians are mingled with enemy troops.

Tentative
Record of Decision

January 15, 1969

We recommend:

A summary of theater nuclear forces and warheads is shown on page 5. Detailed tables are attached.

I. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE

A. The Role of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Our basic military objective in Europe is to deter any kind of Warsaw Pact aggression. NATO's conventional forces are approximately in balance with those of the Pact and should be sufficient to deter a conventional attack or contain one if deterrence fails. Our strategic nuclear forces deter a general nuclear war involving attacks on U.S. cities or those of our European allies.

We also want to deter limited nuclear attacks on our theater forces. The Pact might hope to gain an advantage by initiating a limited nuclear attack and quickly destroying a large part of the NATO land forces without destroying much of Germany. If we could destroy 25% to 50% of the Pact land forces in a restrained nuclear retaliation, we could deny them this option. Unless it is clear to the Pact that NATO's theater nuclear forces could survive such an attack and inflict unacceptable damage on Pact forces, NATO forces might have little effect in deterring the Pact.

A further potential objective, but one we could not count on achieving, is defeating the Pact by using theater nuclear weapons if a conventional defense failed. Our analysis shows we cannot expect to remove the Pact's capability to destroy NATO's military forces or society. Thus, we cannot count on controlling territory without having it destroyed. At best we could plan on destroying enough of the Pact forces to prevent them from controlling NATO countries. not deleted

We plan our Europe-oriented theater nuclear forces primarily for deterrence. In doing so, we provide an adequate war-fighting capability. However, we should not buy more forces to provide the capability to fight a limited nuclear war of long duration. It is unlikely that any war in which thousands of nuclear weapons were used could remain limited. We should concentrate new investments on conventional rather than theater nuclear forces. Conventional forces, which compete for the same resources as theater nuclear forces, provide a much better chance of avoiding a nuclear holocaust.

Tentative
Record of Decision

January 15, 1969

DMS TABLE 118 — U.S. AND ALLIED TREATED NUCLEAR FORCES AND WARHEADS a/
(End of Fiscal Year)

	FY 67	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY
Tactical Aircraft														
Aircraft, Unit Equipment (UE)														
Bombs/Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs)														
Tactical Missiles														
Corporal														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Mace														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Honest John b/														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Little John														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Pershing c/														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Sergeant														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Davy Crockett														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Lance														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Subtotal Tactical Missile Launchers														
Subtotal Tactical Missile Warheads														
Nuclear Artillery														
8" Howitzer														
Tubes														
Warheads														
155mm Howitzer														
Tubes														
Warheads														
Subtotal Nuclear Artillery Tubes														
Subtotal Nuclear Artillery Warheads														
Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs)														
Teams														
Warheads														
Air Defense														
Falcon														
Aircraft (UE)														
Warheads														
Nike-Hercules														
Launchers														
Warheads														
Subtotal Air Defense Aircraft/ Launchers														
Subtotal Air Defense Warheads														
Total Aircraft/Launchers/ Tubes/Teams d/														
Total Bombs/ASMs/Warheads d/														

Our stockpile needs for the Center Region are examined below. In the coming year we will analyze our needs in Europe's Southern Region in a similar manner. We have included a discussion of a new concept -- the initial defensive use of nuclear weapons restricted to NATO territory -- which we are asking the JCS and the Services to do additional work on in the future. We are also asking the JCS and the Services to do additional work on the nuclear terrain fire concept.

B. Land Forces in Europe's Center Region

We currently estimate that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could have the following land forces in the Center Region by M+90 in FY 72: NATO--42 division forces (1.4 million men) and the Pact--90 divisions (1.1 million men). The nuclear capabilities of these land forces, excluding ADMs and air defense, are shown below.

Delivery System
Tactical Missiles
Tactical Rockets
Tube Artillery
Totals

C. Nuclear Defense Against a Conventional Invasion in the Center Region With Effects Limited to NATO Territory

If the Warsaw Pact attacked NATO forces with conventional weapons and NATO could not hold, as a minimum level of limited nuclear war we might consider using nuclear weapons in NATO territory alone. Restricting the use of nuclear weapons to friendly territory might be less likely to lead to escalation than attacking targets in East Germany or other Pact countries.

The following scenario illustrates the possible use of nuclear weapons in West Germany to repulse a Pact conventional attack. It is assume that the Pact attacks in one to three thrusts, NATO forces are pushed back from their main defensive positions, and the local force ratios are such th NATO cannot repulse the attacks conventionally. When the Pact forces have penetrated about 50 kilometers (km) into West Germany, NATO uses nuclear weapons, but only on the Pact divisions (assumed to be about 15 in each thr that are in NATO territory. NATO is assumed to have about 18 divisions in 0 to 50 km zone opposing the three thrusts, so only about half of the Pact divisions would have to be defeated to reduce the force ratio to the point where the attack would be stopped.

If nuclear weapons were only used on Pact forces in West Germany, the Pact could not respond with nuclear weapons against NATO forces unless they used them on NATO territory. They would either have to: (1) cease the attack, (2) continue attacking conventionally by bringing in additional forces, (3) escalate the conflict by using nuclear weapons on NATO forces in NATO territory, or (4) combine courses of action (2) and (3). Their forces, are not as well-designed for limited discrete fire attacks as NATO's forces, and any Pact retaliation would appear to be a terrain fire attack over a large area. To deter such a response, NATO must have a survivable theater nuclear capability, or be ready to use strategic weapons in the theater at this point.

D. Nuclear Defense Against Invasion in the Center Region Using Discrete Fire

The discrete fire concept has traditionally been the basis for analyzing our theater nuclear capability. The essence of this concept is that we must accurately locate and hit a target to destroy it.

The discrete target concept permits us to estimate the stockpile we would need if we could fight such a war. Such a stockpile includes enough nuclear weapons for restricted use, limited to NATO territory, if we decided to use them that way. We cannot count on fighting a prolonged nuclear war using thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, providing more weapons than needed to defeat the Warsaw Pact with discrete fire would not improve our capability. Other factors such as command and control limitations, destruction of our support means, and possible escalation of the conflict would do more to determine the outcome of a war than additional nuclear warheads.

E. Nuclear Defense Against Invasion in the Center Region Using Terrain Fire

A massive Pact nuclear attack, using terrain fire along the entire Center Region front (that is, covering the area where enemy troops are most likely to be located with the lethal effects of air-burst nuclear weapons*) probably constitutes the most serious tactic the enemy could use against our forces. We should assess our capability to deter such an attack. Such a capability would include longer range tactical delivery systems which could survive a Pact attack on our front-line forces and then be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on Pact forces. Assuming they are properly deployed, our recommended Pershing and Lance systems should provide an adequate terrain fire capability.

As shown in the table on page 6, the Pact has concentrated its nuclear capability in longer range, mobile missiles and rockets. These systems are relatively invulverable to discrete fire attacks because they would be far from the front lines and difficult to find. Terrain fire is an option we should consider because it reduces the problem of locating targets. More important, we need to consider the terrain fire concept to evaluate our capability to deter the Warsaw Pact.

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*Includes an overpressure of at least 10 pounds per square inch (psi), an initial gamma radiation dose of 500 roentgens (1,000 roentgens for a yield of less than 200 KT), and 11 calories per square centimeter of thermal radiation (50 calories per square centimeter for yields of more than 60 KT).

By estimating the tactical deployment of NATO and Pact land forces, we can calculate the geographical area they would be likely to occupy in a conventional war-fighting posture and in a dispersed posture. Only some 30% of the total area in the Center Region is suitable for concealing mechanized forces, so only that portion would have to be covered with terrain fire. The fraction of Pact and NATO forces that would survive various terrain fire attacks provides a measure of each side's retaliatory capability.

In a conventional war-fighting posture, we assume that NATO and the Pact would have over 60% of their forces concentrated in the first 50 km on each side of the front lines. Each side would have about 600,000 troops in the area of the three thrusts and to a depth of 50 km. The next table shows the initial forces and capabilities on each side in the Center Region and those remaining after limited terrain fire attacks by each side. The attacks are restricted to the area of the three thrusts and to a depth of 50 km from the front lines.

	Initial Forces and Capabilities a/	Capability Remaining After A Limited Terrain Fire Exchange b/
Men (Thousands)		
Nuclear Launchers		
Nuclear Warheads		
Lethal Area (Km^2)		

a/ Excludes tactical air, air defense, and strategic forces (Polaris and MR/IRBMs).

b/ The results are based on a lethal area coverage (10 psi) degraded by the overlapping of multiple weapons and by those nuclear effects that fall outside the targe area (60% for a 440-KT warhead).

If the forces were concentrated as they would be for fighting a conventional war, NATO would have enough retaliatory capability to destroy 45% of the Pact's manpower using only a limited terrain fire attack. This should deter the Pact from using nuclear weapons against NATO forces in such a situation since they could not count on achieving a major advantage by doing so. The table on the preceding page includes a first strike by NATO to show that the Pact also has a retaliatory capability.

In the nuclear terrain fire exchange considered above, the total area covered by each side's terrain fire attack is about 7,500 sq are km, or about 3% of the total area of West Germany. Total civilian casualties could be about five million. The use of nuclear weapons, especially terrain fire, is not attractive in such a situation. However, terrain fire would use longer range systems more effectively than discrete fire would for destroying Pact forces, and we need to consider terrain fire as well as discrete fire, to evaluate our theater nuclear deterrent.

If both the NATO and Pact forces were in a dispersed posture to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear attacks, fewer forces would be destroyed in limited terrain fire attacks, since only about 15% and 10% of the Pact and NATO manpower, respectively, might be in the first 50 km zone of the three thrusts. The Pact and NATO would, however, have additional troops along the front and to a greater depth. In a dispersed posture, we assume each side might have about 60% of its troops in the 0 to 100 km zone along the whole German front. With both forces dispersed and with unlimited terrain fire attacks using all tactical land force weapons, the results could be as shown in the next table.

	Initial Forces and Capabilities a/	Capability Remaining After an Unlimited Terrain Fire Exchange
Men (Thousands)		
Nuclear Launchers		
Nuclear Warheads		
Lethal Area (Km^2)		

a/ Excludes tactical air, air defense, and strategic forces (Polaris and MR/IRBMs).

NATO could not cover the whole front (about 750 km) with nuclear terrain fire to as great a depth as the Pact, but NATO forces could still destroy 20% of the Pact manpower in retaliation. On the other hand, the Pact could not count on gaining an advantage by using such a dispersed

posture because in their view NATO might attack first with nuclear weapons to pre-empt a Pact terrain fire attack and destroy about 35% of the Pact manpower (more, if the attack occurred before the Pact forces were well-dispersed). Even if the Pact believed that NATO would not strike first, they would have to consider the possibility of retaliatory U.S. attacks with strategic nuclear forces since terrain fire attacks to a depth of 80 km (destroying as much as 25% of Germany) would not necessarily be considered limited nuclear war.

The foregoing analysis suggests the following conclusions:

1. A survivable theater nuclear capability which could inflict unacceptable damage on Pact forces should deter the Pact from using tactical nuclear weapons. Terrain fire is an option to consider for retaliation to a massive Pact attack which could destroy NATO's front-line forces. Terrain fire could cause more damage to European society than limited discrete fire. However, we cannot reasonably expect a war to stay limited if thousands of nuclear weapons are used for discrete fire.

System	Maximum Range	Percent of Launchers that Might Survive a Terrain Fire Attack Along the Whole Front to Various Depths
Pershing		
Sergeant		
Honest John		
Tube Artillery		

Theater Nuclear Requirements for the Center Region

We cannot plan to fight a limited nuclear war of long duration, using thousands of nuclear weapons in either discrete or terrain fire, because of the vulnerability of most of our warheads and delivery systems, the probable destruction of our support means by enemy attacks, limitations on command and control, and the great pressures to escalate the conflict. We need only enough nuclear weapons to be able to respond up to the point where continued limitation of a nuclear conflict would be very improbable. When additional discrete fire would do as much damage to European society as more effective limited terrain fire attacks, we should consider using terrain fire.

Tactical Bombs
Mace
Pershing
Sergeant
Honest John
Tube Artillery
ADMs
Air Defense
ASW Depth Bombs
Total Nuclear Warheads

Our theater nuclear capabilities are limited far more by our lack of adequate command, control, and support than by the size of our nuclear stockpile. Considering these limitations and the competing demands on our resources, we do not need to maintain such a large stockpile in Western Europe

G. Allied Support

We have committed ourselves to support certain allied units and we should continue to do so. At the same time we should reduce the number of bombs with which we support each allied squadron from about 1.1 to 1 per Unit Equipment (UE) aircraft. We cannot count on using tactical aircraft in a nuclear war except in a pre-emptive strike by NATO, and one bomb per UE aircraft is enough to cover such a possible but unlikely situation. We should continue discussions with our allies about Lance, but defer a decision on support until we know if the system works and whether we will in fact procure it. Our detailed recommendations on support ceilings and ceilings for discussion with our allies are shown in the table on page 28.

II. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN ASIA

A. Role of Nuclear Weapons in Asia

We maintain nuclear forces in Asia for two broad objectives. First, we want to deter the use of nuclear weapons by the Chinese. We also wish to assure our Asian allies that we will use nuclear weapons in their defense if the Chinese attack them with nuclear weapons. Second, should deterrence fail, we want a nuclear war-fighting option to defend against a Chinese invasion. Korea presents the worst threat of a major invasion where we might have to consider using nuclear weapons. Unless the Chinese assist their allies with massive land forces, we should not have to consider using nuclear weapons against the other Asian Communist land forces. Our programmed forces can satisfy these two objectives.

Current estimates of China's nuclear capability are shown in the next table.

	China's Nuclear Forces a/		
	FY 68	FY 72	FY 77
Strategic Forces			
ICBMs, MRBMs, and SLMs			
Bombers			
Nuclear Bombs and ASMs			
Air Defense Launchers			
Air Defense Warheads			
General Purpose Forces			
Nuclear-Capable Aircraft			
Nuclear Bombs and ASMs			
Frog Missiles			
Total Nuclear Warheads			

Now that China has some nuclear capability, we cannot use nuclear weapons without risk of retaliation. Even in a pre-emptive strike, we could not be sure of destroying all of China's nuclear capability. With just a few surviving weapons, the Chinese could destroy some of our important bases, airfields, and ports. Loss of these facilities could substantially reduce our logistic and air advantages. Thus, there are offsets to the military advantage we might gain from initiating the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the resulting deaths and destruction and their long-range political consequences could outweigh the advantages we might gain by using nuclear weapons. Thus, there are potentially compelling military and political reasons to avoid the use of nuclear weapons except under extreme circumstances.

The threat of a conventional Soviet invasion in Asia is small, and the Soviets' use of tactical nuclear weapons against free Asian countries is unlikely. Soviet interests in Asia are probably not important enough to risk using nuclear weapons in limited conflicts. In any case, our nuclear options against the Chinese should be adequate against the Soviets.

B. The Threat to Korea

The North Koreans have a force of about 281,000 men; the Chinese could deploy about 650,000 men into Korea by M+70. The narrow mountainous peninsula probably restricts the effective deployment of land forces (excluding coolies) to about one million (the maximum used during the Korean war), but the Chinese might allocate more troops to an invasion. China has 2.3 million men in its active land forces and about 100 million men for potential army use.

The Chinese may also be limited by their willingness to accept casualties. In the Korean War, however, the Communists suffered about 1.5 million casualties. The peak casualty rate occurred in April-May, 1951, when they lost 250,000 men (killed, wounded, and captured) in five weeks. After that they fought for two more years and lost 400,000 more men.

We often think of the Chinese army as a large mass of men, thus as an ideal nuclear target. This concept is highly misleading because the Chinese apply the "massed human wave" tactic in a very specific way. They mass only when they find one of our weak or isolated company positions, preferably using a 4 to 1 manpower ratio. The Chinese do not need to concentrate more than a few hundred meters from the front lines since they are not dependent on mechanized equipment. Moreover, dispersing is to their advantage because it makes them less vulnerable to our artillery and air attacks. Their dispersal behind the front lines is also consistent with our experience during the Korean War. Reconnaissance pilots were often unable to identify troops on the ground, although other facts later confirmed that the troops were there.

C. Conventional Defense Against an Invasion

The Republic of Korea (ROK) land forces alone should be able to defend successfully against a North Korean attack. Even against a combined Chinese/North Korean attack, it appears that they provide a substantial deterrent and a capability for initial defense. By furnishing equipment to the ROK rear area security divisions, we could improve the manpower ratio of Chinese/North Korean forces to ROK/U.S. forces to less than 1.5 to 1 (the ratio in 1951 when we stopped a Communist offensive). Moreover, the ROK forces are more effective now than they were in the 1950s. Thus, our conventional forces may be enough to stop a combined Chinese/North Korean attack, and we should not plan on necessarily initiating the use of nuclear weapons in this contingency.

D. Nuclear Defense Against an Invasion Using Discrete Fire

If we could not hold conventionally against a Chinese/North Korean attack, we might use discrete fire with nuclear weapons against targets at depths greater than one or two km in an attempt to inflict casualties at a high rate over a few days and destroy their will to fight. Typical targets for discrete fire would be company-sized units containing an

average of about 100 men. Because most company-sized targets more than one km from the front would be widely dispersed, we could not find more than a few hundred such targets in a few days. By maintaining about 500 land force weapons and tactical bombs, which would be sufficient to kill 50,000 soldiers, we can provide an option to inflict casualties at a very high rate over a few days. We could not take away the ability of the Chinese to continue an invasion by using nuclear weapons this way, but we might destroy their will to fight.

To take away the ability of the Chinese to continue a determined invasion, we would have to consider destroying a million or more troops. To do this using discrete fire would require using 10,000 or more nuclear warheads over a period of months, not days, assuming we could locate that many worthwhile targets. Even if we could locate targets, we would still not be sure of stopping a determined invasion. Thus, we should not calculate our requirements for Korea on the assumption that we can destroy the war-fighting capability of the Chinese by using discrete nuclear fire in an extended conflict.

E. Nuclear Defense Against an Invasion Using Terrain Fire

If we cannot hold against the Chinese conventionally, and if we cannot destroy their will to fight by causing a very high casualty rate with discrete nuclear fire, we might consider using nuclear terrain fire. However, it would be terribly destructive because the enemy forces would be widely dispersed and we would have to cover all the terrain.

We cannot count on destroying the war-fighting capability of the Chinese by using terrain fire to a limited depth beyond our front lines. The Korean peninsula is about 180 km wide near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). To provide terrain fire to a depth of 50 km would require covering about 9,000 square km. For a greater depth of fire, the area would be proportionately larger. The numbers of tactical nuclear bombs that would be needed for terrain fire of this magnitude are shown in the following table.

Potential Communist Troop Casualties	Depth of Fire on Peninsula (Km) a/	Number of Delivered Weapons b/	Area Covered with at Least 10 Psi (Square Km) c/
[redacted]			

a/ Pyongyang is about 150 km north of the DMZ and the Yalu River is about 400 km north of it.
b/ Using a mix of tactical bombs based on the current tactical bomb stockpile, excluding about 500 with the lowest yields.
c/ The total land area of North Korea is about 120,000 square km.

Using terrain fire to a depth of about 400 km to get the maximum number of troop casualties, we would kill most of the 12 million North Korean civilians and probably some friendly civilians as well. This would clearly be undesirable.

Instead of using terrain fire from the front lines to various depths, we could consider using it in the 50 to 150 km zone to destroy the local reserves and supplies. Our conventional forces should be able to defeat a front-line force of 200,000 to 300,000 men in such a situation.

F. Interdicting Logistics to Reduce Supply

An on-line force of about 300,000 North Koreans and Chinese might require about 1,400 tons of ammunition plus other supplies per day. With no interdiction, about 18,000 men would be needed to operate the transportation system. If we could keep all major choke points (about 100) destroyed permanently, the Chinese could overcome the obstacles with about a million coolies to hand-carry supplies around the choke points. However, we could not keep all major choke points destroyed, even with nuclear weapons.

G. Theater Nuclear Requirements for Korea

The above analysis suggests the following conclusions:

1. We cannot count on defeating a determined Chinese invasion by using nuclear weapons, and we should not plan on using them initially, though we should have concepts and contingency plans for their use. We should improve the conventional capabilities of our allies and rely on them as much as possible to stop conventional attacks.

3. We could consider resorting to terrain fire, but only if our conventional defense failed and the Chinese did not come to terms after we had used limited nuclear discrete fire. Even then we could not be certain of stopping a determined invasion, and we might kill as many as five million North Korean civilians. If we decided to use terrain fire in Korea, we could use high-yield strategic bombs.

4. Though we may use nuclear weapons in an interdiction role, we cannot count on stopping an invasion by interdicting logistics, and we should not stockpile nuclear warheads for this purpose.

Our end-FY 68 stockpile of nuclear warheads in Korea and the stockpile we recommend for Korea in FY 70 are shown below.

	FY 68	Recommended for FY 70
Sergeant		
Tactical Bombs, Honest John, and Tube Artillery		
Davy Crockett		
ADMs		
Nike Hercules		
Total Nuclear Warheads		

H. Peacetime Deployments to Korea

III. MIX OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

In developing and procuring new tactical nuclear weapon systems, we should stress survivable, longer range, mobile missile systems in order to

A. Tactical Bombs

B. Low-Yield, Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM's)

C. 155mm Howitzers

million more than that required to maintain the current warheads.

D. Sergeant

Subject to negotiations with the Italians, we recommend phasing out the Sergeant battalion in Italy in FY 70. We also recommend phasing out the Sergeant battalion in Korea in FY 71 for an annual savings of $6.3 million. We do not need Sergeant in Korea for limited discrete fire, and if we decide to use terrain fire, we can rely on air-delivered weapons in Asia. Finally, we recommend retiring the Sergeant battalions in Germany and the United States (starting in FY 73) when Lance is deployed.

E. Lance and Honest John

F. Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs)

ADMs are nuclear charges designed to delay an advancing army by placing obstacles in its path. While the military benefits of using ADMs can be sensitive to the timeliness of their release and we should keep a capability to use them forward of our main battle positions, the possible severe reaction to the first detonation of any nuclear device cautions against early use of ADMs except under the most extreme circumstances.

We have asked the JCS and the Services to study an ADM employment concept in which we would consider using ADMs primarily to the rear of the main defensive positions in the event we are not able to defend conventionaly against a conventional attack. Under this concept, we would not plan on using ADMs between the borders of enemy territory and our own main defensive positions. In order to avoid using nuclear weapons if at all possible, we would plan to test our conventional forces in the main defensive positions before using nuclear weapons. Then, if it appeared that we were not able to defend conventionally, we would consider using ADMs (which, being defensive weapons, could be considered less escalatory than other nuclear systems) to help stop the attack. Thus, the primary region where we would consider using ADMs would be in the area from about 25 to 100 km behind our initial main defensive positions--behind the place where we could first really test our conventional defenses and in front of the region where other nuclear responses would clearly be more appropriate. This concept would not preclude the possible use of ADMs in other areas, such as along the main defensive positions rather than further to the rear, and it would be consistent with our flexible response strategy and the new strategy adopted by NATO.

IV. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FORCES

A. Lethal Chemicals

Lethal chemicals can kill many unprotected troops quickly. Casualties are very low against protected troops, but the combat effectiveness of troops in protective clothing is degraded.

We estimate that the Soviets have about 275,000 tons of lethal chemical agents, compared to about 35,000 tons for the United States. (The composition of the U.S. stockpile is shown in the table on page 29.) For defense, we have masks and, to prevent absorption of chemicals through the skin, some old individual protection suits and collective protection devices.

In Soviet doctrine, lethal chemicals are usually considered in conjunction with nuclear weapons. The Soviets could escalate a conventional conflict in Europe by using nuclear weapons or chemicals, or both. Our theater nuclear capability helps to deter their use of nuclear weapons. To deter the Soviets from using chemicals alone, we must be able to prevent them from gaining a significant advantage from their use. To do this we need enough defensive capability to prevent a large number of casualties and an offensive capability to force the Soviets to take protective measures.

Europe is the only area where we need a deterrent against the use of lethal chemicals. The Soviets seem intent on avoiding the use of nuclear weapons in limited conflicts in other areas and probably would also forego the use of chemicals. We have no evidence that the Chinese have a significant lethal chemical war-fighting capability. Our conventional forces provid sufficient alternatives against other countries.

For the defensive component of our lethal chemical deterrent in Europe, we need individual protection (masks and protective suits) for our land forces and forward air bases, some warning capability, and protective shelters for forward medical units. Large numbers of warning devices and protective shelters would contribute to our ability to fight a prolonged war, but would increase our deterrent very little. For the offensive component of our chemical deterrent in NATO's Center Region, we need enough chemical capability to expose unprotected front-line troops to a 10% casualty rate per day for about 10 days of intense combat (equivalent to a 20 to 90 day war, depending on usage rates).

For NATO's Center Region, the approximate additional 10-year costs for equipment and munitions (above our current inventories) to provide a lethal chemical deterrent, which would give us some war-fighting capability, are shown in the next table.

Capability	Additional 10-Year Cost a/ (In $ Millions)
Defensive Protection for 11 U.S. Division Forces (DFs) and 5 Forward Air Bases	$ 400
Offensive Capability for the U.S. and Allied Sectors	140
Total Costs	$ 540

a/ Provides individual protection for troops and a 10-day offensive capability at 750 tons per day.

We should procure the additional equipment to provide a deterrent capability for NATO's Center Region, giving priority to improvements in our defenses against lethal chemicals. We recommend against procuring a chemical capability to fight a prolonged war. Any extensive use of lethal chemicals would probably lead to a nuclear war. We will address our lethal chemical needs for other NATO regions in the coming year.

B. Incapacitating Chemicals (Including Riot Control Agents)

We might benefit from using incapacitating chemicals in situations where civilians are mingled with enemy troops and we do not have reasonable conventional alternatives. For such situations, we could benefit from improvements that would increase the duration of the effects now available with tear gas. However, we should not use incapacitants which make people irrational and unpredictable. Nor should we use presently available chemical incapacitants in ordinary combat against any enemy forces because: (1) feasible conventional alternatives are almost always available, (2) we do not want to risk enemy retaliation with lethal chemicals, and (3) we do not want to risk lowering the barriers to chemical warfare.

For the post-Vietnam Baseline Force, we should stockpile a 30-day supply of tear gas for one DF with air support and one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). This is enough for counterinsurgency operations. In addition, we should stockpile enough tear gas for civil disturbances. We should not increase our stockpiles of any other incapacitants until further research and development is done on improved agents.

We recommend disapproving the JCS proposal to buy a chemical incapacitating capability for all land and air forces at a 10-year cost of $440 million (excluding costs for research, development, and operations in Vietnam).

THEATER/TACTICAL

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

AF Dir

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 1965

SUBJECT: Theater Nuclear Forces (U)

as of 1-5-83 (A)
Sanitized Master

I. Introduction

In conjunction with my annual review of our various military forces, I have completed a concurrent review of our theater nuclear forces and their implications for U.S. defense programs. This memorandum summarizes the major issues addressed in my review and presents the basis for my recommendations concerning theater nuclear forces. The timing and appropriateness of presenting or advocating these overall policies to our Allies has not been addressed.

In particular, I recommend:

1. The U.S. continue to urge the improvement of a NATO nonnuclear capability as the primary defense against nonnuclear aggression in Europe. 1/

2. Theater nuclear capabilities be programmed to help deter USSR initiation of nuclear war, to meet nuclear attacks, and to serve as insurance against failure of NATO's nonnuclear defense. In light of the increasing Soviet theater nuclear capabilities and their substantial chemical warfare means, our prospects for overcoming any major Soviet nonnuclear advantage with nuclear means are doubtful.

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4. Continued reliance upon "external" U.S. forces to cover targets within the USSR which threaten Europe; disapproval of SACEUR's proposal that Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) be provided for this purpose. 2/

1/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse the maintenance of a nonnuclear option in Europe to meet "major nonnuclear assault" (50-60 divisions within 30 days). However, they do not agree with designating either nonnuclear defense or nuclear defense as the primary defense against nonnuclear aggression in Europe and they would not associate escalation to tactical nuclear warfare only with failure of nonnuclear defense.

2/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that except for deterrence of general war, reliance on external forces to achieve the desired theater defense options reduces the credibility of both the tactical nuclear and nonnuclear options and that the presence of substantial numbers of MRBMs would impress both Allies and the Soviets with SACEUR's capability to counter the full range of the threat to Western Europe.

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5. Substitution of Pershing missile systems as feasible for aircraft on nuclear Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) to provide a more survivable strike capability and to release aircraft for other roles in which their inherent flexibility can be used to advantage.

In order to improve our understanding of tactical nuclear war and its requirements, I am directing study of the following areas during the coming year:

1. Command and control procedures and facilities required to permit decision makers at all levels to make informed decisions for the selective and controlled use of theater nuclear forces.

2. Action required to permit a viable transition from nonnuclear conflict to nuclear conflict on the ground.

4. Relative costs and effectiveness of various alternative theater nuclear force postures in the Far East.

5. Interaction of chemical and nuclear warfare and the deficiencies in our current defensive capabilities against chemical weapons.

The principal US and allied theater nuclear delivery capabilities are summarized in the following tables (Table I and Table II).

TABLE II
TACTICAL AIR AND ASW SYSTEMS

	FY 61	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY

II. Basis for the Recommendations

Our theater nuclear forces1/ have important relationships with our strategic nuclear forces on the one hand and our theater nonnuclear capabilities on the other hand. The relationships raise a number of major issues of crucial relevance to U.S. plans and programs. The three principal issues have to do with:

1. The role of external strategic nuclear delivery forces in the defense of Europe.

2. The role of theater nuclear forces in the defense of Europe.

3. The role of theater nuclear forces in the Far East.

I believe we understand the first issue and its implications quite well; we know a good deal about the second issue, but not enough; and we require more study of the third.

A. NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces: Size, Control and Costs.

1. Opposing Theater Nuclear Capabilities

Our theater nuclear forces face formidable and increasing Soviet theater nuclear forces, especially in Europe. Measured in terms of nuclear capable delivery systems or nuclear warheads, it is clear that although the West possesses numerical superiority in many respects, a theater nuclear war in Europe might involve large scale use of nuclear weapons by both sides.

Moreover, despite the large uncertainties about the level and allocation of Soviet theater nuclear capabilities (only the midpoints of ranges of uncertainty are shown in this memorandum 2/), it appears that the Soviets have some significant superiorities too. For example, the Soviets appear to have

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1/ The term "theater nuclear forces" is used to distinguish the forces involved from intercontinental nuclear forces and sea-based nuclear forces. Theater nuclear forces include ground force (Army and Marine Corps) and tactical air (Navy and Air Force) nuclear delivery systems and supporting forces. They also include IR/MRBMs, which cannot strike intercontinentally.

2/ For more detail reference should be made to the Intelligence Assumptions for Planning, NIE 11-2, NIE 11-8, NIE 11-14, and NIE 13-2.

a pronounced advantage in numbers of large yield weapons, provided by their IR/MRBM force. This apparent advantage is exaggerated in the table below by the omission of U.S. external forces which offset Soviet IR/MRBMs. I shall discuss the relation between external forces and theater nuclear forces in the next section of this memorandum.

1/ Delivered by land warfare systems and naval air but excluding surface-to-air missiles.


2/ Includes Atomic Demolitions.

4/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the "increasing Communist capabilities should serve as a compelling reason for initiating qualitative improvements in NATO's tactical nuclear posture and for considering quantitative improvements".

The ranges of nuclear capable delivery systems are as follows:

The West holds a substantial superiority in number of aircraft at all ranges, in intercontinental missiles and in dual purpose tube artillery. The Communists, however, have a large number of medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles, and also possess larger numbers than the West of missile launchers in the 12-800 NM range categories.

Thus, with respect to strategic weapons the comparison hangs on the relation of external forces to the theater situation (which is discussed below). With respect to shorter range weapons, the superiority of the West in artillery tube delivered weapons is matched against Communist superiority in tactical missiles. The Western superiority in howitzers could count most heavily if the use of tactical nuclear weapons were restricted to attacking targets within a narrow zone about the forward edge of the battle areas (FEBA), (although they would be unable to take the longer ranged Communist missiles under attack). If the battle were less restrained and deeper targets attacked, the advantage could swing to the longer range, higher yield Communist missiles. We consider below, in the comparison of alternative concepts for European theater nuclear forces, the force structure implications of our expectations on the degree of restraint likely to be observed.



1/ Assuming unrefueled low level flight in enemy territory and including only the Soviet light bombers and fighter bombers estimated to have nuclear capability (Brewer, Beagle, Fitter, and Fishbed).

2/ Individual missile launchers or howitzers. Excludes ADM teams.

The lethal area (within which 50 percent of exposed personnel will become prompt casualties) offers a crude indication of the magnitude of the effects of deliverable chemical stocks on both sides, 1/ ignoring delayed effects, and downwind effects. The lethal area of deliverable toxic chemicals is 7,000 square miles for the West, and 14,000 square miles for the Communists. Comparison with the lethal areas stated above for nuclear weapons suggests that inclusion of chemical weapons may offset the Western advantage in low yield weapons (below 60 kilotons). 2/

An attempt has been made to examine the interaction of chemical warfare and nuclear capabilities. 3/ It proposes that we provide adequate defensive chemical warfare capabilities but relatively small offensive chemical warfare capabilities. This appears to constitute the most reasonable allocation of resources at this time. However, further analysis of the interaction of chemical warfare and nuclear capabilities is required. Accordingly, I am requesting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include such analysis in their continuing study of tactical nuclear warfare.

The comparison of opposing theater nuclear and chemical forces shows no decisive superiority for either side and indicates that both sides have very large weapons stocks. An unrestrained theater nuclear war in Europe would therefore leave it devastated. From the European point of view it would be indistinguishable from general war, with potential mortalities ranging from 100 to 180 million people depending upon the circumstances of initiation of the nuclear exchange. It is in the context of this threat that the role of theater nuclear weapons and the prospects for restrained theater nuclear war must be examined. In particular the notion of a nuclear war in which attacks are limited to military targets and in which there is no attempt to inflict civil damage will be considered and referred to as "tactical nuclear conflict".

2/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this brief analysis does not adequately address relevant military considerations involved in the employment of tactical nuclear/chemical capabilities, but no other analysis is presently available.

3/ ACECOM-72 study by CJCS Special Studies Group, dated April 20, 1965.

2. Control of Nuclear Weapons

3. The Cost of the Approved Theater Nuclear Capabilities

1/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the isolation of nuclear attributable costs should be required in evaluation of equipment requirements and they recommend that analysis of strategy, policy, and weapons not include such costs.

B. The Role of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe

My recommendations on theater nuclear forces are linked to my views on the relation between nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities in Europe. I have discussed the prospects for a major nonnuclear defense of Europe in my memorandum on NATO force structure. The essential point about the relation between the two kinds of capability is that, since the Communists possess large scale theater nuclear capabilities, and theater nuclear war would be two-sided, our own theater nuclear forces can not serve as an acceptable substitute for the ability to defend Europe with nonnuclear forces against a Soviet nonnuclear attack.

There are, however, various reasons for retaining a theater nuclear option in Europe. There is by no means agreement within the NATO Alliance on the various purposes or their relative importance. The different views on this subject were reviewed in last year's memorandum on the Role of Nuclear Forces in NATO strategy, and the situation has not changed significantly.

To summarize last year's discussion, the governments of our main European Allies (U.K., FRG and France) seem to believe that deterrence of almost all resort to force can be achieved by maintenance of stocks of nuclear weapons and a declaratory policy of immediate use of such weapons in response to aggression [even though the political leaders of the West would almost certainly not authorize such response to the lower levels of aggression.] The attitudes of these governments on both theater nuclear force structure and strategy reflect this position. This is also reflected in NATO's current strategic guidance 1/, which plans to use nuclear weapons very quickly in any but the most limited of military engagements with the Soviet Union. Their emphasis on this theory of deterrence also makes them skeptical about the desirability of improving Alliance nonnuclear capabilities 2/ and with respect to some of our Allies (and SACEUR also) results in pressure to increase theater nuclear capabilities.

1/ MC 14/2.

2/ Their attitude is also related to their beliefs about the feasibility of a major nonnuclear option, as I have indicated in my memorandum on NATO force structure.

I certainly accept the importance of deterrrence, especially in Europe, but I cannot accept deterrence based on nuclear threats as a satisfactory substitute for the ability to take action with nonnuclear forces. Our formidable strategic and theater nuclear forces make it highly unlikely that the Soviets would, with premeditation, launch a massive attack, nuclear or conventional, at Western Europe. But our Berlin and Cuban experiences show that major confrontations with the Soviet Union can happen even without a Soviet decision to engage in all-out attack on Western Europe; and these crises also illustrate our need

to be able to take actions short of nuclear war. To have to choose between the extremes of inaction and nuclear war in a crisis would impose severe strains on the unity of the Alliance. Actual resort to nuclear weapons, even if the original intent were to use them in a highly restrained way, would entail high risks of escalation to a theater-wide nuclear war; or to general war which would destroy much of what we want to defend in Europe.

I also believe that continued emphasis on theater nuclear response as a mainstay of NATO's defense will, in the long run, strengthen the tendency for our Allies to seek independent national nuclear capabilities. Although the immediate practical decisions facing the Alliance in the past have concerned the choice of appropriate nonnuclear actions, it has appeared that influence in the affairs of the Alliance was related to operational control over nuclear weapons because of NATO's strategic concept, and the character of the discussion about it.

There is no question about the importance of nuclear weapons in protecting the security of Europe. Their importance is reflected in the large increase in nuclear weapons dispersed to Europe. This is shown in the table on the following page.

However, I believe that the principal nuclear role should be played, as it has been in the past, by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, based outside of Europe.

Theater-based forces, nevertheless, can be useful in several ways. As a supplement to external strike forces they may add to the effectiveness of our deterrence of major Soviet aggression and our coverage of European threat targets in general war. In this role they must be compared with our external forces in terms of cost and effectiveness. Our theater-based nuclear weapons also serve as insurance against a major failure in the nonnuclear defense of Europe by denying the Warsaw Pact the prospect of a meaningful victory in such a case. It must also be observed that the presence of substantial nuclear forces in Europe is taken by our Allies as additional evidence of the strength and firmness of our commitment to the defense of Europe.

With these functions in mind I shall proceed to consider several alternative force structure objectives for our theater based nuclear forces.

C. Alternative Concepts for Central Europe

As a basis for my recommendations on theater nuclear forces for Europe, I have considered five alternative concepts as force structure objectives. They will be discussed under the following headings:

1. Theater Increment for General War (No tactical Nuclear Option)
2. The Tactical Nuclear Engagement
3. The Short Tactical Nuclear Battle (Day or So)
4. The Tactical Nuclear Campaign (Two - Three Weeks)
5. The Extended Tactical Nuclear War (Two - Four Months)

The alternatives vary with respect to the kinds and numbers of nuclear weapons systems needed, the duration of the nuclear war they are expected to fight, and the geographic or other constraints under which the war is expected to be fought. The force structure, effectiveness, and cost implications will be considered, in turn, for each of the concepts. The forces for each concept include those of the preceding one in the listing above, plus an increment. The requirements under each concept will finally be compared with the approved program for theater nuclear forces for Central Europe, FY 1966 to FY 1970.

1. The Increment for General War

Under this concept, ACE nuclear requirements are primarily oriented toward making a contribution to general war capabilities. No tactical nuclear capability is specifically provided.

The role of Allied Command Europe (ACE) in general war would include making a contribution to the strategic nuclear exchange, and preventing, so far as possible, Warsaw Pact ground forces from overrunning Western Europe. To perform these tasks, ACE requires:

1. Coverage of counter-European threat targets, including SACEUR's Scheduled Program.

2. Some nuclear delivery means with which to attempt to block enemy ground forces.

3. Adequate means for judging quickly the military situation in ACE, to provide higher authority with the necessary information upon which to base the decision to go to general war.

The determination of ACE force and support requirements implied by the above must be made on the assumption that external forces would execute the SIOP in general war. It is necessary to consider, therefore,

the extent to which the approved external forces will satisfy ACE requirements in the future, and to judge ACE requirements for MRBM's and shorter range nuclear strike forces in the light of that analysis.

I have examined the contribution of programmed U.S. external forces to the attack of time-sensitive targets in 1972. This is the earliest date at which we could field substantial numbers of MRBMs in ACE. The table on the following page shows the expected numbers of surviving re-entry vehicles that could be assigned to time-sensitive military targets threatening Europe and the U.S., and the resulting damage expectancies. As in JSOP-70, less urgent military targets are covered by aircraft or air to surface missiles.

DAMAGE EXPECTANCIES BY EXTERNAL MISSILE FORCES, 1972[1]
(Retaliation After Surprise Soviet Counter-Military Attack)

The calculation shows that systems presently approved for our strategic forces or currently in development will be able to achieve very high expected damage against a time-urgent target list of the sort that appears likely for the 1970's. In particular, the introduction of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), Poseidon, and TAPS can greatly increase the capabilities of our missile forces. This case assumes that we respond after an attack in which the USSR programs 600 ICBM's against U.S. military targets, including more than 400 against our ICBM force. It is questionable that we would require a high damage expectancy against enemy hard ICBM launchers after we have sustained an

1/ Operational factors (Soviet and U.S.) are from JSOP-70.
2/ The target list is from JSOP-70 for 1974 with an additional fourteen Hard ICBM's singly dispersed. This increment reflects recent revisions to the estimated Soviet Hard ICBM forces.

attack involving the expenditure of most or all of the missiles at the sites. The possibility of more formidable Soviet threats in the 1970's and their implications for our strategic offensive forces is discussed in my memorandum on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces.

It is argued that the MRBM will complicate the enemy's targeting problem and will be able to strike the targets threatening Europe more rapidly than external forces. However, the external forces already complicate the enemy's problem sufficiently, and the Polaris and Minuteman systems could probably destroy the threat to Europe faster than MRBMs, considering realistically ACE's command-control problems and communication delays. Moreover, accuracy improvements in our external forces expected in the early 1970's will make them much more adaptable to SACEUR's constraints policy.

It is also argued that MRBMs under SACEUR's command will give our European Allies greater confidence than they now have in the credibility of NATO's strategic deterrent. The premises underlying this claim appear to be that some portion of the strategic deterrent must actually be on European soil in order to be credible, and that our Allies will believe that the United States would be inclined to release theater nuclear forces more quickly than external strategic nuclear forces if CONUS and the Soviet heartland had not yet been attacked. 4/ I reject both premises and I doubt that our Allies set sufficient store in them to persuade their governments

The level of steady state peacetime QRA force should be kept in balance with the rest of the ACE posture. If the USSR attacked ACE ground forces before they deployed from their casernes, the remaining ACE ground forces would be capable only of weak and desultory opposition to the advance of Communist ground forces. Even if ACE QRA forces succeeded in destroying every one of their targets (virtually all of which are airfields) the relatively unscathed Communist ground armies would remain free to overrun Western Europe. Thus, under conditions of surprise attack Communist prospects would be little affected by the magnitude of ACE's QRA force. On the other hand, once ACE ground forces were alerted and deployed out of their barracks into a less vulnerable posture, enemy prospects for destroying ACE ground defenses by massive missile attack would be reduced and enemy ground forces attempting to overrun Europe would have to bank heavily on air support, which could be largely destroyed by a suitable QRA force. In this instance the QRA force could contribute vitally to ACE's warfighting capabilities. Accordingly, I conclude that although it is essential to provide an adequate QRA force during periods of tension or conflict when ACE ground forces become more survivable through deployment to the field, the size of the QRA force in normal peacetime is not nearly so crucial.

1/ Pending completion of their review of a QRA Pershing field test and Weapons Systems Evaluation Group study on QRA Pershing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it premature to reach conclusions on QRA Pershing. However, with expected improvements Pershing appears to be so much bett suited to the QRA task than tactical aircraft that I consider the centra thrust of my conclusions to be valid. Of course, they can be revised as more information becomes available.

d. Situation Reporting

The provision of information to decision makers during a crisis, a nonnuclear war, or a limited nuclear conflict is a critically important function because of the risks of escalation inherent in major confrontations.

1/ Although our target acquisition may not pinpoint enough targets for effective discrete fire, it does not appear that future developments in airborne side-looking and moving-target-indicator radar, signal intelligence and other means may provide a good assurance of knowing if the enemy attempts to disperse suddenly.

2. The Tactical Nuclear Engagement

Under the preceding concept, ACE would, of course, have sufficient firepower for a demonstration of its resolve to use nuclear weapons rather than suffer defeat in an overwhelming nonnuclear attack. Proponents of nuclear demonstration, however, have stressed tactical use of nuclear weapons, to avoid both the great civilian damage from high yield weapons, and the impression that we have initiated general war. The force structure for the preceding concept includes no low yield weapons.

3. The Short Tactical Nuclear Battle

This concept aims at the ability to fight a two-sided, but short and limited nuclear war, initiated by NATO as the result of an overwhelming Soviet nonnuclear attack, or a nuclear attack by the Soviets to defeat a successful NATO nonnuclear defense. Depending on the deployment of the ground forces on both sides at the initiation of tactical nuclear war, and the intensity of the initial attacks, casualties at the end of the initial one to three day period may be high enough to produce a stalemate, even if only low yield tactical nuclear weapons are employed. Under such condition

1/ ACECON-72, CJCS Special Study Group.
2/ Such demonstration might be similar to the initial stages of the nuclear conflict scenarios depicted in Army Project Id, which was published in July 1964.

a pause might be enforced while reserves moved up to the front to resume the battle, which would subsequently be fought from a dispersed posture to minimize casualties. Even against dispersed troops on or near the front, the use of high yield weapons in blanketing attacks might continue to produce high casualties. The possibility of such use with the attendant collateral damage and incentives to further escalation, would be a destabilizing influence in tactical nuclear war.

If the concept worked as intended, it would provide a capability to force at least a pause in a nuclear or nonnuclear attack, without the heavy civilian damage characteristic of less restrained nuclear conflict. However, deficiencies in target acquisition make it difficult to rely on low yield nuclear weapons. In heavy air defense environments we will have poor target acquisition ability beyond line of sight from the front lines.2/ Commanders in tactical nuclear war will therefore feel strongly impelled to resort to terrain fire with large yield weapons in place of discrete, aimed fire with low yield weapons. The lack of good target information may also tend to increase the level of violence once tactical nuclear war has begun. New reconnaissance systems may offer improvements in target acquisition capability, but they will have to be evaluated in terms of their cost and effectiveness in both nuclear and nonnuclear environments.

4. The Tactical Nuclear Campaign

This concept aims to provide enough tactical nuclear capability to fight for two or three weeks, assuming that ACE ground forces succeed in dispersing sufficiently to hold their casualties to levels permitting the conduct of a coherent campaign and that the conflict does not escalate to general war. As discussed in greater detail in Annex B, it is uncertain that these are valid assumptions.

The time limit for this concept is set by the availability of supplies in forward dispersal stocks, since the enemy could target our lines of

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1/ This estimate is based upon Project 23, and the TAC NUC-65 war games in which about 200 and 260 warheads were employed per corps.

2/ The TAC NUC-65 report states that only ten to fifteen percent of potential targets are likely to be detected in good visibility, and only a third of these recognized as to type of target.

communication in the communication zone if it became apparent that further operations would be critically dependent upon logistics support and manpower reserves. This vulnerability constitutes an incentive to escalation. To remedy it would involve dispersing rear stocks to numerous small depots, and providing appropriate and survivable communications to control their distribution. This would imply major increases in personnel, equipment, real estate and construction in ACE, that are not included under this concept.

Under this concept ACE is to achieve a capability to fight nuclear war at the tactical level for two or three weeks, (perhaps longer if the enemy is deterred from striking ACE logistics depots). If we managed the transition to nuclear war better than the enemy, this concept could enable ACE to defeat the enemy without having to escalate higher, but there are several major uncertainties.

It is not certain that ACE can effect a suitable transition. Civilian casualties may also be large because of the movement of the battlelines during the campaign and the incentives to strike deep targets co-located with cities. If the enemy does attack logistics depots, as he may well do in an engagement of this length, it is doubtful that the conflict can remain limited to the tactical level.

5. The Extended Tactical Nuclear War

Under this concept we would prepare for tactical nuclear war that might continue at varying degrees of intensity for as long as three or four months with casualties in the first month amounting to some 20 to 40 percent of initial troop strength. 2/ To fight that long it would be necessary to provide extensive logistics facilities able to survive in a nuclear war.

A capability to conduct such an extended war would therefore require a major increase in tactical capabilities over current programs. (One study suggests a requirement for over 20,000 nuclear warheads 1/.)

This concept represents a much greater increase in cost than do the previous ones. It is subject to the same uncertainties as the Tactical Nuclear Campaign concept, but more so. In particular, considering the escalatory pressures that seem likely to build up over time, it appears highly questionable that nuclear conflict could remain constrained at the tactical level for the period of time assumed.

6. Conclusion

The table on the following page summarizes the cost of current U.S. theater nuclear programs in support of Central Europe and the costs of the five alternative postures.

1/ As postulated in the Army Project Oregon Trail report of February 1965.

The greatest difference is between the concept for Extended War and the others. The currently approved program is approximately the same as the Tactical Nuclear Campaign concept in terms of the weapons and delivery systems provided. The principal difference between them is the additional expenditure for improved situation reporting, which is desirable under all concepts.

I am unconvinced of our ability to make the transition from nonnuclear to tactical nuclear war without unduly prejudicing our ability to hold in a nonnuclear defense. Another problem in tactical nuclear war is that as the battle lengthens, the incentives to disregard constraints on weapon yields, depth of strike and permissible collateral damage will be strengthened by unsolved problems of target acquisition, movement of the front, and the growing importance of targets in the communications zone.

3. We now have in approved programs for ACE, adequate nuclear weapons and delivery systems for the concepts up to and including the tactical nuclear campaign, with the possible exception of high yield weapons to be employed against ground force targets in general war. I am asking the Chief of Staff, Army, to study the need for such weapons in conjunction with a broader study of the transition from nonnuclear war to nuclear war.

4. I reject the concept of the Extended Tactical Nuclear War as a basis for force structure planning because of its high cost, dubious feasibility, and its very high probability of terminating in general war.

5. I believe that currently approved programs give us a capability to implement at least the Short Tactical Nuclear Battle Concept. Designing our forces to meet this objective permits us to continue to deter Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons during nonnuclear conflict, to engage in a demonstrative use of tactical nuclear weapons, to fight a short tactical nuclear engaged battle, and to perform theater tasks in general war.

6. Although I approve, in principle, the provision of finely graded options between low level conflict and unrestrained general war, our understanding of tactical nuclear war is insufficient to determine whether or not the Tactical Nuclear Campaign Concept should be established as a force structure objective. I have noted that approved programs approximate in size and composition the estimated requirements for this concept and recommend that they be continued but that no additional requirements be approved on the basis of achieving a capability for the Tactical Nuclear Campaign concept pending resolution of the present uncertainties regarding its feasibility, its desirability, and its weapon and support requirements. Specifically I see no basis for increasing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe beyond currently approved levels. 2/ 3/

7. All of the alternatives considered would benefit from improved situation reporting. I am asking the JCS to consider the suggestions presented in ACECON-72 and to propose suitable improvements in our capabilities.

D. Theater Nuclear Warfare in the Far East

While we understand only imperfectly the implications of tactical nuclear conflict in Europe, we know less about such implications in the Far East. In part, this is because we have focused our tactical nuclear studies to date primarily on Europe.

Since too little is known about our nuclear requirements in the Far East to draw concrete conclusions at this time, the following paragraphs are devoted to sketching problems that are already evident and to raising questions that we will seek to answer in the coming months.

We face two essentially different threats in the Far East: The Soviet and the Chinese Communist. The nuclear armed USSR ground forces could strike strongly into Korea but hardly anywhere else for lack of transport. However, the Soviet IRBMs can reach out a good distance and their aircraft could deploy into China or North Vietnam. The following table illustrates what could be the opposing US/USSR nuclear capabilities in this region by M+30. Of course, both sides can reinforce these means with their intercontinental delivery forces. In fact, a number of targets in this region are covered by the Strategic Air Command.

OPPOSING US/USSR NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST, M+30[1]/

CINCPAC		USSR	
1965	1970	1965	1970

The U.S. clearly has the predominance in mass-casualty-producing means. In fact, the U.S. superiority is so great as to raise questions concerning whether our warhead deployments in this area are excessive. These questions become stronger when consideration is given to how weak the Communist air and missile defenses in the area are. The U.S. predominance, together with the strong defense in South Korea, should strongly inhibit Soviet initiation of aggression in this area.

The Chinese Communists pose a different sort of problem. Having recently exploded two nuclear devices, they may already have achieved a marginal nuclear capability. It is estimated that within the next two years their capability could consist of at least a few fission bombs deliverable by the two Badger and a dozen or so Bull[1] bombers on hand. Assuming an all out effort to achieve a large stockpile, the Chinese Communists might possibly have by 1970 a few hundred weapons. Many of these may be small enough to be delivered by their inventory of some 290 Beagle light bombers, by their version of the Soviet thousand mile MRBM (which may be ready for deployment in 1967 or 1968) and by their short range (100-300 mile) submarine launched missiles. Although a small thermonuclear capability may be achieved by 1970, the stockpile seems likely to have only fission weapons (up to 200 KT) until 1970. Based upon the scant information available, the following table illustrates what the Chinese Communist nuclear posture may look like in 1965 and 1970 in terms of delivery capabilities for nuclear weapons of types that the Chinese Communists may develop by these dates.

ILLUSTRATIVE CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

The advent of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability can have serious repercussions throughout the Far East. Under nuclear blackmail, neighboring countries may become more prone to accommodate to Chinese Communists wishes and less likely to call on the U.S. for support.

In the event that a major Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia indicates that the U.S. might have to face a decision to use nuclear weapons, it is clear that the decision could be taken more deliberately than a similar decision against the Soviet Union in Europe. The terrain in many areas of the Far East would slow the pace of a Chinese attack, particularly in the monsoon half of the year, when the rain soaked road net can carry only a third as many forces as when dry. During the dry season U.S. and Allied aircraft can cover the road net, largely unimpeded by weather, reducing traffic sharply at that time too. In fact, while recognizing the demonstrated capability of the Chinese Communist Army to move without dependence upon existing road nets, I consider it questionable whether the approaches into Southeast Asia would permit the Chinese Communist to intervene massively enough in Vietnam or Thailand to overwhelm our conventional capabilities.

Although choke points in the limited road net in this region would be good nuclear targets, there are not many other attractive nuclear targets in the area. Considering the vulnerability of our relatively few airbases in the region, we might well be giving up our superiority in nonnuclear air power if we escalated the war by striking the air fields of an enemy who had even a few nuclear weapons, unless we achieve virtually complete effectiveness in our initial strikes. Furthermore, the forested terrain in Southeast Asia and the enemy propensity for light equipment, dispersion, infiltration, camouflage and night movement could reduce considerably the advantages normally expected in employing nuclear weapons against ground forces.

In the long run, there is a danger that nuclear developments in the Far East may follow the pattern experienced in Europe about a decade earlier. Immediately after the end of World War II the U.S. protected Europe with atomic bombs, much as it later sought to protect Asia with its massive retaliation pronouncement of 1954. Today there are proposals that we must rely on tactical nuclear weapons to handle the "massive Chinese Army" in a manner reminiscent of that envisaged when the Soviets acquired a counter-vailing strategic nuclear capability and we deployed tactical nuclear weapons to defend Europe against the "massive Soviet Army". Many of our problems in Europe today are a result of having oversold a nuclear defense. In order to gain a better basis for decisions concerning what nuclear capabilities to provide in the Far East, I am asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the relative costs and effectiveness of various alternative theater nuclear force postures in the Far East.

III. Program Implications

Our studies have not progressed to the point of developing the detailed, time phased, and costed program needed to meet essential requirements. In its absence I shall express my current views about specific proposals.

I. Nuclear Delivery Systems

2. Nuclear Stockpiles

Any effort to compute stockpile requirements for tactical nuclear warfare is beset by a number of uncertainities. Nevertheless, as discussed above, current programs in support of Europe appear to provide sufficient weapons to conduct as long a tactical nuclear campaign as seems feasible in that region under current circumstances. And subject to further study on

1/ Capable of firing both nonnuclear and nuclear warheads.

the Far East, there appears to be more than enough weapons for that region as well. Thus, the size of our stockpile does not, at this time, appear to limit our tactical nuclear capabilities.

The availability of nuclear materials has increased to the point where it no longer constitutes the governing constraint on the size of the theater nuclear stockpile. (A decision to undertake a substantial anti-ballistic missile program could change this.) The major constraint now appears to be the cost of delivery systems and of warhead fabrication, particularly the latter, since most theater nuclear delivery systems have already been bought and the costs of projected changes which should be attributed primarily to nuclear delivery capabilities are relatively small. In this regard the fabrication costs of tactical nuclear warheads previously scheduled for production during the next six years were as follows:

NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION1/

The U.S. clearly has the predominance in mass-casualty-producing means. In fact, the U.S. superiority is so great as to raise questions concerning whether our warhead deployments in this area are excessive. These questions become stronger when consideration is given to how weak the Communist air and missile defenses in the area are. The U.S. predominance, togetjer withe

Perhaps the most serious deficiency of all concerns the time it takes to transmit information on the tactical situation to decision makers. There has been inadequate improvement over World War II and Korea. It takes many hours to transmit the front line status back to theater level. For example, CINCEUR advises 1/ that in exercises last fall his information on the ground situation arrived up to 36 hours after the event. Apparently too much information is being passed, too much time is consumed in processing at each echelon of command, and the means to expedite and display the essential information are inadequate. Once the necessary procedures have been determined and established, success will depend upon the adequacy of communications.

Much has been said about the vulnerability of our overseas communications systems in a general nuclear war. When these systems are examined in the context of the more restrained environment of nonnuclear and tactical nuclear war, the situation is somewhat less severe-though much remains to be done. It can be expected that within two weeks of the outset of a nonnuclear war the intensive attacks directed against military targets might, as a by product, greatly reduce communications between our major headquarters via the fixed military tropospheric scatter and microwave links and the civil landline networks. The same might be true in the event of escalation to nuclear conflict confined to the engaged battle zone. In these cases communications between high level commands should remain marginally adequate and then improve somewhat as corrective measures are instituted and initial intensity of air attacks subsides. If the enemy made selective nuclear attacks against the communications systems in Europe with the idea of destroying NATO's ability to decide upon and launch Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) forces, most high level communications might collapse. However, SACEUR's airborne command post and other back-up modes that are being programmed, such as satellite communications, are designed to thwart such an attempt (though they would leave us with greatly reduced communications capacity).

Given adequate mobility, higher level reserve forces in nonnuclear conflict may be able to remain dispersed sufficiently to survive and counter enemy initiation. Careful preparation and training in rapid dispersal at the onset of nuclear conflict should also enhance survivability. 1/ An additional approach is the deployment of a highly survivable capability to retaliate and inflict major casualties on the enemy ground forces through the use of high yield nuclear weapons employed on a terrain fire basis, if necessary. Such a capability has been discussed in the section on the General War Increment, above.

Accordingly, I am asking the Army Chief of Staff to study the problem of effecting a viable transition from nonnuclear conflict to nuclear conflict on the ground without prejudicing our nonnuclear defense. This will include investigation of how the distribution of civilians in the battle area should affect the yields employed and of the effectiveness of high yield terrain fire in countering enemy nuclear preemption against our ground forces massed for nonnuclear conflict. The effect of concurrent employment of chemical warfare will also be considered.

It is quite apparent that with the problems of nuclear escalation, decision makers on each side will be strongly influenced by the quality of their machinery for situation reporting. If the decision makers find that they are receiving information late and in incomplete form, they may feel compelled to rely on hunch or intuition. Recognizing the danger of waiting too long to release nuclear weapons, they may possibly accede to the request of a local commander for release in situations which, if fully known, would not warrant release--or they may release too late. In the midst of many disconnected reports of enemy nuclear strikes, they may inadvertently overestimate the extent of the strikes and over-react. Uncertain over the point of launch of certain large enemy strikes, they may miscalculate enemy intentions and initiate responses that might lead us irretrievably down the path to general nuclear war.

On balance, I find that our situation reporting system constitutes a serious weakness in our ability to prosecute tactical nuclear war. Unless major procedural changes are made to filter available information and get the most important data to decision makers with high precedence, the decision makers might find themselves virtually devoid of the critical information needed for decisions. Accordingly, priority must be given to studying this problem and applying the resources necessary to achieve proper balance with other tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities. To this end, I am requesting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake a special study to determine what procedures and facilities are required to keep decision makers at all levels sufficiently informed of crucial events so that they are as ready as possible to make any nuclear decisions which may be required. This will include specific inquiry concerning the minimum essential information required by decision makers, to include the front line situation, status of nuclear delivery forces, location of enemy nuclear strikes, and country of launch of enemy missiles.

ANNEX B

TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN THE ENGAGED BATTLE

The use of nuclear weapons would have two major effects on the battlefield relative to conventional weapons. First, it would increase greatly the casualty rates of engaged forces unless they disperse to much thinner troop densities. Second, it would provide for the first time opportunities to inflict substantial casualties on mobile enemy forces well back from the front, despite the anticipated paucity of detailed target acquisition beyond a few kilometers from the line of contact. Studies suggest that during the transition from nonnuclear conflict to nuclear conflict these two effects create vulnerabilities that may prove decisive unless special safeguards are found to counter enemy attempts to take advantage of them. These vulnerabilities and means which have been suggested to counter them are covered in the following paragraphs.

For illustrative purposes the engaged battle nuclear capabilities likely to confront each other by M+30 in the Central Region of Europe are listed below. 1/

ENGAGED BATTLE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, CENTRAL EUROPE, M+30 2/

In all cases the percentages of casualties in relation to the duration of the games strongly suggests that forces of this type kill each other off very quickly. Unless the war terminates as a result, the prospect is that the battlefield will be left in possession of the side that can get reinforcements there first. (This is the situation envisaged in the Short Tactical Nuclear Battle alternative.)

The appropriate way to reduce the level of casualties on the nuclear battle appears to lie in thinning out the density of troops on the battlefield. This was attempted in Game II of the Tactical Nuclear 65 study by dispersing defending NATO divisions to a "nuclear scared" posture, occupying about two and a half times as much area as conventional formations, i.e., frontage of about 50 kilometers and depth of about 50 kilometers. When yields of up to 35 kilotons were employed, the engaged divisions sustained losses of about six percent per day in tactical nuclear conflict and ACE suffered about 20 percent casualties overall in a 13 day campaign that succeeded in containing the enemy along the forward defense line in Central Europe. (This is the situation envisaged in the Tactical Nuclear Campaign alternative.) Considering

1/ Project 23 by CJCS Special Studies Group, April 1963; Tactical Nuclear 65 by CJCS Special Studies Group, July 1964; Project Oregon Trail by CDC, U.S. Army, February 1965.

that casualty rates in the major battles of the Napoleonic and Civil Wars were over 22 percent and that rates in intensive combat in World Wars I and II came to about 20 percent casualties per day (e.g., the Meuse Argonne Offensive and certain actions in Battle for Normandy), the casulty rates estimated for the Tactical Nuclear-65 game may not be prohibitive.

Unfortunately ground divisions deployed in a dispersed posture lack the concentration necessary for conducting a sturdy nonnuclear defense against strong enemy nonnuclear attack. Dispersed too widely to attain the mutual support and massed firepower necessary for nonnuclear defense, they are subject to penetration and forced withdrawal. As a result there is a requirement that troops engaged in nonnuclear combat assume dispositions of adequate troop density. Thus there is a need for markedly different postures in nonnuclear and nuclear conflict. This creates major problems in effecting transition from nonnuclear conflict to nuclear conflict, problems which differ according to which side initiates the use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, if the enemy initiates nuclear strikes during a nonnuclear conflict, our combat elements massed for nonnuclear defense could suffer the high levels of casualties listed above for conventional deployments unless they succeed in dispersing before being struck. If the enemy employs relatively large yield weapons to blanket the general areas occupied by our ground forces, few of our troops would be left to fight.

This is the nub of the nuclear transition problem at the engaged battle level. Unfortunately it probably cannot be solved by hardening as in the strategic nuclear war case, nor by concealment as in the deep nuclear strike case. During nonnuclear conflict the engaged battle forces are too exposed and too close together to hide successfully and they would run serious risks if they spread out too much.

80-FOI-967
AF Div

6

Record of Decision

January 6, 1967

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Theater Nuclear Forces (U)

My continuing investigation of the role of theater nuclear forces has led me to the following major conclusions:

1. Nuclear weapons are not a substitute for nonnuclear capabilities. The growth of Soviet nuclear forces has reached the point where NATO must anticipate extreme damage in a large scale nuclear war. As a result we can no longer be confident that a theater nuclear posture without strong conventional forces will continue to deter Soviet nonnuclear aggression. 1/

2. Nuclear weapons are a necessary complement to nonnuclear forces. They contribute to the deterrence of Soviet attack with tactical nuclear weapons; they will permit us to respond in kind if such weapons are used; they can be used to support our forces if we fail to contain a large scale nonnuclear aggression; they contribute to deterring or fighting general war. 2/

4. Deficiencies in our posture reinforce the incentives to escalate that are inherent in nuclear warfare. Major improvements at acceptable costs can be made with regard to the vulnerability of our strike forces, situation reporting, doctrine for transition from nonnuclear to tactical nuclear conflict, and battlefield intelligence.

1/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would give a somewhat larger role to theater nuclear forces in the deterrence of nonnuclear agression.

2/ The JCS would add that selective application of nuclear weapons could cause de-escalation or termination of conflict.

3/ Ascribing a larger role to theater nuclear forces in general war, the JCS would not focus their design primarily on limited nuclear conflict.

FOI CASE NO. 80-DFOI-967

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Table I summarizes recommended theater nuclear forces. In particular, I recommend that we:

7. Defer JCS recommended increases in fixed plant communications to nuclear weapons storage sites and units in Europe. Increase reliance on the existing, more survivable and less expensive mobile communications facilities for control of nuclear weapons. Resultant savings in investment and operating costs are $32 million through FY 1972.

Record of Decision

January 6, 1967

U.S. Theater Nuclear Warheads in Support of U.S. and Allied Forces[a/b]
(End Fiscal Year)

I. ROLE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The USSR is now approaching parity with the U.S. in theater nuclear weapons (see Annex A page 22) and it appears unlikely that either side can gain sufficient advantage to upset this parity. This development threatens higher damage in the event of nuclear war, compounds the difficulties of constraining conflict, and effectively rules out meaningful military victory. Nevertheless, theater nuclear forces have several important functions.

Deterrence of Aggression. The Soviets might fear that tactical nuclear weapons would bridge the gap between large scale nonnuclear war and general war, and this fear might help to deter them from extreme acts of aggression in Europe or to inhibit escalation by them in war. However since nuclear war would be catastrophic to both sides, Soviet leaders might doubt NATO's resolve to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against limited nonnuclear aggression or to resist such aggression at all if a nuclear response were the only NATO option available.

The major role for theater nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks in Europe. A Soviet decision maker considering the initiation of nuclear war in Europe would have to assume U.S. willingness to respond in kind.

General War. Our theater nuclear forces also contribute to deterring or fighting a general nuclear war and to denying the Soviets any prospect, however remote, of overrunning Europe in the course of a general war and capturing Western European productive capacity intact. The contribution of theater nuclear forces to deterring or fighting a general war is small however, relative to that of our strategic forces. The size and characteristics of our theater nuclear forces should not, therefore, be determined by the requirements of general war; their general war capabilities should rather be treated as a bonus.

Tactical Nuclear Option. The principal question about limited nuclear war is whether it will escalate to general nuclear war. Once the "firebreak" between nonnuclear and nuclear war is breached with the first nuclear

weapon, escalatory pressures will rise. Opposing commanders will have strong military incentives to strike opposing nuclear strike forces before they are launched, to attack land forces still concentrated for nonnuclear conflict, to compensate for target acquisition difficulties by directing large yield weapons at likely targets, and to hit logistics concentrations in the rear, rapidly increasing damage to population and industry as the battle proceeds.

The mounting damage as nuclear war grows more violent provides the chief incentive for restraint in nuclear war. The figures in the table below illustrate the increase in civil damage as nuclear war mounts in violence through various hypothetically restrained levels of conflict. The table excludes strategic attacks on targets that are collocated with cities, or attacks on urban targets themselves that could result in European fatalities of 200 million.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN CONSTRAINED NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN EUROPE
(Avoiding Attacks on Towns)

There are a number of additional motives for restraint. Neither side can foresee a clear advantage from escalation to override the many uncertainties in this untried kind of warfare. Nor could "military victory", if achieved, compensate for the casualties that even the initiator would sustain among troops and civilians alike in unlimited nuclear war. The initiator's armed forces, no less than his opponent's, could be destroyed - possibly to the point where he would lose control of even his own territory. Regardless of the initial objectives then, each side would want to avoid general war. It is desirable, therefore, that we be able to recognize enemy restraint if it occurs and be able to fight with restraint ourselves.

In sum, it is impossible to predict with confidence the course of a limited nuclear war. The danger of escalation, once the "firebreak" between nonnuclear and nuclear war has been crossed, and the damage, if escalation occurs, caution against relying on our ability to limit nuclear war and against investing large resources in nuclear capabilities that are important only if the war does remain limited. Our posture and doctrine should be designed, where possible without large sacrifices in resources, to reduce incentives for enemy escalation and to provide inducements for him to observe restraint.

Incomplete Intelligence. The Soviets' combat doctrine suggests that they neither expect nor plan on restraint in using nuclear weapons. The Soviets nevertheless maintain at considerable cost a force which is inherently strong in conventional as well as tactical nuclear capabilities. This suggests that whatever Soviet doctrine and strategy are, their forces still provide them with both nonnuclear and nuclear options that continue to complicate our planning, which is already taxed with broad uncertainties concerning the size and yields of Soviet tactical nuclear stockpiles.

Inadequate Situation Reporting Machinery. Long time lags - often many hours in duration - occur before decision makers at theater levels learn of the full combat situation at the front. Inaccuracies in reporting enemy nuclear strikes compound the problem. As a result decision makers may wait too long in releasing nuclear weapons or make a hasty decision in favor of employing nuclear weapons in circumstances which would be more suitably handled without them if the situation were better known. We should be able to improve our reporting machinery substantially.

Vulnerable Nuclear Strike Forces. Our overseas nuclear strike forces consist mainly of tactical aircraft based on easily targeted airfields within range of Soviet IR/MREM forces which are so numerous as to render additional dispersal of SACEUR strike aircraft an insufficient remedy for their vulnerability. Prior to the Soviet IR/MREM force buildup, these aircraft played a major role in SIOP planning because of the timeliness of their strikes as compared to those of intercontinential bombers. However, in view of their current vulnerability to IR/MREMs these aircraft can no longer be depended upon for crucial SIOP tasks. We must now begin to rely more upon our growing mobile Pershing missile forces which would be much less vulnerable after they deployed from their peacetime stations and began moving randomly among previously unoccupied sites in periods of strategic warning. Their lower vulnerability should enhance the stability of the deterrent at the theater level in crisis.

In sum, the unresolved difficulties noted above suggest that we cannot rely with high confidence on nuclear weapons to achieve the traditional military objectives: defense of friendly population, territory, and wealth, and preservation of friendly military forces, while destroying enemy forces to such an extent that we can enforce our political will - though those would, of course, remain our objectives if nuclear war did occur. Nevertheless, as long as we retain our current level of theater nuclear capability and continue to improve it at the level of effort currently programmed, we should be able to deny the enemy confidence in achieving such success against us.

1/ The JCS consider that the necessary logistics are not too costly.

Taking account of the reduced requirement for air delivered nuclear weapons, the Army study results are consistent with my conclusion last year that the number of nuclear weapons already provided for Europe is

adequate. This was also the judgment of the Nuclear Planning Working Group, NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers at its April, 1966 meeting: "Tactical nuclear weapons available to SACEUR and SACLANT under present conditions appear to be sufficient in quantity."

Accordingly, I see no change in circumstances to warrant an increase in the number of weapons dispersed to Europe. 1/ Modernization and improvements involving new allied delivery units can be accomplished by redistribution within the total approved by NSAM 334. Considering our capability for rapid world-wide nuclear weapons redistribution, the stockpile held in CONUS seems appropriate for most likely contingencies.

Should it be necessary to meet overt Chinese conventional aggression with the use of nuclear weapons, our capacity to do so is not in question, provided the Soviets do not intervene. The expected increases in Chinese nuclear capability over the next 10 years and longer will not change this assessment. There are, however, major constraints on the use of nuclear weapons in Asia as well as in Europe which suggest that we could not count on the use of such weapons except perhaps to deter or defend against very large scale aggression. Chinese development of nuclear weapons will, however, permit them to engage in nuclear blackmail. The role, if any, which our theater nuclear forces can play in meeting this Chinese threat remains to be defined. It is not clear that our current deployments are optimum for either military or political requirements in Asia. We do not yet have adequate studies to reach sound judgments on the question of the proper size and composition of our nuclear arsenal. Until such studies are completed I do not believe that any increase in our Pacific theater based nuclear forces is warranted.

IV. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MIX

Though our theater nuclear weapons appear sufficient in quantity, the Nuclear Planning Working Group, NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers in April 1966 concluded that "the optimum mix of nuclear weaponry might profitably be further studied". Studies to date have produced the following results.

1/ The JCS consider that an increase in weapons for Europe must be examined in the coming year.

Taking into account our external forces' contribution against targets in East Europe, I consider these forces sufficient for the entire QRA task. Accordingly, I see no need to increase FRG missiles, even if the FRG decides to follow U.S. example and increase launchers per battalion. The JCS have confirmed the need to place Pershing on QRA, but they are studying further the force level required.

Pershing could be modified to reach well into the USSR, but I consider our external forces adequate for this purpose and intend to focus any improved Pershing capability against East European targets short of the USSR.

I believe that an appropriate peacetime QRA level can be provided by a portion of the Pershing force (perhaps 25 percent) and some QRA aircraft as necessary, pending completion of the Pershing build-up. When

ACE combat forces deploy upon receipt of strategic warning, the non-alert Pershings would also deploy, taking over any targets covered by aircraft in peacetime and bringing QRA forces to full alert. Concurrently, all aircraft can be withdrawn from QRA and made available for immediate use if necessary in nonnuclear conflict to which they are much better suited. Although the aircraft would retain their nuclear capability, nuclear missions would become secondary; their primary orientation for purposes of system design, training and logistics would be nonnuclear warfare. The following table indicates the number of aircraft that might be involved in nuclear missions.

Air Defense Weapons. Until now, nuclear air defense warheads have been justified on two grounds: high effectiveness against weapon carriers (carrier kill) and ability to destroy the nuclear elements of weapons aboard carriers (weapon kill) in order to prevent damage if the enemy fuzes them to detonate upon impact whether or not deliberately dropped ("dead man fuzing"). Individual Nike Hercules warheads, for example, are expected to achieve the following carrier and weapon kill probabilities, taking account of overall system reliability and effectiveness:

NIKE HERCULES SINGLE SHOT KILL PROBABILITY AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Although nuclear warheads are more effective than nonnuclear ones, I believe that deployment of large ratios of nuclear to nonnuclear warheads per battery is not remunerative for two reasons. First I do not accept the weapon kill criterion for tactical defense. It seems unlikely that the enemy would employ "dead man fuzing". We do not arm our own weapons this way because the advantages of doing so do not warrant the attendant increased risk of accidental explosion over friendly territory, or even on enemy populated areas in a limited nuclear conflict.

Extended Range Lance. It may prove desirable to modify the Lance missile so as to deliver nuclear warheads to almost twice the range of the heavier nonnuclear warheads. If this concept proves feasible, major economies can

1/ The Secretary of Army and JCS recommend deferral of this decision pending further study. However, I consider the decision to be justified on the basis of evidence available. If subsequent study indicates that a different level should be provided, we will revise the program as necessary.

be realized by substituting Lance for Sergeant, whose $30 million recurring operating costs should offset the necessary additional RDT&E and procurement costs of the Lance within three or four years after the system becomes operational. Because of the Lance launcher's high rate of fire (up to 6 rounds per hour versus Sergeant's one round per hour), Lance launchers could substitute for Sergeant launchers on less than a one-for-one basis and maintain or even increase total capability.

Despite their advantages, the use of ADMs would risk escalation by violating the demarcation between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, and the seriousness of such an act would be reduced only slightly by the fact that ADMs are not subject to aiming errors and would be detonated on friendly territory. Their use must therefore be subject to the same strict political control as other nuclear weapons.

Since it seems most unlikely that all of these targets would have to be demolished in a war, I have not accepted the JCS recommendations that the ADM stockpile be increased. If warheads are released for use in the covering area, the conflict may be resolved before many deeper targets are executed. In the more likely event that warheads are not released before much of the covering force has been driven in, many of the covering force targets would not be destroyed - and perhaps not many in the rear area. Furthermore, conventional demolitions or nuclear artillery might be acceptable alternatives in a number of cases even though less effective. I have asked the JCS to review SACEUR's ADM requirements in the light of possible substitutes.

The high costs of the nuclear-only Sergeant suggest the desirability of substituting an extended range Lance for Sergeant, if feasible. The data raise further important questions, for example: (1) Would the greater economy of Nike Hercules to Lance warrant increasing its surface-to-surface role? (2) Considering that Lance warheads cost more than Honest John warheads, and 155 shells about twice as much as 8-inch shells, do the nonnuclear advantages of the newer Lance and 155mm warheads justify phasing Honest John and 8-inch battalions out of the inventory as is being considered in an Army optimum artillery mix study? I am asking the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to refine the cost base of Army systems and to study trade-offs within and between alternative mixes.

V. CONTROL AND USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The military effectiveness and political impact of theater nuclear weapons have required that special safeguards, communications and decision procedures be established for these weapons.

Communications. To permit rapid release, special U.S. communications have been installed to all weapons custodians, primarily through fixed plant installations that are highly vulnerable in high intensity nuclear conflict; a secondary system is provided by an Alternate Airborne Command Element (AACE) scheduled to become continuously airborne in 1967. In general, I am opposed to procurement of theater communications solely to cover unlimited nuclear contingencies, unless their costs are commensurate with the small contribution that theater nuclear forces are likely to make in general war. Accordingly, I question the necessity

of keeping the AACE continuously airborne and I am cancelling a scheduled $32 million improvement of the main tropospheric scatter stations linking ten new custodial sites and installing low frequency equipment at 90 locations.1/

Decision Procedures. The Nuclear Planning Working Group (NPWG) of the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers is considering the problem of deciding when use of nuclear weapons may be warranted. SACEUR's political guidance on this subject is now twelve years old and outdated since it does not envisage limited conflict with the Soviets and since the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons may no longer be clearly in the interests of NATO.

In NPWG discussions the FRG and Turkish ministers have suggested that in view of the urgency of releasing nuclear weapons when required, circumstances might warrant predelegation of ADM release authority to field commanders. This is contrary to U.S. policy, but since it is of interest to our Allies, I believe that we should consider the problems of transmitting and processing requests for weapon release in crisis. I am therefore directing the JCS to investigate the probable time delays in processing a request for selective ADM release in accordance with current procedures. As a related matter, I am also requesting the JCS to undertake a special study of procedures and facilities required to keep decision makers at all levels informed of crucial events on the battlefield so as to be adequately prepared for critical decisions.

Decision time is further related to the degree of military and political understanding of nuclear options available. Our dual capable delivery systems and spread of yields provide a wide range of options, ranging from the subkiloton ADMs, bombs, and accurate howitzers to the larger air and missile delivered yields and ranges. In order to streamline procedures and render this capability most effective, various studies have proposed that several levels of response be planned; for example: subkiloton ADMs only; subkiloton ADMs, Davy Crockett and 155mm; all battlefield weapons under 2 kilotons; targets only within range of battlefield weapons; etc. This general approach appears to be worth further development. The JCS are studying it.

It is pertinent to note that in the twelve years since political guidance was issued to SACEUR the Alliance has not achieved a workable mechanism for resolving divergent national views. Individual allied officers have been integrated into NATO nuclear planning at military levels, but to date there has been practically no national participation. A permanent arrangement should be made at the highest political-military level to study nuclear problems and assist in working toward an alliance consensus. The NPWG reached similar conclusions at its meeting in London in April 1966. Such arrangements should permit continuation of fruitful information exchanges and provide a useful arena in which the U.S. can develop further its case on the role of nuclear forces in NATO strategy.

Annex A

OPPOSING NUMBERS OF THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEADS
(Rounded)

Annex B

AUTHORIZED WORLD-WIDE DISPERSAL OF U.S. THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Annex C

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPON SUPPORT IN NATO EUROPE[a/]

(End Fiscal Year)

ANNEX D

Allied Systems Supported By U.S. Theater Nuclear Weapons[a/]

80-FOI-967
DFMS for 1967
AF Div

Record of Decision — Revised January 11, 1968

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Theater Nuclear Forces (U)

My continuing review of the role of theater nuclear and related chemical and biological forces leads me to the following conclusions:

1. Theater nuclear weapons are not a substitute for conventional capabilities. The growth of Soviet nuclear forces has created strong reasons, particularly in NATO, for avoiding the damage inherent in nuclear war except when our most vital interests are clearly threatened. We should program forces to meet all but the largest conventional attacks with conventional means and chemical attacks with some chemical retaliation as well. Even against the largest conventional attacks we should not assume that theater nuclear weapons would be used initially.

2. Nuclear weapons are a necessary complement to conventional forces. They can be used to support our forces if we fail to contain large-scale conventional aggression. They contribute to deterring Soviet attacks with tactical nuclear weapons, and they will permit us to respond in kind if such weapons are used.

3. We buy theater nuclear forces primarily for deterrence and, if deterrence should fail, to give us an option short of strategic nuclear war. We need to improve our capabilities for fighting a controlled and limited theater nuclear war. In particular, we need to improve our capabilities for the selective use of nuclear weapons during the initial stages of such a war.

FOI CASE NO. 80-DFOI-967

Document ____ of ____ Documents

Excised Under the Provisions of (The Freedom of Information Act) 5USC552 (b) (1)

I. ROLE OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THEATER CONFLICT

A. Role of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe

One reason we keep tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is to deter a Soviet tactical nuclear attack. This requires enough force to make the cost to the Soviets of launching such an attack greater than the gain. It also requires protecting our weapons and control systems to reduce Soviet incentives for a nuclear first strike.

Tactical nuclear weapons also supplement our conventional forces in deterring all-out Soviet conventional attacks.

Our threat to use theater nuclear weapons is more believable if we can keep their use limited without having to go to all-out nuclear war. Limits or restraints could take various forms -- type and location of targets, number and yield of weapons, extent of battle area, and type of explosion. Such restraints, if observed, would greatly reduce civilian casualties. For example, 1,000 nuclear weapons (airbursts only) against military targets on a single corps battlefront would cause about 300,000 civilian casualties. In contrast, 9,000 weapons (air and ground bursts) in a regionwide attack limited to military targets, and avoiding cities, would cause about 20 million civilian casualties. I doubt, however, that such restraints would be observed for long in the face of pressures for escalation. Nevertheless, the possibility of limiting casualties leads us to improve our capability for exercising restraint.

Nuclear war cannot be kept limited without good command and control, communications, and procedures for releasing weapons and carrying out contingency plans. Our capabilities are inadequate now, although we

U.S. TREATY NUCLEAR WARHEADS a/ IN SUPPORT OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES
(JCS Stockpile Recommendations, Where Different, in Parentheses; System Recommendations Not Shown) b/

	FY67	FY68	FY69	FY70	Out-Year Objective (FY71-76 c/) TOTAL	U.S.	Allies

plan to improve them in ways discussed later. Even with such capabilities there will be intense pressure to widen the conflict. The temptation would be high, for example, to attack the enemy's nuclear delivery systems before they could be used or to destroy his massed ground forces before they could disperse.

For purposes of deterrence, how well our forces can meet an initial tactical nuclear assault is more important than how long a campaign we can conduct. Our hope is that if theater nuclear war occurs, it can be restrained. Our theater nuclear forces should permit us to force withdrawal of Warsaw Pact ground and tactical air forces using theater nuclear weapons in a gradual, controlled manner. The level of force required to do this is described on page 7 as the "Campaign" force alternative. Furthermore, we should plan for an initial conventional defense and not necessarily for the early use of nuclear weapons.

We cannot rely on theater nuclear forces for more than deterrent roles, although we program enough forces for a theater nuclear campaign. In particular, tactical nuclear forces are no substitute for conventional forces. This is true because our ability to keep a tactical nuclear war limited is doubtful; tactical nuclear operations can probably not be sustained for long; and Soviet tactical nuclear forces, as shown in the next table, are now too strong to give us much prospect of achieving a meaningful military victory.

C. Role of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Although we usually think of nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of mass destruction, as the next table shows, biological and, in some cases chemical munitions, are cheaper and more dangerous. More importantly, these munitions can be produced by many countries. They are therefore potentially even more dangerous to us than nuclear weapons. The large number of potential users of these means -- particularly of biological warfare -- strongly motivates us to deter their use by anyone.

1. Chemicals

Lethal chemicals are weapons of mass destruction only against unprotected personnel. When troops are protected, lethal chemicals are less effective than conventional ammunition. (However, troops in protective clothing are also less effective.) Since Soviet forces are well-trained and equipped to defend against a chemical attack, we gain little advantage by buying a large chemical program in addition to our tactical nuclear forces. Instead, we need only enough to deter Soviet use and force the Soviets to take protective measures. More importantly, we need to improve our defense against chemical warfare with gas masks, protective suits, and proper training. Even this limited program calls for better chemical defenses than most NATO countries have been willing to buy. We rely on our tactical nuclear forces to deter massive chemical attack, just as we do against a massive conventional attack. Pending completion of our study of chemicals needed for these purposes, I am deferring a decision on JCS-recommended additions to our chemical stockpile.

Non-lethal chemicals are useful against insurgents, particularly when enemy troops and civilians are mingled. In such cases, the alternatives to non-lethal chemical attacks are ineffective conventional operations or high casualties to civilians and our own troops.

2. Biological Weapons

We cannot substitute biological for strategic nuclear forces, so a biological warfare program is an additional cost. Since we keep a nuclear retaliatory capability anyway, a lethal biological capability is not needed.

II. ADEQUACY OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

Since we keep conventional forces with strong artillery and missile forces to support NATO strategy, the theater nuclear capability is added at least cost by providing nuclear weapons for these nonnuclear delivery systems.

Most of our spending on theater nuclear forces has been for nuclear weapons, and we have come to measure the adequacy of our theater nuclear forces in terms of the size and balance of our nuclear stockpile. While this is useful, it has led us to pay too little attention to control, communications, and operational plans in weighing the overall adequacy of our theater nuclear forces.

The size and design of our theater nuclear forces should fit their limited role. We should not try to provide forces for a long tactical nuclear war nor should we set aside special theater nuclear forces for a general war. Their contribution in general war is too small compared to that of our strategic forces to be considered anything more than a bonus. The next sections show that our present tactical nuclear stockpile is more than adequate.

A. Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe

a/ Includes tactical nuclear bombs, artillery, and strike missiles.

The Short Battle would give enough force to stalemate enemy front line divisions, but not enough to cope with his local reserve divisions. This level meets most deterrent needs. It may be all that either side can control at this time. The stockpile required to support this level is much smaller than the Soviet tactical nuclear stockpile.

The Extended War would give means to fight the Warsaw Pact's mobilized reserves. This is based on optimistic assumptions that we have time to use mobilized troops, that neither side escalates, and that both sides learn how to reduce the rate of loss of troops and support means. This level is not worth buying. It costs $700 million more per year than the Campaign level. Nuclear conflict of this scope is not likely to stay limited this long, and such an extended nuclear conflict would not be tolerable to our Allies.

2. Support of Allies

Appendix D shows all allied theater nuclear delivery systems that we now support and plan to support in the future. The systems are also included in the table on page 3.

Support of NATO's 155mm howitzer and LANCE systems is now being studied by CINCEUR and discussed with our Allies. Before approving nuclear support for these systems, I will review the Army studies now underway regarding the best mix of nuclear weapons.

3. Present Capabilities

The nuclear stockpile authorized for dispersal to Europe is large enough to support the Campaign level. In my judgment this is adequate. This was also the judgment of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in April, 1967. The Ministers "accepted that tactical nuclear weapons available to SACEUR and SACLANT appear to be sufficient in quantity, but felt that both the mix of weapons and the circumstances in which they might be used required further detailed study."

Moreover, other parts of our posture would fail before our stockpile was exhausted. Unless we succeed in reducing the vulnerability of our nuclear weapons in Europe and improve our understanding and means for conducting tactical nuclear war, we could not usefully employ more than the number of weapons needed for the Short Battle concept.

B. Control and Use of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe

While we are making progress in developing means for safeguarding nuclear weapons and can release them quickly, we are not well-prepared to make critical decisions on how and where they will be used. Nor can we respond rapidly to decisions to use them selectively. We do not have adequate plans for limited tactical nuclear war. We must give civilian and military authorities improved means for following battle situations; better nuclear options to choose from; and more insight into how military, diplomatic, and intelligence factors affect nuclear war.

2. Theater Nuclear Options

The NATO Ministers of Defense have agreed to a new NATO strategy of flexible response. NATO conventional forces should be large enough to help deter a deliberate non-nuclear attack and be able to deal successfully with a conflict caused by miscalculation. They should also maintain the capability for carefully controlled escalation up to and through the use of theater nuclear weapons.

We should have contingency plans ready and U.S. forces trained to a much greater extent than they are now for the controlled use of theater nuclear weapons. Our current war plans provide either for releasing all tactical nuclear weapons or for selective release of a very few weapons, but not for gradual and controlled release as the situation demands. The selective release format that we have now requires so much data and staff work to process, that we might act too late, or be faced with intense pressure for releasing large numbers of weapons to be used at commanders' discretion. We need more prior planning in the form of a range of nuclear options linked to a situation-following system like that discussed above. For each region we should have options such as: (1) show-of-force demonstration; (2) response-in-kind; (3) discrete fire on located enemy maneuver units; (4) larger terrain fire on poorly located battlefield targets; and (5) selective strikes on bridges, airfields, and other deep targets.

C. Theater Nuclear Forces in Asia

1. Capabilities vs. USSR

The threat of an all-out Soviet conventional attack in Asia is small. In the unlikely event that they should launch such an attack, our conventional forces and those of our Asian Allies could probably defeat them without using nuclear weapons. Should the Soviets initiate the use of theater nuclear weapons in Asia, the risks to them would be extremely high.

2. Capabilities vs. China

China presents the main land threat in Asia, primarily in Korea and Southeast Asia. However, as shown in my Memorandum on General Purpose Forces, the Chinese have a very limited ability to attack beyond their borders. Moreover, the forces opposing the Chinese have radically improved as a result of our Military Assistance Program. South Korean land forces alone, for example, provide a better manpower ratio than was needed to stop the Chinese during the Korean war. Thus, we can probably stop a Chinese invasion without using nuclear forces.

Although China is unlikely to have a battlefield nuclear capability before five to ten years, the use of U.S. nuclear weapons against invading Chinese forces would be quite unattractive as a substitute for conventional defense. Not only would such use divide our Allies, it would carry a high risk of Soviet involvement and could lead to a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war.

We and our Allies have enough conventional force in Southeast Asia to block a Chinese/North Vietnamese invasion and hold the key areas. If we did need nuclear weapons we would have time to fly them in. Alternatively, we could conduct nuclear strikes from our attack carriers in a few hours. Thus, we do not need to keep nuclear stocks in Southeast Asia.

We do not need to keep tactical aircraft in the Pacific on nuclear alert for PACOM war plans or for the SIOP. The need for nuclear alert (called Quick Reaction Alert in Europe) has been defended on the grounds that it is needed to reach targets rapidly and to take off quickly for survival. Neither of these arguments applies in Asia. The Chinese do not have an effective means for nuclear pre-emption against U.S. theater forces. And, as shown on the next page, the SIOP is designed so that Asian nuclear threat targets are covered by missiles.

a/ Time-sensitive, nuclear threat targets in China and the USSR East of 100° E, extracted from the SIOP.

Nevertheless, we continue to hold tactical aircraft in the Pacific on nuclear alert. We should not, however, program special resources for these aircraft to stand nuclear alert or to take part in the SIOP. While bombs bought for tactical nuclear war may be used against SIOP targets, they should not be justified on this basis.

D. Summary of the Adequacy of Theater Nuclear Forces*

The JCS TANWERE study developed a set of scenarios for planning the tactical nuclear stockpile in 1970. TANWERE's scenarios assume the following: (1) we need nuclear weapons to defeat 129 Warsaw Pact divisions in Europe, plus 94 Chinese and Asian Communist divisions in Korea and Southeast Asia, plus ten Russian divisions in Iran; (2) we can keep enough air bases to conduct effective nuclear air operations against Warsaw Pact general purpose forces; (3) Chinese divisions will continue attacking after we hit them with nuclear weapons; and (4) tactical bombs should be stockpiled to hit Chinese military and industrial targets in a limited nuclear war. The next table shows my view of the total number of weapons needed for these scenarios and compares them with the stockpile for 1970.

* See Appendix A for FY 68 weapon dispersal authorization.

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS a/
(TANWERE Totals in Parentheses)

1. TANWERE reserves separate stockpiles of tactical nuclear bombs in addition to PERSHINGS for general war (', and for attacking Pact divisions in Europe and the other limited contingencies. My estimates assume that one stockpile is adequate for either task.

We would not fight all these contingencies at once except perhaps in general war, in which case the theater conflict is of relatively little importance. As the table shows, our tactical nuclear stockpile is more than adequate.

III. MIX OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The next table shows those parts of our theater nuclear forces that have high annual costs. It also shows the advantage for the nuclear mission of dual purpose nuclear/conventional delivery systems.

U.S. COSTS FOR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
($ Millions Per Year)

a/ See Appendix C.
b/ Attributes total aircraft cost to nuclear mission.
c/ See Appendix D.

The high cost of the nuclear-only systems shows why we try to use dual-capable systems instead. This has kept the average cost per tactical weapon, including nuclear attributable system costs, to one-tenth the cost per weapon in our strategic nuclear forces.

Tactical aircraft tied to the strike mission on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) are not available for use in conventional war where their flexibility is of most value. Also, aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than missiles and their time to target is longer. This puts pressure on commanders to launch the aircraft early whether or not that is desirable for other reasons.

PERSHING missiles do not have these disadvantages. Carrier-based aircraft are less vulnerable than land-based aircraft, but they should not be held on nuclear alert. Both systems are better than land-based tactical aircraft for the limited role of our theater nuclear forces.

B. Strike Missiles

C. Tactical Missiles

Development of LANCE missiles is now underway: if successful, LANCE could be operational by 1972. With them our LANCE battalions could then take over the mission now performed by SERGEANT. This would permit phasing out SERGEANT at a saving of $300 million over ten years.

D. Nuclear Artillery

E. Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADMs)

ADMs are nuclear charges designed to delay an advancing army by placing obstacles in its path. The main problem with ADMs stems from our uncertainty over when nuclear weapons will be used. Sites where we expect to use ADMs are so important that we must also emplace conventional high explosive (HE) charges to hedge against nuclear weapons not being released. For a planned barrier system, the chambers into which HE is placed can be prepared during peacetime. Such pre-chambering greatly increases the effectiveness of HE while reducing the time, effort, and material needed. Therefore, the incremental value of ADMs in a preplanned barrier is very questionable.

The main role of ADMs should come after nuclear weapons have already been used and the main battle line has shifted. Then we would wish to place obstacles where we have not had time to prepare for HE charges. In such cases ADMs are much more effective than HE.

F. Theater Air Defense

APPENDIX A

FY 68 WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR WEAPON DISPERSAL AUTHORIZATION a/

APPENDIX B

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS, 1970

APPENDIX C

AVERAGE ANNUAL FY 68-77 THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE COSTS a/
($ Millions Per Year)

APPENDIX D

ALLIED THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SUPPORTED BY US WEAPONS a/

STRATEGIC

1967

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Revised January 15, 1968

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Sanitized aw 1-5-83

Record of Decision

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces (U)

I have reviewed our Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces for FY 69-73. The tables on pages 3 and 4 summarize our force goals. For the FY 69 budget, I recommend that we:

1. Maintain a force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. Plan on a Minuteman II force of 500 missiles in FY 69, but replace Minuteman Is and IIs used in follow-on-tests (FOTs) with Minuteman IIIs/ , leading to a force of Minuteman IIIs by end-FY 73. Delay the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of Minuteman III from December, 1969 to July, 1970.

Develop an option to deploy Minuteman III in very hard silos or supplement the present Minuteman deployment at a cost of $40 million in FY 69 and a total cost of $212 million in FY 69-73. Continue the previously approved programs for buying for Minuteman missiles, and for Minuteman III.

With all the above changes, the Minuteman force will cost $147 million less in FY 69-73 than the previously programmed Minuteman force.

2. Maintain the JCS-recommended Titan force structure by buying four missiles in FY 69 for $12.6 million and five in FY 70 for $13.6 million and reducing the FOT rate to four per year.

3. Continue development of Poseidon, and procure missiles in FY 69 at a total FY 69 investment cost of $329 million. Plan on an IOC of November, 1970, based on a (the same as Polaris re-order lead time). Build up to a force of 384 on-line Poseidon by FY 75, for a total FY 69-73 investment cost of $4,998 million. Develop a and plan on a force of 31 Poseidon submarines carrying an average of per deployed missile. Procure MK-3s in FY 69, in FY 70, and a total of in FY 69-73. Against expected threats, this Poseidon force will have the same effectiveness as the previously programmed force with per missile, but will cost $84 million less in FY 69 and $394 million less in FY 69-73.

4. Defer indefinitely the JCS recommendation to deploy at a cost of $200 million in FY 69 and a total cost of $220 million in FY 69-73.

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5. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to start Contract Definition of an Advanced ICBM at a cost of $79 million in FY 69. Instead, continue Advanced Development at a cost of $10 million in FY 69. Development, deployment, and operation of the JCS-recommended force of 350 Advanced ICBMs would cost from $7 to $10 billion in FY 69-75, depending on the basing.

6. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to procure a prototype Ballistic Missile Ship for $120 million in FY 69. Ten-year costs of ten Ballistic Missile Ships would be about $1.6 billion.

7. Approve the Air Force recommendation not to reduce the current base program for the bomber force.

Additional SRAM's for B-52s would cost $68 million in FY 69 and a total of $251 million in FY 69-73. As a special force for suppressing anti-bomber defenses, modify UE B-52s to carry some of the previously approved SRAM's at a FY 69 cost of $54 million and a total cost of $56 million in FY 69-73.

8. Disapprove the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition and full-scale development of the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) in FY 69. Development, deployment, and five-year operating costs for 150 AMSA would be $7.3 billion. Approve instead further development of aircraft technology, as well as a program to develop bomber penetration aids.

9. Approve procurement of Sentinel, a Chinese-oriented area ABM system which also provides an option for the defense of Minuteman. The total Sentinel system investment cost will be $4.9 billion in FY 69-73.

10.

11. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to deploy a Nike-X defense of U.S. cities against attack by the USSR. (Not a FY 69 issue; the JCS consider the FY 69 budget for Sentinel an adequate first step toward the defense they recommend.)

12. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to produce and deploy twelve UE F-12 interceptors for continental air defense at a FY 69-73 cost of $800 million. Approve instead the Air Force recommended plan for a modernized continental air defense force that includes: (a) development and deployment of 198 improved F-106X aircraft; (b) if the Overland Radar Technology program is successful, engineering development of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) on a schedule that permits a system demonstration before substantial production funds must be committed; (c) development of the Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar, addressing production release in September, 197[illegible]

Record of Decision

Revised January 15, 1968

FYDP TABLE 100--U.S. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES

(Not subject to force controls of DOD Directive 7045.7. See detail tables for those forces subject to controls)

	FISCAL YEARS															
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Bombers: Authorized Active Inventory (AAI)																
B-47/RB-47	990	891	644	495	248											
B-52G-F a/	413	413	413	413	413	380	330	281	214	115	50					
B-52G-H	198	264	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281
B-58	44	88	88	88	88	88	86	84	82	79						
FB-111A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63	183	253	253	253	253	253
Total Bombers (AAI)	1645	1656	1426	1277	1030	749	697	646	576	538	513	534	534	534	534	534
Air-Launched Missiles (UE)																
HOUND DOG A and B	216	440	580	580	560	540	480	340	340	340	340	340	340	340	340	340
Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	450	525	525	525	525	525
Total Air-Launched Missiles (UE)	216	440	580	580	560	540	480	340	340	490	790	865	865	865	865	865
Ballistic Missile Launchers																
Missile Launchers On-Line b/																
ATLAS	28	57	126	113												
TITAN	-	21	67	108	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	45	45	36
MINUTEMAN	-	-	160	400	800	800	657	570	500	447	297	147	27			
MINUTEMAN	-	-	-	-	-	80	300	394	494	494	444	444	424	404	384	364
MINUTEMAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	180	350	520	590	610	630
POLARIS	48	96	144	224	400	432	512	528	528	464	336	256	176	160	128	128
POSEIDON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	112	208	320	332	384	384
Subtotal Missile Launchers On-Line	76	174	497	1045	1254	1366	1523	1546	1576	1459	1443	1459	1521	1551	1551	1542
Independently-Targetable Missile Warheads On-Line (non-add)	76	174	497	1045	1254	1366	1523	1546	1574	1474	2721	3836	3181	3604	3922	3943
ICBM Launchers in Modernization/494L	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	36	6	59	59	59	59	6	6	6
SLBM Launchers in Conversion/ Overhaul/Shakedown	32	48	48	112	64	160	144	128	128	192	208	192	160	144	144	144
Total Ballistic Missile Launchers	108	222	545	1157	1318	1526	1710	1710	1710	1710	1710	1710	1710	1701	1701	1692
Other Forces (AAI)																
QUAIL (UE)	324	392	392	392	392	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390
EC-97/EC-135	1100	1122	924	902	814	682	682	677	677	677	677	677	677	677	677	677
RB-47/EC-135	89	50	33	33	30	16	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
RB-71	-	-	-	-	6	18	28	26	27	26	25	25	24	23	23	22
PACCS (Post Attack Command and Control System)(B-47/EC-135)	-	20	59	60	26	30	30	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
RECULUS (UE)	17	17	17	7												
YACAMO (C-130)	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Other Tactical Support Aircraft	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	128	128	121	99	99	99	99	99	99
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)																
On-Line	3	8	9	14	25	27	32	33	33	29	28	29	31	32	32	32
In Conversion/overhaul/shakedown	2	3	3	7	4	10	9	8	8	12	13	12	10	9	9	9
Total Force c/																
Weapons																
Megatons																
1 Megaton Equivalents d/																
Alert Force																
Weapons																
Megatons																
1 Megaton Equivalents d/																

a/ Does not include aircraft in Active Storage. B-52G-F aircraft in Active Storage total eight in FY 67, 43 in FY 68, and 111 in FY 69. It is not possible to estimate totals past FY 69 because of the uncertainty of flying hours generated in Southeast Asia.

b/ Each missile type shown with the number of independently targetable warheads per missile/yield per warhead in megatons (MT)/CEP of last version shown in nautical miles (NM).

c/ To be comparable with Soviet force loadings in Table 100b, force loadings reflect only those weapons which would be loaded for initial strikes by AAI aircraft, ICBM launchers on-line plus those in modernization which could be loaded with missiles during a protracted crisis, and on-line SLBM launchers. Thus, total force loadings represent our emergency combat capability in a protracted crisis. Weapons reserved for retrofire and weapons on inactive status are not included. (Thus, for example, this table does not show that in FY 61 there were more than non-laydown bombs with a total yield of about megatons, not loaded in the force and scheduled for phase-out in FY 61.)

d/ Equivalent yield is calculated by taking yield to the one-half power for weapons greater than one megaton and to the two-thirds power for weapons less than one megaton.

FYDP TABLE 110—U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES

(Not subject to force controls of DPC Directive 7045.7. See detail tables for those forces subject to controls.)

	FISCAL YEARS															
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Air Defense Systems																
Aircraft (Authorized Active Inventory)																
Interceptors a/																
Air Force																
F-101	435	344	343	361	318	318	318	278	140	134	134	134	134	134		
F-102	332	323	281	259	259	94	37	29	29							
F-104	-	-	46	46	40	40	37	26	26	26	26	26	26	26		
F-106	304	307	264	281	274	272	257	251	251	238	238	238	219			
F-106X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	238	238	238
Subtotal Air Force	1061	973	934	947	891	724	649	584	446	398	398	398	398	398	238	238
Air National Guard (ANG)																
F-86	275	220	165	110												
F-89	275	275	248	248	180	100	40	40	40							
F-100	66	67	72	42												
F-102	130	127	152	191	208	344	404	404	404	285	285	285	285	107	28	28
F-104	61															
Subtotal ANG	807	689	637	591	388	444	444	444	444	285	285	285	285	107	28	28
Navy																
F-4	28	30														
Total Interceptors	1896	1692	1571	1538	1279	1168	1093	1028	890	683	683	683	683	505	266	266
Tactical Support for F-106X (C-130) a/	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	73	73	73
Other Tactical Support Aircraft	160	169	156	152	166	176	173	175	175	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
Target Aircraft	243	432	420	407	420	365	330	308	265	262	255	255	254	254	254	254
Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers b/																
BOMARC	238	307	383	300	180	180	172	164	156	148	140	132	124			
NIKE (HERCULES AND AJAX) c/: Army	1884	1572	1208	1009	859	656	656	656	656	552	552	552	552	552	552	552
ANG	608	552	428	357	473	473	473	473	473	429	429	429	429	429	429	429
HAWK (Regular) d/	-	46	46	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48
Total SAM Launchers	2730	2279	2047	1614	1560	1357	1349	1341	1333	1177	1169	1161	1153	1029	1029	1029
Control & Surveillance Systems e/																
NORAD Combat Operations Center	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SAGE Combat Centers	8	8	8	7	7	6	6	6	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SAGE Direction Centers	20	21	18	16	16	14	14	14	13	11	11	11	6	6		
BUIC II Control Centers	-	-	-	-	-	13	13	9								
BUIC III Control Centers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	15	15	15	15	15	15	10
Search Radars	182	179	169	168	162	158	154	141	128	128	128	128	128	128	80	80
ANG Search Radars	6	6	6	6	6	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Cap Filler Radars	-	-	-	-	-	-	91	17	17	17	17	17	17	17		
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Radars	63	63	63	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39		
Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Radar (Back-Scatter)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Fire Coordination Centers	10	28	28	26	25	19	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Radar Units	41	32	22	22	19											
Surveillance & Warning Aircraft g/																
EC-121: Air Force	77	76	65	65	63	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	44		
Navy	55	49	49	47	22											
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	46	46
Total Surveillance/Warning Acft	132	125	114	112	105	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	57	46	46
Missile & Space Defense Systems																
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) (474L)	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
OTH Radar (Transmit/Receive)	-	-	-	-	2/4	2/3	2/3	3/5	4/5	4/5	4/5	4/5	4/5	4/5	4/5	4/5
Other	-	-	-	9	14	14	14	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
SENTINEL																
SPARTAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	160	192	192
SPRINT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	13	17	17
Missile Sites Radar (MSR)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	6	6	6
Perimeter Acquisition Radars (PAR)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	13	17	17
Batteries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

a/ Tentative air defense plan. Force levels after FY 69 to be resolved in 1968.
b/ Equivalent to deployed, operational missiles. Excludes training launchers.
c/ The precise number and location of HERCULES batteries to be phased out in FY 70-71 will be determined later this year.
d/ The number of deployed operational missiles is three times the number of launchers.
e/ Includes CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland.

(d) examining the possibility of augmenting our air defense force during periods of high tension with at least 300 fighters from Tactical Air Command (TAC), Navy, and Marine Corps training units plus carrier-based aircraft as available; and (e) selective phase-down of the current Century interceptor force and portions of the SAGE/BUIC system, the National Air Space Surveillance System, and Nike-Hercules radars.

13. Extend the civil defense program at a FY 69 cost of $77.6 million.

14. Disapprove the JCS recommendation for $191 million for military survival measures. Continue instead the approved program at a cost of $47 million for FY 68-73.

I. THE GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR PROBLEM

The main objective of our nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks on the U.S. Our ability to strike back and destroy Soviet society makes a Soviet decision to strike the U.S. highly unlikely. By choosing to develop and deploy harder-to-attack forces, we can reduce even more the likelihood of such an attack. Unable to destroy most of our nuclear striking power, the Soviets would gain little by striking first.

Although the U.S. and the USSR are strongly deterred from nuclear attacks on each other, a nuclear war anywhere in the world could lead to a war -- and most likely a nuclear war — between the two countries. Thus to avoid a nuclear war with the USSR, we try to make all nuclear wars unlikely. This objective includes:

1. Reducing any possible loss of control of forces in a crisis.
2. Deterring nuclear attacks or intimidation of allied or neutral countries.
3. Discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.
4. Emphasizing and maintaining the firebreak between conventional and nuclear weapons.

Like us, to deter a first-strike nuclear attack, the Soviets maintain the ability to strike back and destroy our society. When they take steps to reduce the damage that we can inflict (e.g., by deploying ABMs), we react to offset these steps. I believe that the Soviets would react in the same way to similar U.S. steps to limit damage to ourselves.

Our analysis shows that the Soviets can protect their second strike capability against any threat we might pose. Since a second strike capability is vital to the USSR, I believe they will insure the survival of this capability. Convinced that the Soviets would counter a major U.S. attempt to take away their second strike capability, we have chosen not to start a major Damage Limiting program against the USSR.

These considerations lead us to depend upon deterrence to keep the USSR from attacking us. Against China, conversely, we can buy an effective defense of CONUS as insurance against a failure of deterrence. China's more primitive technology and poorer economy allow us to develop an effective defense against her nuclear attack capability into the 1980s.

What if deterrence fails and a nuclear war with the USSR occurs? If the war began with an all-out Soviet attack, including our cities, we would reply in kind. If the war started with less than an all-out attack, we would want to carry out plans for the controlled and deliberate use of our nuclear power to get the best possible outcome. The lack of such nuclear war plans is one of the main weaknesses in our posture today.

II. SOVIET AND CHINESE STRATEGIC FORCES

The following table compares U.S. and Soviet intercontinental forces in terms of total megatons, launchers, and bombers.

U.S. VS. SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES a/

	1968		1970		1972	
	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
Ballistic Missile Launchers						
Soft ICBMs	-		-		-	
Hard ICBMs	1054		1054		1054	
FOBS	-		-		-	
Mobile ICBMs (non-add)	-		-		-	
SLBMs	656		656		656	
TOTAL LAUNCHERS	1710		1710		1710	
Intercontinental Bombers	646		558		534	
Total Force Loadings						
Weapons						
Megatons (MT)						
1 MT Equivalents						
Alert Force Loadings						
Weapons						
Megatons						
1 MT Equivalents						

a/ U.S. programmed vs. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for USSR.

Numbers of missile launchers and bombers are a poor measure of the relative capabilities of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces; total megatons are worse. Yet these measures are frequently used in drawing comparisons

between U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities. The important question is not total megatons or numbers of delivery systems, but whether our forces can effectively carry out their missions -- Assured Destruction and attacks on Soviet forces to limit damage. Factors such as accuracy, reliability, survivability, and control are decisive in evaluating the effectiveness of our forces. Our missiles appear to be more reliable than Soviet missiles; they are more than twice as accurate. In 1972, programmed U.S. missile forces could destroy some hardened targets. The expected Soviet ICBM force could destroy only some such targets.

We are buying large numbers of smaller, accurate weapons because they better meet our strategic objectives -- even while reducing total U.S. megatons. The following table compares the number of targets destroyed by programmed for Poseidon, with a single weapon, As the table shows, the of the Poseidon -- with only the yield of the weapon -- can destroy up to times as many targets.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE, EQUAL-WEIGHT PAYLOADS a/

Number of airfields	
Number of hard silos b/	
Number of small cities	(100,000)
Number of medium cities	(500,000)
Number of large cities	(2,000,000)
Number of defensive interceptors needed to counter c/	
Total megatons	

a/ Reliability equals , Circular Probable Error (CEP) equals

Such calculations have convinced me and the Services of the superiority of Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) over single, large megaton weapons for attacking cities or military targets, defended or otherwise. Therefore, the best way to increase the effectiveness of our forces is by putting MIRVs on Minuteman and Poseidon.

During 1964-65, the USSR maintained small silo ICBM construction starts at the rate of about launchers per year. It this rate during the first half of 1966, then . The deployment appears to have stopped except for filling out groups already under construction.

The Soviets have continued to test Fractional Orbit Ballistic Systems (FOBS), which would be useful in an attempt to deny warning to our strategic bombers, if we took no counter actions.

A recent re-evaluation of the present Soviet submarine force indicates about operational Soviet ballistic missile submarines than previous intelligence estimates. The USSR is, however, now making operational a new class of large, nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines to carry sixteen 1,000 to 2,000 nautical mile (NM) missiles. Intelligence estimates project of these ships in service by mid-1971 and by 1976. Diesel-powered Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) submarines no longer are estimated to be part of the Soviet threat to the U.S.

The Soviets also appear to be pursuing two advanced defensive programs: (1) a long-range anti-ICBM system around Moscow with about launchers, and (2) a system across European USSR

We expect both systems to become partially

The Chinese were expected to begin operational deployment of a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) with a in 1967, but did not do so. China also has under development a much larger and more complex missile system, possibly an ICBM. They were expected to complete a large facility for large launchers late in 1967, but did not do this either. It appears that they are about the ICBM schedule that we had previously estimated, which would still allow an initial operational ICBM deployment in the early 1970s.

III. ASSURED DESTRUCTION

We deter a rational enemy from launching a first strike against us by maintaining a strong and secure ability to retaliate under any circumstances. We measure our second strike ability in terms of Assured Destruction -- the capability to inflict unacceptable damage, calculated under extremely conservative assumptions, on the USSR, even after sustaining a surprise Soviet first strike. I believe that our ability to kill from one-fifth to one-fourth of the Soviet people, including at least two-thirds of the people and industry in their large cities, is enough to deter the USSR from launching a first strike against the U.S., even in extreme situations.

However, our Assured Destruction capability does not indicate how we would use our forces in a nuclear war. We must design our forces to cope with many situations, including a war which neither side intended. We reduce the likelihood of such a war by keeping tight control over U.S. forces under all circumstances; by maintaining communications at all times with our forces, the governments of our Allies, and, as appropriate, our enemies; and by retaining options in selecting appropriate responses. If we failed to deter nuclear war, we would want to be able to follow a policy of limiting our retaliatory strikes to the enemy's military targets and not attacking his cities if he refrained from attacking ours. In most situations we would have many missiles surviving to attack Soviet military targets, while withholding enough for Assured Destruction. For this task, ICBM accuracy is very worthwhile.

A. Against the Expected Soviet Threat

Against the expected Soviet threat, our strategic forces can survive a well-executed Soviet surprise attack and carry out an effective second strike. Even after a surprise Soviet first strike with the strongest Soviet forces in our NIE, we could launch more than with a yield of more than , against the USSR in 1976.

How much damage the surviving weapons could cause depends on the effectiveness of Soviet defenses. The next table shows that even against the high NIE-estimated threat, the U.S. Assured Destruction capability is much greater than the 20 to 25% which I believe is needed for deterrence against a Soviet first strike.

CAPABILITIES OF U.S. PROGRAMMED FORCE FOR ASSURED DESTRUCTION
(Percent of Soviet Population Killed)

	FY 69	FY 72	FY 76
Against High NIE Threat			
Against Low NIE Threat			

If we could be sure that Soviet forces would stay within the range of the NIE — both in quality and numbers — we could consider smaller strategic forces.

B. Against China

While China may be able to threaten her neighbors and U.S. bases in Asia by 1972, she will not pose a threat to the U.S. second strike capability. If the U.S. attacked China with nuclear weapons it would be solely in retaliation for some lesser act of aggression, probably involving Chinese nuclear weapons. Rather than calling for the destruction of China, such an act would call for selective attacks on government, military, or industrial targets. Missiles would be needed only for attacking time-sensitive Chinese nuclear targets. Bombers could cover other targets.

one megaton warheads detonated over Chinese cities would destroy half of China's urban population and more than half of its industry. The recommended strategic forces are sufficient to inflict this destruction on China while still maintaining our Assured Destruction capability against the Soviet Union.

C. Against Greater-Than-Expected Soviet Threats

The following table compares the 1976 balanced greater-than-expected threat, used in the following analyses, with the High NIE threat.

	High NIE	Greater-Than-Expected
Independently-targetable missile warheads on-line		
Air Defenses		
Look-down fighters a/		
Low-altitude SAM Launchers		
ABM Launchers		
Area		
Terminal b/		

Programs required to support such an effort should prove technically difficult, expensive, and, since we have clearly indicated we would respond, hold little hope of providing the Soviets with a net gain in effective first strike capability. Nevertheless, to insure that these threats remain unlikely, and to maintain our deterrent should they appear, we make sure that we have available the options needed to counter them.

If the USSR replaces or improves the accuracy of its and it could destroy Minuteman missiles adds in their silos. Even if the Soviets could destroy they would not eliminate our Assured Destruction capability. Our remaining SLBM's and alert bomber force can penetrate the NIE-estimated Soviet defenses and kill at least of the Soviet people through 1976. Similarly, at least through 1976, a very extensive Soviet ABM system and air defense, without greater-than-expected ICBM's, would still let the U.S. programmed

force maintain an Assured Destruction capability of [redacted] Our programmed force can cope with a greater-than-expected ABM because we already have programmed ABM hedges -- Poseidon
Minuteman.

The next table shows that the U.S. programmed force can keep its Assured Destruction capability through FY 75 by putting [redacted] on ea Poseidon missile, even if the Soviets deploy greater-than-expected balanced missile and bomber defenses. Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAM's), SRAM decoys, and an air-to-air missile to protect the bombers against advanced interceptors would keep our Assured Destruction capability against this threat [redacted] through 1976.

U.S. ASSURED DESTRUCTION AGAINST GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED BALANCED DEFENSES
(Percent of Soviet Population Killed)

	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76
U.S. Programmed Force								
U.S. Programmed Force plus [redacted] on Poseidon								

a/ The first percentage shows fatalities if we are required to kill at least two-thirds of the people in defended cities. The second percentage shows fatalities without this restriction.

Only against a combined greater-than-expected Soviet ABM, air defense, and accurate ICBM force, costing the Soviets $20 to $30 billion at the high NIE, would our retaliatory forces need major new additions. Becau of high cost and little return, the Soviets probably will not attempt to at such a posture. Moreover, because of uncertainties about performance and c we should not deploy new systems as replacements for existing systems until threat appears which cannot be economically met by improving the existing systems. We should develop new systems only as options which would restore our Assured Destruction capability should the greater-than-expected threat occur, realizing that it is not likely to occur. Thus, we should select options with small initial costs. If the threat actually materializes, we can, by later investment, develop these options fully. (No augmentation is needed for FY 69-72. Hence, I am recommending against the deployment of the JCS-proposed [redacted] for Polaris A-3s, which improve their capability against ABM only in that time period.)

The following table shows the effect of the combined greater-than expected Soviet offensive and defensive threat on our Assured Destruction capability. It indicates the U.S. programmed force capability and the effects of buying SRAMs, SRAM decoys, an advanced bomber decoy, and an air-to-air missile to protect bombers against an advanced interceptor.

U.S. ASSURED DESTRUCTION AGAINST GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET BALANCED OFFENSES AND DEFENSES
(Percent of Soviet Population Killed)

	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76
Programmed Forces								

a/ The first percentage shows fatalities if we are required to kill at least two-thirds of the people in defended cities. The second percentage shows fatalities without this restriction.

This table shows that even if the bomber defense missile works, the greater-than-expected threat would call for a more effective U.S. Assured Destruction capability by FY 76. In addition, for Assured Destruction we do not want to rely primarily upon bombers which depend upon tactical warning for survival. Therefore, our alternative is to provide our missile forces with added protection. The degree of this protection depends upon how much and for how long we are willing to rely on bombers in the interim. on Poseidon and when added to the above bomber options, result in 30% Soviet fatalities in 1976.) In any event, we should not take steps -- such as reducing the number of bomber bases -- that lessen our confidence in the bombers' survival.

D. Options to Protect Our Assured Destruction Capability

1. Increased Warheads on Poseidon

We are providing the production base so that by FY 74 we could put up to on each Poseidon missile as a hedge against a heavy Soviet ABM or an increased threat to Minuteman.

2. Improve Our Bomber Force

Against improved terminal bomber defenses we can put SRAMs on B-52s in addition to the SRAMs on FB-111s. By initiating procurement in FY 70, the B-52s could be equipped with SRAMs by FY 72.

If Soviet air defenses improved, but their ABM did not, no increase in the size or expense of our strategic forces would be called for. However, for the cost of the present B-52 program we could improve our effectiveness by putting SRAMs on 195 B-52s and phasing out the other sixty.

If Soviet air defenses improved as part of a balanced Damage Limiting program, SRAMs plus penetration aids for the whole bomber force would prove worthwhile and would total about $2.7 billion in ten-year systems costs above the present program.

3. Improvements to Minuteman Missiles

As a hedge against a heavy Soviet ABM system we could replace all the Minuteman II by Minuteman III/MIRV at a cost of $1.9 billion over the present program. As a hedge against the failure of our penetration aids, at a cost of $6.2 billion we could convert to 1,000 Minuteman III missiles and buy for each missile. We could have an all Minuteman III force by FY 76. We could develop for Minuteman as possible replacements for the present , or provide for additional Minuteman IIIs as an alternative to a new ICBM (item #6 below) if we should want more payload. This would cost about $200 million in research and development ($40 million in FY 69) for an IOC in FY 73. Procurement costs would be , of which could be built per year.

4. Defense of Minuteman

Deployment of the light defense of Minuteman, shown below, might dissuade the Soviets from developing and deploying systems which otherwise could destroy Minuteman. In any event, it would provide a useful defense of Minuteman against the expected Soviet ICBM force without accurate MIRVs and furnish a base for developing a stronger defense against a Soviet force equipped with MIRVs. The median defense of Minuteman would protect against less . Finally, the heavy defense of Minuteman would guard against the very sophisticated counterforce threat assumed in the greater-than-expected threat for 1975 and 1976. The following table summarizes these three defenses.

LEVELS OF MINUTEMAN DEFENSE

	Sprints	Spartans	Investment Cost a/ ($ Millions)	Annual Costs ($ Millions)
Light Defense of Minuteman			$400	$10
Median Defense of Minuteman			1400	40
Heavy Defense of Minuteman			3600	160

a/ Defense of Minuteman is considered an add-on to the Sentinel anti-Chinese defense.

5. More Poseidon Submarines

We could order more Poseidon submarines which require a $200 million investment per ship and a four-year lead time. By initiating procurement in FY 70 we could have ten new Poseidon submarines by the end of FY 75 and twenty by the end of FY 76. The more Poseidon missiles we have the less we would have to rely upon Minuteman.

If we chose to deploy additional Poseidon instead of defending or hardening Minuteman, and if Soviet ICBM accuracy improved markedly Minuteman would become very vulnerable and invite rather than deter an attack. In this case, we should phase it out. Thus, choosing Poseidon might result in upsetting the balance of our forces. It would be undesirable to be without a land-based missile force as part of our offensive posture because we would become potentially more sensitive to unexpected Soviet advances in anti-submarine warfare.

6. New ICBM

Contract Definition begun in January 1968 would permit an IOC by FY 75. We could deploy this new missile in new silos as part of a defended or undefended fixed land-based system. Conversely, we could deploy it as a land-mobile or ship-based system or base it in a new class of submarines. In order to develop a new ICBM, we would require a $2 to $3 billion research and development program. The ten-year cost of buying a new ICBM totals some $11 to $20 billion.

The following table compares the costs of these alternatives against the greater-than-expected Soviet threat. The costs shown are over and above the cost of presently programmed forces. All options provide an Assured Destruction capability of 20% by missiles alone against the greater-than-expected Soviet threat in 1976.

COSTS OF VARIOUS MISSILE OPTIONS TO PROTECT ASSURED DESTRUCTION AGAINST GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED THREAT
($ Billions)

	RDT&E	Program Costs (FY 68-76)

If the Soviets do not react by developing and deploying small MIRVs, we can defend Minuteman at less cost than we could procure Poseidons. If they develop a small MIRV threat, the cost of Minuteman defense would about equal the cost of acquiring Poseidons. for Minuteman are not competitive with a light Minuteman defense, but they offer an alternative to heavier Minuteman defenses against the small-MIRV threat. A posture combining defense (calling for small-MIRVs) (calling would be very difficult to attack. None of the new ICBMs enjoys a clear cost advantage over defending Minuteman, putting Minuteman in super-hard silos, or acquiring Poseidons until the Soviet ABM becomes much stronger than the greater-than-expected threat.*

If we choose to buy more Poseidon, we would have to order them in FY 70 and FY 71, before we could see the extent of the Soviet threat. If we develop we would not have to decide to deploy them until FY 73.

A defense of Minuteman can be bought in stages and is likely to hold down the total cost of hedging our Assured Destruction capability. To deploy the heavy defense of Minuteman by FY 76, we would have to decide on the light defense by FY 70, the median defense by FY 71, and the heavy defense by FY 73. Other hedges, such as more Poseidon submarines or the Ballistic Missile Surface Ship, are unnecessary. can be built in response to the threat and they are competitive with the defense of Minuteman. The choice between of Minuteman depends on the direction the Soviet threat takes. To preserve the option to go either way, we should develop them both.

E. Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA)

Recent studies have reviewed the value of a mixed ballistic missile/bomber force against reasonable projections of Soviet defenses into the 1970s. They show the bombers add some measure of assurance against greater-than-expected Soviet threats and induce the USSR to divert resources to their anti-bomber defenses. A mixed offensive force enjoys certain advantages against terminal defenses. By attacking some cities with missiles only, and others with bombers only, we force the Soviets to use more resources to protect all defended cities with both bomber and missile defenses. In order to accomplish this objective, however, we do not need large bomber forces

The previous section discussed the hedges to our programmed strategic offensive forces, especially to their missile components. Since we intend to keep the missile force well-hedged, the issue is whether we also want to hedge our bomber force with an AMSA.

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* This might happen sometime after 1976. Thus, in order to provide a basis for more total missile payload against a possible heavy ABM sometime after this date, continuing Advanced Development of a new ICBM is still desirable. Furthermore, the submarine-carried Advanced ICBM has some promise of eventually replacing Poseidon, in the 1980s, on an equal-cost basis

Is an AMSA a good hedge? It is not. Against the NIE range of threats our programmed forces are adequate. Since the strategic forces are already well-hedged, we can keep an Assured Destruction capability against greater-than-expected threats without the AMSA.

To counter a Soviet greater-than-expected threat, under most circumstances, including the most probable ones, U.S. offensive forces equipped with AMSA cost more than forces with equivalent effectiveness but without the advanced bomber.

What does AMSA cost as a hedge? To answer this question we must compare the cost of bomber forces needed to cope with various levels of Soviet threat. The following two tables make this comparison.

COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE FB-111/B-52 FORCES
($ Billions)

Bomber Force	Program Costs (FY 68-82) a/
A. 210 FB-111s	$ 7.2
B. 210 FB-111s and 255 B-52s without SRAMs	12.4
C. 210 FB-111s and 255 B-52s with per B-52	15.3

a/ AMSA IOC in FY 76.

Force B represents the programmed force and would cope with the higher range of the NIE-projected Soviet strategic forces. It would also let us expand to meet a greater-than-expected Soviet threat. Force A, costing $5.2 billion less, would be appropriate for the lower range of NIE threats. Force C adds SRAMs to the B-52s, providing the expansion needed to meet the greater-than-expected threat. This option would cost $2.9 billion more than Force B.

The next table compares the cost of hedging against the greater-than-expected threat.

COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE STRONG BOMBER FORCES OF EQUAL EFFECTIVENESS
($ Billions)

Bomber Force	Program Costs (FY 68-82)
C. 210 FB-111s and 255 B-52s with per B-52	$15.3
D. 210 FB-111s and 68 AMSAs	15.3
E. 138 AMSAs	16.6

Both Force D and E are about equal in effectiveness to the programmed force plus SRAMs against the greater-than-expected threat, provided B-52 penetration aids work. Force D represents the smallest

AMSA force which we can use as a hedge. It costs $2.9 billion more than the programmed forces. The all-AMSA Force E costs considerably more than either Force A or C, $9.4 and $1.3 billion respectively.

Considerations other than costs make the Force D option less attractive than Force C. First, developing AMSA requires a longer lead time than deploying SRAMs on B-52s, and imposes a substantial initial investment before we could determine that an increased Soviet threat has occurred. Conversely, since the SRAM option has a shorter lead time, we can delay the decision to deploy this missile until the increased threat begins to appear. Secondly, if we decide to proceed with AMSA now and the greater-than-expected threat does not appear, we will have wasted $3 to $10 billion.

In sum, to achieve equal effectiveness, AMSA contributes only marginally at great cost. Thus, Engineering Development is not called for now. However, we should proceed with Advanced Development to provide aircraft technology and to keep open the option of replacing the B-52s.

IV. STRATEGIC DEFENSE

A. Damage Limiting Against the Soviet Threat

Our Assured Destruction capability makes any kind of nuclear war with the Soviets unlikely. Therefore, we first buy enough forces to give us high confidence in our deterrent. As insurance in the unlikely event deterrence fails, we then consider adding forces that might reduce damage to our population and industry. Damage Limiting forces, unlike those for Assured Destruction, cannot and need not work perfectly under all conditions. They should insure against the more probable risks, such as wars growing out of a deep crisis, or threats posed by the growth of Chinese nuclear forces. The basic Damage Limiting question is whether we should deploy Nike-X in defense of our cities.

A defensive system to save U.S. cities from a Soviet nuclear attack must attempt to keep ahead of the Soviet threat, including their reactions to our deployment. In this analysis we use two stages in such a deployment. The first, "Posture A", represents a light defense of cities. It has an area defense of the entire CONUS, providing overlapping coverage of key targets. It has a relatively low-density Sprint defense of cities. It is estimated that initially it would cost about $9 billion in investment and $600 million a year to operate. The second, "Posture B", is a heavier defense with a higher density Sprint defense of cities. It is estimated that initially it would cost $18 billion and $1.1 billion a year to operate. Because of probable Soviet reaction, with Posture B we would also need improved air and civil defense forces at a cost of $4 to $5 billion in investment. Moreover, experience convinces me that the pursuit of effective defenses would eventually lead us to spend about $40 billion.

The U.S. can justify the cost of a major defense only if it could take away the ability of the Soviets to kill Americans. The following table illustrates the effects of these defenses if Nike-X works as designed and if the Soviets do not react to the U.S. ABM. The USSP's estimate of its ability to strike back after a U.S. first strike on its forces might prove lower than shown if the Soviets judge the uncertain factors pessimistically, as we do in making our own Assured Destruction calculations.

U.S. KILLED IN ALL-OUT STRATEGIC EXCHANGE IN 1976
ASSUMES NO SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ABM
(In Millions)

U.S. Programs	Soviets Strike First		U.S. Strikes First Soviets Retaliate	
	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat.	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat.b/
Approved Program (Sentinel)				
Posture A a/				
Posture B				

a/ The JCS currently recommend this deployment.
b/ Enough forces are withheld from the U.S. first strike [redacted] after their retaliation.

This table shows that if the Soviets do not respond, they lose their deterrent. They would be forced to react to increase the ability of their forces to survive and strike back. They could do so in several different ways: (1) by stepping up deployment of SS-9s and SS-11s now in production; (2) by defending their present missile force; (3) [redacted] (4) by deploying a new, large ICBM (either mobile or defended); or (5) by deploying a new submarine-launched missile like our Poseidon. They have the technical capability to do any of these things by the mid-1970s.

If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM [redacted]

A larger Soviet response could raise probable U.S. fatalities still higher.

U.S. KILLED IN ALL-OUT STRATEGIC EXCHANGE IN 1976
ASSUMING SOVIETS RESPOND TO U.S. ABM
(In Millions)

U.S. Programs	Soviets Strike First		U.S. Strikes First Soviets Retaliate	
	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat.	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat.
Approved (Sentinel)				
Posture A				
Posture B				

As part of their response, the Soviets could add large numbers of offensive missiles that would threaten our Assured Destruction capability. We, in turn, would have to react. Viewing each other's buildup in forces as an increased threat, each side would undertake counteracting steps, thereby increasing the costs to both with no gain in security. Therefore, I believe deploying the Nike-X system to protect American cities would be neither wise nor effective.

B. Protection Against Small Urban Attacks

A light U.S. ABM system would protect against a Chinese ICBM attack. By protecting the U.S. against such a threat, it probably would enhance our ability to deter Chinese nuclear intimidation of other Asian countries. Much as a light Soviet ABM system reduces the chances that France could draw the U.S. and the Soviet Union into a nuclear war, a light U.S. ABM system lessens China's ability to do so. The area defense of CONUS would give us a realistic Damage Limiting capability against China for the mid-1970s, as shown in the next table.

U.S. FATALITIES IN A SMALL-SCALE ATTACK a/
(In Millions)

	U.S. Strikes First			China Strikes First		
Number of ICBMs	10	25	75	10	25	75
No Defense	0	1	3	5	10	20
Light ABM	0	b/	b/	b/	b/	1

a/ Assumes three megaton ICBMs, 40% reliability.
b/ Fewer than one million U.S. dead, with some probability of no deaths.

C. Civil Defense

Civil Defense provides low cost insurance for our people in the unlikely event of a nuclear attack. As a by-product it has also proven to be a significant aid in natural disasters. This program should be pursued. More effort is needed to identify useful shelters in home basements. This can fill a large part of the current shelter deficit at a very low cost -- about $0.45 per space added.

D. Continental Air Defense

The number of lives which would be saved by air defense if the Soviets were to attack the U.S. depends on our ballistic missile defense. With only a light missile defense, even a very strong air defense could not save many lives. The Soviets could simply target cities with their missiles. A Soviet first strike, with missiles only, could kill 120 million people;

their bombers could then add less than ten million fatalities even if we had no air defense at all. A force of either 200 improved F-106 interceptors with AWACS (ten-year cost $9.9 billion) or 54 F-12s with AWACS (ten-year cost $11.6 billion) would reduce these fatalities by less than five to eight million

However, there are other objectives of continental air defense which must also be considered. These include defense against countries other than the Soviet Union, defense against bomber attacks on those strategic forces that we withhold in a controlled nuclear war, peacetime patrolling of our air space, discouraging Soviet bomber aspirations, and the use of continental air defense forces in missions outside the U.S. We can achieve these objectives with a modern, more effective air defense force that costs less over the next twelve years than our present force. This modern force will consist of 200 improved F-106 fighters (the F-106X), 42 AWACS, two OTH radars, and the Federal Aviation Agency National Air Space system for back-up command and control. The cost through 1979 for the modern force is $13.7 billion compared with $13.9 billion for the current force. However, the lower operating costs of the modern force will result in substantial savings over the present force after FY 79.

Surveillance is presently the weakest part of our air defense system. Therefore, we should proceed with engineering development of AWACS (if the Overland Radar Technology program is successful) and with development of back-scatter OTH radars. We should also develop, and deploy on the F-106, advanced air-to-air missiles and an advanced fire control system. With these improvements to the F-106, there is little to be gained from the high performance characteristics of the F-12. Thus, we can avoid the additional $1.7 billion cost of an F-12 force and still meet our air defense objectives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

31 January 1968

4a

MEMO TO: GENERAL WHEELER

If, despite General Westmoreland's best estimate, the situation at Khe Sanh should become desperate, the issue of using TAC NUCS will be raised.

If for no other reason, it would be raised because the subject was considered at the time of Dien Bien Phu.

Query: Would some contingency target analysis be in order?

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

Phil = prepare draft back channel to CINCPAC & MACV on this. Caution that plans should very very closely held.

done 17 Feb

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-357
By ___, NARA, Date 2-14-94

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date January 30, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Tuesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:38a		t		op - bring Yuki up	
	12:53a		t		op - wake me at 7:45 a.m.	
	7:30a				Bill Blackburn to second floor	
	5:37a		t		The Situation Room	
	7:18a		t		The Situation Room	
	8:01a				The President asked for Commissioner Willard Deason - when he was told that he was on the way to the office, he left word. The Commissioner returned the call at 8:34a, but the President was at breakfast w/ the leadership	
C	8:30a	11:00			CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP BREAKFAST The Vice President Speaker John McCormack Cong. Carl Albert Cong. Hale Boggs Senator Mike Mansfield Senator Russell Long Senator J W Fulbright , Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee	
		9:50			Senator John Sparkman Senator Robert Byrd Cong. Thomas "Doc" Morgan , Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara General Earle Wheeler Dr. Harold Brown , Secy of the Air Force	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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AGENDA:					Hon. Lawrence O'Brien, the Postmaster General	
1.	USS Pueblo				Walt Rostow	
2.	Message scheduling				Barefoot Sanders — Press Briefing #1114-A indicates that the	
3.	This week's schedule				Joe Califano — President asked Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler	
4.	authorizations and appropriations				Mike Manatos — to "give briefings on the situation in Vietnam	
5.	highway beautification				Tom Johnson — and in Korea."	
6.	housing legislation					
7.	tax bill					
8.	safe streets and crime control					
9.	recess dates					
	9:15a		t		Loyd Hackler - press office	
					Flowers sent today to the services of Mr. Walter Jetton (the barbecue man) who died yesterday (Mrs j sent wire to Mrs. Jetton onher behalf and that of the President)	
	11:10a				To the Oval Ofc - w/ MW	
C	11:19a		t		Hon. Frank Ikard - returning his call (mf's notes on this to DT)	
C	11:20a		t		Hon. Willard Deason	
	11:29a		t		MW - pl	

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	~~xxx~~					
	11:30a	11:33a			Ashton Gonella	
	11:36a		t		MW - pl	
					Chairman, Chicago and Northwestern Railway	
C	11:37a	12:35p			Hon. [redacted] Ben Heineman / OFF RECORD	
					Joe Califano / Chairman, Commisson on Income Maintenance	
					The President was prepared for this mtg - discussing the Commission - by a memo from Jim Duesenberry covered w/ a JAC memo -- Mr. Heineman is in town for work on the Commission.	
C	12:40p	12:47			March of Dimes National Poster Child, Timmy Faas, age 4 of Whittier, Calif.	
					and Mr. Michael Faas - father	
					Mrs. Bea Faas - grandmother	
appt requested by Cong.					Mr. Everett Thorner (Natl March of Dimes Representatives)	
Charles E. Wiggins					Mr. John Blecha - Official March of Dimes photographer	
					covered by press and photogs	
The child is making a tour of					and Louis Buttell	
the country -- some 15,000 miles--					Yuki joined	
as the living symbol of the 30th						
anniversary March of Dimes					and the President played w/ Yuki and little Timmy --	
January campaign.					The President sat at his desk, and sang w/ Yuki and tried to teach	
					Timmy to do the same. Timmy was a bit afraid of Yuki -- "he'll	
Timmy was born with an open					make me fall," he said -- but the President explained that he wouldn't	
spine, and clubfoot.					--and Yuki proceeded to lick Timmy all over the face.	

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C	12:55p	1:01p			Hon. Edward Breathitt, former Governor of Kentucky Gov. Breathitt requested appt. to personally thank him for the confidence the President has shown in Breathitt.	
C	1:05p				Douglass Cater - and	
		1:08p			Eric Leinsdorf -- Mr. Leinsdorf is having lunch w/ Cater -- and Cater notified President of this, asking if he would like to say hello to him.	
	1:08p				To mansion - w/ MW	
C		2:50p			for WEEKLY LUNCHEON w/ Secy Rusk Secy McNamara Hon. Richard Helms General Earle Wheeler Hon. Clark Clifford Walt Rostow Tom Johnson George Christian	At 2:33p, Bromley Smith called Walt Rostow--he used the kitchen phone. At 2:35p, the group was told by WR, that "we are being mortared heavily in Saigon. The Presidential Palace and BOQ's are being hit." TomJohnson:mf

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C	@2:15p			f	Hon. John B. Connally, Governor of Texas - Austin	
	3:05p c		t		Cater - pl - re questions regarding tomorrow's Cabinet Meeting - agenda and attendance	
C	3:20p		f		Secretary McNamara	
	4:20p		t		Rostow - pl	
	4:30p		t		Califano - pl	
	4:35p		t		MW pl	
	4:37p		t		Jones - pl	
	4:40p		t		Califano - pl	

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	5:05p		t		McPherson - pl	
	5:29p		t		MW	
	5:50p				To Oval Office --stopping in mjdr's room to read the evening press briefing	
	6:00p		f		Lynda Bird	
	6:02p		f		MW - pl	
C	6:04p	7:15p			To Cabinet Room to join: Republican leadership Briefing Senator Everett Dirksen Cong. Gerald Ford Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara General Earle Wheeler Director Richard Helms Walt Rostow General Maxwell Taylor George Christian and Tom Johnson Hon. Clark Clifford	

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	7:56p				President to Oval Office	
	7:57p		t		Marvin Watson -pl	
	8:25p		f		Mrs. Chuck Robb	
	8:30p		t		Joe Califano-pl	
C	8:35p				President to Mansion -- joined Capt and Mrs. Charles Robb Cong and Mrs. J J Pickle	
	8:50p		t		Tom Johnson -pl Mr. and Mrs. Simon McHugh	
C	8:50p				DINNER -	
		11:00p			[redacted] w/ 8:35p group	
	9:24p				The Prsident asked for Luci - she was out to dinner - talked to Mrs. Johnson instead	
	9:25p		t		Op - have Yuki brought up - but brush him first	
	9:53p				The President asked for AG Clark - at Ford Theater - "never mind"	
	9:54p		f		Tom Johnson	
	10:19p		t		Situation Room	
	11:40p				retired	

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DAILY DIARY

Date _____

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day _____

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					TODAY sent Veterans Message to Congress	
					TODAY announced that the Prsident will present the Medal of Honor to Major Merlyn H. Dethlefsen, USAF on Feb 1	
					Released text of remarks of the President on signing the exec order establishing observance of Human Rights Year 1968	
					and issued Exec Order establishing the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date January 31, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Wednesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone for t Lo	Telephone for t LD	Activity (include visited by)
					Mrs. Johnson in Texas
					204 1/8 lbs Cloudy - highest near 48
	6:42a		t		Situation Room
	7:00a				tea
	7:24a		t		Secy McNamara
	7:38a		t		Secy McNamara
	7:59a			t	H. M. Baggarly, Tulia, Texas - Editor of the Tulia Herald --the President talked to him a day or two ago about possibly coming to Washington to work
	8:15a				Congressional Leaders started arriving for BREAKFAST
	8:15a	8:30a			Bill Blackburn
	8:15a	8:40a			Marvin Watson
	8:40a				BREAKFAST WITH CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS / leaders from the appropriate Armed Services and Appropriations fields in both Houses. second floor - mansion OFF RECORD
					Senator John Stennis
					Senator Margaret Chase Smith
					Senator Carl Hayden
					Senator Milton Young
					Congressman George Mahon
					Cong. Frank Bow
					Cong. Mendel Rivers
					Cong. William Bates
					Secretary Rusk
					Secretary McNamara
					Secretary-designate Clark Clifford

Expenditure Code

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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					Hon Richard Helms , Director, CIA	
					General Earle Wheeler , Chairman, JCS	
					General Maxwell Taylor	
					Walt Rostow	
					George Christian	
					Tom Johnson	
					George Christian in press briefing #1116-A announced that "the Congressional leaders were fully briefed by the President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and by General Wheeler on the developments in Vietnam and Asia." Christian says: "The President led the discussion at the mtg and reviewed the reports he had received from Bunker and Westmoreland. He also reviewed the situation relating to the PUEBLO and called on Gen Wheeler for detailed report on all of the facts surrounding the seizure of the PUEBLO."	
	11:07a				To Oval Ofc - w/	
		11:50			George Christian, Tom Johnson, and MW	
c	11:24a		t		Hon. Charles Zwick Director, BOB	
	11:29a		t		Rostow - pl	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
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	11:45a		t		Secy McNamara	
c	11:50a	12:00N			[redacted] Hon. James Webb, Administrator, NASA OFF RECORD	
-		12:00N			Dr. Thomas Paine middle initial : O	
					The President later today named Dr. Paine to succeed Robert Seamans in NASA's No. 2 job as Deputy Administrator. His background includes work in the General Electric Co., as a scientist and administrator.	
	12:00n		Members		Executive Committeeof [redacted] of the/National Association of Attorneys General to the President's office	
					Hon. Ramsey Clark, the Attorney General, accompanied:	
					Frank J. Kelley - President , Natl Assoc of Attorneys General	
					Allan S. Shepard, Vice President , "	
					David P. Buckson, Past President , "	
					Members:	
					Francisco Corneiro - Attorney General of Virgin Islands	
					Douglas M. Head - Attorney General of Minnesota	
					Daniel R. McLeod - Attorney General of South Carolina	
					William B. Saxbe - Attorney General of Ohio	
					William C. Sennett - Attorney General of Pennsylvania	
					Boston E. Witt - Attorney General of New Mexico	

Appt requested by AG Kelley, saying "it would be very helpful to us in carrying out our responsibilities if we were to be able to receive from you your counsel and x advice concerning these problems, while at the same time sharing with you some of our views on the impact of crime upon our society and the related problem MORE---of law and order."

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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	Ramsey Clark recommended that the President see this group during the time of their mtg inthis city. The organization is affiliated with the Council of State Governments and is composed of the Attorneys General of the fifty states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam.				Robert Y. Thornton, Chairman, Criminal Law and Enforcement Committee Arthur Sills, Chairman,Habeas Corpus Committee Leon Cohan , Deputy Attorney General of Michigan	
	12:27p				To Cabinet Room - for CABINET MEETING	
	Agenda included: Legislative priorites:new session Korean developments Review of the Budget Status of msgs to Congress				Secy Rusk Secy Fowler Secy McNamara Hon. Ramsey Clark PMG O'Brien [redacted] Secy Freeman Secy Wirtz Secy Gardner Secy Weaver Secy Boyd Hon. David Black , Under Secy of Interior (for Udall) Hon. Howard Samuels , Under Secy of Commerce (for Trowbridge) Hon. Charles Zwick, Director, BOB	
					The President asked for Gardner Ackley to join, but he was holding press conference on the Economic Report which was to last for 1-2 hours.	

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	1:45p				To Oval Ofc - w/MW	
	1:58p		t		Rostow - pl	
	2:01p				Hon. Barefoot Sanders MW	
	2:11p		t		Goldstein - pl	
	2:14p		t		McPherson - pl	
	2:15p		f		Goldstein - returning his call -	
c	2:25p	2:40p			Mr. and Mrs. Herschel Newsom - he is Master of the National Grange DeVier Pierson Mr. and Mrs. John Bechtel - Mr. Bechtel is the artist who did the work presented to Pres Mrs. Arthur Christman - made arrangemnents for the presentation The Group presented to the President a framed Pennsylvania Dutch [redacted]art work -- award for Distinguished service to American agriculture and to rural life and for outstanding and effective dedication to a program to beautify America. The President addressed the Centennial Session of the Grange by telephone in November, and this appt was set up to allow the presentation of "our Grange Centennial Salute."	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
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					[redacted]	
	2:27p		t		Christian - pl	
					press in to cover Grange people	
	2:31p		f		Harry McPherson	
	2:33p	3:30p			Jim Jones	
		2:55p			Harry McPherson	
	q;					
	2:55p		t		Rostow - pl	
	3:00p		t		Christian - pl	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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	3:07p		f		Lynda Robb -- trying to urge the President to go over to the mansion and eat lunch.	
					(Lynda and Chuck are staying in the White House during her mother's absence, and	
	3:10p		f		Barefoot Sanders Lynda is serving as her Daddy's hostess)	
	3:19p		t		George Christian - pl	
	3:25p		t		Rostow - pl	
	3:30p				To mansion [redacted]	
		4:35p			for Lunch — Geo. Christians notes to DT (1) Papal visit (2) Vietnam situation (3) Korea	
					w/ George Christian	
					and	
					Hugh Sidey , TIME-LIFE	
					[redacted]Carroll Kilpatrick , the Washington Post	
					Frank Cormier , AP	
					Merriman Smith , UPI	
					Lynda	
					The President is the only one who ate - others just had coffee	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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	4:30p		t		Walt Rostow - pl	
	4:35p		t		MW - pl	
	4:41p		t		Califano - pl	
	4:47p		t		George Christian - pl	
	[redacted]					
	5:41p				To [redacted] Cabinet Room joining Secretary Rusk Secrtary McNamara General Earle Wheeler Harry McPherson Walt rostow	
	5:57p				Joined by The Vice President Hon. Richard Helms, Hon. Clark Clifford General Maxwell Taylor	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
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C	6:05p				President in Mansion - 2nd floor for CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING - East Room w/ Vice President and others from the Cabinet Room	
					Included tonight were members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate and House Armed Services Committee.	
					C list to DT	
	The President asked Lynda to be dressed and available to be his hostess at this function.					

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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Flowers sent today to Secy Trowbridge
in the hospital - along w/ a [redacted] letter from the President

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	8:30p				President in his apartment	
	8:31p		t		George Christian -pl	
	8:34p		t		Harry McPherson -pl	
	8:40p		f		Walt Rostow	
	8:55p		t		Walt Rostow -pl	
✓	9:03p		t		Horace Busby (Georgetown Club)	
✓	9:05p		t		John Roche (Residence)	
	9:15p				Mr. and Mrs. Lou Harris to 2nd floor Mr. and Mrs. George Christian to 2nd floor	
	9:50p				Joe Califano James R. Jones also to 2nd floor	
	10:15p	11:35p			DINNER - 2nd floor Mansion w/ Mr. and Mrs. Lou Harris Mr. and Mrs. George Christian Joe Califano James R. Jones	
	10:59p		f		Mildred Stegall	
	1:00p				President retired	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Wednesday

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					NOMINATION SENT TO SENATE:	
					Brig General C. Craig Cannon, USA, to be a member of the Mississippi River Commission	
					Today issued proclamation designating the month of Feb as	
					American Heart Month.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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EYES ONLY

1 FEB 68 1526Z

BOOK COPY

COMMUNICATIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE ESG	BOOK	PRIORITY	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG

FROM: General Wheeler, CJCS

TO: Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC
General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY - JCS 01154 Feb 68.

(DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS TO ADDRESSEES ONLY)

1. There is a considerable amount of discussion around town about the Khe Sanh situation to include the inevitable comparisons with Dien Bien Phu. One question raised recently in this connection (and I believe it received some consideration at the time of the Dien Bien Phu siege) is whether tactical nuclear weapons should be used if the situation in Khe Sanh should become that desperate. I consider such an eventuality unlikely. Nevertheless, I would appreciate your views as to whether there are targets in the area which lend themselves to nuclear strikes, whether some contingency nuclear planning would be in order, and what you would consider to to be some of the more significant pros and cons of using

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CJCS

Dist has not been made to anyone outside OCJCS

plr

2 FF-1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-359
By ____, NARA, Date 7-2-93

DATE	TIME
1	1015
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	68
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RELEASER

SIGNATURE Paul Kearney

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

PAUL M. KEARNEY, Administrative Asst to Chairman, JCS

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH WILL BE USED.

EYES ONLY

tac nukes in such a contingency.

2. I do not need a reply quite so urgently as on many of my other requests to you lately -- early next week should suffice. While I know you will have to put a few of your bright planners on this, I would caution you to hold this subject very closely. Warm regards.

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

Book

7a

P 020208Z

FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC HAWAII

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV VIETNAM

ZEM

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 92-356 Appeal (#21)
By SJ, NARA, Date 3-9-04

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY ~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

FRACTURE JAW (U)

A. JCS 01154/011526Z FEB 68.

1. IN LINE WITH YOUR OWN THOUGHTS, WESTY AND I EXCHANGED VIEWS SEVERAL DAYS AGO ON THE NEED FOR SOME VERY CLOSELY HELD PLANNING FOR EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD THE SITUATION AROUND KHE SANH WARRANT AND SHOULD THE HIGHEST NATIONAL AUHORITY DIRECT THEIR USE. WHILE AGREEING THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT KHE SANH WOULD BECOME SUFFICIENTLY DESPERATE TO CALL FOR THE USE OF TAC NUCS, WE FELT THAT MILITARY PRUDENCE ALONE REQUIRES THAT WE DO SOME DETAILED PLANNING REGARDING UNITS TO BE EMPLOYED, DELIVERY VEHICLES, WEAPON AVAILABILITY, PREFERRED WEAPONS BY TYPE AND YIELD, CONSTRAINTS, PREFERRED DELIVERY MEANS, TACTICS AND OTHER OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

2. CONSIDERING THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS MATTER, WE ARE ACCOMPLISHING THE PLANNING UNDER THE STRICTEST SECURITY IN OKINAWA WITH A SPECIAL PLANNING TEAM HEADED BY A CINCPAC PLANNER AND CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC AND CG FMFPAC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO SIMPLIFY REFERENCE TO THE HIGHLY CLASSIFIED PROJECT, THE UNCLASSIFIED NICKNAME OF FRACTURE JAW HAS BEEN ASSIGNED. THE PLANNING CURRENTLY IS WELL UNDERWAY.

3. BEARING IN MIND THE VERY REMOTE POSSIBLITY THAT CINCPAC MIGHT BE CALLED UPON FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR SUPPORT OF BELEAGUERED FORCES DURING THE VERY TIME THAT THE PLANNING GROUP WAS ENGAGED IN ITS WORK, I FORWARDED TO WESTY ON 29 JANUARY A MESSAGE DESCRIBING STEP BY STEP THE PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING THE SELECTIVE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE HOLDS THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS AND AUTHENTICATORS AND THE PURPOSE OF MY MESSAGE WAS TO GIVE HIM A SIMPLIFIED REMINDER FOR HIS USE. ADDITIONALLY, MY MESSAGE INFORMS HIM OF THE TYPE AND LOCATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AVAILABLE AND BEST SUITED FOR THE PURPOSE. AIR DELIVERED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROVIDE THE IMMEDIATE CAPABILITY. SUITABLE WEAPONS ARE AVAILABLE

[redacted] 6.1(a)

4. THE FOREGOING IS TO GIVE YOUR A QUICK SKETCH OF OUR TAC NUC PLANNING AND TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I BELIEVE WE ARE PREPARED FOR THIS EVENTUALITY, UNLIKELY AS IT MIGHT BE. UPON COMPLETION OF THE PLANNING NOW UNDERWAY IN OKINAWA, OUR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS WILL BE REFINED.

5. ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THERE ARE TARGETS IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND THE PROS AND CONS OF USING TAC NUCS IN SUCH A CONTINGENCY WILL BE PROVIDED SUBSEQUENTLY.

6. THIS ENTIRE SUBJECT HAS BEEN VERY CLOSELY HELD IN MY

EYES ONLY

STAFF AND I HAVE CAUTIONED EACH COMMANDER CONCERNED TO HOLD STAFF OFFICERS ON THE STRICTEST NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

WARM REGARDS.

TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date 1 February 1968

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					Mrs. Johnson in Texas Weather: overcast with little drizzle	
	5:08a		t		Situation Room	
	7:00a				Wakeup call	
	7:50a				The President departed the White House (All night reading was returned to the office unworked.) en route Shoreham Hotel for Presidential Prayer Breakfast accompanied by Marvin Watson	
	7:55a				Arrived the Shoreham Hotel , VIP Entrance, greeted by Sen. Frank Carlson (who presided at the breakfast) and then to Regency Room for	
C	9:15	9:25a			REMARKS - Presidential Prayer Breakfast (these remarks heard simultaneously by a group of approx 500 attending the Natl Prayer Breakfast at the Wash Hilton)	
					Then to Blue Room for	
C	& 9:30	9:40a			REMARKS to Congressional Wives Prayer Breakfast	
C	9:42	9:46a			Following the Prayer Breakfast, the President went to another room where he shook hands with a group of Pro Football Players who were in Washington for a kick off of a drive to organize professional athletes into a group bent on inspiring the nation's slum youth. This is a "Christian Athletes Seminar," held in the Tudor Room and Head Coach Tom Landry and player Buddy Dial of the Dallas Cowboys are co-chairmen of this seminar. Also in this room were a group of Brazilian Congressmen who attended the Presidential Prayer Breakfast. They are in Washington on their way to West Virginia, and Gov. Hulett Smith asked that the President greet them. Gov Smith says "these men are very influential leaders in the Brazilian Congress and have important hand in shaping their country's attitudes toward the U.S."	
					left to DT	
	9:47a				The President deaprted the Shoreham Hotel, accompanied by ---	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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Governor Price Daniel, Governor Dewey Bartlett of Okla., MW, Bill Blackburn, and PRESS POOL:
Merriman Smith of UPI and Doug Cornell of AP

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	9:58a				The President returned to the White House and to the office w/	
c		11:26a			Hon. Price Daniel, Director Office of Emergency Planning -- and governor liaison	
c		10:13a			Hon. Dewey Bartlett, Governor of Oklahoma	
	10:05a		t		Col. James U. Cross -- returning his call of a couple of minutes earlier-- Col. Cross said he was anxious to speak with the President, but was leaving at 10:30am to fly to Pittsburgh. --to pick up General Matthew B. Ridgway for his luncheon with the President today.	
c	10:06a	11:02a			Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey, the Vice President joined	
	10:12a			t	Mrs. Johnson -- returning her call -- in Texas --she is trying to decide whether to catch a flight to Washington for last tonight departure or early morning departure.	
c	10:27a	11:26a			Joined by Hon. John Bell Williams, Governor of Mississippi	
c					Hon. John A. Volpe, Governor of Massachusetts	
c					Hon. Charles L. Terry, Jr., Governor of Delaware	
c					Hon. Sherman W. Tribbitt, Lt. Governor of Delaware	
c					Hon. William L. Guy, Governor of North Dakota	
c					Hon. Hulett C. Smith, Governor of West Virginia	
c					Hon. Lester Maddox, Governor of Georgia	
c					Hon. Peyton Hawes, State Revenue Commissioner of Georgia	
					During the visit, the President told the Governors the story of how he had "teased" Senator Ralph Yarborough -- 'Senator was in the office and the President told him he understood there was a young man all set to run against the Senator. The President really built it up and said, come on Ralph, I'll introduce you to him, he's just outside ----Little Lyn	

Press Briefing #118 -A indicates "they talked about the President's crime program, the situation in VietNam, the economic message, and other fiscal matters briefly -- also the mtg of all the Governors here in Washington on Feb 29."

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					was introduced.' The President then passed around the Lyn pictures captioned with political caps---the Governors thoroughly enjoyed the little joke and the picture. MJDR;mb	
					Also while the governors were in MJDR took in a note asking if the President would consider signing the Education Message in front of the Governors -- the President said to tell Joe Califano there had to be a lot more work on it. MJDR:mb	
	11:02a	11:18a			The President to the Cabinet Room accompanied by the Governors from the 9:58a group, the 10:27a group, ~~and the WP~~ to be presented the Economic Report by Hon. Gardner Ackley, Chmn , Council of Economic Advisers Hon. James Duesenberry, member, CEA Hon. Arthur M. Okun, member, CEA and Chmn-designate	
	11:03	11:13a			REMARKS by the President The President then signed two copies of the Economic Report -- and gave the first pen to Hon. Gardner Ackley. The two copies were to go -- one to the House -- and one to the Senate.	

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					In the room for this ceremony were the professional staff members of the Council of Economic Advisers	
	11:20a				The President returned to his oval office w/ George Christian	
		11:22a			Joe Califano -- left to get the Attorney General who was in his office	
		11:26			and the Governors--Maddox, Williams, Volpe, Terry, Guy, Smith, and Lt. Gov. Tribbitt	
		11:26			Price Daniel and Peyton S. Hawes, State Revenue Commissioner, Ga.	
C	11:30a	11:34a			OFF RECORD: Miss Phyllis Bonanno -- in re employment. The President walked out to mjdr's room with her and said for the next two days to teach her all possible so she could take mb's place.	
C	11:36a	11:46a			Presentation of the Heart-of-the-Year Award to Miss Patricia Neal (Mrs. Roald Dahl	
					Dr. Jesse E. Edwards, President, American Heart Association	
					Mr. William F. Laporte, Chmn of the Board and President of American Home Products Corporation; National Chmn. of the Heart Fund Campaign	
					Mrs. William F. Laporte	
					Mrs. Jesse E. Edwards	
					Mr. Rome A. Betts, Executive Director, American Heart Association	
					Mr. John P. Knox, Jr., Assoc. Director, American Heart Association	
					Mr. M. Frederick Arkus, Public Relations Counsel, American Heart Association	
					Mr. Herb Cornell, Director of Public Relations, American Heart Association	
		11:56a			Mrs. Albert Lasker (Mary) (Mrs. Lasker asked for a brief visit privately with the President after this ceremony)	
	11:36	11:46a			PRESS in to cover the presentation	
					This is the American Heart Association's 1968 Heart-of-the-Year Award, and this is National Heart Month.	

appt requested by Dr. Hurst
Miss Neal is the motion picture actress whose recovery from three massive strokes is virtually complete. She has received worldwide attention and is returning to an active and productive life.

Miss Neal has also been invited to the Feb 8 dinner for PM Wilson.

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					The President met Schuetzin Berlin in Aug 1961 and again at Adenauer funeral in Apr81 1967.	
	11:57a				Hon. Klaus Schuetz, Mayor of West Berlin -- on his xx first visit to U.S. as Mayor	
					H. E. Heinrich Knappstein, Amb of Germany	
					Mr. Al Puhan, Desk officer, DOS (Alfred)	
					Ed Fried, NSC	
		11:58a			Mr. Guenter Struve, Personal Asst to the Mayor	
		11:58			Mr. Peter ~~Hertz~~ Hertz	
		11:58			Amb Symington	
					Mayor Klaus gave the President: a book-- Berlin Impression inscribed: "His Excellency The President of the United Statesof America, with the greetings of the people of Berlin, February 1st, 1968, signed, Governing Mayor of Berlin" and a lovely plate in the center of which is the Brandenburg Gate	The President gave the Mayor a picture in a blue leather frame, a butane lighter and fuel, and gold cuff links.
	12:18p		t		Jim Jones -pl	
	12:20p				The President escorted the Mayor of West Berlin to West Lobby ~~to~~x	
					Mr. Christian reported earlier that there is great interest from both German and American photographers to get pix w/ Pres and Mayor.	
	12:25p				The President returned to the oval office	
	12:30p	12:34			OFF RECORD:	
					Mr. & Mrs. Robert Greene (She is Anita Bryant)	
					Mrs. Gloria Rowe - her accompanist	
					Miss Lyric Rowe, about 12-year old=	
					Miss Bryant sang at the Presidential Prayer Breakfast this morning, and the President told her there to come by and see him.	
	12:35p		t		Marvin Watson -pl	
	12:37p		t		Jim Jones-pl	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date 1 February 1968

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
1	12:40p				The President to the mansion	
					escorted by Lt. Col. Haywood Smith, USMC	
					and accompanied by the Mayor of West Berlin and his party	
					to the East Room for the [redacted] Presentation of the MEDAL OF HONOR to	
					Capt. Merlyn H. Dethlefsen, USAF	
					(since deciding to present the award, the Capt. has subsequently been promoted to Major)	
	12:45p	12:55			REMARKS	
	list to DT				Receiving Line in Blue Room	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 1, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day _____

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	1:22p				To Oval Ofc - worked desk	
	1:25p	1:55p			Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski and MW appt requested by the Congressman to discuss Sargent Shriver	
	2:00p	2:05			To Fish Room where Ernie Goldstein was hosting luncheon for Ambassadors: (African)	
					H.E. Louis Rakotomalala, Amb of Malagasy Republic	
					H.E. Celestin Kabanda, Amb of Rwanda	
					H.E. Major General Padma Bahadur Khatri, Amb of Nepal	
					H.E. Karim Bangoura, Amb of Guinea	
					H.E. Chief Michael Lukumbuzya, Amb of Tanzania	
					H.E. Joseph N. Owono, Amb of Cameroon	
					H.E. Leonard Badinga, Amb of Gabon	
					H.E. Oliver Weerasinghe, Amb of Ceylon	
					Hon. Joseph Palmer, Asst Secy of State for African Affairs	
					Hon. James Symington, Chief of Protocol	
					Mr. Ed Hamilton, NSC Staff	
					~~Mr. Walt Rostow~~ Mr. Marshall Wright, NSC staff	

Ernest Goldstein's memo of gist to DT -- indicated that the President greeted each Amb., and then expressed his interest in Africa, stressing varibus evidences of regional economic cooperation. He then went on to discuss the ~~Russk~~ Pueblo incident and spoke feelingly of his desire for peace.

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 1, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	2:05p				Back to Oval Office	
	2:15p	4:00p			To mansion - for LUNCH	
					the Vice President	
					General Matthew B. Ridgway	
					Hon. Clark Clifford	
					Walt Rostow	
					George Christian	
					Tom Johnson	
					General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, USAF	
					Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations	
					General Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff, USA	
					General Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant, USMC	
					Hon. Richard Helms, Director, CIA	
					(the usher says most of the guests departed between 3:50-4:10p, except the Vice President and General Ridgway -- who left at 5:47p)	
	4:30p		t		John Gonella - pl	
	4:31p		t		Ashton Gonella	
	4:32l		t		Joe Califano - pl	
	5:00p		t		MW - pl	

The President was prepared for this mtg by a folder of papers from W Rostow -- analyzing the General's views on VietNam and folders of Sen Kennedy's statements on Viet-nam --folder to DT

General Ridgway was in the Pittsburg area, and the President offered him the use of his pilot and his Jetstar for the flight to Washington for this luncheon.

Secy McNamara and General Wheeler are testifying on the Hill and could not attend.

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date feb 1, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	5:40p		t		Col. Cross	
	5:41p		t		Rostow - pl	
	5:50p				To Oval Office - and to mjdr's room to look at papers on her desk	
	5:58pq				George Christian	
	6:08p		t		Secy McNamara	
	6:21p				To Marvin Watson's office	
	6:33p				To Oval Ofc	
		7:25p			w/ Thomas Vail , Editor-Publisher of the Cleveland Plain Dealer	
					He is also a member of the USIA Advisory Committee.	
					Mr Vail is in Washington for the final mtg of the Sports Arbitration Committee and will	
					be on hand for presentation of his final report to the VP at 3:00p today. Vail has wanted	
					to visit with the President for some time to discuss matters in general. He wants to give	
					his assessment of the Ohio situation and discuss where he can be helpful to the President.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
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Date _____

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day _____

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	6:35p		t		George Christian - pl	
	6:47p		t		Califano - pl	
	7:29p	x	t		Christian - pl	
	7:31p			t	Mrs. Arthur Krim - New York City	
					The ~~xxx~~ President worked folders of night reading from last night and the night	
					before -- working almost five inches of paper in toto.	
	9:00p				To mansion -	
					and to the West Hall, joining	
					Judge and Mrs. Homer Thornberry	
		12:20a			Cong. and Mrs. J. J. (Jake) Pickle	
		12:20a			Mrs. Pickle's son, Richard McCarroll (law student in third year UT law)	
					Miss Phyllis Bonanno	
	9:02p		t		Sam Houston Johnson - to ask him to join	
	9:06p				Marie Fehmer	
					John Criswell, Treasurer, DNC	
					joined	
					Yuki joined - dressed in blue coat trimmed w/ white that Mrs. Traphes Bryant	
					had made for him. He ran to the President immediately, and pefformed--both	
					doing their usual duet.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 1, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	9:15p	10:00			DINNER - w/	
					Judge and Mrs. Homer Thornberry	
		12:20			Cong and Mrs. J j Pickle	
		12:20			Richard McCarroll	
					Miss Phyllis Bonanno	
					Mr. Sam Houston Johnson	
					John Criswell	
					mf	
					Dinner conversation seemed "labored," for the President was tired. He was glad	
					to have the Thornberrys near him, that was evident, but he seemed content to let	
					others do the talking. He took delight in telling once again the story of Father	
					Schneider and the kneelers (this prompted the call to Jake Jacobsen) and also	
					told about Luci's child, Lyn turning over a glass table today. He discussed	
					briefly the difference between little Lyn and Jerry, his cousin, saying that he	
					had talked w/ Mrs. Krim about this, and she explained that it was the first year	
					of the child's life -- and the way the mother carried him -- that contributes to	
					the difference in the two children. The President further explained that little	
					Lyn is taken places -- to the Ranch, etc-- handed around to different	
					people, while little Jerry stays in the apartment and sees only his mother and daddy.	
					At one point, the President looked up and said, "We might be getting our	
					boys back, they're meeting now." -- and he looked at his watch.	
					After dessert, the President asked for cookies -- and poppycock --	
					and then pushed himself away from the table, saying he couldn't sit	
					there any longer without eating more.	
	9:54p		t		Jake Jacobsen - at the Madison Hotel	
					The President asked him to join	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

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	9:58p		t		operator - clear Mr. Jacobsen at the gate	
					After leaving the dining room, the President went to his bedroom, saying he wanted to put on his new shirt -- a blue silk turtle neck. Then to the West Hall, soliciting compliments on it.	
	10:15p	12:40a			Hon. Jake Jacobsen and Dr. Willis Hurst (houseguest) ~~Director, School of Medicine, Emory University, Atlanta~~ joined in West Hall Dr. Hurst is Professor and Chairman, Woodruff Medical Center of Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.	
	~~10:33p~~	10:33p	t		Hon. Henry Fowler, Secy of the Treasury During this call, the President almost fell asleep. His head hung -- and his eyes were closed.	
	10:40p				To the card table -- and a domino game w/ Judge Thornberry Cong Pickle Sam Houston Johnson --the President during the game ate 9 graham crackers	
					The President did not watch the 11:00p news -- but asked that the volume be turned up at one point when General Wheeler ~~was talking~~ came on the screen.	
	11:30p		f		Lynda	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 1, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:15a				The domino game broke up -	
	12:20a				Cong and Mrs. Pickle departed w/ Richard McCarroll	
	12:25a				Mf out - to office	
	12:30a				John Criswell out	
	12:40a				Jake Jacobsen out	
	12:50a				The President retired	
					Houseguests:	
					Judge and Mrs. Homer Thornberry	
					Dr. Willis Hurst	
					Miss Phyllis Bonanno	
					Mr. Sam Houston Johnson	
					Dr. Hurst gave the President a report on Sen. Richard Russell. Sen Russell is in Walter Reed Hospital, and Dr. Hurst examined him and consulted w/ his doctors today.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date _____

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day _____

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					Today signed an amendment to the basic Exec Order that provides for the administration of Okinawa and other Ryukyu Islands--providing that the Ryukyuan Chief Exec shall in the future be popularly elected by his people.	
					Today announced the reappointment of full-five years of two members of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation-- Joseph B. Cumming Col. John A. Macy	
					Today issued statement on the passing of the Truth-in-lending Bill	
					NOMINATION SENT TODAY: to the Senate Thomas O. Paine, of Santa Barbara, California, to be Deputy Administrator of the Natl Aeronautics and Space Administration	
					Today transmitted to the Congress the second annual report of the Natl Endowment for the Humanities.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION-POSSIBLE ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Friday, February 2, 1968 -- 8:30 a.m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-357
By ___, NARA, Date 2-14-94

Mr. President:

One reason for my particular concern for the battle of Khe Sanh is a desire to avoid a situation of battlefield crisis in which Westy and the JCS would ask you to release tactical nuclear weapons.

I have felt that every action ought to be taken now that could prevent such a circumstance from arising.

That is why it may be worth offering Westy now an extra reserve division; although, if the 81st Airborne and/or the two Marine brigades were sent out, you would undoubtedly have to call up the reserves.

I am not making that recommendation. But you may wish to talk privately with Clark Clifford about the advisability of:

(A)

-- communicating privately to Bus Wheeler that it is his duty to minimize the likelihood that the nuclear issue would be raised by the JCS;

-- asking Westy back-channel if he wants an extra airborne division or other reserve forces on the spot. (He would -- almost surely -- accept.)

why K-S not alerted?
W. 1. Hoping westy would not force south to meet "opening"
2- Good weather: US air and artillery effective.
3. Westy appears attack - shortly.

W. will go out to westy to ask how he would handle bad weather and low ceiling on airfield and choppers paid: urgently to reply to earlier question.

W. W. Rostow

OVER

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

NSF, Files of Walt Rostow,
box 7, "Nuclear Weapons--
Contingency Plng"

The President communicated A to Gen Wheeler.

He replied:

- contingency most remote although planning going forward.
- Westy "confident"
- Like McNamara he believes troops could come on ground.
- Will accelerated answer to any questions from Westy:
  - what if Khe Sanh protected?
  - what if artillery too cantonments for a/c and choppers.

5:35 p.m.
2 Feb. 1968

2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-357
By ___, NARA, Date 2-14-94

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Saturday, February 3, 1968 -- 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I thought you would not wish me to discuss the nuclear weapons matter in a meeting.

I did not discuss this question with Gen. Taylor.

I did discuss it with Clark Clifford, but I am 100% sure he did not raise it with the Pentagon. The discussion was yesterday and he confined his advice to saying I had the duty to share my anxiety with you verbally.

I have discussed various aspects of the matter over the past ten days or so with Bob Ginsburgh. It first arose in my mind from recollection that the issue was raised with us by the French at the time of the crisis at Dienbienphu.

In particular, we chatted informally about three matters:

1. Could such a question arise at Khe Sanh?

2. Would nuclear weapons be relevant?

3. What steps could be taken to minimize the likelihood that the question would arise?

With respect to 2, he asked me one day if he might explore the question informally with General Wheeler.

I told him he could if it was understood:

-- this was in no sense a "White House request";

-- the matter had never even been raised with the President, let alone by the President.

I did not envisage that any formal staff work would be set in train.

The fault, therefore, is mine.

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

30

CITE: NONE 07 FEBRUARY 1968

DTG : 062250Z

FROM: ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII

TO : GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV
GEN RYAN, CINCPACAF, HAWAII
GEN BEACH, CINCUSARPAC, HAWAII
ADM HYLAND, CINCPACFLT, HAWAII
LTGEN KRULAK, CG FMFPAC

FRACTURE JAW (U)

1. I HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON THE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR EMPLOYEMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA WHICH WAS DRAFTED BY MEMBERS OF OUR RESPECTIVE STAFFS LAST WEEK IN OKINAWA. EXCEPT FOR THE OPTION OF AIR DELIVERED STRIKES FROM THE PHILLIPPINES, WHICH I HAVE DELETED, THE PLAN APPEARS CONCEPTUALLY SOUND AND CONTAINS THE DETAIL NECESSARY FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

2. FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND: SINCE THE PLAN HAS BEEN HELD VERY CLOSE AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED AT THE WORKING LEVEL, I WOULD EXPECT THAT YOUR PLAN COULD BE FORWARDED TO ME VERY SHORTLY AND ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS SO THAT THE NECESSARY SUPPORTING PLANS CAN BE DRAWN UP.

WARM REGARDS.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 055R-80-15-14
By JOL NARA Date 7-16-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

1-51

~~TOP SECRET~~

47

CITE: JCS 01678 10 FEBRUARY 1968

DTG : 101848Z

FROM: GENERAL WHEELER CJCS

TO : ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC

INFO: GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

SUBJECT: FRACTURE JAW

REFERENCE CINCPAC 020208Z FEB

I REQUEST THAT YOU NOT REPEAT NOT FORWARD ANY PLANS WHICH YOU DEVELOP UNDER THE FACTURE JAW PROJECT UNTIL THE JCS ASK FOR THEM, OR UNTIL A CRITICAL SITUATION ARISES WHICH, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, DICTATES THE NEED FOR US TO CONSIDER SUCH PLANS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ /RAC 16-26
By LLW NARA, Date 10-16-2016

MEMORANDUM INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968 -- 10:00 a.m.

EYES ONLY

Mr. President:

With respect to your questions this morning about the nuclear matter:

1. Attached herewith is the memorandum to General Wheeler from Bob Ginsburgh. As you see, he raised the matter on his own with respect to Dien Bien Phu and no relation to the White House or to me.

2. In Admiral Sharp's response to General Wheeler's back channel message which followed, Adm. Sharp said that he and Westy had exchanged views several days previously on the need for some very closely-held planning about nuclear weapons should the situation around Khe Sanh warrant it and should the highest authority direct their use. He noted it was unlikely the situation at Khe Sanh would become so desperate to warrant such use, but felt military prudence alone required some such planning.

3. There are no nuclear weapons in South Vietnam. Presidential authority would be required to put them there. [redacted]

6.2(a) [redacted]

4. It is Bob Ginsburgh's impression that the account in the Washington Post today (page A-5) of the mission of the scientists to South Vietnam is correct; that is, they went there to check on certain aspects of the barrier hardware. That is what he found out when he checked yesterday.

5. Gen. Wheeler's message and Adm. Sharp's message were not distributed to anyone outside of General Wheeler's immediate office.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 15-216
By GH NARA, Date 12-12-15

~~TOP SECRET~~

43

CITE: MAC 01902 10 FEBRUARY 1968

DTG : 101116Z

FROM: GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

TO : ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

REFERENCE CINCPAC 062250Z FEB 68 FRACTURE JAW

COMUSMACV OPLAN FRACTURE JAW HAS BEEN APPROVED BY ME. PUBLICATION IS NOW IN PROGESS AND PLAN WILL BE DISPATCHED BY ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE 11 FEB. ETA HONOLULU ARMED FORCES COURIER STATION 111200W FEB.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 055R-80-14-3
By JOW NARA Date 7-16-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 10, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Saturday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					Weight: 201 1/4 lbs	
	3:46a		t		The Situation Room - also asked for Yuki to be brought up	
	3:53a		t		Situation Room	
	8:25a		t		Situation Room	
	8:33a		f		Mr. James Brown in the situation room	
	8:45a				Breakfast - w/ Mrs. Johnson Marvin Watson and Mary Rather	
C	8:52a		+	[redacted]	George Brown, [redacted]	
C	9:19a			t	Jake Jacobsen - Austin, Tex	
C	10:04a		t		Secretary McNamara	
C	10:27a		t		Mary Slater Beck - at home	
	10:38a		t		Mildred Stegall	
C	10:42a			t	Judge A. W. Moursund - Texas	
	11:06a		t		Mildred Stegall	
	11:27a		f		mjdr	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
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Date Feb 10, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) The WH Day Sat

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	11:27a		f		Col. James Cross	
	11:35a		f		Mildred Stegall	
	12:00n				To the Oval Office	
C	12:05p	1:15p			Private SIGNING CEREMONY -	
					Signing of H. J. R. 947 and the Proclamation declaring LULAC WEEK (Feb 11-17)	
					Cong. Eligio (Kika) de la Garza of Tex	
					Senator Ralph Yarborough	
					Hon. Vicente T. Ximenes, Chmn, Inter-Agency Committee on Mexican American Affrs	
	Ceremony suggested by				Hon. Raymond Telles, U.S. Mexico-Border Development Commission	
	Chairman Ximenes				Mr. Oscar Laurel, National Transportation Safety Boadd	
					Judge Alfred Hernandez, LULAC Immediate Past National President	
					Mr. Edward Pena, LULAC State Director	
					LULAC -- League of United Latin American Citizens	
	12:15	12:17p			mjdr and mr to meet LULAC people	
	1:20p		f		Walt Rostow	

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C	1:21	2:03p			Edgar (Ed) Ray OFF RECORD Managing Editor of the Memphis, Tennessee Press-Scimitar	
					appt requested by Mr. Ray "just to have a chat"	
	2:03	2:05p			Officers of Burro Club of the United States OFF RECORD to present Honorary Membership in the Club	
C					J. Richard Sewell, President Fred J. Mutz, Vice President Joe Meadow, Secretary-Treasurer James A. Dupree, membership chairman	
					The Burro Club of the U.S. is composed of male Democratic Assistants on Capitol Hill and is an outgrowth of the "Little Congress."	
	2:05	3:15p			Frank Pace OFF RECORD	
C	2:27p				Joined by Hon. Leonard Marks, Director, USIA and Douglass Cater re Chairmanship of the Public Broadcasting Corporation	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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	3:15p				To the mansion	
	3:16p				Back to mjdr's room - "do I have a file to take over there with me?"	
	3:17p				To mansion - and to second floor dining room	
c					where the President had his LUNCH - (only the President ate)	
	T Johnson's				sitting around the table w/ him at this time were:	
	notes to DT				Secretary Rusk	
					Secretary McNamara	
					Hon. Clark Clifford	
					Walt Rostow	
					Tom Johnson	
					George Christian	
	5:15p				To Oval Ofc - w/ Hon. Clark Clifford	
c	5:20p		t		General Earle Wheeler - Chairman, JCS	
					to get a report on the General's conversation with Senator Richard Russell	
c	5:27p		t		Sen. Mike Mansfield	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
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Date Feb 10, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Sat

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	~~xx6:15pxx~~					
	6:15p	6:30p			Walt Rostow	
C	6:20p				Mr. George Brown of Houston, Tex OFF RECORD	
	6:32p		t		MW - pl	
	6:35p	7:17p			DeVier Pierson	
		7:17p			Larry Levinson	
		7:17p			Larry Temple	
					re draft deferments and the order of call of the draft. This mtg consisted of a discussion of the procedures of calling -- calling the oldest first; or, a procedure for a percentage call of each age group between 20-25 -- Pierson ~~xxxxx~~ argued for "oldest first," and Levinson argued the percentage call proposal.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 10, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Sat

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
C	7:30p				To second floor w/ Mrs. George Brown	
C	7:40p		~~x~~x	t	~~Sam Houston Johnson~~x Mr. Arthur Krim - NYC	
	8:05p		t		op - have Yuki brought up	
	8:08p		t		Sam Houston Johnson	
	8:07p		t		op - invite Warrie Lynn to dinner	
	8:14p				mf to second floor	
					President in West Hall w/ Mrs. Johnson	
					Mr. George Brown	
					Mary Rather	
	~~8:05p~~					
	8:30p				DINNER - w/ Mrs. Johnson	
C					Mr. George Brown	
					Sam Houston Johnson	
					Mary Rather	
					Warrie Lynn Smith	
					Phyllis Bonanno	
					mf	
	8:54p				The President asked for two calls -	
					Robert McKinney -- and Frank McKinney	
					--neither available	
					During dinner, the President discussed his mtg w/ his staff on	
					draft procedures, saying that he thought DeVier Pierson made	
					the best case.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 10, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Sat

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	9:20p				To the theater -	
					w/ Mrs. Johnson,	
					Mr. George Brown	
					Warrie Lynn Smith	
					mr, pb, mf	
					Sam Houston johnson	
					to watch "Guess Who's Coming to Dinner," a full length feature film	
					concerning a liberal newspaper editor and his wife -- whose daughter comes	
					home engaged to a negro. The President enjoyed the movie completely,	
					laughing, and admiring the photography ~~depicting~~ set in San Francisco	
	11:18p				The President to his office to read ticker machines,	
					accompanied by Mr. George Brown and mf	
					other guests to their rooms	
	12:10a				To second floor - w/ Mr. Brown	
	12:50a				Retired	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 10, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH

Day Sat

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 11, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Sunday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:16a		t		Chief Wesley King - dispensary	
	2:50a		t		Situation Room	
	5:31a		t		Situation Room	
	8:55a				Breakfast	
	12:13p		f		Walt Rostow	
	12:34p		f		Walt Rostow	
C	12:36p		t		General Earle Wheeler	
C	12:59p			t	Warren Woodward, Dallas, Tex	
C	1:40p				LUNCH in bedroom- on trays - w/ Mrs. Johnson Mr. George Brown	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 11, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Sun.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	4:15p				Mr. George Brown (houseguest last night) departed	
	4:25p				To Office	
V	T. Johnson's notes to DT				for meeting w/ Agenda Classified - to WR Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara 1) Vance General Earle Wheeler 2) Response to Westmoreland General Maxwell Taylor 3) The Sands supply levels Hon. Clark Clifford 4) Emissary to Saigon Hon. Richard Helms 5) other military problems Walt Rostow 6) Speech Tom Johnson	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 11, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Sunday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	6:15p				to second floor	
	6:17p				The President asked for Dale Meeks - in Wichita, Kansas - "never mind"	
	6:20p				The President asked for Dale Malechek - in San Antonio - "never mind"	
C	6:21p	7:15p			Hon. Clark Clifford - on second floor	
C	7:30p				To St. Thomas Episcopal Church - accompanied by Mrs. Johnson, Capt and Mrs. Charles Robb	
	8:00p				Returned to second floor joining Cong and Mrs. Jack Brooks Mary Rather mf	

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FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 11, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the W. H. Day Sun.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	8:03p				Cong and Mrs. George Mahon joined	
	8:06p		t		Marvin Watson - to tell him that he had guests and couldn't come to dinner at his house -- and to ask where the Mahon ~~xxx~~ plaque is for the bluebonnet picture	
	8:11p		t		mjdr - at home - to ask if she knew anything about the Mahon's plaque and picture	
C	8:40p				DINNER - w/ Mrs. Johnson Capt and Mrs. Charles Robb Cong and Mrs. Jack Brooks Cong and Mrs. George Mahon Sam Houston Johnson Warrie Lynn Smith mr, mf, pb	
	9:30p				The President to the domino table - w/ Cong. Brooks, Cong. Mahon and Sam Houston Johnson and Mrs. Johnson to the theater w/ Mrs. Brooks, Mrs. Mahon, and ~~xxx~~ mr (ladies watched "Gone with the Wind.")	
	9:50p				mf out	
	10:00p				Capt and Mrs. Charles Robb - out	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 11, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Sun

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	10:28p		t		op - send Yuki up	
	10:32p				Cong. Brooks and Cong. Mahon to theater	
	11:05p				Cong and Mrs. Brooks and Cong and Mrs. Mahon - out	
	11:15p				Mrs. Johnson to second floor	
	11:40p				retired	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date: Feb 11, 1968

The President began his day at (Place): the W.H.

Day: Sun.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

~~TOP SECRET~~, SENSITIVE

58

CITE: NONE

12 FEBRUARY 1968

DTG : 120242Z

FROM: ADM SHARP, CINCPAC HAWAII

TO : GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
GEN RYAN CINCPACAF HAWAII
GEN BEACH CINCUSARPAC HAWAII
ADM HYLAND CINCPACFLT HAWAII
LGEN KRULAK CG FMFPAC HAWAII

INFO: GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
LGEN UNGER CG USARVIS

FRACTURE JAW

1. DISCONTINUE ALL PLANNING FOR FRACTURE JAW.

2. PLACE ALL PLANNING MATERIAL, INCLUDING MESSAGES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING THERETO, UNDER POSITIVE SECURITY.

3. DEBRIEF ALL PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO THIS PLANNING PROJECT THAT THERE CAN BE NO DISCLOSURE OF THE CONTENT OF THE PLAN OR KNOWLEDGE THAT SUCH PLANNING WAS EITHER UNDERWAY OR SUSPENDED.

4. SECURITY OF THIS ACTION AND PRIOR ACTIONS MUST BE AIR TIGHT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 16-26
By UUB NARA, Date 01-08-2016

~~TOP SECRET~~, SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 12, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH

Day Monday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	2:22a		t		The Situation Room	
C	7:55a			t	Dale Malechek - LBJ Ranch	
C	8:26a			t	Dr. Frank Stanton, NYC	
C	8:29a		t		Secy McNamara	
C	8:30a			t	Mayor Richard Daley - Chicago	
	9:02a		t		Walt Rostow - pl	
C	9:12a		t		Hon Clark Clifford	
	9:23a				The President asked for Governor Connally	
	9:33a		t		Walt Rostow	
C	9:38a		t		Hon. Charles Zwick, Director, [redacted] BOB	
	9:45a		f		Walt Rostow	
C	9:54a			f	Governor John Connally - Austin - returning his call	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 12, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Mon.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	10:44a		t		Walt Rostow - pl	
	10:56a		f		Douglass Cater	
C	11:00a		t		Hon. Clark Clifford	
	11:50a		t		Walt Rostow	
	11:52a				To Oval Ofc	
	11:55a	11:57			F. Mr. Earl/Morris, President of the American Bar Association ~~xxx~~ for SIGNING CEREMONY -	
U				1968	Law Day Proclamation	
					Appt requested by Washington ofc of ABA for purpose of getting a picture of the President and Mr. Morris and signed proclamation for use in a number of publications, including the American Bar News and the ABA Washington letter.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
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The President began his day at (Place) the WH

Day Monday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:00n		t		Califano - pl	
	12:01p		t		Robert Fleming - pl	
	12:02p		t		McPherson - pl	
	12:07p				Mrs. Johnson	
	12:09p		t		MW - pl	
	12:16p		t		Rostow - pl	
	12:29p				The President and Mrs. Johnson departed the office	
	12:31p				Arrived Lincoln Memorial meet at steps by General Charles O'Malley	
					The President laid a wreath	
					General O'Malley introduced the President for his	
	12:40	12:50p			REMARKS a	

The Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States invited the Pres and Mrs to this ceremony honoring Abraham Lincoln's birth. This is the 41st such ceremony sponsored by the organization, and every President of the US with only one exception has participated -- the President himself attended four times previously. The origins of the organization date back to 1887.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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The President began his day at (Place) th e WH Day Mon

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:54p				To White House	
	1:00p				To Oval Office	
	1:01p		t		Califano - pl	
	1:02p	1:03p			George Christian Joe Califano	
C	1:14p	1:40p			Secretary Willard Wirtz re copper strike, the implications of the railroad settlement and the jobs program.	
C	1:45p				The President to the Mansion for LUNCH w/ w/ Director Richard Helms	
Agenda was classified "Secret"					Secretary Rusk	
-- Westmoreland's request					Secretary McNamara	
-- Vance					General Earle Wheeler	
-- a speech					Hon. Clark Clifford	
					Walt Rostow	
					George Christian	
					Tom Johnson	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Date Feb 12, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Mon.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
C	3:20p				To Oval Office - w/	
		3:50p			luncheon guests — Tom Johnson's notes to DT	
					Secy Rusk	
					Secy McNamara	
					Director Helms — re Vietnam	
					General Wheeler	
					Hon. Clark Clifford	
					Walt Rostow	
					George Christian	
					Tom Johnson	
					all out at 3:50p	
	3:30p		f		Barefoot Sanders	
C	4:05p	4:26p			Hon. Charles Murphy - former Chairman, CAB	
	4:29p		t		Joe Califano - pl	

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DAILY DIARY

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The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Mon.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
C	4:35p			t	Hunter McLean - Ft. Worth, Texas	
C	4:37p	5:15p			Hon. Robert Weaver, Secretary, HUD	
	4:40p		t		MW - pl	
	5:00p	5:07p			Joe Califano joined	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Date Feb 12, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Mon.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
C	5:17p	5:42			Hon. Sargent Shriver OFF RECORD appt requested by Mr. Shriver "to discuss his personal situation -- wants to keep the President informed."	
C	5:42p				To the Mansion - and to the [redacted] Second Floor, OFF RECORD for Yellow Oval Room REMARKS to "Choice '68" Board of Directors ATTENDANCE: Sidney James , Vice President, Washington, TIME Inc. Lloyd A. Doggett, Students/ Association President, Univ of Texas Edward Cates, Student Body President, Kansas State Teachers' College Richard Beahrs, Pres., Associated Students, Univ of California, Berkeley James P. Doody, President, Fordham College Student Government, Fordham Univ Mike Fancher, Editor, Oregon Daily Emerald, University of Oregon Michael D. Fullwood, Pres., Wisconsin Student Association, Univ of Wisconsin John Kesler, President, Associated Students, Univ of Utah Candy McCampbell, Editor, UT Daily Beacon, Univ of Tennessee James D. Spaniolo, Editor, State News, Michigan State Univ Strobe Talbott, Chairman, Yale Daily News, Yale Univ Sam A. Williams, President, Georgia Tech Student Body, Georgia Institute of Technology Robert G. Harris, Exec Director, Choice '68 John Steele - Washington correspondent for TIME	

Press office did a transcript of this mtg.

Also present in the room were young white house staffers-- introduced to the group by Joe Califano.-- also WH Fellows

CHOICE '68 is a public Service Program of TIME magazine.

Choice 68 is a national collegiate presidential primary to be conducted by ballot simultaneously on 2,500 U.S. college campuses on April 24.

The Board of Directors is in Washington to decide on the names for the ballots and the referendum questions.

(see page 9)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 12, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Monday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	7:00p				President to Office w/ Jim Jones	
	7:05p		t		Secretary Robert McNamara (Returning his call)	
	7:11p		t		George Christian -pl	
	7:20p	7:21p			George Christian	
	7:21p	8:35p 9:35p			OFF RECORD: Mr. Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News Tom Johnson appt requested by Mr. Lisagor to discuss the Pueblo-Vietnam situation.	
	8:25p		t		Walt Rostow	
	8:30p		f		Bromley Smith	
	8:35p				George Christian	
		9:30			Jim Jones	
		9:30			Larry Temple	

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Date Feb. 12, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day Monday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	9:05p		t		Hon. Clark Clifford (Residence)	
	10:00p				President to Mansion	
	10:00p				Mr. Sam Houston Johnson (Mansion)	
	10:02p		t		Mary Rather (Mansion)	
	10:04p		t		Phyllis Bonanno (out to dinner - never mind)	
	10:06p		t		Dr. John Roche (Residence)	
	10:10p				DINNER - w/ Mrs. Johnson Sam Houston Johnson	
	11:00p				The President asked for Joe Califano - at Valenti residence 0 "never mind'	
	11:02p		t		Sam Houston Johnson	
	11:00p				Retired	

Also attending Choice '68 mtg were White House Fellows:

Tim Wirth	Jack McGinty	and PRESS POOL: Muriel Dobbins, Balt. Sun
Barnes Ellis	Gerry Snyder	Frank Reynolds, ABC
Peter Krogh	John Havelock	Ralph Harris, Reuters
Pete Townley	Howard Newman	Mike Posner, UPI
Joe Freitas	Doris Kearns	Frank Cormier, AP
Bob Huefner	Jan Dykman	Bill Mader of TIME
Dick Balzhiser	Barbara Currier	
Betsy Levin	Don Furtado	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
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Date _____

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day _____

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					Today announced the President's intention to nominate Joseph Bowman, Jr., to be Assistant Secy of the Treasury.	
					Today transmitted to the Congress the Seventh Annual Report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.	
					Today announced the President's intention to appoint Dr. Jacob Bregman of Glen Cover, Illinois, to be a commissioner representing the U.S. Govt on the River Valley Water Sanitation Commission.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Date February 13, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day Tuesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					No leadership meeting today because House and Senate ~~will be~~ are in recess; the traditional Lincoln-week (GOP) Congressional Recess	
	4:54a		t		Situation Room	
	8:20a	8:49a			President and Mrs. Johnson to Pool --for swim	
	9:10a				Breakfast	
C	9:10a		t		Amb. Robert McKinney (at Treasury Dept.) -- he is Chairman of the President's Task Force on Travel	
	9:20a		f		Doug Cater	
	9:29a		f		Walt Rostow	
C	9:37a		t		Hon. Clark Clifford	
	10:05a		f		Walt Rostow	
C	10:06a		t		Secretary Robert McNamara	
	11:02a				To mjdr's room -- talking to Juanita about his diet	
	11:06a				To Office	
	11:11a		t		Walt Rostow -pl	
C	11:16a	11:34a			Maj. General Herman Nickerson, Jr./USMC Director of Personnel US Marine Corps (nickname in the Marine Corps is "Herman the German") (later today, the President nominated him to be Lt. Gen.) wife = (Phyllis Anne Winters) Nickerson is Deputy Chief of Staff of USMC, replacing Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt)	

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Date February 13, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day Tuesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
C	11:35a	12:42p			Dr. Frank M. Stanton - OFF RECORD	
					(President, CBS) (The President called for and showed Dr. Stanton the cards Joe Califano used in introducing WH staff, WH Fellows, and the visitors for "Choice '68" meet the evening before.)	
	11:49		t		Watson pl	
	12:45p		t		George Christian - pl	
C	12:46p	1:10p			To mansion - w/ MW	
					and to the East Room for	
					Presentation of the National Medal of Science Awards	
					introduced by Dr. Donald Hornig,	
					REMARKS	
Ceremony attended by principal science officials of the government, heads of major scientific societies and organizations, the science press, senior media representatives, and the Washington Corps of Embassy Science Attaches.					Presented medals to recipients:	
					Kenneth S. Cole, Senior Research Biophysicist, Natl Institutes of Health	
					Harry F. Harlow, Prof of Psychology, Univ of Wisconsin	
					Alfred H. Sturtevant, Prof of Biology, Emeritus, Calif Institute of Technology	
					Michael Heidelberger, Prof of Immunochemistry, NYU	
					Edwin H. Land, President, Polaroid Corporation	
					Igor I. Sikorsky, retired Engineering Manager, Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corp.	
					Paul J. Cohen, Prof of Mathematics, Stanford Univ	
					Jesse W. Beams, Prof of Physics, Univ of Virginia	
					Francis Birch, Prof of Geological Sciences, Harvard Univ	
					Gregory Breit, Prof of Physics, Yale University MORE	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Date Feb 13, 1968

Day Tuesday

The President began his day at (Place)

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					Louis P. Hammett, retired Prof of Chemistry, Columbia Univ	
					George B. Kistiakowsky, Prof of Chemistry, Harvard	
					RECEIVING LINE IN BLUE ROOM - w/ Mrs. Johnson	
	1:12p				To second floor-	
			q		for WEEKLY LUNCHEON w/	
0/		2:32p			Secretary Rusk re Pueblo	
		2:25p			Secretary McNamara	
		2:25p			Walt Rostow TJ's notes to DT	
		2:25p			General Maxwell Taylor	
		2:25p			Hon. Clark Clifford	
		2:25p			Hon. Richard Helms	
		2:25p			General Earle Wheeler	
		2:40p			Tom Johnson	
		2:40p			George Christian	
					The President was prepared for this luncheon mtg by a memo listing questions related to the ~~xxbx~~ call-up of reserve units and individuals. Agenda included: (classification: secret) - returning to W Rostow 1. Vance 2. Pueblo etc	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Date Feb 13, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) t h e White Housed

Day Tues

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	3:00p		t		MW - pl	
3:50p	~~4:10p~~		t		Rostow - pl	
	4:20		t		Califano - pl	
	4:54		t		Christian pl	
	5:16				To Oval Office -- through mjdr's room and to look at first page of Evening Star	
	5:30p		t		MW - pl	
	5:31p	6:15p			Hon. John Gardner, Secy of HEW OFF RECORD --appt requested by Secy Gardner for the purpose: "to explain to the President his next step. Gardner says he not only wants to do this as a matter of courtesy, but he would try to have the President's blessing for action he is taking." NY Times, Feb 14, indicates that outgoing Secy Gardner has accepted the offer to become head of the Urban Coalition's private campaign to transform the cities of America.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 13, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the White House Day Tuesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
C	6:16p	6:21			Jim Novy OFF RECORD appt requested by Mr. Novy to discuss "the Jewish National Fund, a fine charitable organization."	
C	6:21p	7:10p 7:10p			Charles A Bartlett off record - columnist and George Christian Appt requested by Bartlett to talk about VietNam Hackler's briefing memo indicates "he wants to talk to find what's uppermost on the President's mind, how he feels about problems, and how he sees the current situation in total and to get a reflection of the President's spirit." Christians notes to DT	
C	7:11p	9:35p			C. R. Smith OFF RECORD	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 13, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the White House Day Tuesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	7:35p		f		Walt Rostow	
C	7:51p		t		Hon. Clark Clifford	
C	8:00p			t	Hon. Abe Fortas - Montreal, Canada	
C	8:10p			t	Senator Warren Magnuson - Billingham, Washington	
	8:12p		t		Mrs. Johnson	
	8:20p		f		Walt Rostow	
	8:40p				To mansion - w/ Mr. C. R. Smith	
					--and to the second floor, joining Mrs. Johnson and Mary Rather	
	8:45p				mf to second floor	
C	8:55p				DINNER - w/ Mrs. Johnson C. ~~Rxxxxx~~ R. Smith mr, mf Sam Houston Johnson	
	8:55p		t		Sam Houston Johnson - to invite him to dinner -- he came down and joined immediately.	

Conversation re plans for Mr. Smith

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 13, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Tues.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	9:17p		t		Marvin Watson - ~~get~~ to ask him to make arrangements for Sam Houston Johnson to go to DNC and sit in on meetings w/ Democratic Party State Chairmen	
	9:35p				To the South Grounds - w/ Mrs. Johnson to say goodnight to Mr. C. R. Smith	
	9:40p				To second floor w Mrs. Johnson	
	9:45p				Mrs. Johnson and mr to theater	
	9:54p		f		Walt Rostow	
	9:55p				mf out - President to his bedroom w/ Sam Houston Johnson	
C	10:13p			t	Dale Meeks - LBJ Ranch	
	11:06p		f		Walt Rostow	
	11:40p				retired	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date _____

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day _____

Entry No.	Time		Telephone f or t		Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
					Today's evening news carried bulletins to the effect that we were sending 10, 500 more troops to VietNam	
					Today announced that William V. S. Tubman of Liberia has accepted the President's invitation to visit the U.S. beginning in Washington on March 27 and 28.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
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Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	6:11a		t		Situation Room	
C	7:53a		f		Secy McNamara	
C	8:09a		t		Secy McNamara	
C	8:31a		t		Cong. George Mahon - at home	
C	9:03a		f		Dr. John Roche	
	9:24a		f		Douglass Cater	
C	9:37a		t		Hon. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI	
C	9:46a		f		Hon. Clark Clifford	
C	10:01a		t		Secy Rusk	
	10:07a		f		Walt Rostow	
	10:10a		f		Col. James Cross	
	10:34a		t		Walt Rostow	
C	10:55a			t	C. R. Smith - New York City - Chrm of Board - American Airlines	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	11:30a				To Oval Ofc - w/ MW	
	11:32a		t		George Christian ~~Ox~~ - pl	
C	11:33a	12:10p			Hon. Ramsey Clark the Attorney General	
	12:11p				To Cabinet Room for CABINET MEETING --~~thexxxxxxxx~~ then immediately back to Oval Office w/ Secretary of State Dean Rusk carrying with him a red tag memo from Rostow -- Hainan	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:15p				To Cabinet Room for	
					CABINET MEETING - followed by Secretary Rusk	
					The Vice President	
					Secretary Rusk	
					Ambassador Goldberg	
					Under Secy of Treasury Joseph Barr	
					Hon. Ramsey Clark, the Attorney General	
					Postmaster General Lawrence O'Brien	
					Secretary Udall	
					Secretary Freeman	
					Under Secy of Commerce Howard Samuels	
					Secretary Wirtz	
					Under Secy of ~~xxxxx~~ HEW, Wilbur Cohen	
					Secretary Weaver	
					Secretary Alan Boyd	
					Secretary Fowler	
					Hon. William Driver, VA Administrator	
					Hon. John Macy, Civil Service Commission Chairman	
					Hon. Leonard Marks, Director USIA	
					Joe Califano	
					Charles Maguire	
					Agenda:	
					1. status of legislation	
					2. summer youth program	
					3. foreign press handling of U.S. issues	
					4. veterans in public service	
					Secy Rusk also distributed a pamphlet to all Cab mbrs, "Briefing Notes on VietNam - Feb 1968, Dept of State,"	

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DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:55p				To Oval Ofc -	
					for a moment	
	12:57p				and then back to Cabinet Meeting	
	1:14				President into Oval Room w/ — TJ's notes to DT	
					Sec. Dean Rusk	
					George Christian	
	1:15 p	1:40p			Vice President Hubert Humphrey	
	1:16 p				in from MW's office:	
		1;40p			Clark Clifford — re violation of Chinese air space	
		1:40p			Gen. Earle Wheeler	
		1:40p			Gen. Maxwell Taylor	
		1:40p			Sec. Robert McNamara	
					Tom Johnson	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
C	1:40p				President went to Fish Room for 1;00p appointment for the signing of the S 1542, the Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 SIGNING CEREMONY	
C	Left to DT					
C	1:56p				President into Oval Office with Vice President Hubert Humphrey	
	2:00p		t		Rostow - pl	

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DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	2:04p				To the Cabinet Room to meet with Federal Co-Chairmen of Economic Development	
	Commissions:				[redacted] - accompanied by The Vice President	
					J. Russell Tuten, Coastal Plains	
					Thomas F. Francis, Upper Great Lakes	
					[redacted] John J. [redacted] Linnehan, New England	
					William McCandless, Ozarka	
					Orren Beaty, Four Corners	
					Joe W. (Pat) Fleming, Appalachia	
					and Doug Nobles	
	2:15p		f		Walt Rostow	

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Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	2:24p				To mjdr's room -	
					read G C's morning press briefing	
					and papers on corner of her desk	
	2:30p				To Oval Ofc	
	2:37p		t		George Christian - pl	
	2:39p				To mansion	
	2:45p		f		George Christian	
	3:15p		~~t~~ f		Ashton Gonella	
	3:30p				The President asked for Luci Nugent - she was at the University - he left word	
C	4:09p		t		Secy Rusk	

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Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	4:20p		t		Rostow - pl	
b	4:25p		f		Secy McNamara	
	4:36p		t		McPherson - pl	
	5:10p		t		Christian - pl	
c	5:14p		t		Hon. Clark Clifford	
c	5:32p		f		Cong. George Mahon	
	5:50p				To Oval Ofc -- saying, "I just had two big iced milks"	
					Mr. Bryant and Yuki to ofc-	
					Mr. Bryant brought the President the front page of the Wall Street Journal w/ a story on Yuki on it.	
					then looked at album of baby pictures w/ captions	
	5:59p				To Oval Office - w/MW	
	6:02p		t		George Christian -pl	
	6:05p				Tom Johnson	
	6:14p		t		Congressman George H. Mahon (Tex.)	
	6:30p		t		Doug Cater -pl	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb. 14 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Wednesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	6:32p		t		Marvin Watson -pl	
	6:36p		t		Doug Cater -pl	
C	6:37p				To Mansion for RECEPTION AND REMARKS to the DEMOCRATIC PARTY STATE CHAIRMEN who are attending a one-day conference sponsored by the Democratic National Committee - OFF RECORD	
	list to DT					

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DAILY DIARY

Date Feb. 14 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH

Day Wednesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	8:02p				To Oval Office w/ MW	
	8:03p		t		Secretary Robert McNamara (to return his earlier call) -- the Secretary was out to dinner - the President told the Operator he would call him in the morning	
	8:10p				MRS. [redacted] Diana Heiges, Austin, Texas	
	9:00p				(Tom Johnson called and told me to let the President know that Bill Moyers James Hagerty and Pierre Salinger were on Channel 11 being interviewed by Dan Rather -- the President turned on his sets and told me to let Mrs. Johnson know about the program.	
	10:15p				President to Mansion w/ James R. Jones MRS. [redacted] Diana Heiges	
	10:19p		t		Situation Room	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb. 14 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the ~~Ox~~ WH Day Wednesday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone for t Lo	Telephone for t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	10:35p	12:18a			Senator and Mrs. Birch Bayh (Indiana)	
		12:18a			Mr. and Mrs. Chet Huntley	
		12:18a			Becky Rogers (Mrs. Paul)	
		12:18a			Capt. and Mrs. Tazwell Shepherd	
	10:45p				DINNER	
					President and Mrs. Johnson	
					Mrs. [redacted] Diana Heiges (Houseguest)	
					James R. Jones	
	12:15P				Retired	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 14, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the wh Day Wed.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					Today approved S. 1788, which authorizes the Secy of the Interior to conduct six water resource project feasibility studies.	
					Today issued proclamation on American History Month.	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	7:59a		t		Diana Heiges - houseguest in mansion	
	8:00a				Breakfast	
	8:10a		t		op - tell George Christian and Tom Johnson to put on Channel 4	
C	8:12a		f		Secy Robert McNamara	
	8:56a		f		Joe Califano	
	9:13a		t		John Roche	
	9:20a		f		Doug Cater	
	10:20a		f		Joe Califano	
	10:22a		f		Jim Jones	
	11:13	11:43a			To Oval Ofc - w/ George Christian and Tom Johnson	
	11:20a				Yuki	
	11:29a		t		McPherson - pl	

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DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	11:45a				To Cabinet Room for handshake and pix w/ Arthur S. Flemming 1968 Award Winners (Ten Outstanding Young Men in the Federal Government for '68)	
					The ten winners were selected Jan 31 at the Supreme Court by a panel of judges chaired by Justice Clark and including men such as Birch Bayh, C. R. Smith, and Dr. Wilson Elkins	
					Sent to DT	
	11:47a				To Rose Garden w/ above - for pix for press and tv photographers	
	11:48a				To Oval Office - to signing table	
	11:52a		t		MW - pl	
	12:00n	12:07p			To Larry Temple's office	
	12:08p				Diana Heiges (to take in Rostow memos) -- Mrs. Heiges began work in the President's office today	

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Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:20				President stopped in mdjr's office and asked MW and Mr. Flem[illegible]ing if his hair looked all right.	
C	12:24p	12:36p			President into the Cabinet Room w/ ceremony witnessing the consummation of two demonstration projects in 20 cities White HOuse Community Senior Service Program	
					Secretary Wirtz	
C list to DT	12:20 - 12:30p				REMARKS	
					the ofcrs and members of the Exec Board of the Natl Council of Senior Citizens are in Wash for two mtg concerning the problems of the elderly. Since the Labor Dept was ready to sign two separate contracts for demonstration projects in twenty cities w/ the Natl Council of Senior Citizens of Washginton, D. C. and the Natl Council on the Aging of New York this ceremony was arranged. Purpose of projects will be to open up socially useful part time jobs in Community Service - jobs that for lack of funds are not now and normally would not be available. Jobs to be filled with retired workers on low incomes who want part time jobs and others age 55 or over who have not reached retirement age, are unemployed and have difficulty securing employment in the competitive labor force. Each of the two organizations will operate demonstration projects for the Senior Citizens Community Service Corps in ten communities.	
Mtg w/ the President suggested to again underscore the Administration's efforts toward meeting the problems of the elderly.						
		12:36p			President into Oval office w/ MW	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	12:50p		t		Rostow - pl	
	1:00p		t		Sanders - pl	
1:10	~~1:20p~~				To Cabinet Room	
					for SWEARING-IN of	
					Merton Peck as a Member of the Council of Economic Advisers	
					and Arthur Okun as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers	
	1.15	1 24			REMARKS	
	list in folder on Pres. Desk					

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
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Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	1:29p				Back to Oval Office	
C	1:30p	1:40p			John H. (Johnny) Crooker, Jr and MW	
	1:38p	2:45p 2:45p			Hon. Alexander Trowbridge, Secy of Commerce C. R. Smith, Chairman of Board, American Airlines	
	2:50p		t		Califano - pl	
	3:05p		t		Temple - pl	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 15, 1968 [redacted]

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	3:07p				To the mansion - followed by Jim Jones	
	3:10p		t		George Christian	
	3:15p		t		Douglass Cater	
	3:26p		t		Ashton Gonella (at lunch. Jim Ketchum answered - President talked to Ketchum)	
	3:29p		f		Douglass Cater	
	3:30p		t		MW -	
	3:37p		t		[redacted] Joe Califano	
	3:55p		f		Joe Califano	
	4:00p		t		MW - pl	

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DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Tburs

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	4:07p		f		Walt Rostow	
	4:10p		t		Rostow - pl	
	4:30p		t		Califano - pl	
	4:40p		t		Sam Houston Johnson	
	4:45p		t		MW pl - JRJ on duty	
	5:10p				Mr. and Mrs. Steve Martini	
	5:50p		t		George Christian	
	6:07p				To South Grounds - to meet Helicopter carrying Hon. Cyrus Vance --just returned from special mission on behalf of the President -- to Korea	
	Mr. Vance briefed the press in the press ofc 7xxx 7:06-7:12p				Rostow says that it is important to show the Korean Government that Vance reported promptly and privately to the President and possibly to the President's Senior Advisers. ... the helicopter to the White House is a further display to the Korean Government of the President's personal interest in getting the report.	

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The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	6:10p				To Cabinet Room w/ Mr. Vance - and party	
					joining:	
					The Vice President	
					Secretary Rusk — TJ's notes to DT	
					Secretary McNamara	
					Hon. Clark Clifford	
					Walt Rostow	
					General Maxwell Taylor	
					General Earle Wheeler	
					Under Secy of State Nicholas Katzenbach	
	7:06p				To Oval Ofc - w/	
		7:40			Secy Rusk	
		7:40			Secy McNamara	
		7:40			Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge	
		7:40			Hon. Clark Clifford	
		7:40			General Earle Wheeler	
	7:16p	7:40			George Christian in	
	7:17p	7:40			Rostow in	

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The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	7:25p	7:40			Tom Johnson joined	
	7:40p				MW	
	7:42p				George Christian	
	7:45p				OFF RECORD:	
		8:05			St. Clair McKelway of the New Yorker Magazine	
					--"he claims to be a great supporter of the President," says TJ --	
					and is the brother of Benjamin McKelway.	
					Interview to be applied to ~~bexx~~ use as a future article in the magazine.	
					TJ's notes & DT	
	7:46p		f		Walt Rostow - in the situation room	
C	8:00p		f		Secy Rusk	

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	8:15a				To the situation room w/ MW and Geo Christian	
	8:37p				To MW's ofc	
	8:40p				To Oval Ofc	
	8:41p	8:45			Diana Heiges	
C	9:05p	9:33p			Departed South Grounds on OFF RECORD trip to the Washington Hilton where the National Conference of Christians and Jews is hosting a Brotherhood Citation Dinner honoring, His Eminence, Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle, Archbishop of Washington -- see Page 11	
	9:33p				To mansion Sent to DT	
	9:44p		t		Honorable Clark Clifford (Mr. Clifford was out - the President said never mind)	
	9:50p		t		Walt Rostow (Mr. Rostow was out -- the President talked to Mr. James Brown in the Situation Room)	
	10:00p				DINNER w/ [redacted] Diana Heiges	
	10:17p		t		Mr. James Brown (Situation Room)	
	10:25p			t	Dale Malechek (Was out -- the President said never mind)	
	10:27p			t	Dale Meeks (Ranch)	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb. 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	~~11:28p~~			t	~~Mrs. Johnson (New York City)~~	
	~~11:45p~~				~~President Retired~~	
					re dinner honoring Cardinal O'Boyle:	
					The President went directly to the room in which the dinner (grand Ballroom) was held, made REMARK S and presented citation and medal to Cardinal O'Boyle and promptly departed.	
					~~blank~~ head table list ~~on~~ in folder on mf's desk	
					The President was met by Walter F. McCardle, Chairman of the Washington Chapter, NCCJ Immediately introduced by Donald Bittinger, Chairman of the Dinner	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 15, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Thurs.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					Today approved S. 491, a bill to authorize litigation to determine the rights and interests of the Navajo Tribe and the Ute Mountain Tribe in and to certain disputed lands in New Mexico.	
					Today announced inviting former chancellor Ludwig Erhard of Germany to lunch at WH on March 18.	
					Today announced inviting NATO Secy General Manlio Brosio to call at the White House on Feb 19.	
					Today released text of the President's msg to the Fifth Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council Meeting in Maracay, Venezuela, delivered by Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Chairman of the American Delegation.	
					Today announced the appt of Mr. Laurence C. Vass as U.S. Rep on the Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands.	
					NOMINATION SENT TO SENATE TODAY: Joseph M. Bowman, Jr., of Georgia, to be an Asst Secy of the Treasury, vice W. True Davis, Jr., resigned.	
					Issued statement on Secy Gardner's leaving to serve as Chairman of the Urban Coalition	
					Today ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ released text of Presidential announcement on Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco	
					Today signed proclamation designating Feb 1968 as American Histiry Month	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the W H Day Fri

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	7:30a				Bill Blackburn to the second floor	
C	7:44a		●	t	Judge A. W. Moursund - Johnson City, Tex	
	7:45a				Breakfast	
C	8:29a		f		Secy Robert McNamara	
	8:30a				MW to second floor	
C	9:00a			t	Mr. Edwin Weisl, Sr - NYC	
	9:00				Jake Jacobsen to second floor	
	9:07a		t		James Jones - pl	
C	9:08a			t	Justice Abe Fortas - Montreal, Canada	
	9:55a		t		DeVier Pierson	
	10:00a		t		Jake Jacobsen - in Larry Temple's office	
C	10:01a		t		Senator A. S. Mike Monroney	
	10:11a		f		Walt Rostow	
C	10:25a		t		Clifton C. Carter	
	11:00a				George Christian and Tom Johnson to second floor	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day Friday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	11:05a				To Oval fc - w/	
		11:29a			Christian and Tom Johnson	
	11:30a				To Fish Room w/ Jim Jones	
✓					for film TAPING of statement on education w/	
					Braulio Alonso, President of the National Education Association	
					the film is aimed at all school teachers to stimulate their involvement in politics.	
	11:40a				Back to office w/ JRJ	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Fri

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	11:50a	11:55a			OFF RECORD:	
					[redacted] William (Bill) Fisher - to be promoted to Chief today	
					(movie photographer assigned to photo office)	
					Frank Wolfe	
					Yoichi Okamoto	
					Tom Atkins	
					Gary Gross	
					the President posed for a picture w/ Fisher, signed his promotion papers.	
					[redacted]	
	12:10	12:15p			Larry Temple	
	12:15p		t		Tom Johnson - pl	
C	12:25p	1:45p			Hon. Eugene Black, Special Advisor to the President on Southeast Asian economic and social development. --reported on his trip to and meetings in the Middle East.	
C	1:50p	2:10p			Hon. Robert McKinney - Editor of the Santa Fe New Mexican	
					--and working Chairman of the Industry-Government Special Task Force on Travel	
					Amb. [redacted] McKinney presented the report of that task force to the President.	
					McKinney was formerly Amb to Switzerland	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Fri

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	2:00p		t		Joe Califano - pl	
C	2:17p			f	Ben Heineman - Chicago - returning the President's call	
V	2:30				To the mansion w/ Jim Jones to	
					greet ~~tx~~	
	w/ asked ashton for list				~~tgex Kix~~ the Louisiana Mardi Gras Queens touring the White House	
	2:37p				to second floor -	
					LUNCH - alone	
	2:55p				to bedroom	

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Fri

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	3:05p		t		Cater - pl	
C	3:11p			t	Jack Valenti - Houston, Tex	
	3:19p		t		Cater - pl	
	3:30p		t		MW - pl	
	3:35p		t		MW - pl	
	3:37p		t		Christian - pl	
	3:40p		t		Tom Johnson - pl	
	4:30p				To Oval Ofc	
C	~~4:40p~~ 4.42	5:10p			To Fish Room for PRESS CONFERENCE --announced the resignation of Secy Trowbridge for health reasons, and appt of C. R. Smith as his successor. Also announced intention to name John H. Crooker, Jr as Chairman of the CAB -- and then took questions	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Fri

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	5:12p				To Oval Ofc	
C	5:21p				OFF RECORD: Peter Lisagor - Chicago Daily News and Tom Johnson	
	5:31p		t		Rostow - pl	
	5:35p		t		MW - pl	
	5;36p		t		Christian - pl	
C	6:15p			+	Miami Beach Frank McKinney in Florida	
C	6:50p	8:15p			Attorney General Ramsey Clark Larry Temple also for a little while agenda included: report on Civil Rights legislation, situation on the Washington-Martin Luther King demonstration, Justice Dept appointments, and anti-trust cases including Time, Inc. acquisition of Newark Evening News.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb. 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) _____ Day Friday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	8:25p	8:30p			Tom Johnson	
	8:30p				To the Mansion	
	8:52p			t	~~Lyn Nugent (Austin, Tex.)~~	
	9:05p			t	Mrs. Pat Nugent (Austin, Tex.)	
C	9:05p				DINNER	
					w/ Tom Johnson	
					Commissioner and Mrs. Willard Deason	
					Mr. and Mrs. William S. White	
					Miss Marie Fehmer	
					Mr. and Mrs. Simon McHugh	
					Mr. George Christian and Mrs.	
	9:08p		t		Miss Diana Heiges - to invite her to join for dinner -- she joined	
	9:26p		t		General Robert Ginsburgh - NSC staff	
	10:32p				All [redacted] guests out	
	11:01p		t		Tom Johnson	
	11:30 p				Retired	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—256-957

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date Feb 16, 1968

The President began his day at (Place) the WH Day Fri.

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone f or t Lo	Telephone f or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					Today announced intention to nominate Capt. Joseph B. McDevitt, Judge Advocate Generals Corps, U.S. Navy, for appt as Judge Advocate General of the Navy, with the rank of Rear Admiral, for a term of four years.	
					Today announced intention to nominate John R. Petty of New York City to be Asst Secy of the Treasury for International Affairs - presently Deputy Asst Secy for Intl Affairs.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 OF—256-957

February 16, 1968 – President Lyndon B. Johnson Press Conference

THE PRESIDENT. [1.] George[1] tells me that he has given you something not to announce today. I want to give you something you can announce just as soon as you get out of here.

[1]George E. Christian, Special Assistant to the President.

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

We have accepted with very deep regret the resignation of Mr. Sandy Trowbridge-Mr. A. B. Trowbridge--the Secretary of Commerce. The resignation is effective March 1st.

We will send to the Senate the name of Mr. C. R. Smith, the former president of American Airlines, and the present chairman of the board of American Airlines.

Mr. Smith was born in Minerva, Texas, and for the last 30 years has been associated with American Airlines, residing in New York.

Mr. Smith is a member of the Business Council and has been for some 10 or 12 years. He is recommended very warmly and strongly by Secretary Trowbridge and other leaders, including Secretary Wirtz, with whom he will have to work closely.

Mr. Smith has agreed to move to Washington and join us effective March 1st.

CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

[2.] As you know, some time ago Mr. Charles Murphy informed us of his desire to leave the Civil Aeronautics Board. We are accepting his resignation from that Board. For the time being, he will be a consultant to the President, acting as a counsel for me here in the White House on a part-time basis.

He will be succeeded as Chairman of the Board, the Senate willing, by Mr. John H. Crooker. Mr. Crooker is a member of the law firm of Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman & Bates, in Houston, Texas.

I first knew him 38 years ago when he defeated my debating team in Houston High School. He was a star senior debater. I later took one of my men and Mr. Crooker and they defeated the State champions.

Since that time Mr. Crooker has graduated with honors from the Rice Institute, and with honors from the University of Texas Law School. He was on the Law Review there.

He is presently a resident of the District of Columbia, representing his firm here. His nomination will go to the Senate very shortly.

He was born in 1914, and Mr. Smith was born in 1899. Mr. Smith is 68 years of age. Mr. Trowbridge is 37 years of age.

I think that is. all I have. George will give you the biographies on these men.

QUESTIONS

MR. TROWBRIDGE'S RESIGNATION

[3.] Q. Is it health in Mr. Trowbridge's case?

THE PRESIDENT. The doctors had some question when he became Secretary of Commerce. He went through a very thorough examination. He had had a heart problem. He decided to accept the challenge. He did a very fine job.

He has been working long and hard, but he has suffered a little relapse. He has been out for a few weeks. After completing his examinations at Johns Hopkins with other doctors in the last few days, he gave me his letter yesterday resigning as Secretary of Commerce.

We are very hopeful that we can utilize his services to the extent his health will permit in some other capacity, but we have not even discussed that.

Q. Is he returning, Mr. President, to his private company?

THE PRESIDENT. I just answered that. As far as I know, he said to me that he would be available to us for anything he could do, so far as his health is concerned. But I do not think he has made any plans of any kind. I think he will have to speak for himself.

My judgment is he would wait for some time to see how his health comes along. Then if we could use him on something not so strenuous as a Cabinet job, we might be able to get him to do that. If not, he will make some private connection, I am sure.

Q. How long did he serve? From last June, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. George will supply that information to you.

Q. Mr. President, are you concerned by what may seem to some as a considerable number of departures from your administration at high levels?

THE PRESIDENT. We always hate to see anyone depart, particularly men like Mr. Trowbridge. But in the light of the circumstances, I think I wouldn't want him to stay and I don't think you would, either.

MR. MURPHY'S DUTIES

[4.] Q. Mr. President, can you tell us anything more specific about what Mr. Murphy will be doing for you here?

THE PRESIDENT. He will be a counsel here at the White House, advising with the President, reporting directly to the President. His specific duties will be primarily legal. He was counsel to President Truman. He will be available, I think, for any assignment that the President desires to give him.

Q. I wondered, sir, if you might have any political assignments in mind for him?

THE PRESIDENT. None whatever.

A SECRETARY FOR HEW

[5.] Q. Do you foresee a new Health and Welfare Secretary soon?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't have any immediate timetable on that. We have a very outstanding man as Under Secretary.[2] I would anticipate that he would act for at least a few weeks.

[2]The nomination of Under Secretary Wilbur J. Cohen to succeed John W. Gardner as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare was announced by the President in his news conference of March 22, 1968 (see Item 153).

THE AID PROGRAM

[6.] Q. Mr. President, there have been some problems relative to the AID program lately. I wondered if you could give us your viewpoint as to what this amounts to, if you feel it jeopardizes your AID program this year, and what you are doing about it?

THE PRESIDENT. The AID program always has its problems with the Congress. The information I have about it is that the matter is now under consideration by the Justice Department. The Inspector General of the State Department has been very diligent in attempting to make a thorough study of the problems in the AID program. He is making his report available to the Attorney General and to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

GOVERNOR ROMNEY ON VIETNAM

[7.] Q. Mr. President, you may have noticed that Governor Romney now refers to our force in Vietnam as the Johnson-Nixon policy. Does that ring any bell?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I would think we shouldn't play politics with the war and try to associate it with name-calling.

I think most of the Americans at one time or another have agreed with the policy and there have been some departures from the ranks. But I am not going to say anything that I consciously believe will involve the war and the men who are fighting it in a political campaign.

STATUS OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND

[8.] Q. Mr. President, sir, there have been some rumors in the last couple of days from various Members of Congress that General Westmoreland might be transferred. Can you comment on that?

THE PRESIDENT. I think that has been thoroughly covered. I should think you could observe from the sources that they are not either my confidants or General Westmoreland 's.

I don't want to attribute bad motives to anyone, but I would think it hardly likely that the Commander in Chief would get information about the future of General Westmoreland from a Republican Congressman from Wisconsin. I think that would be apparent to almost anyone.

I think that General Westmoreland is confronted with one of the great tests of his career, as we are in this country.

Just before he goes into battle there in South underequipped Vietnam--Khe Sanh, or whatever engagements may follow--I would not want to have him in doubt for a moment, or a single one of his men in doubt, about his standing with his Commander in Chief or with his superiors.

I am amazed that you would give the attention to him that you do in the light of my expression of admiration and respect for him so recently--in December, at Cam Ranh Bay, when I spoke very personally about him and gave him one of America's highest decorations.

I have observed this question being raised. I think it was first raised abroad. It continues to be raised here every day.

I don't know how to put a stop to it, except to say that I have never known a man with whom I have worked in the military for whom I had a higher regard or a greater respect.

I would hope that that statement could end the gossip and the rumors about General Westmoreland's future.

I think we all know that he has served there at my insistence and with the approval of the Joint Chiefs longer than one would ordinarily serve in an ordinary post.

But these are not ordinary times. They require each of us to help along and contribute whatever we can.

Just as General Taylor[3] said to me, "I have been away from my family now in three wars, but I am ready to go back again if you need me," General Westmoreland has said he would stay there as long as I want him to stay there.

[3] Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Ret., Special Consultant to the President.

While I don't want to be inconsiderate of him, I do think that it is in your interest and the Nation's interest, and the free world's interest, that this man, with his background, his experience, and his knowledge of conditions there be there at this critical stage.

I know the credibility problem. I cannot say to you that he will never leave.

I know he has. been there over 4 years already. But I can tell you that I have no intention of seeing him leave, I have no plan for him to leave, and, if I did have, I don't think it would come to you the way it has.

I think all of you should give consideration to how these things come to you. Because if you flash around the world the doubt that someone has and then to remove that doubt he has to make a statement, when, in the normal routine of things it should be changed, then you say, "You misled us.." So you get it either way--"Have you stopped beating your wife?"

I said to General Westmoreland, when I saw reports in the intelligence of what was being said about him, and I saw them picked up by certain overseas newspapers, and before they came into wide circulation here but appeared, I think, in one brief reference, that I wanted him to know very bluntly that I had never known a man in the military whom I had more confidence in. I don't know how to go any stronger than that.

But there is a campaign on to get over the world that we have doubts in General Westmoreland. That campaign I don't believe is going to succeed. It is not going to succeed with me. I have no doubts about his ability, about his dedication.

If I had to select a man to lead me into battle in Vietnam, I would want General Westmoreland.

Does that make it clear to anybody and everybody, including all the foreign press that may want to pick it up?

You see, what irritates me is that I see these things about a week or two ahead of time. They originate, go around the world and then they get real hot here. There are reasons for doing these things. One of the reasons is to destroy people's confidence in the leadership.

With all the men we have at stake out there, with all the lives that are involved-it could be any of you or your boys--I just don't think that is the way to play it.

I see where General Westmoreland may be named a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have never discussed that with General Westmoreland for one second.

So far as I am concerned, if there is any way General Westmoreland could go, it would be up. Right now, he has the most important assignment I know of, and I am going to try to help him. I hope I am helping him by making it clear--repeat, clear--loud and clear--that every person that I know of who deals with General Westmoreland has great respect and confidence in him.[4]

[4]The President, in his news conference of March 22, 1968, announced his appointment of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to succeed Gen. Harold K. Johnson as Army Chief of Staff (see Item 153).

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND VIETNAM

[9.] Q. Mr. President, could you address yourself, please, sir, to the gossip and rumors about nuclear weapons in Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT. I think the Press Secretary covered that very well.

The President must make the decision to deploy nuclear weapons. It is one of the most awesome and grave decisions any President could be called upon to make.

It is reasonably apparent and known to all that it is very much against the national interest to carry on discussions about deployment of nuclear weapons; so much so that the act, itself, tries to guard against that.

I have been in the executive branch of the Government for 7 years. I think I have been aware of the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of State, and by the Secretary of Defense during that period.

So far as I am aware, they have at no time ever considered or made a recommendation in any respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons. They are on our planes on training missions from time to time.

We do have problems. There are plans with our allies concerning what they do.

There is always a person available to me who has full information in connection with their deployment, as you newspapermen know. I think if any serious consideration were ever given, and God forbid there ever will be, I don't think you would get it by some anonymous caller to some committee of the Congress. I think most of you know that, or ought to know that.

No recommendation has been made to me. Beyond that, I think we ought to put an end to that discussion.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

[10.] Q. Mr. President, do you see any new, hopeful prospects for negotiating with Hanoi?

THE PRESIDENT. We look for them every day.

I would like to be able to say "Yes." In the last few days, preparatory to closing out the statement that Secretary Rusk issued yesterday, I believe, or the day before, we reviewed Hanoi's actions in response to more than 20-odd proposals made by well-intentioned and interested people.

We reviewed the many overtures that we had made, including the most recent one where we thought we went as far as honorable men could go--the San Antonio proposal.

As near as I am able to detect, Hanoi has not changed its course of conduct since the very first response it made.

Sometimes they will change "will" to "would", or "shall" to "should", or something of that kind. But the answer is all the same.

While we were prepared to go into the Tet truce, they were moving thousands of men from the North into the South for the subsequent attacks on that sacred holiday. I think that ought to be an answer that any elementary school boy or girl could understand.

If you want to go to the negotiating table, if you want to talk instead of fight, you don't move in thousands of people with hundreds of trucks through the night to try to catch people--innocent civilians--by surprise m the city, anticipating a general uprising.

We are familiar with all the approaches that have been made to them, and we have encouraged them all the time. But when it is all said and done, I don't want to leave the American people under any illusions, and I don't want to deceive them.

I don't think Hanoi is any more ready to negotiate today than it was a year ago, 2 years ago, or 3 years ago. I don't think it has been at any time during any of that period.

Yes?

U THANT'S PEACE EFFORTS AND COMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON

[11.] Q. Could I ask you whether your review included anything you may have had lately from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or does that await your visit with him next week?[5]

THE PRESIDENT. The answer is yes, that does include such reports as we may have on conversations that have taken place in other capitals.

[5]The text of a White House statement following the President's February 21 meeting with United Nations Secretary General U Thant is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 4, p. 323).

We have responded on occasions to other requests the Secretary-General has made of us. We applaud his efforts to try to bring about a just negotiation, and to get all sides to the peace table.

Ambassador Goldberg had a long meeting with the Secretary-General and got a full report on his recent trip, just as I got a full report on Prime Minister Wilson's recent trip.

I have received a good many reports from folks who have visited other capitals. We are always glad to hear those reports, although we are saddened, sometimes, that they don't bring us the hope we would like to have.

Ambassador Goldberg told me that the Secretary-General would like to see me. He had been to the Soviet capital and met with the leaders there. He had been to the British capital and met with the leaders there.

He has been to India. He has been to the French capital and met with the leaders there.

I told the Secretary-General that, of course, as long as I was in this place, I would always be glad to meet with him any time that he desired to. He suggested next Friday. I told Mr. Goldberg that I didn't know what plans you might have for Friday, but George tells me you always get a little restless, jittery, tired, worn, and snappish on Fridays. Washington's Birthday is Thursday. Maybe if we wanted to get the maximum out of this, we ought to be here where you could be with us on Wednesday. So we moved it up to Wednesday.

On Wednesday I expect to see the Secretary-General and thank him very much for another try, to hear his views and to give him mine.

Q. Will this be lunch or dinner that he is coming for?

THE PRESIDENT. That will be 11 o'clock.

GENERAL WESTMORELAND

[12.] Q. Mr. President, you mentioned a worldwide movement or scheme to undermine confidence in the American military leadership

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't think I said a worldwide scheme. I said we first heard reports in our intelligence reports that come to me every morning. At that time, the strategy was to discredit General Westmoreland's leadership. He had suffered great losses out there.

That was before it was determined that they didn't hold any of the cities they had attacked. But that followed with comments in other capitals, as it frequently does, namely, that there was great division in Washington, and that it was very probable that because of this great disaster General Westmoreland had suffered, he would have to be recalled.

All I ask you to do is just imagine how you are going to feel if the rumor is around that the Chicago Tribune is getting ready to replace you and it gets into the papers, even when you haven't a battle on. Put yourself in General Westmoreland's position.

The very morning that we anticipated one of our most difficult attacks, this came through in reports.

I called in my secretary and I dictated a wire to General Westmoreland. I said, "I want to put it just as bluntly as I know how, that your Commander in Chief has never had more confidence in any military officer with whom, under whom, or above whom he served. Whatever you choose to do here will have my full support."

I made it just as strong as I know how to write it. Sometimes down in my country you can make things pretty strong. I didn't circularize it because I thought that would just give added encouragement to those who would like to feel there was a division.

I did, in response to a series of queries from a number of people, send him a wire. I told only one man and my secretary. I hadn't told Secretary McNamara and I hadn't told Secretary Rusk.

That afternoon I had three inquiries from newsmen about the wire saying, "We know you sent it to him. Give it to us."

I learned I couldn't even trust anyone on a matter like that except my secretary.

I haven't made the wire public, but I am telling you the contents of it.

That happened many days ago and I feel just as strongly about it now as I did then.

I want to emphasize that I don't want to leave the impression with any soldier in that command, with any parent of any man out there, that there is any justification whatever for all this rumor, gossip, talk, about General Westmoreland's competence or about his standing with this President.

MR. VANCE'S VISIT TO SOUTH KOREA

[13.] Q. Mr. President, how do you assess United States relations with South Korea in the wake of Mr. Vance's visit?

THE PRESIDENT. I think Mr. Vance's visit was a fruitful one. I think he had a very cordial and understanding discussion.

South Korea feels very distressed about the attempt that was made to assassinate their President and all the members of his family, as we certainly do.

We feel very deeply our problem connected with the Pueblo.

We have an understanding, a treaty, with them.

Mr. Vance had spent a good deal of time on matters of this kind in the 7 years he has been here.

He had lengthy talks with the Defense Minister, the Prime Minister, and the President.

He made that report to the Cabinet committee yesterday. We thought it was a very good report and his mission was a very helpful one.[6]

[6]On February 9 the White House announced that former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance would visit Seoul, Korea, as the President's personal representative for talks with President Chung Hoe Park and other high Korean officials. Following his report to the President upon returning from that mission, Mr. Vance met with reporters at the White House. Texts of the announcement and news briefing are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 4, pp. 280 and 293).

LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM

[14.] Q. Mr. President, are you giving any thought to increasing the level of our forces in Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, we give thought to that every day. We never know what forces will be required there. We have, tentatively, a goal. We would like to reach that goal as soon as we can. In light of the circumstances that existed when we set that goal, we hoped to reach it sometime this year.

In light of the developments and the subsequent substantial increases in the enemy force, General Westmoreland asked that he receive approximately half of the remaining numbers under that goal during February or early March.

Did you mean enemy forces or our forces?

Q. Our forces.

THE PRESIDENT. I said in light of substantial increases in the enemy force. You understood that, didn't you?

Q. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT. So General Westmoreland told us that.

We carefully reviewed his request in light of the information that had come in. We made certain adjustments and arrangements to comply with his request forthwith. That will be done.

When we reach our goal, we will be constantly reviewing the matter many times every day, at many levels. We will do whatever we think needs to be done to insure that our men have adequate forces to carry out their mission.

PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

[15.] Q. Mr. President, in light of your earlier comments on negotiations with North Vietnam, could you discuss with us the basis for Prime Minister Wilson's statement to the House of Commons, that there was only a narrow margin between the U.S. and Hanoi positions?

THE PRESIDENT. I have given you my views. I assume you have means of getting any details of the Prime Minister's from him.

My views are very clear. I don't know anything I can add to them.

If I have confused you somewhat, I will be glad to help clear it up.

I have told you that I have never felt that they have changed their position, modified it, or moderated it.

Douglas B. Cornell, Associated Press: Thank you, Mr. President.

Note: President Johnson's one hundred and nineteenth news conference was held in the Fish Room at the White House at 4:42 p.m. on Friday, February 16, 1968.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY 8, 1972 MEETING MEMRANDUM

A 22-page memo. In a conversation largely concering North Vietnam's 1972 Spring Offensive, Nixon briefly discussed nuclear weapons, he said, "Obviously, we are not going to use nuclear weapons." however he did address the use of a nuclear threat against North Vietnam.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting

DATE AND TIME: Monday, May 8, 1972 - 9:00 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:
President Nixon
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Secretary of Treasury Connally
Director of Central Intelligence Helms
Director of Office of Emergcy Preparedness, Lincoln
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Kissinger
President's Press Secretary Ziegler
Mr. John Negroponte, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

President Nixon: As you are all aware we have an important decision to make today on Vietnam. The current situation which is certainly not as critical as portrayed by the press is nevertheless in the balance. There are serious questions as to Vietnam's equipment and will. General Abrams needs more assets. We've sent air primarily. The Soviet summit is jeopardized by each option open to us:

-- Doing nothing

-- Only bombing the North

-- Blockading or mining and bombing

Thus today we need a cold-blooded analysis.

Regardless of how we have helped the South Vietnamese, we have done reasonably well in some places and poorly in others. I am surprised at the fact that we have provided inferior equipment to that furnished by the Soviets. They have provided 13 new weapon sytems, big tanks-big guns; this shows what the South Vietnamese are up against. The South Vietnamese fighting performance is a mixed bag. Even by the most optimistic assessment

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there is a substantial danger that South Vietnam may not be able to hold up particularly in Hue; but in Military Regions III and IV where most of the population lives they are doing quite well.

Hue is of symbolic importance and they may attack within the next few days.

Putting it in those terms the real question is not what will happen to South Vietnam but what we have to do to affect the situation. We could wait the situation out. This is a tempting course. If the South Vietnamese can't do the job on the ground it would be tempting for political reasons. We could blame the opposition for getting us into the war and then for not letting us out. Congress undermined us at the negotiating table and we could tell the U.S. people let's flush it because South Vietnam couldn't hack it. This is a tempting proposition. It could be sold. Our Democratic friends would buy it and a great number of Republican friends would buy it as well.

But there are problems. The major one is that, if in the future after all the effort in South Vietnam, a Soviet-supported opponent succeeds over a U.S.-supported opponent this could have considerable effect on our allies and on the United States. Our ability to conduct a credible foreign policy could be imperiled. This leaves out the domino theory; but if you talk to the Thai, the Cambodians, the Indonesians and the Filipinos, as I have, the fact of a U.S. failure and a Communist success would be considered a failure of U.S. policy.

Secondly, the diplomatic track is totally blocked. The public sessions have been unproductive. Henry was in Paris last week and made every offer we had made previously and even more. They flatly refused and insisted on our getting rid of Thieu, releasing everybody from prison and so forth making a Communist takeover inevitable. The Communists now think they're winning and they're getting tougher at the bargaining table.

Thirdly, there is a considerable body of military opinion, not a majority, that we should put more air strikes into Hanoi and Haiphong. The difficulty with this course is, first the DRV will be better prepared, second General Abrams needs assets for the battle in the South and third, there is the serious question of effectiveness of resuming bombings on a regular basis. This raises problems similar to those previously faced and the question of what would be accomplished.

The fourth and final course would be to adopt a program of cutting off the flow of supplies by sea and rail. The effect of cutting off supplies by sea

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can be conclusive but the question of rail is in doubt because of our experience from 1965-68.

Whatever we do it won't affect the battle immediately in the South except perhaps the psychological effect. The real effect will be three of four months from now for sure.

As regards the summit, this latter course might jeopardize the summit. I think we have to realize that if the situation in Vietnam is as it is today there can't be a summit. The summit is jeopardized by all these courses of action. That consideration we have to assume. There will be no summit.

There is no good choice. The bug-out choice is a good political one but I am not sure what this office would be worth after doing that. The other military choices would have grave foreign policy consequences and political consequences at home. Nothing we can say is sure and all have serious risks regarding the summit, public opinion and Congress.

Anyone who raises a question of risk must look at the choices. We face a situation where nothing is sure. There are grave political risks and risks to the country if we try one of these policies and fail.

I believe the first course of action is the least viable. It is the best politically, but it is the least viable for our foreign policy. Escalation in the bombing or a naval and air cutoff have questionable value. Neither will surely tip the balance to the side of success. It is only a question of degree. The only question in regard to increased bombing or a cutoff is whether this provides South Vietnam with a better chance of success.

Admiral Moorer will brief on the military aspects of the mining and air activities.

Admiral Moorer: I will first address the mining plan. There are two kinds of mines, the large mines and the second kind are the smaller Mark 36 destructor mines -- a special mine for the interdiction of small craft. The area of concern is the Haiphong Channel. It is ideal for mining because it is a narrow channel. The green area is where we would place the big mines and any ship which hit a mine and sank would block the channel. The red area shows where we would put the destructors.

There are an average of 42 ships per month in Haiphong. The pier can accommodate 16 to 17 ships and there is a separate off-loading pier for

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POL supplies. The three mile limit is there. It's been put in by the International Lawyers.

President Nixon: The State and Defense Department lawyers have been working on this.

Admiral Moorer: The DRV claims a twelve mile limit. The lawyers contend that because other countries such as the Norweigans and the Japanese claim a three mile limit and we mine beyond that three mile limit, they could claim that mining up to the twelve mile limit would set a precedent.

Dr. Kissinger: Ambassador Johnson came up with a formulation yesterday whereby we could make a proclamation that does not force a decision. We could simply state that the mining is taking place within DRV territorial waters rather than specifying whether it is within claimed DRV territorial waters or territorial waters as we view them legally.

Admiral Moorer: We shouldn't say what we won't do. At 9:00 p.m. tonight 30-45 minutes before laying the mines there would be preliminary suppressive air actions prior to the mines going down.

President Nixon: Would they all be dropped by air?

Admiral Moorer: Yes. Each plane drops four mines.

President Nixon: How many planes would we lose?

Admiral Moorer: We will be using A-6's and A-7's. We will not lose many. It is not as much of a risk as our previous bombing of Haiphong. There will also be gunfire support.

President Nixon: When will the Newport News arrive?

Admiral Moorer: It is arriving tomorrow. The big mines will be set for 72 hours. There is no flexibility on the destructors for the small mines and they can only be set for 24 hours; so the destructors will be dropped 24 hours later. The sterilizers make the big mines inactive within 120 days. This is not absolutely precise but about 120 days. We don't propose initially to put destructors in the channel itself because they have a life of 180 days.

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These mines are magnetic; we have other mines which are more difficult to sweep but we are not putting them in in the initial effort. We could put them in if the other side makes a concerted sweeping effort. The mines are set off at random so that if a sweeping could be made they could be set for three or four or five passes. They are not moored mines like the old World War I mines. They are implanted on the ground. The situation then would be that 72 hours after the first drop the mine field would be activated.

We would lay the larger mines in this area and we would lay the destructors inside the rivers further south. The black line is the three mile limit; the red is the twelve mile limit. Near the DMZ we would lay destructors at Dong Hoi, Quang Khe and Thanh Hoa. These ports are used by little craft that hug the coast to supply routes leading to the Ban Karai and the Mu Gia pass. We will reseed the mines as necessary and we can continually go back and reseed. Associated with this action would be the suppressive air support for the mine laying aircraft.

With regard to the interdiction of the rail lines there are three rail lines from Hanoi to the Chinese border. We would attack the marshalling yards, the junctions, the railroad lines and the highway bridges. We have already done some good work on the lines of communication. As far as the level of effort is concerned we are already putting 200 sorties per day in the Freedom Train area. We would augment this by 100 sorties. This would leave ample assets in the South. Four additional squadrons and the Saratoga have been involved in the augmentation effort and would be used for suppression of air defenses and then to hit the rail and supply lines.

The ships could withdraw or stay. If they stayed, they would block the dock area but we would continue with the attacks against warehouses. If the ships leave we would totally destroy the docks. Laying the mines will be simple.

President Nixon: Regarding the seaborne traffic, is mining enough? Won't we have to stop the ships?

Admiral Moorer: The ships come from two directions. Most come from South of Hainan. The Soviet ships come from the Black Sea and not from Soviet pacific ports. The destroyers would provide a screen to warn ships that the channel has been mined and we would take steps to be sure that cargo is not off-loaded on the beach. They cannot go into the ports without a pilot and there is not a chance of them going up knowing that the channel is mined.

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Secretary Laird: We have the names of all the ships on the way and the cargo they are carrying.

Admiral Moorer: Mr. Helms will talk about the logistics aspects.

President Nixon: How could our interdiction effort be more effective than it was from 1965 to 1968? Will we be using more B-52's?

Admiral Moorer: Yes. In 1965 to 1968 since so many supplies were by sea the railroad was being used at 10-15 percent capacity. Now there would be many more trains and targets and they would have to operate in the daytime. The interdiction would be much more effective now.

President Nixon: Would we have more planes now or less?

Admiral Moorer: We would have slightly less. In 1968 we were running at 30,000 sorties per month, about our present level.

President Nixon: The only advantage could be the B-52's?

Secretary Laird: We're now running 500 sorties a day or about 15,000 per month.

Secretary Connally: Couldn't we knock out the railroads?

Admiral Moorer: The advantage is that then the railroads weren't used to full capacity. When you get to the question of fuel there is an estimated 100,000 tons available which could last three months. It is a very different proposition to bring fuel and food in by rail. You cannot go after a logistics system one category at a time.

Secretary Rogers: Are you satisified that the mining will block the channel?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Secretary Rogers: What about off-shore unloading?

Admiral Moorer: They will try some off-shore loading and perhaps they will use some of the China ports. That's why we will be interdicting both the ports and the railroads. But we can cut down the lighters to a trickle.

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Secretary Laird: They'll use lighters. They have thousands of them. They off-loaded Soviet ships near the DMZ with 500 lighters.

Secretary Rogers: In effect it would be a blockade if we attack the ships.

Dr. Kissinger: If it is inside territorial waters it is interdiction. If we stop vessels outside territorial waters if would be a different matter.

President Nixon: The difference would be one of not stopping vessels on the high seas.

Secretary Rogers: If they off-load on the high seas?

Mr. Lincoln: If we attack ships off the coast then why wouldn't this be a blockade?

Dr. Kissinger: We have the option of only attacking the lighters.

Secretary Laird: You can't have both the mining and attacking the docks.

Vice President Agnew: If the boats have 72 hours to get out?

Dr. Kissinger: Why can't you go after the docks?

Secretary Laird: I'm sure the Soviets will keep ships at the docks.

Dr. Kissinger: The immediate operational question is that of whether you attack the lighters or the ships.

Secretary Laird: The docks must go out in any event. The military significance will be in four or five months. Most of the stuff is economic in nature and food. Almost all the military equipment comes in by rail.

President Nixon: What about POL?

Secretary Laird: The POL comes through port facilities but they have four months' supply in-country.

Secretary Connally: What about the tanks?

Secretary Laird: The tanks come in by rail -- so do the SAMs.

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Admiral Moorer: We have never been able to verify whether the SAMs come in by rail or by sea.

President Nixon: The main thing is the oil.

Secretary Laird: They have four months' supply. If they go on ration they could stretch it to five months.

President Nixon: Does that assume the planned air strikes?

Admiral Moorer: The additional air strikes on POL storage points and warehouses have thus far been limited to south of the 20th parallel.

President Nixon: It would not make sense to take this risk unless we go all out on the rail facilities in a fashion better than in 1968 and we cannot have any stop-start bombing. We must stop movement into Haiphong, particularly the oil; we must bomb the power plants and the attacks must be heavy. There is no easy way. I would like to think that the mining is easy but there must be mining; we must hit the railroads so they cannot divert to rail and we will be hitting stock piles in a substantially increased way north of the 20th parallel. Either we do all that or nothing.

Admiral Moorer: Compared to 1968 the number of DRV motorized vehicles and artillery is much higher.

President Nixon: It is a different war.

Admiral Moorer: The consumption rates are much higher.

Mr. Lincoln: How many planes will be diverted from South Vietnam?

Admiral Moorer: The plan will leave General Abrams with what he needs in view of the recent augmentations.

President Nixon: Tell us what assets we had when we began and what we have there now.

Admiral Moorer: We began with 17 destroyers, now we have 36. We began with three CVA's, now there are six. We have ten more squadrons of aircraft and we have doubled the B-52 capability.

Secretary Connally: In a real sense we are not taking anything away from General Abrams.

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President Nixon: Abrams has double the resources.

Secretary Connally: Is there any doubt that you can't knock out the three rail lines?

Admiral Moorer: I am confident we can.

Secretary Connally: I don't think we should do this if our planes cannot knock out the rail lines.

Vice President Agnew: What about SAMs?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, they have SAMs. They fired 250 of them on the last Hanoi raid and achieved one hit. Last night just west of Hanoi there was only light SAM firing.

Secretary Laird: They still have 8,000 SAMs and have fired 7,000 of them.

Secretary Rogers: How effective will these measures be? Do you think they are the most effective or is there something else we could do?

Admiral Moorer: The only other more effective measure would be an amphibious landing.

President Nixon: That is the other option. We have the Marine division in Okinawa. I have said we would not introduce ground troops. Leaving the mining out, can we step up the bombing on Hanoi and Haiphong?

Admiral Moorer: Yes. We could hit the marshalling yards and the warehouses on the docks.

President Nixon: The problem with respect to bombing is the restraints. The difficulty is civilian casualties. Mining may be the most humane course in this kind of situation.

Secretary Rogers: We would be doing all three. First maximum effort in South Vietnam, secondly the docks, third a blockade.

President Nixon: I have to decide at 2:00 p.m.

Admiral Moorer: We are planning to execute.

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President Nixon: Whatever we do we must always avoid saying what we're not going to do, like nuclear weapons. I referred to them saying that I did not consider them necessary. Obviously, we are not going to use nuclear weapons but we should leave it hanging over them. We should also leave the threat of marines hanging over them. To protect our 69,000 forces, if the GVN collapses, the 18,000 U.S. personnel in Da Nang would be in great peril. In terms of ground forces, an offensive role is one question, a defensive one is something else. We shouldn't give reassurances to the enemy that we are not going balls out. I like the three to twelve mile limit question. I think we should leave it open. Whether we hit ships or lighters should also be left open.

Admiral Moorer: There are enough supplies in the DRV to permit the continuation of current operations. The question is what happens next August and next year if we leave the situation as it is.

President Nixon: It is tempting to do nothing. We are already doing a hell of a lot. We have doubled the B-52's. We have upgraded the army. But we must think of where we are going to be. There is no way we can go to Moscow with the situation as it is. Further down the road in September or October, assuming South Vietnam holds, they will have an enormous incentive to give us one last punch just before the elections. Whoever the democratic candidate is McGovern, Humphrey or Teddy Kennedy, both the DRV and Moscow would like nothing better than to have these men in office.

When we are out can South Vietnam survive? The problem is if South Vietnam goes down the tube next year, we have to look at this in terms of U.S. foreign policy. Should we not do things now to seriously impair the DRV ability to attack then?

One thing I am certain and that is that we cannot be sure that this will work. It depends also on South Vietnam. Do we take great risks regardless of whether the GVN flops or not. The bombing option is perhaps open. The difficulty is that, unless we take off the wraps, your feeling is that it is not going to be effective.

Mr. Helms, will you now brief the situation.

Director Helms: (Director Helms then read the briefing paper attached at Tab A.)

Secretary Connally: (To Director Helms) Why doesn't your assessment give consideration to continuation of what we're doing now? What if the

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69,000 troops are trapped? Where are you with respect to U.S. opinion and world opinion. What happens if we continue the way we are?

President Nixon: When we asked Dick to prepare a briefing it was to brief on the effects of the contemplated course of action.

Secretary Laird: I have sent you a net assessment on the capabilities of North and South Vietnam.

President Nixon: That is only part of it. The bigger question is that of the effect on the U.S. and world opinion of continuing what we're doing and failing or doing what we are considering and failing. The best of both worlds would be to continue as we are and succeed. The reason we are considering this or bombing is that we feel the current situation is one which carries a great risk of failure. How much will this change the situation? I think there is a better than even chance that if we do nothing we will fail. I think there is a better than even chance of success if we do this.

Secretary Connally: The greatest risk is failure by doing nothing more. We have been there ten years. If there is a Dunkirk then this will be a failure on the part of the United States. It will destroy a viable foreign policy for the United States. It will ensure your political defeat, Mr. President, if we fail. If anything happens you can't win with the doves. You can't run the risk of 69,000 American soldiers being trapped.

President Nixon: Your point is to provide greater leverage if South Vietnam collapses.

Secretary Connally: Yes.

Secretary Laird: We wanted two years. The election in 1968 was decided on the Vietnam issue. The problem is in South Vietnam -- in MRs 1, 2, and 3. The problem is not caused by equipment. In MR-1 not a single M-48 tank has been knocked out by a T-54.

President Nixon: The ARVN had 48 tanks -- they have 500; I saw the figures.

Secretary Laird: The problem facing South Vietnam is whether they are willing to stand and fight and search out the artillery. Their marines are doing a good job but not the others. We have the guns but we need the spotters.

President Nixon: We don't have spotters. Regarding the tanks, all but nine of ours were knocked out. Our small tanks are no match for the T-54s.

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North Vietnam has ten times as many tanks. You recall that the Defense Department opposed my sending heavy tanks there.

Secretary Laird: The problem is spotting artillery. The South Vietnamese spotters work within the South Vietnamese camps. The North Vietnamese spotters are better. They accurately pinpoint the South Vietnamese. The reverse is not true. We are using C-130s with infrared against their artillery. This is becoming more effective. When the NVA put 4,600 rounds of artillery into Quang Tri on the last day it caused panic. General Lam was not so good. He had disagreements with General Abrams. We are making certain changes. The point is that the battle in South Vietnam is going to be decided on the ground. Air and naval support are important but they won't win unless there are improvements in the RVNAF leadership. General Minh, the Three Corps Commander, wants out. The ARVN has to change its leaders.

The ground battle in South Vietnam is important. If we take the course we are contemplating it will have an effect in four to six months. I think North Vietnam will stay the course with a U.S. election coming up. These actions will give the impression of working for four to six weeks but then after that they will not.

President Nixon: It might help next year.

Secretary Laird: I agree it might help next year. We are already extended to 1.6 billion dollars. We can't get money from Congress. We are drawing from all over the world for this. I have seen two administrations place everything in Southeast Asia. This Administration has been able to build its strength in Europe. It has come to certain understandings with the USSR and China. If we do this, I think we will go into the campaign on the defensive and it will be a minus. We should not be on the defensive.

President Nixon: You disagree with Secretary Connally. You mean that we should just look at this question from the point of view that if the South Vietnamese can't make it, just resign ourselves to the fact and make a plus out of our other policies.

Secretary Laird: I think South Vietnam can make it. Hue may go but it will not be as bad as 1968.

President Nixon: Your point is South Vietnam can make it without either the strikes or sea interdiction. You don't think from the psychological standpoint it would be helpful even beyond the elections.

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Secretary Laird: It will not have a bearing now.

President Nixon: But what about the future?

Secretary Laird: Yes. But even in the future it is perhaps doubtful.

President Nixon: Suppose we are wrong? Suppose Vietnam fails? How do we handle it? You don't assess the risks for our policy?

Secretary Laird: We must hedge on equipment. We have given them everything they have asked for and will continue. If they don't have enough incentive, then all the equipment in the world won't save them.

Secretary Connally: Why do you use the argument that cost is too great? You aren't going to save any money.

Secretary Laird: The military equipment route is the cheapter route.

Secretary Connally: Explain that to me. Haven't all the assets already been sent there?

Secretary Laird: We are conducting a massive air campaign in the DRV and in South Vietnam. It runs up into tremendous amounts of money. Just to give you an example, one B-52 strike costs 40,000 dollars in ammunition.

Dr. Kissinger: What you are doing is arguing against the present scale of air effort.

Vice President Agnew: I don't think, if we just let things go, we can afford to let South Vietnam slide. When South Vietnam goes it will be utter collapse if something isn't done. It will be a complete loss of U.S. diplomatic credibility around the world. We must move the Soviets off center. We must move off gradualism. We should stop saying what we are not going to do. We are not in a confrontation with the Soviets. There is still the possibility of a face-saving solution in Paris. Before a confrontation with the Soviets they could go to the DRV and say let's find a solution. What will happen if we let South Vietnam slide into defeat?

President Nixon: These are all things we don't know.

Vice President Agnew: If there is a collapse, the Soviets will be encouraged in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean. It will be a green flag for wars of

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national liberation anywhere. I personally believe in the domino theory.

President Nixon: We could do this and still fail. Mel (Laird) is aware of this. The South Vietnamese could still collapse. Then it would only be a chip for our Prisoners of War.

Vice President Agnew: By not doing anything more we would be giving testimony to our weakness. The Europeans have let us be out in front of every fight they have. If something happens with the Soviets then let the Soviets be nervous. Politically and domestically I think it will be vicious for the Administration but, Mr. President, if I were sitting where you are I would say we have got to do something. We're the greatest people in the world for handcuffing ourselves. We are compulsive talkers. I don't think you have any option. The effect could be great in South Vietnam. It could stop the erosion of the internal structure and beat DRV morale.

Mr. Lincoln: I believe the domino theory.

President Nixon: I think we all do. The real question is whether the Americans give a damn any more. American's don't care about Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and the Philippines. No President could risk New York to save Tel Aviv or Bonn. We have to say it -- our responsibility is to say it -- because we must play a role of leadership. A lot of people say we shouldn't be a great power. That is all well and good if there were not another couple of predatory powers on the scene. The Soviets already have a tremendous capability and the Chinese are developing one.

If you follow Time, the Washington Post, the New York Times and the three networks, you could say that the U.S. has done enough. Let's get out; let's make a deal with the Russians and pull in our horns. The U.S. would cease to be a military and diplomatic power. If that happened, then the U.S. would look inward towards itself and would remove itself from the world. Every non-Communist nation in the world would live in terror. If the U.S. is strong enough and willing to use its strength, then the world will remain half-Communist rather than becoming entirely Communist.

Mr. Lincoln: We really have to hedge against a failure in South Vietnam even if the chance of failure is only ten percent. Those who criticize us will say why didn't we do it sooner. This action hedges against it. Four or five months from now it is likely to be of some help. It is a less inflamatory step than just actually bombing.

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I have one technical concern and that is the question of availability of air power. In the short run can it be better used in support of our air mission in South Vietnam than in this interdiction?

President Nixon: I understand the problem. Hue is a little bit like Verdun. The Germans and the French decided it was important and fought for it. Three million men were killed as a result. Hue is a hell of a symbol. General Abrams is using as much as he can.

Secretary Laird: Abrams is dividing up his planes between MR's 1, 2 and 3.

President Nixon: Abrams has 35 B-52s which he does not allocate every day. They are used for targets of opportunity.

Admiral Moorer: He also has a call on the resources operating north of the DMZ.

President Nixon: One advantage of this operation as distinct from bombing more is that, if we bombed more, our credibility will be diminished. If we do this option it will be with the assumption that Abrams will have all the resources he needs. The main battle is in the South. The reason there was no second strike on Hanoi and Haiphong was because General Abrams did not want to divert the resources. I was much persuaded by the needs that he expressed and if the military commander says what he needs, we will support him.

Vice President Agnew: Whatever we do, we should do it all. First,we should free up the air. Second, we should surprise them and third, we should lessen the domestic impact. The docks are part of this. We should go the whole route.

Secretary Connally: I couldn't agree more. It is not only a question of Vietnam but Laos, Cambodia and all of Southeast Asia. Mr. President, you say United States people are sick of it. You said we will withdraw. If Vietname is defeated, Mr. President, you won't have anything. I agree it won't happen in three weeks but it is a mistake to tie our hands as we did in the mid-1960's. At that time many Americans thought we were doing this on a no-win basis. If we move we ought to blockade, we ought to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong. It is inconceivable to me that we have fought this war without inflicting damage on the aggressor. The aggressor has a sanctuary. If Russia gets away with it here like it did in Bangla Desh then it will be all of

By LCU NARA Date 5/24/02

Southeast Asia. Where next? The Middle East? We must think about these things. The other problem is South Vietnam's ability to survive.

President Nixon: Then you would approve this operation.

Secretary Connally: Don't let them nibble you to death on this. You've got to make a conscious decision one way or another. What the people want is leadership.

President Nixon: There is no sure choice. I will have to decide before 2 o'clock. Everything you say will have to be weighed. Secretary Rogers will evaluate the world aspect. We see risks of confrontation. We must have in mind the fact that the USSR, with so much on the plate, might move to cool it rather than heat it up; so there is a question about the USSR there. I think we have to bear in mind that they expressed concern about the problem. They expressed an interest in getting Hanoi back to the conference table. I don't know whether they can influence Hanoi to do something. But as far as the USSR is concerned this course may be an incentive or disincentive.

Secretary Rogers: If there is a failure in South Vietnam that is disastrous for our policies.

President Nixon: Even if we try?

Secretary Rogers: Secondly, we shouldn't be carried away. I think the U.S. people think you have done enough and that you have done very well. The question, therefore, is whether there is something more you can do to be effective. I agree with Dick's (Helms) paper. It is a good one. We assume the effect will be good. LBJ said that it didn't work. Do we think it will work? It is clear that it won't have the effect militarily in the short term and maybe it won't have any effect at all. It could have a psychological effect on both South Vietnam and North Vietnam and, if so, that would be worthwhile.

But it could have the opposite effect both on the battlefield and domestically. I think it's going to be a tough one with our people and with our allies. We will have some help from the British and a few others.

As for Congress and public opinion, I think they will charge that this will have no military effect. It looks from Dick's (Helms) paper that most supplies can come by rail. Maybe they can't but I'm assuming that the CIA paper is right on this.

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If we do this and fail, I think that would be worse and more damaging to our prestige. I don't know whether it will be effective or not. We must rely on the military. If this will strengthen the military hand and the hand of the South Vietnamese, I think we should support it. Could we wait? Perhaps a week? Is there a time factor? I learned in my discussions from the Europeans that the DRV wants to destroy the summit.

Secretary Connally: This will put the summit in jeopardy but I don't think it is certain that they will cancel it.

Dr. Kissinger: I think that if we do this there is a better than even chance that the Soviets will cancel the summit.

President Nixon: I couldn't go to the summit if conditions in South Vietnam are the same as now or worse.

Secretary Connally: It is better for the Soviets to cancel the summit than us.

Secretary Rogers: The question is is it going to work or is it going to hurt us?

Vice President Agnew: I think we are better off if we do it even if we lose Hue.

Secretary Laird: Let's not make so much out of Hue. We lost it in 1968.

Vice President Agnew: The media are making a big thing out of Hue. That is something we cannot help.

Secretary Laird: The problem is one of assets.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem with all these figures is that one cannot construct a program analysis approach type model. The fact of the matter is that they would have to redirect 2.2 million tons of seaborne imports. At present they are only importing 300,000 tons by rail. We did not stop all of their rail transport in 1965-68.

President Nixon: It is very different now. Sihanoukville is cut. Now we will cut off the port.

Dr. Kissinger: They have a theoretical capacity but they can't use trains by day and if you analyze every segment of the railroad in China you will

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find that one segment of the railroad is apt to get overloaded. You can't throw these figures around without a better analysis. It is easy to say that they have a four months' capacity and could go all out and end the war but they would end with zero capacity. Another possibility is that they would try everything in one month or alternately cut way down on their activities. One thing is certain they will not draw their supplies down to zero.

President Nixon: The key point is if it is militarily effective. Looking to the future we have to think about whoever sits in this chair after the election. We must consider the long term advantages as well as the short term. If South Vietnam goes and we have done this, Bill's (Secretary Rogers) view is that we are worse off. John's (Secretary Connally) and the Vice President's view is different.

My view is that either way, if South Vietnam goes, as far as the political situation is concerned we are done. What is on the line is an election. The only effective thing is to decide now that, if South Vietnam isn't going to succeed, then we should withdraw before the debacle, blame it on the Senate and pull out. I could make the God damnest speech to this effect and win the election, but I couldn't bring myself to do that because I know too much. I'm not sure that U.S. training is equal to Communist style training. This is no discredit to us. We are different and we believe in permisiveness. The North Vietnamese fight because they're afraid of what will happen to them if they don't.

My main point is that I will consider the possibility of simply chucking it now, blaming the doves for sabotaging the negotiating track and encouraging the enemy and telling the North Vietnamese we'll do everything they want to get back our prisoners of war.

The price they are demanding for our prisoners of war is not just a deadline for the withdrawal of our forces. We've tried that. They won't give back those prisoners of war until we get out of Southeast Asia totally. At least with this option we have something to bargain for POWs. We certainly can't pay the price that they have demanded.

Vice President Agnew: I disagree that this is a viable political alternative. I don't think we can sell it.

President Nixon: We have several choices. The first is a bug-out. The second is the choice of continuing to do what we're doing. The risk of this course is failure. In any event we are not going to Moscow. When I came back from Communist China I didn't get a damn thing on Vietnam.

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We go to the Soviet Union, we agree on principles, credits, and we toast each other at a time when Soviet tanks are kicking hell out of our allies. If we act and then we have a summit, perhaps we can do that. The real proposition is, are we better off letting the dust settle or will more drastic action tip the balance in a decisive way? I will have to weigh these. All of you come down on these matters in varying degrees and shades. It comes down not to whether we lose in Vietnam but first what can we do to prevent that and second what should we do to make the losses palatable if we do in fact lose.

Secretary Connally: One option was negotiations and last fall and spring there was hope for negotiations but that hope is down the drain. We have lost the negotiating option. At the moment our country's future is in the hands of the South Vietnamese and whether they stand and fight. We cannot allow this situation to continue.

Secretary Laird: I am limited to 2.4 billion dollars annually. I have put in 2.9 billion dollars already, hiding it under the table. I am taking it out of the hide of the Services.

Secretary Connally: You're already pregnant.

Secretary Laird: It's a question of where you are next year. If you are to have a viable policy, you can't break down your whole force posture. You've got to have the support of the people and the Congress.

Vice President Agnew: If we don't get anywhere on the Vietnam question, then we won't be anywhere anyway.

Secretary Connally: We can't make this decision on the basis of cost. You can't convince me that if you bomb the railroads, the ports of Haiphong and Hanoi, you can't persuade me that it won't affect the psychology both in South and North Vietnam.

Secretary Laird: I agree.

Secretary Connally: Maybe you can give the South Vietnamese the necessary will by doing this.

President Nixon: The U.S. way of training may not be the most effective.

Secretary Laird: That may be so but I would only say that in the battle of An Loc, when the North Vietnamese tanks attacked, the only NVA who was not chained to his tank was the tank commander himself.

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Secretary Rogers: Is it going to work with respect to South Vietnam and North Vietnam? Is it going to work with respect to public opinion. Congress and so forth?

President Nixon: The answer is that we aren't sure. I have to balance all these things. The risks of doing what we're doing versus the risks of doing more. I find Mel's (Secretary Laird) analysis of the military situation reassuring but General Abrams' message of May 2 was not reassuring. Mel, would you agree that you would not be surprised to see South Vietnam fold?

Secretary Laird: Out of 44 province capitals maybe the Communists will take five.

President Nixon: I'll decide by 2:00 p.m. In the meantime, if we decide to do this, I will want the operative aspect to be checked with Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird. If we do this we will want to put it in the most conciliatory terms and yet in strong terms as well. This is a decision of great import. We must keep this in confidence. Everyone must support the decision. I don't want to see columns appearing in the papers saying who agreed and who didn't agree. If we decide to do this, it won't work unless we do it with all-out ferocity. I don't know how it will affect the Vice President's trip to Japan.

Vice President Agnew: A few hundred thousand student demonstrators won't bother me. I would not want to assume that the summit is cancelled.

Secretary Rogers: I won't go back to Europe. Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand is over there.

President Nixon: If we do it, we will need all the big guns here in Washington.

Secretary Laird: I think it would be a mistake for me to cancel my meeting with the military planning group of NATO the week after next.

Secretary Rogers: Whatever you decide, Mr. President, you will have our total support.

President Nixon: First, I will weigh Mel's options. Second, I will weigh the bombing option which I don't like; and third, I will weigh the operation

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we have discussed today which does not take so much from General Abrams.

The meeting ended at 12:20 p.m.

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ORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN ROBINSON

FROM: Tony Lake and Roger E. Morris

SUBJECT: Draft Memorandum to the President on Contingency Study

We think the basic memorandum to the President should be extensively re-worked, both as a matter of general concept and specific points. It does not adequately lay out the questions to be asked and alternative answers, but rather makes a number of assumptions. The contingency group should not be arguing at this point for or against the decision. As we understand it, our job is to present clearly and fully all the implications of the action, should the President decide to do it.

Our criticisms in summary are:

-- The present draft offers only one package of actions. It should present alternative military programs for achieving the objective.

-- There is no analysis, beyond an assertion of "reasonable expectation", of the predictable results of the action.

-- There is an adequate treatment of possible reactions by others, but no clear presentation of the probability of those reactions or of what we might do in each case.

-- There is no adequate treatment of our specific diplomatic objective, how we would measure success, or how we would respond to a favorable reaction from NVN.

In our view, the study must assume that the President has decided:

-- That NVN had judged our present policy untenable and was therefore settling in for a slow but sure victory, notwithstanding a decrease in infiltration, etc. and,

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-- That nothing more we could sensibly do on the diplomatic/political side -- such as putting some light between us and Saigon -- would bring around either our critics at home (who help determine Hanoi's judgment) or the post-Ho Chi Minh leadership.

The memorandum should make it clear that we believe the President should be prepared to accept two operational concepts:

-- the action must be brutal and sustainable. Brutal, because of the proven tenacity of NVN in the face of actions which did not strike at their existence in society. Sustainable because we must assume that even in this extreme case they will be evasive and rely on pressures in this country to deflect our action, and that later packages will be required.

-- that the action would be self-contained. The President would have to decide beforehand, the fateful question of how far we will go. He cannot, for example, confront the issue of using tactical nuclear weapons in the midst of the exercise. He must be prepared to play out whatever string necessary in this case.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE INFORMATION

October 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Contingency Military Operations Against North Vietnam

You asked me to consider alternatives to our present policy in Vietnam. One such alternative is a series of short, sharp military blows against North Vietnam designed to bring them to serious negotiations and an honorable settlement. This paper is an initial discussion of what this course would involve.

The paper discusses the objective of such a course, the military concept including targets, possible reactions and U.S. counteractions and an index of the other papers.

The Objective:

Our basic objective is to give Hanoi incentive to negotiate a compromise settlement through a series of military blows. We initially assumed that such blows might best be delivered at targets directly related to Hanoi's capacity to support the war in the south, the objective of previous bombings. We did not find this feasible, however, and decided that hitting targets of more general strategic importance would be more effective.

Our basic goal subsumes several specific military and political objectives:

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(i) To persuade the North Vietnamese, through effective military action, and an explicit willingness to repeat it, that the alternative to compromise is unacceptable damage to their society.

(ii) At the same time, to convey to Hanoi and others that our goal is not the total destruction of the country or the regime, which would invite major outside intervention.

(iii) Thus, to present the Soviets and Chinese with actions too limited to justify a military confrontation with us, yet effective and firm enough to forestall circumvention and promote their eventual influence on Hanoi to compromise.

Accordingly, supporting objectives would be:

(iv) To impose a substantial physical isolation of North Vietnam and destroy vital targets sufficient to confront Hanoi with military and economic disruption and deprivation, involving costly and time-consuming restoration or countermeasures. Our immediate military objective would be significant impact on North Vietnam as a society -- not simply a resumption of bombing aimed at reducing their support of the war in the south.

(v) To strike and maintain a political posture clearly immune to all likely pressures against continuing the action so long as Hanoi refuses to compromise.

What we would be saying by our actions is that:

- the NVN demands for our unconditional surrender are utterly unacceptable.

- we will go to almost any lengths to end the war quickly.

- we have decided to give NVN incentives to end the war by compromise sooner, rather than later.

- we will keep the negotiating avenue open, essentially on the basis of our May 14th (eight-point) proposal.

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Military Concept

The concept involves a number of air and naval actions, grouped into intense phases of short duration, e.g., four strike days, possibly extended over a week by the variability of the weather. These actions would be markedly different from the previous air and naval operations against NVN, which constituted a spasmodic campaign against targets not in sanctuary and which were primarily related to support of the war in the south. The military actions contemplated in this paper, in addition to being intense over a short term, would (a) be directed against targets of a more strategic nature to achieve lasting military and economic effect, (b) confront Hanoi with a fait accompli -- that is, the destruction of a significant target which wouldn't require continuous follow-up bombing -- and (c) thereby generate strong psychological impact on the DRV leadership.

The basic military action would be the partial isolation of NVN by aerial mining of the six deep-water ports and initial interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line. The sea quarantine would be subsequently maintained by both periodic reseeding of the minefields and continuing air and naval operations offshore against NVN watercraft. Should subsequent phases be required, intensified interdiction of the rail lines or alternate routes would reinforce the isolation of NVN.

The initial mining operation would be accompanied by the near-simultaneous disruption of the enemy air order-of-battle and attacks upon several groups of critical economic and war-supporting facilities in NVN. These groups have been selected on the basis that their destruction or neutralization would:

- cause deep psychological impact on the Hanoi leadership.

- signal the return to the hardships and frustration of the earlier bombing period for NVN.

- cause significant physical damage, representing major capital investments and reconstruction efforts.

- halt most modern industrial production.

- prevent most foreign exchange earnings.

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- increase sharply the required imports of essential military and economic goods.

- disrupt extensively normal living conditions, public services and transport, and both urban and rural labor forces.

There would then be a pause in major offensive action to await a diplomatic response from Hanoi. During the pause, however, we would probably need offshore air and naval action to maintain the sea quarantine. The level of these actions would depend upon the NVN efforts to sweep or bypass the minefields.

Subsequent phases, if necessary, would deal with NVN reactions to counter or moderate the effects of the first phase, as well as include attacks upon additional critical groups of facilities for increasing impact. At Tab A is a conceptual plan along these lines.

The critical facilities include at least 29 installations in NVN that would be significant targets for attack under this concept. These are, by groups:

- five complexes in the Haiphong port area.

- six electric power stations.

- four airfields (with all but one of the 119 combat aircraft in NVN).

- three manufacturing facilities (cement, machinery, and coal processing).

- five storage facilities (POL, high-value imports and trucks).

- five transportation targets (three bridges, two railyards).

- the levee system in the Red River Delta.

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently preparing an integrated plan along these lines. Tab B is preliminary in nature pending receipt of these plans. For illustrative purposes, a sample package of actions which might be conducted over two periods of four strike days each is as follows:

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Phase I - aerial mining of the six deep-water ports.

- destruction or neutralization of the NVN air order-of-battle (about 120 jet aircraft).
- neutralization of five transportation targets, three of which are associated with the initial interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line.
- destruction of six key electric power plants.
- destruction of five major storage facilities.

Phase II - destruction or neutralization of possibly reconstituted NVN air order-of-battle.

- destruction of key facilities in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
- intensified interdiction of a probably expanded NE road-railroad route to China.
- breaching of the levee system in the Red River Delta.

These actions run the risk of losses of U.S. aircraft (perhaps up to five per cent) and some of their crews, as well as inflicting considerable NVN civilian casualties.

The probability of success is heavily dependent on the weather, although some portions of the over-all operation could almost always be accomplished. For example, the sea mining could be executed in about an hour during 80 per cent of the days in November and December. Using all-weather aircraft, we could mine in about one day anytime. At the other extreme, however, the weather suited for bombing of the key bridges in the transportation target group occurs about one day out of four in November. Thus, for the sample Phase I, we could expect a high probability of partial success -- i.e., the establishment of the sea quarantine -- but less chance of accomplishing the desired effect on all the targets within a four-day period. For this reason, some flexibility is required, either in the duration of the phase or in the expected effect on the target groups.

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Actions and Counteractions.

We have made an initial estimate of possible actions by NVN, the Soviet Union, and the CPR, with possible U. S. counteractions. Below is an indication of what is touched upon in the respective tabs, which I recommend you read.

North Vietnam (see Tab C).

We can expect Hanoi to demonstrate extremely tough resistance. Its leadership will make judgments on the basis of our estimated intentions (whether U. S. attacks are an act of desperation or the beginning of a long and persistent campaign, regardless of consequences); estimates of its ability to receive sufficient external assistance to permit a viable economy and estimates of whether its political structure can withstand the strain of a sustained U. S. campaign. Hanoi, thus, is likely to respond with measures designed to exert maximum psychological pressure on the U. S. Administration, threatening to expand the war by calling for foreign "volunteers," initiating a large-scale anti-U. S. propaganda campaign, suggesting through a break-off in the Paris talks that a peaceful settlement is no longer possible, conceivably stepping up communist military activities in Laos and Cambodia, or even offering a cease-fire.

A movement toward increased NVN military actions will be limited by her ability to develop alternate supply lines through China and a reluctance to call for volunteers.

Soviet Union (see Tab D).

The Soviets have always been disturbed by the prospect of the action envisioned in this option, because they would be confronted with a direct challenge and with difficult choices. We can expect them to undertake various efforts to circumvent or mitigate the effect of our actions. They would almost certainly make a major effort to get supplies to NVN and to replace the losses inflicted on the NVN air order-of-battle. They might provide personnel for various NVN operations, including air defense. We must be prepared to spill Soviet blood and to inflict damage to Soviet ships, if this proves necessary for the

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effective implementation of our plan. We must also be prepared for Soviet responses outside the area of Vietnam, such as in Berlin. We should expect major political pressures, but the chances of major Soviet pressure to induce NVN toward moderation of her position are no better than even if Hanoi decides to remain intransigent. If Hanoi shows some disposition to move constructively, the Soviets would encourage it since Moscow almost certainly estimates that over time Hanoi can achieve its objectives in the south by political means.

Communist China (see Tab E).

Peking will attempt through offers of economic and military assistance and some political pressures to keep Hanoi in the war, but probably will follow its past policy of avoiding overt intervention and a consequent direct confrontation with the U.S. so long as Hanoi's estimated existence as a socialist state does not appear to be threatened. Peking will support Hanoi politically and diplomatically, principally by an intense anti-U.S. propaganda campaign, but will unlikely move toward an accommodation with the USSR if, as expected, the Soviet response is anything less than acceptance of a full-scale confrontation of its own with the U.S. Peking will return Chinese forces withdrawn from North Vietnam, possibly surfacing them as "volunteers," and will offer South China ports and LOCs to move supplies into the north. Some degree of cooperation with the USSR in supplying Hanoi can be expected. Peking will provide a sanctuary to DRV aircraft diverted from North Vietnam. The Chinese might attempt to stimulate attacks by pro-Peking guerrillas in other Southeast Asian countries in order to divert U.S. military resources. In response, we should inform the Chinese that our operation is not directed against them, but we should maintain pressures on Hanoi regardless of the Chinese role. We do not anticipate that the Chinese will try to prevent Hanoi from seeking an accommodation with us if and when Hanoi decides to do so.

We have identified to date a number of questions which should be answered, or at least considered, in further study. At Tab H we have attempted to list some of the more important questions. Such a paper could be considered a priority work list for additional effort on this alternative course of action.

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Attachments:

A - Conceptual Plan of Military Operations
B - Assessment of Military Actions
C - NVN Actions and U.S. Courses of Action
D - Soviet Actions and U.S. Courses of Action
E - Chinese Communist Actions and U.S. Courses of Action
F - Integrated Diplomatic and Military Scenario
G - Draft Presidential Speech
H - Major Questions

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CONCEPTUAL PLAN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Concept. U.S. military forces will conduct operations against North Vietnam with forces now available in order to demonstrate U.S. resolve to achieve basic U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. Such operations would be designed to attain maximum political, military, and psychological shock, while reducing North Vietnam's over-all economic capacity and war-making capacity to the extent feasible. The operation would commence with a near-simultaneous and integrated attack against the enemy air order-of-battle and air defenses, mining of six deep-water ports, interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line, and attacks against selected, critical targets. The over-all concept is based on the partial isolation and quarantine of NVN by aerial mining augmented by initial rail interdictions, and the maximum practical damage to key targets. It is characterized by boldness of action and intensity of effort and will be conducted in a period of four strike days, not necessarily consecutive if adverse weather conditions prevail. Upon completion it should represent an accomplished fact of measurable proportions.

2. Assumptions.

a. The impending onset of the northeast monsoon brings prevailing poor weather to NVN. Climatological records indicate that weather conditions may prevent effective air operations approximately 50% of the time in November, with the situation becoming progressively worse until April 1, 1970. The assumption is made that sufficient good weather will occur to permit application of tactical air power against NVN targets for the minimum time required to execute the plan successfully but flexibility in selecting D-Day will be necessary. Once initiated, attacks can be completed in a minimum of four days, extended to approximately seven if required by weather.

b. Current constraints will, in general, be altered or relaxed to permit application of force where, when, and to the extent required to achieve the stated objectives. Care will be taken in the exercise of these broadened authorities to minimize civilian casualties and damage to third-country shipping and to avoid border violations.

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c. Domestic and international pressures running counter to U.S. offensive military operations against NVN can be offset through governmental initiatives or tacitly ignored. The U.S. government's demonstration of indifference to such pressures might well constitute the strongest signal to Hanoi.

d. Communist-bloc countries currently supporting NVN's war-making efforts with arms and war support materiel will continue to accommodate to any U.S. offensive initiatives by rerouting their support via alternate channels, but these options will pose problems of significant proportions.

3. Phasing. Planned operations divide themselves logically into two phases, with follow-on phases as necessary. Included in Phase I are those tasks which will close NVN ports, interdict the Northeast Rail Line, disrupt or destroy her air order-of-battle, and destroy vulnerable and critical segments of the North Vietnamese economy. These tasks emphasize the isolation of NVN and the destruction of key targets wherever located, thereby confronting Hanoi with economic problems involving costly and time-consuming restoration or counter-measures. Phase I is characterized as a short strategic campaign against NVN as a society, rather than as a resumption of old bombing patterns with self-limiting attacks against widely dispersed and transient military supply lines to South Vietnam. Phase II would be subject to continuing review as the campaign progresses and as we measure North Vietnamese attitudes toward negotiation.

4. Conduct of Operations.

a. The concept for Phase I is based on the fact that North Vietnam now is completely reliant upon outside sources to sustain her civilian economy and ability to conduct effective combat operations in Southeast Asia. Although current stocks of war materiel available in NVN, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam will permit continuation of offensive military operations for at least several months without additional imports, her over-all national requirements will necessitate shifting of priorities in order to accommodate to growing shortages as outside sources are impeded. However, even if sea imports are fully denied, combat operations could be sustained in South Vietnam at a low rate for an indefinite period of time. Denial of imports by sea and rail, coupled with the destruction of maximum practicable key targets

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and resources, is designed to impact heavily on NVN by achieving a significant effect on her economy and desire to continue the war. These operations will reduce imports into North Vietnam to a critical point and destroy supplies that are exposed to effective attack. It envisions the maximum concentration of effort for shock effect. The credibility of this signal is enhanced by its identification with a concept which exploits the enemy's dependence upon imports. It outlines a series of inter-related military actions against NVN which, for the most part, lend themselves to implementation separately, in combinations, or as an integrated package.

b. The concept in Phase I provides for the integrated and near-simultaneous execution of the following tasks:

(1) Major air strikes against NVN's counter-air capability in order to protect the strike forces.

(2) Aerial mining of North Vietnam deep-water ports and interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line.

(3) The systematic destruction of supplies and selected logistic facilities employing a concentration of air and naval forces in a short period of time.

(4) Subsequent enforcement of the quarantine by periodic reseeding of the minefields and continuing interdiction of NVN lighters and waterborne logistics craft.

c. Subsequently, within available resources, and as required, Phase II operations will be commenced with increased intensity as follows:

(1) The destruction of selected logistics target systems and industrial targets in order of military importance, employing both tactical air and B-52 as appropriate, together with naval gunfire attacks on coastal watercraft and shore logistics installations.

(2) Intensified interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line from Hanoi to Communist China.

(3) Breaching of the levee system in the Red River Delta

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d. Operations are sensitive to several factors which dictate the need for flexibility in execution:

(1) Weather. During the ensuing six months, weather will be the most critical factor. Bad weather can be expected to inhibit attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong areas for days at a time, making it difficult to predict the achievement of given objectives within a fixed number of days. Maximum flexibility should be considered in the selection of the day for the initial attacks. The planned duration of any action should permit continuous operations until at least a given minimum effect has been attained. In the event that weather permits achievement of the desired effect in less than the planned time, the action could be terminated early or additional attacks undertaken for increased effect.

(2) Surprise. Surprise in the initial attacks will enhance optimum results, particularly in the initial strikes on the enemy's air defenses. Early success in this task will generate a greater shock effect, free aircraft for other tasks at an earlier time, and broaden U.S. options for subsequent action. Uncertainties surrounding the possible impact of the modified Fan Song radar or modifications to the SA-2 missile must be accepted as calculated risks.

(3) Concentration of Effort. This concept emphasizes concentration of effort. Concentrated attacks against target areas or target systems have the advantages of greater shock value, greater long-term damage to the enemy, and require less assets to protect strike forces.

(4) Enemy Defenses. Since the cessation of bombing operations north of the 19th parallel on 31 March 1968, enemy defenses have been increased to formidable proportions. Any attack against well-defended targets will require large numbers of suppressive-fire aircraft. The disadvantage in conducting attacks over relatively short periods of time is that in addition to the strike aircraft, aircraft are required for MIG protection, air defense suppression, and electronic countermeasures. In the initial phases, until these threats can be appreciably diminished, losses to friendly aircraft approximating three per cent can be anticipated.

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5. Tasks. The following tasks will be undertaken:

PHASE I

a. Conduct Major Air Strikes Against NVN Counter-Air Capability. Air strikes will be directed at H-Hour against active NVN airfields, aircraft, and other air defenses in order to protect strike forces and run down the enemy MIG inventory. Simultaneously, those SAM sites posing the greatest threat to strike forces will also be struck. The counterair effort and strikes against SAM sites will be continued against other key target systems, and will terminate upon completion of Phase I. Reduction of NVN's air defense will expose vital targets to concentrated air attacks and permit U. S. air and naval forces to operate against NVN with fewer losses. This action can be expected to possess shock value beyond that which could be attributed directly to loss of NVN aircraft, because degradation of the enemy's air defenses broadens the scope of military options open to the U. S. for follow-on actions.

b. Mine NVN Ports. Employing aerial delivery, mines will be seeded in the approaches to six NVN deep-water ports. Once seeded, these minefields would be fuzed to activate approximately 72 hours later. Delayed activation will permit third-country shipping to exit the ports safely. Diplomatic message will be dispatched to all noncombatant governments engaged in maritime trade with NVN to advise them of the hazards to ships remaining in port or attempting to enter port. If NVN attempts to accommodate to this quarantine by over-the-beach off-loading or lightering of cargo, the initial mining effort will be expanded to seed alternate off-loading areas and shallow-water ports. Lighters will be interdicted by a combination of naval gunfire and armed aerial reconnaissance. Minefields will be reseeded as required to maintain their effectiveness. These actions will have the combined effects of closing the ports to ships importing arms and war-supporting materiel to NVN and disrupting the country's economy and foreign trade reserves. Faced with the prospect of having to prosecute the war without the substantial quantities of outside help upon which his very existence depends, the enemy would be forced to reassess his capabilities with a view toward adapting alternatives. Additional shock effect could accrue through the enemy's recognition of our willingness to confront third countries.

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c. Interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line and Air Strikes Against Other Key Targets. To complement the mining and closure of the seaports and further impede the import of war-supporting materiel into NVN, the Northeast Rail Line between Hanoi and Dong Dang in Communist China will be severed by air strikes. To the maximum extent practicable, rail and highway traffic will be disrupted at strategic locations, and any large concentrations of rolling stock and supplies which develop as a result will be attacked and destroyed. Following hard upon closure of his ports, disruption of this vital artery will severely reduce NVN's imports and materially impair his capability to support both his economy and aggressive military operations in Southeast Asia. It will cause the enemy to face the prospect of pursuing his aggressive aims without adequate outside support to sustain him. Major air and naval gunfire attacks will be launched against additional target complexes as strike resources permit. Such targets will be of high economic value, the destruction of which will bite deeply into the available cushion of supplies and resources.

PHASE II

a. Isolation of NVN. Actions initiated in Phase I will be continued as necessary to isolate NVN from outside resources. Particular emphasis will be given to intensified interdiction efforts against NVN.

b. Air Strikes Against NVN. Major air strikes will be launched against critical target complexes in NVN. Among such targets are thermal power plants, industries, and large concentrations of stored vehicles, and rolling stock. A surprise attack against these targets will exploit vulnerabilities which can be expected to exist in several pertinent target categories only at the beginning of hostilities. Strikes will be concentrated against these targets to the maximum extent required to ensure their destruction. Fixed targets will be attacked in a systematic program to reduce depot stocks, port facilities, transportation, and distribution systems. Targets will be struck in a pattern such that the strike effort will be concentrated against the highest priority targets until their destruction is assured before the effort is shifted elsewhere. These actions can have a profound shock effect upon all segments of North Vietnam and the effect can be heightened through careful selection of targets.

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c. Breaching of t he Levee System in the Red River Delta.

6. Target Selection.

a. Careful study of vulnerability factors, sensitivity to critical resupply problems, duration of operations, and availability of strike aircraft will determine final target selection. A number of critical facilities have been identified which meet one or more of the following criteria, and will be examined for inclusion in either a Phase I or Phase II target list:

- Achieve a high degree of damage or disruption to an important military or economic function.

- Require costly and time-consuming restore or countermeasures.

- Have strong psychological impact upon Hanoi's leadership.

b. Possible targets.

- Five complexes in the Haiphong port area, the destruction of which would eliminate a significant fraction of the 50,000 tons of supplies stored there and would cause widespread and severe disruption of the established distribution systems.

- Six electric power stations, the destruction of which would cripple most of NVN's modern industry and require one to two years for restoration with external support and assistance.

- Four jet airfields, on which are deployed all but one of the 119 NVN combat aircraft in country.

- One cement plant which currently provides most of the NVN domestic requirements of about 400,000 tons of cement annually and would require more than a year to repair.

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- One coal preparation plant which is the basis for Hanoi's effort to revive its hard currency export trade.

- One machine tool and engineering plant which is a significant factor in maintaining the NVN transportation system and producing a large share of the country's mechanical equipment.

- Five storage facilities which house some 50,000 tons of high-value supplies, up to 37,000 tons of petroleum (40% of the estimated NVN stockpile), and about 1,000 trucks (10% of the estimated NVN inventory).

- Three key bridges which maintain the flow of imports to Hanoi from Haiphong or China and which, if interdicted simultaneously with the mining of Haiphong, would be highly significant.

- Two major rail yards which not only contain large quantities of materiels but also account for the bulk of the NVN capacity to repair rolling stock.

- The levee system in the Red River Delta which, if successfully attacked during the high water period of July-August, could destroy as much as 25% of the annual rice crop of 100,000 tons, temporarily halt most of the military and economic activity in the Hanoi area, and divert significant manpower to repair flood damage.

It would be neither feasible nor desirable to include all of these targets in one short air and naval bombardment. On the other hand, it is essential to include a substantial number of these whole target groupings in the first phase to complement the sea quarantine and to achieve the maximum over-all military, economic, and psychological impact on the DRV. Subsequent phases, if necessary, would not only deal with the NVN reactions to counter or moderate the effects of the first phase, but would include the remaining target groupings for greater effect.

7. Reaction Time. In order to complete the necessary preparation actions and reposition forces required to implement this concept plan fully, a minimum of 86 hours prior notice is required. Without the mining option, a minimum of 72 hours' notice will be required.

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PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

The two essential elements of the military concept are

-- a mining operation sufficient to seal off the sea approaches to North Vietnam and thus NVN's supply of waterborne imports,

-- collateral bombing designed to destroy or damage supplies, industrial capacity, and critical parts of the transportation system, thereby intensifying the economic strains brought about by the mining.

A detailed assessment of this concept involves analyzing

-- their capabilities to counter the effects of the mining and bombing,

-- requiredactions on our part -- e.g. reseeding the minefields, destroying lighters, cutting rail lines and highways -- to prevent their countermeasures from being successful.

A rough preliminary assessment is as follows:*

NVN Countermeasures and Our Responses

General. North Vietnam has stockpiles of food, industrial supplies, and petroleum sufficient to last several months. Upwards of 30-40% of their petroleum stocks, 50,000 tons or so of imported supplies, and perhaps 1000 trucks could be vulnerable to our initial attacks. Nevertheless, remaining stocks are largely dispersed and difficult to destroy by bombing. These stocks can sustain NVN for a few months.

Countering the Mining. North Vietnam would attempt to counter the effects of the mining in three ways:

-- sweeping or otherwise breaching the minefields,

-- rerouting imports through rail and highway approaches from China,

-- airlift from or through China.

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* The concept assumes that we surprise North Vietnam and that bad weather will not force major changes in the military plan. Later we will analyze what we do if these assumptions prove false.

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North Vietnam, even with Chinese or Russian help probably cannot sweep the minefields in a way which allows large ships to continue to dock. She can attempt to unload ships beyond the minefields into barges and other small craft and sweep the fields well enough to allow cargo to move ashore this way.

If they try this, we can easily lay more mines. We can also attack and attempt to destroy the barges and lighters with naval gunfire and tactical aircraft.

It is more likely that North Vietnam will seek to have imports rerouted through China.

-- Ships with goods bound for North Vietnam could unload in Chan-chiang, 560 miles from Hanoi by direct rail line, or Canton, which is much further by rail from Hanoi; (see attached map)

-- China herself could supply petroleum, food and some other supplies to North Vietnam by rail or highway.

The general strain on Chinese supplies and transportation capability would not be great because North Vietnam's requirements [for 16 million people] are relatively small. There will be local strains, however, and it will take time (we are analyzing how long) to assemble rail cars and divert supplies from their normal routes.

Our response to a major overland operation to supply North Vietnam could be to attack repeatedly the rail lines, marshalling yards, sidings, bridges and highways from China in an attempt to stop the supply flow. We could also bomb supply concentrations.

We should be more effective in this than we were when bombing North Vietnam before; we can concentrate our efforts instead of bombing targets all over North Vietnam. We still will not have complete success, however. Weather, darkness and the difficulty of policing the long border with China will provide opportunities for some supplies to get through.

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There may be an airlift. However, only a fraction of the import requirements -- high value spare parts, medical supplies, etc -- could be moved by air. The problems posed for us by an airlift would be more symbolic than real.

Countering the Bombing. The North Vietnamese may try to restore the airfields we destroy, but they probably will not try to rebuild the other facilities. They will attempt to do without.

ASSESSMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM'S ACTIONS AND U.S. COUNTER-COURSES

Summary.

We must accept from the outset that Hanoi will be an extremely hard nut to crack, and that the North Vietnamese leaders may well conclude that having held out this far, they can do so sufficiently longer to leave us no choice but to back off. Their prestige is committed to victory, and their entire system may be jeopardized without it. They will thus make a very careful calculus of the odds for and against their being able to achieve their goals. Key factors are (1) their estimate of whether our action represents a last, desperate move which they can resist or the beginning of a serious program that will continue regardless of political consequences, in which they must at least consider the latter; (2) their estimate of their ability to continue to receive sufficient vitally-needed economic assistance from outside sources, principally China and the USSR, to allow the already-strained economy to hold together; and (3) their estimate of whether political conditions in the North can be kept stable. Hanoi faces a real dilemma in weighing these factors againsts its objectives.

Assuming that the scope of our actions does not suggest to Hanoi that we are attempting to destroy her as a functioning Communist state, we believe that she will respond more in a psychological than a military sense, although a sharp step-up in supporting military activity can be expected. Hanoi will want to generate the maximum amount of pressure possible against the Administration through criticism on the part of the U.S. public and world opinion in general, and to this end will mobilize its political and military resources to suggest that a peaceful solution had been rendered far more difficult, if not impossible, that U.S. combat losses can be expected to rise, and that the war will continue at a higher level. Hanoi probably will break off the Paris talks. It will attempt to use its diplomatic and political resources to mobilize anti-Administration campaigns in politically sensitive countries and within the U.S. itself. It may use new weapons and techniques in Vietnam in order to convey the impression of an escalation of its own. It will step up the pace of operations in South Vietnam, and possibly across the DMZ, and may call for foreign "volunteers". It will rely on South China ports and Chinese rail and road communications to bring supplies into North Vietnam. It will hope that a combination of crisis atmosphere, increased American bloodshed, and an apparent ability on Hanoi's part to keep going will force the Administration to back down and accept a settlement on Hanoi's terms.

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Conceivably, it will call for a stand-down cease-fire in South Vietnam to cause us to stop our operations. Excluding the factor of American public opinion, this situation should be bearable. Hanoi will still want a political settlement, and for this purpose probably will leave the door open for resumption of the Paris talks. Public opinion outside the U.S. has not proven to be a very effective tool, and should remain insignificant in this instance. Heightened military activity brings with it the threat of heavy casualties, which Hanoi has already sought to avoid, and will impose even greater strain on the North than our actions alone would bring. Calling for "volunteers" would tend to internationalize the war, which Hanoi does not want, and would inject new external influences into its policy deliberations, a situation which NVN wishes to avoid. Hanoi has kept the UN out of the situation, and will probably continue to do so. A slackening of Hanoi's military response in a relatively short time can be expected; while the pressures on Hanoi due to our quarantine will continue. If it calls for a cease-fire, this could be taken as a sign of weakness and we should press for more concessions before accepting.

A continuation of our existing policies toward the Vietnam war thus is indicated, along with an intensified public information campaign to put our actions into perspective, and the adoption of whatever military steps are necessary to meet Hanoi's stepped-up military activities so long as these military activities persist.

In effect, our main problem will not be the specifics of what Hanoi does against us but whether or not the North Vietnamese leaders will move toward a compromise within an acceptable time frame. If they do eventually decide to move toward compromise, the signs may be difficult to read in view of Hanoi's need to preserve as much of its prestige as possible. Concrete proposals will not be immediately offered by Hanoi, and should probably be avoided by us in order to leave the Communists a line of retreat. Without it they may well conclude that they have no other option but to fight to the death. We should take every opportunity to make it clear to Hanoi's leaders that we are willing to make it easy for them to change their previous policies.

If and when Hanoi does decide to move toward accepting a genuine compromise settlement of the war, we doubt that it will be deterred by Chinese Communist disapproval of this course.

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Discussion.

A. North Vietnam

We must accept from the outset that Hanoi will be an extremely tough nut to crack. Having held out for almost five years under heavy U.S. pressure and having ordered great sacrifices on the part of the people, the North Vietnamese leaders will be highly reluctant to yield now. In view of the uncompromising stand which they have publicly taken, they will inevitably suffer a loss of prestige before their people and in the eyes of the rest of the Communist world if they start to back down, and the very future of their grasp over the people and the Lao Dong Party may be involved. If they do decide to move toward a compromise, it may be later rather than sooner, after they have had a chance to assess the reaction in North Vietnam and in the U.S. and to calculate the odds for and against their being able to achieve their goals without a breakdown of the economy and the North Vietnamese political system.

Hanoi accordingly can be expected to strive to convey the impression that it is fully capable of withstanding the full weight of our attacks, that it has powerful friends that will be able to help sustain it, that the war will continue indefinitely but at a higher level and with increased American casualties, and that the U.S. action has in fact brought the threat of a wider conflict. All this would be directed principally at American public opinion and secondarily at world opinion, in hopes that the combination of criticism, tension, and increased bloodshed would in a fairly short period of time work upon the Administration to force it to back down and accelerate the U.S. disengagement from Vietnam.

Nevertheless, behind Hanoi's facade of uncompromising bellicosity, the North Vietnamese leaders will be facing real dilemmaswhich will significantly affect their judgment of North Vietnam's ability to hold out. These include:

Hanoi's Estimate of U.S. Intentions. Although Hanoi's leaders will want to act on the assumption that our attacks represent an act of desperation and that we will be compelled by circumstances to break off fairly soon (an assumption which Peking, at least, will encourage them to make), they will probably be greatly disturbed by the implications inherent in the nature of our attack. Our willingness to reverse entirely the emphasis of the previous year on seeking a political solution to the war and to strike heavily at targets previously left untouched could be read as

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NVN	US	REMARKS
4. Political		
Call on Soviet and Chinese for political support in UNGA and in other forums	Organize counter-pressures diplomatically and through information campaign	
Surface, together with China, presence of Peking's "volunteers", thus suggesting a new Korean-type war	Recall long-standing history of Chinese presence in NVN	

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POSSIBLE NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTIONS AND US RESPONSES

NVN	US	REMARKS
1. In the South		
Step up attacks on urban areas, particularly Saigon, Hue and Danang	Counter with appropriate military operations, publicize violations of 1968 "understandings"	Attacks will probably taper off in fairly brief period due to increased Communist vulnerabilities and run-down in supplies
Attack in strength across the DMZ	Same as above	Same as above
Launch a general "high point" offensive in wide areas of the South	Same as above	Same as above
Launch air attacks into the South against military and civilian targets	Counter with appropriate military operations	Unlikely to be very effective
Presume large-scale infiltration	Step up interdiction efforts	
2. In the North Step up conscription		Manpower shortage may limit this effort, which will also impose further strains on the economy and social structure

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NVN	US	REMARKS
Call for Soviet, Chinese, or other "volunteers", to include manned aircraft and engineer, support, and AAA units (mostly from China)	Consider economic and political sanctions against countries sending "volunteers". Continue with operations despite presence of foreign forces or pilots in NVN	May be considered more of symbolic value than of military value, although Chinese units of the type previously in NVN may help to ease manpower strains
Shift DRV aircraft to Chinese airfields in Yunnan and Kwangsi		Chinese will probably not authorize direct attacks on US aircraft from Chinese airfields
Shift LOC's to posts in South China	Continue periodic strikes of road and rail lines in NVN linking NVN with China	
Call for Chinese and Soviet cooperation in arranging airlift across China of critical supplies	Continue periodic strikes of NVN airfields	
3. Elsewhere		
Step up military pressures in Laos	Continue present policies of aiding RLG, implement military and diplomatic contingency plans	Military and diplomatic contingency planning currently under way
Rely more heavily on Cambodian bases for attacks on US and ARVN centers in the South	Threaten Sihanouk with Cambodia becoming a battleground	

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a U.S. decision to carry on to the end regardless of political consequences. For Hanoi, such a decision could result in the wholesale destruction of the North Vietnamese political system and economic structure -- a situation which Hanoi's leaders have never before faced. They are already quite concerned about the deterioration of political standards in the North, and are attempting to impose a new set of rigid political controls. These could hardly be maintained under stress of sustained U.S. operations at the new levels.

Hanoi's Ability to Continue to Receive Outside Economic Aid. Even under present conditions Hanoi must rely heavily on outside economic assistance to maintain the living standards of the North Vietnamese people at minimum acceptable standards. One-half of the North's foodgrain requirements are imported via rail from China and by ship from the USSR and Eastern Europe, and consumer goods as well as all other types of vital economic necessities come to a significant extent from outside North Vietnam. Although there has been some degree of economic recovery since the cessation of the US bombing, the economy in general remains fragmented and inefficient. Under the impact of the new level of U.S. attacks, economic conditions could seriously and quickly deteriorate if Hanoi's land and sea communications with the outside world are interdicted and remain so to an appreciable extent. Meanwhile, manpower shortages persist, with a substantial proportion of all able-bodied males long since sent to the armed forces.

Hanoi's Estimate of Internal Political Conditions. Morale in the North since the bombing halt has apparently declined -- the people expected an improvement in their living conditions, but none resulted, and there is an adverse reaction on this score. At the same time, the regime is emphasizing rigid socialist standards, which entails removing some of the vestiges of private enterprise still remaining in the North. Popular resentments are likely to rise as this program is carried out. The manpower shortages have exacerbated the situation, and there is resentment at the continued draft. While overt opposition is not present, passive resistance on the part of some population elements probably does exist. The regime is capable of maintaining control now, but over a period of time under changed circumstances may find the problem much greater.

Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations, Hanoi will probably take the following specific actions:

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1. Hanoi will almost certainly break off the Paris talks. It may do so by completely removing its delegation and that of the NLF/PRG, or it might decide to leave some low-level representatives behind as a means of maintaining some contact -- after all, Hanoi does want to end the war, and realizes that it will have to talk to us to do so.

2. Hanoi will appeal to world opinion in general to condemn us, and may open a diplomatic and propaganda campaign through friendly countries and in the U.S. itself to isolate us and cause us to give up our military pressure and simply get out of Vietnam.

3. Hanoi may attempt to induce the USSR and the Eastern European countries to make a special diplomatic effort to make us back away, including introducing resolutions to condemn us in the UN Security Council, and possibly also threats of direct intervention.

4. In its diplomatic stance toward us, Hanoi will probably want to appear to be hard and uncompromising, in order not to suggest weakness or to convey the impression that our attacks had struck home hard enough to cause it to offer concessions. However, Hanoi may well utilize its assets in South Vietnam to attempt to draw the fangs of our operations and make us back off. One possibility open to it is to initiate a call for a stand-still cease-fire via the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" which would leave all forces in place. The PRG could also call for some form of territorial accommodation in which it would call for de facto control over large areas of South Vietnam on the basis of the "revolutionary councils" which the Communists claim to have set up in many places on the basis of "free elections". Hanoi could anticipate a wide measure of popular support in the U.S. for a cease-fire call, with very little critical attention paid to the circumstances under which it was to be effected. The net effect could be a sufficient buildup of political pressure on us to halt all military activities under conditions which Hanoi would hope to exploit better than we could. A cease-fire call could also cause friction between ourselves and the GVN, in view of the latter's opposition to any form of cease-fire.

5. Militarily:

a. In the South, under the assumption that the "understandings" of 1968 were rendered invalid by our operation, we can anticipate more blatant attacks on urban areas, particularly Saigon, Hue, and Danang. In

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addition, there may well be more pressure across the DMZ. Throughout SVN, once the word had been passed and preparations made, there will probably be another "high point" of some consequence intended to inflict as many U.S. casualties as possible to support the activities of anti-war elements in the U.S. It is conceivable that Hanoi may attempt to launch air operations across the DMZ into the South to show that if we escalate, it can too. Finally, Hanoi may resume large-scale infiltration.

b. In the North. In the DRV itself there will almost surely be an effort to step up the draft and mobilize the masses for a much longer war, but Hanoi's latitude in this respect might be curtailed due to manpower limitations and the war-weariness of the people of North Vietnam. (In fact, a return to the status quo ante November 1, 1968, might have a serious negative effect on the people, who have been anxious to see the war end completely, not continue indefinitely.) One new course which is open to Hanoi is to call for "volunteers", as it has occasionally threatened to do, possibly up to and including Soviet pilots and/or aircraft, or manpower drafts along the lines of the Chinese troop contribution. Hanoi will call on Communist China to furnish deep-water ports in South China to replace the quarantined ports, and to permit the continued use of Chinese airfields to Yunnan and Kwangsi as havens for DRV combat aircraft. It may appeal to Moscow and Peking to cooperate to the extent of permitting a Soviet airlift across China and to facilitate the shipment of supplies by rail across China.

c. Elsewhere. Hanoi may counter by stepping up the war in Laos in an attempt to bring about the rapid erosion or collapse of the Souvanna Government, hence diverting our military resources from North Vietnam to meet the wider threat. The North Vietnamese appear to be introducing a new, full division into Northern Laos, which when added to the estimated 13-20,000 DRV forces already there may be capable of retaking the Plaine des Jarres, Muong Soi, and going on to threaten seriously Luang Prabang and Vientiane. The Souvanna Government may not be able to continue if such an attack materializes. Hanoi could anticipate a fair share of public outcry in the U.S. on the score of U.S. overextension if we should respond to meet such a new set of circumstances in Laos, while a collapse of the Souvanna Government and its replacement by a Communist regime would cause great alarm in Thailand and complicate our relations with the Thai.

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In Cambodia, it is conceivable that Hanoi may attempt to drive Sihanouk entirely over to the DRV side, and gain fuller access to Cambodian territory for sanctuary and for staging operations than is now the case.

B. U.S. Counter-Reaction

All these moves by Hanoi should be bearable, leaving out the factor of U.S. public opinion.

In Paris, we will simply sit tight, and tell the world that we are willing to resume the talks anytime Hanoi wants to join us. If there are DRV representatives remaining in Paris, we should attempt to see them. We should not, however, attempt to maintain contact with the PRG/NLF representatives unless the GVN is also present.

With respect to Hanoi's appeals for help, we can assume that neither the USSR nor the Eastern European countries want direct involvement. Mere expressions of political and economic support will cause no real pain. The very nature of our actions should make the provision of economic assistance more difficult. In the UN, we will attempt to avoid a vote by mobilizing sufficient votes in the Security Council to kill a condemnation, and attempting similarly to head off a "uniting for peace" effort. We will continue our own publicity campaign to justify our actions, and hope that the brief period of our operations will ease the pressures on us. Actually, the more active the USSR and the Eastern European countries are, the better, since we want them involved and can assume that all, including USSR, will want the war to end before they themselves become drawn in any deeper.

A PRG call for a cease-fire could be troublesome to deal with if simply put in terms of a stand-down cease-fire throughout the South without reference to other, accompanying considerations such as mutual troop withdrawals. U.S. opinion may see such a cease-fire as a way out, and demand acceptance. Our response should be to agree in principle to such a cease-fire provided the proper details were worked out in advance to permit it to be effectively-maintained, and provided the principle of mutual withdrawals of all foreign troops from South Vietnam were accepted and such withdrawals actually implemented during a cease-fire. We could insist that the details had to be worked out between the PRG and the GVN, thus creating a reason for the two sides to get together for direct talks which

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the Communists might find difficult to resist. It should be noted that a cease-fire appeal would cause problems for the Communists as well, since the degree of territorial control which they would be able to claim on physical terms is far less than they would desire. In addition, their forces are already plagued by a lack of willingness to fight on the basis of "the war is nearly over and why take risks" philosophy, and a rapid deterioration of Communist military assets could occur following a cease-fire appeal. Indeed, the fact that the cease-fire issue has not yet been raised by the Communists suggests that they do not presently see it as favoring their interests. In these terms, a call by Hanoi or the PRG for a cease-fire could be taken as a sign of weakness. Accordingly, we should not give in to public opinion, but should insist on achieving at the minimum a response on mutual withdrawal and supervision before acceding to a cease-fire.

None of Hanoi's military actions in the South should cause us any insuperable difficulty, given the state of the enemy capabilities. Attacks across the DMZ would probably be roughly about the current scale unless Hanoi wanted to change its operations entirely and invite a major conflict; however, larger-scale operations bring greater vulnerabilities and invite higher casualties. Air attacks could be warded off, and the state of training of the DRV air force may not in any event be such as to make such attacks effective. The main problem would be the resumption of larger-scale infiltration, but this, as noted, would mean a complete reassessment of strategy, tactics, and goals -- a difficult process in Hanoi without Ho Chi Minh. In addition, heavy infiltration would dip deeply into North Vietnam's manpower pool, which could be troublesome in Hanoi, and require a considerable increase in logistical support, which may not be feasible. Our most important military response would thus be to delay scheduled troop withdrawals, to take advantage of any increased enemy vulnerabilities, and to suggest that we would be willing to fight it out on any scale.

Regarding Hanoi's moves in the North, we should remain calm and anticipate that much of what Hanoi may say it will do is window-dressing intended more for a war of nerves than for real military effect. If draft calls go up there will be political and economic strains on Hanoi. Calling for "volunteers" would have the disadvantages from Hanoi's standpoint of tending to internationalize the war and take it out from under direct Hanoi control -- the larger the outside contribution, the more say the contributors would possess. This is supposing that the most likely

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contributors, the USSR, the Eastern European countries, and Communist China, would want to be directly involved in the first place. An "international brigade" would be more of a show than a militarily-useful contribution. We might suggest, however, that countries from which "volunteers" were sent would be liable to political and economic countermeasures, if not military reprisals. Chinese manpower, if returned, will help, however, in easing Hanoi's own manpower strains.

The shift of Hanoi's seaborne traffic to South China ports will ease the pressures on it over time, but will require some months to be effective and still leave vulnerabilities, particularly in connection with follow-up attacks on road and rail connections to China inside North Vietnam.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, our follow-on military planning will need to take the new contingencies into consideration. We should begin now to strengthen the Lao armed forces, and in fact are doing so. Extra increments of aid may be necessary, and U.S. military operations on the ground in Laos should be at least contemplated. There is a chance that Hanoi may overextend itself if it tries to accomplish too much in Laos. Regarding Cambodia, we should warn Sihanouk of the possible consequences to his neutrality which direct involvement would entail, and suggest the possibility of Cambodia becoming a battleground if Hanoi's actions there should require a U.S. military response.

The main problem for us will not be the specifics of what Hanoi does but will simply be whether or not Hanoi's leaders will move toward a compromise within an acceptable time-frame. Their various actions to respond to our operation will not count so much as their determination to last us out. It may well conclude that they can get away with calling on their people to tighten their belts and to make do with what they have for as long as they possibly can.

If, as already noted, Hanoi's leaders decide that the undesirable features of resisting a compromise outweigh the undesirable features of holding firm, some signs may be set to us. These could include a beginning of North Vietnamese troop withdrawals from the South, a willingness on the part of the PRG to deal directly with the GVN, and a slackening of the level of hostilities in the South. When we pick them up, we should avoid to the extent feasible a public declamation on the subject, because of Hanoi's need to maintain its prestige. In keeping with Asian military

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tradition, a line of retreat should be left for a defeated enemy on the principle that if he considers himself cornered he is likely to fight to the death in the belief that he has no other recourse. We will thus need to set with great discretion and judgment in handling Hanoi, and should take every opportunity to make it clear through intermediaries that we would be willing to make it as easy as we can for the North Vietnamese to change their previous policies.

If Hanoi should decide to move toward a compromise solution, we doubt that it will allow itself to be deterred by opposition on Communist China's part. Peking has publicly made its objections to a negotiated settlement known on numerous occasions, yet Hanoi has moved ahead; presumably Hanoi would do so again even under circumstances in which the outcome of the negotiations would appear far less satisfactory from Peking's standpoint than, say, under the present circumstances. As noted above, for Hanoi to follow the alternative course of calling for direct Soviet and/or Chinese intervention raises the problem of loss of control over its power of decision, and as far as Communist China is concerned, possible domination of North Vietnam by a traditional enemy of Vietnamese nationalism. Moreover, Hanoi is probably well aware of the Chinese position against engaging in a direct confrontation with the U.S. (see below under Assessment of Chinese Communist Courses of Action).

A list of the political disiderata which we want to achieve from Hanoi through our military operations follows.

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POLITICAL OBJECTIVES TO BE GAINED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS

Basically, what we want to achieve politically is a clear and unmistakable intention on Hanoi's part to accept the principle that the people of South Vietnam should be free to determine their future for themselves without outside interference. This should be signified by the North Vietnamese in tangible ways, as follows:

-- By indicating to us directly in Paris (reopening the talks for this purpose if they had earlier broken them off) that they have accepted our principle, and by following up their acceptance with genuine negotiating proposals asking for specifics on our proposals and outlining in a spirit of compromise what changes, if any, they would want in order to protect their interests. They could also indicate a willingness to examine both the President's 8-point proposal and their 10-point proposal to establish areas of agreement.

-- By abandoning their stand against dealing with the Thieu Government and opening direct talks between the GVN and the NLF (or PRG) to work out the details of election organization and supervision.

-- By demonstrating acceptance of our call for mutual troop withdrawals. This need not be done formally, but could be accomplished by undertaking substantial troop movements which would unmistakably constitute withdrawals of their forces.

-- By effecting a "lull" in hostilities in the South, and letting us know directly or through intermediaries that it was definitely intended as a signal of their intention to lower the level of hostilities markedly and permanently.

-- By ending their infiltration of men into South Vietnam.

-- By removing their forces from Laos and Cambodia.

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Attainment of the first two of the foregoing objectives will probably not be achieved immediately in view of the loss of prestige which the North Vietnamese leaders would suffer if they appeared to be capitulating quickly to our pressure. They may, however, attempt to signify movement in this direction by undertaking some or all of the next steps. In such an event, we should expect firm assurances through intermediaries that these steps were, in fact, intended to show Hanoi's acceptance of our basic principle and that negotiations, including direct talks between the GVN and the NLF/PRG, would shortly resume. We should not accept one of the moves alone, e.g. effecting a "lull", as constituting sufficient proof of Hanoi's good intentions.

Additionally, Hanoi may attempt to appear responsive by:

-- Expressing a willingness to restore and abide by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos.

-- Calling for a cease-fire.

These moves must also be accompanied by more tangible steps to be acceptable. Restoration of the Geneva Agreements and the Geneva Accords cannot be accomplished without the removal of foreign troops from Cambodia and Laos, and a call for a cease-fire cannot be agreed to without at the minimum Hanoi's responding affirmatively and demonstrably to our call for mutual troop withdrawals. We will also want agreement on international supervision of a cease-fire at an early stage.

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SOVIET REACTIONS AND U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Summary

The Soviets have always found the possibility that we might interdict access to Haiphong and conduct sustained operations against adjacent shore facilities a disturbing prospect, simply because these actions would directly challenge their prestige and threaten their assets. To the extent that they have ever counseled moderation in Hanoi, their principal specific reason for doing so has been a fear of this type U.S. action. They have also been disturbed, though less so, by the possibility of a concentrated U.S. attack on DRV air-order-of-battle, confronting them with the burdens of rapid replacement; and by the possibility of a U.S. land invasion, which would place in question the very survival of a communist state.

Soviet reactions to U.S. operations against Haiphong are hard to predict because Soviet options in the area are unattractive. At one extreme there could be drastic responses up to and including direct U.S.-Soviet military confrontation both in the area as well as outside, such as in Berlin. At the other there could be almost total avoidance of confrontation combined with continued overland supply operations and airlifts of questionable effectiveness. The most likely reaction would be between these extremes: efforts to circumvent a quarantine via other ports and by lightering, possibly with Soviet flags, some attempt at mine sweeping, attempts to inhibit our operation by leaving ships in Haiphong, stepped up overland and air supply operations and direct involvement in air defense. Much of this we could not prevent. We would have to make decisions to attack Haiphong even if it meant damage to Soviet vessels and we should be prepared to attack lightes even if they had Soviet flags.

The Soviets would probably attempt to replace rapidly any losses we could inflict on DRV air-order-of-battle, but they would encounter formidable practical problems in doing so if we had succeeded in destroying a large number of aircraft and in keeping DRV airfields inoperable or under harassment. We would be able to do relatively little to prevent gradual Soviet reinforcement of DRV ground defense.

Moscow's main purpose following the onset of our operations would be to generate maximum domestic and foreign pressure to get us to cease and desist. To this end, apart from the type of practical measures suggested above, the Soviets would mount a major political campaign, including the disruption of most ongoing political negotiations. They would do this even at some cost to themselves. We would have to accept this; indeed our own readiness to make certain sacrifices in our relations with the USSR might enhance the weight of our measures in Vietnam. Domestic and international pressures running counter to the U.S. offensive military operations against NVN could be offset through governmental initiatives or tacitly ignored. The U.S. government's demonstration of indifference to such pressures might well constitute the strongest signal of all.

The chances that the Soviets would also exert real pressure to induce greater moderation on the part of the DRV are not great, especially if Moscow was convinced that the DRV leaders are prepared to persist on their present course. If, however, Moscow thought there was some ambivalence in Hanoi, it might engage in a mixture of pressures and inducements to tip the balance. The Soviets would argue that the DRV could in the long run achieve its goals in the south by diplomacy and political means.

POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS and US COURSES OF ACTION

1. In Area

Soviet	US	Remarks
Leave ships in Haiphong Harbor.	Avoid deliberate damage but attack area consistent with requirement for effectiveness.	
Anchor vessels offshore and offload to lighters without or with Soviet flags.	Avoid damage to ships; attack lighters.	
Send ships to alternate ports.	Mine approaches.	Contingency plan required for Chinese ports.
Assist DPV in sweeping with Soviet personnel.	Reseed; if necessary attack sweepers.	
Send in Soviet sweepers	Reseed;	
Send in Soviet sweepers with escorts	Reseed;	
Attacks on US vessels with subs; surface vessels, DRV vessels with Soviet "volunteers". (All unlikely)	Return fire;	
Air attacks with Soviet pilots on US vessels. (Unlikely)	Return fire, hot pursuit.	
Replace DRV aircraft by rail or airlift.	Attack airfields; armed recce to harrass fields.	
Soviet "volunteers" in air defense system.	Attack as planned.	
Increased supply shipments by land and air.	Attack ground facilities as planned; keep airfields inoperable.	

2. Out of Area Soviet	US	Remarks
Harrass access to Berlin	Use existing contingency plans	Requires allied participation
Prevent US access to Berlin	Blockade Soviet military mission to US forces in Germany;	
	Block Soviet use of Panama Canal;	Requires planning
	Act against Soviet trawlers;	Requires planning
	Quarantine Cuba;	Requires planning;OAS
Block all access to Berlin	Use Existing Contingency Plans as above	Requires allied agreement
Harrassment of US shipping	Respond in kind; escort	
Harrass US 6th Fleet in Med.	Respond in kind; place force near approach to Turkish Straits	
Break air agreement	Acquiesce	
Attack US recce flights near Soviet borders.	Reduce flights, escort rest.	
Increase military readiness; alert	Appropriate DEFCONs	Requires careful examination to avoid miscalculation and pre-emption.
3. Political (Illustrative)		
Interrupt ongoing negotiations	Acquiesce	
Act in UNGA	Respond in kind; if unavoidable accept adverse vote.	
Act in UN Security Council.	Do likewise; if necessary, use veto.	
Use Hot Line to exert pressure	Keep cool.	

Discussion

1. Interdiction of access to Haiphong, the bombing of adjacent shore facilities, and any other measures threatening sea communications with the DRV probably have always been the single most disturbing development for the Soviets to contemplate in connection with the Vietnamese war. Also troublesome to them, but less acutely so, has been the threat of a major US campaign against DRV air capabilities or US land operations against the DRV homeland.

2. Attacks on the approaches to and the shore facilities in Haiphong engage Soviet interests in several related ways. They pose a direct physical threat to Soviet ships and in that sense represent a direct challenge of the USSR in a situation where its available and direct military responses are scarce and where we have the capacity to put the burden of escalation on them. At the same time, the other major choice open to the USSR, while less risky vis-a-vis the US, is politically and psychologically unpalatable -- that is, to withdraw their shipping from Haiphong in order to avoid the risk of damage or loss and to honor the quarantine.

3. Because US action against Haiphong would pose such serious problems for the USSR, we must allow for the possibility of drastic Soviet responses. On balance, such responses seem less likely than a more measured combination of military and political actions (see below), but our planning must prepare for the contingency of Soviet military actions against US shipping, naval and merchant, in Vietnamese waters either by submarines already in the area or readily within reach, or by DRV aircraft with Soviet pilots. We must likewise be prepared for retaliation and counter pressure in areas where the local advantage rests with the USSR, most notably around Berlin, possibly in the Sea of Japan, or at least by proxy in Korea. For these and other possible points of pressure, contingency plans already exist. The most pessimistic view of this kind of Soviet reaction would be that it could lead cumulatively to a major US-Soviet confrontation, up to and including the risk of general war.

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4. At the other extreme of the drastic response would be a Soviet decision to avoid damage to their shipping and to minimize the possibility of direct physical confrontation with the US. This would not

necessarily be accompanied, at least in a way discernable to us, by constructive and helpful political moves; on the contrary it might be masked by an extremely hostile political and propaganda posture. Under this contingency, the Soviets would promptly move their ships out of Haiphong and would abide by whatever quarantine or restrictions we had imposed on access to this and other ports. They would not attempt to run the minefields. The Cuban missile crisis provides a reasonable analogy for this type of Soviet response.

5. At the same time, even such a response might and probably would not be without problems for us. Whatever they do at sea, the Soviets would probably do what they could to speed and increase overland shipments through China (assuming the Chinese are permissive) and to attempt increased supply by air, including via China, via Inda-Burma-Laos (which they have attempted in the past) and perhaps directly from the Soviet Far East. Their Egyptian airlift in 1967 has given them some practice in this. Overland and air supply could not handle bulk items such as POL, cement, etc. and their airlift would be subject to the availability of landing fields in North Vietnam. It is possible that the Chinese would make available airfields for Soviet aircraft, though this has not been successfully worked out between the Soviets and the Chinese in the past and would in any case require further arrangements for onward overland transportation.

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6. Between a ragged or drastically escalatory response and total avoidance of a maritime confrontation lie a range of possible Soviet actions. Apart from attempts at an airlift and increased overland shipments, the Soviets might seek alternate means of sea access. Depending on the precise location of minefields, the Soviets might anchor ships further to sea and resort to lighters. They could place Soviet flags on these to deter attack. In addition, or alternatively, the Soviets could sail their ships to other ports although in the case of those in China this will require Chinese agreement (not a foregone conclusion) and cooperation for transshipment (even less a foregone conclusion).

7. Nor is it certain that the Soviets would remove all their shipping in Haiphong harbor. Even if it were possible for them to do so physically -- which, depending on how much warning they had

might be infeasible -- they might instead elect to keep one or more vessels in port even at the risk of loss or damage. Their calculation would be that this might deter or at least inhibit, and hence reduce the effectiveness of US air attacks on port facilities. Even if we were not deferred or inhibited, the Soviets might believe that they could subsequently turn injury to their property to political and psychological advantage against us. At the same time, should Soviet ships be sunk or damaged, it might be more difficult for the Soviets to refrain from tangible counteraction since their prestige will have been engaged. Thus, even if the Soviets had initially decided to do no more than leave a ship or two in port, they might subsequently, if this had failed to deter us, feel obliged to undertake more concrete actions against us.

8. We must squarely face the question of whether or not to risk damage to Soviet vessels in Haiphong. Reconnaissance might reveal whether we could avoid bombing in close proximity to such vessels and still accomplish our main objective of destroying the shore facilities, but we probably should make a decision that if effectiveness so requires, we will bomb even at the risk of damaging Soviet vessels.

9. The Soviets will almost certainly consider the feasibility and desirability of attempting to sweep the minefields. To do this with any degree of effectiveness requires substantial numbers of minesweepers which would take several weeks to get to the Gulf of Tonkin. Even if this were accomplished, the operation would be unattractive since we could reseed without engaging Soviet vessels. Moreover, these vessels cannot stay at sea indefinitely and by definition of our mine plan it would be difficult if not impossible for them to put into DRV ports, or to get out again without substantial losses. Thus, even if the Soviets should attempt such operations they should not seriously affect the quarantine. This being the case, we probably need take no special steps to prevent Soviet vessels from getting to the scene or to attack them once there.

10. To the extent that our attacks on DRV air order of battle are effective the Soviets will be under pressure to send in replacements. They acquired some experience in rapidly airlifting crated fighter aircraft to Egypt in 1967 with AN-12 transports. In the Vietnamese case they will, however, have to cope with more difficult conditions; longer distance, less certain overflight arrangements, more difficult weather conditions, uncertain condition of airfields in Vietnam following US strikes, possible conduct of operations --

landing, assembly, flight-testing -- at Vietnamese airfields under actual attack or threat or US armed reconnaissance. All of these factors, and other problems, would make a major Soviet effort to replace large numbers of fighter aircraft a formidable though not impossible undertaking. Our actions can affect the degree of difficulty in three ways: (1) the number of DRV aircraft we destroy in our strikes will determine the rough number of necessary Soviet replacements; (2) the damage inflicted to DRV airfields will determine the difficulty of subsequent Soviet operations; and (3) policy we follow in conducting armed recce against DRV airfields and other air defense targets will affect the efficiency of the replacement operation.

11. Although the pressures operating on the Soviets to undertake a replacement operation will be strong -- e.g., prestige, influence in the DRV and the Communist world, deterrence of the US -- the actual Soviet decision as whether to proceed will be strongly influenced by their judgment of its feasibility (which, as noted above, we can influence) and by a determination as to whether they want to utilize DRV dependence on them as leverage in getting the DRV to assume a more conciliatory posture toward the US. On balance, assuming reasonable feasibility, we must expect the Soviets to go through with the operation, rather than withholding it for purposes of political pressure. On the other hand, if we succeed in raising really substantial physical obstacles to a meaningful replacement operation, we have some chance of influencing the political behavior of the DRV (and the USSR) in a positive direction for we would then confront the DRV with the prospect of facing our next onslaught with a greatly degraded air-defense.

This plainly argues for:

a. destroying the largest number of DRV aircraft possible;

b. doing the greatest possible damage to DRV airfields; and

c. attempting to keep those airfields inoperable, or at least hampering their return to operability, to the maximum extent possible.

12. Apart from the question of Soviet replacement of DRV air order of battle, Moscow will consider assisting the DRV air defense by increasing its passive capabilities. SAMs and AAA, and associated radar, can be shipped in overland, though this will take time and depends on Chinese cooperation. The Soviets could again airlift personnel to operate the system. There is little or nothing that we could do by military action to prevent such assistance, though we might hamper it by attacks on the rail system. If we succeeded in destroying the DRV air order of battle, in preventing its replacement, it seems questionable whether the Soviets could do enough to augment the air defense system to prevent us from launching subsequent air attacks against targets of our choosing.

13. In any event, our own decision-making must face the probability that in suppressing DRV air defense we are likely to encounter Soviet personnel and to spill Soviet blood. Here, as in other aspects of this whole operation, we need to make a clear decision that we will take this risk.

Political and Associated Actions

14. The crucial judgment that must be made is whether the Soviets, whatever they may or may not do to assist the DRV in overcoming or mitigating the physical effects of our actions, will somehow exert effective pressure on the DRV to change its course in directions we seek. This is a tough judgment for the Soviets and we cannot make predictions with much assurance.

15. One important factor in the Soviet decision will obviously be their assessment of our determination and ability to carry through the course on which we will have embarked. They will want to test this by first exerting maximum pressure on us by punishing us for our actions, and by deterring us from continuing operations.

16. For this reason, we should expect a major Soviet political pressure campaign. Even if we succeed in initially disconcerting the Soviets by the surprise and vigor of our action, their automatic reflexes in this sort of situation are well developed and it will not take them long to set in motion their propaganda, psychological and political machinery.

17. They will wish to give maximum support to the arguments and emotions of the domestic opposition in the US as well as to our opponents, critics and detractors and to the skeptics abroad. Their best instrument for doing so will be to raise the spectre of US-Soviet confrontation and the ghost of a return to the cold war. For this reason, apart from the screams of the propaganda media and possible action in the UNGA, which will still be in session, we can look for Soviet withdrawal from ongoing negotiations and bilateral arrangements with us, even if by so doing they have to make certain sacrifices of their own.

18. Whatever may or may not be the real Soviet attitude toward and expectation of SALT, we should expect them to block those talks and other ongoing arms control discussions, if only because we did so last August when they invaded Czechoslovakia. This is no place to go into the complex Soviet motivation in this whole field, except to say that SALT may not occupy nearly as crucial a role in Soviet thinking as in ours and therefore its sacrifice or postponement will not cause them excessive pain. Since we ourselves have established the principle of interconnections, we should recognize that SALT in the presence of major US military action in Vietnam with potential for direct US-Soviet confrontation would be incongruous. Our willingness to forego it may indeed serve to impress the Soviets with our determination.

19. Similarly, we can expect the Soviets to withdraw from the Middle East negotiations, although, since the Soviets themselves have tended to use these to dampen down the prospects of a Fourth Round, this may not be an easy step for them. In this situation, Israeli military strength is an asset for us since it will tend to deter Soviet efforts to open up a second front against us with their Arab proxies. Prospects for rapid progress in the Middle East negotiations are at best meager and our own interest in the kind of "settlement" likely to emerge from them is in any case equivocal; there is no need to let Soviet withdrawal from the talks and even a more belicose Soviet posture inhibit what we do in Vietnam.

20. As regards Berlin, we should also expect Soviet withdrawal from current sparring over the resumption of the long-interrupted negotiations. This is no loss for us, though it might tend to stimulate adverse German and UK reactions to our Vietnam operations. More

serious of course is the possibility of a Soviet-GDR counter-blockade of Berlin. We have never had nor do we now have any assured way of preventing the Soviets from such action . Ultimately, our deterrent has always rested on our ability to convince the Soviets that we will not let West Berlin starve or fall even if it means escalation to nuclear war. Our drastic action in V etnam may help us to maintain the presumption that we would act "irrationally" in defense of Berlin. Still, Berlin is Moscow's most advantageous pressure point against us and in the postulated situation the Soviets may calculate that our allies will be so ambivalent in their support of us that a Berlin crisis would in fact exert genuine pressure on us to desist in Vietnam. We must steel ourselves to this possibility, maintaining a readiness to undertake prompt responses to any Soviet/GDR encroachments.

21. We should expect the near-total disruption of our bilateral relations with the Soviets, from air agreement to cultural exchange. While some in the US will consider this too high a price to pay and the Soviets will play on such sentiment, this probably will be the least of our problems. Our own responses to such Soviet disruptions should be crisp and direct so as not to give the Soviets the slightest reason to assume that their actions will divert us from our course.

22. The Soviets undoubtedly will also push the East Europeans to sever contacts with us. They may call a Warsaw Pact meeting to proclaim their anathema of us and even the Romanians might in these circumstances find it necessary to toe the line. It will be argued that we are handing the Soviets a potent instrument for reasserting discipline in the Bloc; there is some merit to the point but in our scale of priorities at the time it can hardly weigh heavily in our mind. Moreover, Moscow's historical problem in Eastern Europe will not disappear even if solidarity is temporarily restored.

23. In sum, the Soviets will turn on the heat in the immediate aftermath of our actions even at some pain and sacrifice to themselves. And we will almost certainly confront substantial setbacks to objectives we have sought in our dealings with the USSR. Moreover, we must expect the Soviets to succeed in generating or reinforcing major political opposition, domestic and foreign, to us. However, unless our domestic problem gets out of hand (which it will do only marginally through Soviet doing), the real damage that Moscow can do to our political interests will almost certainly not match or exceed the benefits that would accrue from success in our Vietnam operation (which should be defined as favorable DRV action as a result of the

effectiveness of our military operations). The problem is that the adverse results of Soviet action against us are likely to appear much sooner than the successful results of our Vietnam operation. This means that we must always maintain the conviction that in view of the benefits we expect from achieving our goal in Vietnam we can and must tolerate the worst the Soviets can do to us.

24. Our ability to maintain and credibly convey this conviction will be crucial if we are to have any hope that the Soviets will exert leverage on the DRV. To do so will not be easy because our political system and our body politic simply may not let us. But even if we succeeded, the chances that the Soviets will exert genuine and effective pressure on Hanoi or otherwise play a role useful to us cannot be rated as better than even.

25. The greatest leverage they have is in their material supplies, and this gets down to the basic question of how Hanoi will react if faced -- either because of the effectiveness of our interdiction operations or because of deliberate Soviet cessation of such shipments as could still get through, or because of both -- with a drastic reduction or an end of Soviet material support. Hanoi's own decision is likely to be to carry on as best it can alone or with Chinese support (which could make up for some though not all the types and quantities of material now coming from Russia). If this is also the Soviet judgment, Moscow may simply not be prepared to pay the political price -- in Hanoi, in international communism and in great power prestige -- of being seen to welch on an ally and play the "American game." The argument in the Kremlin on this may be hot and heavy but it is hard to see how those who would "betray an ally" could in the end win out. If this conclusion is correct, the Soviets are likely to pursue the type of middle-range actions in physical support of the DRV discussed earlier, i.e., as much replenishment as feasible while avoiding gross risks of direct military engagement with us.

26. If on the other hand, the Soviets concluded that Hanoi was prepared to move, or that there was enough political sentiment in the DRV's political leadership to move, Moscow might through some mixture or pressure and inducement seek to tip the balance. The pressure would be in the form of footdragging in replenishment (the physical obstacles being what they are, there will be plenty of alibis for slowdowns and shortfalls); the inducement would be in the form of

some role as a political intermediary. The attractiveness of this course, if Hanoi were willing or half-willing, lies in the fact that the Communists after all need make only relatively small concessions to ensure diplomatic movement in Paris and can fairly easily regulate the intensity of the fighting in the South.

27. We are not seeking victory but compromise; compromise, moreover, on terms which many in Hanoi might see as ultimately leading to their achievement of their goals in the South, anyway. Certainly the Soviets could argue, as they may have at times in the past, that American objectives have become so modest over time and the objective trend is in any case running so heavily toward US disengagement, that Hanoi can afford to pursue its goals by political means. In a nutshell, while we almost certainly cannot expect Moscow to pressure or argue Hanoi into surrender, there are circumstances in which Moscow could see its way clear to try to persuade Hanoi that it can achieve what it wants by patience, diplomacy and political action. Only history -- our own conduct and the course of events in the South -- will tell whether the Soviets had given Hanoi sound advice and an accurate prognosis.

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ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIONS AND U.S. COUNTER-COURSES

Summary.

Peking's overriding objective will be to keep North Vietnam from giving in, and to this end it will provide material assistance of a military and economic nature, and possibly use political pressures on Hanoi to keep it in the war. However, unless Communist China concludes that North Vietnam's survival is being threatened, her instincts probably will be to continue her past policy of staying in the background and acting as Hanoi's "reliable rear". From the standpoint both of ideology and national security she probably will want to avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S., particularly in view of the problems along the Sino-Soviet border and her troubled internal circumstances. Politically and diplomatically she will try to help Hanoi to focus world attention on the changed circumstances in Vietnam, and will carry out a campaign of vilification against the U.S. Since nothing short of a serious Soviet confrontation with the U.S. as a result of our quarantine would satisfy Peking, we believe that there will not be a warm-up in Sino-Soviet relations, but rather an intensification of Peking's anti-Soviet stance if, as the odds would favor, the USSR's reactions fall short of a full-scale confrontation. Militarily, Peking will offer increased material assistance to Hanoi, and possibly a return of the engineer and anti-aircraft units which have been withdrawn, surfacing them as "volunteers" if Hanoi so desires. She might also attempt to step up the actions of Peking-influenced guerrillas in other parts of Southeast Asia in hopes of drawing off U.S. strength, and will continue to provide Hanoi with the use of Chinese airfields in Yunnan and Kwangsi as a haven for DRV aircraft. She will open ports in South China to shipping, including Soviet shipping, diverted from North Vietnam, and offer Chinese trucks and freight cars to carry supplies into North Vietnam from Chinese ports.

Our reaction will be essentially the same as it has been in the past with respect to Peking's role in the Vietnam war. We will pass the word to Peking that our actions are not directed against China. We will watch China closely, however, and undertake contingency planning to counter stepped-up Chinese pressures off Taiwan and in areas of Southeast Asia other than Vietnam.

We do not anticipate that Peking will attempt to deter Hanoi from moving toward a genuine compromise settlement of the war should Hanoi decide to do so. Despite the undesirable aspects of such a settlement from Peking's standpoint, Peking's rationale for avoiding a direct conflict with the U.S. will probably prevail.

POSSIBLE CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIONS AND US RESPONSES

CHINA	US	REMARKS
1. In Area		
Step up flow of military and economic aid	Hit at NVN LOC's between NVN and China	
Return military contingents of engineer, service and AAA troops of types formerly in NVN	Continue planned operations without regard for nature of opposition	Strength of Chinese units would probably not go much above previous level of 45-55,000 men
Offer pilots as "volunteers" to fly aircraft with DRV markings	Same as above	
Offer Chinese airfields in Yunnan and Kwangsi as sanctuaries for DRV aircraft	Break off hot pursuit of aircraft flying into China short of frontier	Chinese will probably not authorize direct attacks on US aircraft or ships from Chinese airfields (this was the case during previous bombing)
2. Elsewhere		
Offer South Chinese ports to shipping diverted from NVN, provide Chinese trucks and freight cars	Periodically, hit LOC's in NVN between NVN and China	
Cooperate with Soviets in setting up airlift into NVN across China	Periodically hit NVN airfields	

CHINA	US	REMARKS
Step up activities of Chinese-influenced guerrillas elsewhere in SEA	Activate contingency plans, increase military aid where needed	Burma is a vulnerable area; contingency planning may be needed
3. Political (representative) Surface Chinese "volunteers" in NVN, thus threatening Korea-type war	Keep cool, continue planned sequence of operations, point out past history of Chinese involvement	Chinese unlikely to vary pattern of involvement significantly from that already established

Discussion.

Communist China's overriding objective will be to keep Hanoi from succumbing to our operations, and to this end it will offer material assistance of both a military and an economic nature, and exhortation (perhaps combined with a degree of political pressure) for Hanoi to keep going on the basis of a protracted "peoples war". At the same time, short of a level of action which Peking would take as a U. S. intention to destroy North Vietnam as a viable Communist state, Communist China's every instinct will probably be to stay out of direct military involvement. On ideological grounds it believes that "people's war" must be won by the people themselves with only material assistance provided by the "proletarian internationalists"; hence the overt introduction of Chinese forces would tend to vitiate this "revolutionary" principle. In addition, the Chinese are thoroughly conscious of the strategic imbalance between their forces and those of the U. S. and would seek to avoid a direct confrontation. Peking's problems in facing the U. S. are compounded by its internal dislocations and by its border dispute with the USSR. Peking's rationale in avoiding a confrontation in favor of acting as Hanoi's strong rear area has guided it from 1965 on, and would probably continue in effect even under circumstances in which the Vietnam war went into dimensions never reached before. In this respect Peking might take the line that our attacks represented an act of desperation, and indicated that victory was in sight for Hanoi if it could hold out long enough.

We can probably anticipate as well that there will be no warm-up in Sino-Soviet relations. The only level of Soviet response which would satisfy Peking would be a full acceptance of the U. S. challenge with all its implications; anything less would be regarded as "collusion" with the U. S. by in effect acquiescing in the changed circumstances of the war. As was the case when the U. S. carried the war to the North in 1965 and Moscow failed to respond, the new situation would then bring with it a heightening of the Sino-Soviet polemic. This would not preclude limited arrangements between Peking and Moscow in assuring the flow of aid to Hanoi, however.

Specific Chinese Communist responses are as follows:

1. Peking will certainly attempt to exploit the situation and politically to undercut Soviet influence in Hanoi, using the "I told you so" approach, and charging also that Hanoi's predicament was brought about by U. S. and Soviet "collusion". Peking will urge "protracted war" until a military victory is achieved, and to this end may offer increased material assistance. A step-up in China's world-wide campaign against U. S. "imperialism" and Soviet "social-imperialism" can also be expected, possibly to include diplomatic efforts on Peking's part to induce Afro-Asian states in which it has some influence to condemn the U. S. and the USSR. Concurrently, Peking would "freeze" any U. S. approaches to improve relations.

2. The Chinese probably will reintroduce their engineer, service, and AAA units into North Vietnam on the same terms as before, i. e., quietly and without calling them "volunteers". In view of Hanoi's manpower problems and heightened need to keep land communications open, the Chinese forces could serve a highly useful purpose. In sending troops into North Vietnam, China will also be serving an internal political purpose of showing its people that it is living up to the promise first made at the time of the Tonkin Gulf crisis that it would not stand idly by in the event of a U. S. attack on North Vietnam.

   At the peak of Chinese participation, Peking's forces consisted of three anti-aircraft divisions, about 12,000 men, engineer construction and railroad engineer units numbering 22,000-30,000 men, and miscellaneous service forces of 6,000-8,000 men, for an aggregate of 40,000-50,000 troops. These were positioned mainly along the highway and rail links running northeast and northwest from Hanoi to the Chinese border, and are believed to have assumed the primary role in keeping these links open. It may take some time to reposition the Chinese forces, however, since the units involved have been dispersed and assigned to other tasks. Some are in Northern Laos.

If Hanoi and Peking decide jointly to surface the Chinese forces, a new dimension will be added to the war by involving Peking directly and threatening a wider, Korean-type war. Although such a move would have some psychological value, it would not change the actual circumstances too much. U. S. and world opinion have long known of the Chinese role in Vietnam. And Peking would still be Hanoi's "reliable rear", since the forces involved would in all probability not be committed to combat but would serve in the same supporting capacity as before.

3. China will in addition open its South China ports of Canton and Fort Bayard to shipping diverted from North Vietnamese ports. Whatever additional military aid which China might provide and which North Vietnam might use would be offered by Peking, including diversion of Chinese trucks and freight cars from domestic needs to help maintain the flow of supplies into North Vietnam. The Chinese would also continue to provide use of Chinese airfields in Yunnan and Kwangsi for non-operational activities. Conceivably, the Chinese might offer MTBs or "Komar-Osa"-class PTGs to the North Vietnamese, as well as MIG-19s. This would probably be the limit of Chinese help under the circumstances envisaged given China's own internal difficulties, both political and economic, its need to keep increased forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and its realistic-cum-ideological stand that "people's war" must be won by the concerned people themselves with only material assistance to be proffered by the "socialist" countries.

4. As evidently occurred in 1965, Peking might try to intensify the activities of Peking-influenced guerrillas in Northern Thailand, Laos, and Burma in an effort to divert us from Vietnam. Peking's assets in Thailand among the non-Thai Meo have been sufficient to hold off Thai forces from mountainous areas of Northern Thailand, and it is developing ties with anti-Government ethnic groups in Burma. There could be a step-up of Chinese roadbuilding in Laos. Such

moves would be intended to show that the war "had no boundaries", and possibly divert U.S. resources from Vietnam. A move to increase tensions in the Taiwan Strait is possible for the same reason, but not too likely in view of the risk of direct confrontation with the U.S.

U.S. Counter-Responses

On the political and diplomatic front, Peking's efforts should not create undue difficulties. Peking's isolation from much of the world and its troubled internal situation leave it without much leverage, and the shrillness of its vituperation over the years can hardly be stepped-up further. We should, however, approach Peking's representative at an appropriate spot to convey the message that our attacks are not directed against China.

Militarily, our main requirement will be to avoid provoking China but to maintain U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence activities directed toward the China mainland to detect troop movements and other indications of hostile intent. It will be important to avoid creating the impression that we ourselves are considering carrying the war to China. (As noted above, we will have passed the word via diplomatic contacts to Peking that we were not directing our attacks toward the Chinese.) Elsewhere, we will want to step up our surveillance of areas such as Laos, Northern Thailand and Burma to detect possible Chinese Communist efforts to create diversionary pressures. A heightened alert posture throughout East Asia will be ordered.

If Sino-Soviet tensions should in fact increase through Chinese criticism of the Soviet role, China's military resources could be in part diverted away from Vietnam in favor of the Sino-Soviet border areas.

As a final consideration on Communist China, we doubt that Peking would interpose itself directly between Hanoi and a genuine compromise settlement when -- and if -- Hanoi should decide to accept one. Peking's rationale against direct involvement has already been described, and should remain in effect even under the changed circumstances after our operations. The alternative for Peking would be to assume the role of a

principle protagonist in a war in which the balance of military power would not be on Peking's side, quite apart from the doctrinal embarrassment China would suffer through contradicting its own basic principle. The Chinese are fully capable of twisting their call for a military victory into acceptance of, and support for, the kind of protracted political struggle which would emerge in South Vietnam.

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INTEGRATED DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SCENARIO

Time	Action	Agency
D-30	Establish for the record in a low-key way the history of Hanoi's intransigence in Paris and violation of the "understandings;" this will be accomplished by appropriate statements and backgrounders.	State, White House
D-30	Alert military commanders in the field that operations will be carried out as planned; order them to begin necessary preparations.	Defense
D-6-1/2 to D-2	Most distant CVA departs port for Tonkin Gulf (timed to appear as normal movement).	Defense
D-3	Issue alert order to Commander SEVENTH Fleet to prepare to execute mining plans and to Commander SEVENTH Air Force to prepare to execute air strikes.	Defense
D-2	Issue execute order to Commander SEVENTH Fleet and Commander SEVENTH Air Force.	Defense
H-9	All surface forces in launch position for mining operation in Tonkin Gulf. All air forces at ready status for air strikes.	Defense
H-4	Final go - no go.	White House

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Time	Action	Agency
H-2	Increase readiness posture for SAC and SIOP forces world-wide.	Defense
H-1	Launch air strikes against NVN targets from bases in Thailand and SVN.	Defense
H-1	Launch mine operation aircraft from carriers to Tonkin Gulf.	Defense
H-1	Inform GVN.	State: Embassy Saigon
H-1	Inform TCC's (including GVN).	State: Meeting of Ambassadors in Washington with Secretary
H-1	Inform UK Prime Minister	State: Ambassador in London
H-1	Inform Japanese Ambassador in Washington and Prime Minister in Tokyo.	State: DepAsst Secretary for East Asian Affairs; Ambassador in Tokyo
H-1	Inform NATO allies.	State: Meeting of Ambassadors in Washington with Hillenbrand
H-1	Inform OAS.	State: OAS Rep
H-1	Inform Laotians.	State: Asst Secretary for East Asian Affairs

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Time	Action	Agency
H-1	Inform Ambassadors of countries with ships in or en route to Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha.	State: Country Directors
H-1	Inform USSR.	White House to Dobrynin
H-1	Inform Cambodia.	White House to Cambodian Charge' and American Charge' to Sihanouk
H-1	Inform Congressional Leadership (call meeting at H-2).	White House
H-1	Alert TV networks.	White House
H-1	Press backgrounder (locked door until "H").	White House
H-1/2	Inform USSR.	White House: Molink Message
H	Naval aircraft mine all NVN deep-water ports; aircraft strikes at selected NVN targets.	Defense
H	COMUSMACV increases readiness posture.	Defense
H	Speech by President.	White House
H	UN -- Request UNSC meeting.	State: USUN

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Time	Action	Agency
H	Summon special meeting of Paris talks.	State: Embassy Paris/ US Delegation
H+2	UNSC meeting.	State: USUN
H+5	OAS meeting.	State: OAS Representative
H+5	Inform other governments.	State: Diplomatic Posts
H+12	SEATO meeting.	State: Embassy Bangkok
D-Day	Commence intensified world-wode diplomatic and informational campaign to gain understanding of our actions.	State, White House
D-Day	Be prepared to contend with NVN escalatory actions in SVN and Laos.	Defense
D+1	Initiate follow-up air strikes .	Defense
D+2	Lay destructor weapons.	Defense
D+3	Minefields activated. Continue combat operations as directed.	Defense

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The President's Copy

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

4th Draft
October 2, 1969

DRAFT OF A PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH

My fellow Americans,

It is my duty to tell you tonight of a major decision in our quest for an honorable peace in Vietnam.

I want to begin with a few words about the meaning of negotiation.

Negotiation, as we understand it -- and as almost everyone in the world understands it -- is a process in which two sides seek to resolve a conflict by considering concrete proposals on their merits, by bargaining, by give-and-take, by compromise. Negotiation is a two-way street. Both sides must be willing to engage seriously in this process, in good faith. Or there can be no settlement.

There can be no settlement when only one side makes an honest effort to put forward reasonable compromise terms. There can be no settlement when the other side arrogantly declaims to the gallery and demands capitulation.

Almost exactly one year ago, the United States halted all bombing of North Vietnam on the understanding that "prompt, productive, serious and intensive negotiations" would follow.

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Our Government was led to believe that the bombing itself was the major obstacle to peace. The United States was told this repeatedly by many, both at home and abroad. President Johnson courageously took the risk of removing that so-called obstacle. I supported his decision.

But I must tell you tonight that it is the sober and considered judgment of this Government that the genuine negotiations we expected have not yet taken place.

And I would remind you: This is after one long year -- a year of still more bloodshed and suffering in South Vietnam.

When I assumed the Presidency, I found that the other side had met the U.S. concession of a bombing halt with continued ferocity on the battlefield and sterile posturing in Paris.

Nonetheless, I resolved to take still more new initiatives for peace through patient and flexible diplomacy. This Administration has altered our negotiating position significantly in the direction of compromise and conciliation.

-- We did not insist that the other side stop doing what it was doing before the United States moved in the direction of settlement.

-- We did not insist that the other side declare in advance what they would do before the United States began the

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process of de-escalation through withdrawal of combat forces.

Indeed, we took the very course of action which was urged upon us by so many critics. We seized the initiative for peace, trusting -- as we were assured we could -- that the other side was willing to respond and follow suit.

-- Nor did we even insist that the other side acknowledge that it was following suit. For, as you know, North Vietnam has never admitted what is known to all the world -- that troops of the North Vietnamese Army have been fighting in South Vietnam for years.

-- We have asked only that mutual de-escalation and mutual withdrawal take place in fact. That the Paris peace talks move as rapidly as possible toward a settlement through genuine negotiation.

Thus we did not seek to humiliate our foe. Indeed, we went further by offering bold new proposals designed to engage him in honorable compromise.

-- This Administration offered -- as a major step toward peace -- to negotiate the details of a mutual withdrawal

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over a period of twelve months, provided only that some safeguard in the form of international supervision is part of the agreement.

-- We have proposed -- again in a major new initiative -- that free elections take place in South Vietnam, and pledged to accept their outcome, whatever it might be. We accepted National Liberation Front participation in those elections, as well as a role in organizing them.

-- We proposed an international supervisory body for overseeing such elections and verifying withdrawals. We also said such a body could help arrange a supervised cease-fire.

-- Moreover, we told the other side clearly that we would entertain any alternative proposals they might have for self-determination in South Vietnam.

As the most concrete demonstration of our good faith and desire to reach a settlement, this Administration began the withdrawal of American combat forces. Where the previous four years had seen only the continued buildup of American forces in Vietnam, reaching a ceiling of 549,500 men, it was this Administration that started the process of withdrawal. The ceiling is now down to 484,000. By December 15, we will have withdrawn at least 60,000 men. Some

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have argued that this number is insignificant. I ask them if they would consider the same number to be insignificant if it counted men being added rather than withdrawn.

I can reveal now what Hanoi was clearly able to observe -- that several months ago I changed General Abrams' orders to modify the strategy and tactics of our forces remaining on the battlefields of South Vietnam, in order to cut back offensive operations and thereby reduce the intensity of the fighting and the scale of casualties on both sides.

Our B-52 operations have been reduced by about 20 per cent. And, since their high point early this year, our tactical air missions have been cut by about 25 per cent.

Thus, by both word and deed, we have explicitly ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution.

We have also announced the withdrawal by next summer of 6,000 U.S. fighting men from Thailand.

With resultant reductions in the overall level of U.S. armed forces, we have accordingly reduced our military draft.

These were all major new steps which clearly demonstrated our readiness to end this war on reasonable terms.

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We are ready to continue the process of diplomatic compromise and military de-escalation, if only the other side acts in good faith.

Yet, in taking these initiatives for peace, my fellow citizens, I realized there was the danger that Hanoi -- in the grip of a distorted perception of the United States -- would tragically misunderstand our policy.

-- That they would see our will to peace as weakness.

-- That they would see our hopeful de-escalation as headlong retreat.

-- That they would judge us willing to endure both indifference in Paris and mounting savagery on the battlefield.

-- That they would suspect our public resolve for peace disguised a private resignation to surrender.

-- That they would believe, most wrongly, that the American people lacked the will to call them to account for their cynical refusal to compromise.

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-- That they would believe that their fanaticism would outlast what they saw as our national fatigue.

I decided shortly after taking office that we had to do all we could possibly do to bring an honorable peace to Vietnam. At the same time, I repeatedly warned Hanoi that they should not mistake our purpose or abuse our patience.

In my address to you on May 14, I said, "But no greater mistake could be made than to confuse flexibility with weakness or of being reasonable with lack of resolution. I must also make clear, in all candor, that if needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay." These words were not said lightly.

This warning was privately confirmed to Hanoi's chief negotiator in Paris at the beginning of August. He was informed that if no major progress toward a settlement of the war had been made by the first of November, we would be compelled to take measures of the greatest consequence.

But tonight -- after months of the most thorough study and deliberation -- I must report to you that Hanoi has indeed made a tragic miscalculation of our will and purpose. They have not heeded

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our clear warnings. They have refused to credit the word of the United States.

-- Denouncing our every initiative as a fraud, they have treated negotiations as a forum for U.S. capitulation.

-- Judging the U.S. position untenable, they have stubbornly refused to alter their own.

-- Believing victory over freedom inevitable, they have seen no need for compromise.

I must tell you that their only answer to our many offers has been a monotonous demand for our own humiliation and the destruction of the South Vietnamese Government.

They have laughed in private meetings at our negotiators' frustration. And they have responded to our words of moderation with vituperative insult. In my speech at the United Nations on September 18 I said, "When the war ends, we stand willing to help the people of Vietnam -- all of them -- in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction." I also said that "the people of Vietnam, North and South, have endured an unspeakable weight of suffering for a generation. And they deserve a better future." Hanoi's response to these words was only name

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calling. Radio broadcasts referred to a "bellicose, brutal and cunning imperialist," to our nation's "bellicose acts and colonialist policy." These are the words only of blind and reckless hostility.

The record here is unmistakable. Within a few days, the U.S. Government will publish the complete documentary record -- public and private -- of our search for peace in the face of the unmitigated intransigence of North Vietnam. The world can judge for itself who has prolonged this tragic war.

This record will show, in addition to our warning at the beginning of August, a series of very private efforts we have made to find a reasonable settlement.

-- Before the inauguration in January, I made a private offer of a rapid settlement of all the issues involved. This was rejected.

-- In April, the Soviet Union's Ambassador here in Washington was given a proposal of direct and rapid talks on all questions, specifically including political issues. No reply was received.

-- In May, I personally repeated this proposal to the Ambassador. Again, there has been no reply.

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-- In June, we attempted to send an emissary to Hanoi to offer direct negotiations on all the issues involved. After arriving in Laos, he was refused a visa for entrance into North Vietnam, although he had been led to believe that he would be received in Hanoi. He left a message with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Laos. There has been no reply.

-- At the end of June, we offered to send another emissary to Hanoi to establish direct talks. He also was refused entry.

-- On August 4, my Assistant for National Security Affairs held a secret meeting with Hanoi's chief negotiator in Paris. He emphasized our flexibility and desire to achieve a reasonable compromise. In addition to reviewing our previous offers, he made several points clear:

. We realized, he said, that neither side could be expected to give up at the conference table what had not been conceded on the battlefield, and that a fair political process must register the existing relationship of political forces.

. We knew that we differed from them on how to achieve this, but we also believed that neither side should be

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asked to accept the proposition that there is such a thing as a disguised defeat.

- We were not asking them to disband their organized political forces and they should not ask for the destruction of the organized non-Communist political forces.
- Finally, he said that in order to demonstrate our good will in the period between then and November 1st, we would make another withdrawal of American troops and reduce our B-52 and tactical air operations by 10 per cent.

There has been no direct response to that conversation.

This record confronts the United States with fateful but clearcut choices.

We can go on, as some suggest, in one-sided unrequited concessions. We can slowly withdraw our forces despite the proven intransigence of the enemy. But let no one call this the way to peace.

-- For we must face the cruel fact the enemy has it in his power to continue killing too many American men, and is doing so.

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-- I therefore cannot take the responsibility for basing our policy on the continued withdrawal of American troops, under these conditions, exposing those remaining to ever greater risks at the hands of an enemy who shows no will to peace.

-- While Hanoi may be willing to condemn its sons to endless bloodletting, I will not do so with ours.

-- We insist on a fair settlement now.

Or, some argue that this slaughter could be ended by precipitate withdrawal.

But let no one call this the way to peace. Let no one believe that a forced and hasty retreat by the U.S. will somehow end the killing in South Vietnam.

-- Just the opposite. For South Vietnam, a nation still struggling toward adequate self-defense, the sudden withdrawal of our support would inevitably invite the cruel retribution of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

-- Here, too, the calculus is plain. Terror and barbarism have plagued the villages of Vietnam for a decade. With

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a sudden collapse of our vital support, the massacres at Hue and the recurrent atrocities in the contested countryside could well become the nightmare of the entire nation.

-- Though we had made a commitment to free choice and started South Vietnam to self-sufficiency in defense, this course would leave the issue once more to untold violence.

-- Nor would the South Vietnamese bear alone the consequences of our rapid retreat. We, too, would pay a bitter price: in dangerous vindication of those among our enemies who advocate violence, in the collapse of our friends' confidence in America and, most of all, in the loss of America's confidence in herself.

I cannot choose either of these courses. I was not elected to preside over the senseless attrition of American lives by a deluded foe. To abandon trusting friends to a long night of terror. To shatter our integrity as a nation.

Thus, our course is clear.

Continued bloodshed on the battlefield and Hanoi's rigidity at the peace table have taught us there is but one other choice.

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Hanoi and her allies have long believed that this nation would accept a humiliating defeat, that our Government would have no alternative but to submit to the surrender demanded of us in Paris.

Hanoi has misjudged the strength of the American people. Our enemies have mistaken debate for defeatism.

After difficult and careful consideration, I have decided that we have no choice but to prove to Hanoi that we mean to have an honorable peace in Vietnam.

That decision had to be my responsibility. It is our common responsibility -- yours and mine -- to demonstrate our unflinching resolve to end this war now.

Today, pursuant to my order . . . . .

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I want to make several points quite clear:

-- First, our political objective is precise. We seek to prove to the leaders of North Vietnam that they have no alternative but prompt and genuine negotiations to settle this conflict. We take this action not to interrupt the process of negotiation, but to see it begin at last. Not to make new demands, but to find an honest compromise. We retain our flexible and conciliatory stand in Paris, ready to respond to any reasonable proposal by the other side. Naturally, we pray that their response comes soon, for the sake of their own people.

-- Second, our military action has been measured. It will be swift, punishing and concentrated in a short period of time. We are not resuming the daily bombing of limited targets in North Vietnam. When our action is completed, in a few days, Hanoi will have an interval in which to respond by demonstrating a will to peaceful and productive negotiation.

-- Third, our aims are limited. We do not require the destruction or surrender of North Vietnam. We do seek

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reasonable compromise at the peace table. But Hanoi must now make this choice.

-- We seek no expansion of the conflict. We seek its end. We covet no territory in Southeast Asia. We seek no confrontation with the Soviet Union or China. Our actions are directed against North Vietnam, and North Vietnam alone. But we will take steps within those limits to make our action effective. And the fateful choice of outside powers to involve themselves in this action will be theirs.

I accompany our action today with a call for renewed effort in every quarter to halt this war.

-- I call upon the leaders of North Vietnam to understand finally that a just and mutually-agreed settlement is the only way to bring peace, true independence, and an eventual reconciliation to both North and South Vietnam. Their brave people have already suffered too much for the twisted dream of conquest in the South. Continued intransigence by their leaders will only compound their agony.

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-- I call once again upon the Soviet Union -- in its own interest -- to use its influence with Hanoi to bring an end to this war. If the leaders of the Soviet Union truly desire an era of negotiation rather than confrontation, let them at last begin with Vietnam. But let them also know that we will not be deflected from our course.

-- I say to our friends in South Vietnam that our resolve to find an honorable settlement is stronger than ever before. Let us fortify our firmness in battle with a new spirit of compromise when genuine talks begin.

-- And finally, I ask you, My fellow Americans, for the same strong support you have always given your President in a moment of trial.

For at this moment, we can only stand together in purpose and determination.

As so often in the past, we Americans did not choose this test of strength. It was clearly forced upon us by an adversary, indifferent to our peaceful purpose and heedless of our resolve.

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Let there be no mistake that we have any other choice.

We must face the fact that doubt and debate now can only mislead our enemy and prolong the bloodshed.

This has been at once, my fellow Americans, a most difficult yet most inescapable decision.

For that very reason, it is irreversible.

We cannot have the peace we cherish unless we act to secure it -- and act together.

Tonight, that fact is as plain as ever before in our history.

Our road ahead is clear, and there is no turning back. I know that if we travel it together, as we must, we will end this bitter war.

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By th NARA Date 11/6/05

IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

The following list of important questions is based upon our examination of the Vietnam alternative course of action to date. While the list is certainly not complete, we should have a very good idea of the answers to these questions before adoption of such an action. The questions are presented in the general order in which they would occur if we proceeded with the course.

a. General.

1. What are the prospects of success for this course of action? How would we measure it? What are the consequences -- favorable and unfovorable -- of our succeeding in this manner? Of our failing in this manner?

2. How hard hitting should we make the first phase? Should the second and subsequent phases be tailored for roughly equal impact, or should they be stepped up in over-all impact? To what limit of force should we be prepared to go in order to spur meaningful negotiations? Should we be prepared to use nuclear weapons?

3. Should we make any major readjustments in our current military posture?

b. In the Period Before the First Phase.

1. What should be the nature, channel, and timing of warnings to Hanoi? How would Hanoi, Moscow, and others react to warnings? Would warnings affect military operations through loss of surprise? Should we undertake warning actions, such as increasing certain reconnaissance flights or early readying of forces?

2. What should be our diplomatic stance during this period? Shoud we offer more -- perhaps only to build the record further -- or would this be a sign of weakness or duplicity?

3. What signals or actions by the other side would persuade us not to proceed?

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4. How would we relate the decision to proceed and the many political and diplomatic actions with the vagaries of the weather?

5. To what extent should we consult with our allies? When should we do it?

c. During the First Phase.

1. How should we determine how long the phase should last? Will we be able to measure the attack effectiveness as we proceed? If not, how will this affect the operation?

2. What would be the likelihood and consequences of military failure? What can be done to compensate for unexpected eventualities, such as a long period of bad weather? Can we achieve a minimum desired effectiveness by alternative means?

3. What actions by Hanoi would be sufficient to merit our halting the attack before it is completed?

4. What military actions should we undertake concurrently, e.g., should we alert our strategic and/or the various theater forces? What reinforcing actions would be appropriate in SVN, recognizing that there would be a substantial reduction of tactical air support available in country?

5. How would we handle the likely immediate reactions of the USSR, Communist China, and other foreign countries? What preparations should be made?

6. How would we deal with the likely domestic reaction? What preparations should be made? (These questions fall outside our competence.)

d. Interval Between Phases.

1. What specific responses are we looking for? How would we respond to vague signals of willingness to talk seriously? How would we react to enemy actions which seem promising but are unacknowledged by them?

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2. What measures would we be prepared to take against targets within NVN if we found them to be effectively countering our sea quarantine, e.g., a key railroad bridge between Hanoi and China? Would we permit air or naval response to coastal battery fire against our quarantine forces?

3. What diplomatic stance should we adopt during the interval?

4. If Hanoi responds in a manner acceptable to us, should we offer to assist in removing the mines? Alternatively, should we simply not interfere with NVN sweeping and bypassing efforts and allow the mines to remain active for their present time?

5. How long should we wait before initiating a second phase of attacks? (Most of the questions concerning Phase I would apply to this and subsequent phases.)

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NARA Date 11/1.05

Cable from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Wheeler to General Holloway, CINCSAC.

October 10, 1969.

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

SENSITIVE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY-SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO

DTG Oct 10 22 05 Z 69

COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: GEN WHEELER, CHAIRMAN, JCS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CJCS
J-3

TO: ~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

GEN HOLLOWAY, CINCSAC
ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC
GEN GOODPASTER, CINCEUR
ADM HOLMES, CINCLANT
GEN MCKEE, CINCNORAD/CONAD
GEN THROCKMORTON, CINCSTRIKE
GEN MATHER, CINSO
LGEN RUEGG, CINCAL

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SENSITIVE JCS 12650 OCT 69

1. WE HAVE BEEN DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE A SERIES OF ACTIONS DURING THE PERIOD 130000Z - 250000Z OCT, TO TEST OUR MILITARY READINESS IN SELECTED AREAS WORLD-WIDE TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BY THE SOVIET UNION. THESE ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT NOT THREATENING IN THEMSELVES. THEY MAY INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING TYPE ACTIONS:

ZFF-3

EYES ONLY

A. STAND-DOWN OF FLYING OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS, TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL READINESS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE	TIME
10	1800
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: RADM F. A. BARDSHAR, USN
VDIR J3

PHONE: 56243

EYES ONLY

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Paul M Kearney
Administrative Assistant

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SENSITIVE

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS: GP-1

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 63 WHICH WILL BE USED.

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFI[redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE			
INFO			

B. IMPLEMENTATION OF RADIO AND/OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SILENCE IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS.

C. INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPS EN ROUTE TO NORTH VIETNAM.

D. INCREASED GROUND ALERT RATE OF SAC BOMBERS AND TANKERS.

2. TO INITIATE ACTIONS WITHIN THE TIME FRAME SPECIFIED, CERTAIN COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO STAND-DOWN TRAINING FLIGHTS AND INTRODUCE VARYING DEGREES OF EMCON. THESE INITIAL ACTIONS WILL COVER THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF THE 14-DAY PERIOD.

3. I REQUEST THAT YOU NOMINATE FURTHER ACTIONS COMPATIBLE WITH THE GUIDANCE HEREIN, AND COGNIZANT OF LOCAL PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO YOUR AREAS, ALLIES, AND ENVIRONMENT. THESE NOMINATIONS ARE REQUIRED NLT 122300Z. ACTIONS PROPOSED SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH PROJECT 703.

4. WARM REGARDS. GP-1

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
GP-1	~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH WILL BE USED.

Point Paper for the Chairman, JCS for a Meeting with the President. Subject Plan for US Military Readiness.

October 10, 1969.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SEI .TIVE

Point paper for the Chairman, JCS, for a meeting with the President.

Subject: Plan for US Military Readiness

MAIN THRUST OF POINT PAPER

- Initial actions have been taken to achieve readiness posture with selected US forces for the period 12-25 October 1969. Posture will be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening.

ACTIONS TAKEN

- CINCSAC
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 13 October 1969 stand-down all training flights until further advised.
  - Reinstate degraded alert sorties to maximum extent possible.
    - (Actions taken will not affect SEA operations).
- CINCPAC
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights within the Korean ADIZ until further advised.
  - Reinstate degraded SIOP alert sorties extent feasible.
  - Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.
- USCINCEUR
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights until further advised.
  - Sixth Fleet operate maximum practicable EMCON commensurate with safety.
  - Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.
- CINCSTRIKE/CINCONAD
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights.
  - Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

SECOND PHASE OF OPERATIONS

- Dispatched personal message to CINCs which:
  - Alerts them to forthcoming operation.
  - Requests their nomination further actions which can be taken under guidelines provided.
  - All actions taken will be compatible with Project 703.
- Reaction from CINCs expected NLT 1900 EDT, 12 October - basis for further activity will stem from these inputs.

APPROVED BY _____ Director, J-3

DJS _____ (Concur)(Nonconcur)

Prepared by: Col Jack L. Buckley, USAF
Acting Deputy Director for
Commands/Areas
Operations Directorate

TOP SECRET

Cable from CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RE: Military Readiness

October 12, 1969

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 921140
By WDP NARA Date 8-28-02

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~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

OK

W

DISTRIBUTION PER CJCS:
ACTION: LTG VOGT (DJ-3)
INFO: VADM JOHNSON (DJS)
GEN WESTMORELAND (CSA)
GEN RYAN (CSAF)
ADM MOORER (CNO)
GEN CHAPMAN (CMC)

PRIORITY

12 OCTOBER 1969

P R 112355Z ZFF-6

FM ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC, HAWAII

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH D.C.

INFO GEN HAINES, CINCUSARPAC

ADM HYLAND, CINCPACFLT

GEN NAZZARO, CINCPACAF

ZEN/LGEN BUSE, CG FMFPAC

ZEM

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

MILITARY READINESS (U)

A. CJCS 192205Z OCT 69 (NOTAL)

1. REF A LISTED TYPES OF ACTION TO BE INSTITUTED DURING THE PERIOD 13-25 OCTOBER TO TEST OUR MILITARY READINESS TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BY THE SOVIET UNION AND REQUESTED NOMINATION OF FURTHER ACTIONS.

2. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO ACTIONS LISTED IN PARA 1 OF REF A:

A. STAND-DOWN OF FLYING OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL READINESS. CONCUR EXCEPT FOR SEASIA.

B. IMPLEMENTATION OF RADIO AND/OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SILENCE IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS. CONCUR.

C. INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPS ENROUTE TO NORTH

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
1ST REVIEW DATE: 5/24/02 DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: ERDC DD 1 CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: John Stoudnacl 2 CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: FRD
3 CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
2ND REVIEW DATE: 5/31/02 4 COORDINATE WITH: JCS
AUTHORITY: DD 5 CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 921140
By [illegible] NARA Date 8/28/02

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 921140
By WP NARA Date 8-28-02

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

VIETNAM. CONCUR. WHERE FEASIBLE, RECOMMEND INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPS WORLD-WIDE.

FOIA(b)1

FOIA(b)1

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE IN PARA 3 OF REF A, COGNIZANCE OF EXERCISE HIGH HEELS HAS BEEN TAKEN. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE NOMINATED:

X? CINCPAC

FOIA(b)1

DoE (b)(3)

FOIA(b)1

B. WITHIN BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS AND WITH FULL CONSIDERATION OF MORALE AND OTHER FACTORS AND, ON A SELECTED BASIS, INCREASE READINESS POSTURE OF FLEET UNITS.

C. WITHIN BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS, INTENSIFY OCEAN SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS.

X D. WITHIN OPERATING LIMITATIONS AND PEACETIME ROE, ACTIVELY PROSECUTE SUBMARINE CONTACTS.

X? E. [redacted] CONSIDER MOVEMENT OF EMPTY COMMANDO CHUM BACK-UP AIRCRAFT TO JAPAN AND RETURN. DoE (b)(3)

X F. INCREASE READINESS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AIRCRAFT AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE SYSTEMS.

X G. DEPLOY OF ADDITIONAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO KOREA.

X H. CONSIDER EXECUTION OF SR-71 SORITES IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

X I. INCREASE COLLEGE EYE OPERATIONS IN YELLOW SEA/SEA OF JAPAN.

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

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Authority NND 921140
By WOp NARA Date 8-28-02
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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

J. CURTAIL TRAINING FLIGHTS IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA.

K. ESTABLISH DISCREET LIAISON WITH CIVILIAN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AUTHORITIES IN SELECTED AREAS FOR SIMULATED USE OF ALTITUDE RESERVATIONS.

L. [redacted] DoE (WO).

M. WITHOUT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, RECALL PERSONNEL, EXCEPT FOR THOSE ON LEAVE AND TDY, DURING NON-DUTY HOURS.

N. INCREASE INTELLIGENCE WATCH.

O. INCREASE LOCAL SECURITY AND ANTI-SABOTAGE MEASURES AT MILITARY FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS.

P. AUGMENT PERSONNEL IN PRIMARY COMMAND CENTERS.

Q. ACTIVATE ALTERNATE COMMAND CENTERS.

R. INCREASE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES TO INHIBIT SOVIET COLLECTION EFFORTS. SPECIFICALLY, CONSIDER JAMMING OF SOVIET ELINT AND COMINT COLLECTORS, PARTICULARLY THOSE OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF SSBN BASES.

S. [redacted] FOIA(b)1

T. CONSIDER INCREASING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE OF SELECTED FOREIGN NATIONALS IN U.S.

U. [redacted] FOIA(b)1

V. CONSIDER SELECTIVE EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM U.S. BASES.

W. TERMINATE EXERCISE HIGH HEELS TO COINCIDE WITH INITATION OF

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

Authority NND 921140
By WOp NARA Date 8-28-02

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

EMCON BY TF71.

4. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT ONE OF THE ACTIONS MOST DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS WOULD BE TO RESCHEDULE WORLD-WIDE RECONNAISSANCE, INCLUDING PARPRO, ALONG THE SOVIET PERIPHERY INCLUDING CONTINUOUS 24-HOUR COVERAGE IN SELECTED AREAS AND MAXIMUM USE OF AIR-TO-GROUND DATA TRANSMISSION. HOWEVER, PARPRO CHANGES IN PACOM ARE NOT RECOMMENDED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. UNDER CURRENT RULES, ADEQUATE LEAD TIME IS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH ORDERLY CHANGES IN THE PROGRAM.

B. THE STAND-DOWN OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT FOR INCREASED READINESS PROPOSED ABOVE AND IN REF A WILL IMPACT UPON THE FORCES NORMALLY AVAILABLE FOR PARPRO PROTECTION.

C. STAND-DOWN WOULD REDUCE INTELLIGENCE TAKE.

D. CHANGES IN PARPRO PATTERNS AND PROTECTION PLANS COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN INCREASED RISK TO PARPRO AIRCRAFT.

5. RECOMMEND ACTIONS ADOPTED BE DESIGNED TO CAUSE MINIMUM INTERFERENCE WITH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. EFFORT IN SEASIA.

6. VERY RESPECTFULLY. WARM REGARDS. GP-1.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

Cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCPAC

RE: Increased Readiness Posture

October 17, 1969

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 921140
By WP NARA Date 8-28-02
Reproduced at the National Archives

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SAN... SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~-NOFORN-SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

MSG CHANGED TO EXCLUSIVE PER MESSAGE

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	Oc

17 22 24 69

SPECAT

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: IMMEDIATE

INFO: IMMEDIATE

DTG

FROM: JCS

TO: CINCPAC

INFO: CINCSAC
CINCAL

2792

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

REFS: A. CINCPAC 112355Z OCT 69 (BOM); B. JCS 12650/102205Z OCT 69 (BOM); C. JCS 2075/102209Z OCT 69; D. DEF 2139/111838Z OCT 69; E. JCS 2140/112058Z OCT 69.

1. ~~(TS)~~ FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REF A, WHICH WERE IN RESPONSE TO REF B, REFS C THROUGH E ARE EXPANDED AS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ACTIONS SHOULD COMMENCE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, AND BE CONTINUED UNTIL FURTHER DIRECTED BY THE JCS.

A. AS FEASIBLE AND WITHOUT DISRUPTION OF SIOP COMMITMENT, ENHANCE SIOP NAVAL FORCES AT SEA BY:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Gen Wheeler JS
Adm Johnson
Gen Voght
Adm Moorer
Gen Westmoreland
Gen Chapman
Gen Ryan
DDO/NMCC

2 of 3

4/5

DATE	TIME
17	1800
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

DRAFTER
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: LTC W. R. USHER, USAF
PACIFIC DIVISION, J-3
PHONE: 77254

RELEASER
SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Paul M Kearney
Administrative Assistant
to Chairman JCS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~-NOFORN-SPECAT

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH WILL BE USED.

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Administrative and Criminal Sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination. Section 144.b, Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 921140
By WP NARA Date 8-28-02

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
1ST REVIEW DATE: 5/6/02 DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: DADC DO 1 CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: DAN STEINBERG 2 CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: FRD

Authority NND 921140
By WDP NARA Date 8-28-02
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

(1) ALTERING SSBN PATROL SCHEDULE TO MAINTAIN MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SSBN'S AT SEA.

(2) [redacted]

B. [redacted] DELAY ANY PLANNED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PROGRAMMED DEACTIVATION UNTIL 30 OCT 69.

Doc (1)(c)

C. [redacted]

D. COMMENCING 18 OCT 69, INCREASE READINESS OF CONVENTIONALLY ARMED TACTICAL AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE SYSTEMS.

E. STANDDOWN US MILITARY TRAINING FLIGHTS WITHIN THE JAPAN AND OKINAWA ADIZS. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO PERFORM SELECTIVE FLYING TRAINING IN THE KOREA, JAPAN, AND OKINAWA ADIZS DURING THE PERIOD 18-24 OCT 69. FLIGHTS SHOULD BE HELD TO THE MINIMUM COMMENSURATE WITH CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT

DD FORM 172-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH WILL BE USED.

Authority NND 921140
By WDP NARA Date 8-28-02
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

F. WITHIN RESOURCES AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PEACETIME ROE, COMMENCING 21 OCT 69, INCREASE SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET VESSELS ENROUTE TO NVN AND IN THE ALCOM AREA.

G. INCREASE LOCAL SECURITY AND ANTI-SABOTAGE MEASURES AT US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND IN JAPAN.

H. INCREASE INTELLIGENCE WATCH THROUGHOUT PACOM AREA EXCEPT SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I. AT YOUR DISCRETION, AUGMENT THE PERSONNEL IN PRIMARY COMMAND CENTERS AND, ON A SELECTED BASIS, ACTIVATE ALTERNATE COMMAND POSTS.

J. CONDUCT EXERCISE FOCUS LENS ON 22 OCT - 1 NOV 69 AS PRESENTLY PLANNED.

2. ~~(TS-NF)~~ IN IMPLEMENTING THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE, ASSURE THAT THERE IS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

3. ~~(S-NF)~~ USING NORMAL REPORTING PROCEDURES, REPORT WHEN ACTIONS DESCRIBED HEREIN HAVE BEEN COMPLETED OR WHEN DESIRED POSTURE HAS BEEN ATTAINED.

AS INDICATED IN REF C, DO NOT CHANGE DEFCON. GP-1.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIA
		3	3		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT	

OK IW

DD FORM 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH WILL BE USED.

Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Earle Wheeler to the Secretary of Defense

RE: US Military Readiness Tests - Worldwide

October 22, 1969

Reproduced at the National Archives

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-4664-69
22 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Cy 1-2 handcarried by Sgt Klein 1845

Subject: US Military Readiness Tests - Worldwide

1. ~~(TS)~~ Reference is made to my CM-4645-69, 16 October 1969, subject: "Additional Actions for US Military Readiness Tests - Worldwide." As outlined in the reference, a point in time was selected when certain CINC actions could be terminated if Soviet reaction had occurred.

2. ~~(TS)~~ In the CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA area, we had designated the 22nd of October 1969 as a date to assess reaction to the movement of three MIDEASTFOR ships into the Gulf of Aden for a three-day exercise.

3. ~~(TS)~~ The US naval actions in the Gulf of Aden are believed to have caused a change in the Soviet naval posture in that area. Two major Soviet surface combatants, heading north in the Red Sea for a scheduled 24-31 October visit to a UAR port, reversed course probably late on the 20th, returned to the Gulf of Aden early on the 21st, and continued east southeast toward the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean as of today. Four additional Soviet units appear to be en route from the Seychelles north toward the Arabian Sea.

4. ~~(TS)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have assessed the situation based on intelligence received and recommended continuation of US exercise activity in the Gulf of Aden area until 27 October. We will continue to monitor Soviet reaction and make another assessment at that time.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Cy 3. CSA
4. CNO
5. CSAF
6. CMC
7. DJS
8. J-3
9. Chron
10. CSG
11. CM
12. FEBO

cy 12 of ____ copies
13. Col Jackson

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NOFORN - SENSITIVE

SM Worldwide Readiness Test (22 Oct 69)
Oct 69

Cable from Strategic Air Command Headquarters to Air Divisions

RE: Increased Readiness Posture

October 23, 1969

Ex. 27

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

PREPARED WITH

[redacted]

X

231200Z Oct 69

IMMEDIATE

HQ SAC

12AD DAVIS MONTHAN AFB ARIZ

17AD WHITEMAN AFB MO

19AD CARSWELL AFB TEX

47AD CASTLE AFB CAL

98STRATWG TORREJON AB SPAIN

2AF COMMAND POST BARKSDALE AFB LA

8AF COMMAND POST WESTOVER AFB MASS

15AF COMMAND POST MARCH AFB CALIF

2BOMBWG COMMAND POST, BARKSDALE AFB LA

5BOMBWG COMMAND POST MINOT AFB N DAK

7BOMBWG COMMAND POST CARSWELL AFB TEX

9STRATRECONWG COMMAND POST BEALE AFB CAL

11AREFSQ COMMAND POST ALTUS AFB OKLA

17BOMBWG COMMAND POST WRIGHT-PATT AFB OHIO

19BOMBWG COMMAND POST ROBINS AFB GA

22BOMBWG COMMAND POST MARCH AFB CAL

28BOMBWG COMMAND POST, ELLSWORTH AFB S DAK

42BOMBWG COMMAND POST, LORING AFB MAINE

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
IG	
DI	
DPL	Martin
DM	
DO	
DOPL	
DM2	
DM4	
DM8	
IGS	
DM4	
DM28	
DOCO	
DOO	
DOECOC	
DOCOCS	
DOSR	
DEPI	
DOPLP	
DOPLR	

RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC
CURRENT PLANS BRANCH

4753

CY 1 OF 1 CYS
(SECOND SERIES)

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

12 69-DOPLP-497

TUF TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)
	DOPLPC	LTC McDONALD				

Ex. 27

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE INFO		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753

43BOMBWG COMMAND POST LITTLE ROCK AFB ARK

55STRATRECONWG COMMAND POST OFFUTT AFB NEBR

68BOMBWG COMMAND POST, SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC

70BOMBWG COMMAND POST CLINTON SHERMAN AFB OKLA

72BOMBWG COMMAND POST, RAMEY AFB PR

92STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST, FAIRCHILD AFB WASH

93BOMBWG COMMAND POST, CASTLE AFB CALIF

95STRATWG COMMAND POST GOOSE AB CANADA

96STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST DYESS AFB TEX

97BOMBWG COMMAND POST BLYTHEVILLE AFB ARK

99BOMBWG COMMAND POST WESTOVER AFB MASS

100STRATRECONWG DAVIS, MONTHAN AFB ARIZ

301AIRFLWG COMMAND POST LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO

305BOMBWG COMMAND POST GRISSOM AFB IND

306BOMBWG COMMAND POST MCCOY AFB FLA

319BOMBWG COMMAND POST GRAND FORKS AFB D DAK

320BOMBWG COMMAND POST, MATHER AFB CALIF

379BOMBWG COMMAND POST WURTSMITH AFB MICH

380STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST, PLATTSBURGH AFB N Y

410BOMBWG COMMAND POST K I SAWYER AFB MICH

416BOMBWG COMMAND POST GRIFFISS AFB N Y

13

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	8		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

FORM 1721

Ex. 27

ABBREVIATED [illegible]NT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

[illegible]URITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

449 BOMBWG COMMAND POST, KINCHELOE AFB MICH

916 AREFSQ COMMAND POST, TRAVIS AFB CALIF

456 STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST, BEALE AFB CALIF

SAC CONTROLLER, EIELSON AFB ALASKA

509 BOMBWG COMMAND POST, PEASE AFB NH

TOP SECRET DO ~~CINCSAC~~ JOPREP JIFFY 37331 OCT 69. ARU SAC DOCOCS

SUBJECT: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

REF: A. TS CINCSAC JJ 3661 B. TS DO JJ 3694 C. TS DO JJ 3709 D. SEC DOOK JJ 0118

PART I. MAINTENANCE GENERATION

1. THIS MESSAGE IS IN ADDITION TO REFERENCED MESSAGES, SAME SUBJECT. ALL UNITS EXCEPT 93BW, 340BG, RECONNAISSANCE AND TANKER RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT UNITS WILL COMMENCE GENERATION, AT A TIME SELECTED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER, OF ALL CATEGORY CHARLIE AND FOXTROT SORTIES FOR WHICH AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE. GENERATION MAY BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITS EWO FLOW PLANS, OR EXTENDED TO ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE TIME PERIOD AVAILABLE. AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AUTHORIZED FLYING AND MAINTENANCE COMMITMENTS NEED NOT BE GENERATED. THIS INCLUDES THE SEVEN TANKERS THAT DEPLOY IN SUPPORT OF 22BW AND 92SAW SEAGA AS OUTLINED IN PART II. GENERATION MUST BE COMPLETED NOT LATER THAN 0800 LOCAL, 25 OCT, YOUR STATION EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT LANDING TOO LATE TO BE GENERATED BY THIS TIME. THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE GENERATED ASAP. THE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED FOR SNOW TIME 70-2 ECHO ON 28-29 OCT NEED NOT BE GENERATED UNTIL COMPLETION OF THAT MISSION.

2. AIRCRAFT WILL BE FULLY EWO CONFIGURED. THESE AIRCRAFT

14

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	Group 1	3	8		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Excluded From Automatic Downgrading And	[redacted]

DD FORM 1 Declassification

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

WILL BE SCHEDULED, PREPARED AND ACCEPTED IN THE SAME MANNER AS ANY OTHER UNIT ALERT AIRCRAFT. AN AIRCREW WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIRCRAFT. CMF AND SEALED AUTHENTICATORS WILL NOT BE ON BOARD, AND THE COCKING CHECKLIST WILL NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED. UNITS MAY, REPEAT MAY USE ALERT AIRCREWS AND GROUND CREWS TO PERFORM ACCEPTANCE PRE-FLIGHTS, SUBSEQUENT PRE-FLIGHTS AND SYSTEM OPERATIONS AS INDICATED IN PARA 3A THIS MESSAGE.

3. GROUND CREW PERSONNEL NEED NOT BE ASSIGNED TO THE GENERATED AIRCRAFT, AND CONSEQUENTLY MAY BE RELEASED FOR OTHER FLIGHT LINE DUTIES. ADEQUATE SUPERVISION WILL BE MAINTAINED OVER THESE WEAPON LOADED AIRCRAFT AND A CREW CHIEF WILL BE ASSIGNED PRIOR TO AIRCREW ARRIVAL IF THE SORTIE IS DIRECTED TO BE MANNED.

A. A DESIGNATED CREW CHIEF WILL PERFORM OR ASSIST IN THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULED ACTIVITY ON UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.

(1) A DAILY WALK-AROUND INSPECTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED TO CHECK FOR OBVIOUS EXTERNAL DEFECTS, AND FUEL, OIL AND HYD LEAKS.

(2) CONCURRENTLY WITH TIRE ROTATION (APPROX EVERY 3 DAYS) CHECK QUANTITY AND PRESSURE GAUGES IN THE HYDRAULIC, PNEUMATIC, AND OXYGEN SYSTEMS.

(3) THREE TIMES PER MONTH (7 TO 14 DAY INTERVAL) AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WILL BE EXERCISED. THIS OPERATION WILL

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		4	8		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS [illegible] Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

ABBREVIATED [illegible] IT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

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INFO			

INCLUDE ENGINE RUN CONDUCTED BY AVAILABLE FLIGHT CREWS. THE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE TAXIED FOR OTHER THAN TIRE ROTATION.

4. "GENERATED" AIRCRAFT WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THE MONTHLY AND WEEKLY SCHEDULES AND WILL REMAIN WITHIN THE 7-42 DAY CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN SACM 178-1, VOL I. SINCE THESE "GENERATED" AIRCRAFT ARE NOT COCKED, MAINTENANCE MAY BE PERFORMED AT ANY TIME (T.O. 11A-1-33 PERMITTING). FSAGA REQUIREMENTS ARE WAIVED FOR ALL ALERT AND "GENERATED" AIRCRAFT DURING THIS PERIOD.

A. WHILE IN "GENERATED" STATUS, THE AIRCRAFT WILL BELONG TO MAINTENANCE, AND ACCESS CONTROLLED BY A MAINTENANCE SAC FORM 380.

B. ALL CALENDAR INSPECTIONS AND ACTIONS (I.E. FUEL SUMP DRAINING, ETC.) WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.

C. ~~DOWNLOADING NEED NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AND~~ WATER MAY BE DOWNLOADED WHILE THE AIRCRAFT IS UNMANNED IF WEATHER CONDITIONS WOULD CREATE REQUIREMENTS FOR HEATING AND UPLOADING/DOWNLOADING. THESE ACTIONS MUST BE PRE-PLANNED FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF SORTIE MANNING IS DIRECTED.

5. DEPOT INPUT SCHEDULES WILL BE MET. IN ADDITION, MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES (I.E., CORROSION CONTROL, TCTO, ON BASE MOD, ETC.) SHOULD BE CONTINUED AS PLANNED.

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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
GROUP 1
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SECURITY [redacted]

DD FORM 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

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INFO			

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. NORMAL PRIORITY "A" SECURITY PROTECTION WILL BE PROVIDED. CLOSE-IN SECURITY WILL NOT BE REQUIRED FOR TANKER AIRCRAFT THAT DO NOT HAVE AIRCREWS ASSIGNED OR DO NOT HAVE ABOARD ~~POSSESS~~ CMFSOR SEALED AUTHENTICATORS, WHEN POSSIBLE, ALL GENERATED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE PARKED IN A SINGLE AREA. UNITS WILL REMAIN IN SECURITY OPTION IV AND PROVIDE SECURITY SUPPORT AS REQUIRED WITHOUT CHANGING THE SECURITY OPTION. UNITS WILL NOTIFY NAF (IGS) AND HQ SAC (IGS) WHEN SUPPORT REQUIRES USE OF A TWO-FLIGHT SYSTEM.

7. SACCS REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE JOPREP JIFFY MESSAGE.

PART II. SEAGA ADVANCED PLANNING INFORMATION - FOR 22BW, 92SAW, 6SW, 70 AREFS.

1. THE EIELSON EAST SEAGA ORBIT, REPEAT EIELSON EAST ORBIT ONLY, WILL BE IMPLEMENTED WITH WEAPONS IN THE "SHOW OF FORCE." IMPLEMENTATION HOUR WILL BE 26/1913Z OCT 69. IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE BY RECORD COPY MESSAGE IAW SACM 55-2, VOL II.

2. PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN SAC OPORD 23-70 APPLY EXCEPT AS NOTED BELOW.

A. 22BW, MARCH AFB, IS RELIEVED OF THE COMMITMENT TO DEPLOY FOUR KC-135 AUGMENTEE AIRCREWS. 92SAW, FAIRCHILD AFB, WILL DEPLOY 19

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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DEGRADING Excluded From Automatic Downgrading And Declassification

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

FORM

Ex. 27

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

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INFO			

FOUR ADDITIONAL AUGMENTEE AIR CREWS, A TOTAL OF SIX AUGMENTEE CREWS.

B. ROTATION OF IN-PLACE AIRCRAFT/CREWS AT EIELSON WILL CONTINUE AS SCHEDULED.

C. "I" HOUR IN THIS INSTANCE WILL NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY DECLARATION OF DEFCON 3.

D. PRE "I" HOUR COORDINATION WITH CARF IS BEING EFFECTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

3. WHILE THE IN-PLACE EIELSON TANKER TASK FORCE IS COMMITTED TO SEAGA SUPPORT, ALL RECONNAISSANCE REFUELING WILL BE PROVIDED BY KC-135 AIRCRAFT/CREWS DEPLOYED FROM 70 AREFS, LITTLE ROCK AFB, FOR THIS PERIOD.

A. BASED ON PROGRAMMED KC-135 SORTIE REQUIREMENTS, 70 AREFS WILL PROVIDE KC-135 AIRCRAFT/CREWS AS FOLLOWS:

DATE	ACTION	ACFT/CREWS	TAKEOFF
26 OCT 69	DEPLOY	3/3	26/1930,2000, 2030Z
3 NOV 69	DEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW
9 NOV 69	REDEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW
14 NOV 69	DEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW
16 NOV 69	REDEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW

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CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	Group 1	7	8		

REGRADING INSTR Excluded From Automatic Downgrading And Declassification

SEC [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
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INFO			

B. DURATION OF TDY WILL BE APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS, WITH SCHEDULE PROGRAMMED TO PROVIDE A STABLE FORCE OF 3 AIRCRAFT/3 CREWS. OVERLAP IS NECESSARY TO INCREASE RECON SUPPORT TANKERS TO 6 AIRCRAFT/ 6 CREWS FROM 3-9 NOV AND 14-16 NOV TO ACCOMMODATE PEAK RECON ACTIVITY.

C. AIRCRAFT WILL DEPLOY WITH KC-135Q MSK SPECIFIED IN ANNEX D, SACOPORD 60-70-13. KIT WILL REMAIN UNTIL THIS OPERATION IS TERMINATED AND WILL BE RETURNED ABOARD REDEPLOYING AIRCRAFT TO LITTLE ROCK AFB.

D. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY SAC (DMZ) IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.

E. 6SW WILL DETERMINE DESIRED ROTATION TIMING SUBSEQUENT TO 26 OCT AND COORDINATE WITH 70 AREFS. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LAST HALF OF NOVEMBER WILL BE FURNISHED WHEN REQUIREMENTS ARE KNOWN.

PART III.

IT APPEARS THAT ACTIONS DIRECTED ABOVE WILL BE IN EFFECT ~~THIS "PEAK" WILL EXIST~~ THROUGH THE FIRST WEEK OF NOVEMBER AND POSSIBLY LONGER.

GP-1

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

FORM 470 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED

Cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to all Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands

RE: Increased Readiness Posture

October 28, 1969

Reproduced at the National Archives

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: IMMEDIATE

INFO:

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DISTR: CJCS-5(6-10) DJS-3(11-13) J3-5(14-18) CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)-1(19) CNO(ADM MOORER)-1 (20) CSAF(GEN RYAN)-1(21) CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)-1 (22)M SJCS-3(23-25) RF/FILE-1(1) (25) ONO/GG, (CY-# 2 TO DACC/CBCY #3 TO J3/ADV CYS #4 TO NMCC/DDO)

File O

DTG: 282313Z OCT 69

FROM: JCS

IMMEDIATE

TO: ALL COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ NOFORN [ ] CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

REFS: A. JCS 12650/102205Z OCT 69; B. JCS 12761/141959Z OCT 69

1. ~~(TS)~~ REF A INFORMED OF WORLDWIDE READINESS TEST AND SOLICITED COMMENTS FROM CINCS.

2. ~~(TS)~~ REF B EXTENDED TERMINATION DATE OF READINESS TEST.

3. ~~(TS)~~ ALL ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING THE INCREASED READINESS TEST WILL BE TERMINATED EFFECTIVE 300001Z OCTOBER 69. UNITS INVOLVED WILL RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATING STATUS. GP-3.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION

CJCS	CSA
DJS	CNO
SJCS	CSAF
J-3	CMC

ZFF-1

Dep Asst Def Concurred 28 Oct 69

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OK

DATE	TIME
28	1810
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

09

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 963140
By DH NARA, Date 5/15/07

DRAFTER
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: R. W. SENNEWALD
LT COLONEL, USA
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV, J-3
PHONE: 59829

RELEASER
SIGNATURE: Richard R. Day
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: RICHARD R. DAY, Staff Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS:

387 Worldwide Readiness Test - Oct 69 - 280ct69

Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon and General Charles de Gaulle

Location: General de Gaulle's office in the Elysee Palace in Paris, France

February 28, 1969

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Memorandum of Conversation

Place General de Gaulle's office in the Elysee Palace, Paris

Date: 28 March 1969

Present The President
General De Gaulle
Mr. Andronikov
MG Walters

After expressing his satisfaction at the presidents visit General de Gaulle said that he was entirely at the Presidents disposal to discyss anything he wished.

Th Presidetn thanked him and said that he hoped that they would be able to discuss the whole range of East West problems, then they might discuss such matters as the Middle East, Viet Nam and economic matters even though a great deal of the latter were purely technical.

The President said that one of his major concerns was that as a new president in any talks which we may have with the Soviet Union he wanted to be sure that the position which the United States takes is the best one to achieve our common objectives. He would like to have the Generals advice and suggestions as to what talks the US should have with the Soviet Union and his views on what other initiatives should be taken in this regard by the new administration.. He would also like to talk about bilateral matters of interest to Franceand the United States on which they might take some action. He would also appreciate the Generals evaluation of the situation in Eastern Europe after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet declaration concerning Sovereignty over the other countries of Eastern Europe. He would also like to know the Generals evaluation on China. What policy did he feel was most adapted to the requirements of the situation. He hope that the General would talk to him frankly aand directly/ His purpose was not to talk for any public declaration and what would be said would not be put on the normal diplomatic circuit. General de Gaulle said that t e present could count on him for this. He would certainly maintain the matters discussed in close confidence. The President said that he would appreciate the Generals personal advice.

General de Gaulle recalled that he had already discussed some of these matters with the President in 1967. He fel that we must realize that there was Russia and there was Communism and that they were not always the same thing. France did not want Communism. He did not feel that the communists were advancing any longer. Certainly they were no longer advancing in France and in Italy, certainly not in Germany, not in Poland Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not even in the Russia. He did not think that the danger of communism was over, it may last many years still ubut it can no longer conquer the world. It is too late for that. The dynamic is gone.

Russia said the General is a vast country with a long history with great ressources, pride and ambitions which are not necessarily communist. It is a fact that it is a country which suffered greatly during the war which they feel that they won and t ere is some truth in this. It ws the Russian Army that broke the back of the German Army.Russia is a country filled with ambition ressources and drive. With difficulty they have made progress and they a re aware of this. If the President could place himself in the position of the Soviet leaders he would find that his principal concern for tomorrow would be China.This is an enormous country which has a common frontier thousands of miles long with Russia. The Chinese have always detested the Russians and probably detest them morenow than at any other time in the past

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Chinese ambitions are directed maily against Russia, against Manchuria, Siberia and Central Asia. The Russians know this and China is their main preoccupation.. With Communism stopped this becomes even more important. They see their relationship with the West and with the US in the light of the problems they expect to have with China tomorrow. They are thinking in terms of a possible clash with China tomorrow. They cannot face both China and the West (the US in particular)at the same time. Thus he believed that with prudence and with some steps forwards and some backwards they may well opt for a policy of rapprochement with the West. When he said rapprochement he did not mean that he expected that the Russians would enter into full trust and confidence with the west but that they would like in the light of their growing quarrel with China to be sure that the West would not act against their back.They know that you and they are rivals, but they might want an arrangement, as sort of modus vivendi that would ensure that they would not be attacked in the back. This was true for their relations with the US, with the West and with Germany. They had always suffered greatly at the hands of the Germans but more particularly during the Second World War. The Germans had done terrible things in Russia, they had gone all the way to the Caucasus and had almost overthown the Soviets. The Russians have not forgot this and a perpetual concern of theirs was the though that if they one day have trouble with China they do not wat the Germans to be able to harm them or to drga the West against them. This is an idee fixe of their policy.

The President said he would like to ask whether the General felt that the Russians also had as a goal a modus vivendi with the US while tightening their control over the peoples of Eastern Europe so as to weaken the will of the peoples of Western Europe to build up their defenses. Some of the people to whom the President had talked believed that while the Russian were willing to meet with the US to secure a detente,it was partly because of the fear of China which the general had described but also because one of their major objectives was to consolidate their hold over the peoples of the countries of Eastern Europe and induce the peoples of Western Europe to lessen their defensive efforts.

General De Gaulle said that the Russians would of course be delighted if the countries of the West and the US were to diminish their defense efforts as thus their relative power would be greater but he did not think that the Russians intended to "march West". They knew that this would lead to a general war. The US might not reaact at once with all its means but such a move would inevitably to General War and he did not believe that the Societs wanted this. Their leaders know that they could not win such a war. He repeated that he did not believe that they wanted to march west They would certainly like it if the US and the Western countries were to become weaker but that would still not induce them to move in Europe. It is too late for that. The Soviets do not want their satellites to leave them.They want to maintain the power over Poland, East Germany, Hungary Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria and if possible over Romania. It is already too late for them to do this in the case of Yugoslavia. They had occupied Czechoslovakia because they were afraid that the Czechs would leave them and "go elsewhere". They would not let themselves be weakened in the west but the had given up the idea of conquering the west.They might some day make a move at Berlin but this is a small affair. With their growing concern about China he felt that they were sincere in their desire for a detente with the West. When the French had made the first move in this direction , despite the fact that they had made no political concessions to the Soviets theyhad been treated with great politeness and amiability. When the US arrived at some arrangement with the USSR on Strategic Missiles or ABM's they would also be amiable to the US. Nikita Khruschev had wanted to this but he had not been able to do it, nor had the US, Vietnam had arisen. General de Gaulle felt that working towards a detente was a good isea,in fact if the US was not prepared to go to War or to break down the Wall then there was no alternative policy that was acceptable

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To work towards a detente was a matter of good sense. The US should take all precautions even as the French had in talking to them it waa good sense if you were not ready to make war to make peace. He felt that the Soviets were not strong enough to enlarge their conquests and in view o f their fear of China they might well be disposed towards a detente with the West and the US inparticualr. They had already moved in this direction in coming to an agreement with the US on the non proliferation treaty.

The President then asked whether the General believed that the Russians consider the American nuclear deterrent as c redible. The balance of power in the world had changed markedly since 1962 when Preident Kennedy with the much appreciated support of General de Gaulle had stood firm in the Cuban crisis, At that time the US had a superiority in strategic missiles on the order of five to one, not just in number but in capability of first and second strikes. Since that time the Sovie Union had made remarkable progress in the field of missiles and though the US might still be slightly ahead there was a rough parity in strategic arms.In conventional forces the advantage enjoyed by the forces of the Warsaw pact had also been significabtly increased in relation to the West including France. As things now stood they were way ahead in conventional forces. Some had suggested that if the Russians tried to move politically and diplomatically, the president was incline to agree with General de Gaulle thet they would not march on the Rhine. General de Gaulle interjected "except possible at Berlin". The President continued saying that if the Russians moved did the Russians believe that the US would react with strategic weapons, did the Europeans have confidence that the US would move in answer to ~~xxxxx~~ an attack or the threat of an attack by massive conventional ground forces.

General de Gaulle said he could answer for the French not the Europeans as Europe was made up of all sorts of people. He felt that the French believed that the Russians knew that if they moved west they would have an initial advantage in conventional arms the knew that the USwould eventually, if not immediately, at least after a certain time be obliged to commit atomic weapons. The Russians knew tthat the US could not accept or allow the Russians to conquer Europe for that would also mean the conquest of Africa and the isolation of the United States on the American continent. Thou they might have initial success with tactical weapons they knew that it would not stop there and that t e US would eventually have to use all of its power and destroy the USSR. The US R of course also had the power to destroy the US. He did not believe that the Russian wanted everbody to be dead, themselves included. It was not natural for living beings to harbor such ideas. The death of everyone was not a policy. Europeans and French believed that if the Russians marched the US would not use nuclear weapons right away as this would imply a total effort of each side to kill the other who could also kill you. It would take time and if this was true the situati of Europe would indeed be tragic. If the US were to use tactical nuclear weapons and the Soviets also Europe would be destroyed. Western Europe and the UK by Soviet tactical weapons and East Germany, Poland Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be destroye by US tactical weapons and meanwhile the USSR and the US would not really be harmed. He ws sure that neither side wanted the common death as this was not a policy, If this was so then we must do something else as Cold War prepared Hot War A situation in which blocs always opposed one another led nowhere and prevented progress and even liberty. In a world of detente liberty would be the gainer,it would gain points in Poland Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Such a process had already started in Czechoslovaki. and might even spread to Russia. That is why he felt that with all precaustions the west should move in the direction of a detente that would benefit the Eastern Europeans.

The President then asked how it was that if Freedom gained in an atmosphere of detente that t e Russians would be willing to go along. Would they do so because their primary fear is China ?

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Would they be willing to take the risk that detente would weaken their hold on their Eastern European neighbors ?

General de Gaulle then said that he had pointed out that there was communism and Russia and even if Communism did not want this Russia might. A detente meant relations, contacts, trips, movement of papers and goods, exchanges of states of mind. One could try and seeif one could get together in diffuclt matters What the Soviets had done to try and regain their hold in Eastern Europe was because they felt weakened. The Czechs were certainly not in the same state of mind as they were ten years ago. He was not speaking of their unfortunate leaders or their wrtehed papers but eh Czechs were much closer to us than they were ten years ago. Contacts and exchanges led to hope, hope reappeared. He had travelled in Eastern Europe last year in Poland and he had been struck by the warmthe with which he had beenreceived by the people,In Romania he had received a similar impression, there was of course an element of curiosity to see General de Gaulle and so forth but their was also a desire to get out of the straitjacket in which they found themselves.He had felt this even in the USSR itself. em stillremain men no matter how much they are painted over with ideology. They are still men. The trend towards freedom and dignity is not dead and it can develop in an atmosphere of detente. This was not possible in tensions such that people felt that they were at the edge of war.. What he had said was philosophy but it was also practical. What else could be dono, if one did not want tomake war there was nothing else to do except to do nothing at all and that was always the words possible policy.

The President said thathe would like to indicate his reasons for announcing his polic up to this point. When he was inaugurated six weeks ago if he had announced that on the next day he was going to meet Kosygin and Brezhnev at the summit, the US press and the world would have applauded and said that now progress was really being made. He had not done this because he felt it was necessary to have very careful planning for a meeting at the summit, there had been the spirit of Glassboro, of Vienna and of Camp David and these hopes had been dashed. It was different when we were meeting with our friends and people who were basically like us. He felt that it would be a mistake for the President of the United States to go to a meeting without knowing what we were going to talk about or where we were going. This would simply raise hopes that would subsequently be dashed. Consequently he believed that we should have talks first with our friends and allies including France. The Soviets had interest in talks on the limitation of strategic weapons. This was a matter that could affect the capability of the US forces in Europe. Another reason for not rushing into arms talks was that it was generally claimed that an arms race increased the risk of war. He thought it was clear that both the USSR and the US would like to reduce the financial burden on themselves. He wished to make clear that on this matter he would notmake the decision in this matter on a financial basis, the US had to be able to afford whatever security required.One had to recognize a historic fact that wars also were caused by political tensions. If a freeze on strategic arms were to take place an explosion would still occur in the Middle East at Berlin or in Vietnam and this could lead to war. He felt that this opportunity should be seized by the new administration and he shared the Generals view thatdetente was desirable. However we should be hard and pragmatic in dealing with the Soviets.They knew what they wanted and we must know what we want. While we would not make talks on the Middle East and other matters a condition for talks on limitation of strategic weapons, wedid feel that it was proper to suggest at Ambassadorial level as indeed we had that we felt that we sould try and make progress on all fronts to achieve a detente. We should talk in the UN in the framework of the Four Powers on the Middle East and discuss later what could be done there. We would like the Soviets help on solving the Vietnamese problem, we realized that their situation in this matter was delicate with the Chinese but the Soviets did have great influence on the North Vietnamese. After all 85 percent of their weapons came from the Soviet Union. Perhaps we could also make some progress

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in the Central area on Berlin. Not of course a solution as neither side could give enough to settle the matter, we could perhpas make some progress. The President said he would like to know the Generals opinion whether he thought we were correct in proceeding cautiously in asking the Soviets to talk on several areas rather than discussing only limitation of strategic weapons with them. The reason why the President was popposed to an agreement on Arms limitation only without progress on political issues such as the Middle East, Europe and Vietnam was because such an agreement would greate a sort of euphoria of peace.

General De Gaulle said he felt that the President was quite right. A detente was the only acceptable policy. One must be cautious and not speak of everythi at once, nor should one be overlypolite and make concessions to them. The French who had started the policy of detente with them had never made any concessions even on Germany and they certainly had reasons to do so but had not. Now France was on much better terms with the Soviets and had made no concessions to them. Practically if the US were to start conversations on political subjects as well as on strategic missiles ABM's and so forth and if contact could be made with them on other subjects such as Vietnam and the Middle East he felt that the US could do this with all prudence and dignity. He believed that the President should not rush to Moscow and lay out the red carpet before Brezhnev but that the President was quite right is seeking to have adequate preparations made in advance.

The President then said that the question of the Middle East following the French initiative preliminary talks were taking place between the Four Powers. What did the General feel concerning the question of parallel talks between the US and the USSR bilatterally providing always for consultation within the Four while recognizing that any final settlement should be on the basis of the Four Powers rather than something arrived at bilaterally. This would be to the advantage of all concerned. The question in fact was broader. Sometimes we pay lip service to multi-lateral discussions in the UN, Four Powers etc ut wheninterests of major powers are at stake progress cannot be achieved unless there are bilateral contacts to hammer out differences. The question therefore was did General De Gaulle approve the US having bilateral discussions at the same time as the Four were meeting at the UN.

General De Gaulle said that he felt that if the US entered on the only road to a settlement it was the path of an arrangement between the Four powers which could be implemented then it would be natural to have bilateral talks with the Soviets just as the French had bilateral talks with the Soviets and with the US. He felt that the Four Powers should show that they wanted to agree and were not in favor of indefinite negotiations. It would serve no useful purpose to have a meeting to tellMr. Jarring to go on with his mission. Even before the 1967 conflict France had proposed Four power talks to tell both the Israelis and the Arabs that they should not attack and that the one who did would be blamed. Had we done that we might have prevnted the Israeli attack. France and the US had agreed and the British naturally had done what the Americans wanted (touch of condescending sarcasm). The Russians had not agreed, theyhad though that the Arabs were stronger than they really were and wanted an excuse to continue expanding their influence and sending arms to the Arabs. Now on the contrary the Soviets would like to see and end to the conflict and the US would also. This matter should be solved quickly, if it were not solved quickly the situation would grow worse. He flt that the Four should meet to see how the Security Council resolution of November 1967 could be implemented. This would involve the withdrawal of the Israelis to their original borders, Security for Israel and freedom of navigation for all including the Israelis in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal and a return of the refugees insofar as this could be done. After that some arrangements could be made on the frontiers if the four powers agreed. If this was not done quickly then it woould

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never be done and the situation would constantly grow worse. The Israelis would become more and more imperialistic. Dayan would become the Grand Master of the Israelis and he would want war, to go to the Nile, to Beirut and to Damascus and he could do it for he was better armed than the disorganized Arabs but then he would have trouble not just with occupied Jordan but he would face colossal difficulties with the populatior of Egypt,Iraq and Syria. There would be assassinations and concentration camps; the Pipe lines would be blown up, the Arab governments would fall,Nasser and the Beirut government would falland the Enrages (Madmen) would replace the existing Arab governments. Who would lead these madmen,certainlynot ethe US nor the Soviets. This would not be good for anyone.

The President then said that this process applies not only to the Middle East but also elsewhere.It was vital that the US not engage in bilateral discussions with the Soviets when such negotiations involved the interests or derogated in any way our major friends.There mightbe times when two major powers such as the US and USSR who influenced the Israelis andArabs r spectively might find it useful to talk bilaterally within the framework of the Four Power negotiations but it would be better from al lstandpoints to move as 4 rather than as 2. To return to his question did the General feel that bilateral discussions with the Soviets on the Middle East could be appropriate if the opportunity arisesarises provided that it is clearly understood that we would be talking to the French and British at the same time.
G

Ganral de Gaulle said thathe would repeat what he had said earlier on this subject, that it was normal to talk to everyone. Th Russiand had goven the French their memorandum bilaterlly and had done so with the US also, an exchange of views was normal. But as the present had said it wouldbe better for the mater not to appear as though it had been decided in a private US USSR deal. This would not be sufficient. As powerful as the Russians and the US might be they could not lead the Srabs and the Israelis to accept as solution in this manner. A solution must be reached as a group. This was why the French had proposed that the four propose a solution to the Security Council. If the 4 agree the Security Council will agree and this must be implemented. Now theiris a decision but it is not being implemented. To be applied it must carry general agreement.The US had influence and power with the Israelis and the Spviets had the sae with the Arabs. France did not have the same ressources and power but she did have ways of making herself heard, particularly with the Arabs who wanted the French to participate inany settlement. This was natural and one of the reasons why he felt solution should be on asis of Four Powers. He felt that if a solution was proposed to the Council by the Us and the USSR there might be difficulties but that if it was proposed by the Fpur there would be no difficulties in the Council..

The President aid that he felt it was much better for the US to have company when we make an agreement on the Middle East rather than to have what some people call a Yalta idea of the US and the USSR aking defisions on the Middle East. Also on the Middle East situation it was bad for the Soviet Union to appear to be the Arabs only friend. If the US, France, the USSR and insome measure the UK with Jordan moved totgether it would give a much greater appearance of even handedness.

General de Gaulle then said that if US and France could agree on a practical solution on the terr in they could easily obtain Soviet agreement as they were anxious for conflict there to end. He was not reassured by what might happen in the way of anarchy. If France and US agreed on a solution the Soviets would agree willingly.

The President said that he had read of some of the discussions that had taken place and it was his impression that French and US views in principle were moving in the same channels and he would hope that Foreign Minister Debre and

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Secretary of State Rogers could tak while they were here because in principle it seeemed that we agreed on what to say.

General De Gaulle said that Frankly France had been very favorable to Israel,and still favored its existence. They had been very favorable until June 1967 and then France had changed her attitude.Previouslyshe had always supported Israel had sold her all the arms she wanted and she had wanted a lot.it was true that the Israelsis paid for them. They had had very good relations. He had received Ben Gurion Levi Eshkol and Abba Eban had often beenthere. But from Junel967 on France had changed her attitude. She had told the Israelis not to attack, that if they did they would have initial successes but later it would be difficult and they would create difficulties for everyone. France had told them that if they were attacked they would contribute to the defense of Israel.They had attacjed and seized Sinai and parts of Jordan. Now the sit ation had become more and more difficult. France feels that the Israelis must return to their line of departure. After that steps may be taken to improve their frontiers.. They must give up their conquests.Their existence must be recognized and they must have guaranteed. France was ready to see that they got freedom of nav gation at Aqaba and Suez.We could not let things stand as they are. they will continaually get worse and that will be bad for all.

The President recalled that General De Gaullehad talked along these same lines to him in 1967. He wished to clarifyone matter in regard to Israel. Most people assume that US Presidents make decisions in regard to Israel under the influence of the political power of the Jewish vote in the US. He was not in that position. General de Gaulle said that he followed the US elections and knew that this was not the case with Mr. Nixon. The President said thathe would make his decisions on the Middle East as on Strategic Weapons apart from political consideratins within the US. Regarding Israel as a state and apart from any question of Jewish votes in the US the US will have to use its influence with Isael to get it to accept a settlement. This was a delicate matter and there must not be an imposed settlement. , but one that the Isarelsis agreed to. As a practical matter General de Gaulle knew as well as he did that the Four Powers must agree as to what they would guanantee. A settlemt would be of no value unless it was guaranteed. Israel was very sensitive about animposed settlemeent. They would not accept a settlemtnt imposed from outside. He believd that Israel could agee to the generaloutlines of what had beendiscussed today.

General de Gaulle said thatif the Four powers agree and the Security Council does likewise they will have to have the means to implemet such a settlement. If the Four agree the israelis will have to accept, imposed is a word but the Israelis could not afford to be alone.It will be an imposed settlement otherwise the Israelis would not return to their line of departure. They wpuld accept the settlemt rather than face the troubles and possibly sanctions of the Security Council. The President said that we knew that.

The President then said that he tended to be somewhat pessimistic on the Middle East even if we get a settlement. Radical Forces such as the Fedayeen and others are operating inEgypt,Syria and perhaps Algeria and the Palestinians in Jordan. They are so strong thatany settlemant willbe fragile and we would only be buying time. The President said that he felt it would bein the interest of Israel, France the US and UK and to some extent the Italians to strengthen the forces of stability in the Arab countries. We need even Nasser, compared to his possible successors he appears much better. We should certainly strengthern what some call the conservative forces such as Saudi Arabia and the Jordanians and furher over Libya and Tunisia. After a settlemnt we would need a policy whwrby the nations intensted in stability in the area would give aid and support to existing governments who will abide by a settlement and prevent the revolutionary forces from taking over.

General de Gaulle said that this was quite right and that they would meet the following day to discuss these matter further and the meeting then concluded.

Memorandum to Henry Kissinger from Al Haig

March 2, 1969

Attached: Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to Henry Kissinger February 21, 1969. Joint Chiefs of Staff Report "Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam." Kissinger's Memo Reply to Laird, March 3, 1969.

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By LC NARA Date 7/19/04

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE March 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Memorandum from Secretary Laird Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam

-- At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Laird enclosing the initial, albeit unsanctioned, plans prepared by the JCS in response to your request of January 27 for such a scenario.

-- At Tab B is a proposed reply to Secretary Laird for your signature with some suggestions for modifications which might be considered.

The JCS plans, which have been forwarded, are I believe more extensive than the type you and the President visualized as acceptable signals of U.S. intent to escalate military operations in Vietnam in the face of continued enemy intransigence in Paris. Furthermore, any such plans should be forwarded with the views of the Chairman and the Secretary included. If implemented, they would require some level of coordination at State. The draft plan, in fact, recommends (Page 6 of the draft JCS memorandum) that an appropriate interagency Task Force be formed to refine each of the scenarios which have been developed.

In brief, the plans provide:

1. Actual or feigned airborne/amphibious operations against several objectives in NVN (Appendix A).

2. An actual or feigned airborne/airmobile expedition in force against enemy LOCs in Laos and Cambodia (Appendix B).

3. Actual or feigned renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN (Appendix C).

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4. Actual or feigned subversion of the population and preparation for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi regime. (Appendix D).

5. A plan for actual or feigned technical escalation of war against North (nuclear) (Appendix E).

Recommend

You sign the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Laird which:

1. Expresses your gratitude for the excellent draft plan.

2. Requests additional refinement to include lower level actions.

3. Requests resubmission in final form by March 15, 1969.

Attachments

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By C NARA Date 7/19/02

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21 FEB 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

At the luncheon in my dining room on Monday, January 27, the President, General Wheeler, you, and I discussed the possibility of working out a program of potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks. I was informed this morning that you would like to review the progress made in the staff work on such a program.

I am attaching the preliminary papers which have been prepared in the Joint Staff. I would like to emphasize that the papers have no status other than as working copy. While General Wheeler gave the papers to me, he has not had the opportunity -- nor have the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- to consider the proposals in any detail. Other members of my staff, with whom I shall want to consult before serious consideration is given to such dramatic steps, have not seen the papers at all.

While I wish to be responsive in providing material for some initial consideration, I wish to emphasize (a) the preliminary nature of this work; (b) the desirability of much more detailed discussions within the Department of Defense before any formal suggestions or recommendations can be made; and (c) the necessity, which I am sure you recognize, for coordination with the State Department and others before we proceed with any such steps as those outlined. I must confess to you being more impressed, at least initially, with the potential disadvantages of the proposals than with the possibility of achieving movement in Paris by such means.

Attachments

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1. To preclude prolonged stalling tactics by the communists in Paris, a program of military, political, and psychological activities can be employed by the United States to create fear in the Hanoi leadership that the United States is preparing to undertake new highly damaging military actions against North Vietnamese (NVN) territory, installations, and interests.

2. Although implementation of such a program is technically feasible, there are also certain disadvantages associated with it:

a. US actions may result in a serious misjudgment by NVN or other Communist nations.

b. If NVN fails to react and the US then withdraws without any change in the basic situation, it may strengthen NVN intransigence.

c. If follow-on events make the US deception apparent, subsequent indications of serious US intent would lose their credibility.

d. Adverse criticism may force the US Government to disavow the intent after initiating the deception. The net result would be a strengthening of the NVN position.

3. These disadvantages not withstanding, there may be occasions when some type of deception effort would be desirable. The following proposals, which could be implemented singly or in varying combinations, offer a broad spectrum of possible options:

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a. A combined airborne/amphibious operation against several objectives in NVN. (See Appendix A)

b. Punitive airborne/airmobile expeditions against enemy lines of communications (LOC) and base areas in Laos and Cambodia. (See Appendix B)

c. Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN to include closure of Haiphong and the blockade of NVN. (See Appendix C)

d. Subversion of the population and preparation for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi regime. (See Appendix D)

e. A technical escalation. (See Appendix E)

4. Due to the lack of widespread disaffection within the population of NVN, convincing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) leaders that they are faced with mass uprisings is not presently considered feasible.

5. The appendices set forth scenarios for the proposed operations, to include the basic concept and general activities involved in each.

6. Guidelines for the execution of scenarios:

a. To present a realistic and credible threat to Hanoi, an integrated political, diplomatic, and military effort must be controlled at the national level. Actions by the US negotiating team in Paris and public statements by high US government officials must be coordinated with the picture being painted through the manipulation of military resources.

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b. The threat which is presented to Hanoi in each scenario must be on a significant scale if it is to achieve the desired psychological impact.

c. Each scenario must develop over an adequate period of time to permit the indicators to be picked up by the communists, transmitted through their intelligence network, evaluated, and considered by the top level leadership in Hanoi.

d. The message being transmitted by each scenario must be clear and credible to Hanoi. To the extent that the planned operation will thereby receive domestic or foreign news media recognition, the effect on the American public must be considered.

e. Provision must be made to permit arresting the development of each scenario at any desired stage without jeopardizing US interests.

f. Techniques for executing scenarios.

(1) There are two ways by which the military phases of each scenario can be executed. CINCPAC can be directed to prepare to execute an actual operation at a given future date employing certain designated resources, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain control of preparation and phased execution of the operation. Alternatively a complete deception operation can be conducted under the Joint Chiefs of Staff control. The greatest realism can be obtained by the first alternative. The number of persons who are aware of the underlying psychological objective of the preparations can be held extremely small, lessening the chance of its leakage.

(2) Deception operations are considerably less expensive and easier to control but are much more difficult to present in a credible fashion. Planning must be

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extremely detailed; and, to insure that execution is fully coordinated, a relatively large number of people must inevitably become aware that a deception is being presented.

(3) In the scenarios presented in the appendices, CINCPAC is directed to prepare for actual: (a) airborne/amphibious invasion of NVN, (b) punitive expedition into Laos and Cambodia, (c) resumption of bombing and institution of a naval blockade, and (d) resumption and expansion of subversion operations. However, each of those scenarios can be converted to a deception operation if desired. In the remaining scenario, technical escalation, a deception operation appears more feasible.

7. Evaluation of Scenarios.

a. Airborne/amphibious operation against NVN.

(1) This approach would be the most expensive to execute and presupposes a situation wherein sufficient forces to establish a credible threat are deployed from CONUS or withdrawn from combat during the embarkation and rehearsal phases. It would be the most likely to be observed and reported by the press.

(2) It would require extensive time to prepare, thus presenting an excellent picture to the enemy of a developing US effort. This would provide considerable opportunity for the enemy to evaluate, debate, and decide whether to change negotiating tactics.

(3) A landing targeted at Vinh would be more likely to cause the DRV to reconsider its negotiating tactics than either of the other two lodgements farther south.

(4) For credibility, this scenario must include actions pointing toward the resumption of bombing.

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b. Punitive expedition in Laos and Cambodia.

(1) Punitive airborne/airmobile expeditions against enemy LOCs and base areas in Laos and Cambodia would be unlikely to obtain the desired reaction from Hanoi because of their limited scope and effect, NVN territory is not threatened, and feasible alternatives are available to the enemy.

(2) The threat of an expedition targeted on Tchepone, being closest to NVN, would be more likely to get the desired reaction than alternatives targeted farther south.

c. Resumption of bombing and/or naval blockade.

(1) The resumption of bombing would be the most credible of all the scenarios, since bombing was employed extensively by the United States in the past and the assets for resumption are present in the theater.

(2) With the assets already present, it would be difficult to present a picture of military preparations extending over sufficient time to affect a negotiating posture. This course would also imply the application of emphasis on public statements and other psychological activities to develop the picture of a hardening United States Government resolve.

(3) The naval buildup for a blockade will provide the opportunity to extend military preparations over a substantial period of time, thus providing more flexibility to this approach.

(4) This scenario would be the easiest to control and less expensive than that for an amphibious/airborne attack on NVN.

d. Subversion of the NVN population.

(1) Since it is presently considered infeasible to convince the DRV leadership that it is faced with a

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mass uprising, this scenario by itself would not be likely to produce the desired result of persuading Hanoi to change its negotiating tactics. For greatest effect, it should be coupled with other scenarios.

(2) The development of the actions proposed in this scenario would require considerable time.

e. Technical escalation.

(1) It is difficult to evaluate the degree of credibility which the DRV leadership will attach to this scenario. It would depend in great part on their assessment of the resoluteness of the United States leadership, considering the then existent attitude of the US population toward the entire SEA effort, as well as in their confidence in continued USSR support.

(2) Use of atomic, biological or lethal chemical weapons in Vietnam would excite very strong public and congressional reaction.

(3) The predictable reaction worldwide, particularly in Japan and Okinawa, upon the surfacing of this scenario, militate against its employment.

8. If the concept of applying psychological pressure to change DRV negotiating tactics is approved, it is recommended that an appropriate interagency task force be formed to refine each of the attached scenarios and to prepare detailed plans for their implementation.

APPENDIX C

SCENARIO: Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
US officials indicate increased impatience with communist intransigence and hint that the bombing might be resumed. A high level military conference is followed by increased air and naval reconnaissance of NVN. Stockpiles of air munitions are built up, additional naval units move into the Tonkin Gulf and additional aircraft move onto airfields in Thailand. Leaks hint of a resumption of air and naval operations against NVN. Extensive pyschological operations indicate increased US determination and irritation with Hanoi's delays.	1. A high US government official in an exchange with the press hints that a breakdown in the Paris talks could lead to a resumption of the bombing of NVN, possibly expanded. He also indicates dissatisfaction with the slow pace of negotiations. 2. The US negotiator in Paris indicates to the NVN and NLF US impatience over communist intransigence. 3. Allied propaganda media increase emphasis on VC/NVA violations of the DMZ, Laos and Cambodia. 4. Leaflet drops are resumed over NVN, if not already done. 5. A military conference is conducted at CINCPAC involving SecDef, CJCS, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACTHAI. 6. US officials begin issuing statements designed to prepare the American public for the resumption of bombings.	The tone and timing of statements by US official and negotiators will be keyed to actions and statements by the NVN in Paris and elsewhere. See JCS 2472/420

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SCENARIO: Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
	7. Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against VC/NVA forces. 8. CINCPAC is directed by message to prepare to renew bombing of NVN under reduced restrictions, to close Haiphong and blockade the coast of NVN. 9. CINCPAC, in implementation of the JCS message, takes action to -- a. Increase air reconnaissance over NVN and hydrographic surveys of the coast of NVN. b. Build up stockpiles of air ordnance in SVN and Thailand. c. Move additional carriers and other combat vessels into the Gulf of Tonkin. d. Move or alert for movement additional Air Force Squadrons onto airfields in Thailand. 10. Air Force and Naval Squadrons in the US are alerted for possible movement to the Far East.	The blockade and closure of Haiphong may be directed as a separate action from the bombing resumption.

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By LM NARA Date 2/11/08

SCENARIO: Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
	11. The themes in grey and black radio broadcasts and in leaflets dropped on NVN are gradually changed to indicate an increased lack of patience with Hanoi's actions. 12. JCS is notified of a planned resumption of bombing and blockade of the north. 13. Rumors of a bombing resumption are spread by US airmen to local Vietnamese and Thais.	

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By CIARA Date 7/1/98

APPENDIX E

SCENARIO: Technical Escalation

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
US government officials indicate increased impatience with communist intransigence in Paris and hint at a possible technical escalation of the war. A visit by technical experts to the Far East is followed by a high level political/military conference. US troops in Vietnam commence CBR training while an apparent build-up of highly classified munitions occurs. Radio broadcasts and leaflet themes indicate increased US determination and irritation with Hanoi's delays.	1. The US negotiator in Paris indicates to the NVN and NLF negotiators US impatience over communist intransigence. This theme of impatience is repeated in a press conference by a high US official in Washington. 2. A high US military official in a public statement comments that the Pentagon periodically examines means by which new and more modern weapons could be used in Vietnam if necessary. 3. Allied propaganda media increase emphasis on VC/NVA violations of the DMZ, Laos and Cambodia. 4. Leaflet drops are resumed over NVN, if not already being done. 5. A team of Pentagon technical experts in atomic and chemical warfare makes an extended visit of the Far East, stopping off at CINCPAC, Okinawa, Saigon and Bangkok. 6. A summit conference is held in Honolulu involving President Nixon, President Thieu and the heads of government of TCC's.	The tone and timing of statements of US offici and negotiators will be keyed to the actions an statements by the NVN i Paris and elsewhere. See JCS 2472/420

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By C NARA Date 2/1/08

SCENARIO: Technical Escalation

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
	7. Subsequently, a military conference is held at CINCPAC involving SecDef, CJCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV and CINCSAC. 8. High security storage areas are established at selected sites in SVN and Thailand. A limited number of actual chemical munitions are shipped into SVN and stored at those sites. 9. CBR training is conducted for all US troops in SVN, to include those in rear area jobs. Inspections are conducted of unit CBR equipment. 10. Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against VC/NVA forces. 11. The themes of grey and black radio broadcasts and in leaflets dropped on NVN are gradually changed to indicate an increased lack of patience with Hanoi's actions.	

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By LC NARA Date 2/1/18

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Authority E.O. 12958
By NLP NARA Date 7-11-02

March 3, 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger /s/

SUBJECT: Memorandum Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam

I am very grateful for your memorandum of February 21, 1969 which forwarded the preliminary papers prepared by the Joint Staff on possible actual or feigned military actions which might be undertaken to signal U. S. intent to escalate operations in Vietnam.

The plans are well conceived and the risks involved in their implementation are precisely enumerated. I am somewhat concerned, however, that the "realities" of the current domestic and international environment do not lend themselves to an acceptance of these risks at this time. There may be, however, some less elaborate actions which could be initiated which although more subtle in nature, might be undertaken with reduced risks of news media recognition or domestic turbulence. I have in mind such measures as the selective implementation of indicators which might signal force build-up, increased planning, etc., as manifested by increased military communications, increased aerial reconnaissance, planning conferences or even the staging of amphibious shipping.

Perhaps it would be possible to flesh-out the plans with a spectrum of lower profiled actions of this type which could be implemented with less risk of international and domestic turbulence. I would be most grateful if you would have this excellent effort refined accordingly so that we could jointly discuss the resulting proposals with the President sometime after March 15, 1969. We

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By NARA Date 7-11-02

should also be prepared to discuss with the President proposals for accomplishing required interdepartmental coordination while preserving essential maximum security.

Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon, Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu

August 3, 1969

Location: Bucharest, Romania

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By MB NARA Date 12/9/01

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Private Meeting Between President Nixon and Ceausescu

Participants: President Nicolae Ceausescu
Ion Gheorghe Maurer
Interpreter

President Richard Nixon
Henry A. Kissinger
Colonel Burbec

Date: August 3, 1969
Bucharest, Romania

Ceausescu: I will listen to you, Mr. President, for according to our talks yesterday you have something to say about Vietnam.

Nixon: First, I appreciate the role the Prime Minister played in 1967 in trying to open channels of communications to resolve the Vietnam problem. I was not in the government at that time but I am current on this. The actions were responsible and helpful. As we recognized in 1967, the problem in Vietnam is very difficult. We must recognize that neither side can win or suffer defeat. Some believe that Hanoi and the VC should take over and that the U.S. should get out of Vietnam. Frankly, the U.S. can't do that; it is not just a matter of national honor. Leaving aside emotion, the U.S. committed over 500,000 troops, suffered 35,000 deaths and 200,000 wounded. To withdraw and let Hanoi take over would be a defeat for the U.S. and this, as President, I can't let happen. We can argue about whether we should have gone in or about how the war was conducted. The fact is we're there now and committed. We can't run away without giving the South Vietnamese the option to decide their own future. Hanoi says Thieu should get out and a peace cabinet should take over. We cannot accept that. You, Mr. President, suggest that the answer may be found in a coalition government. That would not be acceptable if it were imposed without giving the people of South Vietnam a chance to decide on it.

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I have said what we can't do, and these we do insist on. We do not, however, insist on:

--- The defeat of Hanoi

--- Hanoi's withdrawal without the opportunity to go to the people of South Vietnam and ask for support.

Look at what we have done:

--- We stopped all bombing of North Vietnam.

--- We withdrew 25,000 combat troops and an additional announcement on this subject will be made later this month.

--- We offered to withdraw all troops within one year if North Vietnam does likewise

--- And we have offered that the future of South Vietnam be determined by internationally supervised elections. President Thieu has offered to accept the VC in supervisory bodies and this is acceptable to me.

The international group would see to it that all groups in the country including the VC have a chance to participate, and if they get the verdict of the people to hold office. We do not propose to stop there. I said on May 14 that we are open to suggestions from the North but that they should talk substantively. If they don't like what proposals I have made, they should make suggestions. Look at our position: We stopped the bombing, have offered to negotiate seriously, will withdraw more troops, have offered elections in which the VC have an equal chance. Yet Hanoi has given absolutely no indication that they are willing to talk substance. True they have the 10 point program, but it simply tells the U.S. to get out and accept defeat. This we won't do. I am concerned by reports from Paris that the North Vietnamese leaders have concluded that their best tactics are to continue to talk in Paris with no substance and to continue to fight in Vietnam, thinking that public opinion will force us to capitulate and get out.

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I never make idle threats; I do say that we can't indefinitely continue to have 200 deaths per week with no progress in Paris. On November 1 this year--one year after the halt of the bombing, after the withdrawal of troops, after reasonable offers for peaceful negotiation--if there is no progress, we must re-evaluate our policy.

Le me make one thing perfectly clear about North Vietnam. I don't hate the North Vietnamese. While I disagree with their government, I admire the courage of the people, their willingness to sacrifice. We want an equal chance for both sides; we want justice and peace for both sides. All we get from them is a take it or leave it position. There is nothing more important to me than to end this war on a fair basis. It will make possible the many Romanian-U.S. actions we talked about, could make possible U.S.-Chinese relations, and would help relations with the Soviet Union. All this is possible.

I want peace, but I will never accept defeat and will not have the U.S. humiliated by Hanoi. What may be necessary here is to open another channel of communications. (Kissinger notes add here: "Get any help in it.")

Mr. President, you implied yesterday that they do want peace on reasonable terms. We have had no indication of this. This is our problem. Dr. Kissinger negotiated with the North Vietnamese during the Johnson Administration. He may have something to add. If we can find an answer it will be a breakthrough to finding peace all over the world.

Kissinger: Mr. President, I can add one or two things to what you said. We have no thought of humiliating Hanoi. We will not try to achieve at the conference table what was not achieved at the battle field. A political solution must reflect the balance of political forces. We object to the other side's position because they want us to destroy Thieu and thus destroy their enemy. They are asking us for a U.S. defeat. President Nixon said the other side will not negotiate seriously. I'll give a brief example to you: The other side has offered the ten points. We agreed to talk about them together with other proposals. But at every meeting they treat us as if we are school boys

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taking examinations in their 10 points, and discuss nothing else. At last week's private meeting, after every statement by us, they said we had no right to say it for we have said it before. They demand something new. What we are asking is that we both recognize the existing balance of political forces. We would still have disagreements, but they could be resolved rapidly.

Nixon: I know you know the people of North Vietnam and you know me. I think that what is needed is a recognition of the fact that they are now making a grave mistake if they think they can wait us out. You can be assured we want nothing but a fair settlement, but it takes two to achieve this.

Ceausescu: Certainly the problem is serious, and as you said, it is a hinderance to the solution of other problems. In our view, a continuation of the war will lead to an unforeseeable situation with very grave consequences. It was good the bombing ceased but you need to go farther. I think here the problem is not the war with North Vietnam but the war which takes place in South Vietnam with internal forces of South Vietnam. A government has been created in South Vietnam by the NLF. We gather this government is ready to accept the creation of a new government to start ending the war, settling it through an understanding between all forces in South Vietnam. I will not discuss the history of how you got into Vietnam. If a political solution is wanted, it then appears that the idea of a government built on a wide base is acceptable and equitable. In our discussion with representatives of the NLF, they said that they wish to arrive at an equitable solution and not in any way to humiliate the U.S. They wish to maintain relations with the U.S. after.

Nixon: When was your last discussion?

Ceausescu: About four weeks ago. About five days ago with their ambassador, the Front ambassador. They asked me, both the representative of the Front and the ambassador from the PRG, to use our relations with the U.S. to assist in reaching a solution as quickly as possible. In my opinion, they want a solution equitable and acceptable to both sides.

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Nixon: How do we get them to talk? They won't talk to Lodge in Paris. We will not accept their negotiating on a take it or leave it basis. Maybe we need a very private channel.

Kissinger: They think they can make us lose without us noticing it.

Nixon: The least we can do for all people in South Vietnam is not to impose anything on them.

Kissinger: They refuse to talk to Thieu, which was the agreement at the time of the bombing halt. This makes it difficult to get a balance of forces, which is all we want.

Ceausescu: I want to ask two questions. If you don't want to answer, I understand. We will not convey your answers to anyone. First, is the U.S. ready to accept and favor a coalition government on an equal basis with the government of South Vietnam to resolve the problem of South Vietnam?

Nixon: Only if the coalition is the result of elections and not negotiation. There could be a coalition in the sense of setting up the machinery for organizing an election.

Kissinger: I must explain this point. The other side says we have proposed elections run by the government of South Vietnam. We actually propose an electoral commission with both sides represented, and an international commission.

Ceausescu: Why not accept a coalition government which bears the responsibility to end the war immediately and prepares for elections, because these can be conducted only without fighting. Elections in time of war are of little value.

Nixon: In addition to an internationally supervised cease fire. You are absolutely right, no election is possible during fighting. I want to emphasize why we cannot agree to a coalition (a hard word for us)...

Ceausescu: Change the word...

Nixon: A coalition government to supervise setting up an election. We have said that we prefer a mixed commission. That's a start.

Kissinger: The other side excludes our side by definition in a coalition government.

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Nixon: We can't dump our people.

Kissinger: We recognize that the NLF exists; we want them to recognize that the Thieu Government exists. We believe this commission makes possible the establishment of a balance of forces through elections which could produce a government to end the war. We do not want to destroy the balance of forces.

Nixon: We do not ask the Front to disappear. They must not ask that Thieu disappear. I think that if we can start there we can make a settlement.

Maurer: I would like to know if I have the correct understanding. The mixed commission, in the American point of view, should watch over a cease fire and organize under international supervision the elections. Then after the elections they will have a government elected representing South Vietnam.

Nixon: Correct.

Maurer: I want to make sure I understand a number of things as seen by the U.S. Will the elections take place while American troops are still in South Vietnam?

Kissinger: That depends on Hanoi. We offered an international commission to supervise the withdrawal of all outside forces, the U.S. as well as North Vietnamese. We believe it is best if all outside forces are withdrawn.

Nixon: I suggested this be done in one year, and that elections be held with all forces gone.

Maurer: The reason I asked for clarification was that the whole context of your discussions shows you know Romania wants the war to end. If Romania did something to help this solution it did it as a result of its interest, and this interest is stronger today because we may now see a new opening in relations between states. Of course, it is difficult to review the history, the rights and wrongs of the war. This is not useful. We must find a flexible, subtle solution. This requires an inventive spirit. President Ceausescu stressed one idea which you should consider. If you don't arrive at a

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solution to end the war peacefully, what will you do then? We find in all this that the major interests get more involved--even interests not willing to get involved get involved. Therefore, it appears flexibility is required from the stronger. President Ceausescu and I have talked with the heads of Vietnam. I have spoken with the leaders of North Vietnam, and a little with South Vietnamese leaders. I observed two very important things in these people. First, they must be masters of their own solutions and these must not be imposed from the outside. I'm thinking of those who support the effort. Secondly, they want to gain a solution without closing the door to future relations with the U.S. It is possible that the best idea is to find a man who could most appropriately provide the best flexibility and inventive spirit. I hope President Ceausescu also believes that talks can yield results. Patience is difficult for the U.S., but it is, in my opinion, advisable.

Nixon: I have one very frank question. Does North Vietnam believe they should talk in Paris and fight in Vietnam, figuring that the U.S. will quit in a year or so, or do you think they want a settlement?

Maurer: On this point, absolutely frankly, it appears possible they think the former. But this fighting is costing them. In our discussions they appear to want a solution. This is clearly my own idea and I cannot guarantee that they are the thoughts of the North Vietnamese. I think they are oriented towards finding a solution.

Ceausescu: I have two problems. It is certain that South Vietnam and the PRG want to reach a peaceful solution and not to be tied to North Vietnam under present conditions. And North Vietnam and South Vietnam know that there is little chance for the war to end quickly in the present way. They stick to the position that a solution must have a finality conducive to self-determination. With a broadly based government composed of religious, cultural and other forces, one can't think this will bring unification with North Vietnam overnight. The commission as proposed by the U.S. is no solution. It leaves two governments in South Vietnam with the right to administer the territory under their control. This will not create conditions suitable for a solution. My idea is for a government coalition, maybe called by some other word, which may include all forces in South Vietnam. I know from what

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they told us that the PRG is not rigid in these matters. A broadly based government would facilitate a solution in a reasonable way.

Nixon: Were they rigid about the exclusion of Thieu?

Ceausescu: I asked them frankly if they were willing to accept members of the Thieu Government. They said this is a problem to be discussed. I think this problem must be looked at with more flexibility and in a practical way.

Nixon: It takes two to be flexible. They say no.

Ceausescu: I asked this for in a day or so they will come and ask your opinion on that point. I can't see an encouraging thing in your reply on this point. Are you ready to withdraw all troops from South Vietnam?

Nixon: If North Vietnam does also--tomorrow.

Ceausescu: It is difficult to tell which troops are from the North.

Nixon: Yes.

Ceausescu: Half of the North Vietnamese government is from the South.

Nixon: Some in the South were born in the North.

Kissinger: Some say the easiest way is to change the Northern and Southern governments.

Nixon: I want to sum up to be perfectly clear. We are flexible and willing to talk in another channel but only if they have an intention to settle. When you ask if we will dump Thieu and form a coalition government, the answer is no, and we are rigid on this. We do not ask the Front to eliminate people from their government. We will work to get a subtle peace. We cannot and will not just pull out. Second, we cannot and will not continue indefinitely to talk in Paris with no progress and while the fighting continues in Vietnam. I know the consequences referred to by the Prime Minister, but it is necessary to end the war by that route it will be because we have no other choice. We would be willing to work out

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solutions having the Front represented on the government to the extent its popular support and its strength justify it. As you know, you can only win at the conference table what was won on the battlefield. Another point--one very delicate and not for publication, but for your use as you want: If we can end the war, my plan is for an economic assistance program for South Vietnam and to make it available to North Vietnam if they want, as North Vietnam recovers from the wounds of war. This is good for North Vietnam and peace in the area. You can see that we are flexible. I want you to realize that only on Thieu are we rigid.

Maurer: You also set a condition, the preservation of the Thieu Government. This is a blind alley; why not try some other way?

Nixon: We say that Thieu and the Viet Cong should submit their courses to the public.

Ceausescu: This is not a solution conducive to ending the war. I think in the long run there are two elements. Thieu on the one hand and the PRG on the other--out of this a new government should emerge.

Nixon: No, not a government, but an instrument to conduct elections. Until elections, the Viet Cong have control over their land and Thieu over his.

Ceausescu: This is no solution.

Nixon: Let's say this in conclusion. I've conducted negotiation over the years--labor negotiations, for example--very tough ones. I know we never settled until both sides were willing to talk. Time is running out. We appreciate President Ceausescu and the Prime Minister's interest. Possibly as we meditate, you may have some ideas. We want to end the war and we will be reasonable. I want to establish a channel of communication with you on these matters. This can be done through the embassy,

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but where they are matter of highest importance, they should be transmitted through Dr. Kissinger. What you said to me remains in this room. What you send me will be in confidence. I may contact you in that way.

Kissinger: If you want to communicate with me, you can do so through your embassy.

Ceausescu: On special problems, I'll send someone.

Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Richard Nixon

October 1, 1969

Subject: Kissinger's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Attached: Memorandum of Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, September 27, 1969, in Kissinger's office.

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PRMPA
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

I

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE October 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Attached is a report of my conversation last Saturday with Ambassador Dobrynin.

Following the prearranged telephone call, I emphasized to Dobrynin that you felt:

-- Vietnam was the critical issue;

-- There would be no special treatment for the Soviet Union until Vietnam was solved;

-- We took seriously Hanoi's attempt to undermine the President's domestic position;

-- The train had left the station and was headed down the track.

Significantly, Dobrynin responded, inter alia, that:

-- He hoped it was an "airplane" and not a "train" and that there would be some "maneuvering room";

-- My private conversations in Paris had impressed Hanoi;

-- Moscow had an interest in improving relations with us but hadn't seen real progress on any subject.

I emphasized that we could go further towards improving US-Soviet relations if Russia took an understanding attitude on Vietnam.

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By: KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

During the conversation Dobrynin also expressed:

-- surprise that no meeting with you had been arranged for Gromyko;

-- interest in our preference as to 2 or 4-power negotiations on the Berlin issue;

-- hope that the White House would intercede to expedite a preliminary agreement on the Middle East between Rogers and Gromyko prior to the latter's departure;

-- assurance that a reply on SALT would occur in due course.

I believe the Soviets are concerned and now more clearly understand that we mean business on the Vietnam issue.

Attachment

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Saturday, September 27, 1969
Time: 3:00 p.m.
Place: Dr. Kissinger's Office

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came to see me at his request. I let him wait for a week but agreed to a brief appointment on Saturday afternoon.

After an exchange of pleasantries, Dobrynin remarked that his Minister regretted not having had an opportunity for a longer chat with me. Had Gromyko been able to visit Washington, Dobrynin would have given a luncheon for him and me at the Soviet Embassy. The absence of a visit to Washington made Gromyko's trip somewhat unusual. I said I regretted that his Foreign Minister did not come to Washington, as I would have enjoyed talking to him, and was sorry his schedule was so crowded. Dobrynin replied that the difficulty was the absence of a meeting with the President, which had been a standard procedure during previous visits to the General Assembly. I told him that in order to keep ourselves from being swamped we had adopted the rule that no Foreign Minister would see the President in Washington. In any event, there had never been a formal request. Dobrynin said he was not aware that there were such fine questions of protocol.

Dobrynin then remarked that his Minister had asked him to inquire whether in negotiating the Berlin issue we had any preference as to forum. Specifically, did we care whether it was discussed in a four-power or two-power forum? While the Soviet Union was willing to speak in a four-power forum, it was also prepared to have two-power discussions. I told him that four-power discussions seemed to be quite acceptable. If there was any different inclination on the part of the President, I would let him know.

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Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East and said that the meeting in New York had been very constructive. Gromyko hoped that he would be able to come to a preliminary agreement with the Secretary of State before his departure on Wednesday. He asked for intercession of the White House in expediting this agreement. I replied that since matters seemed to be in train on the diplomatic level, there was no need for White House intervention. I added that Dobrynin should understand our elemental position. We had made several communications to the Soviet Union on Vietnam to which they had never replied. While this did not inhibit normal diplomatic relations, it made it very difficult for the White House to go beyond what normally occurred on the diplomatic level.

At this point, the President called. When the conversation was completed, I commented that the Presidentr had called me at a providential moment because it enabled me to tell the President directly what was being discussed. To us Vietnam was the critical issue. We were quite prepared to discuss other subjects, but the Soviet Union should not expect any special treatment until Vietnam was solved. They should also have no illusions about the seriousness with which we took Hanoi's attempt to undermine the domestic position of the President. Dobrynin asked me whether there was any hope for a coalition government. I replied that we had covered the subject at great length previously and that I could add nothing. It was a pity that all our efforts to negotiate had failed. The President had told me in his call that the train had just left the station and was now headed down the track. Dobrynin responded that he hoped it was an airplane and not a train and would leave some maneuvering room. I said the President chooses his words very carefully and that I was sure he meant train.

Dobrynin then asked what our problem had been in the past. I said that every negotiation turned into a discussion on our readiness to accept the 10 points. We could not negotiate in a forum of ultimatums. Dobrynin said that my own conversations with the Vietnamese seemed to have gone rather well. I asked him what he meant. He said Hanoi had told Moscow that they had been very impressed by my presentation and thought I understood Vietnamese conditions very well. I replied that if this were true the next move was up to them.

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PRMPA
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

Dobrynin then engaged in a lengthy exposition to the effect that the Soviet Union, for its own reasons, was interested in peace in Vietnam and had in the past often been helpful. I countered that we had no illusions about Soviet help in the past. It had been considerably in the interest of Hanoi and had been largely tactical. Dobrynin said that he wanted to assure me of Moscow's continued interest in improved relations with the U.S., but it was getting very difficult to convince Moscow of our goodwill. There had been no real progress on any subject. For example, we could have been more generous on trade liberalization. I said the most important issue was Vietnam. As soon as Vietnam was out of the way and especially if the Russians took an understanding attitude, we would go further. Dobrynin smiled and said that I had an unusual ability to link things together. I told him that we had hoped to have a reply on SALT. Dobrynin said there would be a reply in due course but did not give any indication as to when.

Dobrynin returned to the subject of Soviet interest in improving relations with us. I said we reciprocated this feeling, especially after Vietnam was out of the way.

H. R. Haldeman Diary Handwritten Entry

Friday, 17 October (1969)

Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. Special Files. Hand-written Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman

Friday Oct 17

The "High Prices" radio speech. After several rejections because of non-people type language he finally got the inflation speech down to a high prices speech. Read it for the radio at 8:0 and all four networks. Then shot 1 min reflex for TV news — Made all the papers, all radio nets live & replay, and all TV net news. Damn good replay. Plus wire mailing & have an intensive follow up plan for promotion. Did this one right all the way — for me. P. very pleased — Hadn't earlier in day he said he wouldn't do the TV.

UK mtg this morning & a few cpers. Early AM clear to prepare for speech. Then a session w/ Sec Robert Thompson re plan for ending Vietnam war. Then off to CO for the weekend w/ Pat Bell, E & Lee Rue. We had staff session there re plans for Nov 3 & Nov 15 — & maximum effort. Agreed to basic plan of business as usual — & further concept that P has a plan, it's working — & he will discuss it Nov 3. K has all sorts of secret-type activity going on around the world to try to give Soviets & NVN — appears to be working because Dobrynin asked for early mtg — which we have set Secretly for Sunday. K thinks this is good chance of being the big break — But that it will come in stages. P. is more skeptical.


Egan & P the story on cyclamates & necessity for Food & Drug to pull all dietetic soft drinks etc off the market. Will create huge problems for friends like Don Kendall & Art Linkletter.

P. is calling Helms & Cushman of CIA & CIA Bureau and then Reid, Mitchell & Rogers on Sunday. Will give pretty strong injunction of major peace activity again.

Again today several long retrospective chats — as he continued process of re-reality & Building new approach to job & to the current problem.

Telephone conversation # 4899, sound recording, LBJ and GEORGE REEDY, 8-12-1964, 6_01PM

Click below to play audio



Duration: (min: sec): 5:10

Description:

DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE ON JOHNSON FAMILY BUSINESS; RELEASE OF AUDITOR'S REPORT; BARRY GOLDWATER'S STATEMENT ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; POSSIBLE PRESS QUESTION ON SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Reedy, George E. (George Edward), 1917-1999

Speaker 1: LBJ

Who Placed the Call?: Speaker 2

Speaker 2: GEORGE REEDY

Location of Speaker 1: Oval Office or unknown location

Subject: Defense; Elections; LBJ personal; National politics; Presidency; Press relations; LBJ speeches and statements; Vietnam

Title: Telephone conversation # 4900, sound recording, LBJ and MCGEORGE BUNDY, 8/12/1964, 6:06PM

CLICK BELOW TO PLAY AUDIO



Duration: (min: sec): 3:07

Description: BUNDY READS SUGGESTED RESPONSE BY SECRETARIES OF STATE, DEFENSE TO BARRY GOLDWATER'S STATEMENT ON AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY COMMANDERS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING TONKIN GULF INCIDENT; DISCUSSION OF SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Bundy, McGeorge, 1919-1996

Collection: Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings

Speaker 1: LBJ

Who Placed the Call?: Speaker 2

Speaker 2: MCGEORGE BUNDY

Location of Speaker 1: Oval Office or unknown location

Title: Telephone conversation # 4937, sound recording, LBJ and ROBERT MCNAMARA, 8/14/1964, 6:55PM

CLICK BELOW TO PLAY AUDIO



Duration: (min: sec): 5:09

Description: LBJ ASKS MCNAMARA FOR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE BOARD, TEASES HIM ABOUT NOT RECEIVING THEM SOONER; DISCUSSION OF RESPONSE TO GOLDWATER'S CHARGE THAT LBJ HAD AUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TONKIN GULF; MCNAMARA REVIEWS PROCEDURES

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; McNamara, Robert Strange, 1916-2009

Speaker 1: LBJ

Who Placed the Call?: Speaker 1

Speaker 2: ROBERT MCNAMARA

Location of Speaker 1: Oval Office or unknown location

Subject: Appointments and nominations; Arms control and disarmament; Defense; Elections; Humor and mimicry; National politics; Press relations; Space program; Vietnam

Archivist's General Note: "RE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE BOARD"

Telephone conversation # 4957, sound recording, LBJ and ROBERT MCNAMARA, 8-15-1964, 2_44PM



Duration: (min: sec): 2:41

Description: DISCUSSION OF LBJ'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND HIS RESPONSE TO BARRY GOLDWATER'S CHARGE THAT LBJ AUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TONKIN GULF INCIDENT; LBJ SUGGESTS RUSK, MCNAMARA ALSO HAVE STATE DEPT AND DOD RESPOND TO CHARGE

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; McNamara, Robert Strange, 1916-2009

Speaker 1: LBJ
Who Placed the Call?: Speaker 1
Speaker 2: ROBERT MCNAMARA
Other Speaker(s): OFFICE CONVERSATION
Location of Speaker 1: Oval Office or unknown location

Subject: Arms control and disarmament; Defense; Elections; National politics; Press relations; Vietnam

Archivist's General Note: "VIETNAM & POLITICS"; OFFICE CONVERSATION PRECEDES CALL; DAILY DIARY INDICATES LBJ IS MEETING WITH LYNDA JOHNSON, JACK VALENTI AT TIME OF CALL

Telephone conversation # 4958, sound recording, LBJ and GEORGE REEDY, 8-15-1964, 2_50PM



Duration: (min: sec): 1:40

Description: REEDY REPORTS ON CONVERSATION WITH UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER OF PRESS ON LBJ'S PRESS CONFERENCE RESPONSE TO GOLDWATER'S CHARGE THAT LBJ AUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TONKIN GULF INCIDENT; LBJ ASKS FOR FOREIGN REACTION TO GOLDWATER'S CHARGE

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Reedy, George E. (George Edward), 1917-1999; Valenti, Jack J. (Jack Joseph), 1921-2007

Speaker 1: LBJ

Speaker 2:

GEORGE REEDY


Other Speaker(s): JACK VALENTI

Subject: Arms control and disarmament; Defense; Elections; National politics; Press relations; Vietnam

Archivist's General Note:

"RE: RUMOR OF DROPPING ATOMIC BOMB - POLITICS"; RECORDING STARTS AFTER CONVERSATION HAS BEGUN; JACK VALENTI IS MEETING WITH LBJ AT TIME OF CALL

Telephone conversation # 4962, sound recording, LBJ and CHALMERS ROBERTS, 8-15-1964, 3_00PM



Duration: (min: sec): 15:08

Description: LBJ'S RESPONSE TO GOLDWATER'S CHARGE THAT LBJ AUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TONKIN GULF; PROCEDURES FOR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; SECURITY BRIEFINGS FOR CANDIDATES, FORMER PRESIDENTS; TIMING OF LBJ'S SPEECH ON TONKIN GULF RETALIATION; CHINA; CONGO

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Roberts, Chalmers McGeagh, 1910-2005

Speaker 1: LBJ

Speaker 2: CHALMERS ROBERTS

Subject: Africa; Arms control and disarmament; Communist bloc; Defense; Diplomacy; East Asia and the Pacific; Elections; Humor and mimicry; National politics; Presidency; Press relations; LBJ speeches and statements; Vietnam

Archivist's General Note: "RE: FEAR OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS-POLITICS, ETC."; CONTINUES ON NEXT RECORDING

Title: Telephone conversation # 10916, sound recording, LBJ and DWIGHT EISENHOWER, 10/3/1966, 5:24PM



Duration: (min: sec): 7:04

Description: SHORT DISCUSSION OF EISENHOWER'S HEALTH; EISENHOWER EXPLAINS HIS RECENT STATEMENT ON VIETNAM; RICHARD NIXON ON US IN VIETNAM; EISENHOWER CONTRASTS KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS, USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS; LBJ REMINISCES ABOUT EISENHOWER'S POLICY ON VIETNAM

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969

Speaker 1: LBJ

Speaker 2: DWIGHT EISENHOWER

Subject: Congressional relations; Defense; Diplomacy; East Asia and the Pacific; LBJ reminiscences; Pre-Presidential; Presidency; Vietnam

Archivist's General Note: PREVIOUSLY OPENED ON TAPE SO.01, PNO 2; SELECTED AS A HIGHLIGHT OF THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION COLLECTION BY THE LBJ LIBRARY

Telephone conversation # 12723, sound recording, LBJ and DWIGHT EISENHOWER, 2/19/1968, 12:17PM



Duration: (min: sec): 4:33

Description: LBJ CONTINUES TO DISCUSS PRESS STORIES, SCIENTISTS' CABLE TO EISENHOWER ABOUT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN VIETNAM; UNSUITABILITY OF USING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KHE SANH; LBJ OFFERS TO HAVE SCIENTISTS BRIEFED; LBJ'S VISIT WITH THE EISENHOWERS YESTERDAY

Contributor: Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969

Speaker 1: LBJ

Speaker 2: DWIGHT EISENHOWER

Subject: Arms control and disarmament; Congressional relations; Defense; Diplomacy; First Lady; Presidency; Press relations; Vietnam; Vietnam criticism

Archivist's General Note: "NUCLEAR WEAPONS & MINES & TYPES OF WARFARE USED IN VN"; "LISTENED TO BY YB", "TRANSCRIBED IN FULL YB" WRITTEN ON ENVELOPE CONTAINING DICTABELT; TIME FROM DAILY DIARY; CONTINUES FROM PREVIOUS RECORDING; SELECTED AS A HIGHLIGHT OF THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION COLLECTION

1969-03-02 Memorandum from Al Haig to Henry Kissinger, 'Memorandum from Secretary Laird Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam'

Memorandum from Al Haig to Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum from Secretary Laird Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam," 2 March 1969, enclosing a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to Kissinger, 21 February 1969, and report [excerpts] from Joint Staff, Top Secret/Sensitive, with Kissinger's Memo Reply to Laird, 3 March 1969, Top Secret

During this meeting it was brought up ,"the possibility of working out a program of potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks." The Joint Staff of the JCS soon set about the task of preparing a set of "indicator actions" designed "to create fear in the Hanoi leadership that the United States is preparing to undertake new highly damaging military actions against North Vietnamese territory, installations, and interests.

Source: NSCF, box 1007, Haig Vietnam Files, Vol. 1 (Jan - March 1969)

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Authority E.O. 12958
By LC NARA Date 7/19/02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE March 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Memorandum from Secretary Laird Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam

-- At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Laird enclosing the initial, albeit unsanctioned, plans prepared by the JCS in response to your request of January 27 for such a scenario.

-- At Tab B is a proposed reply to Secretary Laird for your signature with some suggestions for modifications which might be considered.

The JCS plans, which have been forwarded, are I believe more extensive than the type you and the President visualized as acceptable signals of U.S. intent to escalate military operations in Vietnam in the face of continued enemy intransigence in Paris. Furthermore, any such plans should be forwarded with the views of the Chairman and the Secretary included. If implemented, they would require some level of coordination at State. The draft plan, in fact, recommends (Page 6 of the draft JCS memorandum) that an appropriate interagency Task Force be formed to refine each of the scenarios which have been developed.

In brief, the plans provide:

1. Actual or feigned airborne/amphibious operations against several objectives in NVN (Appendix A).

2. An actual or feigned airborne/airmobile expedition in force against enemy LOCs in Laos and Cambodia (Appendix B).

3. Actual or feigned renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN (Appendix C).

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4. Actual or feigned subversion of the population and preparation for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi regime. (Appendix D).

5. A plan for actual or feigned technical escalation of war against North (nuclear) (Appendix E).

Recommend

You sign the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Laird which:

1. Expresses your gratitude for the excellent draft plan.

2. Requests additional refinement to include lower level actions.

3. Requests resubmission in final form by March 15, 1969.

Attachments

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By LC NARA Date 7/19/05

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21 FEB 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

At the luncheon in my dining room on Monday, January 27, the President, General Wheeler, you, and I discussed the possibility of working out a program of potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks. I was informed this morning that you would like to review the progress made in the staff work on such a program.

I am attaching the preliminary papers which have been prepared in the Joint Staff. I would like to emphasize that the papers have no status other than as working copy. While General Wheeler gave the papers to me, he has not had the opportunity -- nor have the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- to consider the proposals in any detail. Other members of my staff, with whom I shall want to consult before serious consideration is given to such dramatic steps, have not seen the papers at all.

While I wish to be responsive in providing material for some initial consideration, I wish to emphasize (a) the preliminary nature of this work; (b) the desirability of much more detailed discussions within the Department of Defense before any formal suggestions or recommendations can be made; and (c) the necessity, which I am sure you recognize, for coordination with the State Department and others before we proceed with any such steps as those outlined. I must confess to you being more impressed, at least initially, with the potential disadvantages of the proposals than with the possibility of achieving movement in Paris by such means.

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1. To preclude prolonged stalling tactics by the communists in Paris, a program of military, political, and psychological activities can be employed by the United States to create fear in the Hanoi leadership that the United States is preparing to undertake new highly damaging military actions against North Vietnamese (NVN) territory, installations, and interests.

2. Although implementation of such a program is technically feasible, there are also certain disadvantages associated with it:

a. US actions may result in a serious misjudgment by NVN or other Communist nations.

b. If NVN fails to react and the US then withdraws without any change in the basic situation, it may strengthen NVN intransigence.

c. If follow-on events make the US deception apparent, subsequent indications of serious US intent would lose their credibility.

d. Adverse criticism may force the US Government to disavow the intent after initiating the deception. The net result would be a strengthening of the NVN position.

3. These disadvantages not withstanding, there may be occasions when some type of deception effort would be desirable. The following proposals, which could be implemented singly or in varying combinations, offer a broad spectrum of possible options:

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a. A combined airborne/amphibious operation against several objectives in NVN. (See Appendix A)

b. Punitive airborne/airmobile expeditions against enemy lines of communications (LOC) and base areas in Laos and Cambodia. (See Appendix B)

c. Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN to include closure of Haiphong and the blockade of NVN. (See Appendix C)

d. Subversion of the population and preparation for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi regime. (See Appendix D)

e. A technical escalation. (See Appendix E)

4. Due to the lack of widespread disaffection within the population of NVN, convincing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) leaders that they are faced with mass uprisings is not presently considered feasible.

5. The appendices set forth scenarios for the proposed operations, to include the basic concept and general activities involved in each.

6. Guidelines for the execution of scenarios:

a. To present a realistic and credible threat to Hanoi, an integrated political, diplomatic, and military effort must be controlled at the national level. Actions by the US negotiating team in Paris and public statements by high US government officials must be coordinated with the picture being painted through the manipulation of military resources.

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b. The threat which is presented to Hanoi in each scenario must be on a significant scale if it is to achieve the desired psychological impact.

c. Each scenario must develop over an adequate period of time to permit the indicators to be picked up by the communists, transmitted through their intelligence network, evaluated, and considered by the top level leadership in Hanoi.

d. The message being transmitted by each scenario must be clear and credible to Hanoi. To the extent that the planned operation will thereby receive domestic or foreign news media recognition, the effect on the American public must be considered.

e. Provision must be made to permit arresting the development of each scenario at any desired stage without jeopardizing US interests.

f. Techniques for executing scenarios.

(1) There are two ways by which the military phases of each scenario can be executed. CINCPAC can be directed to prepare to execute an actual operation at a given future date employing certain designated resources, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain control of preparation and phased execution of the operation. Alternatively a complete deception operation can be conducted under the Joint Chiefs of Staff control. The greatest realism can be obtained by the first alternative. The number of persons who are aware of the underlying psychological objective of the preparations can be held extremely small, lessening the chance of its leakage.

(2) Deception operations are considerably less expensive and easier to control but are much more difficult to present in a credible fashion. Planning must be

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extremely detailed; and, to insure that execution is fully coordinated, a relatively large number of people must inevitably become aware that a deception is being presented.

(3) In the scenarios presented in the appendices, CINCPAC is directed to prepare for actual: (a) airborne/amphibious invasion of NVN, (b) punitive expedition into Laos and Cambodia, (c) resumption of bombing and institution of a naval blockade, and (d) resumption and expansion of subversion operations. However, each of those scenarios can be converted to a deception operation if desired. In the remaining scenario, technical escalation, a deception operation appears more feasible.

7. Evaluation of Scenarios.

a. Airborne/amphibious operation against NVN.

(1) This approach would be the most expensive to execute and presupposes a situation wherein sufficient forces to establish a credible threat are deployed from CONUS or withdrawn from combat during the embarkation and rehearsal phases. It would be the most likely to be observed and reported by the press.

(2) It would require extensive time to prepare, thus presenting an excellent picture to the enemy of a developing US effort. This would provide considerable opportunity for the enemy to evaluate, debate, and decide whether to change negotiating tactics.

(3) A landing targeted at Vinh would be more likely to cause the DRV to reconsider its negotiating tactics than either of the other two lodgements farther south.

(4) For credibility, this scenario must include actions pointing toward the resumption of bombing.

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b. Punitive expedition in Laos and Cambodia.

(1) Punitive airborne/airmobile expeditions against enemy LOCs and base areas in Laos and Cambodia would be unlikely to obtain the desired reaction from Hanoi because of their limited scope and effect, NVN territory is not threatened, and feasible alternatives are available to the enemy.

(2) The threat of an expedition targeted on Tchepone, being closest to NVN, would be more likely to get the desired reaction than alternatives targeted farther south.

c. Resumption of bombing and/or naval blockade.

(1) The resumption of bombing would be the most credible of all the scenarios, since bombing was employed extensively by the United States in the past and the assets for resumption are present in the theater.

(2) With the assets already present, it would be difficult to present a picture of military preparations extending over sufficient time to affect a negotiating posture. This course would also imply the application of emphasis on public statements and other psychological activities to develop the picture of a hardening United States Government resolve.

(3) The naval buildup for a blockade will provide the opportunity to extend military preparations over a substantial period of time, thus providing more flexibility to this approach.

(4) This scenario would be the easiest to control and less expensive than that for an amphibious/airborne attack on NVN.

d. Subversion of the NVN population.

(1) Since it is presently considered infeasible to convince the DRV leadership that it is faced with a

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mass uprising, this scenario by itself would not be likely to produce the desired result of persuading Hanoi to change its negotiating tactics. For greatest effect, it should be coupled with other scenarios.

(2) The development of the actions proposed in this scenario would require considerable time.

e. Technical escalation.

(1) It is difficult to evaluate the degree of credibility which the DRV leadership will attach to this scenario. It would depend in great part on their assessment of the resoluteness of the United States leadership, considering the then existent attitude of the US population toward the entire SEA effort, as well as in their confidence in continued USSR support.

(2) Use of atomic, biological or lethal chemical weapons in Vietnam would excite very strong public and congressional reaction.

(3) The predictable reaction worldwide, particularly in Japan and Okinawa, upon the surfacing of this scenario, militate against its employment.

8. If the concept of applying psychological pressure to change DRV negotiating tactics is approved, it is recommended that an appropriate interagency task force be formed to refine each of the attached scenarios and to prepare detailed plans for their implementation.

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SCENARIO: Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
US officials indicate increased impatience with communist intransigence and hint that the bombing might be resumed. A high level military conference is followed by increased air and naval reconnaissance of NVN. Stockpiles of air munitions are built up, additional naval units move into the Tonkin Gulf and additional aircraft move onto airfields in Thailand. Leaks hint of a resumption of air and naval operations against NVN. Extensive pyschological operations indicate increased US determination and irritation with Hanoi's delays.	1. A high US government official in an exchange with the press hints that a breakdown in the Paris talks could lead to a resumption of the bombing of NVN, possibly expanded. He also indicates dissatisfaction with the slow pace of negotiations. 2. The US negotiator in Paris indicates to the NVN and NLF US impatience over communist intransigence. 3. Allied propaganda media increase emphasis on VC/NVA violations of the DMZ, Laos and Cambodia. 4. Leaflet drops are resumed over NVN, if not already done. 5. A military conference is conducted at CINCPAC involving SecDef, CJCS, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACTHAI. 6. US officials begin issuing statements designed to prepare the American public for the resumption of bombings.	The tone and timing of statements by US official and negotiators will be keyed to actions and statements by the NVN in Paris and elsewhere. See JCS 2472/420

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By CARA Date 7/1/98

SCENARIO: Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
	7. Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against VC/NVA forces. 8. CINCPAC is directed by message to prepare to renew bombing of NVN under reduced restrictions, to close Haiphong and blockade the coast of NVN. 9. CINCPAC, in implementation of the JCS message, takes action to -- a. Increase air reconnaissance over NVN and hydrographic surveys of the coast of NVN. b. Build up stockpiles of air ordnance in SVN and Thailand. c. Move additional carriers and other combat vessels into the Gulf of Tonkin. d. Move or alert for movement additional Air Force Squadrons onto airfields in Thailand. 10. Air Force and Naval Squadrons in the US are alerted for possible movement to the Far East.	The blockade and closure of Haiphong may be directed as a separate action from the bombing resumption.

Authority E.O. 12958 By LMARA Date 7/19/95

SCENARIO: Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
	11. The themes in grey and black radio broadcasts and in leaflets dropped on NVN are gradually changed to indicate an increased lack of patience with Hanoi's actions. 12. JCS is notified of a planned resumption of bombing and blockade of the north. 13. Rumors of a bombing resumption are spread by US airmen to local Vietnamese and Thais.	

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By C MARA Date 7/1/10

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APPENDIX E

SCENARIO: Technical Escalation

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
US government officials indicate increased impatience with communist intransigence in Paris and hint at a possible technical escalation of the war. A visit by technical experts to the Far East is followed by a high level political/military conference. US troops in Vietnam commence CBR training while an apparent build-up of highly classified munitions occurs. Radio broadcasts and leaflet themes indicate increased US determination and irritation with Hanoi's delays.	1. The US negotiator in Paris indicates to the NVN and NLF negotiators US impatience over communist intransigence. This theme of impatience is repeated in a press conference by a high US official in Washington. 2. A high US military official in a public statement comments that the Pentagon periodically examines means by which new and more modern weapons could be used in Vietnam if necessary. 3. Allied propaganda media increase emphasis on VC/NVA violations of the DMZ, Laos and Cambodia. 4. Leaflet drops are resumed over NVN, if not already being done. 5. A team of Pentagon technical experts in atomic and chemical warfare makes an extended visit of the Far East, stopping off at CINCPAC, Okinawa, Saigon and Bangkok. 6. A summit conference is held in Honolulu involving President Nixon, President Thieu and the heads of government of TCC's.	The tone and timing of statements of US offici and negotiators will be keyed to the actions an statements by the NVN i Paris and elsewhere. See JCS 2472/420

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By C NARA Date 7/1/98

SCENARIO: Technical Escalation

CONCEPT	IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS	COMMENTS
	7. Subsequently, a military conference is held at CINCPAC involving SecDef, CJCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV and CINCSAC. 8. High security storage areas are established at selected sites in SVN and Thailand. A limited number of actual chemical munitions are shipped into SVN and stored at those sites. 9. CBR training is conducted for all US troops in SVN, to include those in rear area jobs. Inspections are conducted of unit CBR equipment. 10. Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against VC/NVA forces. 11. The themes of grey and black radio broadcasts and in leaflets dropped on NVN are gradually changed to indicate an increased lack of patience with Hanoi's actions.	

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By LC/ARA Date 2/1/18

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Authority E.O. 12958
By NARA Date 7-11-02

March 3, 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger (S)

SUBJECT: Memorandum Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam

I am very grateful for your memorandum of February 21, 1969 which forwarded the preliminary papers prepared by the Joint Staff on possible actual or feigned military actions which might be undertaken to signal U. S. intent to escalate operations in Vietnam.

The plans are well conceived and the risks involved in their implementation are precisely enumerated. I am somewhat concerned, however, that the "realities" of the current domestic and international environment do not lend themselves to an acceptance of these risks at this time. There may be, however, some less elaborate actions which could be initiated which although more subtle in nature, might be undertaken with reduced risks of news media recognition or domestic turbulence. I have in mind such measures as the selective implementation of indicators which might signal force build-up, increased planning, etc., as manifested by increased military communications, increased aerial reconnaissance, planning conferences or even the staging of amphibious shipping.

Perhaps it would be possible to flesh-out the plans with a spectrum of lower profiled actions of this type which could be implemented with less risk of international and domestic turbulence. I would be most grateful if you would have this excellent effort refined accordingly so that we could jointly discuss the resulting proposals with the President sometime after March 15, 1969. We

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By NARA Date 7-11-02

should also be prepared to discuss with the President proposals for accomplishing required interdepartmental coordination while preserving essential maximum security.

1969-03-22 Henry A. Kissinger to the President, Subj Vietnam Papers with memorandum from Kissinger to the President, subj Vietnam Situation and Options

Henry A. Kissinger to the President, Subj: Vietnam Papers, 22 March 1969, with memorandum from Kissinger to the President, subj: Vietnam Situation and Options, [3/20] attached, Top Secret

A discussion on a wide range of possible Vietnam strategies. Emphasis is on getting the Soviet Union to encourage a diplomatic solution.

According to a notation "There is no question that the Soviets could play a major role in bringing the war to an end if they decide to put pressure on Hanoi." Then Madan Theory is introduced, “change the current Soviet calculation of gains and risks." And, "Within Vietnam we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control."

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Morton A. Halperin Papers, box 10, Vietnam

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

sent to President 3/22/69

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Vietnam Papers

Attached are several papers on Vietnam focused on: (1) negotiations, (2) possible escalation, and (3) U.S. force levels in the South and possible de-escalation. The papers attached are:

HAK Memo on Vietnam Situation and Options.

My effort to summarize where we stand and my recommendations for action in the next several months. Attached to this memo is my memo to you on de-escalation and a staff paper on negotiations.

Laird Memo.

Trip report plus recommendations, particularly on U.S. troop levels and ARVN improvement. A lucid description of the situation we face in South Vietnam. A summary of the memo is also at the Tab.

Wheeler Memo.

Recommendations related mainly to reactions to enemy shelling.

Mutual Withdrawal Memo.

This memo points to the evidence that Hanoi may be seriously interested in negotiating mutual withdrawal.

Encls: a/s

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By JOW, NARA, Date 3-15-01

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MEMORANDUM

4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3/20

Sent to NC

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Vietnam Situation and Options

This memorandum contains my analysis of the Vietnam situation and my views on the major decisions which you will have to face in the next several weeks concerning: (1) negotiation strategy, (2) the level of our forces in the South and possible de-escalation, and (3) response to further enemy shelling of major cities.

I. The Situation as of January 20

The situation in South Vietnam which we inherited on January 20 is well described in Secretary Laird's memorandum to you:

> "General Abrams has made remarkable progress in achieving a measure of military superiority throughout South Vietnam. The pacification program, which must depend primarily and increasingly on South Vietnamese efforts, is also proceeding, though at a slower rate. But none of our officials, either military or civilian, is under any illusion that the battle in South Vietnam can be brought to a military conclusion within six months, a year or even several years. Options, over which we have little or no control, are available to the enemy for continuing the war almost indefinitely, although perhaps at a reduced intensity."

While the domestic opposition to the war which was again increasing quieted down after January 20, there is little question that domestic controversy will begin to mount, certainly within a few months.

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II. Assets and Liabilities

In evaluating our options now, we need to take account of our own assets and liabilities and those of the enemy.

Our main asset is the presence of our troops in South Vietnam. Hanoi has no hope of attaining its objective of controlling the South unless it can get us to withdraw our forces. Because of our overwhelming economic strength and military power Hanoi knows that we cannot, by military means, be forced to withdraw.

Our substantial capability to escalate the war confronts Hanoi with the danger of having to rely even more heavily on China and the Soviet Union.

Our liabilities are the domestic opposition in the United States and the continuing weak political base of the Saigon government.

Hanoi's assets and liabilities are to a large extent the reverse of our own. Hanoi knows it cannot defeat us militarily and that a step up in our actions could threaten its autonomy. There are signs of strains in morale in North Vietnam which must worry the leadership. Moreover, the danger of a Sino-Soviet clash which would disrupt their supplies from both countries almost certainly poses a continuing sense of unease. The unpredictable international situation provides an incentive to Hanoi to negotiate.

Hanoi's main asset is the high value it attaches to gaining control of South Vietnam and hence its willingness to accept casualties and risks that seem disproportionate to us. Hanoi is, of course, fighting in familiar terrain and has been able to develop a political-military strategy for the conflict. The Hanoi leadership also counts on world and U.S. public opinion.

III. Where Do We Go From Here?

We must, in the coming months, fully coordinate our diplomacy with our military actions in a carefully orchestrated plan designed to maximize the possibilities of getting a satisfactory settlement.

We face the continuing dilemma that if Hanoi believes we are running out of time it has no incentive to negotiate. We, thus, must play our hand in a way which:

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(1) increases the time we have available,

(2) makes clear to Hanoi that our domestic opposition will not force a precipitous withdrawal, and

(3) provides incentives to both Hanoi and Saigon to negotiate.

In order to do this, we must:

(1) seek private talks and progress in the negotiations without appearing over eager or anxious,

(2) maintain the confidence of the GVN,

(3) assess military questions, including possible escalation, not in military terms alone but also for the political effect of our actions and, in particular, its impact on the negotiations.

We must recognize the paradox that a deliberate pace is the fastest route to a settlement. A calm posture will bring peace faster than constantly pressing for talks, seeking to force the pace, and putting forward a smorgasbord of proposals.

How should we apply these general principals in dealing with the specific questions of negotiations, U.S. force levels and possible U.S. de-escalation and the political effects of possible escalatory steps particularly in relation to the Soviet Union?

IV. Negotiations

It is extremely important that we carefully consider the pace of our negotiations and the subjects we wish to negotiate about. We must avoid the mistakes of the past.

Prior to January 20, we fluctuated between intensive efforts to get negotiations started and long periods in which there was no contact at all. During our "peace offensives" American envoys descended on capitals all over the world; during the intervals between these spasms, we relied largely on military measures. When we engaged in diplomacy we sometimes seemed so anxious that we encouraged Hanoi to believe that domestic support was fast running out. We thus encouraged Hanoi intransigence by giving rise to the hope that domestic opposition would force us to withdraw.

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Governor Harriman's negotiating style compounded these problems. He presented a picture of being desperate for a settlement and gave Hanoi a smorgasbord of proposals from which to choose. This gave Hanoi a feeling that we were enormously anxious and gave Hanoi the ability to choose to discuss those proposals which would create maximum difficulty between us and the GVN.

We must avoid these pitfalls in the future. Thus far, our objective has been to establish a deliberate pace in the negotiations. We have developed a careful plan of action designed to assure the GVN that we do not intend to sell out their interests in a desperate effort to get out as quickly as possible and to convince Hanoi that we believe we have time. We have not blocked private talks; we have simply not asked for them. To have pressed for private talks sooner would have run the risk of a confrontation with the GVN.

There are signs that this strategy is evolving successfully:

(1) Hanoi has indicated a willingness to engage in private discussions which would at least include military questions. This was reflected in a Vance/Lao conversation and in several recent conversations with Soviet officials. There is no comparable period during the Vietnam War in which the enemy has been making so many overtures to us for private talks. The enemy is also complaining publicly that we are refusing to talk to them privately.

(2) The GVN has inaugurated private contacts with the NVN and the NLF.

(3) Our relations with Saigon have greatly improved. We are just beginning to establish full mutual confidence as reflected in your conversation with Ky, their failure to press hard for retaliation after the Saigon shellings, and Thieu's agreement to our proposing to Hanoi that we begin bilateral private talks.

We must now begin to make progress in Paris moving carefully and deliberately. As we move into private talks with Hanoi, the issues we must face are:

(1) The Pace of the Negotiations. We wish to move as quickly as possible towards a settlement. However, we should gear the pace of the negotiations to actual progress and not seek talks for their own sake. To press for frequent private meetings and to constantly alter our position

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in an effort to show sincerity would be counterproductive. Hanoi would only conclude that by waiting they can get better terms.

(2) Agenda.

We should first discuss the issue of mutual withdrawal on which our bargaining position is the strongest. Hanoi's primary objective is to get us to withdraw our troops; our major objective is to get their troops withdrawn. We must recgonize that neither we nor Hanoi may want to implement a complete withdrawal until the other parts of a settlement take shape, but we should delay talking about political issues related to SVN since such discussions can only lead to acrimony with the South -- a basic objective of Hanoi. Saigon, in any talks on political matters, is likely to appear to be obstinate and we will be under great pressure to press the GVN not to prevent successful negotiations.

I recognize that we must at some point be prepared to discuss a political settlement. But the issue is what we talk about first. We should begin with an issue on which our position is close to that of the GVN and which the GVN believes is a legitimate subject for US/NVN discussions.

(3) Relations with the GVN. There is no doubt that at some point we will have to engage in arm twisting of the GVN. The question is again one of timing. If we press the GVN now, since their structure is fragile, there may be nothing to negotiate about. We should only be prepared to press them very hard towards the end of the negotiations when an overall settlement is in sight.

(4) Relations with the Soviets.

There is no question that the Soviets could play a major role in bringing the war to an end if they decide to put pressure on Hanoi. The Soviets probably would like the war to end but we have not yet found the leverage to get them to act on that desire.

There are two views on how we can influence the Soviets. The first argues that we must demonstrate our good faith, our desire for peace.

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The second view, which I share, is that the Soviets will put pressure on Hanoi only if after a careful calculation of costs and gains they decide that it is in their interest to do so. The Soviets clearly would pay a price in terms of their relations with Peking, with Hanoi, and with the world communist movement if the Kremlin pressured Hanoi into accepting settlement. We must give those in the Soviet hierarchy who might want to move in this direction credible arguments to use with their hard-line colleagues.

We must find a way either within the Vietnam context or beyond it to change the current Soviet calculation of gains and risks.

Within Vietnam, we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control. Possible escalatory steps must be considered in this light.

Our negotiating strategy must be related to our military operations in the field. Our decisions regarding responses to Hanoi's shelling of the cities, U.S. military operations in the South, and possible troop deployments must show the same determination not to be panicked and a sense that we know what we are doing.

V. Escalation

Any escalatory moves that we take in response to Hanoi's shelling of the cities must be based on a clear understanding of what we are trying to achieve. Our escalatory moves would not have primarily a military objective. Our concern would be the political effect of our actions.

It is difficult to conceive of political effects in response to Hanoi which would justify full scale resumption of the bombing. We must weigh the physical damage we can do to North Vietnam against the loss of domestic and international support of the American position which would follow a resumption of the bombing. A consideration of these factors leads, I believe, to the conclusion that a sustained resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam would not now be justified. What we have done thus far has, I believe, conveyed the appropriate message. If the shelling and abuse of the DMZ continues over the next several weeks, a single escalatory strike might be warranted.

If we do engage in more extensive escalation, I believe it should be aimed at influencing the Soviet Union not Hanoi. We must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get

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out of control. The only credible objective we could have in escalating would be to give the Soviets concern. Our planning for possible escalation does not have this criteria in mind and thus our current options have only the unfortunate consequences of a bombing attack without the possible advantages of posing a threat to the Soviets. We have just begun to give imaginative thought to this problem.

VI. U.S. Military Forces and Operations in the South

One school of thought argues that we should de-escalate the war in the South in concert with a negotiating initiative and then hope that by demonstrating good faith to the Russians we can get a settlement. As I noted above, I do not believe that we could influence the Russians by demonstrating sincerity. Moreover, I believe that we must keep up our military pressure in the South. When and if we withdraw troops it should be on the basis that the ARVN forces are now in a position to pick up the slack of a full scale military campaign against the enemy. Ordering de-escalation would not necessarily reduce casualties, since the enemy could still attack, nor would it reduce pressures to bring forces home and to end the war. Of equal importance, it would be very difficult to devise orders which would be at all acceptable to the field commanders and which would in fact lead to de-escalation. (My memorandum to you discussing de-escalation is attached.)

It is conceivable that at some point we would de-escalate. However, to try to negotiate de-escalation would be demoralizing to our forces and any negotiation could only be very protracted. Hanoi may seek to discuss de-escalation but we should not assume that we must talk about whatever the enemy wants to talk about. Discussions about de-escalation would only be time wasting.

An announcement at the right time, probably May or June, of our intention to withdraw about 75,000 troops this year and to re-examine the situation at the end of the year would buy us a considerable amount of time at home, make clear to Hanoi that we will not be forced into the total withdrawal which they seek, and at the same time indirectly put pressure on Saigon to negotiate a political settlement in the South. I believe we should move in this direction. We should aim at withdrawing U.S. maneuver battalions leaving the combat support units behind to aid the ARVN. Prior to their withdrawal, we may want to regroup some of our combat units and hold them in reserve. Since the vast majority of our casualties occur in maneuver battalions, this process would result in reduced U.S. casualties while permitting us to support the ARVN.

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VII. Recommendations

1. Between now and June we should engage in private talks with the North Vietnamese about mutual withdrawal and press Saigon to talk to the NLF. If Hanoi proposes 4-party private talks, we should, with GVN agreement, enter into them but let the GVN take the lead in discussing political matters.

2. We should announce in June that we will withdraw 75,000 troops from South Vietnam during the remainder of the year and that at the end of the year we will re-examine the situation. (General Abrams should be told that the decision to withdraw some troops this year has been made in principle and be asked to submit a concrete plan for withdrawal of 50 or 75 thousand men between July and December. This is Secretary Laird's recommendation except that he suggests withdrawing 50-70 thousand men.)

3. The U.S. withdrawal announcement should be in the context of a major Presidential speech stressing our desire for peace, presenting a detailed peace plan, and calling upon Hanoi to engage in serious negotiations about mutual withdrawal. (I am working on a detailed scenario.)

4. We should do everything possible to accelerate ARVN modernization and put all the pressure that we can on the GVN to improve the quality and effectiveness of the ARVN.

5. We should develop a plan for the withdrawal of our combat forces over the next several years. The plan should explore the possibility of withdrawing U.S. combat troops leaving support units behind to aid ARVN combat units.

6. We should not take any de-escalatory moves within the South. If Hanoi proposes discussions of this subject we should refuse to talk about de-escalation except in the context of an agreement on mutual withdrawal.

7. We should begin immediately to develop alternate plans for possible escalatory military actions with the motive of convincing the Soviets that the war might get out of hand. (At your direction, work is underway on this question.)

8. We should continue to press the GVN to engage in discussions with the NLF. We should instruct Ambassador Bunker to continue his discussions with the GVN about political arrangements in the South and urge them to develop a specific plan which they could put forward publicly with details which could be passed privately to the NLF and Hanoi.

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1969-04-11 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to Dr. Henry Kissinger

Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to Dr. Henry Kissinger, 11 April 1969, enclosing memorandum to Laird from JCS Chairman Wheeler, 11 April 1969, and paper, subj: Plan for a Mining Feint of Haiphong Harbor, n.d., Top Secret

The slow progress of the Paris peace talks, Nixon and Kissinger decide to order out mine-laying exercises in the Philippines and the Tonkin Gulf. Hoping the North and the Soviets would believe this was in preparation for the mining of Haiphong.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

11 April 1969

MEMO FOR Dr. Henry Kissinger, NSC

Henry:

I am forwarding a plan which I understand you and some of your staff have been working on with the Navy. General Wheeler's comments are attached.

While I am providing both the basic plan and General Wheeler's comments, I would like to talk with you about such operations before serious consideration is given for implementation. I have serious reservations about this proposed operation in particular.

Attachments

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Date: JAN 2007
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
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DATE: DEC 6 2002
REVIEW DATE: Dec 2012

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OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

11 April 1969

MEMO TO: Secretary Laird

Attached is a proposed plan for a mining feint of Haiphong Harbor which has been prepared in response to Dr. Kissinger's request. I believe Dr. Kissinger discussed this with you previously. I have gone over this plan and find nothing wrong with it militarily. The sequential actions indicated down through Step Three can all be done unilaterally by the Navy. However, several of the actions indicated under Step Four would require coordination with and implementation by CINCPAC.

I understand that this plan is to be considered in addition to OPERATION LUNCH-BREAKFAST BRAVO, and not in lieu of the latter. I believe that the latter operation is more meaningful from a military viewpoint. While I am not fully informed on the complete politico-military considerations involved, I believe that this plan for a mining feint is feasible.

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Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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Date: 23 JAN 2007
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

PLAN FOR A MINING FEINT OF HAIPHONG HARBOR

Objective: To create indecision within the Government of North Vietnam with regard to intended U.S. military actions, specifically as they relate to the mining of Haiphong harbor.

General Cover Story: U.S. Navy conducting a Pacific-wide test of its mining plans, including logistic procedures, training, mine readiness and reaction times. The exercise includes movement of mines from storage areas to ships operating in the South China Sea.

Assumption: That increased U.S. military activity in certain specific areas of preparedness will come to the attention of the Hanoi government through the communist intelligence and espionage systems.

General Concept: To undertake a series of military actions which separately or collectively create the impression that the U.S. is making plans for or giving consideration to the mining of Haiphong. Each action will:

a. be deniable, both publicly and within the U.S. government.

b. have a suitable cover story which would permit denial of any actual mining plan in the event of unintentional public disclosure.

c. be relatively low key when taken alone.

d. be credible in both near and far term.

Sequence: The following sequential actions provide a scenario of events designed to transmit signals to the North Vietnamese government. These actions provide an increasing order of activity. The earlier steps are more deniable both publicly and within the U.S. government as being part of any master mining plan. The supplementary actions at the higher end of the spectrum have both an increased threat potential and are less deniable as a function of time:

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Step One --

1. CNO transmit message inquiries to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (normal information addressees), to:

Sat 12 Apr — a. confirm actual on-board inventory and location of Pacific Command mine assets. (Message could be transmitted UNCLASSIFIED, then upgraded next day to SECRET in order to focus attention.)

Sun 13 Apr — b. report material condition of mines and estimated manhours necessary to bring to operational readiness.

Mon 14 Apr — c. verify quantity of MK-36 destructor mines on-board deployed carriers.

Mon 14 Apr — d. report state of mining readiness of embarked aircraft squadrons.

Mon 14 Apr — 2. Direct Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make ready 50 MK-52 mines, 50 MK-50 mines, and 50 MK-55 mines, and hold in high state of readiness at Subic.

Wed 16 Apr — 3. Airlift fifty MK-52 mines each from Yokosuka, Atsugi, Iwakuni, and Naha to the Naval Ammunition Depot, Subic Bay, Philippines.

Thurs 17 Apr — 4. Airlift all available MK-52 training-configured, inert mines from locations in Western Pacific to Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, Philippines for pilot/crew training and indoctrination.

Step Two --

Sat 19 Apr — 1. Airlift mines and mine personnel from Cubi Point to attack carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Sun 20 Apr — 2. Load ammunition ship in Subic Bay with replenishment mines, and sail to Tonkin Gulf. (This ensures exposure to local stevedores.)

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Mon 21 Apr 3. Load attack carrier in Subic Bay with mines.

Step Three --

Tues 22 Apr 1. Conduct mine plant exercises from Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, for carrier air wing personnel.

Tues 22 Apr 2. Provide suitable number U.S. Marine Corps A-6 pilots temporary additional duty from Danang to Naval Air Station, Cubi, for mine qualification.

Fri 25 Apr 3. Move 1,000 mines from Yokosuka to Subic by ship.

Step Four -- Supplementary actions for further study and consideration; dates to be determined.

1. Move North SAR (Sea Air Rescue) and PIRAZ (Positive Indent Radar Advisory Zone) ships from present southern positions to pre-bombing halt stations. Provide suitable escort, CAP (Combat Air Patrol), etc.

2. Increase reconnaissance over coastal approaches to Haiphong.

3. Initiate continuous and intensive surveillance of sea approaches to Haiphong with P-3 and ASW (antisubmarine warfare) aircraft.

4. Drop empty mine drogue parachutes in area of ostensible minefield off approaches to Haiphong. (Time permitting, soluble mine shapes could be manufactured.)

5. Position squadrons of destroyers in area 20 miles off Haiphong to simulate threat of blockade.

6. Load and sail submarine from Subic with mines.

7. Replenish or increase West Pacific mine stocks from U.S. depots.

8. Initiate low-key procurement discussions with U.S. mine manufacturers.

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C. COMINEFLOT ONE 111425Z MAY 69 PASEI
1. IN REF A CNO DIRECTED THAT PREPARATIONS BE MADE FOR TF 77 AIR WINGS TO CONDUCT MINE DELIVERY TRAINING IN THE SUBIC OPERATING AREAS DURING REGULAR CVA IN PORT PERIODS. REF B REQUESTED THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF DRILL MINES REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A MINEX FOR ENTERPRISE DURING TER 15-20 MAY IN PORT PERIOD. ADDITIONALLY, REF B REQUESTED CTF 77 TO SPECIFY THE PARTICULAR SUBIC OPAREA IN WHICH

PAGE TWO RUYPZFF4147 S E CICHE T
TO LAY A DRILL MINE FIELD. REF C SETS FORTH WATER DEPTH PARAMETERS FOR RECOVERY OF DRILL MINES.
2. FOR CTG 77.41 WHEN DIRECTED, REQUEST YOU COORDINATE V ANNING FOR AND CONDUCT MINE TRAINING EXERCISES DURING SUBIC IN PORT PERIOD 15-20 MAY. COMINEFLOT ONE WILL BE AVAILABLE IN SUBIC 14-21 MAY FOR LIAISON AS REQUIRED TO DISCUSS DETAILED REQUIRZMENTS FOR MINE RECOVERY VESSELS, EOD DIVERS AND MINE SPOTTING SHIPS/CRAFT. DESIRE THAT EXERCISES BE CONDUCTED ALONG FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:
A. FOR EACH MISSION, PLAN AND LAY ONE-LINE MINEFIELDS CONSISTING OF AT LEAST FOUR MINES PER LINE.
B. EACH DELIVERY SQUADRON ON BOARD ENTERPRISE WILL PARTICIPATE INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE.
C. MINIMUM OF 2 AIRCRAFT PER MISSION.
D. EACH AIRCRAFT WILL BE LOADED WITH 2 MK25/55 OR 4 MK36/52 DRILL MINES.
E. MISSIONS ARE TO APPROACH MINEFIELD FROM SEAWARD WITHOUT BENEFIT OF TACAN NAVIGATIONAL ASSISTANCE. FINAL DELIVERY SHOULD BE AT MAXIMUM AIRSPEED AN
MINIMUM ALTITUDE CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY AND DRILL MINE LIMITATIONS.

c. UTILIZE A6 AIRCRAFT TO ACT AS PATHFINDERS IF POSSIBLE. USE OF
T

AEW AIRCRAFT IS ENCOURAGED.
d. EMPHASIS IS TO BE PLACED ON ACCURACY AND MINE SPACING.
3. FOR COMNAVBASE SUBIC. PUBLICATIONS SETTING FORTH SUBIC OPERATING
AREA DO NOT REFLECT WATER AREAS FOR LAYING DRILL MINES. REQUEST YOU
SPECIFY A SUITABLE AREA WITH WATER DEPTHS OF LESS THAS120 FEET.
ADDITIONALLY, REQUEST THAT THE DESIGNATED MINE FIELD BE LOCATED IN
PROXIMITY TO SHORE RANGE TOWERS FOR SPOTTING AND TRIANGULATION
OF MINE IMPACTS. IF RANGE TOWERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, REQUEST YOU
PROVIDE SPOTTING BOAT TO MARK LOCATION OF MINE IMPACTS IF FEA-
SIBLE.
4. FOR NAVMAG SUBIC AND COMINEFLOT ONE: REQUEST THE FOLLOWING DRILL
MINES BE MADE READY AT NAVMAG SUBIC FOR POSSIBLE MINE EXERCISES WITH
ENTERPRISE A6/A7 AIRCRAFT DURING THE PERIOD 19-20 MAY:

MINE	LUG
4 MK25-2	MK6
2 MK55-2	MK3
3 MK55-3	MK3
3 MK55-5	MK3
18 MK36-1	MK13
3 MK52-3	MK6

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3 MK52-5	MK6

NOTE: DETERMINATION OF DRILL MINE PERFORMANCE NOT ESSENTIAL. PUR-
POSE OF EXERCISE TO PRACTICE DELIVERY TACTICS.
5. FOR ALL: UPON COMPLETION OF MINEX, REQUEST COMMENTS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE AND THE COORDINATIO
N
PROBLEMS INVOLVED BE SUBMITTED TO CTF 77. INFO WILL BE USED
TO
DEVELOP STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR SUBSEQUENT EXERCISES.
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22. Memorandum of Conversation (USSR)[1]

Washington, May 14, 1969.

At Kissinger's invitation, I visited him in his office at the White House on the morning of May 14.

Kissinger said that, as I was aware, President Nixon was to deliver a televised address to the nation on Vietnam at 10 p.m. tonight. Nixon had expressed the wish that the text of his speech be provided to the Soviet Ambassador in advance so that it could then be transmitted to Moscow for the Soviet Government.

…

To a question as to what he, Kissinger, sees as the difference between the position of the current administration and the position of the Johnson Administration on the Vietnam issue, he asserted that there is indeed a definite difference.

He stated that prior to March–April 1968 Johnson had, in general, believed only in a military solution; therefore, he had made virtually no effort to think about the substance of the political problems. However, after he stopped the bombing of the DRV, he had rather naively hoped for a fairly quick settlement—as the other side's response. In the face of unyielding tactics by the Vietnamese at the negotiations, he was somewhat at a loss, and until the end of his presidency he essentially had no clear political views as to what more to do and how to deal with the other side.

Nixon, on the other hand, takes a realistic approach, according to Kissinger. He recognizes de facto Hanoi's interest in the further development of events in South Vietnam. He recognizes the NLF as a reality that exists and operates in South Vietnam. He is prepared to accept South Vietnam's neutrality. He is prepared to accept whatever the South Vietnamese themselves agree on. In the final analysis, he is even prepared to accept any political system in South Vietnam, "provided there is a fairly reasonable interval between conclusion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system."

At this point my conversation with Kissinger was interrupted, since we were invited to join Nixon upstairs.

…

A. Dobrynin

---

[1] Source: AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 53, p. 399, d. 6, l. 44–50. Secret. From Dobrynin's Journal. No American record of Dobrynin's conversation with either Kissinger or Nixon has been found.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 16, 1969

Mr. Kissinger:

Sainteny approved the translation this morning before he left for Florida.

He asked that the copy of his notes and the translation be destroyed after you show them to the President. He has the original notes.

Tony Lake

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Translation

I will try to meet with Mai Van Bo in the presence of Xuan Thuy and will give to him the letter destined for Ho, calling to his attention that this time I have the latitude to let him know that President Nixon has authorized me to give it to him. I will ask him to have this letter sent to Hanoi as rapidly and safely as possible. I will inform him of Mr. Kissinger's trip to Paris on August 4 and his desire to learn of Hanoi's reaction to the message of the President.

I will add that knowing President Nixon personally, I had already had a conversation with him on Vietnam in 1966 after my return from Hanoi.

In May and during these last few days, he has spoken with me with total sincerity.

I carried away from these conversations the conviction that President Nixon sincerely wishes to put an end to this war and that he is prepared to discuss it with good will with the highest responsible authorities of the government of Hanoi on the condition that he would find on their part the same real desire to reach a conclusion.

But he will not allow himself to be snared by the tactic of drawing out the negotiations in the hope that American public opinion,

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having become weary, would finish by accepting an unconditional withdrawal -- a trap into which he will not fall under any circumstances.

He has decided to hope for a positive outcome from the conversations at Paris by November 1, and he is prepared to show good will by some humanitarian gestures which Mr. Kissinger will be prepared to discuss in detail. But if, however, by this date -- the anniversary of the bombing halt -- no valid solution has been reached, he will regretfully find himself obliged to have recourse to measures of great consequence and force. When he talks of solution, he does not mean gestures like the release of a few prisoners but steps indicating an imminent end of the war.

Regardless of public opinion or opposition, Mr. Nixon is determined to bring this war to an early conclusion. He totally rejects continued talking and fighting. If this diplomatic approach fails, he will resort to any means necessary.

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
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DUCK HOOK



20 JULY 1969

Office of Chief of Naval Operations

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CNO LTR SER 374P1/725755 of 29 April 1980
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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

~~SECRET~~

21 July 1969

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - ~~EYES ONLY~~

Dear Mel,

In response to Henry Kissinger's request, I have had prepared a detailed plan for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction (quarantine) of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville.

The mining plan has three options with response times varying from 12 to 86 hours. I recommend option A.

Viewed solely from a military point of view, the interdiction (quarantine) concept is relatively simple, requires few forces with little risk to these forces. The other implications of such an operation are, of course, substantially more complicated.

I have attached a proposed memo from you to Henry forwarding the plans for the consideration of higher authority.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Tom

T. H. MOORER
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Attachment

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Dear Henry,

In response to your recent request, a detailed plan has been prepared for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction (quarantine) of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville.

Please let me know if I may be of any further assistance.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

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SUMMARY OF MINING PLAN FOR HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX

1. This paper summarizes a plan for mining the Haiphong Port Complex, including Cam Pha and Hon Gai.

BACKGROUND

2. In 1968 cargo throughput into Haiphong averaged 4100 tons per day. So far in 1969 this average has increased to 5200 tons per day. About 90 percent of all imports via sea into North Vietnam pass through Haiphong. USSR provides about 50 percent of this shipping. This cargo is estimated to consist not only of food and petroleum products which contribute to the prosecution of the war, but in addition, trucks, generators, and other war supporting materials. (See Tab A). The closing of the Haiphong Port Complex will have a major effect on the North Vietnam economy and the capability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in the South.

HAIPHONG COMPLEX MINE PLAN

3. The mining plan (Tab C) is designed to stop entry of deep draft shipping into the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha (all in Haiphong Complex), and to disrupt major attempts by the North Vietnamese to employ lighterage for offloading deep draft shipping which would be forced to anchor to seaward of the minefields.

4. Three options are specified in the Mining Plan, viz, A: Three CVA's; B: Two CVA's; and C: One CVA. Option A, using 154 mines/605 destructors, provides the most complete and effective mining of the Haiphong Complex and accomplishes the mission in one launch (except during brief period when no large CVA is available). Option A has disadvantage of longer reaction time because one of the three CVA's involved may be in port when the plan is initiated. (See Tab B for Reaction). Options B and C, using 98 mines and 400-600 destructors, provide effective mining of the deep water channels with much quicker response time. Disadvantages inherent in B and C are less dense minefields and elimination of certain shallow water destructor fields.

5. Arming delays of 72 hours are set on all mines to allow time for departure of third nation shipping.

6. The use of mines is not an offensive act since no weapons are specifically directed against any target. Any damage which occurred to either North Vietnam or third country shipping would be self inflicted resulting from their decision to penetrate waters that have been openly declared unsafe. There is no coercion on the part of U.S.

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7. Plans provide for follow-on launches, when directed, to lay destructor fields. These are designed to disrupt lighterage if reconnaissance reveals that North Vietnam is offloading substantial amounts of cargo from ships at anchor. Destructors will not be delivered earlier than 48 hours after initial minefields are laid. (24 hours is maximum delay which can be set on destructors).

8. SAR (Search and Rescue) ships and PIRAZ (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone) ships will be positioned to the north to provide necessary support. BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air Patrol) and TARCAP (Target Combat Air Patrol) will also be provided.

9. Tab A describes North Vietnamese Air Order of Battle which could be encountered. Considering the low level profile of the mission (approximately 300') there is little or no danger from either MIG aircraft or SA-2 emplacements. In most cases, minefields selected are outside the range of AAA, although some exits from target area will approach AAA defenses. Based on planned aircraft tracks and known locations of North Vietnamese air defenses, expected aircraft loss rate will be approximately 3 percent (conservative estimate).

10. Provisions are included in the plan for follow up reconnaissance to check on effectiveness of fields and reaction of the North Vietnamese. Reseeding operations will be executed as necessary to maintain the integrity of the various minefields.

11. For diversionary purposes, several weeks prior to execution, PIRAZ and SAR forces will be relocated to positions in the Tonkin Gulf which they will occupy during the actual mission. After about 12 hours on station they will return to current operating areas. This relocation will be repeated at random intervals (about every 10 days) to inure North Vietnamese defenses and entice them to lower their guard when mission is actually carried out.

12. Detailed rules of engagement are listed in Tab D. Flak suppression will be required against those AAA sites of greatest threat to own forces. Talos missiles are authorized over land against hostile MIG aircraft which threaten U.S. forces.

13. Possible reactions by USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam have been analyzed and appear in Tab E. An interesting conclusion of this analysis is that much of the uneasiness about Vietnam throughout the world has subsided and that it is likely that the mining of the Haiphong Complex would generally be interpreted as a show of determination, whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness.


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14. Third nation shipping would have three options: Not to enter, enter with risk, or anchor outside. Many studies show that sufficient barges, sampans, and junks are available for lightering operations but this is a very difficult operation, requiring large numbers of people and excessive time. It is particularly difficult during the Northeast Monsoon season (September-May). Further, while moving from ship to shore, lighters are vulnerable to ship and aircraft attack without undue risk to third nation ships and without risk of killing civilians ashore. If decision is made to interdict lighters while they are moving from ship to shore, surface gunfire, as well as air, can be employed.

15. The rules of international law regarding mine-laying have been reexamined. The traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war. The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered laws of war, based on the "war or peace" dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts in self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore, the mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described in this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's and U.S. right of collective self-defense against the aggression of North Vietnam. (See Tab F).

TABS
A - Intelligence
B - Execution Timing
C - Mining Plan Concept
D - Rules of Engagement for Mining Plan
E - World Reaction to Mining
F - Legal Ramification of Mining

Tab



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TAB A

INTELLIGENCE

HAIPHONG

1. General Situation:

a. Air Threat: There are eight serviceable jet airbases in North Vietnam with an estimated 94 jet fighters of the MIG 15, 17, 19 and 21 variety. Strip alert is stood at five of the eight bases. The NVN GCI coverage of NVN and the Gulf of Tonkin is excellent but the NVN Air Force has only a limited all weather/ night capability.

b. SAM Threat: There are three known active SAM sites which could take under fire aircraft over water conducting operations in the proposed minefield area. SA-2 operational effectiveness below 1000' is limited due to ground return.

c. AAA Threat: There is limited threat from NVN gun AAA over the minefield. There is known light AAA (effective range 4 NM) on Ile de Norway and the heavy AAA in the vicinity of Cat Bi/Kien An airfields and Hon Gai has an effective range of 7 NM to 25,000 feet.

d. NVN Naval Threat: (Haiphong Area)

Motor Gunboat (PGM)	11
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)	9
Subchaser (SC)	2
Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat (PTH)	1

(1) The PGM is capable of 43 knots for 1 hour. At 20 knots, range is 655 NM. Armament consists of 2-37MM single mounts and 2 - 20 MM single mounts. It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD.

(2) The PT boat is capable of 50 knots for 350 NM. At 30 knots for 410 NM. Armament consists of 4 - 12.7 MM guns, 2 - 18" torpedoes, and 4 depth charges. It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD.

(3) The PTH is estimated capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots. Armament is 2 - 21" torpedoes and two twin 12.7 MM gun mounts. It has the POT HEAD surface search radar.

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2. Enemy Forces.

a. North Vietnam.

(1) Naval Forces: The North Vietnamese Navy was designed to be a coastal defense force, but has proved itself incapable of performing the task. Its P-4 Class PT's pose the only threat to large surface craft, but NVN tactics and torpedo readiness render this threat almost negligible. The Navy's SO-1 SC have ASW ordnance, but crews have not been trained to use it. The patrol craft (Swatow Class PGM and Shanghai Class PTF) provide 37 MM mobile platforms to supplement shore defenses, but have no significant anti-ship capability.

(2) Air Force: The North Vietnamese Air Force has grown considerably since the beginning of the Vietnam hostilities. The NVNAF combat inventory presently includes about 94 fighters and 4 IL-28 bombers located in North Vietnam.

3. Enemy Capabilities.

a. North Vietnam is capable of:

(1) Attacking with light jet bombers and jet fighters/bombers opposing naval forces operating in the Gulf of Tonkin or the northwestern area of the South China Sea.

(2) Conducting limited harassment of opposing naval units operating in the coastal waters.

(3) Conducting limited defensive minelaying operations in coastal waters.

4. NVN Maritime Activity.

a. The Haiphong port complex handles some 90 percent of North Vietnamese seaborne imports. The war has caused North Vietnam's need for imports, particularly foodstuffs, petroleum, machinery, construction materials, trucks, earth moving equipment, and generators, to grow. The principal contribution of the North Vietnamese economy to the war has been as a manpower source and the maintenance of a logistics system capable of moving men and imported war material to the combat zones.

b. The bulk of military equipment used by the enemy in both North and South Vietnam continues to be imported from Communist countries. The value of such aid in 1968 is estimated at $400 million, down from about $600 million in 1967. The decline in military imports in 1968 probably reflects reduced needs for air defense weapons, particularly ammunition and surface-to-air

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missiles, since the U.S. bombing cutbacks of 31 March and 31 October 1968. There is evidence that large quantities of arms and ammunition have entered North Vietnam by rail from Communist China. Although there is no specific proof that pinpoints the import of arms into North Vietnam via the sea, this is still a strong possibility. It could be coming by sea and never be detected. Regardless of the fact that it cannot be determined what percentage of arms are coming from which nation and by which route, a reduction in food, petroleum, machinery, construction materials, trucks, and other war-supporting items will reduce the war-making potential of North Vietnam and have a direct effect on its ability to support the war in the South.

c. Haiphong continues to be important as the port through which the North Vietnamese economy is propped-up by its communist allies while its manpower is being drained off to the war in the south.

d. During 1968 seaborne imports to North Vietnam rose to a new high of 1,960,000 tons, 39 percent above the volume in 1967 and the largest increase recorded for any year. Imports from Free World countries remained at the same low level as 1967 (accounting for only 2 percent of the total), thus imports from communist countries provided the total of the increase.

e. More than half of North Vietnam's nearly two million tons of imports during 1968 comprised of food (790,000 tons) and petroleum (385,000 tons). The USSR supplied 77 percent of the petroleum (some 90 percent of which was motor gasoline and diesel oil). Communist China supplied 18 percent. Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo (construction equipment, industrial machinery, trucks and motor vehicles, chemicals, cement, metal products and waterborne logistics craft) increased in 1968 for the fourth consecutive year and totaled 605,000 tons.

f. Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo increased from all parts of the communist world except Communist China, which showed an 11 percent decrease. Imports of this category from China showed a particularly steep decline in the second half of 1968. Motor vehicle imports from China, for example, dropped off from 6,000 tons in the first half of the year to 1,000 tons in the second half.

Tables 1 and 2 provide ship arrivals, by Flag, to North Vietnam since 1964.

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Table 1

North Vietnam:
Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals, by Flag
1964-68

Flag	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Total	*580*	*530*	*379*	*386*	*500*
Communist countries	178	274	305	308	351
USSR	48	79	122	181	216
Eastern Europe	58	50	44	29	31
Albania	--	1	2	1	1
Bulgaria	2	5	9	4	4
Czechoslovakia	7	4	--	--	--
East Germany	1	--	--	--	--
Poland	48	40	33	24	26
Communist China	72	144	138	97	98
Cuba	--	1	1	1	6
Free World	402	256	74	78	149
Cyprus	--	3	12	5	13
Denmark	1	--	--	--	--
Finland	1	--	--	--	--
France	1	2	--	--	--
Greece	35	28	7	--	--
Indonesia	1	--	--	--	--
Italy	11	1	1	2	1
Japan	74	37	--	--	1
Kuwait	--	--	--	--	1
Lebanon	20	9	--	1	2
Liberia	7	3	--	--	--
Malta	--	2	4	3	1
Netherlands	8	5	--	--	--
Norway	43	29	--	--	--
Panama	12	1	--	--	--
Singapore	--	--	--	--	6
Somalia	--	--	--	--	9
Sweden	3	--	--	--	--
United Kingdom	177	136	50	67	114
West Germany	8	--	--	--	--
Illegal flag	--	--	--	--	1

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TABLE 2

BLOC SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM - 1969


MONTH	SOVIET NO.	SOVIET GRT. DWT.	POLISH NO.	POLISH GRT. DWT.	BULGARIAN NO.	BULGARIAN GRT. DWT.
JAN	24	102,343 130,885	2	15,771 22,999	-	--
FEB	19	90,869 114,780	4	27,178 39,835	1	7,962 11,600
MAR	17	68,268 85,253	1	8,231 10,580	-	--
APR	21	113,695 140,591	2	13,564 20,359	-	--
MAY	21	97,656 122,841	1	6,904 10,086	2	6,303 6,496
JUN	15	65,373 84,879	1	9,267 12,407	1	5,920 9,200

	E. GERMAN		CUBAN		CHICOM	
JAN	-	--	-	--	8	31,012 44,260
FEB	-	--	-	--	8	39,584 57,610
MAR	1	8,810 10,130	-	--	15	59,341 85,650
APR	1	8,002 10,300	1	9,390 12,686	7	30,770 48,130
MAY	1	8,003 10,300	1	9,732 12,686	4	14,592 22,560
JUN	2	17,658 23,100	-	--	7	28,928 42,360

TOTAL NO.	JAN 34	FEB 32	MAR 34	APR 32	MAY 30	JUN 26
GRT.	149,126	165,593	144,650	175,420	143,550	127,136
DWT.	198,144	223,825	191,613	232,066	181,050	171,946

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
NORTH VIETNAM: Maritime Ports, Anchorages, and Shipping Channels



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
NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 10 JULY 1969

8	IL-28/BEAGLE LIGHT JET BOMBER	4 YUNNANI, 4 PHUC YEN
78	MIG-21/FISHBED JET FIGHTER	33 YUNNANI, 39 PHUC YEN 6 BAI THUONG
122	MIG-15/17/FAGOT/FRESCO JET FIGHTER	59 YUNNANI, 8 KIEN AN, 24 LIUCHOU, 20 HOA LAC, 4 KEP 7 PHUC YEN
40	MIG-19/FARMER JET FIGHTER	10 KEP, 30 YUNNANI
6	UMIG-15/MIDGET JET TRAINER	1 YUNNANI, 3 KEP, 1 KIEN AN, 1 HOA LAC
37	IL-14/LI-2/CRATE/CAB TRANSPORT	HANOI/HAIPHONG/YUNNANI/ LANG SON AREA AIRFIELDS
20	MI-1/4/HARE/HOUND HELICOPTER	VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC PRIMARILY HANOI/HAIPHONG
4	MI-6/HOOK HELICOPTER	VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC
29	PROP TRAINER	YUNNANI
3	AN-24/COKE TRANSPORT	1 YUNNANI, 2 GIA LAM
1	IL-18/COOT TRANSPORT	GIA LAM
22	AN-2/COLT LIGHT TRANSPORT	HAIPHONG/LANG SON/HANOI YUNNANI AREA AIRFIELDS




NVN JET AIRCRAFT		LOCATION NVN	LOCATION CHINA
FIGHTERS			
MIG-15/17	122	39	83
MIG-19	40	10	30
MIG-21	78	45	33
FTRS SUB-TOTAL	240	94	146
BOMBERS			
IL-28	8	4	4
TRAINERS			
UMIG-15	6	5	1
TOTAL JET AIRCRAFT	254	103	151

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
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MONTH	RP 1	RP 2	RP 3	RP 4	RP 5	RP 6A	RP 6B	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
31 OCT 68	1249	468	550	360	93	1001	509	4229	4624
	38	10	4	63	—	148	135	395	
30 NOV 68	1393	539	611	384	93	1127	606	4753	5165
	34	10	10	51	—	162	145	412	
31 DEC 68	1564	599	571	447	89	1179	626	5075	5439
	29	10	10	44	—	119	152	364	
31 JAN 69	1504	560	545	424	94	1232	570	4929	5280
	29	25	10	52	—	119	118	351	
28 FEB 69	1539	555	555	446	153	1223	570	5041	5352
	36		10	47		117	101	311	
31 MAR 69	1425	472	491	432	154	1192	618	4792	5129
	39	—	10	45	—	123	120	337	

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NORTH VIETNAM EW/GCI COVERAGE



DIA GEOGRAPHIC

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18 JULY 1969

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Tab

B

TAB B

EXECUTION TIMING

1. Response time will vary as a result of several factors: Location of CVA's, currently assigned mission of CVA's, location and readiness of mines, and configuration of aircraft. The response times in this plan range from 12 hours for options B and C to 86 hours for option A (when one CVA is in most distant port). Response for option A could be reduced to 18 hours provided an alerting message returned the third CVA to Tonkin Gulf.

2. Definition of Execution Terms:

M-Hour: DTG of message ordering mining plan implemented. (A subsequent order is required for launch of mining aircraft unless L-Hour is specified in this message).

L-Hour: Time launch of mining aircraft commences as ordered by appropriate authority. L-Hour may be pre-designated when M-Hour is signalled or may be ordered separately.

D-Hour: Time when all fields are in place for option selected.

A-Hour: Time when all fields are activated.

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3. Timing of pertinent events (M-Hour to L-Hour).

	OPTION A (assuming 1 CVA in port)	OPTION B	OPTION C
(1) All designated Forces in Tonkin Gulf	M +68 hrs (CVA from most distant port)	M +0	M +0
(2) All mines aboard CVA's in readiness condition "C"	M +74	M +0	M +0
*(3) All Surface Forces in launch position	M +77	M +3	M +3
*(4) All mines readied to Condition "A"	M +82	M +8	M +8
*(5) All mines loaded & aircraft ready for launch	M +86	M +12	M +12

* Events (3), (4) and (5) are proceeding concurrently.

---

4. Time available to higher authority to cancel the mining operation after it is ordered implemented:

a. Unlimited if message implementing mining plan did not specify an L-Hour and if no L-Hour has been signalled subsequently.

b. After L-Hour has been specified or signalled, the mining operation can be cancelled provided the cancellation order is received and understood aboard the CVA's by L +15 minutes.

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Tab

C

TAB C

MINE PLAN CONCEPT

1. Concept. When directed TF 77 will conduct offensive CVA aerial mining operations in the Haiphong Port Complex in order to interdict the maritime logistic support of North Vietnam. Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha comprise the complex to be mined and were selected because over 90 percent of the maritime support for North Vietnam enters throughout these ports.

a. The plan provides three mining options, i.e. ALFA (3 CVA's), BRAVO (2 CVA's), and CHARLIE (1 CVA). TF 77 can commence mining operations within 12 to 86 hours after receipt of an execute directive, dependent on which option is selected.

b. In each option the mine fields are armed 72 hours after planting and this fact will be publicly announced. This allows a safe passage period for shipping that desires to depart the area.

2. Mine Fields (See Chart - Appendix 7):

a. Haiphong - The port of Haiphong is mined with five fields. Two fields (A and B) close the main channel with sea mines. Fields 1 and 2 contain mines and destructors and are planted adjacent to the main channel. Field 3 is a destructor field which can be laid over field B in order to seal the main channel to lighterage craft as well as ocean shipping.

NOTE: Sea mine fields are lettered, destructor fields are numbered. Sea mines arm in 72 hours, destructors in 24 hours. No destructors are planted in main channels on the first launch for any option in order to ensure a safe departure channel during the grace period.

b. Hon Gai - Fields C, D and E are sea mine fields designed to block the ocean vessel principal access route. Destructor fields 4 and 5 will block the most used lighterage and anchorage areas serving Hon Gai.

c. Cam Pha - Fields F, G, H and I are sea mine fields designed to prevent access to Cam Pha 72 hours after planting. Destructor field 6 will interdict lighterage operations in the area.

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d. Mine/Destructor allocations - The following quantities of sea mines listed are required for fields A through I for options indicated:

OPTIONS	MINE TYPES			
	MK 50-0 500# ACOUSTIC	MK 52-2 1000# MAG IND	MK 52-3 1000# PRES MAG	MK 55-2 2000# MAG IND
A	10	67	12	25
B	10	42	12	14
C	10	42	12	14

Destructor fields 1 through 6 require the following assets:

DESTRUCTOR/MINE TYPES

	DST 36 500# MAG	DST 40 1000# MAG	MK 50-0 500# ACOUSTIC
A1/2*	564	40	30
B1	564	48	20
B2	402	40	20
C	358	36	20

*See paragraph 3a for further definition of options.

All mines/destructors required for the above options are currently aboard 7th Fleet CVA's or at the Naval Magazine, Subic Bay.

3. Forces:

a. Carrier requirements:

Option: A1 - 1 large CVA and 2 small CVA's
A2 - 3 small CVA's
B1 - 1 large CVA and 1 small CVA
B2 - 2 small CVA's
C - 1 large CVA

b. Other ships - The operation includes requirements for the following additional ships:

North SAR - 2 DD/DLG - North Search and Rescue, Strike Monitor

PIRAZ - 1 CAG (TALOS) and 1 DD/DDG - Strike and Cap Control

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c. Supporting Aircraft - Support aircraft required include:

Bar Cap/Tar Cap F4/F8 - To protect mining force and carrier force.

Tankers EKA3/KA4/KA6 - Refuel fighters or mining aircraft as required.

ECM/AEW EA6/E2A/E1B - To provide radar following and to counter missiles and fire control radars.

IRON HAND/FLAK SUPPRESSORS A4/A7/A6/F4 - To provide mining force protection.

RECONNAISSANCE RA5C/RF8 - To provide Post-Strike results/NVN reaction.

4. Operations:

a. Plan Description - This is a three option plan providing a choice of 3, 2, or 1 carriers to mine the Haiphong Complex. Principal advantages/disadvantages of each option are presented in the following:

Option A

Advantages: A three carrier force provides the maximum flexibility in strike size and composition. In this concept, total mine requirements are not stored on the CVA's. Some of the required mines are held aboard an ammunition ship in the Tonkin Gulf thus allowing CVA's normal ordnance stowage and operations. Provides the most complete and effective mining of Haiphong Complex.

Disadvantages: Requires mine transfer at sea with attendant delay in response to execute order. Current posture requires two CVA's at Yankee Station; Third CVA late arrival could delay execute up to 86 hours. Requires dedication of two AE's to partial mine load-out thus restricting conventional ordnance stowage and AE deployment.

Option B and C

Advantages: Mines are stored aboard CVA's thus speeding response time. Deep water fields are still effectively mined.

Disadvantages: Mines take up come CVA ordnance storage space - requiring increased replenishment or slight lessening of the normal Vietnam in country support capability.

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b. Aircraft Sortie Requirements - See Appendices I, II, III, IV and V to TAB C. It will be noted that "second launch" or "follow-on" sorties are included. These sorties would provide destructor fields to interdict lighterage craft but will not be launched until directed.

c. Reconnaissance and Replenishment:

(1) Reconnaissance flights/operations will be conducted subsequent to the mine laying operation to determine NVN/Foreign shipping reaction/response to the mining effort as well as results.

(2) In order to extend the maximum effectiveness of the fields as planted, replenishment operations should commence in about 4 months for sea mines and 2 months for destructors. Field attrition resulting from NVN sweeping or mine detonation may require earlier replenishment, but no replenishment will take place until directed.

5. Mine Logistics:

a. For option A, to ensure mine availability and preparedness, two AE's will be loaded with identical inventories of 101 mines; and one AE will always be at Yankee Station.

b. For other options carriers will have aboard a preassigned mine loadout and the assisting Mobile Mine Assembly Teams (MOMAT).

c. Subic Bay will support the programmed 4 month mine replenishment requirement and is capable of providing additional mine assets. COMSERVPAC/COMINEPAC will ensure that Subic mine inventories remain filled.

6. Aircraft Losses. Estimated maximum losses would be 3.2%, or for example, in option A2 with 3 launches and 15 support aircraft per launch included, the loss estimate is 6. Minimum loss estimate is 3 aircraft on option C.

7. Execution Diversion/Deception. If an option is approved for planning, TF 77 carriers/support vessels will be loaded to support the option selected. Additionally, CTF 77 will randomly move SAR/PIRAZ ships into the planned northern position in order to lessen NVN initial reaction to support ship positioning when the plan is executed. Normal surface escort and air cover will be provided during these incursions.

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APPENDICES

I - Option A1 Sortie Requirements
II - Option A2
III - Option B1
IV - Option B2
V - Option C
VI - Minefield Coordinates
VII - Chart

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APPENDIX I TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION ALFA ONE

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN **
3 A6	A*	6 MK 52-2	A1-A6
		6 MK 52-3	A7-A12
4 A6	B*	20 MK 50-0	B1-B20
1 A7	C	4 MK 55-2	C-C4
5 A7	D	7 MK 55-2	D21-D27
		14 MK 52-2	D1-D14
		6 MK 52-3	D15-D20
2 A7	E	12 MK 52-2	E1-E12
2 A7	F	12 MK 52-2	F1-F12
4 A7	G	12 MK 52-2	G1-G12
		9 MK 55-2	G13-G21
1 A7	H	5 MK 55-2	H1-H5
2 A7	I	11 MK 52-2	I1-I11
4 A6 (NOTE 1)	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
2 A6 (NOTE 1)	6	24 MK 40 (DST)	N/A
2 A7 (NOTE 1)	6	16 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
18 A4/7	1	180 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
6 A4/	1	30 MK 50-0	T1-T30

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

8 A4/7	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
10 A4/7	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4 AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

* THESE FIELDS ARE ASSIGNED TO A6 AIRCRAFT ON EACH OPTION OF PLANS A, B AND C IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A NIGHT ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY OF MINING THE HAIPHONG DEEP WATER CHANNEL IF DIRECTED.

** MINE CASE NUMBER

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APPENDIX II TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION ALFA TWO

27C CVA (CTG 77.X)

FIRST LAUNCH

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
13 A4/7	G	12 MK 52-2	G1-G12
		9 MK 55-2	G13-G21
5 A4/7	H	5 MK 55-2	H1-H5
4 A4/7	I	11 MK 52-2	I1-I11

SECOND LAUNCH

8 A4/7	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

FOLLOW-ON

14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

FIRST LAUNCH

4 A4/7	A	6 MK 52-2	A1-A6
		6 MK 52-3	A7-A12
4 A4/	B	20 MK 50-0	B1-B20
16 A4/7	1	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
	1	30 MK 50-0	T1-T30

SECOND LAUNCH

8 A4/7	1	80 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

FOLLOW-ON

8 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

FIRST LAUNCH

4 A4/7	C	4 MK 55-0	C1-C4
14 A4/7	D	14 MK 52-2	D1-D14
		6 MK 52-3	D15-D20
		7 MK 55-2	D21-D27

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SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
4 A4/7	E	12 MK 52-2	E1-E12
4 A4/7	F	12 MK 52-2	F1-F12
		SECOND LAUNCH	
10 A4/7	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
		FOLLOW-ON	
10 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	6	40 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4, AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

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APPENDIX III TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION BRAVO ONE

INITIAL LAUNCH

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
1 A6/1A7	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
		6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
3 A6	B	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
		3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
1 A7	C	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
3 A7/1A6	D	12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
		4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
1 A7	E	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
1 A7	F	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
2 A7	G	6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
		3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
1 A7	H	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
1 A7	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
4 A6	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
18 A4	1	180 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A4	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
4 A6	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
14 A7	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A6	6	48 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
10 A4	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

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APPENDIX IV TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION BRAVO TWO

INITIAL LAUNCH

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
2 A4	B	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
1 A4		3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
10 A4	D	12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
		4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
2 A4	E	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
3 A4	H	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
5 A4	2	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

4 A4	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
		6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
4 A4	C	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
2 A4	F	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
5 A4	G	6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
		3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
2 A4	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
4 A4	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20
3 A4	1	30 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

OPTION BRAVO TWO

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
9 A4	1	90 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
5 A4	5	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
10 A4	6	40 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
7 A4	3	70 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
11 A4	4	110 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

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APPENDIX V TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION CHARLIE

INITIAL LAUNCH

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
1 A7/1A6	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
		6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
3 A6	B	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
		3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
1 A7	C	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
3 A7/1A6	D	12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
		4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
1 A7	E	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
1 A7	F	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
2 A7	G	6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
		3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
1 A7	H	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
1 A7	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
4 A6/7A7	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20
		70 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

OPTION CHARLIE

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

SORTIES	FIELD	MINE/DST	MCN
5 A7	1	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
5 A7	2	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A6	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
2 A6/5A7	4	86 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
3 A7	5	30 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
3 A6	6	36 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

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APPENDIX VI TO TAB C

MINING

1. Attrition minefields within 12 mile claimed territorial limits for the interdiction of ocean traffic in the Haiphong Deep Water Complex will consist of 9 minefields. A maximum of one mine/destructor field and 5 destructor fields are provided to interdict lighterage contingent upon which option is executed.

a. Minefield Coordinates: (Use H.O. Chart 3162, 5TH ED and H.O. Chart 3161, 7TH ED, REV 12/68).

(1) Field "A" Coordinates -	20-47.5 N	106-50.3 E
	20-47.5 N	106-51.1 E
	20-45.8 N	106-52.0 E
	20-45.8 N	106-51.3 E
(2) Field "B" Coordinates -	20-45.2 N	106-52.3 E
	20-42.6 N	106-57.3 E
	20-42.3 N	106-56.4 E
	20-44.85 N	106-51.5 E
(3) Field "C" Coordinates -	20-47.6 N	107-06.85 E
	20-47.6 N	107-07.1 E
	20-46.9 N	107-07.2 E
	20-46.9 N	107-06.85 E
(4) Field "D" Coordinates -	20-48.05 N	107-08.6 E
	20-48.5 N	107-10.1 E
	20-47.5 N	107-10.5 E
	20-47.1 N	107-08.8 E
(5) Field "E" Coordinates -	20-50.15 N	107-11.4 E
	20-50.15 N	107-12.5 E
	20-49.7 N	107-12.6 E
	20-49.7 N	107-11.5 E
(6) Field "F" Coordinates -	20-50.0 N	107-13.8 E
	20-50.0 N	107-14.9 E
	20-49.5 N	107-15.0 E
	20-49.5 N	107-13.9 E
(7) Field "G" Coordinates -	20-55.7 N	107-16.8 E
	20-55.05 N	107-18.0 E
	20-54.2 N	107-17.25 E
	20-53.4 N	107-17.2 E
	20-53.4 N	107-15.2 E
	20-53.0 N	107-16.0 E
(8) Field "H" Coordinates -	20-53.2 N	107-19.65 E
	20-53.2 N	107-19.9 E
	20-52.5 N	107-19.9 E
	20-52.5 N	107-19.65 E

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(9) Field "I" Coordinates - 21-05.6 N 107-30.6 E
21-05.3 N 107-31.1 E
21-03.5 N 107-29.3 E
21-04.9 N 107-28.9 E

b. Destructor Field Coordinates:

(1) Field "1" Coordinates - 20-42.1 N 106-47.8 E
20-43.8 N 106-52.3 E
20-41.7 N 106-56.0 E
20-39.8 N 106-49.1 E

(2) Field "2" Coordinates - 20-43.8 N 106-52.3 E
20-44.7 N 106-54.8 E
20-42.5 N 106-58.7 E
20-41.7 N 106-56.0 E

(3) Field "3" Coordinates - 20-44.7 N 106-54.8 E
20-45.8 N 106-57.7 E
20-43.0 N 107-00.6 E
20-42.5 N 106-58.7 E

(4) Field "4" Coordinates - 20-53.8 N 107-01.7 E
20-53.4 N 107-06.8 E
20-52.3 N 107-06.9 E
20-53.0 N 107-01.5 E

(5) Field "5" Coordinates - 20-53.4 N 107-06.8 E
20-55.2 N 107-09.5 E
20-55.0 N 107-10.8 E
20-52.3 N 107-06.9 E

(6) Field "6" Coordinates - 20-59.0 N 107-21.55 E
20-58.7 N 107-22.6 E
20-57.1 N 107-20.0 E
20-57.4 N 107-19.2 E

c. Mine Allocations: Option A

(1)

MINEFIELDS	MK 50	MK 52-2	MK 52-3	MK 55-2
A	-	6	6	-
B	20	-	-	-
C	-	-	-	4
D	-	14	6	7
E	-	12	-	-
F	-	12	-	-
G	-	12	-	9
H	-	-	-	5
I	-	11	-	-
TOTAL	20	67	12	25

(2)

DESTRUCTOR FIELDS	DST 36	DST 40	MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)	180	-	30

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DESTRUCTOR FIELDS	DST 36	DST 40	MINE MK 50-0
2	72	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	140	-	-
5	100	-	-
6	-	40	-
TOTAL	564	40	30

Mine Allocations: Option BRAVO

(1)

MINEFIELDS	MK 50	MK 52-2	MK 52-3	MK 55-2
A	10	5	6	
B		3		
C				4
D		12	6	4
E		6		
F		6		
G		6		
H				3
I		4		3
TOTAL	10	42	12	14

(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 1

FIELD #	DST 36	DST 40	MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)	180	-	20
2	72	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	140	-	-
5	100	-	-
6	-	48	-
TOTAL	564	48	20

(3) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 2

FIELD #	DST 36	DST 40	MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)	120	-	20
2	50	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	110	-	-
5	50	-	-
6	-	40	-
TOTAL	402	40	20

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Mine Allocations: Option CHARLIE

(1)

MINEFIELDS	MK 50-0	MK 52-2	MK 52-3	MK 55-2
A		5	6	
B	10	3		
C				4
D		12	6	4
E		6		
F		6		
G		6		3
H				3
I		4		
TOTAL	10	42	12	14

(2)

DESTRUCTOR FIELDS	DST 36	DST 40	MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)	120	-	20
2	50	-	20
3	72	-	-
4	86	-	-
5	30	-	-
6	-	36	-
TOTAL	358	36	40

d. Mine Descriptions:

Mine MK 50-0: 500 LB acoustic influence mine
Mine MK 52-2: 1000 LB magnetic induction mine
Mine MK 52-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine
Mine MK 55-2: 2000 LB magnetic induction mine
DST 36: 500 LB magnetic influence mine
DST 40: 1000 LB magnetic influence mine
Mine MK 36-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine

e. Mine Stocks:

NAVMAG SUBIC	MINES
Mine MK 50	148
Mine MK 52-2	330
*Mine MK 52-3	40 (enroute)
Mine MK 55-2	250
*Mine MK 36-3	66

* Mine MK 36-3 acceptable substitute for Mine MK 52-3.

f. Specific Mining Notes:

(1) Mine requirements listed under options B and C are considered the minimum acceptable number in the minefields.

(2) When CTF 77 assigns minefield responsibility by CTG, embarked MOMATS will ensure the mines are labeled with the proper mine case numbers (MCN).

(3) Field BRAVO. Delivery runs should be made to place mines within the buoyed ship channel.

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
(4) Fields DELTA and GOLF. Mines MK 55-2 should be planted in the deep sections of the minefield (approximately 9 fathoms or deeper).

g. Replacement Mines. CVA/AE maintain 10 percent in excess of required mines for spares. Replacement mines will have operational adjustments preset. Spare mines may be substituted without further adjustment for the same MK Mod mine in any field. Spare Mine MK 52-2 may substitute for Mine MK 52-3 in addition to Mine MK 52-2.

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[redacted]

SENSITIVE



APPENDIX VII

[redacted]

SEE TAB C FOR MINEFIELD COORDINATES

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Tab

D

TAB D

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

MINING HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX

1. The following rules of engagement are effective for US forces operating in support of the mining plan.

2. Definitions:

a. Territorial seas: A belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth measured from the low water mark along the coast. However, in the states claiming twelve-mile territorial seas, twelve miles shall be observed for these rules as if it were the width of their territorial seas. The following distance is presumed to be claimed as a territorial sea:

(1) North Vietnam - 12 miles (Presumed)

b. Internal waters: Waters to landward of the territorial sea.

c. Territorial air space: Air space above the land territory, internal waters, and territorial seas of a sovereign country.

d. Immediate pursuit: Pursuit initiated in response to actions or attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined herein. The pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted and may be extended as necessary and feasible over territorial/internal air space/seas as prescribed in these rules of engagement.

e. Hostile aircraft: An aircraft identified as non-US and non-allied which is observed in the act of attacking or acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack US/friendly forces.

f. Hostile vessel (surface or subsurface)

(1) A vessel which is attacking or acting in a manner which indicates within reasonable certainty an intent to attack US/friendly forces.

3. General Rules:

a. US forces executing this plan are authorized to attack and destroy any hostile vessel or aircraft as herein defined.

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b. Immediate pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible pursuant to the above, subject to the following conditions and limitations:

(1) In event US forces are attacked by hostile forces in North Vietnam, or over international waters, US forces may conduct immediate pursuit over internal waters or into territorial seas or air space of North Vietnam.

(2) No pursuit is authorized into Communist Chinese territorial seas or air space.

(3) US forces, which under the limitations of these rules enter unfriendly territorial land, sea, or air spaces in immediate pursuit, are not authorized to attack other unfriendly forces or installations encountered, unless attacked first by them, then only to the extent necessary for self-defense.

(4) Declaration of aircraft or vessels as hostile will be tempered with judgment and discretion. Cases can occur wherein the destruction of communist bloc forces would be contrary to US and allied interests. All available information and intelligence shall be considered in determining action to be taken in such cases.

4. Use of surface to air missiles against hostile aircraft.

Talos, Terrier, and Tartar equipped ships will attack and destroy aircraft as feasible which are positively identified as hostile in accordance with these rules of engagement:

a. Before firing, all indications must eliminate any possibility of firing on friendly aircraft, and must indicate the probable presence of a hostile aircraft. The above requirements may be satisfied by verifying the identity of aircraft through special and other intelligence sources or any other means available.

b. Authority is granted to fire Talos, Tartar or Terrier missiles over the North Vietnam land mass. Missiles will not be fired over territory of Communist China.

c. Missiles will be command destructed five seconds after passing the closest point of approach if intercept is not accomplished.


5. Use of ALQ-91 (SEE SAW) is authorized in accordance with CINCPACFLT 190001Z SEP 68.

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6. Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force.

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Tab



TAB E

WORLD REACTIONS TAB

1. This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the U.S. mining of the Haiphong Port Complex.

2. General Comments.

a. Mining of the Haiphong Port Complex would be regarded as an "escalation" of the war and would be so treated by the Communist world in its propaganda. It would be accepted as such by most of the rest of the world as well - particularly the neutrals such as Sweden and India.

b. Much of the uneasiness concerning Vietnam which was important in world affairs approximately a year ago has now subsided. In the present world climate it is likely that this act would be generally interpreted as showing determination, whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness. It is still possible that charges of "recklessness" would be directed against the U.S. Small powers would, in general, manifest more disapproval than large powers who would be more likely to appreciate the dilemma which pushed the U.S. to this action. Large powers would not be likely, however, to "speak out" on behalf of the U.S.

c. It would be interpreted by all discerning governments as primarily a challenge to the USSR. Few would really consider it as sufficient to disturb the peace of the world, but many would act as if they so regarded it. In recent decades, the world has seen a number of examples of the application of force clearly calculated to signal resolve rather than recklessness. The majority of the world's leaders have become inured to the kind of propaganda which inevitably follows this use of force. In the end, those who have no direct interest in the matter take precautions to ensure that they will not become involved. Those who have an interest, but no capability, propagandize. Those governments which have both interest and capability are addressed below.

3. North Vietnam.

a. NVN has only a limited, unsophisticated capability to counter the mining program. Anti-mine warfare efforts should not have any appreciable effect on the program overall.

b. NVN has a considerable capability to attempt circumvention of the mining program through the use of small (mostly wooden) boats and lighters. Some of these would be lost, of course, but this would not deter NVN from putting forth a major effort in this respect.

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c. To the extent that the mining affected the flow of goods into NVN, a maximum effort to compensate for the reduction would be undertaken via the overland and coastal-water routes from Communist China.

d. NVN could be expected to attack US units engaged in the mining. They are not capable of preventing such a US effort, but they could attempt harassment of US ships and aircraft. The expected aircraft loss rate is 3 percent or less.

e. NVN would probably consider that it was in its interest for a Russian ship to be sunk (or appear to have been sunk) by U.S. mines. To this end -- and in this eventuality -- NVN might foster a situation that would encourage a U.S.-USSR confrontation over the mining issue. Russian failure to stand up to the Americans, if that should occur, would be unsettling to NVN, but it would not drive them into the arms of China.

f. To the extent practicable, NVN would probably respond to the U.S. escalation with some escalation of its own elsewhere, probably in Laos.

4. Communist China.

a. Communist China is beginning to figure less and less as a factor in NVN policy surrounding this war. CHICOMS are still the most important suppliers of small arms (up to the size of mortars and some rockets) and ammunition to NVN, but they no longer retain any discernible political influence with Hanoi in return for their arms support.

b. Chinese reaction to the mining is expected to be negligible, except in the propaganda areas, which should also have negligible impact.

c. The Chinese might be persuaded by NVN to step up their aid, if that is required, but Chinese aid and support of any kind would not be likely to compensate NVN for the possible loss of Russian support. (Political and psychological support is perhaps as important as material). In short, NVN is not likely to risk the loss of Russian backing by too ready a dependence on Communist China. At the same time, China would be asked to do more of what she is now doing.

d. If the shipments of Russian goods across China are now encountering difficulties, as reports indicate, then the act of mining, per se, would not be expected to affect that situation. Other factors, such as the Russian-Chinese border talks, would be expected to be of much greater direct importance. The current problems between the Russians and the Chinese are surely bigger than the future of South Vietnam; they may even be bigger than the future of North Vietnam.

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5. The USSR.

a. If the Russians are willing to risk some ship losses in crossing the minefield in order to demonstrate their resolve to support NVN, little will have been gained as regards the NVN war. Russian-U.S. relations will have suffered a setback, but even that should not be serious. The Russians will know that by flaunting the U.S. minefield they are not running a great political risk: that they would primarily be showing only the depth of their own determination. They already know well the depth of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, and while they might be momentarily surprised at our mining decision in the light of current U.S. policy, they will soon recover and see it as a challenge thrown down to them to abandon their North Vietnamese ally.

b. If necessary to prove their commitment to NVN, the USSR might cross the minefield. At the very least, they would provide assistance to the NVN in their efforts to circumvent the mining program, perhaps even to the extent of dispatching minesweepers. In Russian eyes, it would be, from a political/psychological point of view, a Berlin-Blockade in reverse. Thus the probability is that no open confrontation between the U.S. and Russia would result because none would be necessary.

c. At the same time -- once proper allowance has been made for "face" on both sides -- the Russians would probably be further disgusted with the whole business of the war (which has always been of much less importance to them than to us). The net effect could be to prompt the Russians to put more political pressure on NVN to end the war: to accept a "political settlement." They could not force NVN, and they certainly would not cut off visible support of NVN; but the war in Southeast Asia is becoming an annoyance to the Russians in their current foreign policy aspirations, which primarily seek support against China. The mining of Haiphong would provide them with one more good excuse to put added pressure on Hanoi for a settlement. This pressure would not be visible pressure, for the world to see, and it would not be likely to be instant. It might not even be decisive, but it could be an important factor at this time.

d. Russia's most visible reactions would probably occur outside of Southeast Asia and impinge upon the question of U.S.-USSR relations in general. They might, for example, freeze progress toward such on-going matters as SALT, or they might become more difficult on matters having to do with solutions to the Middle East problem. They could even decide on a course of no cooperation with the present Administration in an attempt to embarrass it politically.

6. U.S. Counter Actions

a. The U.S. can blunt the anticipated propaganda by the

USSR, Communist China, and others by explaining, at the time the mining of the Haiphong Complex is announced, that the U.S. has gone to great lengths to end the war in Vietnam, by the bombing halt, the withdrawal of combat troops, and political accommodations. These attempts have met nothing but intransigence on the part of North Vietnam and her allies. U.S. patience and understanding have reasonable limits which are now being strained. The mining of the Haiphong Complex is a low order response to the complete lack of cooperation by the North Vietnamese government and its allies.

b. If the USSR suffers ship losses in attempting to run the minefield, the U.S. can express sincere regrets and point out that the loss was completely unnecessary since the original announcement by the U.S. provided sufficient time for all shipping to depart Haiphong safely. Point out that the USSR callously sacrified the loss of their men and material in spite of all U.S. attempts to protect third nation shipping.

c. If the USSR provides minesweepers to North Vietnam, or sweeps the minefield herself, this will be detected by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Upon completion of the sweeping operation, the U.S. can reseed the field as necessary.

d. If, as is most likely, the Soviet ships anchor just to seaward of the minefields and leave the off-loading to the North Vietnamese via lighterage, the U.S. can respond by seeding the lighters' routes with MK 36 destructors. All of the normal routes will have been seeded in the initial mine lay. Follow-on seeding would be needed if the North Vietnamese select alternate routes.

e. There is little the U.S. could do to prevent the USSR from delaying SALT or withdrawing from Mid-East talks. In the case of SALT the USSR might well decide that her vital interests are at stake in gambling on a nuclear arms race and therefore go ahead with the negotiations. If the USSR drops out of the Mid-East talks, the U.S. can express regrets and make plans to continue to seek peace in the Mid-East without Soviet participation.

f. The U.S. could accept the use of Chinese ports by the USSR and transshipment of material by rail from China to North Vietnam. Such an arrangement would delay the arrival of material in Haiphong and Hanoi and could further strain the relations between Communist China and the USSR.

g. A Soviet blockade of Berlin should be addressed as a separate issue without relation to U.S. action in Southeast Asia. The U.S. response would parallel those actions taken in the past to all threats by the Soviets and East Germany to a closure of access to Berlin.

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h. The US could destroy North Vietnamese lighterage with gunfire from US destroyers as the lighters depart the deep water anchorages for the beach. There would be no threat to third nation shipping and no loss of civilian lives.

i. Adverse weather conditions, particularly during the Northeast Monsoon period from September to May with attendant high sea states, would make NVN lighterage operations both dangerous and inefficient. In addition both people and resources would be diverted from other tasks, like fishing and inner harbor transportation, if an extensive lighterage operation were attempted. This diversion and the delay in the arrival of imports would have a cumulative adverse effect on the North Vietnamese economy and their ability and willingness to continue the war effort in the South.

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Tab

F

TAB F

LEGAL RAMIFICATION OF MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR AND ITS APPROACHES

1. The traditional international law doctrines, particularly as codified in Hague Convention VIII (1907) impose the following restrictions, among others, on the use of mine warfare:

a. The use of mines presupposes the existence of a state of war.

b. The laying of mines with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping is prohibited.

c. The use of mines in time of peace could be considered an act of war by third countries.

d. Interference by mines with movements of international shipping on high seas is prohibited.

2. Whatever the historic worth of these prohibitions, a modern legal analysis of the use of mines in present day international conflict requires an examination of several additional factors. The international laws of war have evolved throughout history out of an interaction from disputes between nations, conflicts between military efficiency and humanitarianism, and changing weapons technology. Since the end of World War II, these laws have been subjected to the unprecedented pressures of cold war international politics and introduction of modern weapons. Because of the resulting revolutionary changes, the traditional laws of war have been rendered obsolete, but no fixed principles have yet been internationally accepted to replace them.

3. However, the national right of self-defense, which has existed since time immemorial, has been recognized in the U.N. Charter and strengthened in international practice. Also, the former simple dichotomy between state of peace and state of war no longer has legal or political validity. Therefore, in assessing the legality of an act of coercion, the rigid formulas of pre-World War II are irrelevant, and new standards for legality must be sought.

4. South Vietnam, a sovereign nation, possesses the inherent right to defend itself against aggression. In the exercise of this right, South Vietnam requested U.S. assistance in repelling the aggression which has been waged by North Vietnam with increasing ferocity for several years. Therefore, the United States and South Vietnam have the right under international law to participate in the collective defense of South Vietnam against armed attack.*

*Department of State Bulletin, dated March 4, 1966, entitled The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam.

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5. A principal source of supplies for the continued prosecution of that aggression is the Port of Haiphong. The aggression could be greatly reduced by effectively denying to North Vietnam these necessary supplies. As part of its self-defense effort, therefore, South Vietnam and its allies would be justified in employing a reasonable method of denying this flow of supplies. The mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, can properly be considered such a method. Mine emplacement should extend seaward of Haiphong Harbor only so far as is necessary to halt the entrance of shipping to the harbor. Advance notification must be given to all shipping concerning time of activation of mines laid. All shipping entering Haiphong after that time would do so at its own peril.

6. The fundamental test of any act in international law is reasonableness. The reasonableness of self-defense actions is gauged by the standards of necessity and proportionality. It is clear beyond dispute that South Vietnam is deeply engaged in self-defense action against the overt hostilities of North Vietnam. Thus, the necessity for action is clear. In assessing the proportionality of the mining of Haiphong, the following elements are pertinent:

a. Mining is a passive, not aggressive, measure.

b. Advance notice will be given to third countries.

c. Mining will be restricted to the area around Haiphong.

d. Potentially, no loss of life or property need be incurred.

e. This defensive measure will reduce loss of life and material elsewhere in the zone of hostilities.

7. In summary, the traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war. The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered the laws of war, based on the war or peace dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts in self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore, mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described in this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-defense against the aggression of North Vietnam.

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: PINCUS/PAUL VISIT

ATTENTION: EA/PHIL

DECLASSIFIED DEC 16 2009
Authority: EO 12958 as amended
Chief, DoD Ofc of Security Review

1. DURING VISIT TO SUBIC AND CLARK THREE SUBJECTS WERE RAISED BY PINCUS AND PAUL WHICH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MAY RAISE PUBLICLY OR WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THIS REPORT SENT TO INSURE THAT DEPARTMENT AWARE OF THESE ISS

2. U-2 FLIGHTS [redacted] DURING VISIT TO FICPAC AND SUBIC PINCUS AND PAUL EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN SOURCE OF PHOTOS PROCESSED AND LOCATIONS PHOTOGRAPHED. PHOTO PROGRAMS IN NVN, SVN, LAOS, AND NORTHERN THAILAND DESCRIBED. OFFICER IN CHARGE ALSO SAID, IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT QUESTION THAT HE AWARE OF MANNED RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER [redacted] AS WELL AS ANGLE PHOTOGRAPHY PROGRAM ALONG [redacted] HE SAID FILMING [redacted] MADE SEVERAL RUNS PER MONTH. OIC FICPACFAC DECLINED TO RESPOND BECAUSE OF CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS, TO QUESTIONS ON PROGRAM FOR PHOTOGRAPHING [redacted] SATELLITES. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO PINCUS AND PAUL THAT THEY SHOULD DIRECT ALL OF THEIR QUESTIONS TO NRTSC UPON THEIR RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

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3. AERIAL MINES. -- ALSO AT SUBIC PINCU AND PAUL INQUIRED AABOUT 1000 MINES (AIR DROP TYPE) RECENTLY SHIPPED FROM JAPAN TO SUBIC. THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD HEARD ABOUT THE SHIPMENT IN JAPAN. OFFICER IN CHARGE NAVAL MAGAZINE

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SUBIC CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED 1000 SUCH MINES FROM JAPAN BUT SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHY THEY SENT TO SUBIC. HE SAID THAT SHIPMENTS ORDERED BY CINCPACFLT AND THAT THEY OVER AND ABOVE SUBIC'S NORMAL INVENTORY.

B. NAVY CAPT HIHN, CO NAD CHRLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, WHO IS IN FAR EAST AS HEAD OF MINE READINESS INSPECTION TEAM, HAPPENED TO BE AT SUBIC ON SAME DAY AS PINCUS AND PAUL. HE ALSO CALLED TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH THEM. HE CONFIRMED SHIPMENT TO SUBIC AND SAID HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF REASON FOR SHIPMENT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD INSPECTED MINES AND FOUND THEM IN GOOD CONDITION (I.E., NOT IN NEED OF REPAIR). WHEN ASKED ABOUT HIS OTHER ACTIVITIES AT SUBIC, CAPT. HIHN SAID THAT HE HAD RUN SIX DAYS OF TRAINING EXERCISES ON THE ARMING AND PREPARATION OF MINES FOR AIRDROP.

C. DURING VISIT TO USS ORISKANY, WHICH WAS IN PORT AT SUBIC, PAUL ASKED CO WHAT PILOTS DID IN PORT. CO SAID THAT AMONG OTHER THINGS PILOTS DID TRAINING EXERCISES TO KEEP UP THEIR SKILLS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT KIND OF EXERCISES BEING CONDUCTED THIS VISIT, CO SAID THAT THEY WERE AERIAL MINE LAYING EXERCISE.

D. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, PINCUS AND PAUL MENTIONED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON, IN CAMPAIGN SPEECH, HAD SAID SOMETHING ABOUT MINING NVN WATERS, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY AREA IN VICINITY HAIPHONG.

3. COMMENT: EVENTS RECOUNTED ABOVE MAY BE ENTIRELY COINCIDENTIAL. HOWEVER, IN VIEW CONCERN PINCUS AND PAUL REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED ABOUT MILITRY ACTIONS THAT COULD INCREASE OUR COMMITMENTS GENERALLY OR LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM, BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT WE GET OUR FACTS STRAIGHT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CINCPAC ALERTED THROUGH NAVY CHANNELS.

4. [redacted]

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PRUNING KNIFE STATUS REPORT NO. 1

JCS 11422/DTG 152332Z SEP 69

1. THE PRUNING KNIFE GROUP NOW NUMBERS EIGHT AND IS ENROUTE TO CLARK FROM HICKAM. GENERAL ELWOOD WHO HEADS THE PAC DELEGATION AND I HAD VERY USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH ADMIRAL MCCAIN THIS MORNING. WE HAVE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON METHOD OF OPERATION AT THIS POINT. I THINK OUR APPROACH IS SOUND, IT REMAINS TENTATIVE HOWEVER SUBJECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF SAIGON INPUTS.

2. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE PLANNING GROUP WILL DEVELOP A SOUND MILITARY CONCEPT OF ACTION NEEDED TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES IN SEA BY FORCE OF ARMS. WE WILL THEN FIT VARIOUS ACTION INTO THIS CONCEPT INCLUDING AS MANY OF THOSE OUTLINED IN REF AS PRACTICABLE. OUR RATIONALE IS THIS:

A. SIGNALS TO HANOI HAVE NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE IN THE PAST BECAUSE THEY WERE RECOGNIZED AS TRANSITORY ACTIONS THAT COULD BE ENDURED AND NOT AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A CREDIBLE MILITARY CONCEPT DESIGNED TO REALIZE US OBJECTIVES BY FORCE OF ARMS.

B. SIGNALS WHICH CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS PARTS OF A CREDIBLE CONCEPT WILL HAVE A LOGIC, HITHERTO LACKING, AND HENCE AN IMPROVED CHANCE FOR CONVINCING THE NVN THAT HE CANNOT PROFITABLY CONTINUE TO OPERATE AGAINST SVN. WHEN THE ENEMY EVALUATES THE TOTAL SIGNAL HE RECEIVES, MILITARILY, POLITICALLY, AND DOMESTICALLY, AS INDICATIVE OF FIRM RESOLVE AN EFFECTIVE SIGNAL WILL HAVE REACHED HANOI. THE PAUSES TO PERMIT REACTION TO SIGNALS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED IN A MANNER LEAST DAMAGING TO SHOCK AND MOMENTUM OF EFFORT. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER PAUSES WILL PROBABLY BE INDUCED

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PERFORCE BY WEATHER.

3. WITH AN AGREED CONCEPT AT HAND WE WILL THEN, SIMULTANEOUSLY, USING THE PRUNING KNIFE GROUP AND MACV/7TH AF/7TH FLEET ASSISTANCE, DEVELOP PLANS IN A MODULAR FASHION TO FLESH OUT THE CONCEPT. PLANS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE OR PARTS THEREOF WILL BE A BASIS FOR THIS.

4. MODULAR PLANS DEVELOPED IN SUPPORT OF THE CONCEPT WILL BE REVIEWED, COORDINATED, AND VALIDATED BY THE PRUNING KNIFE GROUP AND FORWARDED TO YOU WITH MACV AND CINCPAC BEING FURNISHED COPIES FOR COMMENT/APPROVAL.

5. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS APPROACH MAY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE AT CERTAIN LEVELS BUT SUGGEST THAT A COMPLETELY SOUND AND AGREED MILITARY PROPOSAL SHOULD BE STATED CLEARLY AND SUPPORTED AS THE BASIC JCS PROPOSAL. WE WILL ALSO, AS A SEPARATE EFFORT, PREPARE A LIST OF SIGNALING ACTIONS MORE CLOSELY FOLLOWING LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF REF. THESE ACTIONS WILL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF FEASIBILITY AND DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY AND WILL OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE.

6M MODULES DEVELOPED TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL TESTING FOR FEASIBILITY. THE VALIDITY OF THE CONCEPT WILL NOT BE ESTABLISHED UNTIL THIS HAS BEEN DONE. WE ARE ACUTELY AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES IMPOSED BY WEATHER DURING THE NE MONSOON, THE UNKNOWN EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR ECM AGAINST THE MODIFIED FAN SONG, THE EFFECT OF THE LONG NVN STANDDOWN, ON AIRCREW EXPERIENCE, AND THE GENERAL HARDENING OF AAA AND AIRCRAFT HANGARING. WE ALSO NOTE A NEED FOR COORDINATION OF THIS EFFORT WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

INITIATIVES, THIRD COUNTRY REACTION ASSESSMENT WORLDWIDE, AND DOMESTIC REACTION. THESE LATTER THREE ISSUES WE, OBVIOUSLY, WILL NOT ADDRESS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY AND BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

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NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF MSC
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INFORMATION

~~DECLASSIFICATION BY JOINT ST~~
DATE: ~~SEP 14 2000~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Conceptual Plan for Implementation of Operation DUCK HOOK

Operation DUCK HOOK (aerial mining of the Haiphong port complex and interdiction or quarantine of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville) would not be approached as a purely military action but instead as a combined military and diplomatic operation intended to produce both military and political results with minimum adverse reactions at home and abroad.

We would commence with a diplomatic move timed to precede by seven days the actual military strike against the Haiphong sea approaches and the interdiction of Sihanoukville. We would call in Ambassador Dobrynin and tell him in strong terms that our patience with Hanoi had been strained to the breaking point, not only by its intransigence at Paris but equally by its actions in South Vietnam by overturning the "understandings," conducting acts of terror against the South Vietnamese civilian population, violating the 1962 Accords in Laos, openly conducting acts of aggression with North Vietnamese troops, and by infringing on Cambodian neutrality through the overt use of Cambodia as a sanctuary. We would warn Dobrynin that unless Hanoi reversed its course in all these areas in the very near future -- a matter of a few days, in fact, -- we would be obliged to take some form of action to show Hanoi that it could not escape the consequences of its behavior. We would expect as an immediate sign of Hanoi's changed intentions a significant constructive move on its part in the Paris negotiations.

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By DLJ/DE NARA, Date 3/15/13

Also at a point seven days in advance of our projected strike, we would have Ambassador Lodge take the same position with the communists in Paris that we took with Dobrynin in Washington.

We would, of course, not specify what we intended to do. However, by introducing Cambodia and especially Laos into the equation, we would leave the door open for a wide range of options, e.g. B-52 raids in Laos, rather than just countermeasures against North Vietnam. In this way we would preserve military security, keep the Soviets and Hanoi guessing, and build up the threat of a much stronger case before the world by introducing Hanoi's flagrant aggression in Laos and Cambodia. The Soviets are undoubtedly very much aware that Souvanna and Prince Sihanouk have both publicly attacked North Vietnam for its acts of aggression in their countries. Hopefully, the Soviets would then be concerned enough to put pressure on Hanoi to respond to our warning.

If Hanoi should not respond, we would proceed with our military measures. For the Haiphong operation we envisage the maximum possible effort in the shortest period of time, with maximum security. This would involve concentrating three attack carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin in a manner which would seem routine. We would not send sea-air rescue ships or radar vessels north of their normal stations until the mining aircraft were about to be launched. We would not inform any country, friend or foe, until one hour before the aircraft appear over the Haiphong sea approaches, so that no security leak could occur. For Sihanoukville, we would quietly detach the requisite number of interdiction ships and time their arrival on station to coincide with the strike off Haiphong. The strike would take place about 0500 Hanoi time (1800 in Washington), which would be first light there, early evening here.

One hour before the actual attacks we would call in the TCC's, the NATO powers, members of the OAS, the Lao Ambassador, and the Cambodian Charge' to the Department of State for appropriate advance briefings on the rationale for our moves. I would call in the Soviet Ambassador to inform him that we had given fair warning, that we had been compelled to act, and that he and Hanoi should now know we meantbusiness. This was not anti-Soviet, but only against Hanoi.

(The same points would have been made to Moscow one-half hour later by a Molink message.) Finally, the Ambassadors of all friendly countries with ships in or en route to Sihanoukville and the Haiphong complex would be informed by the Department of State and the American Charge' in Phnom Penh would inform Prince Sihanouk.

Meanwhile, you would brief the Congressional leadership and there would be a locked-door press briefing. Concurrent with the strike, you would go on national television and radio, and we would simultaneously request a special meeting of the UN Security Council. (I anticipate that this meeting would be about two hours later.) In all of these actions, the following points would be stressed:

-- No loss of life need occur.

-- The mines are set to arm themselves 72 hours after being dropped, allowing ample time for all shipping to clear port.

-- The acts do not constitute a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam or an act of war against Cambodia; they are in response to Hanoi's own deliberate transgressions.

-- Our moves demonstrate that we mean business. Although we do not contemplate further measures at this time, we will judge what further steps may be necessary in the light of Hanoi's response.

-- We remain sincerely interested in a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam, and are, in fact, calling a special meeting of the Paris Talks to move in this direction.

-- Our actions are not directed against the Soviet Union or Communist China, but only against Hanoi.

One problem about the mining of Haiphong will need to be met: the plans call for a seeding of Mark 36 destructors, which are set to arm themselves 24 hours after being dropped, in order to block sweeping and lightering operations. Another strike against the Haiphong sea approaches would thus be necessary no earlier than 48 hours after the first strike. I believe on balance that you should mention this in

your speech so that the two separate strikes will be regarded as part of one action, even though the destructor missions might encounter increased reaction as a result.

At this point, we would have done all we could do to meet the immediate needs of the situation. We would follow through at Paris with Hanoi, in Moscow and Washington with the Soviets, and wherever else we need to take diplomatic action with respect to our friends and our opponents. We would assume a heightened PACOM and SAC alert posture militarily to show our resolve and to respond to whatever contingencies arise.

In Paris, we would encourage a favorable Hanoi response by reiterating all of our previous concessions in a new and forthcoming package. We would not expect, however, any substantive movement by Hanoi until they had assessed their new predicament, examined alternative courses of action, and checked with both the Soviet Union and China to determine what level and kinds of support they could expect.

You will notice that I have not recommended any direct approach to Communist China such as that made to the Soviet Union. I anticipate that our limited actions would speak for themselves as not being directed toward Peking. China's stance throughout the Vietnam war has been to stay in the background, avoiding a direct confrontation with us, and I believe it would continue as before.

13 September 1969

VIETNAM CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Concept of Operations

U. S. military forces will conduct operations against North Vietnam in order to demonstrate U. S. resolve to apply whatever force is necessary to achieve basic U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

Such operations will be designed to achieve maximum political, military, and psychological shock, while reducing North Vietnam's over-all war-making and economic capacity to the extent feasible. The campaign will be conducted in a series of separate and distinct actions, each signalling an increasing or escalating level of military intensity.

Domestic and international pressures, and the possibilities of Soviet or Communist Chinese reaction, will be important factors, but will not necessarily rule out bold or imaginative actions directed toward achievement of the primary objective.

In undertaking actions to achieve these objectives, military forces will be employed in periodic, short but intensive military operations of 48-72 hours each during a period of approximately six months. Continuous military actions, such as armed reconnaissance over North Vietnam, or naval blockade of Haiphong, are not envisioned except to substantially maintain the effects achieved by the previous operation(s).

Subsequent to each phase of this campaign, North Vietnamese military and diplomatic responses will be evaluated before initiating the next major military action.

The initial campaign of military action against North Vietnam will be commenced on order and no later than 1 November in order to take maximum advantage of the transition period between the Northwest and Northeast monsoon seasons. Thereafter, operations

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(p. 143)

probably will be conducted with reduced visibility because of deteriorating weather conditions. Initial actions will include, but not be limited to, the mining of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, and a major anti-war campaign to reduce the enemy ability to resist further military actions against NVN. In addition and to the maximum extent possible, enemy supply operations in support of VC/NVA activities in SVN will be degraded. Thereafter, subsequent operations will include consideration of the following military actions, as well as others which may be applicable:

Possible Washington Decision Points	Possible Action
1	Mine NVN ports (complete and long duration closure).
1	Conduct major air strikes against NVN air order of battle, imposing collateral damage as practicable against NVN airfields.
1	Conduct selective anti-SAM/AAA operations south of 19 degrees N.
1	Attack military supplies south of 19 degrees N.
1	Conduct ground sweep in DMZ south of Ben Hai River.
2	Reseed NVN minefields.
2	Conduct major air strike against Haiphong port complex.
2	Remove B-52 attack restrictions on certain supply concentrations/sanctuaries in Laos.
2	Attack military supplies and LOCs in North Vietnam.

Possible Washington Decision Points	Possible Action
2	Conduct ground sweep across the Ben Hai River within the limits of the DMZ.
2	Quarantine or mine Sihanoukville (with permissive channel).
2 or 3	Partial destruction of Red River dikes (or during period of optimum flooding).
3	Conduct major air strikes against high value targets in Thanh Hoa and Vinh.
3	Conduct ground sweep through the DMZ into NVN, employing reinforced ARVN division, supported by U.S. air.
3	Cross border operations (brigade size) into Laos and/or Cambodia.
3 or 4	Complete breaching of dike system.
4	Conduct major air strike against high value target systems (electric power, war supporting industry, transportation support facilities, military complexes, POL and air defense).
(4)	Clean nuclear interdiction of three NVN-Laos passes. ✓
(5)	Nuclear interdiction of two NVN-CPR railroads. ✓
5	Amphibious landing near Vinh, draw NVA forces, and generate killing zone.

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 9/17/69

INITIAL COMMENTS ON CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. See attached for suggested changes on first page.

2. Questions on list of possible actions:

-- Why must the mining provide "long duration closure"? We then lose control -- there would be no way to reward good behavior. Wouldn't medium duration -- say 2-3 months -- give us more flexibility? We could then promise to allow reopening or threaten to reseed as the situation required.

-- Each "package" will be politically more difficult in the U. S. The first must therefore be as tough as possible to gain as much psychological effect as it can. Would it be physically impossible to carry out all of 1, 2 and 3 as the first package? Of these actions, the following seem most dubious, however:

* Ground actions in North Vietnam would run a very high risk of Chinese ground reaction, and we do not have the resources -- especially in the face of Vietnamization -- to carry them out on a scale which would pose much threat to Hanoi.

* Bombing the dikes will raise particular problems here in the U. S. It would be best, I believe, to save this for later, but somehow imply its possibility during the first actions.

* A permissive channel into Sihanoukville could face us with the daily decisions we wish to avoid, if the Russians chose to force the issue there.

-- Under (4), would there be any geographical restrictions on these high value target systems?

3. Other possible actions:

-- What would be our concurrent movements of ships to the area, our state of strategic readiness, our posture in Korea and Berlin?

-- If we go as far as the interdiction measures in (4) and (5), what other actions should we take at this very high level of escalation once the precedent is established?

-- What would we do if these actions fail?
-- What counter-actions would we take in various contingencies?

Attachment

T Lake

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By [illegible] NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4:40 p.m., September 27

Mr. Kissinger said he was just going to call the President when this call came in. He said he had an interesting conversation with Dobrynin. He came in with two stupid questions: (1) whether we want to have the Berlin talks to be quadripartite or bilateral, and (2) he wanted us to use our influence to see that Gromyko and the President [redacted] before Gromyko leaves on Wednesday (K interjected here he thinks the State people have practically given away our position). K told D his call was providential -- as far as the White House is concerned, we have no great incentives; D owes us an answer to the question given him in May and another in the conversation K had with him in April. As far as we are concerned, the train has left the station. The Soviets have a choice of believing the President or the New York Times and K, if he could advise him, would recommend that they believe the President.

D said one other thing -- he knew of K's meeting in Paris. K asked him what he knew. D said Hanoi told them this was the best conversation they had had and they thought something might come of it. K said if it does, they will have to make the move. We are not going to make the move, to which D didn't really respond. D said there are a lot of arguments in the Soviet Union, and they feel we are not willing to move very fast on Soviet-American relations in general. D did not mention SALT, but mentioned trade, for example. K told him that the President had told D, and K had told D, that we are going very far on trade, but we aren't going to let Communist countries supported by the Soviet Union chop us out. K said he had been very tough with D -- he didn't give an inch.

K told the President he didn't think we should move very fast on the Middle East. P said the point is we can't deliver. K said that is not what they are asking. They want us to agree to a piece of paper for Yarring (?) to deliver. K said they aren't anxious to get something in the Middle East -- their problems with the Egyptians must be very serious. He wanted us to be very forthcoming.

P wanted to know D's attitude. K said they want major improvements in relations with us. He said they always run into trouble. He was asked in Moscow what advance has been made, and he couldn't answer. K told him he could have said "the SALT talks." D said there will be a positive answer pretty soon, but he didn't say any more about it. K said he doesn't believe the U.S. should be in a pleading position on it. He thinks we could play it the other way. If we go the hard route, and can keep them quiet, that is what we want. P said he is

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By dco NARA, Date 5/27

keenly aware that we don't want to take the hard route and make them mad. He asked K, "You have no doubt but that he is reminded of the fact we are going the hard route?" K said yes; he had been very tough on him. D had asked what K thought of the Sino-Soviet problem. K had said the Soviets have a big geopolitical problem that no death is going to solve. D had asked K whether he thought they (the Soviets) were going to attack the Chinese. K had replied that, as a historian, he thought the Soviets were considering it.

D had [redacted] said something about Romania -- he asked who thought of it. K had replied that every fundamental decision here is made by the President, and he wasn't going to give D a checklist of who made the various proposals.

D had asked whether we had any response from the Chinese on the change in travel restrictions. K had replied that D knew as well as he that the Chinese move in very complicated ways (which didn't really give an answer to his question). K said he had been personally much more aloof with D than before.

P asked what had been said about Vietnam. K told him D had said we may not believe it, but the Soviets have a real interest in ending this war, but for different reasons than ours. K told him we have no evidence of this. K said D had said they had been helpful on the shape of the table, to which K replied that they were helpful to Hanoi on that. K gave no encouragement here, and wasn't really very pleasant. He had reminded D that we have a problem -- there can be no movement until they show us.

The President said, "The summit and trade they can have, but I'll be damned if they can get the Middle East, etc." K said he doesn't see what we gain by going to a fall-back position on the Middle East. His instinct for handling this, would be for Rogers to tell Gromyko we will give our answer to Dobrynin in about two weeks.

K said he thinks D came to see him to let him know they knew about K's Paris meeting, and to fix an invitation for Gromyko to see the President. D had said in all previous administrations Gromyko had been received by the President. K told D that Gromyko hadn't asked for a meeting. K told the President if Gromyko asks for a meeting, formally, the President will have to see him, but if he doesn't, K doesn't think we should invite him. K said D came back to this two or three times --(Gromyko would love to have an invitation). K further doesn't think we should encourage him to ask for an [redacted] appointment.

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By [illegible] NARA, Date 5/27

to the President
said, on the Middle East, it would help us if we didn't do anything right now -- it could be done in about 10 days to 2 weeks between Gromyko and Dobrynin. K said he didn't know whether Rogers will make a formal proposition -- he hadn't been in touch with K. P said waiting makes sense.

P said the papers had made a big thing about Gromyko getting a warmer reception than he. The reason is obvious -- all the Middle East had to be silent to him; we have nothing to offer the Africans; and we didn't mention Latin America. He said he felt it was foolish to go up there. K said he didn't think the President got a cool reception; he couldn't count on the newspapers giving such a distorted picture. The President said we said things not calculated to get a warm reception.

Getting back to D and Vietnam, P asked K whether he saw much movement. K's response was that the fact that [illegible] D told him about his Paris conversation, and that Hanoi considers that the most useful conversation they have had, he (K) considers positive. D had said in watching the President's news conference, it was clear [illegible] the President isn't going to make any major concessions, and that it was useful to get this on the table. K thinks we will get a move within the next month.

P mentioned the demonstrations coming up on October 15. He said the Democratic National Chairman had been meeting with the doves, at the same time of his press conference, to make Vietnam a political issue. P said he didn't hit this hard with Haldeman, but he feels the real attack should be on them. K agreed, saying they got us into the war. P said our people have to start fighting harder. K said the press conference was essential and extremely helpful. He thinks events of the last two or three weeks show the long route cannot possibly work. The President agreed, especially with our 60,000-man withdrawal, reduction of the draft by 50,000, and Ho Chi Minh's death. The doves and the public are making it impossible to happen. He asked K, if in his planning, he could pick this up so that we make the tough move before the 15th of October. K said yes. P said he had been wondering if we shouldn't -- he doesn't want to appear to be making the tough move after the 15th just because of the rioting at home. K said there is a problem, however -- if Hanoi takes us seriously, and they wouldn't have told Moscow if they weren't taking it seriously, we shouldn't confuse them. If we want them to make the move, we should give them time -- two weeks. His only worry is that if we went ahead with the tough move before the 15th -- and there is a 10% chance Hanoi might want to move, if we hit them before they have a chance to make the move, it will look as if we tricked them. He said the President might want to consider another press conference before the 15th [illegible] or a television report, saying

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By [illegible] NARA, Date 5/27

these people (demonstrators, etc.) are dividing the country and making it impossible to settle the problem on a reasonable basis. P said he would just as soon have them demonstrate against the plan. If we went ahead and moved, the country is going to take a dimmer view after the move than before. P would like to nip it before the first demonstration, because there will be another one on November 15. P reminded that Laird had said for three months after we do this, it will have ~~XXXXX~~ relatively high public support. K said as an assistant, he had to give P the dark side. He suggested again the possibility ~~XX~~ of P going on television before the demonstration -- possibly around Oct 10.

P said okay; they had had an interesting day; and he would see K on Monday. If Rogers calls, P will try to cool off that thing. K said Rogers can be generally positive but defer an answer for two weeks.

lds

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PRMPA
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

I

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE October 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Attached is a report of my conversation last Saturday with Ambassador Dobrynin.

Following the prearranged telephone call, I emphasized to Dobrynin that you felt:

-- Vietnam was the critical issue;

-- There would be no special treatment for the Soviet Union until Vietnam was solved;

-- We took seriously Hanoi's attempt to undermine the President's domestic position;

-- The train had left the station and was headed down the track.

Significantly, Dobrynin responded, inter alia, that:

-- He hoped it was an "airplane" and not a "train" and that there would be some "maneuvering room";

-- My private conversations in Paris had impressed Hanoi;

-- Moscow had an interest in improving relations with us but hadn't seen real progress on any subject.

I emphasized that we could go further towards improving US-Soviet relations if Russia took an understanding attitude on Vietnam.

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During the conversation Dobrynin also expressed:

-- surprise that no meeting with you had been arranged for Gromyko;

-- interest in our preference as to 2 or 4-power negotiations on the Berlin issue;

-- hope that the White House would intercede to expedite a preliminary agreement on the Middle East between Rogers and Gromyko prior to the latter's departure;

-- assurance that a reply on SALT would occur in due course.

I believe the Soviets are concerned and now more clearly understand that we mean business on the Vietnam issue.

Attachment

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PRMPA
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Saturday, September 27, 1969
Time: 3:00 p.m.
Place: Dr. Kissinger's Office

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came to see me at his request. I let him wait for a week but agreed to a brief appointment on Saturday afternoon.

After an exchange of pleasantries, Dobrynin remarked that his Minister regretted not having had an opportunity for a longer chat with me. Had Gromyko been able to visit Washington, Dobrynin would have given a luncheon for him and me at the Soviet Embassy. The absence of a visit to Washington made Gromyko's trip somewhat unusual. I said I regretted that his Foreign Minister did not come to Washington, as I would have enjoyed talking to him, and was sorry his schedule was so crowded. Dobrynin replied that the difficulty was the absence of a meeting with the President, which had been a standard procedure during previous visits to the General Assembly. I told him that in order to keep ourselves from being swamped we had adopted the rule that no Foreign Minister would see the President in Washington. In any event, there had never been a formal request. Dobrynin said he was not aware that there were such fine questions of protocol.

Dobrynin then remarked that his Minister had asked him to inquire whether in negotiating the Berlin issue we had any preference as to forum. Specifically, did we care whether it was discussed in a four-power or two-power forum? While the Soviet Union was willing to speak in a four-power forum, it was also prepared to have two-power discussions. I told him that four-power discussions seemed to be quite acceptable. If there was any different inclination on the part of the President, I would let him know.

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Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East and said that the meeting in New York had been very constructive. Gromyko hoped that he would be able to come to a preliminary agreement with the Secretary of State before his departure on Wednesday. He asked for intercession of the White House in expediting this agreement. I replied that since matters seemed to be in train on the diplomatic level, there was no need for White House intervention. I added that Dobrynin should understand our elemental position. We had made several communications to the Soviet Union on Vietnam to which they had never replied. While this did not inhibit normal diplomatic relations, it made it very difficult for the White House to go beyond what normally occurred on the diplomatic level.

At this point, the President called. When the conversation was completed, I commented that the Presidentr had called me at a providential moment because it enabled me to tell the President directly what was being discussed. To us Vietnam was the critical issue. We were quite prepared to discuss other subjects, but the Soviet Union should not expect any special treatment until Vietnam was solved. They should also have no illusions about the seriousness with which we took Hanoi's attempt to undermine the domestic position of the President. Dobrynin asked me whether there was any hope for a coalition government. I replied that we had covered the subject at great length previously and that I could add nothing. It was a pity that all our efforts to negotiate had failed. The President had told me in his call that the train had just left the station and was now headed down the track. Dobrynin responded that he hoped it was an airplane and not a train and would leave some maneuvering room. I said the President chooses his words very carefully and that I was sure he meant train.

Dobrynin then asked what our problem had been in the past. I said that every negotiation turned into a discussion on our readiness to accept the 10 points. We could not negotiate in a forum of ultimatums. Dobrynin said that my own conversations with the Vietnamese seemed to have gone rather well. I asked him what he meant. He said Hanoi had told Moscow that they had been very impressed by my presentation and thought I understood Vietnamese conditions very well. I replied that if this were true the next move was up to them.

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Dobrynin then engaged in a lengthy exposition to the effect that the Soviet Union, for its own reasons, was interested in peace in Vietnam and had in the past often been helpful. I countered that we had no illusions about Soviet help in the past. It had been considerably in the interest of Hanoi and had been largely tactical. Dobrynin said that he wanted to assure me of Moscow's continued interest in improved relations with the U.S., but it was getting very difficult to convince Moscow of our goodwill. There had been no real progress on any subject. For example, we could have been more generous on trade liberalization. I said the most important issue was Vietnam. As soon as Vietnam was out of the way and especially if the Russians took an understanding attitude, we would go further. Dobrynin smiled and said that I had an unusual ability to link things together. I told him that we had hoped to have a reply on SALT. Dobrynin said there would be a reply in due course but did not give any indication as to when.

Dobrynin returned to the subject of Soviet interest in improving relations with us. I said we reciprocated this feeling, especially after Vietnam was out of the way.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
DATE: SEP 2007
BY: 0664393

8 OCT 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air and Naval Operations Against North Vietnam

Background and Nature of Objective

At this stage of developments, with Neogitations talks seemingly stalled in Paris, with combat activity levels reduced in South Vietnam, but with seemingly rising levels of discontent in the United States, we should review the over-all situation and determine the course of action best calculated to achieve our objective there. As you have stated, our objective in South Vietnam is to achieve for the South Vietnamese people an opportunity to determine the political and economic institutions under which they will live. Various alternatives to achieve that objective are possible. Arrayed in terms of intensity -- and probably duration -- of U.S. involvement, there are at least four alternative concepts: (a) A rapid U.S. exodus under honorable conditions, e.g., under the umbrella of a cease-fire; (b) accelerated Vietnamization of all levels of activity in South Vietnam; (c) pursuit of the currently programmed Vietnamization activity; or (d) escalated U.S. military activity with an eye towards imposing decisively on North Vietnam's will and capability to pursue the war in South Vietnam. This memorandum addresses the last alternative, i.e., that dealing with increased U.S. military activity.

Criteria and General Observations

In seeking our objective in South Vietnam, we must be alert to some constraints. We must, for example, act in a fashion which will:

- Maintain the support of the American people.
- Be within tolerable economic limits, both for the U.S. and South Vietnam, i.e., not create undue inflationary or balance of payments pressures on the one hand or exorbitant and self-defeating controls on the other;
- Not destroy the political, economic, and social fabric of South Vietnam and the other nations of Southeast Asia;

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Case # 06-M-0415

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- Not disable us from honoring our commitments and protecting our security interests elsewhere in the world;
- Not result in the alienation of our friends and allies elsewhere in the world; and
- Not precipitate a wider, more costly, and even longer conflict.

The fundamental question is how to gain our objective within these controlling criteria. Would escalated U.S. military activity do so?

A total military victory would require the destruction or ejection of NVN forces from South Vietnam and its immediate borders in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam, plus the reduction of VC forces to impotence. This course has some rudimentary appeal.

A number of questions are raised, however, by the concept of military victory. One question is whether the U.S. people would stand for the concomitant higher casualty levels on both sides. A second question is whether the U.S. economy could sustain, without substantial readjustments, the burden of increased resources for the war effort. A third question, assuming the increased military activity would spread throughout Southeast Asia, is whether the damage levels inflicted, especially in South Vietnam, would preclude achievement of a viable South Vietnamese society. A fourth question implicit in concentration on military victory concerns our ability to honor our other commitments, to prevent alienating our friends and allies, and to avoid creating a larger war with more, and more dangerous, adversaries.

The answers to most of the key questions involved in a concept of military victory, dictate against pursuing such a course. But such answers may be somewhat academic for the very reason you have already ruled out the pursuit of military victory.

The question then is whether there might be some form of escalated U.S. military activity which, short of military victory, could act upon the North Vietnamese will and capability decisively enough to cause them to negotiate a settlement which would allow the U.S. to achieve its basic objective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted a proposal to you which purports to achieve that purpose.

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What the Concept Is

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concept proposes a high-intensity air and naval campaign against North Vietnam. While the details of the plan are still evolving, the following dimensions are clear:

- Surprise and concentration of effort in the Haiphong/Hanoi area would be emphasized.
- Phase I would involve those "integrated modules" designed to (a) neutralize the NVN air order-of-battle; (b) close key NVN ports; and (c) destroy other "high value" targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.
- Phase II would involve additional "attack modules" designed to (a) destroy NVN war-supporting facilities, particularly again in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and (b) interdict the Northeast rail line.

The Phase I concept would involve strikes on thirty (30) targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and mining the approaches to the NVN ports of Haiphong, Hon Gui, Cam Pha, Ben Thuy, Dong Hoi, and Quang Khi. More than 3500 sorties would be flown. The Chiefs conclude the Phase I operations would have "a strong psychological and military impact on the North Vietnamese leadership."

The Phase II concept would involve strikes on an added eight (8) targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. The Chiefs conclude the Phase II operations would "contribute to a reduction of the enemy's ability to carry out its aggression against South Vietnam." The Chiefs add, however, in a significant caveat that "... it must be emphasized that a significant reduction in the flow of material to their (NVN) forces in South Vietnam would require a sustained campaign over an extended period of time." The implied JCS conclusion is that any decisive impact on the war in South Vietnam and the attainment of the basic U.S. objective there depends on (a) the North Vietnamese will being so affected by the initial strikes as to cause them to negotiate a favorable settlement to the U.S., or (b) the prosecution of a sustained and indefinite U.S. air and sea campaign against North Vietnam. Both parts of that implied JCS conclusion involve significant uncertainties, risks, and costs.

CIA Evaluation of the JCS Concept

The single most instructive evaluation of the type of concept proposed by the JCS is a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum

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written in May 1968 and updated on October 7, 1969. The CIA conclusions are as follows:

- A Mining program would serve as an effective means of interdicting North Vietnam's normal seaborne commerce. The disruption to this trade would be widespread but temporary, given Communist China's cooperation. Within a short period -- two to three months -- North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports. The North Vietnamese, however, could sustain the economy and the war effort at present levels for several months solely by drawing down present reserves and maintaining present imports overland. Shipment of goods from the USSR and Eastern Europe by overland routes would raise costs, but constitute a small additional burden on Hanoi's Communist allies.

- There seems, in brief, to be no way of overcoming Hanoi's ability to sustain a continuing flow of essential material support from abroad, to distribute these goods internally, and to forward them to its forces in South Vietnam, except in the unlikely event of Chinese intransigence. The existing capacities of the railroad, highway, and river connections with Communist China -- some 16,000 tons a day -- are more than twice the daily volume of North Vietnamese imports.

- A mining-bombing program would carry with it significant liabilities. The possibility of damage, sinking, or entrapment in port of foreign shipping is high. This would present the USSR, particularly, with difficult decisions and create new risks of a Soviet-US confrontation. If the mining were effective and forced a shift to alternate overland supply routes, it would require more extensive cooperation and assistance on the part of the Chinese. This conceivably could result in strengthening Chinese political influence in Hanoi. It would also risk a confrontation between US and Red Chinese air and naval forces.

- A mining program would also evoke protest and critical reaction from Free World maritime states. Almost all world powers would see the program as further intensification of the war, even if the program were to follow a breakdown of the Paris negotiations.

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- If the negotiations were in process when the mining program was started, Hanoi would probably break off the talks. However, any such North Vietnamese decision would probably be based on the total war situation, including the status of the fighting in the south and the success of the talks in undermining the position of the Saigon government.

Added Evaluation of the JCS Concept Plan

The CIA evaluation, which technically goes into detail to substantiate the conclusions stated above, can be reinforced by analyzing the specific JCS Concept Plan now being presented. The Chiefs' Plan, for example, is characterized by the following:

- U.S. losses in Phase I and Phase II are estimated by the Chiefs to be less than 3 percent of the sorties flown. Even based on that loss percentage estimate, losses on the first wave of attacks (3799 sorties over five full days) would be in excess of 100 aircraft. Given the density of the NVN air defenses in that area, and the concurrency of the strikes, i.e., the fact the NVN air order-of-battle is not to be cleared out before the other targets are attacked, losses could be much higher. Furthermore, the loss of major US ships would have to be considered.

- Civilian casualties in North Vietnam would be high. Given the location of the targets in densely populated areas, and the element of surprise to be utilized, the civilian casualties would probably be substantial. Charges would be made the U.S. is killing civilians indiscriminately.

- At risk would be increased NVN attacks through the DMZ and accentuated attacks on SVN populated areas. While the NVA/VC forces have not literally adhered to the November 1, 1968 understanding in these areas, the violations have been well below their capability. The exposure of U.S. and GVN forces in northern I Corps could lead, in particular, to an early call by U.S. Commanders for ground reinforcements.

- The military effectiveness of the plan is cast in doubt by the Task Group notes which have been provided from Saigon. That Group indicated, inter alia, the following problem areas:

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- The existence of sanctuary air bases in Red China. This means an air threat could continue indefinitely, possibly even with Red Chinese involvement.

- Even with the mining plan, "NVN could accommodate ... by expanding their lightering facilities...."

- At present, the enemy probably has sufficient supplies stockpiled in Cambodia to support his forces in III and IV Corps at 1967-68 operating rates for several months. Therefore, unless the resupply route through Cambodia were sealed, the war in SVN could be continued.

- Sealing off Cambodia would require Cambodian tacit agreement. Blockade and mining are considered acts of war under international law. It is not clear such tacit agreement could be obtained.

- There is an implication that substantially larger requests for both air, naval, and ground forces and requests for added operating authorities would ensue. Such forces and authorities would be involved in:

  - Quarantining or blockading Cambodia.

  - Flying B-52 raids into NVN.

  - Making ground incursions into Cambodia, Laos, and NVN.

- No reference is made to costs. It is difficult to price out the JCS Concept Plan on the basis of the information provided. But a rough estimate would put the incremental annual costs at anywhere from $1.0 billion to $5.0 billion. The economic impact of such outlays is not addressed.

In addition to the implications in the Chiefs' Concept Plan as not constituted, there are the following initial considerations:

- If U.S. casualties should increase, either in actions in NVN or resultant actions in SVN, the U.S. public reaction could be devastating. It would not suffice to say that in the long-run casualties will be reduced if they increase sharply in the short-run.

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- Demonstrations would have to be expected, both in the U.S. and at U.S. Embassies abroad. This would be all the more probable without some NVN provocation for the U.S. adoption of the Chiefs' Plan.

- Allegations would be made that the military had taken control in the U.S.

The sum total of the considerations outlined above casts grave doubt on the validity and efficacy of the JCS Concept Plan. The Chiefs add another note of doubt by taking note of the questionable weather in NVN during the winter months. Their wariness is well taken. In November 1966, we were able to fly only an average of 242 sorties per day and in November 1967 only 239 sorties per day over NVN. That is far below the sortie level indicated in the JCS Plan, which calls, for example, for 797 sorties on the first full day of operations. Succeeding winter months give equally poor flying weather over North Vietnam until about April.


But weather is a second-order question. It is noteworthy the Chiefs, while recommending the Plan be approved for continuing planning, do not

- Indicate how the Plan would lead to conclusive or decisive results, nor do the Chiefs

- Contend that the Plan would have decisive results.

Therefore, the Plan would involve the U.S. in expanded costs and risks with no clear resultant military or political benefits.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
DATE: SEP 2007
BY: 0664393

JCSM-600-69
1 October 1969, As Revised 10/3/69

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Air and Naval Operations Against North Vietnam (TS)

1. (TS) As you requested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a concept plan for high intensity air and naval operations against North Vietnam. Although detailed planning is not yet complete, sufficient information is now available to provide you with an overview of the plan and initial comments concerning its implementation. It should be noted that this report is based on preliminary information and includes some modifications by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to information which has been developed by a small planning team in the field. Data contained herein will be subject to refinement as the plan is completed.

2. (TS) The concept plan which has been developed emphasizes the use of surprise and concentration of effort to achieve maximum practicable psychological and military impact. This plan is divided into two phases, each of which includes various attack modules which are described in the Appendices hereto and each of approximately the same duration. Phase I is an integrated package of three attack modules which when implemented as an entity will insure optimum initial effect. Phase II consists of those modules which require an effort of greater duration and which will have an additional impact upon the enemy's will and ability to continue the war. In preparing these plans note has been taken of the fact that the period from 1 November - 31 March is the period of the Northeast Monsoon. It is characterized by low cloud cover over the target areas in North Vietnam. Weather conditions suitable for offensive air operations in North Vietnam occur from a level of less than 50% in November to less than 10% in January and February. (See Appendix G for detailed analysis of NVN weather.) These weather conditions influence the choice of specific attack options, particularly since a primary objective is to provide strong psychological shock to the enemy in the near-term.

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3. (~~TS~~) Phase I operations consist of three integrated attack modules utilizing concentrated air and naval effort to be conducted on approximately five full strike days, not necessarily consecutive. (See Appendix F for forces available, forces required, and damage effect criteria). These modules are designed to: neutralize the North Vietnamese Air Force; close the ports through which North Vietnam receives the bulk of its war-supporting materials; and destroy various high value economic and war supporting facilities in North Vietnam, including initial interdiction efforts against the northeast rail line.

a. Neutralization of the NVN Air Force. Air strikes will be conducted against the NVN counter-air capability to insure the success of the strike effort. These attacks will be designed to gain and maintain air superiority over North Vietnam. Targets will include active NVN airfields, aircraft, and other air defenses including those SAM sites posing the greatest threat to the strike forces.

b. Closure of NVN Ports. Aerial mining operations will be conducted in the approaches to the NVN ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha, Ben Thuy, Dong Hoi and Quang Khe. Where applicable, these minefields will be fuzed to activate approximately 72 hours later, thus permitting third-country shipping to exit the ports safely upon receipt of notification of the minefields. Immediately following initiation of air operations against North Vietnam, naval destroyers and cruisers will be deployed into NVN coastal waters to attack lucrative targets such as NVN coastal shipping, waterborne logistic craft and transshipment points. In addition, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire and mine reseeding operations will be employed on a continuing basis to interdict lighterage operations and maintain the minefield.

c. Destruction of High Value Targets. Selected industrial installations, power plants, and communications facilities including marshalling yards and key bridges will be subjected to concentrated attack. This module includes key governmental and military control centers and initial attacks against the northeast rail line.

4. (~~TS~~) Phase I operations will have a severe psychological impact on the North Vietnamese government in that steps are taken to isolate it from outside support. Further:

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a. Destruction of the North Vietnamese air order of battle would have three interrelated functions. It would provide maximum protection for the strike force, significantly reducing combat losses which otherwise would be anticipated. It is essential to the successful attainment of the military objectives associated with this plan. Finally, the attainment of aerial superiority over North Vietnam should have a strong psychological impact of its own, as the enemy realizes that he has been disarmed in this important self-defense capability.

b. Effective closure of the NVN ports and initial interdiction of the northeast rail line would serve notice to the Hanoi leadership and its supporters that they can no longer count on the large quantities of war-supporting materials, equipment, and supplies which have been imported throughout the course of the conflict.

c. Destruction of high value economic and war-supporting facilities and installations would represent to North Vietnam a significant loss in economic worth. These facilities cannot be easily replaced under any conditions. Their destruction, in combination with the closure of the ports, should provide a strong psychological shock to the Hanoi government. The shock is further increased by the addition of certain high governmental command and control facilities to this module.

5. (~~TS~~) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the employment of B-52s in selected areas would provide additional shock effect, add to the total weight of effort, and enhance round-the-clock impact.

6. (~~TS~~) Probable North Vietnamese and other communist military reactions to Phase I operations are under study.

7. (~~TS~~) Phase II operations, as developed in the concept plan, include additional attack modules which will further reduce North Vietnam's military and economic resources. These modules will have an additional impact on Hanoi's will and ability to carry on the war. They will be executed as an integrated package, subject to weather, resources, and other operational considerations.

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a. Destruction of War Supporting Facilities. Air attacks will be conducted to destroy military logistic facilities, supplies, vehicles, and equipment located primarily within the Hanoi-Haiphong area. In addition, armed air reconnaissance and naval gunfire attacks will also be conducted against coastal craft and port facilities. This action will continue the isolation of North Vietnam from imports by sea.

b. Interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line. Further attacks will be conducted to interdict the northeast rail line from Hanoi to Communist China. This will complement the closure of the seaports and further impede the import of war-supporting materiel into North Vietnam.

8. (TS) Boldness of action, surprise, and mass attack are key elements of the concept plan, both for shock effect and for ultimate military effectiveness. If full surprise is achieved, it will permit the early neutralization of the North Vietnamese counter-air capability and the rapid completion of attacks against the high value target list. This will reduce losses and free aircraft for other tasks, thus broadening US options for subsequent action. With regard to initial offensive operations, maximum flexibility must be accorded the field commanders to choose the day, time and sequence of the initial attack, based on short range forecasts of target weather conditions.

9. (TS) The concept also emphasizes concentration of effort in order to achieve greater psychological impact, increased long-term damage to the enemy, and reduced friendly losses. To this end, maximum available force, including the CVA presently dedicated to Korean contingencies, will be employed for as long as it takes to achieve the desired results.

10. (TS) A decision lead time of approximately 72-86 hours will be required, depending on force location at the time, in order to complete the preparatory actions necessary for initiation of Phase I operations.

11. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. The Phase I operations outlined in this plan will have a strong psychological and military impact on the North Vietnamese leadership. Essential to the attainment of this

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objective is the gaining of air superiority over North Vietnam, the effective closure of the major North Vietnamese ports, and the initial interdiction of the northeast rail line.

b. Phase II operations will contribute to a reduction of the enemy's military and economic resources, but it must be emphasized that a significant reduction in the flow of materiel to their forces in South Vietnam would require a sustained campaign. Such a campaign is not envisioned in the concept of this plan at this stage. The combination of Phase I and Phase II operations will achieve meaningful military as well as psychological impact by (1) reducing the availability of imported materiels into North Vietnam, and (2) exacting attrition of North Vietnam's war-making capacity and its ability to support aggression in South Vietnam.

c. The inability to predict operational weather on a long-term basis during the period of the Northeast Monsoon, as well as the requirement to maximize the effectiveness of the attacks, will necessitate delegation of latitude and flexibility to the operational commanders as to the actual timing and sequence of attacks.

d. Certain Project 703 reductions will have an adverse impact on total force capability and some programming adjustments may be indicated. However, adequate forces can be made available to execute this plan.

12. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this concept plan for high intensity air and naval operations against North Vietnam be approved for continuing planning. It is further recommended that the knowledge of this plan be restricted to those with an absolute need to know.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T. H. Moorer

T. H. MOORER
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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APPENDIX A

OUTLINE PLAN FOR ATTACKS AGAINST NVN AIR ORDER OF BATTLE (AOB)

(PHASE I)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan to maximize the benefits of initial surprise by conducting attacks against the NVN AOB.

TARGETS: Targets will include active NVN airfields, aircraft, air defenses, including associated command and control facilities, and those SAM sites posing the greatest threat to the strike forces.

BACKGROUND: The bombing halt, which commenced on 1 November 1968, has permitted North Vietnam to reconstitute and expand her air defense systems and facilities. The NVN jet fighters currently based on six airfields and the located SA-2 missile firing positions are priority targets in this air campaign designed to gain and maintain air superiority over North Vietnam. This would provide maximum protection for our strike forces as well as enhance effective execution of subsequent strikes against the key targets in other modules.

TASK ORGANIZATION: US forces committed to Southeast Asia and contiguous waters are available for surprise attacks against the enemy AOB, known SA-2 missile firing locations and other air defense systems. The magnitude of the task requires full use of all Seventh Air Force, Task Force 77 and 1st Marine Air Wing operationally capable aircraft against these targets.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Strike forces will begin at H-Hour with a coordinated attack, exploiting the element of surprise, on the six airfields and known active SA-2 missile firing sites. A maximum effort will be maintained, as weather permits, in subsequent follow-on attacks to exploit the disruption and damage resulting from the initial surprise attack. The six enemy airfields which will be targeted are:

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(1) Hanoi/Gia Lam

(2) Phuc Yen

(3) Kep

(4) Hoa Lac

(5) Haiphong/Kien An

(6) Yen Bai

b. The weight of effort to destroy the enemy AOB and SAM positions will require the use of all the tactical air resources that are suitable for employment in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

TIMING: Timing is critical in the execution of this module since it is the key to the implementation of Phase I. The limited number of good weather days will require flexibility in the initiation of Phase I and once initiated a maximum sortie effort in order to achieve the objectives.

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APPENDIX B

OUTLINE PLAN FOR CLOSURE OF
HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX,
BEN THUY, QUANG KHE, AND DONG HOI

(PHASE I)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for the offensive aerial mining and destructor seeding of all deep water ports in NVN, and the air and naval gunfire interdiction of NVN coastal shipping and small craft and port facilities. These operations will deny maritime shipping access to port facilities and disrupt attempts to transship cargo by small craft and barges from deep water anchorages.

MINING PLAN

TARGETS: Haiphong Port Complex, including Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha; and the supplemental mine fields at Vinh, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi (Annex 1).

TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Mining Forces:

Option		Number CVAs
ALPHA One	-	One Large Deck, Two 27-Cs
ALPHA Two	-	Three 27-Cs
BRAVO One	-	One Large Deck, One 27-C
BRAVO Two	-	Two 27-Cs
CHARLIE	-	One Large Deck

b. Support Forces:

(1) Option ALPHA One and Two: One ammunition ship would be located in the Tonkin Gulf to transfer mines to the CVAs.

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(2) Options BRAVO and CHARLIE: Mines would be pre-positioned on the CVAs. No supporting AE required.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. The plan is segmented into various options dependent upon the number of CVAs available and type of CVA, large deck or 27-C class, as shown under Task Organization. Option ALPHA One is recommended for execution of this plan.

b. There are a total of 15 mine fields/destructor fields. Nine are primarily deep water bottom mine fields, five are pure destructor fields, and one is a combined mine and destructor field.

c. The following table shows the weight of effort:

Option	Type Weapon	Number Weapons	Number A/C Sorties
ALPHA One	Bottom Mine (Mix)	154	30
	Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)	604	58
ALPHA Two	Bottom Mine (Mix)	154	62
	Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)	604	68
BRAVO One	Bottom Mine (Mix)	98	20
	Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)	612	54
BRAVO Two	Bottom Mine (Mix)	98	39
	Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)	440	50
CHARLIE	Bottom Mine (Mix)	98	20
	Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)	394	29

d. Option ALPHA One will require about 88 strike aircraft sorties from three CVAs to deliver 154 sea mines and 604 destructors. The operation would be executed in two phases: (1) Phase One - laying the sea mines and a portion of the destructors within two hours of initial launch time.

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An arming delay of 72 hours on all sea mines is provided to allow third country shipping time to clear the NVN ports after announcement by the US Government that the mine fields have been planted. (2) Phase Two - seeding the remaining destructors in the channels which were left open for the exit of third nation shipping. This would be done no sooner than 48 hours after the initial seeding in Phase One since destructors have only a 24-hour arming delay.

e. This plan as a separate operation would effectively impair the logistic support that presently enters via Haiphong. By itself the mining operation would have a high psychological impact on North Vietnam leadership and the third countries now providing support to North Vietnam. Further, it would face the North Vietnamese with logistics problems of great magnitude in the development of alternative supply routes.

f. The forces assigned to Commander, Seventh Fleet are adequate to implement this plan. When implementing this and associated plans, Commander, Seventh Fleet will be released from the CVA requirement in the Sea of Japan.

TIMING:

Option	Reaction Time
ALPHA One	86
ALPHA Two	86
BRAVO One	12
BRAVO Two	12
CHARLIE	12

a. The 86-hour reaction time is a worst case which assumes one of the three CVAs is located in Singapore. If a prealert message is received and all three CVAs are in the Tonkin Gulf, the reaction time for Option ALPHA would be 14 hours.

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b. The 12-hour reaction time assumes that the designated CVAs have been preloaded with required mines. An early decision is required to load out designated CVAs.

WEATHER: It is desired to execute this plan during daylight hours, in weather conditions with a ceiling of at least 1,000 feet and with at least 5 NM visibility. Because of the limited number of A-6 aircraft available, only the main sea mine fields for Haiphong can be laid at night or in weather conditions less than the recommended minimums. Weather predictions indicate that the required minimums will exist during 80 percent of the days from 1 November-31 December.

SUPPORTING ACTIONS: Immediately following initiation of air operations against NVN, naval destroyers and cruisers will be deployed into NVN coastal waters to attack lucrative targets such as NVN coastal shipping, waterborne logistic craft and transshipment points. Armed reconnaissance and naval gunfire will be employed on a continuing basis to interdict any attempts to transship by NVN small craft from ships anchored outside minefields or from other ports.

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ANNEX 1 (SUPPLEMENTAL MINE FIELDS) TO APPENDIX B

PURPOSE/CONCEPT: In order to reemphasize and to continue the US intent to enforce the seaborne logistic interdiction and harassment of North Vietnam, three supplemental mine plans are provided here.

EXECUTION: A single carrier (27-C or large deck) can execute all of the included plans on one launch. All-weather execution can be accomplished if A-6 aircraft are available.

MINE PLANS:

a. Ben Thuy Port Facility/Song Ca River.

(1) The Song Ca is one of the major inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves the transshipment areas associated with Vinh. The mine field consists of 40 DST MARK 36 and 6 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the Song Ca River.

(2) Sortie requirements:

6 A-4 or 4 A-6.

(3) Field dimensions: Length - 1-1/4 mile; width - variable to 2,700 feet; depth - variable to 24 feet.

b. Quang Khe Port Facility/Song Giang River.

(1) The Song Giang is one of the major inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves not only the NVN southern panhandle but the Laos infiltration routes as well. The mine field consists of 40 DST MARK 36 and 6 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the Song Giang River.

(2) Sortie requirements: 6 A-4 or 4 A-6.

(3) Field dimensions: Length - 1 mile; width - variable to 2,600 feet; depth - variable to 24 feet.

c. Dong Hoi Port Facility/Kien Giang River.

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(1) The Kien Giang is one of the major southern inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves the DMZ area. The mine field consists of 30 DST MARK 36 and 4 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the river.

(2) Sortie requirements: 4 A-4 or 3 A-6.

(3) Field dimensions: Length - 1.1 miles; width - variable to 2,100 feet; depth - variable to 16 feet.

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APPENDIX C

OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST HIGH VALUE TARGETS

(PHASE I)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for the conduct of offensive air operations against high value targets in North Vietnam.

TARGETS:

a. The following list contains high value economic and war supporting facilities to be attacked in Phase I:

(1) Hanoi TPP.

(2) Uong Bi TPP.

(3) Hanoi Transformer Station.

(4) Hanoi International Radcom Transmitter.

(5) Hanoi Telephone and Telegraph Office.

(6) Haiphong Cement Plant.

(7) Hanoi Machine and Tool.

(8) Hanoi Railroad Station and Classification Yards.

(9) Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge.

(10) Gia Lam Railroad Station Yard.

(11) Yen Vien Railroad Yard.

(12) Hanoi Ministry of Defense.

(13) Hanoi Senior Party Training Center.

(14) Hanoi Air Force and Army Air Defense Commands.

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(15) Haiphong Warehouses and Docks.

(16) Xuan Mai Army Barracks and SA-2 Missile Storage.

This target list is under continuous review and will be updated as required.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Use of all Seventh Fleet, 7th Air Force and 1st Marine Air Wing operationally capable aircraft which will not be utilized in the attacks against the enemy AOB or the mining operation.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Available strike forces will commence a concentrated attack against these high value targets concurrently with the attacks against the enemy AOB and the mining of the ports in the Phase I operations. As resources and weather permit, follow-on attacks will be maintained to exploit the disruption and damage resulting from the initial surprise attack.

TIMING: A minimum of 72 hours notice would be required prior to execution to ensure readiness of strike units for the Phase I operations.

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APPENDIX D

OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN WAR SUPPORT FACILITIES

(PHASE II)

PURPOSE:- To provide an outline plan for the conduct of offensive air operations against NVN war support facilities, to include attacks against selected coastal targets and waterborne logistics craft (WBLC). (Annex 1).

TARGETS: The following targets comprise a listing of high impact war supporting targets:

a. Haiphong Army Barracks and vehicles stored southeast of Haiphong.

b. Vehicle park at the Cat Bi Airfield.

c. Haiphong POL storage and handling facilities.

d. Haiphong Naval Shipyard.

e. Haiphong railroad/highway bridge and by-pass.

f. Haiphong southwest highway bridge.

g. Haiphong south-southeast highway bridge.

h. Kien Am bridge.

i. Coastal shipping.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Combined Seventh Fleet, 7th Air Force and 1st Marine Air Wing assets which can be made available.

CONCEPT:

a. The element of surprise will be lost after the first day of operation during which a maximum effort of sorties will be flown against NVN air capabilities and air defenses.

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The strikes against NVN war supporting facilities would be executed as directed following Phase I.

b. Continuous armed reconnaissance will be conducted along the North Vietnamese Coast, using both air and surface elements, to complement the mining of Haiphong and insure isolation of North Vietnam from the sea.

TIMING: Upon implementation of Phase II when resources, weather and operational conditions permit.

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ANNEX 1

NAVAL SURFACE OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

(PHASE II)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for naval surface ship interdiction of North Vietnamese waterborne logistics craft (WBLC) and destruction of selected military and logistic targets by naval bombardment. This operation will ensure the effects of the mining of key ports and significantly degrade the ability of the North Vietnamese to use small craft to shuttle supplies to ships anchored outside the minefields or from other ports.

TARGETS: North Vietnamese WBLCs operating along the inland and coastal waterways of North Vietnam and selected military and logistic targets in North Vietnam.

TASK ORGANIZATION: 1 Cruiser

6 Destroyers

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. For maximum effectiveness the operation should be continuous until the Vietnam War has been satisfactorily concluded; however, these operations will have a substantial psychological and military impact if conducted over a short period of time and repeated at random intervals. Not knowing when the United States might resume these attacks, the North Vietnamese would be inhibited in their plans for coastal logistics operations.

b. The forces listed under Task Organization would be supported with aircraft for spotting, reconnaissance, and target identification (12 sorties per day), Combat Air Patrol, Search and Rescue forces, Talos cruisers, and PIRAZ ships.

c. The potential threat to the naval gunfire ships are North Vietnamese aircraft, PT boats, and coastal artillery.

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The risk of significant damage to US warships or spotter aircraft is relatively low. The risk would be further minimized by conducting air strikes on the North Vietnamese air and naval bases.

d. This plan is militarily feasible and can be executed with forces assigned to Commander in Chief, Pacific. To provide the required number of ships it will be necessary to stand-down the present commitment in the Sea of Japan (TF 71). Additionally, if this operation continues over 30 days, Seventh Fleet must be augmented by 10-12 destroyers and one cruiser.

e. This interdiction plan can be conducted as a separate operation or integrated with other offensive operations to enhance the overall impact.

TIMING: Reaction time for commencing these operations, if no warning orders are issued, would be approximately 24 hours after receipt of the execute directive.

WEATHER: These operations can be conducted in all weather conditions; however, low ceilings and reduced visibility would preclude air support for spotting, reconnaissance, and target identification.

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APPENDIX E

INTERDICTION OF THE NORTHEAST RAIL LINE

(PHASE II)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for conducting major air strikes against the North Vietnamese northeast railroad and Highway 1A/4 by-passes.

TARGETS: NVN northeast rail LOC and Highway 1A and 4 by-passes.

BACKGROUND: North Vietnam is completely reliant upon outside sources of supply to sustain her ability to conduct military operations in SEA. The northeast rail LOC and the Highway 1A/4 by-passes which support and complement it, is one of two major transportation arteries, the other being Haiphong. Disruption of this critical artery in conjunction with the closing of major ports, will severely reduce imports and materially impair North Vietnam's capability to support both the North Vietnamese economy and operations in Southeast Asia.

TASK ORGANIZATION: US forces committed to Southeast Asia and contiguous waters. Allocation of strike effort requires full use of all operationally capable aircraft of Seventh Air Force, Task Force 77, and First Marine Air Wing.

CONCEPT:

Air attacks will commence with the implementation of Phase II. The maximum available number of strike aircraft will attack rolling stock as well as rail facilities to create movement stoppages. Attacks will continue until the required level of destruction is accomplished. Suppression of NVN air and air defenses will be required for these strike waves. Follow-on strikes will be conducted, as necessary, to prevent reconstruction or repair of facilities on the northeast rail LOC and highway by-passes and to impede traffic flow along the LOC.

TIMING: With the implementation of Phase II and when resources, weather and operational considerations permit.

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APPENDIX F

SORTIE DATA

(PHASE I)

1. Sorties Available.

a. 7th AF - Thai Based		214	
SVN Based (w/tanker augmentation)		123	
			337
1st Marine Air Wing		60	
			60
Carrier Task Force 77 - 4 CVAs		400	
			400
	Total		797

b. Air Force sorties are based on a 1.0 sortie rate per possessed aircraft. Marine sorties are based on estimated number of sorties which can be provided with organic KC-130 tanker support. Navy sorties are computed on a basis of 100 sorties per aircraft carrier (63 A/C X 1.6 sortie rate).

2. Desired Damage Criteria used in computing sortie requirements:

a. Bridges: 85% probability of collapsing one span.

b. Railroad Yards: 50% probability of achieving 12% damage.

c. POL storage, power plants, and communication facilities: 50% probability of achieving 70% damage.

d. Airfields: 50% probability of achieving 30% damage to all structures; 75% probability of achieving interdiction to the runways; and 91% probability of damaging aircraft sufficiently to prevent takeoff.

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e. All other facilities: 50% probability of achieving 30% damage.

3. Estimated number of sorties required for Phase I:

AOB	1,822
Aerial Mining	120
High Value	1,857
Total	3,799

4. Application of sorties by module and number of full days (12,000 feet and 5 miles) required.

		FULL DAY					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
AOB	STK	356	396	248	-	-	-
	SPT	292	326	204	-	-	-
Mining	STK	66	-	22	-	-	-
	SPT	16	-	16	-	-	-
High Value	STK	36	42	168	420	338	-
	SPT	31	33	139	377	273	-
		797	1594	2391	3188	3799	

5. Based on climatological data in Appendix G, it is highly improbable that Phase I could be completed in five consecutive days during the Northeast Monsoon. For example, three consecutive days of favorable weather could be followed by four consecutive days of unfavorable weather before an additional period of favorable weather could be expected. Statistically then, the elapsed time required to complete Phase I would be at least nine calendar days and could be 21 days. Sound operational planning should recognize that a break in sequence of operations will cause a loss of momentum, thereby permitting reconstitution of defenses and will, as a consequence, require added sorties.

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APPENDIX G

WEATHER

1. Mean number of days with the occurrence of a 6-hour period of ceiling/visibility greater than 12,000 feet/5 miles between 0700 H and 1900 H (daylight hours)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Haiphong	4	3	3	6	12	13	18	21	15	20	13	4
Hanoi	8	3	3	5	16	19	22	18	18	19	13	10

2. Mean duration of favorable days at the indicated locations.

Haiphong	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	4	3	4	3	2
Hanoi	3	1	2	2	3	3	5	3	3	3	3	2

3. Mean duration of unfavorable days at the indicated locations.

Haiphong	8	10	8	5	4	3	2	2	2	3	4	12
Hanoi	6	9	10	7	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	5

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TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO

DTG OCT 10 22 05Z 69

COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: GEN WHEELER, CHAIRMAN, JCS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CJCS
J-3

TO: GEN HOLLOWAY, CINCSAC
ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC
GEN GOODPASTER, CINCEUR
ADM HOLMES, CINCLANT
GEN MCKEE, CINCNORAD/CONAD
GEN THROCKMORTON, CINCSTRIKE
GEN MATHER, CINSO
LGEN RUEGG, CINCAL

FOR STAFF SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SENSITIVE JCS 12650 OCT 69

1. WE HAVE BEEN DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE A SERIES OF ACTIONS DURING THE PERIOD 130000Z - 250000Z OCT, TO TEST OUR MILITARY READINESS IN SELECTED AREAS WORLD-WIDE TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BY THE SOVIET UNION. THESE ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT NOT THREATENING IN THEMSELVES. THEY MAY INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING TYPE ACTIONS:

ZFF-3

EYES ONLY

A. STAND-DOWN OF FLYING OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS, TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL READINESS.

FOR STAFF

DATE	TIME
10	1800
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: RADM F. A. BARDSHAR, USN
VDIR J3

PHONE 56243

EYES ONLY

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
Paul M Kearney
Administrative Assistant

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SENSITIVE

REGRADING INSTRUCTION: GP-1

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 63 WHICH WILL BE USED.

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFI[redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE			
INFO			

B. IMPLEMENTATION OF RADIO AND/OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SILENCE IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS.

C. INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPS EN ROUTE TO NORTH VIETNAM.

D. INCREASED GROUND ALERT RATE OF SAC BOMBERS AND TANKERS.

2. TO INITIATE ACTIONS WITHIN THE TIME FRAME SPECIFIED, CERTAIN COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO STAND-DOWN TRAINING FLIGHTS AND INTRODUCE VARYING DEGREES OF EMCON. THESE INITIAL ACTIONS WILL COVER THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF THE 14-DAY PERIOD.

3. I REQUEST THAT YOU NOMINATE FURTHER ACTIONS COMPATIBLE WITH THE GUIDANCE HEREIN, AND COGNIZANT OF LOCAL PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO YOUR AREAS, ALLIES, AND ENVIRONMENT. THESE NOMINATIONS ARE REQUIRED NLT 122300Z. ACTIONS PROPOSED SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH PROJECT 703.

4. WARM REGARDS. GP-1

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
GP-1	~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH WILL BE USED.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SEI .TIVE

Point paper for the Chairman, JCS, for a meeting with the President.

Subject: Plan for US Military Readiness

MAIN THRUST OF POINT PAPER

- Initial actions have been taken to achieve readiness posture with selected US forces for the period 12-25 October 1969. Posture will be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening.

ACTIONS TAKEN

- CINCSAC
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 13 October 1969 stand-down all training flights until further advised.
  - Reinstate degraded alert sorties to maximum extent possible.
  - (Actions taken will not affect SEA operations).
- CINCPAC
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights within the Korean ADIZ until further advised.
  - Reinstate degraded SIOP alert sorties extent feasible.
  - Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.
- USCINCEUR
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights until further advised.
  - Sixth Fleet operate maximum practicable EMCON commensurate with safety.
  - Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.
- CINCSTRIKE/CINCONAD
  - Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights.
  - Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.

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SECOND PHASE OF OPERATIONS

- Dispatched personal message to CINCs which:
  - Alerts them to forthcoming operation.
  - Requests their nomination further actions which can be taken under guidelines provided.
  - All actions taken will be compatible with Project 703.
- Reaction from CINCs expected NLT 1900 EDT, 12 October - basis for further activity will stem from these inputs.

APPROVED BY _____ Director, J-3

DJS _____ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Prepared by: Col Jack L. Buckley, USAF
Acting Deputy Director for
Commands/Areas
Operations Directorate

Friday Oct 17

The "High Prices" radio speech. After several rejections because of non-people type language finally got the inflation speech down to a high prices speech. P read it for the radio at 8:30 and all four networks. Then shot 1 min reflex for TV news. Rode all the papers, all radio net live + replay, and all TV net news. Damn good today. Plus work mailing + have an intensive follow up plan for promotion. Did this one right all the way — for me. P very pleased — the earlier in day he said he wouldn't do the TV.

UK mtg this morning + a few appts. Early AM clear to prepare for speech. Then a session w/ Sec Robert Thompson re plan for sending Vietnam. Then off to CO for the weekend w/ Pat Bell, E + Ev Jr. We had staff session there re plans for Nov 3 + Nov 15 — + maximum effort. Agreed to basic plan of business as usual — + further concept that P has a plan, it's working — and he will discuss it Nov 3. K has all sorts of secret-type activity going on around the world to try to give Soviets + VN — appears to be working because Dobrynin asked for early mtg — which we have set Secretly for Monday. K thinks this is good chance of being the big break — but that it will come in stages. P is more skeptical.

Egan + P the story on cyclamates + necessity for FDA to pull all dietary supplements off the market will create huge problems for friends like Don Kendall + Art Fleischer.

P is calling Helms + Cushman of CIA + DOD Bruce and then Reid Mitchell + Rogers on Sunday. Will give pretty strong reflection of major peace activity again.

Again today several long retrospective chats — as he continued process of re-reality + Building new approach to job + to the current problem.

(14)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED AUG 16 2006
Authority: EO 12958, as amended
Chief, Declass Br, Dir. & Rec. WHS

TS-0136/AP-3

11 OCT 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR J-3 (OPERATIONS)

SUBJECT: Concept Plan to Physically Test US Military Readiness-Worldwide

1. DIA and NSA representatives met this morning to coordinate operations necessary for support of the subject plan. The ensuing discussion leads us to request that very serious consideration be given to cancellation of Exercise High Heels scheduled to begin 14 October.

2. The National Security Agency has a standing contingency plan for the purpose of determining Soviet reaction to specific operations by US military forces. This plan will be implemented in support of the subject operation. It was never contemplated, however, that implementation of the plan would be required during one of the U.S. High Heels exercises.

3. The volume of High Heels traffic will cause a delay in movement of the critical non-exercise traffic containing the real intelligence we are looking for regarding Soviet reaction to our military readiness test. This volume will, we believe, be detected by the Soviets and we have no way of knowing how their analysts will read, or misread, the traffic levels. The flow of exercise traffic conflicts with the aspect of limiting EMCON as certain U&S Commands have been directed to do. It is also well known in the history of exercises that one or more messages have been inadvertently transmitted without the prescribed prefix, or on the wrong circuit. Such an incident involving a message containing threatening material, along with Soviet observations of actual U.S. movements, radio silence and standdown activities could cause a hazardous situation.

4. We believe the subject Concept Plan offers a more realistic test than the planned exercise; that cancellation of the exercise-- particularly if publicly announced-- would contribute to the objectives of the "real" operation, while continuation would not; that the exercise would introduce substantial hazards; and that attainment of a primary intelligence objective-- detecting indications that the "Soviets have become aware of the increased readiness"-- would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.--

5. In view of above, it is strongly recommended that exercise High Heels be cancelled.

signed
G. C. BROWN
DIAAP

14 OCT 1969

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~
~~FOR SECRET CHANNELS~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

SECRET

13 October 1969 CJCS

Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for a meeting with the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Impact of Exercise HIGH HEELS on Plan for Increased Readiness Posture (U)

1. BACKGROUND

- The intelligence community is concerned that the concurrent execution of Exercise HIGH HEELS 69 and the Plan for Increased Readiness Posture will have mutual influence and recommends that Exercise HIGH HEELS 69 be cancelled immediately (Exercise dates: 14-23 October 1969).

- Planning for Exercise HIGH HEELS is essentially complete. Most Exercise funds have been expended, field command posts have been activated, and WSEG observers are in place worldwide.

- Execution of Exercise HIGH HEELS results in a very high volume of communications traffic, relocation of military headquarters worldwide to emergency locations, and a shift of numerous personnel from their normal locations.

- Exercise activity is not compatible with achievement of purpose of the Increased Readiness Plan (actions involved in Increased Readiness Plan may be construed as exercise activities).

- Cancellation of the Exercise prior to its initiation or sometime during the Exercise should add to effects of Increased Readiness Plan actions.

2. DISCUSSION

- Possible Courses of Action:

  - Conduct Exercise HIGH HEELS as scheduled.

  - Cancel HIGH HEELS 69 immediately.

  - Postpone HIGH HEELS to a later date.

  - Initiate Exercise as scheduled. [redacted]

  - Conduct Exercise as a Joint Staff exercise without CINC participation.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

- Intelligence community recommendation stems from their difficulty in concurrently reading the signals created from directed stand-down and that produced by Exercise HIGH HEELS activity. In addition the same analysts are required for both.

- Cancellation of HIGH HEELS 69 now would create a 27-month gap between HIGH HEELS exercises. The next scheduled HIGH HEELS Exercise is in January-February 1971 in conjunction with NATO Exercise WINTEX 71.

- If the Exercise were postponed to January, much of the current effort could be used to play the Exercise at that time. However, a significant portion of required funds authorized for FY 70 have already been expended. Delay beyond January conflicts with planning cycle for WINTEX71/HIGH HEELS 71.

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- Cancellation of the Exercise subsequent to the initiation of HIGH HEELS play has the advantage of allowing the new administration to become acquainted with emergency decision-making processes. However, it knocks out the redirection and reconstitution phase which has not been played in depth for 24 months.

- DIA considers that termination during the exercise would create a stronger signal than cancellation prior to the initiation of Exercise play, however, the Soviets probably already know that the Exercise is underway from the various pre-exercise actions accomplished and some signal will be apparent even if the Exercise were terminated immediately. Early cancellation will also preclude any association between Exercise actions and increased readiness posture.

- Valuable training has been gained by both the CINCs and the Joint Staff in preparing for the Exercise. Remainder of exercise tests existing procedures and acquaints higher authority with the emergency decision-making process. If at all possible execution of those phases of Exercise HIGH HEELS having to do with the emergency action conferences involving higher authorities should be accomplished.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cancel CINC participation in Exercise HIGH HEELS and limit Joint Staff participation to that activity required to support the scheduled emergency action conferences during Phase I.

- Alternatively, if the above is not acceptable, cancel Exercise HIGH HEELS rather than postpone it.

APPROVED BY _____

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Prepared by: COL J. H. CHANCE, USAF
Gen Operations Div., J-3
Ext. 53089/13 Oct 69

Concur.
D.J.S.

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By TM NARA, Date 11/14/96
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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

October 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Test of U. S. Military Readiness

As you directed, actions have been taken and are being planned to test the readiness posture of selected U. S. forces. These actions will be discernible to the Soviets, but not threatening.

We have selected initial actions which can be taken without prior consultation with our allies, with no additional expenditure of funds and without degradation of current essential missions.

I believe these actions and other suggested actions being requested of the commanders concerned will meet the objectives outlined in your request.

A brief outline plan and implementing messages already dispatched are attached hereto.

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TAB A

OUTLINE PLAN FOR TESTING MILITARY READINESS

Objective - To achieve a readiness posture with selected US forces for the period 13-25 October in a manner which will be discernible to the Soviets, but not threatening.

Assumptions - Actions will: not require additional funding or resources; not require consultation or agreement with allies; can be taken without degradation of current essential missions; can be taken with plausible rationale for public information purposes; be readily apparent to Soviets as increased US readiness for confrontation.

Courses of Action - Selected US military forces worldwide will be directed to stand-down all flying training activity, and to take certain other measures.

a. A message will be dispatched to SAC no later than 1200 hours, 11 October, directing stand-down of all flying training and reinstatement of degraded alert sorties to maximum extent possible. Stand-down will commence at 0800 local Omaha time on 13 October 1969. The stand-down will continue until otherwise directed by the JCS.

b. A message will be dispatched to CINCONAD, CINCPAC, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, no later than 1200 hours, 13 October, directing stand-down of all flying training

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activities and assumption of highest degree of combat readiness permitted by stand-down and consistent with no change in DEFCON. Stand-down will continue until otherwise directed by the JCS.

Timing - The stand-down postures will continue until US intelligence indicates Soviets have become aware of the increased readiness. A special intelligence watch has been established for this purpose. SAC will begin its stand-down 2 days earlier than other participating commands to permit appearance of intensification of US readiness over a period of several days. The US Sixth Fleet will impose EMCOM to create impression of unusual fleet activity in addition to standing down normal flying training activity. The JCS will determine when commands will be selectively returned to normal posture.

Possible second Phase - Participating commands will be requested by separate message to suggest possible additional measures for second phase implementation. These measures will be considered by the JCS and directed for implementation as selected.

Termination - All operations will return to normal no later than 25 October, and possibly earlier, if directed by the JCS.

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
			X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO

DTG

FROM: JCS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION
CJCS (
J-3 (

TO: CINCSAC

T O P S E C R E T CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

1. (TS) HIGHER AUTHORITY HAS REQUESTED THAT WE TEST US CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS BUT SHOULD NOT BE THREATENING.

2. (TS) AS THE SAC PARTICIPATION IN THIS OPERATION, IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING COMMENCING AT 0800 HOURS LOCAL TIME 13 OCTOBER 1969.

A. STAND DOWN ALL TRAINING FLIGHTS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE BY THE JCS.

B. REINSTATE DEGRADED ALERT SORTIES TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE AND REPORT WHEN THIS ACTION IS COMPLETE. THIS POSTURE IS TO BE MAINTAINED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

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#4

DATE	TIME
10	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER
TYPED NAME AND TITLE
COL RAY B. SITTON, USAF
STR OPS DIV, J-3
PHONE 59080

RELEASER
SIGNATURE Paul Kearney
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
Paul M Kearney
Administrative Assistant

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET

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and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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ACTION			
INFO			

3. {TS} THESE DIRECTED ACTIONS SHOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS.

4. {S} IF QUERIES ARE RECEIVED FROM NEWS MEDIA CONCERNING THE ABOVE ACTIONS, SPOKESMAN SHOULD STATE THAT WE ARE MERELY TESTING CURRENT READINESS POSTURE. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE FORWARDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. GP-3

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TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
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PRECEDENCE

ACTION: IMMEDIATE

INFO: IMMEDIATE

DTG:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: JCS

TO: CINCPAC

INFO: CINCPACFLT
CINCPACAF
COMUSKOREA
COMSAF
SAFADVON

SPECAT

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT

CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

1. (TS-NF) HIGHER AUTHORITY HAS REQUESTED THAT WE TEST US CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT SHOULD NOT BE THREATENING.

2. (TS-NF) AS THE PACOM PARTICIPATION IN THIS OPERATION, IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:

A. COMMENCING AT 0800I, 15 OCT 69 (2300Z, 14 OCT 69), STANDDOWN ALL REPEAT ALL US MILITARY

DATE: 10 TIME: 1750
MONTH: OCT YEAR: 69
PAGE NO.: 1 NO. OF PAGES:

DRAFTER
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: LTC W. R. USHER, USAF
PACIFIC DIVISION, J-3
PHONE: 77254

RELEASER
SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Paul M Kearney
Administrative Assistant

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET-NOFORN-SPECAT

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and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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TRAINING FLIGHTS WITHIN THE KOREAN AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE (ADIZ) UNTIL FURTHER DIRECTED BY THE JCS.

B. DIRECT ALL US MILITARY OPERATIONAL AIR UNITS WITHIN THE KOREAN ADIZ TO UTILIZE THE STANDDOWN TO ACHIEVE AN IMPROVED STATE OF READINESS. REINSTATE DEGRADED SIOP ALERT SORTIES TO EXTENT FEASIBLE. DO NOT CHANGE DEFCON.

3. (S-NF) IF QUERIES ARE RECEIVED FROM NEWS MEDIA CONCERNING ABOVE ACTIONS, SPOKESMAN SHOULD STATE THAT WE ARE MERELY TESTING CURRENT READINESS POSTURE. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE FORWARDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. GP-1

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FROM: JCS

TO: USCINCEUR

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CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

1. (TS) HIGHER AUTHORITY HAS REQUESTED THAT WE TEST US CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS BUT SHOULD NOT BE THREATENING.

2. (TS) AS USEUCOM PARTICIPATION IN THIS OPERATION, IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING COMMENCING AT 0800 HOURS LOCAL ZONE TIME ON 15 OCT 69:

A. STAND DOWN ALL TRAINING FLIGHTS, ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINE CORPS, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE BY THE JCS.

B. BRING ALL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS TO A MAXIMUM STATE OF READINESS CONSISTENT WITH NO CHANGE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: CJCS (S) J-3 (S)

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MONTH: OCT YEAR: 6[illegible]

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DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: COL GEORGE H. RUSSELL, USA, EUROPEAN/MEAFSA DIV., J-3 — PHONE: 54846

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney — TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Paul M Kearney, Administrative Assistant to Chairman, J.C.S.

SECURITY: TOP SECRET

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IN EXISTING DEFCON.

C. UNITS OF THE SIXTH FLEET WILL OPERATE UNDER CONDITIONS OF MAXIMUM PRACTICAL EMCON COMMUNSURATE WITH SAFETY AND WITH THE MINIMUM TRANSMISSIONS REQUIRED TO PREPARE FOR EXERCISE DEEP FURROW.

3. (S) IF QUERIES ARE RECEIVED FROM NEWS MEDIA CONCERNING THE ABOVE ACTIONS, SPOKESMAN SHOULD STATE THAT WE ARE MERELY TESTING CURRENT READINESS POSTURE. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE FORWARDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. GP-3

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

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ACTION: IMMEDIATE

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FROM: JCS

TO: CINCSTRIKE

SPECIAL INSTRUCT

CJCS
J-3

T O P S E C R E T CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

1. (TS) HIGHER AUTHORITY HAS DIRECTED THAT WE TEST US CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS BUT SHOULD NOT BE THREATENING.

2. (TS) AS THE STRIKE PARTICIPATION IN THIS OPERATION, IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING COMMENCING AT 0800 LOCAL TIME FOR CONCERNED UNITS ON 15 OCTOBER 1969.

A. STAND DOWN ALL TRAINING FLIGHTS.

B. INCREASE THE READINESS OF STRIKE FORCES TO THE HIGHEST STATE OF READINESS THAT CAN BE ATTAINED

DATE	TIME
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MONTH	YEAR
OCT	
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DRAFTER
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: W. A. EVANS, JR.
LTC, USAF
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV, J-3
PHONE: 72209

RELEASER
SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Paul M Kearney
Administrative Assistant

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS: Chairman, J.C.S.

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CONSISTENT WITH NO CHANGE IN DEFCON STATUS.
THIS POSTURE IS TO BE MAINTAINED UNTIL FURTHER
NOTIFIED BY JCS.

3. (S) IF QUERIES ARE RECEIVED FROM NEWS MEDIA
CONCERNING THE ABOVE ACTIONS, SPOKESMAN SHOULD
STATE THAT WE ARE MERELY TESTING CURRENT READINESS
POSTURE. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE
FORWARDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. GP-3

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ACTION: IMMEDIATE

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DTG

FROM: JCS

TO: CINCONAD

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION

CJCS (S)
J-3 (S)

T O P S E C R E T CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

1. (TS) HIGHER AUTHORITY HAS DIRECTED THAT WE TEST US CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS BUT SHOULD NOT BE THREATENING.

2. (TS) AS THE CONAD PARTICIPATION IN THIS OPERATION, IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING COMMENCING AT 0800 LOCAL TIME FOR CONCERNED UNITS ON 15 OCTOBER 1969.

A. STAND DOWN ALL TRAINING FLIGHTS.

B. INCREASE THE READINESS OF CONAD FORCES TO THE HIGHEST STATE OF READINESS THAT CAN BE ATTAINED

2 of 1

DATE	TIME
10	1230
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: W. A. EVANS, JR. LTC, USAF WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV, J-3 — PHONE: 72209

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney — TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Paul H. Kearney, Administrative Assistant to Chairman, JCS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

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CONSISTENT WITH NO CHANGE IN DEFCON STATUS. THIS POSTURE IS TO BE MAINTAINED UNTIL FURTHER NOTIFIED BY JCS.

3. (S) IF QUERIES ARE RECEIVED FROM NEWS MEDIA CONCERNING THE ABOVE ACTIONS, SPOKESMAN SHOULD STATE THAT WE ARE MERELY TESTING CURRENT READINESS POSTURE. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE FORWARDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. GP-3

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TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY-SENSITIVE

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO

RESTRICTED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DTG Oct 10 22 05 Z 69

COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: GEN WHEELER, CHAIRMAN, JCS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CTG 3
J-3

TO: GEN HOLLOWAY, CINCSAC
ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC
GEN GOODPASTER, CINCEUR
ADM HOLMES, CINCLANT
GEN MCKEE, CINCNORAD/CONAD
GEN THROCKMORTON, CINCSTRIKE
GEN MATHER, CINSO
LGEN RUEGG, CINCAL

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY SENSITIVE JCS 12850 OCT 69

1. WE HAVE BEEN DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE A SERIES OF ACTIONS DURING THE PERIOD 130000Z - 250000Z OCT, TO TEST OUR MILITARY READINESS IN SELECTED AREAS WORLD-WIDE TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BY THE SOVIET UNION. THESE ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT NOT THREATENING IN THEMSELVES. THEY MAY INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING TYPE ACTIONS:

ZFF-3

A. STAND-DOWN OF FLYING OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS, TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL READINESS.

DATE	TIME
10	1900
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2

DRAFT

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

RADM F. A. BARDSHAR, USN

PHONE 56243

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

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ACTION IMMEDIATE			
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B. IMPLEMENTATION OF RADIO AND/OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SILENCE IN SELECTED AREAS OR COMMANDS.

C. INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPS EN ROUTE TO NORTH VIETNAM.

D. INCREASED GROUND ALERT RATE OF SAC BOMBERS AND TANKERS.

2. TO INITIATE ACTIONS WITHIN THE TIME FRAME SPECIFIED, CERTAIN COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO STAND-DOWN TRAINING FLIGHTS AND INTRODUCE VARYING DEGREES OF EMCON. THESE INITIAL ACTIONS WILL COVER THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF THE 14-DAY PERIOD.

3. I REQUEST THAT YOU NOMINATE FURTHER ACTIONS COMPATIBLE WITH THE GUIDANCE HEREIN, AND COGNIZANT OF LOCAL PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO YOUR AREAS, ALLIES, AND ENVIRONMENT. THESE NOMINATIONS ARE REQUIRED NLT 122300Z. ACTIONS PROPOSED SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH PROJECT 703.

4. WARM REGARDS. GP-1

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

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By HAM NARA, Date 11/14/08

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RECOMMENDED GENERAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN

1. There will be no public information releases made concerning subject activities or operations. In the event it becomes necessary or desirable to inform the public, the following contingency planning guidance will apply.

a. The Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs will be responsible for specific instructions to all commands concerning initial and follow-on public information releases relating to this operation.

b. An initial public information release will be made by the OASD/PA in Washington at _____ hours, 13 October 1969. This release will be made in a routine manner normal for announcements concerning joint exercises. Essential elements of the release will include the following:

> "The Defense Department announced today that elements of its unified and specified commands in selected areas world-wide are scheduled to begin a series of operational and logistical exercises on 13 October 1969. These exercises are designed to test the current military readiness of U.S. forces. The exercises will be terminated when readiness test objectives have been satisfied."

c. Participating commands will prepare similar public information announcements to be used in answer to local press

Declassified
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NARA, Date 11/16/06

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query that may be generated after the national release. These local releases in response to query will emphasize that visible activities are simply part of the world-wide test of current military readiness. Any significant departure from the text of the national release will not repeat not be made until cleared and authorized by OASD/PA.

CO

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 921140
By WDP NARA Date 8-28-02
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SAN [illegible] SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~-NOFORN-SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

DTG: Oct 17 22 24 z69

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: IMMEDIATE

INFO: IMMEDIATE

SPECAT

FROM: JCS

TO: CINCPAC

INFO: CINCSAC
CINCAL

2792

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

REFS: A. CINCPAC 112355Z OCT 69 (BOM); B. JCS 12650/102205Z OCT 69 (BOM); C. JCS 2075/102209Z OCT 69; D. DEF 2139/111838Z OCT 69; E. JCS 2140/112058Z OCT 69.

1. ~~(TS)~~ FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REF A, WHICH WERE IN RESPONSE TO REF B, REFS C THROUGH E ARE EXPANDED AS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ACTIONS SHOULD COMMENCE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, AND BE CONTINUED UNTIL FURTHER DIRECTED BY THE JCS.

A. AS FEASIBLE AND WITHOUT DISRUPTION OF SIOP COMMITMENT, ENHANCE SIOP NAVAL FORCES AT SEA BY:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Gen Wheeler JCS
Adm Johnson
Gen Voght
Adm Moorer
Gen Westmoreland
Gen Chapman
Gen Ryan
DDO/NMCC

2 ff-3

#5

DATE	TIME
17	1800
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE: LTC W. R. USHER, USAF, PACIFIC DIVISION, J-3 — PHONE: 77254

RELEASER: SIGNATURE: Paul Kearney — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Paul H. Kearney, Administrative Assistant to Chairman JCS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~-NOFORN-SPECAT

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH WILL BE USED.

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Administrative and Criminal Sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination. Section 144.b, Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 921140
By WDP NARA Date 8-28-02

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
1ST REVIEW DATE: 5/6/02 DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: DRC DDO 4 CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: DAVID STEARNS 2 CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: FRD

Authority NND 921140
By WDP NARA Date 8-28-02
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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

(1) ALTERING SSBN PATROL SCHEDULE TO MAINTAIN MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SSBN'S AT SEA.

(2) [redacted]

B. [redacted] DELAY ANY PLANNED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PROGRAMMED DEACTIVATION UNTIL 30 OCT 69.

(b)(1)

C. [redacted]

D. COMMENCING 18 OCT 69, INCREASE READINESS OF CONVENTIONALLY ARMED TACTICAL AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE SYSTEMS.

E. STANDDOWN US MILITARY TRAINING FLIGHTS WITHIN THE JAPAN AND OKINAWA ADIZS. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO PERFORM SELECTIVE FLYING TRAINING IN THE KOREA, JAPAN, AND OKINAWA ADIZS DURING THE PERIOD 18-24 OCT 69. FLIGHTS SHOULD BE HELD TO THE MINIMUM COMMENSURATE WITH CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIAL
		2	3		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT

DD FORM 172-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH WILL BE USED.

Authority NND 921140
By WDP NARA Date 8-28-02
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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

F. WITHIN RESOURCES AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PEACETIME ROE, COMMENCING 21 OCT 69, INCREASE SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET VESSELS ENROUTE TO NVN AND IN THE ALCOM AREA.

G. INCREASE LOCAL SECURITY AND ANTI-SABOTAGE MEASURES AT US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND IN JAPAN.

H. INCREASE INTELLIGENCE WATCH THROUGHOUT PACOM AREA EXCEPT SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I. AT YOUR DISCRETION, AUGMENT THE PERSONNEL IN PRIMARY COMMAND CENTERS AND, ON A SELECTED BASIS, ACTIVATE ALTERNATE COMMAND POSTS.

J. CONDUCT EXERCISE FOCUS LENS ON 22 OCT - 1 NOV 69 AS PRESENTLY PLANNED.

2. ~~(TS-NF)~~ IN IMPLEMENTING THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE, ASSURE THAT THERE IS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

3. ~~(S-NF)~~ USING NORMAL REPORTING PROCEDURES, REPORT WHEN ACTIONS DESCRIBED HEREIN HAVE BEEN COMPLETED OR WHEN DESIRED POSTURE HAS BEEN ATTAINED.

AS INDICATED IN REF C, DO NOT CHANGE DEFCON. GP-1.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	3		

OK IW

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN-SPECAT

DD FORM 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH WILL BE USED.

2341
~~2340~~

COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET
COMMUNICATIONS

201400H OCT 69 trw

SECRET/NOFORN

NAVCOMOPNET X

N3 WHS ORIG

O 200814Z OCT 69

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO CTG 70.8

INFO CINCPACFLT
CTF 72
CTF 77
CTU 70.8.9
COMDESDIV 92
USS OZBOURN
COMDESRON NINE

Mine Sov Ship

DECLASSIFIED

SURVEILLANCE OF SOV MERSHIP

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 181424Z OCT 69 NOTAL
B. CINCPACFLT INST 03100.3F

1. SOVIET MERSHIPS UZGOROD POSIT ~~31-30N7 128-32E6~~ AT ~~19000ZO~~ CSE ~~SOUTHERLY~~ 28-00 No 126-36 E8 1918007 SSW
31-36 N3 127-24 E6 1421007 SSW

SPD 11-15 KTS, AND VITIM POSIT ~~34-00N7 128-48E3~~ AT ~~19000Z9~~ CSE ~~SOUTHERLY~~

SPD 16-20 KTS ARE POSSIBLY TRANSITING TO HAI-PHONG. IAW REF A INTEND

CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE ON ONE MERSHIP DURING TRANSIT.

2. TASK COMDESDIV 92 IN OZBOURN TO ATTEMPT RDVU EITHER MERSHIP PARA 1

AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE, AS FEASIBLE, TO WITHIN SIXTY NM HAI-PHONG.
SURVEILLANCE TO BE CONDUCTED FROM SAFE DISTANCE NOT SO CLOSE AS TO BE INTERPRETED AS HARASSMENT.
IN EVENT OF DELIBERATE HARASSMENT BY SOV SHIPS REF B APPLIES. REMAIN
CTG 70.8
OUTSIDE 12 NM COMMUNIST TERRITORY. SITREPS EVERY SIX HRS TO ~~ORIG~~ INFO

ALL ADDEES THIS MSG. INCLUDE POSIT, C/S, FUEL, WX AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT

INFO.

PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES

RELEASED
200814Z OCT 69

0906/20 A36P
1158/20 FFAS
1030/20 FFAN

	00	01	001	002	012	013	N1	N2	N3	N1	N5	N6	FMO	WAR ROOM	SDO		GEN MSG	ROUTER	CMS	ON LINE
FLAG									D							N33				

	CO	XO	CDO	OOD	OPS	ENG	WEPS	NAV	PERS	S/SEC	SUPP	MED	MAR	CHAP
SHIP														

14

41

SECRET/NOFORN

3. AN SOA INCREASE TO 20 KTS DURING OZBOURN TRANSIT BUCKNER TO BASHI WILL INCREASE PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT OF MERSHIP VIC BASHI.

4. CTF 72 TASKED BY ~~SEP~~ SEPARATE MSG TO RELOCATE MERSHIPS AND PASS INFO TO COMDESDIV 92.

5. SURV DUTIES MAY DELAY OZBOURN ARRIVAL TU 70.8.9 ABT ONE DAY.

6. COMDESDIV 92 ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-4

DECLASSIFIED

14

TOP SECRET NOFORN

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-4664-69
22 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Cy 1-2 hand carried by Sgt Klein 1845

Subject: US Military Readiness Tests - Worldwide

1. (~~TS~~) Reference is made to my CM-4645-69, 16 October 1969, subject: "Additional Actions for US Military Readiness Tests - Worldwide." As outlined in the reference, a point in time was selected when certain CINC actions could be terminated if Soviet reaction had occurred.

2. (~~TS~~) In the CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA area, we had designated the 22nd of October 1969 as a date to assess reaction to the movement of three MIDEASTFOR ships into the Gulf of Aden for a three-day exercise.

3. (~~TS~~) The US naval actions in the Gulf of Aden are believed to have caused a change in the Soviet naval posture in that area. Two major Soviet surface combatants, heading north in the Red Sea for a scheduled 24-31 October visit to a UAR port, reversed course probably late on the 20th, returned to the Gulf of Aden early on the 21st, and continued east southeast toward the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean as of today. Four additional Soviet units appear to be en route from the Seychelles north toward the Arabian Sea.

4. (~~TS~~) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have assessed the situation based on intelligence received and recommended continuation of US exercise activity in the Gulf of Aden area until 27 October. We will continue to monitor Soviet reaction and make another assessment at that time.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Cy 3 - CSA
4 - CNO
5 - CSAF
6 - CMC
7 - DJS
8 - J-3
9 - Chron
10 - CSG
11 - CMC
12 - FEB O
cy 12 of ____ copies
13 - Col Jackson

TOP SECRET - NOFORN - SENSITIVE

339 Worldwide Readiness Test (22 Oct 69) Oct 69

Mike
Sov Warship

F 0 HN 20022
CLAS S PREC U
DTG 0220029 TOR 0220513 ACT N2
DIST ABCDEF

RMN
A 08016 C 05008 D 05209 E 04095 F 05056

DECLASSIFIED

VKVV PUSN09002
O 220029Z OCT 69
FM USS ORLECK
TO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO
INFO CINCPACFLT
CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO PT ONE
CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO PT TWO
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEG
I
SEVEN PT SIX
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT DOSR PT ONE
NCO WESTPAC NFOF NET
COMDESFOV FIVE TWOR
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN
SURVEILLANCE OF SOV MERSHIP 11)
SITREP 03 AS OF 220000Z OCT 69
1, (U) POSIT 18-00N 108-21E2
2, (U) CSE 339, SPD 13 KTS
3, (U) FUEL! 66 015
4, (U) WX! SCT/VISBY 12NM/TEMP 83/SEA TEMP 84/WIND FROM 110 DEG

PAGE TWO S E C R E T NOFORN
12 KTS/SEAS CALM,
5, (S) MERCHANT IDENTIFIED VISUALLY AS SVIRSK, CLOSED TO 1500 YDS
ABEAM AND RECORDED APPROX 20 MIN, NARRATED SNOOPY VIDEO TAPE 22
INTELLIGENCE STILL PHOTOS TAKEN, SVIRSK HAS PATHFINDER TYPE RADAR
ANT ON MAST OF LOOP ON STACK, TWO FM WHIP ANTS, TWO UHF ANTS,
STILL NO ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS OBSERVED FROM SVINSK, NO DECK-LOADED
CARGO, A GREEN CANVAS BAG IS VISIBLE AT TOP OF SECOND UPRIGHT,
APPARENTLY COVERING UNK PIECE OF EQPT OR ANT, OBSERVED SIX MALE,
TWO FEMALE PERSONNEL ON DECK, SVIRSK STEAMING STDY CSE, SPD,
HEADING DIRECTLY FOR HAIPHONG, NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY, NO DEVIATIONS
FROM RULES OR ROAD,
6,
(S) INTEND CONTINUE SHADOW 3000 YDS ASTERN SVIRSK UPON COMPLETION
PHOTOGRAPHY, ETA SIXTY NU, FROM HAIPHONG 2211002 OCT 69,
GP-4
BT
5130

14

Ex. 27

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

[redacted]

FILE DESIGNATION

PREPARED WITH

X

231200Z Oct 69

IMMEDIATE

HQ SAC

12AD DAVIS MONTHAN AFB ARIZ

17AD WHITEMAN AFB MO

19AD CARSWELL AFB TEX

47AD CASTLE AFB CAL

98STRATWG TORREJON AB SPAIN

2AF COMMAND POST BARKSDALE AFB LA

8AF COMMAND POST WESTOVER AFB MASS

15AF COMMAND POST MARCH AFB CALIF

2BOMBWG COMMAND POST, BARKSDALE AFB LA

5BOMBWG COMMAND POST MINOT AFB N DAK

7BOMBWG COMMAND POST CARSWELL AFB TEX

9STRATRECONWG COMMAND POST BEALE AFB CAL

11AREFSQ COMMAND POST ALTUS AFB OKLA

17BOMBWG COMMAND POST WRIGHT-PATT AFB OHIO

19BOMBWG COMMAND POST ROBINS AFB GA

22BOMBWG COMMAND POST MARCH AFB CAL

28BOMBWG COMMAND POST, ELLSWORTH AFB S DAK

42BOMBWG COMMAND POST, LORING AFB MAINE

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
IG	
DI	
DPL	
DM	
DO	
DOPC	
DM2	
DM4	
DM8	
IGS	
DM4	
DM28	
DOCO	
DOO	
DOECOC	
DOCCC5	
DOSR	
DEPI	
DOPLP	
DOPLPC	

RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC
CURRENT PLANS BRANCH

4753

[redacted]

CY 1 OF 1 CYS (SECOND SERIES)

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

12 69-DOPLP-497

TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)
	DOPLPC	LTC McDONALD	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Ex. 27

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE INFO		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753

43BOMBWG COMMAND POST LITTLE ROCK AFB ARK

55STRATRECONWG COMMAND POST OFFUTT AFB NEBR

68BOMBWG COMMAND POST, SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC

70BOMBWG COMMAND POST CLINTON SHERMAN AFB OKLA

72BOMBWG COMMAND POST, RAMEY AFB PR

92STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST, FAIRCHILD AFB WASH

93BOMBWG COMMAND POST, CASTLE AFB CALIF

95STRATWG COMMAND POST GOOSE AB CANADA

96STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST DYESS AFB TEX

97BOMBWG COMMAND POST BLYTHEVILLE AFB ARK

99BOMBWG COMMAND POST WESTOVER AFB MASS

100STRATRECONWG DAVIS, MONTHAN AFB ARIZ

301AIRFLWG COMMAND POST LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO

305BOMBWG COMMAND POST GRISSOM AFB IND

306BOMBWG COMMAND POST MCCOY AFB FLA

319BOMBWG COMMAND POST GRAND FORKS AFB D DAK

320BOMBWG COMMAND POST, MATHER AFB CALIF

379BOMBWG COMMAND POST WURTSMITH AFB MICH

380STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST, PLATTSBURGH AFB N Y

410BOMBWG COMMAND POST K I SAWYER AFB MICH

416BOMBWG COMMAND POST GRIFFISS AFB N Y

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		2	8		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

DD FORM 1721

Ex. 27

ABBREVIATED [illegible]NT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

[illegible]URITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

449 BOMBWG COMMAND POST, KINCHELOE AFB MICH

916 AREFSQ COMMAND POST, TRAVIS AFB CALIF

456 STRATAEROSPWG COMMAND POST, BEALE AFB CALIF

SAC CONTROLLER, EIELSON AFB ALASKA

509 BOMBWG COMMAND POST, PEASE AFB NH

TOP SECRET ~~[illegible]~~ DO JOPREP JIFFY 3731 OCT 69. ARU SAC DOCOCS

SUBJECT: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

REF: A. TS CINCSAC JJ 3661 B. TS DO JJ 3694 C. TS DO JJ 3709 D. SEC DOOK JJ 0118

PART I. MAINTENANCE GENERATION

1. THIS MESSAGE IS IN ADDITION TO REFERENCED MESSAGES, SAME SUBJECT. ALL UNITS EXCEPT 93BW, 340BG, RECONNAISSANCE AND TANKER RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT UNITS WILL COMMENCE GENERATION, AT A TIME SELECTED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER, OF ALL CATEGORY CHARLIE AND FOXTROT SORTIES FOR WHICH AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE. GENERATION MAY BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITS EWO FLOW PLANS, OR EXTENDED TO ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE TIME PERIOD AVAILABLE. AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AUTHORIZED FLYING AND MAINTENANCE COMMITMENTS NEED NOT BE GENERATED. THIS INCLUDES THE SEVEN TANKERS THAT DEPLOY IN SUPPORT OF 22BW AND 92SAW SEAGA AS OUTLINED IN PART II. GENERATION MUST BE COMPLETED NOT LATER THAN 0800 LOCAL, 25 OCT, YOUR STATION EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT LANDING TOO LATE TO BE GENERATED BY THIS TIME. THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE GENERATED ASAP. THE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED FOR SNOW TIME 70-2 ECHO ON 28-29 OCT NEED NOT BE GENERATED UNTIL COMPLETION OF THAT MISSION.

2. AIRCRAFT WILL BE FULLY EWO CONFIGURED. THESE AIRCRAFT

14

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	Group 1	3	8		

DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS: Excluded From Automatic Downgrading And Declassification

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

DD FORM [illegible]

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

WILL BE SCHEDULED, PREPARED AND ACCEPTED IN THE SAME MANNER AS ANY OTHER UNIT ALERT AIRCRAFT. AN AIRCREW WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIRCRAFT. CMF AND SEALED AUTHENTICATORS WILL NOT BE ON BOARD, AND THE COCKING CHECKLIST WILL NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED. UNITS MAY, REPEAT MAY USE ALERT AIRCREWS AND GROUND CREWS TO PERFORM ACCEPTANCE PRE-FLIGHTS, SUBSEQUENT PRE-FLIGHTS AND SYSTEM OPERATIONS AS INDICATED IN PARA 3A THIS MESSAGE.

3. GROUND CREW PERSONNEL NEED NOT BE ASSIGNED TO THE GENERATED AIRCRAFT, AND CONSEQUENTLY MAY BE RELEASED FOR OTHER FLIGHT LINE DUTIES. ADEQUATE SUPERVISION WILL BE MAINTAINED OVER THESE WEAPON LOADED AIRCRAFT AND A CREW CHIEF WILL BE ASSIGNED PRIOR TO AIRCREW ARRIVAL IF THE SORTIE IS DIRECTED TO BE MANNED.

A. A DESIGNATED CREW CHIEF WILL PERFORM OR ASSIST IN THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULED ACTIVITY ON UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.

(1) A DAILY WALK-AROUND INSPECTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED TO CHECK FOR OBVIOUS EXTERNAL DEFECTS, AND FUEL, OIL AND HYD LEAKS.

(2) CONCURRENTLY WITH TIRE ROTATION (APPROX EVERY 3 DAYS) CHECK QUANTITY AND PRESSURE GAUGES IN THE HYDRAULIC, PNEUMATIC, AND OXYGEN SYSTEMS.

(3) THREE TIMES PER MONTH (7 TO 14 DAY INTERVAL) AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WILL BE EXERCISED. THIS OPERATION WILL

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	6		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS [redacted] SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

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ABBREVIATED UNIT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

INCLUDE ENGINE RUN CONDUCTED BY AVAILABLE FLIGHT CREWS. THE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE TAXIED FOR OTHER THAN TIRE ROTATION.

4. "GENERATED" AIRCRAFT WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THE MONTHLY AND WEEKLY SCHEDULES AND WILL REMAIN WITHIN THE 7-42 DAY CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN SACM 178-1, VOL I. SINCE THESE "GENERATED" AIRCRAFT ARE NOT COCKED, MAINTENANCE MAY BE PERFORMED AT ANY TIME (T.O. 11A-1-33 PERMITTING). FSAGA REQUIREMENTS ARE WAIVED FOR ALL ALERT AND "GENERATED" AIRCRAFT DURING THIS PERIOD.

A. WHILE IN "GENERATED" STATUS, THE AIRCRAFT WILL BELONG TO MAINTENANCE, AND ACCESS CONTROLLED BY A MAINTENANCE SAC FORM 380.

B. ALL CALENDAR INSPECTIONS AND ACTIONS (I.E. FUEL SUMP DRAINING, ETC.) WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.

C. ~~DOWNLOADING NEED NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AND~~ WATER MAY BE DOWNLOADED WHILE THE AIRCRAFT IS UNMANNED IF WEATHER CONDITIONS WOULD CREATE REQUIREMENTS FOR HEATING AND UPLOADING/DOWNLOADING. THESE ACTIONS MUST BE PRE-PLANNED FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF SORTIE MANNING IS DIRECTED.

5. DEPOT INPUT SCHEDULES WILL BE MET. IN ADDITION, MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES (I.E., CORROSION CONTROL, TCTO, ON BASE MOD, ETC.) SHOULD BE CONTINUED AS PLANNED.

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CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		5	6		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECURITY [redacted]

DD FORM 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. NORMAL PRIORITY "A" SECURITY PROTECTION WILL BE PROVIDED. CLOSE-IN SECURITY WILL NOT BE REQUIRED FOR TANKER AIRCRAFT THAT DO NOT HAVE AIRCREWS ASSIGNED ~~AND~~ OR DO NOT ~~POSSESS~~ HAVE CMF OR SEALED AUTHENTICATORS. WHEN POSSIBLE, ALL GENERATED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE PARKED IN A SINGLE AREA. UNITS WILL REMAIN IN SECURITY OPTION IV AND PROVIDE SECURITY SUPPORT AS REQUIRED WITHOUT CHANGING THE SECURITY OPTION. UNITS WILL NOTIFY NAF (IGS) AND HQ SAC (IGS) WHEN SUPPORT REQUIRES USE OF A TWO-FLIGHT SYSTEM.

7. SACCS REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE JOPREP JIFFY MESSAGE.

PART II. SEAGA ADVANCED PLANNING INFORMATION - FOR 22BW, 92SAW, 6SW, 70 AREFS.

1. THE EIELSON EAST SEAGA ORBIT, REPEAT EIELSON EAST ORBIT ONLY, WILL BE IMPLEMENTED WITH WEAPONS IN THE "SHOW OF FORCE." IMPLEMENTATION HOUR WILL BE 26/1913Z OCT 69. IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE BY RECORD COPY MESSAGE IAW SACM 55-2, VOL II.

2. PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN SAC OPORD 23-70 APPLY EXCEPT AS NOTED BELOW.

A. 22BW, MARCH AFB, IS RELIEVED OF THE COMMITMENT TO DEPLOY FOUR KC-135 AUGMENTEE AIRCREWS. 92SAW, FAIRCHILD AFB, WILL DEPLOY

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	Group 1	6	8		

DOWNGRADING Excluded From Automatic Downgrading And Declassification

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

FORM

Ex. 27

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

FOUR ADDITIONAL AUGMENTEE AIR CREWS, A TOTAL OF SIX AUGMENTEE CREWS.

B. ROTATION OF IN-PLACE AIRCRAFT/CREWS AT EIELSON WILL CONTINUE AS SCHEDULED.

C. "I" HOUR IN THIS INSTANCE WILL NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY DECLARATION OF DEFCON 3.

D. PRE "I" HOUR COORDINATION WITH CARF IS BEING EFFECTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

3. WHILE THE IN-PLACE EIELSON TANKER TASK FORCE IS COMMITTED TO SEAGA SUPPORT, ALL RECONNAISSANCE REFUELING WILL BE PROVIDED BY KC-135 AIRCRAFT/CREWS DEPLOYED FROM 70 AREFS, LITTLE ROCK AFB, FOR THIS PERIOD.

A. BASED ON PROGRAMMED KC-135 SORTIE REQUIREMENTS, 70 AREFS WILL PROVIDE KC-135 AIRCRAFT/CREWS AS FOLLOWS:

DATE	ACTION	ACFT/CREWS	TAKEOFF
26 OCT 69	DEPLOY	3/3	26/1930,2000, 2030Z
3 NOV 69	DEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW
9 NOV 69	REDEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW
14 NOV 69	DEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW
16 NOV 69	REDEPLOY	3/3	TBD BY 6SW

18

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	Group 1	7	8		

REGRADING INST Excluded From Automatic Downgrading And Declassification

SEC [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1393-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		RICHARD Q. McDONALD, LTC CURRENT PLANS BRANCH	4753
INFO			

B. DURATION OF TDY WILL BE APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS, WITH SCHEDULE PROGRAMMED TO PROVIDE A STABLE FORCE OF 3 AIRCRAFT/3 CREWS. OVERLAP IS NECESSARY TO INCREASE RECON SUPPORT TANKERS TO 6 AIRCRAFT/ 6 CREWS FROM 3-9 NOV AND 14-16 NOV TO ACCOMMODATE PEAK RECON ACTIVITY.

C. AIRCRAFT WILL DEPLOY WITH KC-135Q MSK SPECIFIED IN ANNEX D, SACOPORD 60-70-13. KIT WILL REMAIN UNTIL THIS OPERATION IS TERMINATED AND WILL BE RETURNED ABOARD REDEPLOYING AIRCRAFT TO LITTLE ROCK AFB.

D. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY SAC (DMZ) IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.

E. 6SW WILL DETERMINE DESIRED ROTATION TIMING SUBSEQUENT TO 26 OCT AND COORDINATE WITH 70 AREFS. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LAST HALF OF NOVEMBER WILL BE FURNISHED WHEN REQUIREMENTS ARE KNOWN.

PART III.

IT APPEARS ~~THIS "PEAK" WILL LAST~~ THAT ACTIONS DIRECTED ABOVE WILL BE IN EFFECT THROUGH THE FIRST WEEK OF NOVEMBER AND POSSIBLY LONGER.

GP-1

19

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	Group 1	8	8		

REGRADING INSTRUCTION Excluded From Automatic Downgrading And Declassification

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

DD FORM 172 [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

NSP 89A/1

27 October 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible Communist Reactions to US Military Readiness Tests.

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(C) 25X1, 25X3, 25X6
ARP Action Cert 44 Date 7-24-09

1. CIA has cooperated with DIA in maintaining an all-source watch on Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Asian Communist military actions which might be in reaction to the US military readiness tests which began on 13 October. Of the military measures observed, only a few were sufficiently unusual to be considered as possible responses to the US readiness posture. Analysis of the reasons behind these military measures is complicated by Soviet awareness of exercise High Heels, by Operation Deep Furrow in the Aegean area, by the crises in Lebanon and Somalia, and by the possibility that some of the Chinese and Soviet measures in the Far East may be related to each other rather than to the US posture.

2. A list of the noteworthy Communist military measures follows:

[ ] B1

COMMENT: Because this action occurred less than two hours after the SAC standdown began and since it was apparently localized in the Far East, we doubt that it was a reaction to the US readiness test.

[ ] B1

COMMENT: This predates actions taken by CINCEUR in the US readiness tests and probably reflects Soviet interest in exercise High Heels which began on 14 October and of which the Soviets were aware.

[ ] B1

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMENT: US Naval Task Force 71 began operations in the Sea of Japan on 16 October. This would be sufficient cause for increased Soviet [ ] B1 activity in the area.

[ ] B1

COMMENT: This activity may reflect interest in the SAC standdown or the CINCEUR standdown of 16-17 October, or perhaps both.

[ ] B1

COMMENT: We do not know the purpose of the Chinese alert. [

] and covers the opening of Sino-Soviet border talks on 20 October. It also coincides with press stories of a US military readiness test based on the sudden breaking off of port visits by the USS Yorktown and Newport News and the deployment of Task Force 71 exercises into the Sea of Japan. Thus the Chinese action could be in response to either Soviet or US actions or both or this alert may be the result of considerations of which we are not yet aware.

[ ] B1

[ ] B1

21 October--Two Soviet Navy missile ships were in the Red Sea en route to the Egyptian port of Safaga for a visit scheduled to begin on 24 October. On 21 October the two ships had reversed course and headed out of the Red Sea. They subsequently rendezvoused with several other Soviet ships near the island of Socotra off Somalia.

> *COMMENT: On 17 October three US Naval ships sailed to rendezvous in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia. The Soviets were almost certainly aware of their presence, which they may have associated with the 15 October assassination of the Somali president and the coup d'etat there on 21 October. Thus, although the movement of the Soviet ships was probably at least in part a reaction to the presence of the three US ships, it took place in the context of a local situation rather than as a reaction to a world-wide US military alert posture.*

3. Conclusions: Of the many Communist military actions noted, only the [ ] B1 activity seems clearly related to the US military readiness tests. And even this might be directed less at the world-wide US posture than at the specific operations of High Heels, Deep Furrow, Task Force 71, and the tensions in the Middle East. All of the other actions seem best explained by other considerations.

There has been no reflection of acute concern by the Soviets such as a nationwide military stand-down or general alert in the USSR. There has been no reflection of the US military alert posture in Soviet or Chinese news media or in diplomatic activity.

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: IMMEDIATE

INFO:

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DISTR: CJCS-5(6-10) DJS-3(11-13) J3-5(14-18) CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)-1(19) CNO(ADM MOORER)-1 (20) CSAF(GEN RYAN)-1(21) CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)-1 (22) SJCS-3(23-25) RF/FILE-1(1) (25) ONO/GG, (CY-# 2 TO DACC/CBCY #3 TO J3/ADV CYS #4 TO NMCC/DDO)

File O

DTG: 282313Z OCT 69

FROM: JCS

IMMEDIATE

TO: ALL COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ NOFORN [ ] CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE (U)

REFS: A. JCS 12650/1022052 OCT 69; B. JCS 12761/1419592 OCT 69

1. ~~(TS)~~ REF A INFORMED OF WORLDWIDE READINESS TEST AND SOLICITED COMMENTS FROM CINCS.

2. ~~(TS)~~ REF B EXTENDED TERMINATION DATE OF READINESS TEST.

3. ~~(TS)~~ ALL ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING THE INCREASED READINESS TEST WILL BE TERMINATED EFFECTIVE 300001Z OCTOBER 69. UNITS INVOLVED WILL RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATING STATUS. GP-3.

09

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Authority NND 63140
By TH NARA, Date 8/15/07

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION

CJCS	CSA
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DATE	TIME
28	1810
MONTH: OCT	YEAR: 1969
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1

DRAFTER
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: R. W. SENNEWALD, LT COLONEL, USA, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV, J-3
PHONE: 59829

RELEASER
SIGNATURE: Richard R. Day
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: RICHARD R. DAY, Staff Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS:

387 - Worldwide Readiness Test - Oct 69

- 28 Oct 69

~~TOP SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

28 OCTOBER 1969
DIASIR 301-69
1600 EST

COPY NO. 6

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SUMMARY OF SOVIET REACTIONS TO US OPERATIONS

9

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 06-03/8 ltr 1.4(c) 6-21-07 letter
By KNB NARA, Date 8-30-07
[pl 911]

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SUMMARY OF

SOVIET REACTIONS TO

US OPERATIONS

#9

The following summary is one of a series of reports to be issued as information concerning Soviet reactions to US Military Readiness Tests becomes available. As a general rule, Soviet activities considered unrelated to such tests will be reported in other DIA publications.

NLI-06-03/8 [illegible] 20/11

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SOVIET REACTIONS TO US OPERATIONS

HIGHLIGHTS

Soviet military activity which may be in response to the present US Military Readiness activities during the period 261600 to 281600 EST October is as follows:

SANITIZED 1.4(c)

[redacted] It is assumed that the Soviets would have obtained an initial read-out by yesterday of film from COSMOS 302, which was deorbited -- on schedule -- on 25 October.

In the Indian Ocean area, a Soviet F-class conventionally powered attack submarine and two surface ships, previously part of the group located near Socotra Island, have been sighted in the southern Persian Gulf.

[redacted]

DETAILS


SANITIZED 1.4(c)

[redacted]

[NLN 06-03/8 p3 of 11]

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SANITIZED
1.4(C)



2. Strategic Rocket Troops: Normal activity.

[NLN 06-03/8 p 4/9 11]

EXEMPT

MR NLN 06-03/8 p. 5 of 11 pp.

SANITIZED 1.4(c)

[redacted]

4. Tactical Air Forces: Normal activity.

5. Air Defense Force: Normal activity.

6. Military Air Transport: Normal activity.


7. Ground Forces: Normal activity.

8. Naval Forces: In the Indian Ocean area, the F-class conventionally powered submarine, DON-class submarine tender 995, and MAYAK-class small refrigerated cargo ship ULMA were sighted in the southern Persian Gulf early today. They probably left the Socotra Island area about 24 October. No port visit in the Persian Gulf area has been announced, but the presence of the submarine in these confined waters suggests that one is scheduled. The KRESTA-class guided-missile light cruiser, KASHIN-class guided-missile frigate (DLG), ALLIGATOR-class tank-landing ship, SOFIYA-class oiler, and four space-event-associated ships apparently remain in the Socotra area.

In the Sea of Japan, a KASHIN-class DLG continues to shadow two US destroyers.

In the Atlantic, OKEAN-class intelligence collector LINZA has departed her station off Holy Loch and by today was believed to be in the area south of Ireland, where USS YORKTOWN has been operating.

[NLN 06-03/8 p6 #11]



EXEMPT

MR NLN 06-038 p. 7 of 11 pp.

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron is reacting to the presence of US naval units in the eastern area. As expected, it is continuing the increased surveillance that was initiated during NATO Exercise DEEP FURROW. Many units of the Squadron have been and remain in eastern Mediterranean ports or anchorages. Several, however, are monitoring US Task Groups north and southeast of Crete. Two surface combatants remain in the vicinity of Cyprus, while another appears to be leaving the western Mediterranean, possibly to shadow the USS SARATOGA Task Group. Three MIRKA-class escorts that joined the Squadron on 26 October have continued a southward transit from the Aegean Sea and were nearing Alexandria today.

Two surface combatants and a surveying ship that are scheduled to return to the Black Sea are off the Dardanelles. A total of six units -- three surface combatants, two W-class conventionally powered attack submarines, and the surveying ship -- are scheduled to transit the Turkish Straits northbound by 1 November. None has been scheduled southbound before 1 November. The Squadron presently consists of 40 units -- 17 surface combatants, 10 submarines (including a J-class conventionally powered cruise-missile unit), two intelligence collectors, and 11 other naval auxiliaries.

9. Naval Fleet Air Forces: Normal activity.

10. Diplomatic: Normal activity.

[redacted]

SANITIZED 1.4(c)

12. Reconnaissance Activity: Normal activity.

[redacted]

[NLN 06-03/8 p8of11]

[redacted]

SANITIZED
1.4(c)

Part III: Asian Communist Countries

[redacted]

There is still no evidence to link the activity with increased US readiness tests. (TOP SECRET UMBRA NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

[NLN 06-03/E p 9 of 11]

[redacted] SECRET/RD

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1ST REVIEW DATE: 2/3/96 DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER)
AUTHORITY: ☐ ADC ☐ AUC 1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
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2ND REVIEW DATE: 8/1/97 3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
AUTHORITY: 4. COORDINATE WITH
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Frame 009

HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

FY 1970

HISTORICAL STUDY NO. 117 (U)

VOLUME I

Microfilm frames 009 thru 256

NARRATIVE

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B. K. HOLLOWAY, General, USAF
Commander in Chief

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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

20 APRIL 1971

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Cy 1 of 1 Cys

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OCN 71-B-0001

AFHRA Cy 2 of 4.

94-IHD-031
94-HO-067

SAC Cy 4 OF 4 Cys

OA-CVI-3771-1A

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

[redacted] (b)(1)

For these reasons, the factors recommended by General Holloway in 1969 (for 1 July 1970) were less pessimistic than those suggested by General Nazzaro in 1968 (for 1 January 1969). The revised PLS values would be used by the JSTPS in the preparation of SIOP-4, Revision H (1 July 1970).[229]

Special JCS Readiness Test

(U) (~~TS~~ Gp 1) In October 1969, the Strategic Air Command participated in a special test of United States military readiness. On 10 October 1969, the JCS Chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler, notified General Holloway and the CINCs of seven unified commands that: "We have been directed by higher authority to institute a series of actions during the period 130000Z - 250000Z Oct, to test our military readiness in selected areas world-wide to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union. These actions should be discernible to the Soviets, but not threatening in themselves."[230]

(U) (~~TS~~ Gp 3) Subsequent correspondence from the JCS omitted the ominous reference to "possible confrontation" and emphasized that the actions to be taken comprised a "test." The background sentence then read: "Higher authority has requested that as a test, repeat, as a test, we take certain actions which would increase our readiness and which would be discernible but not, repeat, not threatening to the Soviets."[231]

(U) (~~TS~~ Gp 1) Headquarters SAC received no further information concerning the origin or purpose of the special readiness test. Speculation focused upon a possible connection with the peace talks in Paris and President Nixon's scheduled address to the nation on the war in Vietnam.[232] (It was announced on 13 October that President Nixon would deliver an address on 3 November on the situation in Vietnam at that time.)[233]

(U) (~~TS~~ Gp 1) Initial public affairs guidance from the JCS stated that queries from the news media should be answered with the statement that, "we are merely testing current readiness posture."[234] This was shortly superseded by more specific and restrictive guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD/PA). Included in this guidance was the statement that: "Maximum security must be maintained to achieve desired results of this exercise."[235] The guidance from the ASD/PA prohibited any public announcement concerning the JCS-directed test scheduled to begin on 13 October 1969, and initially forbade response to queries unless specifically authorized by ASD/PA. The only response which would then be permitted was: "We do not repeat not comment on readiness tests."[236] This policy was later modified to allow release of the authorized response prior to notification of the ASD/PA.[237]

(C) (~~TS~~ Gp 1) The initial message from General Wheeler listed a number of actions under consideration for a demonstration of increased U. S. military readiness. Possibilities included a stand-down of combat aircraft in certain areas, increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam, silencing radio and other communications in certain areas, and an increase in the ground alert status of SAC bombers and tankers.[238] Specific instructions to each individual CINC followed immediately. The JCS directed the CINCSAC to cease tactical flying training and to reinstate as many degraded alert sorties as possible.[239]

These actions were to be effective at 0800 local time on 13 October 1969 and were to be maintained until further notice by the JCS. The JCS specifically stated that "These directed actions should in no way affect Southeast Asia operations."[241] Although unmentioned, the SAC ICBM force was also unaffected. This circumstance illustrates two fundamental facts: The SAC missile force was always maintained in a high degree of readiness; and manned aircraft could more appropriately support a "show of force."

(U) ~~(TS~~ Op 1) On 12 October 1969, the CINCSAC disseminated guidance for reinstating degraded aircraft alert sorties in the continental United States and for suspending routine combat aircrew training missions.[242] The only SIOP aircraft alert sorties not reinstated at 0800 local on 13 October were the 20 degraded B-52 alert sorties at Andersen AFB, Guam. The actual aircraft ground alert force then increased to 144 B-52s, 32 B-58s, and 189 KC-135s.[243] In comparison, actual alert figures on 30 September 1969 had been 79 B-52s, 31 B-58s, and 130 KC-135s.[244] There were several exceptions to the policy of suspending combat crew training flights. The principal one was continuation of B-52 and KC-135 crew training at Castle AFB. Rotational movements to and from Goose AB, Eielson AFB, Torrejon AB, and satellite bases continued as scheduled. Also unaffected were certain testing programs, movements related to the conflict in Southeast Asia, and SAC support of TAC deployments.[245] On 16 October, Headquarters SAC notified its units that the readiness test would last for at least two weeks, and accordingly provided additional instructions for managing crew resources and fuel orders during the test. At the same time, SAC authorized Fifteenth Air Force to provide refueling support for lateral commands with Castle tankers.[246]

(U) ~~(TS~~ Op 1) Meanwhile, other tests of U.S. military readiness world-wide were under consideration. In his initial message to the CINCs, General Wheeler had requested them to suggest further actions compatible with his guidance and Project 703.[247] On 13 October, General Holloway replied. Because of the limited information concerning the nature of the test, the CINCSAC prefaced his recommendations with the qualification, "Within the objectives of this exercise as understood here . . . ."[248] His most significant proposal was for a limited exercise of SEAGA with weapons. General Holloway also stated that additional aircraft, above the day-to-day SIOP alert force, could be placed in the "highest state of maintenance readiness to include the loading of weapons." However, it would not be reasonable to place these aircraft on actual alert because of the

DOCID: 7-1-77

serious shortage of aircrews (unless crews excess to the 1400 Arc Light sortie rate were returned from SEA).[249]

(U) ~~(TS~~-Gp 1) On 14 October 1969, General Wheeler notified General Holloway and the other CINCs that the readiness test would last until about 0001Z on 30 October. He also informed the CINCs that their recommendations had been considered in the preparation of further tests, and that individual instructions would follow approval by "higher authority."[250]

(U) ~~(TS~~-Gp 1) An intentional omission from SAC's list of suggested actions was dispersal. In fact, Headquarters SAC strongly recommended against dispersal during the readiness test because it would further restrict crew scheduling and aggravate the problem of crew shortages. On 17 October, General Holloway sent the following analysis of the problem to the JCS:[251]

> A serious shortage of aircrews causes limitations in SAC's ability to fully implement further readiness conditions either for the current test or for an emergency. Our readiness plans are based on the requirement to fully generate and disperse the aircraft force and also fly SEAGA. Because of the crew shortage we do not have that full capability. In fact, if we were to fully generate the aircraft force today, there would be about eighty aircraft for which there would be no aircrew available at the time the aircraft became generated.
>
> If we generate aircraft we should implement dispersal, but if we disperse we reduce our ability to cycle crews through airborne SEAGA, ground alert, and submarine reaction posture. In an actual emergency we would have to evaluate the situation and, in some units, make a choice between flying SEAGA and implementing dispersal.

Almost simultaneously, and at the request of the JCS, Headquarters SAC did forward a list of selected dispersal actions which would least affect the command's readiness in case of an actual emergency.[252] However, the JCS did not pursue the matter further.

(U) ~~(TS-NOFORN~~-Gp 1) Also on 17 October, the JCS disseminated additional instructions for the military readiness test. In order to prevent the loss of critical items of combat crew training, the

JCS authorized selective flying training for the week beginning 18 October.[253] Headquarters SAC immediately notified its units that "limited and selective" flying training was authorized in bomber and tanker units until the morning of 25 October.[254] At the same time, the Air Staff requested SAC to support the refueling requirements of TAC's replacement pilot training.[255]

(C) (~~TS NOFORN~~-Gp 3) Another stand-down then followed at 0800 local time on 25 October. Specific instructions for additional SAC participation included two of the actions suggested by SAC on 13 October. First, the JCS directed SAC to place additional aircraft in the highest state of maintenance readiness (with weapons) in conjunction with the 25 October stand-down. Second, the JCS directed a "Show of Force" SEAOA operation, with weapons, on the Eielson East orbit only, with an I-Hour of 26/1913Z October 1969.[256]

(C) (~~C~~) (~~TS~~-Gp 1) On 23 October, Headquarters SAC provided its units with instructions for accomplishing maintenance generation. All aircraft units, except those with primary functions of training, reconnaissance, and reconnaissance support, were directed to generate category Charlie and Foxtrot sorties for which aircraft were available. Although aircraft were to be fully EWO configured, aircrews would not be assigned to the aircraft. Headquarters SAC did not establish [ ] specific timing, but it directed completion of generation by 0800 local time on 25 October.[257] Approximately 65 per cent of SAC non-alert SIOP aircraft were generated for the JCS test.[258]

(C) (~~C~~) (~~TS~~-Op 1) Headquarters SAC simultaneously furnished planning information for the SEAOA "Show of Force" operation on the Eielson East orbit.[259] The B-52 units assigned to that orbit were the 22d and 92d Wings.[260] The 22d possessed two bombardment squadrons (30 UE total) and the 92d had one, so the operation involved six airborne alert sorties launching daily. For the "Show of Force" option, first launch times for these units were approximately 20 hours after I-hour (26/1913Z October). Therefore, the airborne operation actually began on 27 October.[261] (This was the first time nuclear weapons

were carried on "airborne alert" sorties since the B-52 crash near Thule AB in January 1968.)

(U) (~~TS-NOFORN~~-Gp 1) The readiness test ended almost as abruptly as it began. On 28 October, the JCS directed termination of the test and a return to normal operating status at 0001Z on 30 October 1969.[262] Headquarters SAC notified its units,[263] and General Holloway informed his commanders that he was "very pleased with the excellent response and performance of the aircrews, support personnel, staffs and commanders throughout the current JCS directed readiness test."[264]

(U) (~~TS-NOFORN~~-Gp 1) Shortly after termination, the JCS requested the commanders to comment on the readiness test--difficulties, impact, and benefits.[265] In response, Headquarters SAC commented on the lack of information concerning the objectives of the exercise. Problems encountered during execution were minimal. The most significant impact concerned the problem of aircrew shortages. As expressed by SAC, "the shortage of combat crews reduces the flexibility . . . SAC once enjoyed and this at a time when we are searching for additional options."[266] There simply were not enough crews to support force dispersal or a full-scale SEAGA operation. The readiness test also aggravated the problem because of the curtailment of in-unit training for non combat-ready crew replacements.[267]

Training and Evaluation

Unit MWO Evaluations

(U) Throughout FY-70, Headquarters SAC continued to rely upon the operational readiness inspection (ORI) system as an effective means of evaluating a tactical unit's capability to accomplish its primary mission under realistically simulated combat conditions. Conducted by an inspector general (IG) team from Headquarters USAF, Headquarters SAC, or one of the numbered air force headquarters, the ORI was designed to evaluate all operational aspects of a unit's weapon systems as well as certain mission support areas. An operational readiness inspection test (ORIT) was that portion of the ORI

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JAN 31 2014

Kissinger

a. Showed great concern lest we plan to spring a completed package on the NSC without careful HK review and participation.

We reassured him: We will review our work with him about Oct. 1. We aim for an NSC meeting in December.

b. Concentrated his entire interest on employment policy, scenarios, options available to President, etc. Put aside with virtually no comment issues of declaratory policy or acquisition policy or what we communicate to our allies. I gather he feels all those questions are subsequent and subordinate to working out proper employment policy.

c. Felt President, after inauguration, should spend about two days in thorough review and consideration of nuclear employment options available to him in various plausible scenarios, and of their consequences, so that he understands these things "in his bones." Felt the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs should be even more thoroughly and continuously familiar with these options and scenarios. Felt that at each decision point in the scenario they had to understand what the next decision point would be. NSS 3.3(b)(6) OSD 3.3(b)(5),(6)

[redacted]

e. Said the President's strategy has been (in the Mid-East crisis, in Vietnam, etc.) to "push so many chips into the pot" that the other side will think we may be "crazy" and might really go much further.

f. Said he agreed that our strategy must be to prevent escalation. He agreed that theatre and strategic weapons must be treated together in a common policy. He agreed with all the objectives and principles John Foster recited. But he said he could not get ahold of it until we showed him what it meant concretely and how it was to be done.

[redacted]

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

Downgraded to Secret
Date: [redacted]012
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended
Date 31 Dec 2008
OSD F.S. 212 [redacted] 3.3 (b) (5)
Review/Declassify On: 30 Dec 2033 Equity: TBD

#1

12-M-2597

h. Asked how much we could get done by October 1st.
John Foster said
(1) Analysis of the recovery problem,
(2) Analysis of the practicality of the targeting called for,
(3) Some scenarios and options analysis.

Office of the Secretary of Defense SVS.I.8532
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 30 JAN 2014 Authority: EO 13526
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By JB NARA Date 8-2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 19, 1974

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Reviewed by H. D. Brewster HDB
Date U.S. 7-8 1978

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
DECEMBER 31,----------

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Graham A. Martin, Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Special Assistant to the Secretary
Mr. W. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

DATE, TIME: July 17, 1974; 12:00 p.m.
PLACE: The Secretary's Office, State Department

Kissinger. I am delighted to have an Ambassador who is tough. Your basic mission seems to be going well.

Martin. The military campaigns are going well. We have kept Hanoi slightly nervous, leaving them uncertain as to what we will do. But the GVN has been told that they have to fight in the first line. They have done so and they have built their confidence. They have fought well. They have not fought for some tactical enclosures near Cambodia but they have held everywhere else. They have disrupted the North Vietnamese infiltration corridor into the Delta. Even the U.S. Army in its great days would have been proud of the operation that the South Vietnamese ran into Svay Rieng.

The other side can mount an offensive. It can have some successes. It can take Tay Ninh or Hue but it cannot keep either.

Kissinger. How long could they hold?

Martin. Maybe several months. But I do not think they would do it if they cannot get you to Paris for a cease-fire in place.

Kissinger. I have no intention of going to Paris. I would like to reply to Le Duc Tho. I do not want an argumentative tone. I have no intention to meet with him. He cannot do anything for us. If he formally requests a meeting and gives me guarantees, it would be OK.

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Martin. I agree. The Paracels affair had a political effect that was positive for Thieu. His domestic position is firm. Our friends come out and they interview the Saigon chapter of the Worldwide Association of Alienated Intellectuals, so they get a different picture. But I think that if one were to hold a vote today, 80 percent of the South Vietnamese would not want to change, even if they do not like Thieu. If the elections under the Paris agreements were held, the GVN would win 90 percent of the votes.

Militarily, they are holding. Politically, they are more solid than I had the right to hope.

Kissinger. When I made the agreement, I thought it might be a two-year thing.

Martin. Only if we throw it away. South Vietnam will crumble economically, which will hurt politically, if we do not get enough aid for them. I do not think they can make sufficient military effort if their economy is in trouble.

You are on the verge of something which is the only way it could work. The CIA tells us that North Vietnam will get $1.2 to $1.4 billion of aid this year, compared to what South Vietnam gets. They, of course, use their costs figures and no transportation. So, the figure is lower than our comparable value.

The need in North Vietnam for massive reconstruction is now great. If we can get an aid level here that is enough to get things going in South Vietnam, we will have no problems.

Kissinger. We may get $600 million.

Martin. That is enough. Dan Spiegel, Humphrey's man, changed his attitude when he was out in Vietnam. So do others. There has been a real change in Vietnam. If we get $600 million, I can get $100 million from Japan. Also perhaps something from the Federal Republic and from France. The whole thing will begin to roll.

In Thailand, we started the economic program and finally it expanded to the point where it went on by itself. We can do that in Vietnam.

Kissinger. I am assuming that things in Cambodia make no difference.

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Martin. Can you leapfrog North Vietnam and the KC and get to Sihanouk directly? If we can get him and a few others, we would be in great shape.

Kissinger. I like that idea but I can only do it if I see Sihanouk in Peking.

Martin. Maybe you can get David Bruce to do it. It would perhaps work. Of course, in a real sense, it does not matter. No matter who controls Phnom Pehn, North Vietnam would always be able to keep troops on the South Vietnamese border.

Kissinger. Then you do not think that South Vietnam is weaker now?

Martin. It is much stronger now than before. The Achilles' heel is the economy, in order to pay the soldiers enough. If we can get an appropriated level of $600 million this year, I can assure you that the place will turn out alright. As for military aid, we need $900 million if the Pentagon does not steal it from you. That is what they did last year.

They now want somebody who can be responsible at DOD for Vietnam aid. They want von Marbod. I think that's like putting a fox in a chicken coop.

They charged things to Vietnam which have nothing to do with Vietnam, like the R&D on the F5E's.

If I can get about $1 billion, I will be OK.

One of Brooks' people asked if I should have the authority to approve every item of aid, so as to have some responsible person to whom they could turn. I said that would be alright.

Dan Spiegel said that the publicity campaign has gone to the point where the political prisoner issue is no longer prominent on the Hill.

Kissinger. I don't mind having you testify.

Martin. The GAO has done a report, at Kennedy's specific request, that could be used against us.

Kissinger. We should not have been so defensive about some of the things that came out. We do not comment in leaked documents, Bob (to Ingersoll). But we certainly do not apologize.

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Martin. I have received very positive mail after the flurry of stories. There was also a lot of hate mail about Kennedy. It worries me. It is one of the strangest things why he attacks me. I have never tried to attack him.

Dan Spiegel says that if you want the appropriation, you can have it.

Kissinger. That is why I have been talking to the committee.

Martin. You have got to make it personally clear.

Kissinger. Right. I will do so after my meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting next Tuesday.

Martin. You can have the money if you want it.

Kissinger. If that is the case, I will get it.

Our opponents have seen that Vietnam is the hinge of our policy. So have others. Lee Kuan Yew said that we have got to get through 1976.

Martin. I can do that if you give me the money.

What I am trying to work for is a de-escalation of the level of violence.

Kissinger. Can we give them a tacit acceptance of a third Vietnam?

Martin. Only if they know that it is the end of the line. But they cannot be certain of that.

Kissinger. The people who talk about a cease-fire may have a situation like that in mind. North Vietnam wanted a cease-fire for political warfare, but they have not won it. The time may come when they will accept a cease-fire for a third Vietnam.

Martin. We cannot have it be acknowledged. It must just happen.

Kissinger. I am fascinated by the reaction of the Poles and the Hungarians.

Martin. They still want the "PRG" zone to be acknowledged. We cannot do that.

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Kissinger. On your appearances, can you wait until after Tuesday? I have that here. How long can you be here?

Martin. As long as you want. I can make a lot of private visits to a lot of people.

The networks want to see me. All the talk shows. What shall I do? I have no interest, but if you think it will make a contribution, I can do it.

Kissinger. Let us not do it unless we need to do it to get a positive note. There is no reason to begin a fight. I favor one on one or small groups.

Martin. On the Kennedy thing, I have heard nothing. If the testimony is good and aggressive, it could go well.

Kissinger. You have not done badly so far.

Martin. My predictions on Kennedy have turned out correct.

Kissinger. Is there anything else we should discuss? Such as Laos or Thailand, etc.?

Martin. I have talked to Kintner. His staff is scared of public opinion. In Thailand, you can have what you want if you handle it correctly. Often, we did not tell them.

Ingersoll. We told the military but they did not pass it on.

Martin. The military is still there and is still very strong. They are all friends. If you like, I can see some of them when I get back. As for Laos, I hope Charlie (Whitehouse) can change his ideas.

(There were some closing pleasantries.)

Excerpts from MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973

31 pages of excerpts from Graham A. Cosmas's book, "MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973." These excerpts include coverage of nuclear weapons and Operation Fracture Jaw. Fracture Jaw was a top-secret U.S. military contingency plan in which General William C. Westmoreland sought to ensure that nuclear weapons would be available for use in northern Quang Tri if necessary, to prevent a major defeat

THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN VIETNAM

MACV

THE JOINT COMMAND IN THE YEARS OF WITHDRAWAL 1968–1973



Graham A. Cosmas

MACV
The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973

United States Army in Vietnam

MACV
The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973

by

Graham A. Cosmas



Center of Military History
United States Army
Washington, D.C., 2006

2

Prelude to Tet: Warnings and Preparations

Throughout the debate over whether the war was stalemated, the administration's progress campaign, and President Johnson's movement toward leveling off the American effort, all the participants assumed that the other side's war strategy would remain the same. They expected the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to continue their mixed large-unit and guerrilla campaign of attrition with the aim of exhausting American patience and South Vietnamese resources and forcing a negotiated settlement favorable to the revolution. Reflecting this view, an interagency intelligence estimate issued in November 1967 concluded:

> The Communists apparently recognize that the chances of a complete military victory have disappeared, and they aim instead at a protracted war. Their objectives . . . are to immobilize and wear down the Allied military forces, to maintain base areas, expand their political agitation and control in contested and GVN [government of Vietnam] areas, and defeat the RD [pacification] program. In pursuit of these objectives, their tactics are to combine and coordinate closely their military operations and political activity.[1]

In fact, when the intelligence estimate was published, the enemy was well into his preparations for something quite different: a nationwide offensive intended to achieve decisive political and military victory within a short time. The Military Assistance Command, the American mission in Saigon, and the U.S. intelligence community, as well as the South Vietnamese government and armed forces, gradually became aware that the enemy was preparing for more than his ordinary annual winter-spring offensive. However, they failed fully to

[1] Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 14.3–67, p. 2, in U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, *William C. Westmoreland, Plaintiff, v. CBS, Inc., et al., Defendants. 82 Civ 7913 (PNL). Plaintiff General William C. Westmoreland's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant CBS's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, app. B*, p. 248 (hereafter cited as *Westmoreland Memorandum of Law, app. B*). For a similar view, see Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, an. A, pp. 4–5, Historians files, CMH.

appreciate the planned nature and extent of the attack and hence were taken at least partially by surprise when it began.

The Enemy Plans an Offensive[2]

Even as President Johnson and his advisers tentatively decided to level off the American war effort in Vietnam, their adversaries in Hanoi were getting ready to do the opposite. Undeterred by the increasing American pressure, the northern and southern revolutionary leaders held unwaveringly to their maximum goal: a unified Communist Vietnam. Like many Americans, the Communist leaders believed that the conflict had reached a stalemate, but for them a stalemate represented a temporary equilibrium of forces, a stage on their march to inevitable victory. Instead of a way out of the conflict, they sought a means to shift the balance in their favor.

By the spring of 1967, the Vietnamese Communists believed that they had passed through the first two stages of the people's revolutionary war—those of organization and base building and of guerrilla warfare—and entered the third and final stage. In that stage, large combat-seasoned guerrilla and main forces backed by a strong political infrastructure and mass popular following were in position to launch what the Communists called the General Offensive–General Uprising. In this revolutionary climax, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military units would launch attacks to destroy the South Vietnamese Army and pin down American forces. As these actions went on, urban and rural popular uprisings spearheaded by commando assaults on South Vietnamese military headquarters, administrative facilities, and communications centers would sweep away the puppet regime and install National Liberation Front governments at every level from the hamlets to Saigon. Since the early 1960s, the North Vietnamese Communist Party had identified the General Offensive–General Uprising as the culminating point of its politico-military campaign in the south. For the Saigon area, the *Central Office for South Vietnam* (*COSVN*), the senior enemy headquarters for the southern half of South Vietnam, had prepared detailed plans for such an operation. Since 1965, *COSVN* had been compelled to divert its resources to the growing battle against the Americans, but its plans remained in the files ready to be brought up to date and executed.[3]

More than the diversion of resources may have held back the offensive. In response to the massive intervention of American combat

[2] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on John M. Carland, "The Tet Offensive of 1968: Desperate Gamble or Calculated Risk?" (Unpublished paper, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2001) and William M. Hammond, "Preparations Begin" (Unpublished paper, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002).

[3] The uprising concept is explained in "The Process of Revolution and the General Uprising," document captured by U.S. troops, 22 May 68, *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, no. 45, CMH.

forces, factions among the North Vietnamese leaders engaged in a two-year debate over war strategy. Masking their differences in Marxist-Leninist jargon, the contending groups promoted their views through polemics published in the official Communist press and broadcast on North Vietnam's state radio. They argued over the proper relationship between large-unit and guerrilla operations, the relative roles of political and military struggle and of fighting and diplomacy, and the merits of protracted conflict versus an all-out drive for victory in the shortest possible time. By mid-1967, they had reached a consensus that would blend most of the contending elements of their strategy in the context of the General Offensive–General Uprising.[4]

In a mirror image of General Westmoreland's view of the conflict, the Communist leaders believed that they were making slow but steady progress in their struggle. Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, the *COSVN* military commander, for example, acknowledged in retrospect that his forces had encountered "difficulties and weaknesses" in replacing casualties, building political strength, and "conducting mass movements in urban areas." Nevertheless, he argued, these problems existed "in the context of a favorable situation" in which the revolutionary army held the initiative and the Americans were "bewildered by the new battlefield" and by the Communists "new form of war."[5]

Although the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were taking heavy losses and winning few victories on the battlefield and the U.S. bombing was placing severe pressure on the North Vietnamese society and economy, the political situation held much promise. The leaders in Hanoi knew that antiwar sentiment was mounting in the United States and among "progressive" forces around the world. Still better, during 1968, a presidential election year, the American administration would be under additional strain that likely would inhibit its response to new Communist initiatives. Even more promising, South Vietnam appeared to be extremely vulnerable. The majority of South Vietnamese soldiers and people, the Communists assumed, in their hearts hated the Saigon regime and its American "imperialist" sponsors. Viewed from Hanoi, the I Corps revolt of 1966, the periodic anti-government demonstrations by Buddhists and other groups, the relatively small proportion of the popular vote received by the winning ticket of Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky in the September 1967 presidential election, and the presence of tens of thousands of impoverished displaced peasants in city slums were harbingers of incipient revolution in the urban centers of Saigon's power. Only a spark, a catalytic event, was needed to set South Vietnam's cities aflame, inspire Saigon's troops to defect, and sweep away the puppet regime.[6]

[4] Thomas K. Latimer, "Hanoi's Leaders and Their South Vietnam Policies, 1954–1968" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1972), chs. 8 and 9, summarizes the controversies.

[5] Quotations are from Carland, "Tet Offensive," pp. 4–5.

[6] This account of North Vietnamese/Viet Cong plans and assessments is drawn from William J.



North Vietnamese Communist leaders and government officials arrive for an official visit in Peking.

Taking all these considerations into account, the collective leadership of the North Vietnamese Communist (Lao Dong) Party decided to "prepare to strike a decisive blow against the enemy, win a great victory, bring about a great-leap-forward transformation, and force the United States to accept military defeat." In May 1967, the Politburo, the party's inner executive directorate, initiated planning for the General Offensive–General Uprising. At that time, the Politburo instructed the Central Party Military Affairs Committee, in coordination with the major theater commands in the south, to prepare an overall plan for the assault. During June, the party's Central Committee unanimously endorsed the Politburo's strategic decision to "prepare a decisive victory in 1968." In July, the Politburo approved the Central Party Military Affairs Committee's plan and set a tentative date for the offensive. At the end of October, on the basis of reports from the south, the leaders in Hanoi pushed the date forward to 30–31 January 1968, the beginning of Vietnam's Tet lunar new year holiday. The change left local commanders in the south with a short time for preparation, but the Communist leaders believed that an offensive during the festivities would catch Saigon's forces off-guard and have maximum military and political impact. The Politburo then developed a policy resolution and

Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 261–65; Latimer, "Hanoi's Leaders and Their South Vietnam Policies," chs. 8 and 9; Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, *The General Offensives of 1968–1969*, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981), pp. 14–24; Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 434–42; and James J. Wirtz, *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), chs. 1 and 2.

a detailed operational plan based on the earlier work of the Central Party Military Affairs Committee.[7]

In December, the Politburo presented the resolution to the Fourteenth Plenum, or general meeting, of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. Approved by the delegates and formally issued on 1 January 1968 as Central Resolution Fourteen, the document defined the enemy's "crucial mission" during the winter-spring 1967–68 campaigning season as "to mobilize the greatest efforts of the entire Party, the entire army, and the entire people in both regions [North and South] to carry our revolutionary war to the highest level of development and use the general offensive and general uprising to secure a decisive victory in a relatively short time."

As used in Resolution Fourteen, the term "decisive victory" denoted the achievement of three important strategic objectives: the collapse of the Saigon regime and its armed forces, the establishment of a neutralist coalition government in the south dominated by the National Liberation Front, and the beginning of negotiations for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Although not mentioned in the resolution, another objective would be to compel the United States to end or at least to significantly curtail the bombing of North Vietnam. After "decisive victory" was achieved, what the Communists called "total victory" would follow later when North Vietnam absorbed South Vietnam into a single socialist state.

Specifically, the proposed offensive was to begin with a series of main force operations along South Vietnam's western border and the Demilitarized Zone, designed to bleed and demoralize U.S. and South Vietnamese troops and to draw the allies' attention away from the attack preparations in the lowlands and urban centers. Once this campaign was well under way, Viet Cong sapper and local force units, previously infiltrated into Saigon, Da Nang, Hue, and scores of province and district capitals, were to attack South Vietnamese military and government headquarters, police stations, and radio and television facilities. These assaults would paralyze the government and military high command so that the party's political agents could establish a revolutionary regime and call the people into the streets. Additional main force units, concentrated on the outskirts of the cities, then would move in to finish off armed resistance and secure the victory. If all went as planned, the Americans, fighting for their lives along the borders, would find the country to their rear in the hands of a new Viet Cong–dominated coalition government to which much of the South Vietnamese had defected. The United States would have no recourse

[7] Quotations are from War Experiences Recapitulation Committee of the High-Level Military Institute, *Vietnam: The Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation, 1954–1975: Military Events* (Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1980) (hereafter cited as *Resistance War*), trans. by Joint Publications Research Service, Doc. no. 80968, 1982, p. 100; see also p. 101.

but to negotiate for withdrawal on whatever terms the victorious revolution chose to grant.[8]

To maximize his chances of achieving surprise, the enemy planned to launch his crucial attack on the cities at Tet, the Vietnamese new year, which in 1968 would be celebrated at the end of January. This holiday was deeply sacred to the Vietnamese as a time for renewal of bonds with family and ancestors and preparation for the year ahead. Its week-long celebration included much feasting, gift-giving, shooting of fireworks, and reunion with family and friends. Throughout the long war, Tet, like Christmas and the western New Year's, had been the occasion of temporary truces, which both sides exploited for maneuver and resupply but rarely for major attacks. The South Vietnamese normally furloughed large numbers of their troops for the holiday, and the extensive movement of travelers for the occasion offered ideal cover for infiltration of Viet Cong soldiers and supplies into the cities. Above all, a full-scale attack during the holiday would achieve maximum shock and surprise, thereby enhancing the likelihood of government collapse.[9]

Although the planners in Hanoi made some allowance for a less-than-complete triumph, they appear to have considered decisive victory a real possibility. Their directives to lower-level political and military cadres spoke of the new offensive as the climactic moment of the revolution's long struggle. The instructions called for total dedication and total sacrifice for the sake of total victory.[10]

This ambitious plan was controversial at its inception and, as the Communists themselves acknowledged in retrospect, was based on an overestimation of the revolutionary forces' military and political strength and capabilities and an underestimation of those of the allies. According to later Vietnamese Communist histories, many southern Viet Cong commanders from the first considered their forces inadequate to achieve the plan's maximum goals; but they dared not voice

[8] The enemy plan is conveniently summarized in Wirtz, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 61–64; and Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, pp. 443–46. Msg, Abrams MAC 10931 to Westmoreland, 15 Nov 67, Westmoreland Message files, 1–30 Nov 67, CMH, analyzes a captured enemy order for the border battles. For overall strategy, see "The Process of Revolution and the General Uprising," document captured by U.S. forces on 22 May 68, *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, no. 45; and Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence Information Report no. 6–026–1418–68, 18 Apr 68, sub: VC Plans. Both in CMH.

[9] The significance of Tet to the Vietnamese is conveniently summarized in Westmoreland, *Soldier Reports*, p. 310. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, *Intelligence*, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982), p. 35, claims that North Vietnamese authorities had less respect for Tet as a sacred tradition than did the South Vietnamese government and people.

[10] War Experiences Recapitulation Committee, *Resistance War*, p. 100, recounts the Hanoi Politburo's view of the possible outcomes, including the possibility of a less-than-total victory. Present-day Communist Vietnamese historiography claims that the North Vietnamese all along envisioned the General Offensive–General Uprising as a prolonged process and that the southern Viet Cong misconstrued the campaign as a "one-blow" effort. See Capt Ronnie E. Ford, "Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise" (Master's thesis, Defense Intelligence College, 1993), pp. 111–12.

their objections because the plan was based in part on their own earlier optimistic reports of political and military success. A number of important North Vietnamese leaders, reportedly including Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, the architect of victory at Dien Bien Phu, argued against the offensive. They urged instead a continuation of protracted attritional warfare. Looking backward, General Tran Van Tra declared:

> During Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength. In other words, we did not base ourselves on scientific calculation or a careful weighing of all factors, but in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires. . . .[11]

Warnings and Preparations

By the time the Central Committee adopted Resolution Fourteen, preparations for the campaign were well under way. During the summer and fall, the North Vietnamese increased the flow of men and materiel down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. According to a later Communist account, some 31,700 personnel entered South Vietnam during 1967, more than twice the number that infiltrated during the previous year, along with over 6,500 tons of weapons and supplies. The weaponry included thousands of automatic rifles, machine guns, and hand-held antitank rocket launchers. Gradually and secretly, the Communists disseminated orders down their chain of command and initiated local attack planning. Viet Cong units, often as yet unaware of the purpose of their efforts, clandestinely stockpiled supplies near South Vietnam's cities and prepared for their urban attack missions. Party cadres assembled lists of government officials and supporters to be killed and kidnapped, as well as lists of members of the prospective revolutionary town and province administrations. During the fall, main force regiments engaged allied forces in a series of unusually prolonged battles at Con Thien on the Demilitarized Zone and Song Be, Loc Ninh, and Dak To on the western edges of II and III Corps. These battles, which cost the enemy thousands of men but also pushed up the weekly American casualty rate, apparently were designed to draw allied forces to the borders and distract their attention from the offensive preparations against the cities.

[11] Quotation is from Col. Gen. Tran Van Tra, *Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theater*, vol. 5, *Concluding the 30-Years War* (Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe Publishing House, 1982), trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Joint Publications Research Service, Southeast Asia Report no. 1247, 2 Feb 83, p. 35. Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, pp. 449–50, comments on Vo Nguyen Giap's opposition to the offensive; see also pp. 446–48. A senior Communist leadership review of the offensive is described in CIA Intelligence Information Report, 13 Aug 70, CMH. Ford, "Tet 1968," pp. 112–15, 163–67, 274, summarizes recent Communist accounts.



The battle for Dak To peaked with a costly attack by the 4th Battalion, 173d Airborne Brigade, against well-entrenched North Vietnamese on Hill 875.

Hanoi also made political and diplomatic preparations. North Vietnam signed new military and economic aid agreements with the Soviet Union and China. To curb home-front dissent, the Hanoi regime arrested over 200 senior party members and officials who lacked sufficient zeal for the war effort and decreed harsh punishment for persons guilty of "counterrevolutionary" crimes. The National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong, announced a new program aimed at broadening its appeal to the South Vietnamese people and instigated rumors that the National Liberation Front and the United States were secretly negotiating to replace the Thieu-Ky regime with a Viet Cong–dominated coalition government. Finally, on 31 December, the North Vietnamese foreign minister issued a public declaration that seemed to commit Hanoi to enter peace negotiations if the United States stopped ROLLING THUNDER. In the light of what followed, the purpose of this statement was less than clear. Probably, it was aimed both at laying the groundwork for negotiations and at diverting American attention from what by that time were visible indications of an imminent major Communist offensive.[12]

[12] These preparations are conveniently summarized in Hammond, "Preparations Begin"; Wirtz, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 66–77; Lung, *General Offensives*, pp. 25–31; and Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1984), pp. 65–69. Also, Msgs, Abrams MAC 10931 and MAC 11239 to Wheeler, 15 Nov 67 and 22 Nov 67; Westmoreland MAC 01001 to Sharp and Wheeler info Gen Johnson, 21

The enemy took great pains to conceal his preparations and intentions. Until almost the eve of the attack, a U.S. intelligence study later concluded, "probably no Communist officer below the level of *COSVN*, front, or military region was aware of the full scope of the offensive." The assault units received their final orders 72 hours or less before the time of execution. Nevertheless, the Communists had to distribute orders and plans and indoctrinate their troops and political cadre concerning the transcendent significance of the coming effort. Inevitably, as a result, American and South Vietnamese intelligence organizations during the fall and winter steadily accumulated evidence, primarily from captured documents and prisoner interrogations, of the scale, objectives, and timing of the attack. On the basis of this evidence, analysts at the MACV J–2 Current Intelligence Branch, the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam,[13] and the CIA Saigon station issued studies that predicted a nationwide enemy offensive, including major attacks on the cities. The CIA study, finished in November, accurately forecast the successive phases of the coming campaign. Its drafters suggested that the border battles were part of the first phase and that a second phase, possibly including the city attacks, would begin in January.[14]

Higher-ranking intelligence officers and commanders at MACV and elsewhere received these studies at best with skepticism. The MACV chief of intelligence, Maj. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, and his chief estimator, Col. Daniel Graham, for example, heard briefings on the J–2 and CIA attack predictions but rejected their conclusions, as did George Carver, who oversaw Vietnam activities at the CIA. Often before, enemy documents had called for major attacks, but the attacks never had occurred. An all-out nationwide offensive seemed clearly beyond the capabilities of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong and seemed inconsistent with their presumed strategy of protracted attritional warfare. An attempt to capture the cities, where the enemy hitherto had confined his efforts to terrorism, espionage, and political

Jan 68. All in Westmoreland Message files, 1–30 Nov 67 and 1–31 Jan 68, CMH. Latter message discusses rising American casualty rates.

[13] The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, established in 1966, included both American and South Vietnamese personnel and was intended to bring together American technical expertise with Vietnamese knowledge of their language, people, and culture. It drew upon the product of similar combined centers for the exploitation of captured enemy documents and materiel and prisoners of war. For its establishment, see Cosmas, *Years of Escalation, 1962–1967*, ch. 8.

[14] Quotation is from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), "Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam" (Interim Report), ca. early 1968, p. 3, JX 397, in *Vietnam: A Documentary Collection*, card 698. Wirtz, *Tet Offensive*, ch. 4; Lung, *General Offensives*, pp. 32–37; Interv, Lt Col James E. Smith and Lt Col Edward P. Smith with Gen William B. Rosson, 1981, pp. 377–80, Senior Officers Oral History Program, Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (hereafter cited as Rosson Interv); Phillip B. Davidson, *Secrets of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990), p. 105; U.S. District Court, *Westmoreland Memorandum of Law, app. B*, pp. 217, 267, 374–75. Saigon station analyses are summarized in Ford, *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers*, pp. 119–21.

agitation, appeared especially improbable. The Communists lacked the conventional military strength to seize and hold major towns. According to the allies' political assessment (which turned out to be accurate), the Communists could count on little help from urban citizens who, while often hostile or apathetic toward the Saigon regime, were far from ready to rise on behalf of the National Liberation Front. Hanoi's leaders, whom the allies credited with possessing excellent intelligence on South Vietnamese affairs, would not be so foolish as to throw away their forces in a hopeless endeavor. The city attack plans, therefore, could be dismissed as propaganda and the border battles understood as desperate enemy efforts to gain limited successes largely for psychological and political purposes—efforts that, in fact, had merely exposed enemy troops to slaughter by American firepower. Thus ironically, the miscalculations in the North Vietnamese plan worked in its favor by causing the allies to discount the evidence that reached them of the nature of the attack.[15]

Although the Military Assistance Command's evaluations and plans discounted the likelihood of a nationwide enemy offensive, General Westmoreland took steps that had the effect of strengthening his position. During September and October, he secured Defense Department agreement to a speed-up in deployment of the major Army combat elements in the recently approved reinforcement Program Five—the headquarters and two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division and the 11th and 198th Light Infantry Brigades—so that all would arrive in South Vietnam before the expected Christmas cease-fire. The MACV commander obtained these accelerated deployments not in anticipation of a major nationwide Communist offensive but rather to get more troops in hand to meet the perennial enemy threat in northern I Corps and to provide additional forces for projected allied operations. He also wanted to make certain that his reinforcements were not being blocked by any diplomatic maneuvering attendant upon the Christmas truce.[16]

[15] Wirtz, *Tet Offensive*, ch. 3, examines allied assumptions; see especially pp. 111–19, 124–28, 175–77. Ford, *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers*, pp. 121–23; Lung, *Intelligence*, pp. 145–52; and *General Offensives*, pp. 37–42. Westmoreland, *Soldier Reports*, pp. 316, 320–23; Davidson, *Vietnam Secrets*, pp. 104–11; and Interv, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL) with Lt Gen Phillip B. Davidson, 30 Mar and 30 Jun 82, sess. 1, p. 45 (hereafter cited as Davidson Interv); and Interv, LBJL with Col Daniel Graham, 24 May 82, sess. 1, pp. 39–41, and 3 Nov 82, sess. 2, p. 7 (hereafter cited as Graham Interv). Westmoreland gives his view of purpose of the border battles in Msg, MAC 10547 to Wheeler, 6 Nov 67, Westmoreland Message files, Nov 67, CMH.

[16] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, *United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*, 12 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), sec. 4.C.6(b), pp. 215–22 (hereafter cited as *United States–Vietnam Relations*). Msgs, Gen Johnson WDC 13028 to Westmoreland, 2 Oct 67; Gen Johnson JCS 8356–67 to Sharp and Westmoreland, 5 Oct 67; Gen Johnson WDC 13666 to Gen Dwight E. Beach, CG, USARPAC, and Westmoreland, 14 Oct 67; Beach HWA 2978 to Gen Johnson info Westmoreland, 14 Oct 67; Westmoreland MAC 9810 to Johnson, 19 Oct 67; Beach HWA 3067 to Gen Johnson, 24 Oct 67; Westmoreland Message files, Oct 67, CMH.

Westmoreland campaigned as well to eliminate the holiday cease-fires or, failing that, to minimize their durations and their restrictions on his forces' freedom of action. Temporary truces for Christmas, the western New Year's, and Tet had become an established practice in the war which General Westmoreland and other American commanders deplored as affording the enemy periods free from allied attack during which the enemy could reinforce and resupply his troops. Early in October, Westmoreland, on the basis of a MACV staff study, recommended to the Mission Council that the United States and South Vietnam announce no holiday cease-fires at all during the coming season. If political considerations required truces, they should be limited to 24 hours each at Christmas and New Year's and 48 hours at Tet. Westmoreland initially floated the idea of tying the cease-fires to a mutual freeze on troop movements and logistical operations by both sides, but at Admiral Sharp's urging, he backed away from this proposal as potentially unmanageable and dangerous to allied forces if a truce should be extended by diplomatic maneuvering.[17]

The Mission Council accepted Westmoreland's 24/24/48 formula, as eventually did the administration. At State Department insistence, the administration rejected the MACV commander's suggestion that each truce be made conditional on enemy behavior during the previous truce, although it gave his forces ample latitude in reacting to major Communist cease-fire violations. On 19 December, Westmoreland transmitted to his commanders the agreed U.S. and South Vietnamese plan for 24-hour cease-fires at Christmas and New Year's and a 48-hour stand-down at Tet. He enjoined his commanders to bring "maximum pressure" on the enemy in the days immediately before each pause in operations and to position their troops to obstruct enemy troop and supply movements during each truce. The other side at the same time announced its own longer cease-fires for each holiday. Significantly, throughout these discussions, Westmoreland based his case for limiting the cease-fires on past violations by the enemy and the need to deny him unmolested movement of troops and supplies, not on any imminent threat of a Communist offensive.[18]

[17] Westmoreland, *Soldier Reports*, p. 279. Westmoreland History Notes, 1–30 Oct 67, tab A; Memorandum for the Record (MFR), Hendry, 8 Oct 67, sub: CIIB [Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau] Meeting, 7 Oct 67, tab A–11. Both in Westmoreland History file no. 23 (1–15 Oct 67), CMH. Msg, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) MAC 34790 to Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), 22 Oct 67, COMUSMACV Signature file, 1967, CMH. Msgs, Sharp BNK 2376 to Gen Johnson and Westmoreland, 10 Dec 67; Westmoreland MAC 12000 to Sharp, 11 Dec 67. Both in Westmoreland Message files, Dec 67, CMH.

[18] Msg, Eugene Locke Saigon 8008 to Bunker, 9 Oct 67, tab A–23, Westmoreland History file no. 23 (1–15 Oct 67); Memo, Westmoreland for Bunker, 8 Dec 67, sub: Holiday Cease-fire Announcement, COMUSMACV Signature file, Dec 67; Msg, Bunker Saigon 13232 to Sec State, 12 Dec 67, tab A–17, Westmoreland History file no. 26 (29 Nov–16 Dec 67). All in CMH. Msgs, Westmoreland MAC 11960 to Sharp, 10 Dec 67; and MAC 12363 to Field Force and Component Cdrs, 19 Dec 67. All in Westmoreland Message files, Dec 67, CMH. Quotations are from latter message. Wirtz, *Tet Offensive*, p. 211, comments on lack of mention of any enemy offensive threat.

Despite these indications of business as usual, by late December, the Military Assistance Command, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and senior officials in Washington had come to recognize that the enemy's next winter-spring offensive would be much larger than ordinary and have unusually ambitious objectives. The indications were impossible to ignore. The sheer volume of captured documents and prisoner interrogations pointing toward a nationwide offensive and attacks on the cities commanded attention. Enemy willingness to stand and fight at Dak To and other places, at great cost to themselves, and its launching of nearly simultaneous attacks in several corps areas at once, represented a break with past patterns. Westmoreland in response commissioned a joint study by his intelligence and operations staff directorates to discover the Communists' intentions in these operations and determine how the command should react to and exploit them. As the new year began, a growing amount of intercepted radio traffic provided additional evidence that the enemy planned widespread assaults on an unprecedented scale, including some directed against cities and the coastal lowlands. Yet skepticism remained. In mid-December, for example, General Westmoreland directed the MACV psychological warfare office to consider a post-Tet program to "capitalize on those VC pre-Tet promises that do not materialize," specifically the reports that enemy troops in some areas "allegedly are being directed to go all out now on the basis that peace will come immediately after Tet."[19]

The Military Assistance Command and its overseers in Honolulu and Washington paid special attention to accumulating evidence of a sudden dramatic increase in North Vietnamese infiltration. Throughout most of 1967, the command believed that the enemy was dispatching fewer men per month to South Vietnam than he had during the previous year, probably because he had completed his buildup of units and now was only sending down replacements. As late as 5 October, General Westmoreland reassured the State Department that he possessed no "hard intelligence" of a major expansion of enemy forces. However, during November and December, analysts in the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, extrapolating mathematically from

[19] Wirtz, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 180–90, 202–03; PFIAB, "Intelligence Warning," p. 3. Quotation is from MFR, Brig. Gen. William E. Bryan Jr., USAF, 17 Dec 67, sub: CIIB Meeting, 16 Dec 67, tab A–8, Westmoreland History file no. 27 (19–26 Dec 67), CMH. J–2 and J–3 evaluation is directed in MFR, Bryan, 18 Nov 67, sub: CIIB Meeting, 18 Nov 67, tab A-44, Westmoreland History file no. 25 (13–28 Nov 67), CMH. U.S. District Court, *Westmoreland Memorandum of Law*, *app. B*, p. 157n; U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, *William C. Westmoreland, Plaintiff, v. CBS Inc., et. al., Defendants. 82 Civ. 7913 (PNL). Memorandum in Support of Defendant CBS's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment*, pp. 121–22; and *app. A*, p. 344; Davidson Interv, 30 Mar and 30 Jun 82, sess. 1, pp. 36–38, 41–42; Bruce E. Jones, *War Without Windows: A True Account by a Young Army Officer Trapped in an Intelligence Cover-Up in Vietnam* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1987), p. 141. Brig. Gen. John R. Chaisson, the MACV Combat Operations Center (COC) chief, predicted hard fighting ahead in Presentation at Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), 2 Jan 68, in Chaisson, Oral History, pp. 141–42, Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C.; see also pp. 108–12. See also Ltr, Chaisson to Mrs Chaisson, 29 Nov 67, box 7, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif.

meager information in collateral sources, began estimating much higher infiltration rates than they reported in the published order of battle with its stringent requirement for documentation of each unit and replacement group. In addition to these estimates, which were based on experimental methodology and rejected higher up in J–2, MACV received and accepted reports, based on special intelligence, of the advance of several North Vietnamese divisions, hitherto held in reserve in North Vietnam, to positions within striking distance of Khe Sanh, the westernmost Marine position in northern I Corps. Col. Charles Morris, General Davidson's chief of intelligence production, and a select group of senior analysts concentrated full time on this troop movement, which involved at least 20,000 men. They were "terribly concerned with this," Morris later recalled, "this reshaped the whole bloody war." Similar concern was felt in the White House, where President Johnson and his advisers, privy to the same special intelligence MACV was receiving, anxiously watched the enemy converge on Khe Sanh.[20]

By the end of December, the administration and MACV had concluded that the Communists were preparing for some sort of major military assault early in the new year and that the offensive might be part of a larger change in Communist war strategy. However, they remained uncertain what the direction of change would be, the more so after the North Vietnamese foreign minister's announcement on 31 December. If a consensus existed, it was that the enemy, realizing his position was deteriorating, would try a last-ditch offensive before moving to the conference table. Epitomizing this view and echoing the conclusions of an assessment earlier in the month by the CIA Saigon station, General Westmoreland, on 20 December, told General Wheeler:

> The enemy has already made a crucial decision concerning the conduct of the war. . . . The enemy decided that prolongation of his past policies for conducting the war would lead to his defeat, and that he would have to make a major effort to reverse the downward trend. . . . His decision therefore was to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period. . . . If the enemy is successful in winning a significant military victory somewhere in SVN [South Vietnam], or gaining even an apparent position of strength, he may seek to initiate negotiations. If, on the other hand, he fails badly, we do not believe that he will negotiate from weakness, but will continue the war at a reduced intensity. In short, I believe that the enemy has already made a

[20] Msg, Locke, Westmoreland, and Komer Saigon 15107 to State Dept, 5 Jan 68, Cable Chronological State Dept (Chron-State) (Jan–May 68), Deputy COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (DepCORDS) files, CMH; Memo, Davidson for Komer, 6 Aug 67, sub: Monthly Report of Infiltration into SVN; Draft Ltr, Komer to President, 20 Aug 67, Robert M. Montague Papers. All in CMH. Msg, Westmoreland MAC 9311 to Fred Greene, 5 Oct 67, Westmoreland Message files, Oct 67, CMH. Col. Charles Morris quotation is from his Deposition no. 2, pp. 155–57; see also Morris, Deposition (no. 1), pp. 38–39, 73–74, and (no. 2), pp. 106–11, in *Vietnam: A Documentary Collection,* cards 345, 348–49.

crucial decision to make a maximum effort. The results of this effort will determine the next move.[21]

This assessment, however, was not unanimous. Admiral Sharp, for example, declared on 26 December that he saw no "criticality in the current enemy situation which portends a final push effort." He rejected the theory that Hanoi "has misread the evidence and believes conditions are ripe for a Communist victory," insisting that the Communists' excellent intelligence network in the south must be telling them otherwise. Sharp expected the enemy in the next few months to strike some sharp blows aimed at pressuring the United States to accept a Viet Cong–dominated coalition government and acknowledged that it might be "considering further changes concerning the future conduct of the war." Nevertheless, "the likelihood of a final effort . . . sometime after Tet cannot be discounted but remains remote."[22]

The Military Assistance Command, although it acknowledged the probability of nationwide enemy attacks, expected the heaviest blow to fall in northern I Corps. Cut off from the rest of South Vietnam by the Hai Van Mountains, a spur that ran down to the sea just north of Da Nang, the area's land communications were tenuous. Its proximity to North Vietnamese bases and troop concentrations, along with the presence of Hue, the former Vietnamese imperial capital, and other important objectives, made it the logical place for the enemy to seek significant territorial gains or a major battlefield victory. Persistent North Vietnamese infantry and artillery attacks on Con Thien and other Marine positions below the Demilitarized Zone, as well as the movement of additional North Vietnamese divisions toward the area, reinforced this view. A war game of a possible enemy offensive, played at Military Assistance Command headquarters in late December and early January, confirmed that the enemy's best course of action would be to launch secondary attacks in the Central Highlands, along the central coast, and around Saigon while striking the main blow with four or five divisions in Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the two provinces of northern I Corps. Tending to confirm MACV's assessment, subsequent North Vietnamese accounts indicate that the divisions assembling along the Demilitarized Zone were intended to break through the strongpoint obstacle system and seize Hue and possibly Da Nang in conjunction with local uprisings. Although unaware of these facts at the time, MACV was preoccupied during December and January with preparations for large-scale combat in the region between the

[21] Msg, Westmoreland MAC 12397 to Wheeler, 20 Dec 67; see also Msg, Wheeler JCS 10897–67 to Sharp and Westmoreland, 16 Dec 67. Both in Westmoreland Message files, Dec 67, CMH. Compare to the Saigon CIA station estimate of 8 Dec 67, quoted in Ford, *CIA and Vietnam*, pp. 120–21.

[22] Msg, Sharp to Wheeler, 26 Dec 67, Westmoreland Message files, Dec 67, CMH.

Demilitarized Zone and the Hai Van Pass, which constituted the dividing line between northern and southern I Corps.[23]

Long concerned with the Communist threat to northern I Corps, General Westmoreland, in the spring of 1967, had deployed the Army brigades of Task Force OREGON (later renamed the Americal Division) to the southern part of the corps area so that III Marine Amphibious Force could shift more of its marines toward the Demilitarized Zone. The MACV commander also opened additional air and seaborne lines of communication to the endangered region. By the end of the year, the MACV staff was planning an extensive series of offensives against the enemy bases in western I Corps. Code-named YORK I through IV, these operations were to begin in March of 1968 and progressively work from south to north, cleaning out the enemy strongholds. To conduct these operations, General Westmoreland planned to transfer the 1st Cavalry Division to I Corps from its normal operating area in II Corps. As the enemy offensive threat increased, the MACV commander used the YORK plans as the basis for preparations to send the air cavalry to I Corps to help the marines counter or preempt the expected North Vietnamese assault.[24]

By the beginning of January, MACV had concluded that the climactic battle would take place at Khe Sanh. The Marine combat base and airfield, located on a plateau in northern Quang Tri Province close to the Laotian border, was the farthest western outpost of the McNamara barrier line. It obstructed a major enemy infiltration route from Laos into coastal I Corps, served as a base for Studies and Observations Group teams operating against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and was potentially important for supporting larger attacks into Laos along Highway 9 if such ever were authorized. Surrounded by mountains and able to be supplied and reinforced only by air, Khe Sanh bore a superficial resemblance to Dien Bien Phu, where the Viet Minh had won their climactic victory over the French in 1954. Early in the new year, special intelligence, supplemented by information from prisoners and defectors, indicated that at least two North Vietnamese divisions and possibly more were converging on the base. Officials in Saigon and Washington,

[23] The war game is described in Davidson, *Vietnam Secrets*, pp. 104–05. Westmoreland's concern with I Corps is evident in his History Notes, 29 Nov–16 Dec 67, tab A, Westmoreland History file no. 26 (29 Nov–16 Dec 67) and 28 Dec 67–31 Jan 68, tab A–1, Westmoreland History file no. 28 (27 Dec 67–31 Jan 68). Both in CMH. Ford, "Tet 1968," pp. 152–62, 168–77, summarizes Communist accounts.

[24] Westmoreland History Notes, 28 Dec 67–31 Jan 68, tab A–1; MFR, Bryan, 7 Jan 68, sub: CIIB Meeting, 6 Jan 68, tab A–16. Both in Westmoreland History file no. 28 (27 Dec 67–1/31/68), CMH. Msgs, Westmoreland MAC 9592 and MAC 11636 to Johnson, 12 Oct 67; Westmoreland MAC 9619 to Sharp, 13 Oct 67, 3 Dec 67; Wheeler JCS 00043–68 to Westmoreland info Sharp, 2 Jan 68; Westmoreland MAC 00204 and MAC 00636 to Sharp info Wheeler, 5 Jan 68 and 14 Jan 68. All in Westmoreland Message files, Oct and Dec 67, Jan 68, CMH. Logistics and reinforcement actions are summarized conveniently in Admiral U. S. G. Sharp and General William C. Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam (as of June 1968)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 172 (hereafter cited as Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report*).



Aerial view of the base at Khe Sanh

including President Johnson, who had a relief map of Khe Sanh set up in the White House, anxiously observed developments, anticipating a desperate and possibly disastrous battle.[25]

The Marine commanders of III Marine Amphibious Force were less than enthusiastic about defending Khe Sanh, and some senior civilians in Washington suggested abandoning it as untenable. However, General Westmoreland insisted on holding the position. Khe Sanh, unlike Dien Bien Phu, was within artillery range of other friendly bases and easily reachable by airplanes and helicopters. Hence, Westmoreland was confident that he could supply the garrison by air and destroy enemy attackers with a curtain of bombs and shells. As with the other border battles, Westmoreland argued that it was better to fight the enemy in a remote, relatively unpopulated area like Khe Sanh rather than in the heavily settled coastal districts, and that a Communist attack on the

[25] Development of the threat is summarized in Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, pp. 554–55; Capt. Moyers S. Shore, II, USMC, *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1969), pp. 26–31; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report*, p. 182; Westmoreland, *Soldier Reports*, pp. 198, 316–17. A proposed corps-size attack into Laos along Highway 9 is described in Msg, Westmoreland MAC 01382 to Sharp, 30 Jan 68, Westmoreland Message files, Jan 68, CMH.

base would offer the allies a chance to employ their overwhelming firepower with maximum effect. While the MACV commander later declared that his decision to hold Khe Sanh was a "military" one, he told General Wheeler on 12 January that, while Khe Sanh was important as a base for SOG teams and "flank security" for the strongpoint obstacle system, "it is even more critical from a psychological viewpoint. To relinquish this area would be a major propaganda victory for the enemy. It[s] loss would seriously affect Vietnamese and US morale." Eleven days later, he maintained "unreservedly" that Khe Sanh was "of significance: strategic, tactical, and most importantly, psychological."[26]

During January, the Military Assistance Command mustered its forces for the expected decisive battle. At MACV's direction, III Marine Amphibious Force reinforced the two Marine battalions already at Khe Sanh with two additional ones. MACV temporarily placed the SOG teams operating from the base under III Marine Amphibious Force's control. The South Vietnamese, at Westmoreland's urging, added a South Vietnamese Ranger battalion to establish its presence in the expected climactic battle. Additional American and allied troops massed in northern I Corps. In mid-January, Westmoreland, implementing his earlier contingency plan, ordered the headquarters and two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division to deploy to the Hue–Phu Bai area; later he rounded out the division with a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division transferred from II Field Force. At the same time, the South Korean Marine brigade shifted northward in I Corps, allowing III Marine Amphibious Force to place part of the 1st Marine Division north of the Hai Van Pass. The South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, pressed by Westmoreland, dispatched two South Vietnamese airborne battalions to Hue to augment a two-battalion task force already there. By the end of January, MACV had concentrated more than 50 percent of all its American combat battalions in I Corps.[27]

In the small hours of 21 January, the North Vietnamese opened their long-awaited attack on Khe Sanh with a fierce but unsuccessful ground assault on a Marine outpost on one of the nearby hilltops north of the base, followed by an artillery and mortar bombardment

[26] Quotations are from Msgs, Westmoreland MAC 00547 to Wheeler, 12 Jan 68, tab 23, Westmoreland History file no. 28 (27 Dec–31 Jan 68), and Westmoreland MAC 0160 to Sharp info Wheeler, 23 Jan 68, Westmoreland Message files, Jan 68. Both in CMH. In latter file, see also Msgs, Wheeler JCS 00343–68 to Westmoreland info Sharp, 11 Jan 68; and Sharp to Wheeler, 14 Jan 68. Typical retrospective rationalizations for holding Khe Sanh are in Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report*, pp. 162–63; Westmoreland, *Soldier Reports*, pp. 335–38; and Shore, *Khe Sanh*, pp. vi–viii. III Marine Amphibious Force reluctance to commit itself to holding the position is recalled in Chaisson, Oral History, pp. 370–73, MCHC.

[27] Reinforcement decisions can be followed in tab A–8, Westmoreland History file no. 27 (19–26 Dec 67), and tabs A–1, 23, 26, 28, 32, and 71, Westmoreland History file no. 28 (27 Dec 67–31 Jan 68), CMH; Chaisson, Oral History, pp. 215–16; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report*, pp. 160, 163–64, 182. Studies and Observations Group control is mentioned in Chaisson Diary, 5 Dec 67–13 Feb 68, box 9, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institution.

that blew up the marines' ammunition dump. In response, MACV ordered the Seventh Air Force to initiate Operation NIAGRA, a previously planned round-the-clock campaign of B–52 and tactical air strikes and artillery bombardment targeted by an intensive reconnaissance effort, which included the use of advanced sensors originally procured for the anti-infiltration barrier. A special ad hoc group in MACV headquarters selected targets for the B–52 missions. General Westmoreland closely supervised the conduct of the NIAGRA campaign, occasionally specifying particular targets for bombing and reconnaissance. MACV and III Marine Amphibious Force began an equally large-scale aerial resupply effort for the base, using both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. To handle casualties, MACV prepared to open an Army surgical hospital in northern I Corps while two Navy hospital ships took position offshore. General Westmoreland secured permission from Admiral Sharp to continue bombing targets in Laos during the Tet cease-fire. The MACV staff began planning an amphibious feint against the southern Democratic Republic of Vietnam to divert enemy reinforcements from Khe Sanh.[28]

Preoccupied, as was the rest of the U.S. government, with the analogy between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu, the MACV commander put his staff historian to work on a study of the earlier battle aimed at demonstrating its differences from the impending one. When the historian delivered a rather pessimistic initial report, Westmoreland emphatically told his staff, "We are not, repeat not, going to be defeated at Khe Sanh" and "strode deliberately from the room."[29]

Such expressions of confidence notwithstanding, General Westmoreland attempted to prepare his superiors, and his own command, for the worst. On 23 January, he warned General Wheeler that there were "problem areas to be overcome or circumvented" in the coming battle and that many aspects of the engagement would require "an additional element of interpretation" to prevent the press and public from developing "erroneous and misleading assessments of our battlefield posture." He urged that the administration take precautions so that "a withdrawal from the Khe Sanh salient or an initial setback" would not precipitate "an erosion of our military and civilian determination" to achieve America's objectives in South Vietnam.[30]

[28] The opening battles are recounted in Shore, *Khe Sanh*, pp. 33–45; Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, pp. 558–59; John Schlight, *The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1988), pp. 277–85; Bernard C. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1973), passim. See also Westmoreland Message files, Jan 68; and Westmoreland History file no. 28 (Dec 27 67–Jan 31 68), especially tabs 32, 49, and 73. Both in CMH. Jones, *War Without Windows*, pp. 161–68, describes work of the Khe Sanh targeting group.

[29] Westmoreland, *Soldier Reports*, pp. 337–38, describes the historical report and his reaction to it. See also tab 49, Westmoreland History file no. 28 (Dec 27–Jan 31 68), CMH.

[30] Msg, Westmoreland MAC 0160 to Sharp info Wheeler, 23 Jan 68, Westmoreland Message files, Jan 68; MFR, Bryan, 20 Jan 68, sub: CIIB Meeting, 20 Jan 68, tab 32, Westmoreland History file no. 28 (27 Dec 67–31 Jan 68). Both in CMH.

Even more ominous, on the twenty-fourth, Westmoreland cabled to Admiral Sharp a recommendation that the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), and MACV begin contingency planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in northern Quang Tri if necessary to prevent a major defeat. He noted that in the uninhabited mountains around Khe Sanh, such weapons could be used with great effect and with "negligible" civilian casualties. Sharp on the thirtieth accepted Westmoreland's proposal and ordered planners from MACV and CINCPAC's component commands to meet on Okinawa on 1 February. Assigning the project the code-name FRACTURE JAW, Sharp enjoined all concerned to "bear in mind the very sensitive nature" of the planning and to restrict knowledge of it to as few people as possible on an "absolutely essential need to know basis." Even before Sharp's action, Westmoreland had put a small MACV staff group to work on a detailed concept for the operation.[31]

Command Problems in I Corps

The impending crisis in I Corps brought to a head festering disagreements between the Military Assistance Command and the III Marine Amphibious Force over command arrangements. It also sharpened the doubts of General Westmoreland and the Army-dominated MACV staff about the ability of the III Marine Amphibious Force headquarters to direct the increasingly large and complex multiservice campaign that was developing. General Westmoreland in response set in motion changes in both air and ground command in I Corps, which plunged MACV into a new round of political and doctrinal conflict with the marines.

During the planning for Operation NIAGRA, General William W. Momyer, the Seventh Air Force commander and Westmoreland's deputy COMUSMACV for air, seized the opportunity to renew his service's campaign for operational control of the marines' fixed-wing tactical aircraft. Momyer was a strong proponent of his service's doctrine that airpower in a theater of operations should be under the central direction of the theater deputy commander for air. Hence, he considered the arrangement that CINCPAC had established early in 1965, under which III Marine Amphibious Force retained command of its aircraft wing and had first call on use of its planes, to be wrong in principle and unsatisfactory in practice. The problem worsened as Army divisions entered I Corps and fighting intensified along the Demilitarized Zone. With MACV mediating, the Seventh Air Force and III Marine Amphibious Force improvised working arrangements to coordinate

[31] Msgs, Westmoreland to Sharp, MAC 01164, MAC 01369, MAC 01439, 24 Jan 68, 29 Jan 68, and 30 Jan 68; Sharp to Westmoreland, Ryan, Beach, Hyland, and Krulak, 30 Jan 68 (quotation is from this message); Sharp to Westmoreland, 30 Jan 68; Westmoreland Message files, Jan 68. All in CMH.

their operations; but Momyer considered these a poor substitute for central direction of all fixed-wing air activity by himself as deputy COMUSMACV for air. The air campaign in support of Khe Sanh would require the most precise coordination of B–52 and tactical air strikes, as well as helicopter missions and artillery fire, in a restricted area—coordination, Momyer insisted, that could be achieved only by placing the marines' jet fighters and bombers under the control of the Seventh Air Force. Articulate, forceful, and persistent, Momyer pressed his case upon Westmoreland.[32]

On 17 January, Westmoreland opened the doctrinal battle. He informed Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, the III Marine Amphibious Force commander, that in view of "the increased deployment of Army forces into I Corps, impending battles and the need for having more operational flexibility of the air effort," he was "contemplating placing operational control of the I [*sic*] Marine Air Wing under my Deputy for Air." Westmoreland reassured Cushman that III Marine Amphibious Force would retain operational control of its helicopters. He also declared that the proposed new arrangement was a "temporary measure to meet the current situation." The MACV commander sent a similarly worded message to Admiral Sharp. Emphasizing that the "impending major battle" made necessary "an immediate change in the control of tactical air in I CTZ [Corps Tactical Zone]," he insisted that it was "no longer feasible nor prudent to restrict the employment of the total tactical air resources to given areas." "I feel the utmost need," he said, "for a more flexible posture to shift my air effort where it can best be used in the coming battles."[33]

The tentative wording of Westmoreland's message to Cushman suggests that it might have been a trial balloon, designed to test reaction of III Marine Amphibious Force and other interested commands. If so, the balloon quickly drew a volley of arrows. On the eighteenth, General Momyer discussed the plan with Cushman and his staff but failed to win their agreement to the change. General Cushman the same day denounced the plan as "doctrinally and functionally" unsuited to his requirements. He protested to Westmoreland that the proposal amounted to "replacing my aviation commander and control over his

[32] Earlier air command controversies are recounted in Cosmas, *Years of Escalation, 1962–1967*, chs. 3 and 8. Air command arrangements in effect through late 1967 are contained in MACV Directive no. 95–4, 13 Jul 65, copy in MCHC Archives. See also Chaisson, Oral History, pp. 229–30, 235–37, MCHC; Ltrs, Chaisson to Mrs Chaisson, 17 Oct 67 and 14 Nov 67, box 7, John R. Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institution; Nalty, *Fight for Khe Sanh*, pp. 68–80; Schlight, *Years of the Offensive*, pp. 108–09, 203–05, 262–64, 269–70; William W. Momyer, *Airpower in Three Wars* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1978), pp. 284–87.

[33] Quotations are from Msgs, Westmoreland MAC 00791 to Cushman, 17 Jan 68; and Westmoreland MAC 00797 to Sharp info Wheeler, Gen John Paul McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak, 18 Jan 68; Westmoreland Message files, Jan 68, CMH; Westmoreland History Notes, 28 Dec 67–31 Jan 68, tab A–1, Westmoreland History file no. 28 (27 Dec 67–31 Jan 68), CMH; MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, p. 436.

night there. Of 51 South Vietnamese battalions assigned to support pacification, 46 were operating in their assigned areas. President Thieu replaced two corps commanders and fifteen province chiefs, to the net advantage of pacification. According to the CORDS Hamlet Evaluation System, the percentage of the South Vietnamese urban and rural population living in relatively secure areas, which had fallen immediately after Tet, began gradually rising during the spring and was approaching pre-offensive levels by the middle of the year. A government-sponsored hamlet self-defense movement made headway in some areas, and there were indications of peasant disillusionment at the Viet Cong's failure to achieve their promised great victory at Tet. The rural economy recovered quickly, with no long-lasting shortages or price inflation. The progress achieved was fragile, and advisers in the hardest-hit provinces estimated that it would take six to nine months to restore the program to full momentum (pessimists doubted it ever had much momentum). Nevertheless, contrary to alarmist reports immediately after Tet in both the news media and official channels, pacification, thanks in part to timely MACV and CORDS efforts to revive it, was far from dead.[23]

I Corps: MACV Versus the Marines

While taking steps to control the situation in the rest of the country, General Westmoreland throughout February and March focused much of his attention on northern I Corps, where he expected enemy forces to launch the next and potentially most dangerous phase of their offensive. The MACV commander told General Wheeler on 9 February that "the only really serious threat that faces me now" was in the area between the Demilitarized Zone and Hai Van Pass. There the rain and fog of the northeast monsoon and the enemy's cutting of Highway 1, the allies' sole land supply line, intensified the threat posed by massed North Vietnamese divisions.[24]

Events strengthened the MACV commander's concern. At Hue, the North Vietnamese augmented their initial attack force and waged a bitter month-long battle to hold the city. At Khe Sanh, besides continuing rocket and artillery bombardment, they assaulted two of the Marine garrison's hilltop outposts and were repulsed only after hand-to-hand fighting. On 7 February, using tanks for the first time in South Vietnam, they overran the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei 14 kilometers southwest of the Marine combat base. General Westmoreland

[23] Statistics are from Msg, Komer Saigon 24361 to Bunker, 9 Apr 68, Cable Chron-State (Jan–May 68), DepCORDS files, CMH. In same file, see Msg, Bunker Saigon 21382 to Sec State, 7 Mar 68. Memo, Komer for Bunker, 23 Apr 68, Bunker—Memos for RWK (1967–68); Msg, Komer to Westmoreland, MAC 9389, [ca. Jul 68], Backchannel file (1967–68). All in DepCORDS files, CMH. MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 519–20, 527–29. Command changes are described in Clarke, *Final Years*, pp. 308–13.

[24] Msg, Westmoreland MAC 01858 to Wheeler and Sharp, 9 Feb 68, Westmoreland Message files, Feb 68, CMH.



President Johnson reviewing the relief map of Khe Sanh

and General Abrams, who activated MACV Forward headquarters at Phu Bai in mid-February, viewed these events, and the buildup of additional North Vietnamese forces in striking distance of Hue and Da Nang, as presaging a full-scale Communist offensive aimed at seizing all of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, possibly to establish a position of strength from which to enter negotiations.[25]

President Johnson and his advisers anxiously watched the developing siege of Khe Sanh. The president, disturbed by ominous press reports that likened the marines' situation and probable fate to those of the French at Dien Bien Phu, repeatedly pressed Westmoreland, through General Wheeler, for reassurance that the base would not fall. The MACV commander in response reiterated his conviction that airpower and artillery would crush any North Vietnamese assault, as well as his assertion that the outpost must be held for both military and morale reasons. On 4 February, the president secured from the Joint Chiefs of Staff their written concurrence with Westmoreland's views. At

[25] Msgs, Westmoreland MAC 01592 to Sharp info Wheeler and Bunker, 3 Feb 68 and MAC 01975 to Sharp and Wheeler, 12 Feb 68; and Abrams PHB 169 and PHB 231 to Westmoreland, 26 Feb 68 and 5 Mar 6. All in Westmoreland Message files, Feb and Mar 68, CMH. MFR, Chaisson, 18 Feb 68, sub: Unit Deployments, tab 65, Westmoreland History file no. 29 (1–29 Feb 68), CMH. Also Enemy plans: CIA Rpt, 20 Feb 68, copy in CMH; Ford, "Tet 1968," pp. 152–62, 168–77, 275–77. Battles for Hue and Khe Sanh are described in detail in Shulimson et al., *Marines in Vietnam, 1968*, chs. 9–12 and 14.

Johnson's direction, Westmoreland, beginning on 5 February, made a special daily report on operations at Khe Sanh and in the Demilitarized Zone area, including statistics on B–52 and tactical air strikes, tons of supply delivered to the base, and American casualties. While seeking reassurance and military details, the president left the conduct of this battle to his field commander. Johnson and his advisers, Wheeler told Westmoreland, recognized that "you are the responsible commander and that no one can direct tactical operations in the field from Washington."[26]

Among President Johnson's greatest worries about Khe Sanh was that the military might ask permission to use tactical nuclear weapons there to prevent disaster. Reassurances to the contrary from Wheeler and Westmoreland were less than convincing. Westmoreland, for example, on 3 February, after the usual expression of confidence, added that "should the situation in the Demilitarized Zone area change dramatically," the United States must be "prepared to introduce weapons of greater effectiveness against massed forces," with "either tactical nuclear weapons or chemical agents" as "active candidates for employment." During the first weeks of February, CINCPAC, MACV, and III Marine Amphibious Force continued the top-secret contingency planning, code-named FRACTURE JAW, which they had begun late in January for using tactical nuclear weapons around Khe Sanh. On the ninth, General Westmoreland approved a MACV operational plan for this purpose. By that time, however, the issue had become public in the United States, with Senator Eugene McCarthy and others charging that the military was preparing to use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam. The administration, facing a domestic and foreign outcry, publicly disavowed any such intent. Secretly, on the twelfth, at Wheeler's direction, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland discontinued all FRACTURE JAW planning, placed the documents under tight security control, and instructed the few staff personnel involved not to disclose even the existence of the plans.[27]

With nuclear weapons thus effectively ruled out, the Military Assistance Command used every other means at its disposal to

[26] Quotation is from Msg, Wheeler JCS 01316 to Westmoreland info Sharp, 4 Feb 68, Westmoreland Message files, Feb 68, CMH. Msgs, Wheeler JCS 01147, JCS 01305, JCS 01320, and JCS 02885 to Westmoreland, 1, 3, 4 Feb 68 and 13 Mar 68; Westmoreland MAC 01586, MAC 01637, MAC 02018, and MAC 02954 to Wheeler info Sharp, 3, 5, 12 Feb 68, 2 Mar 68; Westmoreland MAC 01666 to Wheeler info Sharp and Bunker, 5 Feb 68. All in Westmoreland Message files, Feb–Mar 68, CMH. MFR, Westmoreland, 16 Feb 68, sub: President's Position on Khe Sanh, tab 60, Westmoreland History file no. 29 (1–29 Feb 68), CMH.

[27] Quotation is from Msg, Westmoreland MAC 01586 to Wheeler info Sharp, 3 Feb 68; Westmoreland Message files, Feb 68, CMH. Msgs, Wheeler JCS 01154 to Sharp and Westmoreland, 1 Feb 68; Wheeler JCS 01272 to Westmoreland info Sharp, 3 Feb 68; Wheeler JCS 01678 to Sharp info Westmoreland, 10 Feb 68; Westmoreland MAC 01900 and MAC 02007 to Cushman, 10, 12 Feb 68; Westmoreland MAC 01902 to Sharp, 10 Feb 68; Sharp to Wheeler info Westmoreland, 2 Feb 68; Sharp to Westmoreland et al., 6 and 12 Feb 68. All in Westmoreland Message files, Feb 68, CMH. Controversy in the United States is covered in Hammond, *Military and the Media, 1962–1968*, pp. 361–63.

strengthen northern I Corps against the coming blow. Despite worsening weather, the command kept up round-the-clock air and artillery bombardment of the North Vietnamese divisions besieging Khe Sanh. With fighting still going on all over South Vietnam, General Westmoreland took the calculated risk of thinning American forces in II and III Corps to obtain additional reinforcements for northern I Corps, notably the aforementioned shift of the 101st Airborne Division from the Saigon area to Thua Thien. He told General Cushman on 23 February, "I have no more reserves" and warned the Marine commander, "you will have to go on extreme economy of force s[outh] of the Hai Van [and] cut corners everyplace" if still more troops were needed in the north. Reacting to the appearance of North Vietnamese tanks at Lang Vei, Westmoreland set the MACV staff to work augmenting I Corps anti-armor weaponry. In cooperation with Admiral Sharp, he resumed planning for an amphibious feint above the Demilitarized Zone to divert North Vietnamese troops from the battle in Quang Tri.[28]

As February gave way to March, the great North Vietnamese attack still did not materialize. The allies continued hammering the enemy with airpower, further expanded their logistical base north of the Hai Van, and deployed their reinforcements. They also began planning a counteroffensive to destroy Communist forces in the coastal lowlands and then break the siege of Khe Sanh.[29]

As the crisis in the north intensified, so also did General Westmoreland's doubts about the competence of III MAF's leadership. His discontent came into the open on 7 February, at a meeting at III MAF headquarters to deal with the fall of Lang Vei and with an apparent new North Vietnamese threat to Da Nang. Discerning what he considered to be an "absence of initiative" among the marines, Westmoreland gave direct instructions to General Cushman's subordinate commanders for organizing the rescue of the surviving Lang Vei defenders and for deploying battalions from the Americal Division to reinforce Da Nang. This experience, and other irritations, strengthened Westmoreland's resolve to set up a new headquarters to oversee the

[28] Khe Sanh bombardment is summarized in Shulimson et al., *Marines in Vietnam, 1968*, pp. 475–86. See also Memo, Col D. A. Gruenther, Dir Operations Research/Systems Analysis, Hqs MACV (MACEVAL), for COMUSMACV, 5 Apr 68, sub: An Analysis of the Khe Sanh Battle, Westmoreland History file no. 31 (1–30 Apr 68), CMH. Quotation is from Chaisson Diary, 23 Feb 68, box 9, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institution; see also MFR, Chaisson, 24 Feb 68, sub: Commander's Guidance, tab 76, Westmoreland History file no. 29 (1–29 Feb 68), CMH. Development of amphibious feint is summarized in MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 781–82; see also Westmoreland Message files, Feb 68, CMH.

[29] Westmoreland History Notes, 1–29 Feb 68, tab 1, Westmoreland History file no. 29 (1–29 Feb 68), CMH; Westmoreland History Notes, 1–31 Mar 68, tab 1; MFR, Chaisson, 3 Mar 68, sub: COMUSMACV Visit to ICTZ, tab 5; Msg, CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 12 Mar 68, tab 24. All in Westmoreland History file no. 30 (1–31 Mar 68), CMH; Msg, Abrams PHB 218 to Westmoreland, 4 Mar 68; Cushman to Westmoreland, Abrams, Rosson, 8 Mar 68; Abrams PHB 261 to Westmoreland, 9 Mar 68. All in Westmoreland Message files, Feb–Mar 68, CMH. MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, p. 619.



(Left to right) *General Wheeler, General Abrams, and Secretary of Defense Laird*

Despite Abrams' advocacy of delay, Nixon and Laird, under intense political pressure, went ahead with plans for an early withdrawal. On 2 June, after further exchanges with the Joint Chiefs, Abrams, and McCain, Laird recommended to the president that planning for 1969 be based on a maximum of 50,000 troops with an immediate decision only on the first installment of 25,000, removal of which would begin in July. General Abrams meanwhile, in response to the Joint Chiefs' concern about the threat to northern I Corps, revised the first increment to include only one regiment of the 3d Marine Division and the headquarters and two brigades of the 9th Infantry Division.[23]

With military planning for the initial withdrawal on the way to completion, President Nixon moved to secure the Saigon government's

Discussion with Gen Abrams, 9 May 69, box 137, NSC files, Nixon Papers, NARA. MACV, Force Planning Synopsis, pp. 29–32.

[23] Msgs, Abrams MAC 6542 to McCain info Wheeler, 22 May 69; Abrams MAC 6987 to Wheeler and McCain, 1 Jun 69; Abrams MAC 7021 to Wheeler and McCain, 2 Jun 69; Abrams MAC 7206 to McCain, 6 Jun 69; Wheeler JCS 07142 to McCain and Abrams, 9 Jun 69; Abrams Papers, CMH. Memo, Laird for the President, 2 Jun 69, sub: Vietnamizing the War (NSSM 36), box 089, NSC files, Nixon Papers, NARA; MACV Force Planning Synopsis, pp. 36–43, 47–49. Westmoreland, *Soldier Reports*, p. 381, claims that his protests to the Joint Chiefs and Henry Kissinger initiated the change in divisions in the first increment.

endorsement, and also that of his field commanders, before making a public announcement. He arranged to meet with President Thieu on 8 June at the U.S. Pacific outpost of Midway, a site chosen because it had not been used for similar conferences by President Johnson and because it lacked inhabitants who might demonstrate against Nixon, Thieu, and the war. En route to Midway, Nixon met on 7 June in Honolulu with his principal civilian and military advisers, and with Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, and Admiral McCain. Preparatory to this meeting, Wheeler repeatedly urged Abrams and McCain to emphasize for the president "the threat to U.S. forces and the risk involved in force reductions." The chairman's efforts to mobilize his field commanders against redeployment were in vain. At the preliminary gathering, the military commanders, pressed by the civilians who insisted redeployments were a political necessity, agreed to go forward with the first 25,000-man withdrawal. According to Kissinger, they did so with obvious reluctance, since they knew they were committing themselves to a process that likely would be irreversible and deprive them of any real hope of victory.[24]

With the military leaders on board, the rest was anticlimax. At Midway on 8 June, President Thieu agreed without hesitation to the commencement of American withdrawals. Two days later, President Nixon announced that the United States would remove 25,000 troops from South Vietnam by the end of August. As planned, a regiment of the 3d Marine Division and the headquarters and two brigades of the 9th Infantry Division were the principal combat units to depart. Nixon pledged that after completion of the first withdrawal, he periodically would consider additional redeployments in the light of progress in the Paris talks, the pace of RVNAF improvement, and the level of enemy action. The following month, during a trip to Asia, the president expanded Vietnamization into his "Nixon Doctrine," under which he pledged that the United States would protect its Asian allies against nuclear threats but declared that "in cases involving other types of aggression" America would furnish military and economic assistance but would "look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."[25]

Once begun, American withdrawals took on a momentum of their own, each increment following the previous one in steady succession. Domestic political pressures, far more than MACV's evaluation criteria, dictated the pace, as Nixon and the Democrats tried to outbid each

[24] Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 35, 272. Quotation is from Msg, Wheeler JCS 06337 to Abrams info McCain, 24 May 69, Abrams Papers, CMH. Conference preparations are covered in Msgs, Abrams MAC 6527 to Wheeler and McCain, 22 May 69; Wheeler JCS 06798 to McCain and Abrams, 2 Jun 69; Abrams MAC 7088 to Wheeler and McCain, 4 Jun 69. All in Abrams Papers, CMH.

[25] Quotations are from Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 222–25; see also pp. 273–74. Historical Division, "Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1969–1970," pp. 109–10; MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, ch. 4, pp. 10–11.

other on withdrawal size and timing. In June, for example, former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, writing in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*, urged that the United States pull 100,000 troops out of Vietnam by the end of 1969 and remove all combat personnel by the end of 1970. Nixon, at a 19 June news conference replied: "We have started to withdraw forces. . . . We will withdraw more," and he expressed "hope that we could beat Mr. Clifford's timetable." During the Asian trip on which he promulgated the Nixon Doctrine, the president, in a brief stop in Saigon on 30 July, made it clear to President Thieu that continued withdrawals would be necessary to maintain American public support for the administration and the war.[26]



President Thieu and President Nixon meet at Midway Island.

Even as the troops of the first increment, Phase I, boarded ships and planes, planning for the second redeployment increment, known as Phase II, got under way. Under administration pressure, this increment gradually expanded from 25,000 troops to 40,500. Abrams and McCain protested that such enlargement was unwarranted by the situation. In their final NSSM 36 report, the Joint Chiefs declared that removal of more than 50,000 men during 1969 "would be clearly without justification on military grounds and beyond the threshold of prudent risk." Nevertheless, on 16 September, President Nixon directed the 40,500-man pullout, built around the rest of the 3d Marine Division and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to be completed by 15 December.[27]

[26] Quotation is from MACV, Force Planning Synopsis, pp. 65–66; see also pp. 85–86. Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 274–77, 282–83. Memo, Kissinger for the President, 8 Jul 69, sub: SEQUOIA NSC Meeting on Vietnam; and Memo, Sec State Rogers for Sec Def, sub: Your Memorandum Transmitting NSSM 36 Final Report . . . , 3 Sep 69, both in box 091, NSC files, Nixon Papers, NARA, illustrate pressures within the administration for continued and larger withdrawals.

[27] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 283; MACV, Force Planning Synopsis, pp. 69, 88, 93–94, 96.1, 98–99, 104, 106, 108, 111–12, 115–19, 122.1, 136–37; Historical Division, "Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1969–1970," pp. 113–24; MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, ch. 4, pp. 12–13. For Abrams' and McCain's views, see Msgs, Abrams MAC 9967 to McCain, 2 Aug 69; McCain to Wheeler info Abrams, 13 Aug 69 and 23 Aug 69. Both in Abrams Papers, CMH. Quotation is from Memo, Wheeler JCSM–522–1–69 for Sec Def, 29 Aug 69, box 091, NSC files, Nixon Papers, NARA.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

3

March 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: [redacted] Destroyers Patrolling Offshore North Vietnam

3.3(b)(4),(5)
6.2(a)

The attached report [redacted] aboard the [redacted] which was caused by offshore mortar fire from North Vietnam raises sharply the question of why U.S. destroyers on these patrols [redacted]

3.3(b)(4),(5)
6.2(a)

Although in this case no serious problem resulted from the North Vietnam attack, I can foresee the possibility of a misleading news report in the event the circumstances of this attack leak to the press.

[redacted]

3.3(b)(4),(5)
6.2(a)

I called this report to the attention of Ben Read who spoke to Mr. Katzenbach. Katzenbach expects to discuss this question with Mr. Vance today.

BKS

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ/RAC 09-110
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-17-10

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THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3a

THE JOINT STAFF

25 March 1967
9:30 AM EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Report of Nuclear Incident

1. At 241918 EST the [redacted], operating approximately 4,000 yards offshore east of the DMZ, was hit by what was estimated to be three rounds of mortar fire. [redacted] was conducting a Naval Gunfire Support patrol for BEACON HILL I operations and was not firing a mission at the time of the attack. [redacted] opened range and fired 78 rounds of counterbattery fire with unknown effect. The mortar ceased firing at [redacted] when the range to the beach was about 7,800 yards.

2. Results of this attack were two direct hits in the ASROC (anti-submarine rocket) magazine and the third in the radar room. One Rocket Thrown Depth Charge (RTDC) motor ignited. The magazine was flooded and the fire extinguished. [redacted] Eighteen torpedoes with conventional warheads were also stored in the magazine. All of the weapons in the magazine were damaged to varying degrees from shrapnel holes in fins to heat and water damage. There was no apparent damage to [redacted] No personnel were injured.

3. CINCPAC has directed an investigation to determine if any [redacted] received damage.

H. J. TRUM III
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Copies to:
WHITE HOUSE
SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS
DJS
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
NWSE
CMC
AFCP
CSA
CNO
DDO
ADDO
DIA Rep
NSA Rep
CIA Rep
State Rep
PA Rep
CCOC

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 09-111 appeal
By isl NARA, Date 3-31-11

E.O. 13526
3.3(b)(4)(5)
6.2(a)

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DECK LOG-TITLE PAGE
NAVPERS 3100/1 (1-66) (Formerly NAVPERS 716)

S/N-0105-404-1550

DECK LOG BOOK

OF THE

U.S.S. OZBOURN

DD 846
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

Attached to 92 Division,
9 Squadron,
Flotilla,
7 Fleet,
Naval District,

Commencing 0001 1 March (zone time and date), 19 67 ,

at US Naval Base Yokosuka, Japan (location),

and ending 0000 31 March (zone time and date), 19 67 ,

at US Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines (location)

Approved by: J. [illegible] DENTAE, CDR, USN Commanding

TO BE FORWARDED DIRECT TO THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NAVPERS 0/2 (1-66)
(Formerly NAVPERS 719)

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

S/N-0105-404-1560

USS OZBOURN (DD846) ZONE DESCRIPTION -8H DATE SATURDAY (Day) 25 (Date) MARCH (Month) 19 67

AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L 17° 01.9N	BY	2
λ 107° 09.4E	BY	2

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L 16°58.5N	BY	2
λ 106° 45'E	BY	2

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000		
L 16°50.5N	BY	2
λ 107°20.2E	BY	2

LEGEND: 1-CELESTIAL, 2-ELECTRONIC, 3-VISUAL, 4-D. R.

REMARKS

0000-0400 STEAMING IN FSA 1 IN CORPS 2 AREA RUN IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMSEVENTHFLT THIRD QUARTER EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. SHIPS IN COMPANY INCLUDE U.S.S. PRINCETON (LPH 4), U.S.S. OGDEN (LPD 5), U.S.S. MONTICELLO (LSD 35), AND U.S.S. AIGELOW (DD 942). SOPA AND OTC IS CTG 76.5 EMBARKED ON U.S.S. PRINCETON (LPH 4) SHIPS DATA: #1 AND #3 BOILERS, #1 AND #2 5/6 GENERATORS, PLANT SPLIT. CONDITION OF READINESS TWO AND MATERIAL CONDITION YOKE SET FWD FR. 172 AND MATERIAL CONDITION ZEBRA SET AFT FR 172. SHIP IS DARKENED. BASE COURSE 000°T / 180°T BASE SPEED 3KTS. 0022 C/C 160°T. 0135 C/C 000°T. 0215 C/C 160°T 0235 COMMENCED FIRING. 0245 CEASE FIRE. AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 25 ROUNDS HC, 25 ROUNDS SPDN WITH NO CASUALTIES. 0318 C/C 000°T

J.D. Schrader
J. D. Schrader, ENS, USN

0400-0800 UNDERWAY AS BEFORE 0414 C/C TO 180°T. 0500 C/C TO 000°T. 0546 C/C TO 180°T. 0626 C/C TO 000°T. 0710 C/C TO 180°T

T.M. Sherlock
T. M. SHERLOCK, LT(JG), USNR

0800-1200 UNDERWAY AS BEFORE. 0740 MUSTERED THE CREW AT QUARTERS. ABSENTEES: NONE. 0817 TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY ENEMY MORTARS OFF THE COAST OF VIET NAM ABOUT 4000 YDS. EAST OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THE APPROXIMATE POSITION: 17°03'N 107°09'E. MANEUVERING ON VARIOUS COURSES AND SPEEDS TO EVADE FURTHER GUNFIRE. SET CONDITION 1AA. THE SHIP RECEIVED TWO DIRECT HITS CAUSING DAMAGE IN THE MK 25 RADAR ROOM AND ASROC MAGAZINE. THERE WAS MINOR DAMAGE FROM SCHRAPNEL THROUGHOUT THE PORT SIDE 0820 FIRE IN THE ASROC MAGAZINE. COMMENCED RETURNING GUNFIRE. 0826 CEASED FIRING AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 65 ROUNDS OF 5"/38 HICAP, 2 ROUNDS OF 5"/38 VT, 10 ROUNDS OF 5"/38 AAC, 77 ROUNDS OF 5"/38 SMOKELESS POWDER CARTRIDGES WITH NO CASUALTIES. 0836 FIRE IN THE ASROC MAGAZINE UNDER CONTROL. DAMAGE: FIRE AND SCHRAPNEL DAMAGE TO ASROC MISSILES; STRUCTURAL DAMAGE: 2'X2' HOLE IN PORT BULKHEAD AND DECK OF THE MAGAZINE ABOUT FRAME 128 0840 NO PERSONNEL CASUALTIES. 0846 FIRE IN THE MK 25 RADAR ROOM. POWER TO MK 25 RADAR ROOM SECURED. 0849 FIRE IN MK 25 RADAR ROOM UNDER CONTROL. NO PERSONNEL CASUALTIES. DAMAGE: EXTENSIVE FIRE AND SCHRAPNEL DAMAGE TO MK 25 RADAR ELECTRONIC GEAR. STRUCTURAL DAMAGE: 2'X1' HOLE IN PORT BULKHEAD ABOUT 4 FEET ABOVE THE DECK AT FRAME 82. 0934 SECURED FROM GENERAL QUARTERS. 1000 C/S 01 KNOT. LAUNCHED THE MOTOR WHALEBOAT TO CHECK DAMAGE TO PORT SIDE. 1048 RECOVERED MOTOR WHALEBOAT. REPORTED A 4" DIAMETER HOLE 5 FEET ABOVE THE WATERLINE AT FRAME 40. MANEUVERING

EXAMINED

E V Walsh LTJG U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

S/N-0105-404-1560

USS O'BANNON DD 846

DATE Saturday 25 March 19 67
(Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS-CONTINUED

AT VARIOUS COURSES AND SPEEDS WHILE STAYING CLEAR OF FSH I

A W Swinger
AW SWINGER, ENS, USN

12-16 UNDERWAY AS before 1231 C/C 225°T 1249 C/C 050°T C/C 100°T stationed Helo Transfer detail 1258 C/C 095°T 1319 A/C Stop Secured helo Transfer detail 1513 set Helo Transfer detail C/S 25 Kts 1515 C/C 080°T 1524 Helo away Transferred Two (2) EOD personnel C/C 130°T 1542 C/S 03 Kts C/C 090°T

S.D. Schroder
S.D. SCHRODER, ENS USN

16-20 UNDERWAY AS before 1610 stationed Helo Transfer Detail 1627 Secured Helo Transfer Detail 1657 Sighted USS WADDELL (DDG-24) Range 9,800 yds Bearing 271°T 1707 C/S 5 Kts. Proceeding to take station for Motor Whale Boat Transfer To port of USS WADDELL (DDG 24) 1721 Motor Whale boat Alongside C/S 3 Kts, 1812 Motor whale boat from USS WADDELL (DDG-24) departed. 1813 C/C 230°T C/S 15 Kts C/C 273°T Proceeding Enroute To night Steaming Area 1858 Achieved 850° degree Superheat in # 2 & 3 Boilers 1926 C/S 9 Kts. 1939 C/C 090°T 1950 C/C 270°T

T.M. Sherlock
T.M. SHERLOCK LT(JG) USN


20-24 UNDERWAY AS BEFORE. MANEUVERING ON VARIOUS COURSES AND SPEEDS WHILE REMAINING IN THE VICINITY OF OPERATION BEACON HILL. 2152 C/S 25 KNOTS C/C 130°T. PROCEEDING TO SUBIC BAY, P.I. 2223 C/C 140°T, 2227 C/C 130°T 2317 C/C 125°T.


A W Swinger
AW SWINGER, ENS, USN

EXAMINED:

S.V. Walsh LTJG U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH




9





FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED STATES

1969–1976
VOLUME XXXIV

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1969–1972



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume XXXIV

National Security Policy, 1969–1972

United States Government Printing Office
Washington

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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- Chemical and Biological Warfare, Safeguard Phase II, the Draft (Documents 94-139)
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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editor is convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations *Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This specific volume documents U.S. national security policy from 1969 to 1972. Readers interested in the larger context in which the formulation of national security policy during this period took place should consult the volumes in the *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, subseries on the Soviet Union (volumes XII through XV), China (volumes XVII and E–13), Vietnam (volumes VI through IX), and Foundations of Foreign Policy (volume I). Readers interested in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I,

1969–1972, and volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1979; for other arms control initiatives, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972. For the U.S. defense relationship with Europe, readers should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, *1969–1976, Volume XXXIV*

After assuming office in January 1969, President Richard M. Nixon received some surprising news that affected the formulation of national security policy for the remainder of his first administration: since the end of his stint as Vice President eight years earlier, the Soviet Union had achieved rough strategic parity with the United States. Where the United States had at one time enjoyed a commanding military superiority compared to its main global rival, it now suffered from "significant vulnerabilities" vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This volume documents the Nixon administration's efforts to grapple with this new strategic situation; its review of U.S. nuclear and general purposes forces and strategic doctrine; its attempts to ascertain the level of technological sophistication achieved by the Soviets in their missile program; and its decision to deploy Safeguard, a modified anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). The volume also examines the evolution of the administration's strategic priorities as its defense plans ran up against the realities of a worsening American economy and a tightening federal budget; its policy towards the use of chemical and biological weapons; U.S. nuclear policy in Asia; and the transition from military conscription to an all-volunteer armed force, a movement undertaken during the first Nixon administration as the war in Vietnam drew to a close. While the primary focus of the volume is on the formulation of national security policy, one chapter is devoted to the October 1969 Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, in which President Nixon secretly placed on alert portions of the United States military, including its nuclear forces, a fact that remained virtually unknown for many years thereafter. Throughout this volume, a theme that arises time and again is the relationship between the United States' military strength and its diplomatic strength; in particular, the importance of military might—real or perceived—to the United States' ability to maintain its credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike.

Like all recent *Foreign Relations* volumes in the Nixon-Ford sub-series, the emphasis of this volume is on the formulation of policy, rather than its implementation. Regarding national security policy, the key players in the policymaking process were the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency, with input from the Department of State.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than

the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editor for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words or phrases underlined in the original are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of the volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in this and other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations

concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Nixon White House Tapes

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President's Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same

conversations printed in previous *Foreign Relations* volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers' inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2005 and was completed in 2011, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excisions of a paragraph or more in 10 documents, and minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 24 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented in this volume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of U.S. national security policy from 1969 to 1972.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials, namely John Powers, at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). He also wishes to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Thanks are due to members of the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence in the Central Intelligence Agency, who helped to arrange access to the files of that agency, and to James Van Hook, the former Joint CIA–State Historian. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers. The editor was able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. The editor would also like to thank Sandy Meagher for her valuable assistance in expediting the use of Department of Defense files. Finally, the editor thanks

the staff of the National Archives and Records Administration, especially David Langbart and Herbert Rawlings; Michael Waesche of the Washington Nation Records Center in Suitland, Maryland; and Gier Gundersen, Donna Lehman, and Helmi Raaska, for their courtesy, professionalism, and tireless assistance.

M. Todd Bennett collected the documents, made the selections, and annotated the documents under the supervision of Louis J. Smith, Chief of the Europe and General Division, and Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Chris Tudda coordinated the de-classification review, under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Carl Ashley did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs

October 2011

Ambassador Edward Brynn
Acting Historian

Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations *Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have full access to the papers of President Nixon and White House foreign policy records, including tape recordings of conversations with key U.S. and foreign officials. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project housed at the National Archives and Records Administration include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, the Library of Congress, and other U.S. Government agencies. Although all the material printed in *Foreign Relations* volumes has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. Nixon's papers were transferred to their permanent home at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, in Yorba Linda, California, after research for this volume was completed. The Nixon Library staff and Ford Library staff are processing

and declassifying many of the documents used in the volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, *1969–1976, Volume XXXIV*

In preparing this volume, the editor made extensive use of the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, especially the National Security Council (NSC) Institutional Files (H-Files) and the NSC Files. The editor found the minutes of the meetings of the NSC and its various subgroups, located in the H-Files, particularly useful. These subgroups included the Senior Review Group (SRG), originally called the Review Group during 1969–1970, which reviewed major foreign policy issues, including national security issues, and the Defense Program Review Committee (DRPC), created in October 1969 specifically to review defense issues and the Department of Defense's budget. The record of the DPRC's meetings—and the memoranda, studies, and correspondence prepared in advance of, and in response to, those discussions—form the backbone of this volume. Similar documents prepared in conjunction with meetings of the Senior Review Group and of the NSC also proved crucial, as did the basic building blocks of national security policy in the Nixon White House: National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs). All of the above records are in the H-Files.

The editor also relied heavily upon records located in the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials. The ABM–MIRV files, featuring documents generated primarily in 1969–1970, detail such topics as the Nixon administration's decision to pursue an anti-ballistic missile defense in March 1969 and that summer's controversy regarding whether or not the Soviets had equipped the SS–9 missile with independently targeted warheads. The Agency Files include key correspondence between the NSC and the Department of Defense regarding the U.S. military posture and the Pentagon's budget. A number of topics pertaining to defense are found in the Subject Files.

Several other portions of the Nixon Presidential Materials yielded key documentation. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President's Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and the White House and Camp David telephones. Transcripts of President Nixon's selected conversations provide insight into policy formulation and reveal his views, and those of his leading advisors, on the U.S. defense posture and the military establishment. Similarly, selected transcripts of Kissinger's telephone conversations uncover the national security advisor's delicate negotiations with those officials responsible for formulating a defense posture and the Defense Department's annual budget. Finally, the President's Office Files, part of the White House Special Files, contain records of Nixon's meetings with leaders of Congress on defense matters. The handful of original documents found in the Kissinger Papers, consisting largely (but not entirely) of copies of NSC documents located in the Nixon Presidential Materials, helped flesh out the picture of U.S. national security policy during

this period.

Second in importance to the Nixon Presidential Materials were the records of the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Of particular note were the records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including Secretary Laird's weekly staff meetings, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. The Laird Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan, comprise select internal Defense Department papers and that department's correspondence with other government agencies, including the NSC, the Department of State, and the JCS. The records of the two chairmen of the JCS, General Earle Wheeler and Admiral Thomas Moorer, located in the National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the JCS, provided key evidence regarding the views of the uniformed military.

Department of State historians have access to the records of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA's History Staff, part of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, facilitates this access. The National Intelligence Estimates, and the files pertaining to their creation, found in the CIA's National Intelligence Council files were crucial to the volume's documentation of the U.S. intelligence community's perception of Soviet and Chinese military capabilities.

The JCS Readiness Test, a heretofore largely secret nuclear alert that occurred in October 1969, presented a special documentary challenge. Several collections helped fill out the story, revealing clues as to the alert's objectives and implementation. Foremost among those resources was Record Group 218, Records of the JCS, Records of the Chairman of the JCS—Wheeler, held at the National Archives. The Kissinger Papers at the Library of Congress yielded some crucial correspondence between the national security advisor and President Nixon. Also productive were several collections in the Nixon Presidential Materials: Kissinger's Telephone Conversations and portions of the NSC Files, including Alexander Haig's Chronological Files, H.R. Haldeman's Journals and Diaries, the President's Daily Briefing, the appropriate folders labeled "Items to Discuss with the President" within the Subject Files, and the memoranda of Kissinger's conversations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin contained in the Trip Files.

Much of the documentation used in the volume has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished sources

Department of State

Central Files. *See* Record Group 59 under National Archives and Records Administration below

Lot Files. *See* Record Group 59 under National Archives and Records Administration below

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files

DEF, Defense affairs

DEF CHICOM, PRC defense affairs

DEF 1, Defense affairs, policy, plans, readiness

DEF 1 EUR, Defense affairs, policy, plans, readiness concerning Europe

DEF 1 EUR W, Defense affairs, policy, plans, readiness concerning Western Europe

DEF 1 US, U.S. defense affairs, policy, plans, readiness

DEF 1 US-USSR, U.S.-USSR defense affairs, policy, plans, readiness

DEF 1–1, Defense affairs, contingency planning

DEF 1–1 US, U.S. defense affairs, contingency planning

DEF 1–2 US, Defense affairs, U.S. stockpiling of strategic and critical materials

DEF 1–3, Defense affairs, military capabilities

DEF 1–5 U.S., U.S. defense affairs, alert measures

DEF 1–6 US, U.S. defense affairs, civilian defense

DEF 6, Defense affairs, armed forces

DEF 6 US, U.S. defense affairs, armed forces

DEF 12, Defense affairs, armaments

DEF 12 CHICOM, PRC defense affairs, armaments

DEF 12 US, U.S. defense affairs, armaments

POL CHICOM–US, PRC–U.S. political affairs and relations

POL CHICOM–USSR, PRCN–USSR political affairs and relations

POL US-USSR, U.S.–USSR political affairs and relations

POL 1 US, U.S. political affairs and relations, general policy

POL 1 US-USSR, U.S.–USSR political affairs and relations, general policy, background

POL 27 US, U.S. political affairs and relations, military operations

Lot Files

PM Files: Lot 69 D 446

Files of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 1964–1975

PM Files: Lot 72 D 503

Files of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of International Security, Policy and Planning, 1966–1972

PM Files: Lot 72 D 504

Files of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of International Security, Policy and Planning, 1969–1971

S/P(C) Files: Lot 73 D 363

Subject, country, and area files of the Policy Planning Staff and the Planning Coordination Staff, 1969–1973

S/S Files: Lot 72 D 370

Memoranda of the Executive Secretariat, 1970

S/S Files: Lot 72 D 371

Memoranda of the Executive Secretariat, 1971

S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443

Office Files of William P. Rogers, 1969-1973

S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212

National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and related papers, 1969–1976

S/S-NSC Meeting Files: Lot 71 D 175

National Security Council meetings, 1969-1970

S/S–NSC/Cabinet Files: Lot 73 D 288

Cabinet meetings and National Security Council meetings, studies, and subgroups, 1970–1972

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Moorer

Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Wheeler

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)

Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversations

National Security Council Files

ABM–MIRV
Agency Files
Country Files—Europe
Alexander Haig Chronological Files
Henry A. Kissinger Office Files
Name Files Presidential/HAK Memcons
President's Daily Briefing
President's Trip Files
Subject Files

National Security Council Institutional Files

Meeting Files
Minutes of Meetings
Study Memoranda (National Security Study Memoranda)

Policy Papers (National Security Decision Memoranda)
Intelligence Files

Special Collections

H.R. Haldeman Diaries

White House Central Files

President's Daily Diary
Subject Files: Confidential Files

White House Special Files

President's Office Files
President's Personal File

White House Tapes

Central Intelligence Agency

National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01012A

Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Laird Papers

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Manuscript Division

Henry A. Kissinger Papers
Elliot Richardson Papers

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas

National Security File

Rostow Files

Special Files

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Department of Defense

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72A-6308

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1969

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72A-6309

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1969

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 73A-1971

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1970

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 73A-1975

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1970

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 74-083

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1971

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 74-115

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1971

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75-125

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1972

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75-155

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1972

OSD Files: FRC 330 74-142

Files from the Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense Vault, 1969-1972

OSD Files: FRC 330 75-089

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1969

OSD Files: FRC 330 75-103

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1969

OSD Files: FRC 330 76-0028

Secretary of Defense staff meetings, 1969-1972

OSD Files: FRC 330 76-067

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1970

OSD Files: FRC 330 76–076

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1970

OSD Files: FRC 330 76-197

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1971

OSD Files: FRC 330 76-207

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1971

OSD Files: FRC 330 77-0094

Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1972

OSD Files: FRC 330 77-0095

Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1972

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Abbreviations and terms

AAM, air-to-air missile
AAW, anti-air warfare
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ABMDA, Army Ballistic Missile Defense Agency
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AD, assured destruction
ADIZ, air defense identification zone
ADM, Atomic Demolition Munitions
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
ALCOM, Alaskan Command
AMSA, Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft
ANG, Air National Guard
ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States (treaty organization)
AP, Associated Press
AREUR, Army Europe
ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
ASA, anti-submarine aircraft
ASM, air-to-surface missile
ASV, anti-submarine vessel
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
AVF, all-volunteer armed force
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System
B, billion
BMD, ballistic missile defense
BMEWS, Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BMS, ballistic missile submarine
BNSP, basic national security policy
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BW, biological weapon(s)
C^3, command, control, and communications
CBW, chemical and biological weapon(s)
CCP, Consolidated Cryptologic Plan
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEP, circular error probability
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CHICOM, Communist China (People's Republic of China)
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCAL, Commander in Chief, Alaska
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command

CINCNORAD, Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CINCONAD, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, STRIKE Command
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
COB, close of business
COC, command operation center
COMIDEASTFOR, Commander, Middle East Forces
COMINT, communications intelligence
CONAD, Continental Air Defense Command
CONUS, Continental United States
CPR, People's Republic of China (also PRC)
CVA, attack aircraft carrier
CVAN, attack aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered
CVS, support aircraft carrier
CW, chemical weapon(s)
CY, calendar year
D, deployment
D-day, deployment day
DEFCON, defense readiness condition
DFE, division force equivalent
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DICBM, depressed trajectory intercontinental ballistic missile
DLGN, nuclear-powered guided missile frigate
DOB, dispersed operating bases
DOD, Department of Defense
DPQ, Defense Planning Questionnaire
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee
ECM, electronic countermeasures
ELINT, electronic intelligence
EMCON, emission control
EMP, electromagnetic pulse
ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
EUCOM, European Command
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/RPM, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs
exo pen aids, exoatmospheric penetration aids
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBM, fleet ballistic missile
FBS, forward-based systems
FOBS, Fractional Orbital Bombardment System

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FY, fiscal year
FYDP, Five-Year Defense Program
GNP, Gross National Product
GPF, general purpose forces
GRC, Government of the Republic of China
GTE, greater than expected
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HPD, hard point defense
HSD, hard site defense
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IOC, initial operational capability
IPMG, Interdepartmental Political-Military Group
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ISI, initial support increment
J–3, Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JFM, Joint Force Memorandum
JSOP, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
KGB, *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (Committee for State Security, Soviet Secret Police)
KP, kitchen police KT, kiloton
LANTCOM, Atlantic Command
LOC, lines of communication; limited operational capability
LRA, long-range aviation
LSNW, limited strategic nuclear warfare
M, mobilization day; million
MAF, Marine Amphibious Forces
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MBFR, mutual and balanced force reductions
MIDEASTFOR, Middle East Forces
MIRV, multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles
MK, Mark
MM, Minuteman missile
MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile
MRCA, multi-role combat aircraft
MRV, multiple reentry vehicles
MSC, Military Sealift Command
MSR, missile site radar
MT, megaton(s)

NAC, North Atlantic Council
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA, National Command Authority; National Capital Area
NE, Northeast
NEA, Northeast Asia; Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIPP, National Intelligence Projections for Planning
NK, North Korea
NLT, not later than nm, nautical mile
NOA, new obligational authority
NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSF, National Science Foundation
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NVN, North Vietnam; North Vietnamese
NW, Northwest
OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
O&M, operations and maintenance
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OP&MA, Objectives, Plans and Military Assistance Division
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD (ISA), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OSD (SA), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis
OST, Office of Science and Technology
OTH–B, over the horizon—backscatter radar
PACOM, Pacific Command
PAR, perimeter acquisition radar
PDB, President's Daily Brief
pen aids, penetration aids
PF, police force; popular force
PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PLA, People's Liberation Army
POL, petroleum, oils, lubricants
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

POM, Program Objectives Memorandum
PRC, People's Republic of China (also CPR)
PSAC, President's Science Advisory Committee
psi, pounds per square inch
PWs, prisoners of war
RCA, riot control agent
RCS, remote control system
R&D, research and development
RDF, radio-direction-finding
RDT&E, research, development, test, and evaluation REFORGER, Return of Forces to Germany
RF, reserve force; regional force
RG, Review Group; Record Group
ROK, Republic of Korea
ROTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps
RV, reentry vehicle
RVN, Republic of Vietnam
SAB, Science Advisory Board
SAC, Supreme Allied Commander; Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, European Command
SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Command
SAL, strategic arms limitation
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAM–D, surface-to-air missile development
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF, Secretary of Defense
SFD, Special Facilities Division (OEP)
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SG, Safeguard
SIGINT, signals intelligence
SIOP, Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM, submarine launched ballistic missile
SLCM, submarine launched cruise missile
SOSUS, sound surveillance system
SOUTHCOM, Southern Command
SPN, Spartan missile
SRAM, short-range attack missile
SRG, Senior Review Group
SSBN, nuclear ballistic missile submarine
SSI, sustaining support increment
SSN, nuclear submarine

SSO, special security officer
STRAF, Strategic Army Forces
STRIKE, STRIKE Command
SVN, South Vietnam
SWWA, Stop-Where-We-Are proposal
TOA, total obligational authority
TO&E, table of organization and equipment
TOE, term of enlistment
UAR, United Arab Republic
UCP, unified command plan
U/I, urban/industrial
UK, United Kingdom
ULMS, Undersea Long-Range Missile System
UN, United Nations
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USAF, United States Air Force
USARPAC, United States Army, Pacific
USC, Under Secretaries Committee, National Security Council
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, European Command
USCINCSO, United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command
USEUCOM, United States European Command
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USSOUTHCOM, United States Southern Command
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VN, Vietnam
VP, Verification Panel
WG, working group
WRT, with respect to
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group
WWMCCS, Worldwide Military Command and Control System

Persons

Abrams, Creighton W., General, USA; Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam until June 28, 1972; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army from October 12, 1972
Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States
Anderson, George W., Jr., Admiral, USN; Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Bennett, Donald V., Lieutenant General, USA; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency from September 1969 until August 1972
Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary, Communist Party, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
Brooke, Edward W., Senator (R-Massachusetts)
Buchanan, Patrick J., Special Assistant to the President
Butterfield, Alexander, Special Assistant to the President from January 1969 until January 1973
Cargo, William I., Director, Policy Planning staff, Department of State, from August 4, 1969, until July 30, 1973
Carroll, Joseph P., Lieutenant General, USAF; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency until September 1969
Chafee, John H., Secretary of the Navy from January 31, 1969, until May 4, 1972
Chapin, Dwight L., Special Assistant to the President from 1969 until 1971; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to the President
Chapman, Leonard F. Jr., General, USMC; Commandant, United States Marine Corps until 1972
Clifford, Clark M., Secretary of Defense from March 1, 1968 until January 20, 1969
Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from October 1969
Cole, Kenneth R., Jr., Special Assistant to the President from January 1969 until November 1969; Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs from November 1969 until December 1972
Connally, John B., Secretary of the Treasury from February 1971 until June 1972
Cushman, Robert E., Jr., Lieutenant General, USMC; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 7, 1969, until December 1971; Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1972
Dam, Kenneth W., Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget from 1971
David, Edward, E., Jr., Science Advisor to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology from September 14, 1970
Davydov, Boris N., Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
de Poix, Vincent P., Vice Admiral, USN; Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from August 1972
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States; member, Central

Committee of the Communist Party from 1971

DuBridge, Lee A., Science Advisor to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology from 1969 until 1970

Ehrlichman, John D., Counsel to President from January until November 1969; thereafter, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

Ellsworth, Robert F., Assistant to the President from January until May 1969; Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from May 1969 until June 1971

Farley, Philip J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until August 1969; Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until 1973; member, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Flanigan, Peter, Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy

Foster, John S., Director, Office of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense from 1969

Froehlke, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration until June 1971

Goodpaster, Andrew J., General, USA; Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam until April 1969; thereafter, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Haig, Alexander M., Jr., Colonel, Brigadier General from November 1969, Major General from March 1972, USA; Senior Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from June 1969 until June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970 until January 1973

Haldeman, H.R., Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff

Harlow, Bryce N., Assistant to the President from 1969 until 1970; thereafter, Counselor to the President

Harper, Edwin L., Special Assistant to the President from 1969 until 1972; Assistant Director, Domestic Council from 1970 until 1972

Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence

Hershey, Lewis B., General, USA; Director of the Selective Service System until 1970; thereafter Special Advisor to the President for Manpower Mobilization

Hillenbrand, Martin J., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 1969 until April 1972; Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from June 27, 1972

Holloway, Bruce K., General, USAF; Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State from September 21, 1970, until July 12, 1972; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of State

Jackson, Henry M. (Scoop), Senator (D-Washington); Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Johnson, Nels C., Vice Admiral, USN; Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 19, 1970

Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 7, 1969

Kelley, Roger T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel from March 3, 1969

Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury until January 1971
Kennedy, Edward M., Senator (D-Massachusetts)
Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense
Lee, John M., Vice Admiral, USN; Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1970
Lincoln, George A., Director of the Office of Emergency Planning from 1969
Lynn, Laurence E., member, National Security Council staff, Assistant for Programs from 1969 until 1970
Mansfield, Michael, Senator (D-Montana); Senate Majority Leader
Mayo, Robert P., Director, Bureau of the Budget from January 22, 1969, until June 30, 1970
McConnell, John P., General, USAF; Chief of Staff, Air Force until August 1, 1969
McCracken, Paul W., Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers until November 1971
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1961, until February 29, 1968
Mitchell, John, Attorney General from January 20, 1969, until February 15, 1972
Moorer, Thomas H., Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations until July 1, 1970; thereafter, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Moot, Robert C., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
Nitze, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1967 until January 20, 1969; member, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States
Nutter, Warren, G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from March 4, 1969
Odeen, Philip A., member, National Security Council staff
Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 13, 1971
Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor, Department of State
Pursley, Robert E., Brigadier General, USAF; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Resor, Stanley R., Secretary of the Army until June 30, 1971
Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State until June 23, 1970; thereafter, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State
Rush, Kenneth, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from July 1969 until February 20, 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 23, 1972
Ryan, John D., General, USAF; Chief of Staff, Air Force from August 1, 1969
Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget until June 1970; Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 until August 1971; thereafter, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Scott, Hugh D., Jr., Senator, (R-Pennsylvania); Senate Minority Leader
Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until August 1971

Seamans, Robert C., Jr., Secretary of the Air Force from February 15, 1969
Selin, Ivan, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from January 31, 1969, until January 30, 1970
Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr., Director, United States Information Agency
Shultz, George, Secretary of Labor from January 1969 until June 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 until May 1972; thereafter, Secretary of the Treasury
Sloss, Leon, Director, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from October 1969
Smith, Gerard C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from February 1969; Ambassador and Chairman, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Smith, K. Wayne, member, National Security Council staff; Director, NSC Program Analysis staff from January 1971
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member, National Security Council Operations staff, Europe from January 1969
Spiers, Ronald I., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from August to September 1969; thereafter, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Chairman of the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group
Stennis, John C., Senator (D-Mississippi); Chairman, Armed Services Committee
Tarr, Curtis W., Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Air Force, from 1969 until 1970; Director of the Selective Service System from 1970 until 1972; Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs from May 1972 Tucker, Gardiner L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from January 30, 1970
Vogt, John W., Lieutenant General, USAF; Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 20, 1970, until April 7, 1972
Walters, Vernon A., Lieutenant General, USA; Military Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Paris until March 1971; thereafter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 2, 1972
Warner, John W., Under Secretary of the Navy until May 1972; thereafter, Secretary of the Navy
Weinberger, Caspar W., Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 until May 1972; Director, Office of Management and Budget from June 12, 1972
Westmoreland, William C., General, USA; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until June 1972
Wheeler, Earle G., General, USA; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 2, 1970
Zeigler, Ronald L., Press Secretary to the President
Zumwalt, Elmo R. Jr., Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations from July 1970

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[6. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff]

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Washington, February 14, 1969, 10:40 a.m.

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10. National Security Study Memorandum 24

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11. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird

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12. Editorial Note

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13. Memorandum of Conversation

Versailles, March 1, 1969.

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14. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, undated.

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15. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, March 5, 1969.

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16. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

Washington, March 5, 1969.

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17. Minutes of Meeting Among the President's Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Kissinger), the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), and Other Department of Defense Officials

Washington, March 5, 1969.

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18. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

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19. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers

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20. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rogers

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21. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Congressional Relations (Harlow) to President Nixon

Washington, March 10, 1969.

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22. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 11, 1969.

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23. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant (Haldeman)

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24. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon

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25. Editorial Note

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26. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

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28. National Security Study Memorandum 57

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30. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, May 26, 1969.

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31. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

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32. Minutes of Review Group Meeting

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33. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 5, 1969.

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34. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, June 5, 1969.

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35. Editorial Note

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36. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

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37. Editorial Note

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38. Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate 11–8–68

Washington, June 23, 1969.

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39. National Security Decision Memorandum 16

Washington, June 24, 1969.

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40. Memorandum From Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 30, 1969.

41. National Security Study Memorandum 64

Washington, July 8, 1969.

42. National Security Study Memorandum 69

Washington, July 14, 1969.

43. Editorial Note

44. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, September 1, 1969.

45. Paper Prepared by the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group

Washington, September 5, 1969.

46. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, September 9, 1969.

47. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

48. Editorial Note

49. Editorial Note

50. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon

Washington, September 30, 1969.

51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 2, 1969.

52. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, October 2, 1969.

53. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 4, 1969.

54. National Security Study Memorandum 78

Washington, October 8, 1969.

55. National Security Decision Memorandum 26

Washington, October 11, 1969.

56. National Security Decision Memorandum 27

Washington, October 11, 1969.

57. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, October 30, 1969.

1. Editorial Note

Following Richard M. Nixon's victory in the general election held in November 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his top foreign policy advisers hosted a number of transition briefings for the incoming administration. The briefings were conducted in meetings between Johnson and the President-elect on November 11 and December 12; between Johnson's Special Assistant Walt W. Rostow and Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon's newly named Assistant for National Security Affairs, on December 5; and between Clark Clifford, the outgoing Secretary of Defense, and his replacement, Melvin Laird, on December 23. These transition briefings covered a host of topics, among them the war in Vietnam, the Middle East, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the status of strategic arms limitations negotiations with the Soviets, relations with NATO allies, and the organization of the National Security Council system. According to the records of the meetings, however, they did not deal with national security policy, the U.S. defense posture, or the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Johnson Library, Special Files, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 4, November 11, 1968 Meeting; and ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Box 14, Nixon and Transition) See also Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, pages 357–358.

2. National Security Study Memorandum 3[1]

Washington, January 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

The SUBJECT

U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power

The President has directed the preparation of a study reviewing our military posture and the balance of power. The study should consider in detail the security and foreign policy implications of a wide range of alternative budget levels and strategies for strategic and general purpose forces.[2]

To perform this study the President has directed the creation of a steering group to be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and to include representatives of the Secretary of State, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Staff support for this study will be arranged in consultation between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the undersigned. Upon request, agencies shall make available personnel to provide staff support. Agencies shall also perform such studies in support of the overall study as may be requested by the Chairman of the Group.[3]

The report of the group shall be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by July 1, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 1–42. Secret.

[2] According to Kissinger's memoirs, the purpose of the reexamination of military doctrine "was to enable us in time to plan and defend our military programs according to reasoned criteria, to adjust our strategy to new realities, and to try to lead the public debate away from emotionalism." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 215)

[3] The Interagency Steering Group was also known as the Packard Committee, after its Chairman, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard.

3. National Security Study Memorandum 8[1]

Washington, January 21, 1969.

TO
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Technical Issues Concerning U.S. Strategic Forces

In addition to the study of the U.S. military posture requested in NSSM 3, the President has directed the preparation of a separate study on technical issues concerning U.S. Strategic Forces including questions of reliability and command and control.

The President has directed that this study be performed jointly by the Department of Defense and the NSC Staff in a manner to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The results of the study should be reported directly to the President.[2]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 1–42. Top Secret.

[2] The study done in response to NSSM 8 was incorporated into the response to NSSM 3, the summary of which is printed as Document 34. See in particular section II, part B, number 3, and section V. In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled his dissatisfaction with the response to NSSM 8, a shortcoming he blamed on the Pentagon. According to Kissinger, the development of "strategies to meet contingencies other than all-out nuclear challenge" remained incomplete until James Schlesinger's tenure as Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975. (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 216–217)

4. Notes of Review Group Meeting[1]

Washington, February 6, 1969.

Kissinger: Strategic forces first. Talking points.[2] Is list of objectives reasonable for NSC and is paper[3] appropriate to objectives?

Rosson: Yes.

Pedersen: Difficulty understanding exactly what the options meant.

Kissinger: Agree. Can't assume principals know what DL [damage limitation?] means.

Smith: Hard to relate options to issues for decisions.

Kissinger: Agree. Figures are illustrative. Promised JCS would not have field marshal in WH [White House]. Give options a label. Avoid [illegible]—can't find five adjectives for sufficiency.

Schlesinger: Are they options or possible objectives. U.S. may not be far along the line to accurate MIRVs. Maybe four or five years before we have accurate MIRVs.

Kissinger: Is justification for MIRVs only attack hard targets?

Schlesinger: No, also penetration.

Lynn: Mean some options may not be open.

Schlesinger: Yes.

Kissinger: DL may also relate to active defense.

Lynn: Question is—if this is technologically feasible should we do it?

Kissinger: Add glossary. Any choice really depends on series of assumptions about technological and political development[s]. State what theory of AC [arms control] operating on—e.g., restraint leads to agreement, threaten or start a race. Should we attach list of uncertainties that each involves?

Rosson: Paper already involved but like idea of listing assumptions.

Kissinger: What can senior men do: list of questions for strategic review, general guidelines, or at least what questions they have to answer in their own mind[s]. In ME [Middle East] discussion President reacts best to pros and cons in outline form.

Rosson: Take option 1. What would be an assumption?

Lynn: Once settled—Soviets could or would not react.

Kissinger: Major uncertainties.

Lynn: Distinguish preparing climate for talks and kind of agreement you accept.

Kissinger: Senior people unlikely to decide now. Depends on Soviet WP [war plan?] also on role in Type II Det. [deterrence?].

Pedersen: Difference between deciding to do something to get an agreement or to do [something?] even in the presence of an agreement.

Fisher: Agree.

Pedersen: Add two options: (1) improved defenses: small ABM, no MIRV (2) Sentinel[4] and no MIRV.

Farley: More relevant to Packard committee paper. Or relate to observations about ABM level.

Kissinger: Changed orientation of ABM.

Pedersen: Detailed comments.

Lindjord: Should civil defense be added?

Kissinger: Yes. Begin in JCS briefing on strategic balance. Talk to General Wheeler about it. Get everyone agreed on factual situation. How can discussion of arms talks be handled? Call to the attention of principals that options have implications for arms talks.

Rosson: Key issue is whether to press forward now for talks or wait until strategic posture is well along. Also intermediate alternative.

Pedersen: Yes. Could do quicker strategic study. In meantime make arrangements for talks.

Fisher: Option of discussing only principles not a real option. These can be done in diplomatic exchanges.

Kissinger: Two problems: (1) account for strategic review?

Lynn: Paper raises just these questions.

Earle: Add [at?] beginning of talks could aid study—could get an indication of where

Soviets are going.

Kissinger: (2) question to linking to political. President's view is that political improvement might lead to talks or at least put in harmony. See some improvement before agree to talks. Thus necessary to keep open option that talks will not take place. This issue should be discussed in NSC. Problem of how to establish linkage. How much progress?

Lynn: Interaction between kind of issues brought up pol[itically] and kind of agreement.

Kissinger: President believes agreement in either category must benefit both sides. Not a question of trade-offs. Moving on political agreements in AC could make AC more likely.

Fisher: State both sides of coin.

Pedersen: Policy choice.

Fisher: Argument that now is the time on strategic talks, which may not be here two–three years from now.

Kissinger: Rewrite pp. 16–18[5] in view of considerations that should go into talks.

Pedersen: Three choices: (1) go ahead now; (2) wait for Packard; (3) split out strategic review and do in six weeks. Could go ahead with arranging talks.

Earle: Repeats opening talks could aid strategic study.

Kissinger: p. 26a. President not overwhelmed by argument that things should go forward because they were previously approved. And blackmail argument rather [than?] trying to go forward together.

Fisher: Delayed strategic program does not deal with MIRVs.

Pedersen: Vorontsov[6] very concerned with MIRVs. Agreement should include.

Fisher: Sentinel does not deal with how to deal with Congressional posture on relationship between Sentinel and talks.

Kissinger: Need theory on talks and theory of impact of unilateral decisions on talks, then what does it say about MIRV and Sentinel.

Rosson: OK, but in discussion of delay of MIRVs make clear impact on strategic posture.

Smith: MIRVs not given sufficient prominence.

Sonnenfeldt: Are we talking about delay or cancellation since agreement does not include

it?

Fisher: Delay to hold open option to ban MIRVs.

Kissinger: On Sentinel—pressure of events may force a decision before end of review. P. 27 is premature.[7]

Lynn: Existence of proposal is an important fact.

Kissinger: President is aware of it. Could list it. In New York, President told Chiefs were on board and may not be later. Said they are not a sovereign government.

Pedersen: Must decide whether you wait for review. Then how to go forward.

Kissinger: (1) linkage; (2) strategic review; (3) even if establish linkage can you have preliminary talks while political talks go forward? Could we get estimate of time hurdles we are passing? What would happen if we waited six months? Could we add political and military assessment of what happens if we wait?

Schlesinger: Are two-tier talks envisioned; experts then political?

Fisher: Previously, ambassadorial talks at one level.

Kissinger: Defer tabling a proposal option. Re. five-[year] budget review options: Do we have enough for NSC to give guidance to DOD?

Rosson: Yes.

Kissinger: More detail on Sentinel.

Schlesinger: What advantage if AC negotiations may provide you with an opportunity not to do what cannot be done, e.g. MIRVs which he thinks work but do not.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. No classification marking. The original is a transcription of handwritten notes in an unknown hand, the only record of the meeting found. The notes do not indicate when the meeting began, but give an ending time of 4:20 p.m. The following attended: Henry A. Kissinger, James Schlesinger, Philip J. Farley, Counselor of the Department of State Richard F. Pedersen, Deputy Director of ACDA Adrian S. Fisher, R. Jack Smith representing the Central Intelligence Agency, Director of USIA Frank Shakespeare, Haakon Lindjord of OEP, Lieutenant General William B. Rosson of the Joint Staff, JCS, Defense Adviser to the U.S. Mission to NATO Ralph Earle II, and Alexander M. Haig, Laurence E. Lynn, Spurgeon Keeny, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Morton Halperin of the NSC Staff.

[2] Kissinger's talking points are ibid., Box H–34, Review Group Meeting, February 6, 1969.

[3] All such references are to "Strategic Policy Issues," an undated paper prepared by the NSC Staff. On February 1, Kissinger sent the paper to Review Group members for their consideration prior to the meeting. (Ibid.) The NSC considered a revision of the paper at its February 14 meeting. A summary of that paper is printed as Document 6.

[4] Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced in an address given to United Press International Editors and Publishers in San Francisco on September 18, 1967, that President Lyndon B. Johnson had decided to deploy Sentinel, an ABM system designed to provide area defense against a relatively small nuclear attack by China and an accidental, irrational, or unsophisticated attack by the USSR. See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume X, National Security Policy, Document 192.

[5] These pages of "Strategic Policy Issues" deal with SALT.

[6] Yuli M. Vorontsov, Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy.

[7] Page 27 of the paper lists the arguments for and against tabling an arms control proposal or only discussing principles and objectives.

5. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, February 12, 1969.

Briefing by Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff

Compared payload of SS–9, Titan II.
Alert U.S. weapons=1/2 megatonnage of Soviet threat.
Soviet ABM defends 48% of Soviet targets.

Nixon: What can their ABM do? What intelligence do we use?

Ans: ELINT.

Nixon: Do we assume theirs works?

Ans: We have low confidence. Talinn[2] is [not] ABM, but prudence dictates we treat it as such.

Helms: Our statements of Soviet accuracy based on real world, not estimates.

Nixon: Observers say Soviets emphasize defense, we emphasize offense. Why?

Laird: Soviets spending 3/2 $ on offense over last 24 months, several dollars to one on defense. Their GNP is half of ours.

Nixon: We are only puttering in defense. Critics say, but then you make war more respectable.

Rogers: Ten percent of our missiles targeted against their ABM, also average delays 22 minutes before we launch?

Laird: Our committee more impressed with delay factor.

Helms: They have good ABM only around Moscow. Talinn isn't ABM.

They have cut back, not expanded. Cut from 128 to 64. They realized they couldn't keep our weapons out.

Laird: You can't measure time in dollars and cents (ref. delay).

Briefer: We have significant vulnerabilities.

468 of his hard ICBMs untargeted, rest get only small damage.

Results:

During Cuba: We could win under any circumstances.


Showed megaton exchange

5–1 in favor of U.S. preemption.

68–86% U.S. Population Surviving

We had clear advantage, position of strength. But picture has been changed. Today's megaton exchange. They are now ahead or equal.

Nixon interested in megaton figures—



Seems to say rough parity. Parity may not exist, balance may easily be upset. e.g., Today our missiles are vulnerable to pindown; theirs aren't.

Our bomber force vulnerable to inadequate warning.

Our command control is vulnerable.

Adm:[3] Our computers on missiles are high speed. Theirs aren't. Fallout from way it works.

In Soviet perspective: They are way ahead. Thus he may become bolder and more direct in his aggression.

Nixon: Because he knows we aren't confident.

Briefer showed force trends:

They're doing better. (*No MIRV*).

If Soviets are planning to MIRV, they have more throw weight. They could do better. (McConnell: They will be less accurate).

Nixon: Astounding change in six years. When did we become aware of this change? When did SIOP plans warn of this.

Ans: Some people knew it.

Helms: They put in their missiles very fast.

McConnell: And we cut our bombers.

Nixon: What about our projections now? Whack! 5 to 1 and we're now even.

Nixon: Can't use projections. We have tended to underestimate.

Helms: We've both over and underestimated. We saw it in 1966.

McConnell: We made no effort to keep ahead except quality.

Laird: We're tied down in the war. That had highest priority.

Nixon: Also, some were willing to accept parity concept.[4]

McConnell: I was surprised in 1966.

[Briefer:] Forces adequate for reprisal, not adequate to produce favorable advantage for the U.S.

McConnell: Must remember that of missiles untargeted, most won't be there, and we can't get them with more forces.

[Briefer:] Soviet rate of growth exceeds ours, we don't know where they're going.

We're concerned with SS–9, and their Polaris-type submarine.

We see new land mobile ICBM, FOBS, MIRVs. Their R&D may exceed ours by factor of two. Pindown possible.

We have assured destruction, but not damage limiting.

Our population losses exceed those of Soviets. Their wpns bigger, our population more concentrated.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the minutes, which incorrectly lists February 10 as

the date on which the meeting was held. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held on February 12 from 10:36 to 11:52 a.m. in the Fish Room of the White House. The following attended the meeting: President Nixon, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Lincoln, Chief of Staff of the USAF General John P. McConnell, Richard Helms, Bryce Harlow, Kissinger, and Lynn. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] Construction began on Talinn, a Soviet defensive missile system, in 1964.

[3] The Admiral, not further identified, was apparently a member of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

[4] Nixon later recalled that it was clear to him by 1969 that "absolute parity" between the two superpowers was illusory given the quantitative and qualitative asymmetries between the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, he wrote, the United States, if it had chosen to pursue nuclear superiority once again, would succeed only in escalating the arms race. "Consequently, at the beginning of the administration I began to talk in terms of *sufficiency* rather than *superiority* to describe my goals for our nuclear arsenal." (Nixon, RN, p. 415)

6. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

Summary of Paper

We can view the general objectives of our strategic forces as follows:

1. We want to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies; that is, we want to deter a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. We also want our strategic forces to contribute to the deterrence of other forms of attack on vital areas.
2. If a nuclear war nevertheless occurs with the Soviet Union or anyone else, we want to be capable of limiting damage to ourselves and our allies to the extent that it is technically and economically feasible to do so.
3. We want to be able to respond to limited and perhaps protracted nuclear conflicts that may come about either deliberately or by accident.

We can pursue these objectives by developing and buying strategic forces with three types of capability:

1. The capability to inflict heavy damage on enemy population and industry, even after our own forces have been attacked.
2. The capability to limit damage to ourselves and our allies during the course of a nuclear exchange—for example, by being able to destroy enemy forces before they are launched, to intercept and destroy enemy weapons that have been launched, or by providing protection against blast and fallout for U.S. population and industry.
3. The capability to use and control forces deliberately and selectively to achieve limited objectives against targets in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or China, perhaps in a protracted conflict.

However, just as we react to important developments in Soviet strategic capabilities, they probably react to changes we make in our forces in accordance with their own strategic objectives. For example, the large build-up in our ICBM and Polaris force in the early 1960s was probably a reaction to the possibility of a “missile gap” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; the Soviets have understandably reacted to close the missile gap that they in fact have faced because of our build-up. The Soviet Talinn air defense system is possibly a reaction to the prospect that we would deploy a B–70 bomber. We have reacted to the Talinn system by pushing the development of Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles for our offensive missile force, because we feared, wrongly, that Talinn was an ABM system. The Soviets may now feel compelled to go ahead with mobile ICBMs and a Polaris-type force in the face of our MIRV threat.

Understanding the action/reaction process is complicated by the fact that the current Soviet build-up may have already anticipated new developments on our part, so that go aheads on new U.S. programs would not necessarily lead to additional Soviet reactions.

The critical question is, after we trace through the consequences of future actions and reactions by both sides, will we be better able to meet our strategic objectives by changes in our posture? Will nuclear wars be less likely? Will war outcomes really be more satisfactory to us in the event deterrence fails? Both we and the Soviet Union now may have the capability largely to offset attempts at significant improvements in offensive and defensive capabilities by the other side. This factor, in addition to the many technical problems in designing strategic systems, may make it very expensive to pursue significant improvements in *relative* capabilities.

Today, for example, both we and the Soviet Union can kill about 40 percent of the other's population—80–90 million people—even after absorbing an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces. Though each side plans to use part of its forces for limiting damage to itself, both sides will suffer very heavy destruction in a nuclear war. Such capabilities can probably be maintained by both sides throughout the 1970s. Moreover, today neither side has any incentive to strike the other first; both sides lose very heavily no matter who starts the war.

Nevertheless, both the Soviet Union and China are increasing their strategic nuclear capabilities. Both have strategic research and development programs which could lead to technological breakthroughs that threaten our security. We cannot risk such breakthroughs. There is a wide variety of strategic options that we should consider when deciding how to deal with this situation and meet our strategic objectives.[2]

For example:

Dominance would seek to get a clear margin of superiority over the Soviets. We would seek significant increases in both damage-inflicting and damage-limiting capabilities against the Soviet Union and attempt to achieve them with high confidence. We would take the initiative in force development and deployment, and we would avoid falling behind in any important force category such as ICBM launchers.

Improving the Balance would provide for more modest increases in damage-inflicting capability. We would actively pursue damage-limiting programs such as ABM defenses to the extent they are technically and economically feasible. We would improve our capability for selective nuclear response.

Maintaining the Balance would seek to preserve present relative U.S. strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union with about the same degree of confidence. However, we would maintain the necessary options to respond efficiently and promptly to Soviet force improvement initiatives.

Stable Deterrence would have the same requirements for damage-inflicting capability as the previous option, but we would not feel compelled to insure as heavily against unexpected threats. No significant damage-limiting programs would be undertaken. We would emphasize programs which reduced the vulnerability of our forces.

Minimum Deterrence would base U.S. deployments on probable rather than highly unlikely Soviet threats and maintain options to meet high estimates of the Soviet threats. We would not buy forces for damage-limiting, nor would we emphasize strategic capabilities for less than full-scale nuclear war.

The Strategic Policy Issues paper gives pros and cons for each option. In general, the critical issues in evaluating these options are likely to be:

1. The nature and likelihood of Soviet reactions and how this would affect:
   a. The extent to which we can actually improve our capabilities.
   b. Our own course of action in the face of Soviet reactions.
2. The prospects for getting started on arms limitation talks and the possibilities for reaching agreement on the strategic balance implied by this option.
3. The political value to us of having improved strategic capabilities (or creating the presumption that we have them).
4. The value to us of improved military capabilities in terms of deterrence and war outcomes.
5. The size of the strategic forces budget relative to the benefits obtained.

Budget Issues

There are several types of FY 70 strategic force budget decisions that can be made now. We could:

1. decide to procure certain systems now in development, e.g., an advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA) or an anti-Soviet ballistic missile defense system;
2. increase research and development efforts for possible new systems;
3. add to or accelerate programs currently approved for deployment;
4. delay approved strategic programs such as Sentinel.[3]

Certain budget decisions should probably be made only after basic policy has been decided. Therefore, policy decisions could await the completion of the Interagency Military Posture Review now underway. On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense may want to consider certain FY 70 budget amendments on the merits of the individual issues. Such amendments should be made only after careful consideration of their implications for overall strategic policy and arms limitation possibilities.

The attachment discusses the Sentinel issue in some detail.

Arms Limitation Talks

Recent interest in pursuing strategic arms limitation talks is motivated not only by the present state of the strategic balance but also by the likely outcome of attempts by either side to increase its relative capabilities in the absence of an agreement.

1. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union can launch a massively destructive attack on the other after absorbing an all-out attack on its strategic forces.
2. Neither side in the foreseeable future can hope to be able to alter significantly this ability to damage the other.
3. The present costs of strategic forces are large and will get significantly larger if additional programs go unchecked.

Therefore, negotiating a strategic arms limitation agreement can have at least three objectives in terms of the strategic balance:

1. By reducing the strategic arms competition, an agreement could reduce many of the uncertainties which now influence our programs.
2. Just by talking, we might gain valuable information and improved understanding with the Soviet Union on how each side sees nuclear forces and strategy.
3. In the long run, the costs of our strategic forces will probably be lower with an agreement than without one.

The primary question on strategic grounds is, should we go forward with strategic arms limitation talks in the near future or delay a decision pending completion of the military posture review (in six months or, if the strategic portion is accelerated, in two months)? Regarding this issue, there are two questions:

1. What would be the consequence of waiting six months in terms of the strategic balance?
2. What might the conclusions of the military posture review suggest concerning the U.S. position for possible talks with the Soviets? How soon could enough of the review be completed to reach these conclusions?

Attachment

Sentinel ABM System

The approved program calls for the deployment of a system designed to protect the U.S. against a light ICBM attack from China in 1975. The system has been called “anti-Chinese” because (a) most of its radars face only in the direction from which Chinese ICBMs would be launched, (b) the area defense are vulnerable to effective penetration aids which the Soviets, but not the Chinese, could develop by 1975, and (c) the system emphasizes area defense; an anti-Soviet system of this size would emphasize terminal

defense of cities. On the other hand, the system can save 10–20 million U.S. lives in a Soviet attack if the Soviets do not install penetration aids on their missiles, and it can be expanded for defense of our ICBMs, defenses for our cities against Soviet attacks, or both.

The system is funded at $1.8 billion in FY 70, and the total cost is estimated at $8.5 billion. The Defense Department has delayed all Sentinel construction activity pending a review of the program. The options include: (a) proceeding with the approved program, (b) further delaying the program or stretching it out for FY 70 savings of $340–550 million, (c) redirecting the deployment to the defense of Minuteman sites and continuing Research and Development for a total cost of $4.7 billion (FY 69–70 savings of $1 billion, $3.8 billion overall), (d) cancelling the Sentinel deployment and continuing research and development.

Continuing Sentinel would be consistent with three options—Dominance, Improving the Balance, and Maintaining the Balance. Further delaying or cancelling Sentinel might be consistent with a policy of Maintaining the Balance, Stable, or Minimum Deterrence. However, the overall implications depend largely on whether an ABM defense of Minuteman or an anti-Soviet ABM defense of our cities or both are chosen instead, either now or later.

a. The arguments for proceeding with the approved program are:
   (1) The planned deployment schedule would provide virtually complete protection in the early 1970s when the intelligence community estimates that the Chinese could have as many as 10 ICBMs. Without Sentinel, U.S. fatalities could be as high as seven million in a Chinese first strike with 10 ICBMs.
   (2) The planned deployment provides a basis for a larger anti-Soviet system. If the Soviets do not react to Sentinel, the thin defense might reduce U.S. casualties in a nuclear war with Russia by 10–20 million, or about 8–15 percent.
   (3) Moving ahead on schedule would increase Soviet incentives to engage in negotiations on strategic arms limitations.
   (4) Moving ahead would also provide early protection against accidental or irrational launch of ICBMs against the U.S.
   (5) The Soviets could have a Sentinel-like system deployed by the mid-1970s.
b. The arguments for further delay or cancellation are:
   (1) We have an effective deterrent against China in our strategic offensive forces for the foreseeable future. Since Sentinel would contribute only marginally to increasing the credibility of our deterrent, a delay would not endanger our security.
   (2) Few believe that an anti-Chinese system justifies the current cost of Sentinel; currently estimated cost is significantly higher than when the decision was made and costs are rising.
   (3) The Chinese ICBM program appears to be slipping. We now estimate that the Chinese will have 12–21 ICBMs in 1975.
   (4) Delay would permit a careful evaluation of the real issue: should we look on Sentinel as a down payment in a defense of Minuteman (in which case we could save

$3.8 billion), on a larger anti-Soviet ABM system (in which case we would need to spend $10–20 billion more), or both?

(5) Work on the Soviet Moscow ABM system has slowed down considerably and the Soviet system is a primitive one. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviets may get very far ahead of us in ABM capability.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–20, NSC Meeting, February 14, 1969. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, which summarizes a 21-page paper, entitled "Strategic Policy Issues," included in the President's briefing book for the NSC meeting of February 14. Kissinger sent the complete paper to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and Lincoln on February 12 to serve as the basis for the NSC's discussion of strategic policy issues. (Ibid.) The NSC Review Group discussed a draft of the full-length paper during its meeting on February 6. (Ibid., Box H–34, Review Group Meeting, February 6, 1969)

[2] In a February 5 briefing memorandum sent to Richard Pedersen, Philip Farley considered the paper's five alternative strategies to be insufficient. He proposed two additional strategic alternatives for the Review Group's consideration. The first included offensive forces without MIRVs coupled with a "minimum" ABM area defense directed against China. The second included the same offensive posture but with a larger urban defense than that planned for Sentinel. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC/Cabinet Files, 1970–72: Lot 73 D 288, Box 6, NSC Review Group Memoranda)

[3] See footnote 4, Document 4.

7. Notes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, February 14, 1969, 10:40 a.m.

10:40 Helms Briefing

Soviets at cross roads—new decisions can now be made.

Their objective meaningful deterrent—overcome earlier political and psychological disadvantage.

SS–9 bigger, more accurate than SS–11.

a. Defense: 64 ABM launchers.
b. R&D—many projects at or near decision stage. On Talinn—majority believe it is air defense; some believe with different radars could be made into ABM.

Soviets have limited number of near term reactions. Resources are scarce. They are *long way* from coping with our attack forces.

Defense. Moscow defense began in 1963. They cut from 124 to 64 because it couldn't cope with our capabilities. Improved ABM possible between 1973–1975 [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Would protect important target area, not nation-wide = estimate.

Soviets still have problem with low altitude bomber attacks. Costly.

Offense.

a. 35–50 SLBMs by mid 1970s.
b. ICBM—1100–1500 goal for next 10 years.
c. We estimate they will MIRV, MRV. They recently tested a MRV.
d. Flight tests of FOBS, depressed ICBM.
e. Mobile land ICBM. We look for mobile IR, MR, ICBMs.

Nixon: Do we have mobile systems?

McConnell: We don't need it.

Nixon: They started ABM in 63, no mobile. Are they more imaginative and bold in new weapon systems? Do they start, we follow? We don't want to get in that syndrome.

McConnell: European mobile ICBM did not get by Congress.

Nixon: Do we get frozen in?

McConnell: We improve existing systems, not build new ones.

Nixon: We are always fighting last war. If mobile missile is good, why not build it?

Laird: I was part of a group that turned it down. I thought Polaris concept was better rather than dependence on NATO.

Nixon: They have big ones mobile.

Laird: In late 1950s we tried this but went with other systems.

Nixon: Packard, you've talked to intellectuals, do you worry about their advances?

Packard: Our technology is better than theirs. Soviets have begun to increase in 3–4 years, we have not. Our MM at 1000, our SLBMs, our bombers are effective. We're in fairly good shape. We could make many alternative moves. e.g., Sentinel, would cost money, but would protect against Soviets. We are improving missiles. But Soviets started with SS–9 and can destroy our MM silos. Yet we can't destroy their silos. We don't have first strike capability.

Kissinger: We [*They*] don't either.

Nixon: My point is fundamental, philosophical. Goes back to Sputnik. Freezing in, failure to experiment, move on. Breakthroughs are immense, political and psychological value. Are we moving forward adequately?

Packard: Our knowledge here is good enough. Uncertainty is if they have new idea, we don't, ball game could change. Our problem is that Soviets are producing twice as many scientists. Red Chinese are producing 4 times as many scientists.

Laird: Can't but back R&D.

Nixon: We're oriented toward social sciences. They may be doing more exciting breakthroughs.

Helms: Their work is exciting in aerodynamics for air defense aircraft.

Laird: We haven't been able to spend like the Soviets have because of war effort. They put in $1.5 billion (I think $3 billion), force U.S. to spend $30 billion. They are outspending us $4/3.4–1 on defense; 3–2 on offensive weapons and it's such a great effort for them. They want talks because this is hurting them: 7–1 effort ratio.

HAK: Our [*Their*] SS–9, a counterforce weapon, if they get enough. While ours can't take out their silos, can't expend our force.

McConnell: We need a heavier weapon.

Smith: We aren't in such a lagging position. We have led in MIRVs, SLBMs, photo-reconnaissance.

Nixon: They are one jump ahead of us.

McConnell: That's right.

Laird: I'm surprised that they are going ahead with mobile missiles.

Lincoln: They don't have effective first strike.

McConnell: Question is warning. If we wait, don't use positive warning, they can develop first strike …

Nixon: Really relates to the aggressiveness of their foreign policy. Kennedy saw 5–1 in 1962, had confidence. We can't do this today. Our concern is with their confidence, what do they think we have. We may have reached a balance of terror.

HAK: This is a new situation.

Nixon: Yes.

HAK: Packard, what would sensible leader be thinking of when they do things different from us?

Packard: We're trying to estimate their possibilities.

Rogers: Henry, won't they be looking for a breakthrough?

Nixon: This obsession with success could turn out to be an acute danger. We've tended to underestimate them. They get frozen in, we think, we're bound to stay ahead. Packard, aren't we far ahead?

Packard: Yes, only need for a little concern. We're in no serious danger.

Nixon: You're watching it all the time?

Rogers: Are we learning anything in Vietnam?

Laird: Medicine.

Lincoln: Political factors.

Nixon: Our philosophy is not to strike first. Maybe we don't need it.

Packard: Neither side can get a first strike capability. You lose more in a first strike than in a second strike.

McConnell: There's no advantage to putting missile in a space ship.

Agnew: Is defense cheaper than offensive?

Laird: No.

Agnew: Then won't they do it cheaper. Which costs the most?

Packard: Either side can offset other's actions.

McConnell: We assume no warning in our plans because this is the worst case.

HAK: Soviet planner will have a different worst case, that we do launch on warning.

It's difficult to believe either side will launch everything. More likely to be limited.

McConnell: Probability of our destruction 25% greater if we attack on warning.

Nixon: 25% as against all that devastation.

We have to look at decisions their fellow has to make. No matter what they do, they lose their cities. That's the important point. What a decision to make.

HAK: Each side looks at its own worst case.

Nixon: We have to do this. Isn't this traditional?

McConnell: Yes.

HAK: Might not start with strike on U.S. Their assured destruction edge affects their willingness to be aggressive. Relationship of this new situation to local aggression is the important point.[2]

Nixon: They have shifted their emphasis. They used to know American President might react. But not now.

HAK: Prompt affects only part of the story. Much more. Decisions are very hard to make. This might mean smaller packages will be used to avoid going to larger one.

Nixon: Flexible response is baloney. They have possibility of conventional option, greater numbers. We remember our massive retaliation, gave us freedom to act. This has changed. In Europe, we may have to face up to a drastic increase in our conventional capability.

Rogers: Henry's point is the in-between ground.

Lincoln: No clear fire break.

Nixon: Don't we have to reevaluate this because of enormous destructive power?

HAK: Europeans don't realize American nuclear umbrella depended on first strike. No longer true. Need review of strategic doctrine.

Laird: We don't have flexible response because of drawdowns.

Nixon: Nuclear umbrella no longer there. Our bargaining position has shifted. We must face facts.

Helms: No signs of a new long range bomber—force will decline in numbers.

China—ICBM program seems to be running into snags. If testing starts this year, earliest is late 1972, probably 2 or 3 years later.

Submarines unlikely.

Weapons which could reach U.S. are three to four years away.

McConnell: Then small in number.

Smith thinks Arms Control will save a lot of money.

Nixon: (1) Can we accelerate strategic time table on your study?[3] Say three months? We will need it for negotiations.

Packard: Yes, but interactions with GPF are more complex.

Nixon: Let's do that.

(2) On ABM, what is our present posture?

Laird: We're going through budget review. I think we can cut back the program by $200 million, move some of the sites away from the cities, but we should go forward. Don't use it against Soviet Union except for sub launches and misfires. Say it is to take out 20–25 Chinese ICBMs in a few years.

Nixon: What is [*does*] going forward buy us technically?

Packard: Thin system is adequate against China. Next step is a heavy system of Sprints around the cities, but it is a brute force system. We shouldn't do it under any condition unless we get into an un-stoppable race. (Perhaps some protection with non-nuclear

warheads.)

Nixon: What is Soviet emphasis?

Helms: They're stopped around Moscow but continuing with experiments. Could upgrade Talinn.

Laird: MM could be upgraded to an ABM.

Nixon: When on ABM?

Laird: 17 March we have to go up.[4]

Nixon: We should have an ABM meeting before Laird goes to VN. Line is we're reviewing all of our defense systems, going ahead with R&D, we intend to ask for it.

Rogers: On SALT, delay can be made 2–3 months, beyond that we will be hard pressed to resist pressures.

Nixon: We should get our ducks in a row. Three months from now we should be ready. In meantime maybe we can make progress in other fields.

HAK: Option that we may not have talks should be left open.

Nixon: We would be foolish not to explain possibility of getting something going in other fields. Shouldn't just react.

Rogers: Isn't easy to find out what other admin represented to the other side. Rostow gave them a paper, but we can't get a copy of it.[5]

Nixon not content.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–20, NSC Meeting, February 14, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the notes. These notes were transcribed from Alexander Haig's handwritten notes, which are ibid. According to the President's Daily Diary, the following attended the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room of the White House: Nixon, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy, Gerard Smith, Lincoln, Helms, Elliot Richardson, David Packard, General John P. McConnell, Ellis H. Veatch, Director of the Bureau of the Budget's National Security Programs Division, Kissinger, and Haig. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] Although confident that the technological superiority of the U.S. strategic force counterbalanced its numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Kissinger recalled his

concern that the new administration faced "an unprecedented challenge." Because of parity, he wrote, "The credibility of American pledges to risk Armageddon in defense of allies was bound to come into question." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 196–198)

[3] In a February 14 memorandum accompanying the President's preparatory materials for the meeting, Kissinger urged Nixon to consider the following issues: the "Sentinel problem," any "guidance" he wished to give to the ongoing military posture review commissioned by NSSM 3, and possibly accelerating that review since technological achievements, including MIRVs, made in the meantime could derail strategic arms limitation talks. The President highlighted much of this advice, underlining the portion dealing with the acceleration of the strategic review. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–20, NSC Meeting, February 14, 1969) NSSM 3 is Document 2.

[4] Laird testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 19. (*New York Times*, March 20, 1969)

[5] Possibly a reference to a paper President Johnson's Special Assistant Walt Rostow handed to Ambassador Dobrynin on September 16, 1968; see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 282.

8. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, February 19, 1969.

President introduced Henry to discuss the options.

HAK: Difficulty: In addition to military factors, psych factors play an enormous role. For deterrence, what other side thinks is as important as what we think. Bluff taken seriously … (quote from NATO book).[2] Can't prove why something is not happening (also from NATO book). Answer can't be settled conclusively.

Paper[3] indicates a view of basic options; categories to use in analyzing them—lists: cost, political, military reactions.

RG laid out five basic options.

1. *Dominance*—summarizes (Refer to long paper).[4]

Discusses arguments. Mentions now we have no first strike capability (like we had in 1962), particularly for NATO. Dominance might get us back.

Also, gives us political & psychological advantages. But hard to recapture 5 to 1 superiority —constantly increasing level damage. (Using long paper)

2. *Improving the Balance*

(Again uses basic paper)

3. *Maintaining the Balance*

(quotes paper)

Adds argument against: utility of forces for Allied deterrence becomes demonstrably less.

4. *Stable Deterrence*

Deliberate deterrent force.

5. *Minor Deterrence*. Fashionable at MIT and Harvard.

Present Posture—a little short of having a significant edge.

Choice is not purely technical, but theory of use of nuclear forces, role in arms control, reactions. Will have significant influence on Packard recommendations, Alliance policy,

arms control policy, East-West Relations.[5] Nixon asked Packard for types of things you are looking at.

Packard:

Purposes and choices of ABM.

Neither side has dominance.

Soviets deploying additional missiles. They will be superior in number of missiles. We are now superior in SLBMs but they want parity. We have substantial superiority in manned bombers.

Two extremes: What is required for Dominance?

a. Destroy enemy's offensive force so he can't strike back.
Tough, can't destroy subs. We would need more accurate, heavier missiles, bombers can't be used in timely way.
b. Other side: Provide very good protection of targets.

Problems with ABM.

1. New *substantial* amount of protection—very efficient; but Soviets can keep up by proliferating, MIRVs. They can counter at low cost. ABM is ineffective protection. HAK: against full-scale Soviet attack.
2. Use of tactics effective against ABM; Soviets can concentrate and overwhelm parts. ABM not attractive at this time.

What is required for deterrence?

1. Protect second strike capability.

Situation is fairly good now. Land-based missiles in hardened sites, vulnerable to bigger more accurate missiles.

Bombers are vulnerable except those on alert. SLBMs bring our bombers under attack.

Our own SLBMs are excellent deterrent.

2. We can use ABM to protect missile & bomber forces. Fact ABM isn't perfect isn't so troublesome; you complicate Soviet problem, aren't losing people.

You could increase deterrence by building up offensive forces. But you don't need this for second strike capability.

Not sound to say we will protect cities; is sound to say we will protect second strike

capability.

This deployment doesn't threaten Soviets.

Nixon: Neither one does, or does cities protection threaten them psychologically?

Packard: They would see cities defense as prelude to other offensive build-up.

Nixon: Suppose you could defend cities. Really means credible threat of first strike would be much greater if they are screwing with Allies.

Packard: Wouldn't really give you first strike.

Smith: Population protection is historically a signal of going for first strike. Would be more threatening.

Nixon: We say glibly we will fire on warning. Who's sure? As soon as you do, you are risking great destruction.

Laird: Issue is that we can't move toward defense of cities. Impossible to solve this equation. We should assure our people of this. We can handle other threats, adding to our deterrence. Shouldn't care about what Soviets think, but what's best for our security, security of our nation.

Nixon: It is important to game plan it from their point of view. Important for arms control discussions.

Laird: They have ABM, but they may be protecting other targets.

Packard: We don't know why their ABM. Use of ABM to protect our offensive forces would be stabilizing, would help with strategic arms limitation talks.

Nixon asks Smith what he thinks.

Smith: Doesn't make much difference one way or other as far as talks. Ongoing program isn't decisive on talks issue.

Rogers: Isn't having option good negotiating point?

Smith: Best posture is ABM connected with signs of progress on SALT and with signal they aren't going for first strike capability.

Parochially I am against ABM. I would urge at same time as ABM decision, say we have reviewed last proposal—approved by Chiefs—we are now in position to begin talks. Announce we will limit number to say Moscow's number, not deploy then on first strike mode.

Wheeler: If I thought technically, fiscally feasible to [develop?] ABM defense which gave first strike capability, I would advocate it, destabilizing or not. Wouldn't bother me.

Nixon: Wouldn't bother me either. Nuclear umbrella in NATO a lot of crap. Don't have it.

Wheeler: IR/MRBMs are targeted by our forces. This decrement to what we have to protect the U.S. Allies extremely sensitive to this. Of course, we are protecting our own assets in Europe.

Nixon: NATO sensitive, want to make sure we continue to target weapons aimed at them.

Wheeler: Present system does not give protection against sea-launched systems.

Nixon: We could keep more bombers on alert with political warning.

Wheeler: Now 25% alert rate.

HAK: They wouldn't give political warning.

Nixon: I mean, over months we could bring it up.

Wheeler: It would be expensive.

Nixon: Let me talk of firing on warning. We have subs, bombers, non-hardened Soviet sites. Your plans assume the worst, that we don't fire on warning. It is vitally important to assume this because of confusion that would exist.

Wheeler: You can get false radar signals. We've had them. We might get warning in form of getting signals of increased deployments of say submarines. Could be cause of putting bombers on increased alert. Now we have no means of detecting launching of missiles from submarines unless patrol planes pick it up. Since bombers are important, a reorientation to close this gap is important.

Nixon: What does it cost to increase faces on radars?

Packard: Not much, about $100 million.

Packard: You can build more or less of a system. We couldn't defend some cities. But you could defend some bases. This dilutes protection against China because you need full area coverage. But you could begin getting useful protection.

Nixon: Discuss Chinese situation. It would have to be a first strike. Why would it be against our second strike capability? Wouldn't they destroy cities? Why does this answer a Chinese attack?

Packard: (Shows chart) Area defense will give early protection against early Chinese

threat. This Spartan protection only against primitive system. Penaids [penetration aids] will defeat it.

Lincoln: Proposition: by starting but not stating how far we will go will aid Gerry [Smith].

Smith: No, would prefer number. We could increase if it we had to.

Rogers: Art VI of NPT—says parties will enter into arms limitation agreement. Important to non-nuclear power. With NPT notified [*ratified*], we should proceed in good faith.[6] I was asked this yesterday. We are obligated to go ahead with talks, in good faith, language of treaty is clear.

Nixon: But not what and when. We're not tied down.

Rogers: Of course, but we must proceed in good faith. If Soviets say let's talk, we have to. We're under the gun.

Wheeler: Haven't we been under that obligation for a long time in representations to U.N.?

Rogers: This is treaty obligation.

Smith: We are already in negotiations. Public statements have a meaning. Gore[7] thinks we should start just on ABM. I think Soviets want talks both on offensive and defensive missiles.

Laird: Soviets don't want to negotiate defense.

Rogers: We should have total offensive/defensive.

Nixon: For trip,[8] I want to be kept as flexible as possible. Same with decision on ABM. It would be unhelpful to make it appear that we are leaning (don't debrief Depts and have it appear in papers) though arguments appear convincing. Then if we decided to move, that could be important gesture in arms control problem. We're not sure what affects them; then let's not appear too precise until we get some leverage.

Laird: Though cutback may be in FY 70 budget, it will add on $200 million over long haul.

Packard: You can say categorically that you're never going to $100 billion or $50 billion system. You're going completely away from fixed system. Also, we should present problem more effectively. Too few people understand it. (In terms of American reaction.)

Laird: March 17 is date to present. Congress wants to see amendments first, they're jealous.

Nixon: Let's plan it out rather than leak it out and screw it up!

Nixon, Rogers: Soviets want to talk both offensive/defensive missile systems.

Nixon: Leave out option on minimum deterrence. But in your review, take a look at those options.

HAK: Each should have package, analysis of implications.

Nixon: Helpful to have costs of these strategies.

Packard: Prices will be good enough for general decision, not difficult. General purposes forces the real problem. Strategic isn't that significant in the total budget; 20% more isn't that much. Difficulty with Dominance is that it's damn near impossible.

Rogers: Present it well.

Nixon: When you're talking about converting it, you're knocking out the Chinese defense.

Packard: We will have some area protection through '75. Main change is getting completely away from protecting our cities against Soviet threat.

Wheeler: Complicates targeting problems of the Soviets. For example, they will have to put more weapons on Washington.

Nixon: You'd be more willing to fire defensive weapon on warning than those which go over to them. Very important point.

Nixon: How does it work?

Packard: Excludes 4 M7 warhead. Would increase radiation, but fallout problem is a minor one.

Smith: Any problems with Canadians?

Wheeler: We have a group at NORAD discussing with Canadians. But they will want to know more about it. Canadians have a number of questions.

Nixon: I wouldn't make point that this will increase our bargaining leverage with Soviets. Let's do these things, they know what we're doing. We shouldn't appear to be too obvious. Henry do you agree? Leverage is real, but talking about it would make it unreal.

HAK: I agree.

Packard: But there will be questions.

Laird: It will begin tomorrow.

Nixon: Say, major consideration is defense of the U.S. This isn't simply a bargaining counter. Now will this help negotiations? Answer: I won't try to evaluate what they're thinking. But in negotiating it will be overall offensive/defensive strength we will be negotiating.

HAK: It wouldn't hurt for Mel to speak strongly for defense.[9]

Laird: I will say we haven't made a decision.

Nixon: Absolutely, it's important. Decisions that will be made will be what is best for the U.S. This will be taken into account by our arms control negotiation. Not that we're doing this to strengthen our hand.

Smith: We can say that ABM won't have serious effect. We don't know what effect it will have but I don't think it will be decisive one way or another.

Nixon: Does deployment allow you to keep pace with developments in the art? This constantly worries me. Can we learn anything?

Packard: We will learn something. We will not be limited in what we learn as we deploy it. Various improvements will be possible. Various ideas can be investigated: non-nuclear technology, use of laser beams. This technology looks very interesting. We want to continue work doing [*along*] these and other interesting lines.

Rogers: Will our program prevent Soviets from achieving a decisive breakthrough?

Packard: We will do everything we can.

Nixon: I think this gives us a better chance to keep up. We have to do what he is doing. At least until Mr. Smith negotiates …

Smith: Do we need to keep development progress going?

Packard: Technology needs to be married to a requirement to get real benefits. It's difficult to develop a useful, practical system in a vacuum.

Laird: Strategic price cut is one thing. Real difficulty is conventional forces. Soviets can buy more cheaper than we can. Our costs will go up. Schroeder[10] wants to know will we send more force over if we have strategic agreement.

Nixon: On presentation. Intellectual community is getting hysterical about ABM, partly because we don't have facts.

1. Will cost $100 billion—(we're getting away from thick system).
2. We're threatening Soviets.

This is confrontation between Admin & Mil/Industrial complex. Will we listen to JCS, Sec Def or to State. Acid test of presenting issue properly. We have to explain decision when it is made that it doesn't give credence to Mil/Indust complex, doesn't look like new round in arms race, doesn't frighten Soviets, doesn't worry money people. We have to say, failing to do this little would be highly irresponsible act. We can't be apologetic.

Would be a mistake to indicate we will delay modest program until we see talks results. Shouldn't tie them together.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears in the minutes. The participants continued the discussion of strategic policy issues begun during the NSC meeting of February 14. According to the President's Daily Diary, the following attended the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:26 a.m. to 12:26 p.m.: the President, Kissinger, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, David Kennedy, Lincoln, General Earle Wheeler, Helms, Packard, Gerard Smith, and Veatch. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] Not further identified.

[3] See Document 6.

[4] See footnote 1, Document 6.

[5] The National Security Council was also scheduled to discuss East-West relations during its meeting of February 19. Time did not permit such a discussion, which was supposed to focus on a paper entitled "East-West Relations," prepared by the NSC's Interdepartmental Group for Europe. The paper outlines three basic alternative approaches toward Soviet-American relations: mutual antagonism with minimal cooperation, détente, and a limited adversary relationship. According to the paper, proponents of the latter alternative, including the White House, agreed "that a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent and a continuing strong NATO are necessary in order not to tempt the Soviets into military or diplomatic adventures." See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 18.

[6] The U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in March 1969. It entered into force in March 1970.

[7] Senator Albert A. Gore, Sr. (D-Tenn.)

[8] President Nixon traveled in Europe from February 23 through March 2.

[9] Laird testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 20. See footnote 3, Document 16.

[10] Secretary Laird and Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, discussed the U.S. military commitment to Europe during a meeting held on

February 1 at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 13, NATO, Vol. 1)

9. National Security Study Memorandum 23[1]

Washington, February 20, 1969.

TO
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Amendments to FY 70 Defense Budget

The President desires to have a National Security Council Meeting at 10 a.m., March 4, 1969,[2] to consider the principal amendments to the FY 70 Defense Budget, especially with respect to the Sentinel Program, proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

A paper outlining the amendments to be discussed and their rationale should be forwarded to the President by March 1, 1969. In the case of the Sentinel Program, the paper should include an analysis of the alternatives considered in reviewing and evaluating the program and an outline of a public information program conforming to the Secretary of Defense's recommendation.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 1–42. Secret. Copies were sent to Agnew, Rogers, Wheeler, Helms, Lincoln, and Robert Mayo.

[2] The NSC meeting was actually held on March 5; see Document 16.

10. National Security Study Memorandum 24[1]

Washington, February 20, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Military Posture Review

As a result of the NSC meeting on February 14, 1969, the President has directed that the strategic portion of the U.S. Military Posture Review directed by NSSM 3 be completed and forwarded to the NSC Review Group by May 1, 1969.

As part of the strategic study, the President has directed an analysis of how the Soviets view the strategic balance. Specifically, he would like the study to address the following question: based on Soviet estimates of U.S. strategic plans and programs, and their implications for the strategic balance, how might the Soviets react?[2]

The President has also directed a full reappraisal of our conventional and tactical nuclear strategies in light of the strategic balance and its implications concerning the likelihood of non-nuclear war, especially with regard to Europe. This reappraisal should be conducted as part of the U.S. Military Posture Review and submitted on July 1, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 1–42. Secret.

[2] In May 1969, the NSSM 24 Interagency Working Group, chaired by a representative from the CIA, submitted its report, entitled "How the Soviets View the Strategic Balance." The 15–page report, which concluded that Soviet leaders sought strategic equivalence rather than superiority vis-à-vis the United States, included three sections: "Moscow's Assessment of the Strategic Relationship," "Other Factors Behind the Soviet View of the Strategic Relationship," and "Institutional Factors Affecting Soviet Assessments of the Strategic Balance." (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–137, NSSM 24) The study, forwarded by Packard to Kissinger under a covering memorandum dated May 12, was Tab E to the response to NSSM 3, which included as Tab C an analysis of likely foreign reactions to various U.S. strategic postures. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 320.2, Strategic) A summary of the NSSM 3

response is Document 34.

11. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

JCSM–111–69 Washington, February 26, 1969.

SUBJECT
Sentinel Program Review (U)

1. (TS) In response to your request,[2] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Sentinel program in relation to the projected threat, military objectives, and political and fiscal constraints. Preliminary alternative deployment levels and modes have been examined toward an objective of protecting the US second strike capability and National Command Authorities, while maintaining protection of the United States against the early threat posed by the Chinese People's Republic or a small number of ICBMs from any source.
2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the most serious threat to the security of the United States is the rapidly expanding Soviet strategic offensive missile capability. In developing a posture for strategic forces capable of countering this threat, our general objectives are clear. We want to deter Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and if deterrence should fail, be able to inflict severe damage on the Soviet Union while limiting damage to the United States so as to terminate the attack with the United States in a position of relative advantage.
3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously accepted the Sentinel as a useful first step toward a ballistic missile defense capability. In a preliminary review of possible alternative Sentinel deployments, options have been identified which range from a deferral of the approved program deployment schedule through major revisions to the Sentinel program including reduced sites, radars, and missions, as well as alternative sitings of radars and missiles relative to large population areas. Based on an accelerated program review, a revised Sentinel deployment, Deployment Model 1–69, developed by the Army and described in the Enclosure[3] hereto, has been prepared and is summarized below.
   a. Deployment Model 1–69, in comparison with Sentinel, consists of a reduced number of sites, Missile Site Radars and Perimeter Acquisition Radars and missiles, but with an increased number of radar faces, and proposed locations further removed from cities. Surveys are now being conducted to determine such locations. The cost comparisons for the revised deployment, less Atomic Energy Commission costs, are $5.8 billion investment and FY 1968–1976 total costs of $8.7 billion; approved Sentinel program costs for the same period are $6.0 billion investment and $8.8 billion total. The site completion for the 1–69 deployment can be accomplished between October 1973 and April 1975, based on 15 March 1969 start date for full site survey investigation, congressional notification on land acquisition by 25 April 1969,

and maintaining present R&D pre-production and production efforts.

b. Deployment Model 1–69 could provide: additional warnings for CONUS-based bombers against SLBMs and FOBS; some protection against ICBMs, SLBMs, and FOBS; an option for protecting a portion of Minuteman force; protection against a moderately heavy attack on National Command Authorities at Washington, D.C., with an option to protect the control centers at Colorado Springs and Omaha; coverage for the more populous areas of CONUS against the early CPR threat with damage denial against this threat or a small number of ICBMs from any source; and a basis for subsequent improvement as required.

c. An alternative deployment, employing an Improved Spartan missile is described in the Enclosure and is an option for which development should be continued to provide advanced capabilities should the threat dictate. The decision for deployment of an Improved Spartan to meet the IOC date of 1 July 1975 reflected in the Enclosure, however, would not be required, for budget purposes, prior to 1 October 1970 or submission of the FY 1972 budget.

4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that while the revised ballistic missile defense deployment described in the Enclosure clearly does not provide the necessary capabilities against the primary threat, it will add to the overall defensive capability and strategic posture of the United States against that threat, and will be compatible with future improvement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the Sentinel Deployment Model 1–69 best reflects the guidance parameters contained in your request and they can support approval and implementation thereof. Additionally, they consider that it is essential to proceed with selective research and development programs that will provide for feasible improvement of a ballistic missile defense within the considerations of both technological and fiscal attainability.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 373.24, Safeguard. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A stamped note, dated February 27, on the first page reads: “Sec Def has seen.”

[2] No record of Laird’s request was found. But Colonel Robert E. Pursley, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, forwarded Wheeler’s memorandum to Laird under a covering memorandum dated February 27 that reads partly as follows: “I believe the attached support and endorsement of the Joint Chiefs is that which you had hoped for.” (Ibid.)

[3] Attached but not printed is a 27-page enclosure, entitled “Sentinel Program Review.”

12. Editorial Note

On February 27, 1969, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms submitted National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 13–8–69, entitled "Communist China's Strategic Weapons Program." The NIE was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency. Its purpose was to "assess China's strategic weapons program and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the mid-1970s."

The NIE concluded that the "development of strategic weapons systems has been given a high priority in China," judged already to possess a "regional nuclear strike capability in the sense that it could now have a few thermonuclear weapons for delivery by its two operational medium jet bombers. China could also have some fission weapons in stock." As for intercontinental ballistic missiles, the intelligence community projected that, "if the Chinese achieved the earliest possible initial operational capability (IOC) of late 1972, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975. In the more likely event that IOC is later, the achievement of a force of this size would slip accordingly." The latter scenario was considered more likely because "many uncertainties," including a confused domestic political situation and limited technical and industrial resources already stretched by other internal economic demands, left "in doubt the future pace, size, and scope of the Chinese program. In general, the Chinese are taking more time in the development and production of modern weapons systems than we judged likely several years ago." The intelligence community also predicted that "Chinese planners will come to recognize, if they do not already, that China cannot begin to match the nuclear strike capability of the superpowers," a realization that "may lead them to forego large-scale deployments of early missile systems."

The NIE struck a similar note regarding China's use of its nuclear weaponry. "So long as the Chinese strategic force remains relatively small and vulnerable," the estimate stated, "the Chinese will almost certainly recognize that the actual use of their nuclear weapons against neighbors or the superpowers would involve substantial risks of a devastating counterblow to China." The NIE is in the Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 7.

13. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Versailles, March 1, 1969.

PRESENT
The President
General de Gaulle
Prime Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Andronikov
MG Walters

This conversation followed the morning one which was reported upon separately. This is the report of the talks that occurred after lunch.

The President said that on Tuesday after his return the National Security Council would meet on the matter of an anti-ballistic missile system.[2] Subsequently he would meet with our legislative leaders and it was probable that his decision would be announced on Tuesday evening or Wednesday morning. He was speaking in great confidence.

General de Gaulle said that the President would be confident that there would be no indiscretion on the French side.

The President said that this was a difficult decision, there had been a lot of speculation concerning it and it had many political overtones and was related to possible talks with the Soviets in respect to limiting missiles. The General would remember that the Soviets had developed a limited anti-ballistic missile system and they had deployed it only around Moscow. It was our understanding that they were delaying deploying it further around other cities hoping for further developments in this field. He was speaking to the General in great confidence as no one knew what his decision would be, and there was great speculation concerning it. After the Soviets had deployed their system last year the US had decided to go ahead with a limited system known as the Sentinel. This would be deployed around our major cities.

General de Gaulle repeated his assurances that no one would talk on the French side.

The President said that since the election and his inauguration great political pressures had been brought on the administration on two grounds. Some felt that we should wait until after we saw how thing went in talks with the Soviets and the second ground was the fear expressed that in some of the protected cities that the presence of the missiles might endanger them. The 2nd ground was totally fictitious. The first ground had some basis of relevance. The argument had also been made that from the bargaining point of view the US should also have something on the counter and since the Soviets already have something we should too. A third argument relates to the capabilities of the system. A

thin anti-ballistic missile system would be effective only against an attack by a minor nuclear power like China and would not be effective against a major nuclear power like Russia which could launch enough missiles to penetrate it. Even between the US and the USSR whatever advantage no matter how small makes an attack by the other more difficult. It means more targets to take out. If missiles are deployed to protect cities then the argument can be made that the prime purpose of the system is to provide some assurance to a nation that might make a first strike. Today for example if another Cuban missile crisis were to occur and as a result the US struck first, the man making such a decision would be very heartened to know that no matter how many weapons the USSR launched that there would be a second strike. The argument could be made that it would increase the credibility of a US strike.

On the other hand if the US did not go forward with at least a minimal program the possibility exists that before the time of an agreement the Soviets might make significant technical breakthroughs that would give them a definite advantage. Credibility was both political and military. A majority of public opinion in the US would probably oppose the deployment of such a system because there was a trend of opinion against military costs and this combined with false fears. Another reason would be that some might fear that this would escalate the arms race. Actually he was leaning towards, though his mind was not definitely made up, a limited system but in a sense different from the defense of cities. This involved planning to build an ABM system for the purpose of protecting the deterrent and our second strike such as the Minuteman sites and other non hardened sites. This would also avoid the risk of falling behind in development of the art. Secondly it would improve our bargaining position and thirdly it would not be provocative to the Soviet Union because it would bear no relationship to a first strike. It would only be effective in protecting our capability for a second strike in reply to a first strike by the USSR. Pending any agreement the US must at all costs maintain the ability to make a second strike. Another good reason to choose this program rather than to deploy the system around cities was that the unprotected cities would complain that others were protected but not them. The Europeans would say this also.

General de Gaulle said that this would also avoid having to choose which cities would be protected. The system would cover only those organisms essential to assure a US second strike so that the adversary would know that there would be a second strike. When Kosygin had gone to the US and seen President Johnson at Glassboro[3] he had stopped in Paris on his way back to Moscow. He said that Pres. Johnson had told him that an ABM system would be ruinous for both of them and they should reach an agreement not to build them. Kosygin had said that maybe what was needed was an agreement against missiles rather than against anti-missiles.

The President said that since 1962 the Soviets had widened the advantage in conventional forces between the forces of the Warsaw pact and those of the Western countries and they had in great measure closed the gap in strategic weapons. Until an agreement was

reached we had no choice but to maintain our credibility. General de Gaulle thanked the President for telling him about this.

The President said that to return to the question of Western Europe, as he had indicated there were great political pressures for a substantial reduction of US Forces in Europe and more particularly in Germany. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Senators Fulbright and Mansfield had presented bills requiring the return to the US of two divisions. These would certainly have passed without Czechoslovakia. In the US, peoples' memory was short and Czechoslovakia was nearly forgotten. Amidst the talk of détente people would probably favor a lessening of the US presence in Europe. The same kind of talk would lead some of our people to favor reducing our arms budget by substantial amounts. This is why it would be dangerous if the idea prevailed in the US that the only option was a nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR. People would jump to conclusions and feel that all of our problems were over. They would start asking why it was necessary to maintain forces in Europe.

General de Gaulle said that if a détente was achieved with the Soviet Union that's where the situation would end anyhow. He did wish to point out one thing. If the US decided to make substantial reductions in US strength in Europe that was the US's business, but there was one thing he must point out. It would not be good if the idea arose that the departing US forces should be replaced with German units. This would have serious consequences. Even if the US decided to withdraw some of its forces in Europe it should still maintain a real military presence.

The President said that one thing he wanted to emphasize to the General was the fact that we have not decided when the talks may begin, we want to get a little more out of the other side, on political matters. It was a delicate situation which might easily set off a precipitate demand to reduce our effort in Europe and in strategic weapons. He believed like the General that we should welcome a détente in Europe with the USSR. They may well want it because of their primary concern regarding China, but of this we cannot be sure until we see what they do in negotiations. Until then those of us who had responsibility for maintaining the primary deterrent had to see that it was maintained.

General de Gaulle said that he would permit himself to tell the President that he was quite right.

The President said that he would tell the General that he was surprised after his election when he saw the classified figures at how close the Soviet Union was to us in strategic missiles. We were still ahead but not by much. This did not mean however that the deterrent lacked credibility. Each side had a capability for a second strike, which meant that a decision would have to be taken in less than 20 minutes for something that could kill 60 or 70 million people. We were sure that the Soviets had the same concern and that therefore the deterrent was credible.

General de Gaulle said that there were two points related to the deterrent at the present time. The Russian government was obviously aware of its responsibilities, so was the US government. Neither believes that the other will strike first. However changes could take place in Russia and less probably in the US which would make this situation no longer true. This was why the French were holding onto their weapons and refusing to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty. They were however favorable to as large a number of countries as possible signing the treaty. Quite frankly they hoped that neither the Germans nor the Israelis would acquire nuclear weapons.

The President said that when we think of men making these decisions we normally think of normal men but a man we would not consider normal—Hitler—started World War II. We must therefore also plan for the madman. He felt as he had expressed earlier that it was important for the good of the US that not only France should have nuclear weapons but in a broader sense that in the economic, political and military fields that the European Community have independent power and existence. This was one of the reasons why he had favored what is generally called integration but he was not wedded to any particular method. He felt that from the point of view of the United States that there be some collective power which can be a major economic political and military force apart from the US, but with it we hope, was very important.

General de Gaulle said that this opinion was also theirs.

The President said that he had been talking to the Prime Minister at lunch and while the approaches to the Major Powers to which the General had referred were not along the lines we had previously approved we would welcome them if they could get things done. He wanted to emphasize that on European problems including those of the UK we would express our views at times but that things in Europe should be allowed to develop in their own way. Times had changed. 22 years ago Europe was prostrate, economically, militarily and spiritually. They had been thinking in terms of a military alliance and fear of invasion had brought them together. Times had required American leadership as the US had power and Europe did not. The US was still ahead in economic and military power, but the nations of Europe were stable and had developed political strength and substance and in some cases nuclear capabilities. He felt that the period in which the US could effectively exert leadership is no longer here. He did not mean by this that we would not assume our responsibilities for the common defense. We would continue our role in NATO and do everything we could to draw the nations of Europe together. Political realities had changed and we would expect initiatives to come from Europeans. This was the way he meant to conduct the foreign policy of the United States.

General de Gaulle said that they took note of this and shared this feeling. Changes that would come were such that they would take time. The French will not oppose them. They are not opposed to rapprochement and even union. Because they were favorable to these ideas they were hostile to false appearances. They did not feel that Europeans should resign themselves to a subordinate position but rather that they should take over their

own responsibilities. The US could do a great deal to help.

[Omitted here is discussion about the Middle East, monetary reform, and relations with the Vatican.]

The meeting then concluded.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, President/HAK Memcons, Memcons—The President/Gen. De Gaulle, February 28–March 2, 1969. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles. Nixon traveled in Europe from February 23 through March 2. Presidents de Gaulle and Nixon held discussions focusing on the Soviet Union on February 28; on Germany, Berlin, and the future of Europe during the morning of March 1; and on economic matters on March 2. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid. The record of the talks held on the morning of March 1 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972. The memorandum of conversation of the March 1 discussion of economic matters is ibid., volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 7. For Nixon's recollections of these meetings, see Nixon, RN, pp. 371–375.

[2] The NSC met to discuss the ABM on Wednesday, March 5; see Document 16.

[3] President Johnson and Alexei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, held a summit meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey in June 1967.

[4] On the morning of March 4, the President briefed bipartisan Congressional leaders on the results of his European trip. After discussing relations between the United States and Western Europe, Nixon turned to defense matters, informing lawmakers that "the Soviets made great strides in closing the strategic gap since the Cuban confrontation, but they have 'widened the gap' in conventional weapons." Consequently, since the deterrent offered by massive retaliation was less credible, he favored a strategy of flexible response. Enhancing NATO's conventional capabilities would expand the alliance's military options and have an "enormous political effect," according to the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Box 77, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 2, 1969)

14. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense[1]

Washington, undated.

AMENDMENTS TO FY–70 DEFENSE BUDGETS

This paper will address two principal items in the FY–70 Defense Budget: the Sentinel Program and Operations in Southeast Asia.

A. Missile Defense Alternatives

Introduction

In 1967, the United States initiated a ballistic missile defense deployment program called Sentinel. This ballistic missile defense system was composed of the radars and interceptor missiles developed by the Army in its Nike-X development program. These components were designed to defend a variety of missile threats and to be put together in many ways so as to perform any one of several missions or any combination of missions. This paper summarizes the results of a review of several defense missions and of possible arrangements of the Sentinel components to determine if changes should be made. This review also considered deploying no missile defense at this time.

In order to understand the alternatives we have at this time, it will be useful to review the characteristics and operational capabilities of the various Sentinel components.

There are basically two types of ballistic missile defense, area and local (terminal) defense. In area defense, a single interceptor can defend areas of the country several hundreds of miles across. In local defense, the area defended can be 100 miles in diameter.

In Sentinel, a large radar called the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), has been designed to detect and accurately track missiles at ranges up to 2000 miles. Based on information from the PAR, a Spartan interceptor, carrying a multi-megaton warhead with a lethal radius of up to 30 miles, is launched to intercept the incoming warhead high above the atmosphere and hundreds of miles from the launch site. A much smaller radar, the Missile Site Radar (MSR), is located at the Spartan launch site and is used to guide the Spartan to an intercept by accurately tracking both the incoming warhead and the Spartan. Because of the large area coverage from a Spartan site, only several sites are required to provide protection for the entire United States. PARs are needed around the borders of the U.S. to provide detection and tracking of ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs).

It is possible for an attacker to make use of confusion devices which could be distributed

above the atmosphere to hide the exact location of the RV from the area defense. For such attacks, local defense has the advantage over area defense of being able to wait until these devices burn up or separate from the RV on reentry. Because of this necessity to wait, a local defense interceptor can defend only a relatively small area, say up to 30 miles across, when such confusion devices are used. This requires a very fast and small interceptor. The Sprint was developed to carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of a few kilotons and to fly 50 miles at altitudes to 100,000 feet in about 50 seconds. It operates with a MSR which could sort out confusion devices and guides the Sprint to the incoming warhead. To be the most effective the MSR must be close to the point where the warhead comes into the atmosphere. The Sprint, because of its short range, must also be located in or near the defended area. Hence, the MSR and associated Sprints required for each city or military installation (such as a group of Minuteman sites) to be provided a local defense.

A combination of area and local defense can be obtained by placing MSRs, Spartans, and Sprints in a single defense complex. Since the PARs are the eyes of the area defense system, they should be collocated with an MSR/Spartan site and protected by Sprints to insure their survival. This multiple use of the sites and equipment enables significant savings over several single-purpose defense systems.

Alternatives

Four basic alternative ways to combine these defense components for several objectives have been examined. Each will be discussed below.

1. Defense of Cities Against USSR

a. *Objectives and Options*

(1) Limit damage to U.S. urban/industrial centers in event of nuclear war and enhance national survival and recovery possibilities.
(2) Provide area defense against emerging CPR missile threat and accidental launches.

b. *Description*

This defense system would essentially be the Sentinel system as originally designed with three major additions: (1) two PARs to give complete radar coverage against SLBMs and Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems, (2) Sprints to the MSR sites already near the large cities, and (3) new MSR/Sprint sites near additional cities. Such a defense system would have terminal defense for 25 of our key industrial centers with a minimum of about 1000 Sprints as well as an area defense with a minimum of 500 Spartans. The deployment could be started in early 1973 and would be completed in 1977.

c. *Costs*

The estimated investment cost for such a minimum system would be $11 to $12 billion. The required funding per year, including operations and R&D, is estimated to be:

FY–68	FY–69	FY–70	FY–71
$590M	$960M	$2B	$3B

d. *Discussion*

Pros

(1) Deterrence of Soviet attacks is a function of our overall strategic capabilities, not only our retaliatory capacity. This system would strengthen our deterrent against the Soviets.
(2) In the event deterrence fails and U.S. urban/industrial centers are attacked, it would save lives and help ensure a favorable war outcome.
(3) It would also satisfy other missile defense objectives such as protecting against emerging Chinese ICBM threat and accidental launchings.
(4) The area defense aspect of this system would provide some protection for our retaliatory forces; options would exist for increasing this protection by deploying additional Sprints around ICBM sites, for example.
5. It would provide defense of our National Command Authority.

Cons

(1) Our basic strategic objective is deterrence of a nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies. To meet this objective, we first buy forces that give us a very high confidence retaliatory capability. We also buy conventional forces to handle situations that otherwise might escalate to nuclear war. We believe these forces make nuclear war an extremely remote possibility. If deterrence works, we avoid nuclear war altogether.
(2) We believe that the Soviet Union also places great emphasis on avoiding nuclear war and that they size their strategic offense forces to have a retaliatory capability that could survive an attack by the U.S. Thus, we expect that the Soviets would and could respond to large U.S. missile defense deployments that tend to diminish their retaliatory capability by expanding and improving their offense forces. In the long-run, it does not appear possible to materially reduce the vulnerability of our urban/industrial centers to Soviet attacks, independent of our expenditures on missile defense of cities.
(3) If we desire to protect against the emerging Chinese ICBM threat, accidental launches, or Soviet threats to our retaliatory forces, we could do so at significantly lower costs with different deployments.
(4) A decision to defend our cities against Soviet attacks would stimulate further expenditures in the already expensive strategic arms race, and would adversely complicate possible future arms limitation talks.
(5) There would be adverse domestic political reactions to the deployments in this

system.
(6) Allied reaction might well be that the U.S. is retreating toward a "Fortress America" strategy.

2. Area Defense Against Chinese ICBM (Sentinel)

a. *Objectives and Options*

(1) Provide area defense denying damage against emerging Chinese ICBM attack and guarding against accidental or demonstration launch of a small number of ICBMs from any nation.
(2) Provides some protection for Minuteman and the option for additional defense of these forces when and if needed.

b. *Description*

The Sentinel system would consist of 16 MSR/Spartan sites providing area defense of the continental U.S. and Alaska. A Sprint battery would protect the island of Oahu. Six PARs would be located across the northern U.S. and Alaska. No radar coverage against SLBMs would be provided. The PARs would be collocated with MSRs and given Sprint protection. Approximately 500 Spartans and 200 Sprints would be deployed. Four of the MSR–Spartan batteries would be located in Minuteman fields to provide a portion of CONUS area defense and the option for later addition of Sprints for local defense. The other MSRs would be located near cities to provide better protection against growth of the Chinese ICBM threat and to provide for Sprint defense of the city should that become desirable in the future. The deployment could be started now with the first site becoming operational in early 1973 and the last early 1975.

c. *Costs*

The estimated investment cost is approximately $6 billion. This cost plus operating and R&D costs require funding at roughly the following rates:

FY–68	FY–69	FY–70	FY–71
$590M	$960M	$2B	$3B

d. *Discussion*

Pros

(1) There is evidence that the Chinese could have an initial ICBM force by 1972 and about 20 ICBMs by 1975. The Sentinel system can provide a damage-denial capability against this emerging threat. The effectiveness in reducing U.S. deaths from a Chinese attack after completion of the system is shown below:

U.S. Deaths From A Chinese First Strike in the 1970s

Number of Chinese ICBMs on Launchers U.S. Deaths (Millions)	10	25	50	75
With no Defense	7	11	18	23
With Sentinel	0+	0+	0+	1

(2) This system can provide protection against accidental ICBM launches.

(3) This system can also provide through qualitative and quantitative improvements a damage limiting capability against an improving Chinese threat in the late 1970s.

(4) It provides some limited protection for Minuteman sites, bomber bases, and command-control centers from ICBM attacks.

(5) It provides options for adding terminal defense to Minuteman sites; to some cities.

(6) By enhancing U.S. deterrence, it strengthens the credibility of our commitments to defend our allies against nuclear intimidation.

(7) It lessens China's ability to drag the U.S. and the Soviet Union into a nuclear war.

(8) This level of ABM defense may strengthen our position in entering possible future arms limitation talks.

(9) It provides some protection against small Soviet attacks and complicates their targetting.

(10) It provides all of the above yet does not deprive the Soviets of their second-strike capability, whatever way they might measure it.

(11) It can become operational by the end of 1972.

Cons

(1) Our overwhelming strategic offensive forces and our conventional force capabilities are sufficient to deter Chinese nuclear attacks on ourselves and on our allies.
(2) An anti-Chinese oriented ABM system might overemphasize Chinese nuclear capabilities. The increased fear of Chinese nuclear attack, coupled with the awareness of their vulnerability to such attacks, would cause concern to our allies.
(3) It might also suggest to other nations that we think the Chinese might act irrationally, thereby adding to the above concerns.
(4) It might keep Asian countries from adhering to a nonproliferation treaty by drawing attention to the threat and causing them to raise demands for their own defense, possibly as a step toward developing their own offensive nuclear capability.
(5) The Soviets may perceive this limited ABM system as a first step towards U.S.

deployment of a larger system, and may begin to take offensive counteractions to hedge against such a possibility.
(6) The Soviets have slowed down their ABM deployments, although R&D has been speeded up, and have expressed strong interest in discussing limitations of both defensive and offensive systems. Insofar as we would get committed to the full deployment of this system, this might complicate any agreement we might seek to negotiate with the Soviet Union on ABM limitations.

3. Modified Sentinel

a. *Objectives and Options*

(1) Provides defenses for our Minuteman sites, SAC bomber bases, and our National Command Authority and its communications against a Soviet attack. Additional defense of Minuteman can be provided when and if needed.
(2) Provides coverage of our more heavily populated areas against an emerging Chinese ICBM threat with the option to include defense of Hawaii and Alaska.
(3) Provides protection against the accidental launch of a small number of ballistic missiles from any power.
(4) Provides further options to (a) accelerate protection of urban/industrial centers against an emerging Chinese ICBM threat, (b) incorporate protection of the Combat Operation Centers at Colorado Springs and Omaha against a moderately heavy attack, and (c) incorporate new generation radars and missiles from R&D programs to provide improved capabilities should the threat dictate.

b. *Description*

The Sentinel system as designed would be rearranged to provide for the above objectives. Complete radar coverage against ICBMs, SLBMs, and FOBS would be provided and the MSR/Spartan sites would be moved away from large cities to locations that provide the best protection of our bomber bases against surprise attack and SLBMs. One PAR site at Alaska is eliminated and two PARs are added in Southern California and Northern Florida, respectively. Five MSR/Spartan sites would be eliminated, three from the interior of the U.S. and one each from Alaska and Hawaii. There would be a total of about 12 MSR/Spartan locations. The four MSR/Spartan sites in the Minuteman fields would be able to provide a portion of area defense and would preserve the option to add Sprints for local defense of Minuteman. A MSR/Spartan/Sprint site would be located at Washington, D.C. to protect the National Command Authority and its communications. A few Sprints would be added at each of the radars to provide some additional defense against attack. About 450 Spartans and 200 Sprints are needed for this system. Due to the requirement for new detailed site selections and evaluation analyses, the first site would not be operational until late 1973; the deployment would be completed in early 1975.

c. *Costs*

The estimated DOD investment cost of this system would be roughly about that of the Sentinel, or about $6 billion.

The estimated total funding requirements, including operations and R&D, would be:

FY–68	FY–69	FY–70	FY–71
$590M	$750M	$1.5B	$2.0B

d. *Discussion*

Pros

(1) It allows some protection of our Minuteman ICBMs against the Soviet missile threat.

(a) Although we can maintain Assured Destruction with high levels of destruction on the Minuteman force, we are concerned about maintaining an expensive force that might become vulnerable. Such forces, in a period of extreme crisis, may invite an attack rather than deter one if the enemy knows he can probably destroy the force. Therefore, we should protect the Minuteman or be prepared to phase out land-based missiles, or be prepared to develop other alternatives.

(b) Even though the Soviets are not expected to have an adequate force (an accurate MIRV) to destroy Minuteman for several years, we must maintain options against the possibility that they could. Therefore, this option, by providing a radar network as a base, allows us to make follow-on decisions at an appropriate time.

(c) We have investigated several alternatives for protecting Minuteman against a "greater-than-expected" Soviet threat: (a) ABM defense, (b) adding or relocating Minuteman in superhard (3000 psi) silos, and (c) combinations of above. We have examined these options against the accurate Soviet MIRV threat and have compared the near term and relative costs to keep about one-third of the Minuteman force surviving, shown in the table below:

	Costs ($Billions)		
Force Option	R&D Investment		Level-Off Annual Cost[2]
ABM Defense[3]	0	5.9	0.6
New MM in Hard Rock Silos (HRS)	0.3	8.8	0.5
New & Relocated MM in HRS	0.3	10.2	0.5
ABM and New MM in HRS[3]	0.3	7.0	0.5

ABM defense of Minuteman is expected to be less expensive in the initial years and probably less expensive over all than the other force options identified above. In addition, defense would be much cheaper against lesser threats such as the development of a

smaller number of large accurate MIRVs for their large missiles. This is something the Soviet technicians might develop as a product improvement without a decision by their national leaders to adopt a major damage limiting strategy. However, we would not want to rely exclusively on ABM defense of Minuteman. We are uncertain about the effectiveness of a heavy defense against a heavy Soviet attack and the sensitivity of the defense to smaller MIRVs and penetration aids. To counteract this sensitivity we would have to add even larger levels of defense resulting in a larger cost than that shown in the table above. We would need lower levels of defense and smaller numbers of hard rock silos if we deployed a combination and hedged against a greater uncertainty in the threat and in the effectiveness of the defense and hard rock silos. Such a force would be extremely difficult for the Soviets to destroy.

(d) The table below compares the protected Minuteman force with other alternatives for maintaining Assured Destruction. We have assumed the Soviets have deployed a full greater-than-expected threat consisting of accurate MIRVs, improved low altitude air defenses, and heavy ABM defenses of their cities in an attempt to remove our Assured Destruction capability. This is the largest plausible threat we plan against.

Costs to Maintain Assured Destruction (Soviet Greater-Than-Expected Threat)

	Costs ($ Billions)	
	R&D	Ten-Year System Costs
Minuteman-Defended and in Hard Rock Silos	0.3	10
700 Additional Minuteman in HRS	0.3	11
20 Additional Poseidon Submarines	0	14
New Land-Based ICBM (WS–120A)	2.6	14
New Sea-Based ICBM (ULMS)	2.0	14

We can protect Minuteman with ABM defenses and hard rock silos cheaper than we can add Poseidons or hard rock silos alone. The new ICBMs, sea-based or land-based, show no clear cost advantage until the greater-than-expected threat becomes stronger than currently estimated.

(2) It provides an effective means of preventing our bomber force from becoming vulnerable to a surprise Soviet SLBM attack.

(a) Our Strategic bombers are a major component in our retaliatory force because (a) they force the Soviets to pay large costs for a balanced defense against bombers and missiles, (b) they hedge against the unexpected failure of missile forces, (c) they are useful for nonnuclear conflicts, and (d) they allow us to quickly increase our force size by simply increasing the alert rate. Bombers are vulnerable to a surprise Soviet attack, since they rely almost exclusively on tactical warning for survival. We have adequate warning of Soviet ICBMs and FOBs through current BMEWS and 440L system and are taking steps

to improve this warning with a new surveillance satellite (Program 949). However, against a surprise SLBM attack, even if we get warning at near the time of launch, the missile flight time is so short to some bases that a significant portion of our bombers and tankers may be destroyed before they can be launched.

(b) There are four alternatives to decrease the vulnerability of the strategic bomber force against SLBMs: (1) dispersal, (2) airborne alert, (3) improved ASW forces, and (4) active defense of the bases. We can disperse the bomber force to reduce the take-off time by putting only two bombers and two tankers on each of 250 airfields (all would not be on alert). However, this would cost $200–400 million per year and depressed SLBM trajectories would still make the take-off time marginal. We are not certain about our ASW capability and probably would not rely on it completely. Airborne alert is difficult to maintain over a long period of time since additional crews and increased aircraft maintenance is required. We estimate airborne alert for 40% of our bombers would cost $800–900 million per year.

(c) We have initiated three steps to increase bomber survivability. The first step includes a limited bomber dispersal plan which includes about 67 alert bomber bases, thus increasing the number of targets required for the SLBM. The second is a new satellite warning system which gives tactical warning at nearly the time of missile launch to increase the warning time. With these new plans, a significant portion of the strategic bombers can survive until the SLBM force expands to that projected for about 1973.

(d) ABM defense of the bomber bases against new long-range SLBMs with a good warning system can provide additional time to launch the bombers. In the years after 1973, this defense, with the new warning system and dispersal, significantly increases the bomber survivability as shown in the table below, and reduces the dependency of the bombers on tactical warning for survival. Such a defense could be completed by 1975.

Capabilities for Protection of Strategic Bombers

	FY–70	FY–71	FY–72	FY–73	FY–74	FY–75	FY–76
Threat							
Number of Soviet SLBM on-Station (Surprise attack)	0	1–2	2–4	4–7	6–11	8–15	10–15
	% of Alert Bomber Force Surviving Against High NIPP						
U.S. Force							
Minimum Energy SLBM Trajectories							
Satellite Basing with 949	100	95	90	60	40	30	30
Satellite Basing with 949 and ABM Defense	100	95	90	60	80	85	95
Depressed SLBM Trajectories (should this threat develop)							
Satellite Basing with 949	100	90	60	35	20	15	15

Satellite Basing with 949 and ABM Defense	100	90	60	35	60	85	95

(3) Since missile and radar sites would not be located in large cities, it would not be perceived by the Soviets as a first step towards a major U.S. ABM program. Because of these reasons, this system is not expected to complicate strategic arms talks.

(4) It would provide nearly the same level of protection of our population against Chinese ICBM threats, small attacks from any nation, and accidental launches as the Sentinel system. However, Hawaii and Alaska could be at risk if we did not exercise the option to defend them.

(5) It would protect our National Command Authority; and maintains the option to protect the COCs in Colorado Springs and Omaha.

(6) It does not call for deployment of ABM interceptors in any major cities, thereby reducing domestic criticism.

(7) It could provide defense against the total threat; ICBMs, SLBMs, FOBS, and growth threats.

Cons

(1) Even after we deploy the system, there is a possibility that the Soviets might develop means to degrade it, e.g., warheads with small radar signatures, depressed trajectories, and other penetration aids. Thus, the effectiveness of the system may become uncertain, or without improvements, become degraded. Such uncertainty is not consistent with our requirement for the maintenance of a high-confidence retaliatory capability, especially if we require a reliable capability in each element of our strategic forces, i.e., our bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs.
(2) We will have a high-confidence retaliatory capability in our ICBMs and SLBMs, only if the Soviets do not deploy a large ABM system. Thus, even if the bombers can be destroyed in a surprise attack, we still would retain an adequate deterrent.
(3) If the capability to protect bomber bases is to be maintained in the future in the face of growing threats, additional Spartans would probably be needed. However, the Spartans are also capable of defending cities. Thus, the Soviets might view an increase in the number of Spartans as a destabilizing move on our part. It might lead them to increase the size of their offense force to maintain their retaliatory capability.
(4) SLBM warning time would range from three to 15 minutes. This implies that nuclear release authority for defensive missiles must be predelegated to the ABM defense commander (probably CINCONAD). Otherwise, with only the President giving the nuclear release, the time between warning and release authority may preclude intercept of a large number of SLBMs.
(5) We run some risk of not having the system deployed in time.

4. No Missile Defense Deployment

a. *Objectives and Options*

(1) Continue reliance on strategic offensive capabilities.
(2) Maintain options to deploy various system now under consideration (SABMIS, Nike–X, etc.) with emphasis on options for protecting retaliatory forces.
(3) Reduce costs and domestic criticism.

b. *Description*

(1) Cancel Sentinel.
(2) Continue ballistic missile defense R&D.

c. *Costs*

Sentinel can be cancelled shortly. Non-recoverable costs have been incurred. This would result in roughly a $600 M loss, i.e., if the program had never been started, we could have saved $600 M exclusive of R&D costs. The funding requirements to date for Sentinel and for continuing R&D only would be roughly:

	FY–68	FY–69	FY–70	FY–71
Sentinel and Nike–X	$590M	$750M	$350M	$300M

d. *Discussion*

Pros

(1) Although ABM defense provides the least costly alternative to the protection of our deterrent force against a Soviet attack, we do not have to deploy an ABM defense. We could rely on other alternatives for force protection.
(2) Our overwhelming retaliatory force would deter a deliberate attack by the Chinese.
(3) The high cost for the defense system could be applied to other pressing national needs.
(4) It might enable us to negotiate a complete ban on ABMs with the Soviet Union and thereby simplify certain kinds of verification problems.
(5) No change in our alliance relationships.

Cons

(1) The pros of all previous alternative defense systems.

Recommendation

The review of the pros and cons have led us to select Alternative 3 (Modified Sentinel). On balance, we feel that defense of our retaliatory forces, protection against the emerging

Chinese threat and an accidental launch are essential to U.S. national security.[4]

[Omitted here is Section B, “FY 70 Budget Amendments for Support of Operations in Southeast Asia.”]

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper. This paper was prepared in response to NSSM 23, Document 9. Laird sent it to Kissinger as an attachment to a March 1 covering memorandum. On March 4, Kissinger forwarded it to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and Lincoln for their consideration prior to the following day’s NSC meeting. Copies were sent to David Kennedy, Mayo, Gerard Smith, Helms, Wheeler, and Richardson. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, FY 70 Defense Budget, March 5, 1969)

[2] Costs include operation of Minuteman force. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] Assumes Sentinel R&D costs are “sunk.” Investment costs for Sentinel equipment in Minuteman fields are included in defense costs above. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] Assumes Sentinel R&D costs are “sunk.” Investment costs for Sentinel equipment in Minuteman fields are included in defense costs above. [Footnote in the original.]

[4] The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs generally endorsed the Defense Department’s recommendation. However, in a briefing memorandum sent to Rogers on March 4, Farley recommended pushing for revisions in the program’s public rationale, including a “delay in the program which gives us additional time to explore seriously a strategic arms agreement with the Soviets. Moreover, the rationale should also stress that implementation is subject to modification, depending on the outcome of negotiations with the Soviets.” (National Archives, RG 59, Entry No. 5000, S/S–NSC Meeting Files, 1969–70: Lot 71 D 175, Box 3, NSC Meeting, March 5, 1969)

15. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, March 5, 1969.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting on FY 1970 Defense Budget

The Department of Defense will brief the NSC on their proposal for an ABM system, which they term the Modified Sentinel System.

This system will:

1. Provide us with the option to respond promptly to Soviet deployment of accurate multiple warheads on their ballistic missiles by actively defending our Minuteman missile force. It will not provide us with an actual Minuteman defense.
2. Provide us with area protection for our alert strategic bomber force against attacks by Soviet ballistic missile submarines and orbital weapons.
3. Provide protection for Washington, D.C. against moderately heavy attacks from any source.

Such a system, designed to protect our deterrent, can also provide protection against accidental or irrational nuclear attacks by any power. In addition, the system can provide complete protection against the early Chinese ICBM threat.

The old Sentinel system also provided the Minuteman defense option and protection against the early Chinese threat. Sentinel did not provide protection for our bombers, did not protect Washington against moderately heavy attacks, and did not provide complete protection against accidental attacks from any source.

I believe you should approve the DOD plan. However, I recommend that you do not indicate your final decision until Monday.[2] In the meantime, I will have prepared a rationale and backup book which all agencies can use in their public statements.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, FY 70 Defense Budget, March 5, 1969. Top Secret. Sent for action.

[2] March 10. No record of Nixon's response to Kissinger's recommendation was found.

[3] Kissinger on March 8 sent a briefing book to Nixon that included a draft presidential statement announcing the ABM decision and its rationale, questions and answers likely

to arise on the issue, and additional background material. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, Anti-Ballistic Missile System)

16. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, March 5, 1969.

Packard: Complex problem. No simple rationale or basis for going ahead.

Area defense:

PAR—1500–2000 mi range.

Spartan—kill radius of 20 mi. (later said 12 mi for soft targets, 4 mi for hard targets) Fallout not a problem.

Quite a large number of missiles can be handled. MSR can handle 20 targets, control 10 missiles.

PAR components tested. No test prior to 1st installation.

MSR Operating unit at Kwajalein.

Spartan being flight tested [with] 4 MT warhead; some test problems, but not serious.

In 1962, Soviets tested ABM warhead in the air. Nixon noted. We had done nothing in this field.

Sprint: 2KT warhead, 55 mi max range.

1967 Threat

1. 4–8 Chinese ICBMs by 1972.
2. Soviets level off at 1482. High estimate.
3. Adequate warning predicted for bombers.

Threat changes

1. 3MT Chinese warhead tested; their missile test facilities expanded; 20 ICBMs by 1975. (None operational now)
2. Soviets ICBM build-up continuing; additional SS–9s good against our missiles; development of MIRV. Evidence suggests threat against land-based missiles.
3. Soviet Y class BMS in serial production.
4. Soviets have tested FOBS; depressed trajectory flight development continuing.

Summarizes our forces, Soviet forces now and in 1976. Mentions that we should maintain

bombers, get a new one.

Nixon: Compelling argument for bombers is that they can be put on alert.

Lynn note: you can't say you have expansion for defense of Hawaii and Alaska, no expansion for cities.

Packard: Weakness is that they take a long time to get there. We will want a multiplicity of capabilities.

Mentions 10 1 MT bombs, do same damage as 1 25 MT bomb.

Your capability depends on hardness of targets.

Also, only a fraction of your force is needed for deterrence.

Don't have to protect 90% of your force. Not the same with protection of population; can't protect just 20% of population.

Reviewed alternatives.

Modified Sentinel

> Oriented toward protection of our retaliatory capability
>
> Provides for defense of Minuteman sites. 4 radars in MM sites plus Sprint & Spartan missiles. Giving attention to protection of SAC bomber bases. Not feasible to provide hard point defense of bombers; they are soft targets. Key is SLBM threat, short warning.
>
> Protection of NCA is very important problem.

Nixon: Take out of discussion term "Washington, D.C." Use words National Command Authority.

Packard: Provides for expansion. Provides protection in increments. "Does not provide option to defend major cities with Sprints (except Washington)." Will not provide that foundation. Maybe some locations close to cities. But orientation is not toward protection of major cities.

Nixon: Don't use term "initial investment."

Mayo: Isn't it true that cash savings are less than TOA savings?

Packard: We could take another 3 month delay to completion and save another $200 million in TOA. We recommend going ahead without further delay. We're a little late

now.

We recommend proceeding with modified system. Can't be justified on basis of defense of bombers only or missiles only. We believe we need multiplicity of elements in system. Won't complicate talks with Soviets.

Nixon: Why not just build more offensive capability?

Packard: This move would encourage continuation of the arms race. It would be more provocative.

Agnew: Won't Soviets still be able to damage our cities? If so, what good does this do?

Packard: We have no damage limiting capability. We depend on retaliating capability as a deterrent.

Agnew: Is this giving us added retaliatory capability?

General assent from Nixon, Wheeler and Packard.

Agnew: Isn't it at a high cost?

Packard: Shows chart[2] on Alternatives to Minuteman Defense. No alternative is as attractive as system we are proposing.

Wheeler: We do not stress enough the Chicom ICBM threat. I look at it as reverse deterrence. Chicoms could defer [*deter*] you from assisting in defense of Taiwan with no ABM.

Nixon: How long would we have credible first strike capability against Chicoms?

Wheeler: Through 1970s.

Helms: Wheeler's right.

Laird: I would say much longer, into 1980s.

Nixon: Our desire here is for its political effect. We won't trade off any city here against anything out there.

Packard: This deployment would put uncertainty into any Chinese calculation.

Agnew: Emphasis misplaced. I can see people on hill objecting to going ahead and not providing complete protection.

Laird: People on hill impressed with need for a retaliatory capability.

Agnew: Don't we have enough with Polaris and the bombers?

Laird: Polaris can't destroy their missiles. Our backgrounders will put China first.

Nixon: Where is Soviet ABM directed?

Helms: Soviet ABM is directed entirely against U.S.

Nixon: Soviets are moving ahead at an escalating rate, is that right?

Helms: Yes.

Mayo: We have an important budget problem for FY 70. I would hope that you could keep options open with respect to budget reviews a few days or at most a week! If we want Sentinel, where else can we save? Other agencies aren't taking budget stringency that seriously. I wish there were something between $6 billion and 0.

Nixon: Your argument should be considered. I would urge that never publicly indicate option was held open for budget reasons.

Mayo: I feel that very strongly.

Richardson: Can it be made clear that option precludes population defense? Would system as proposed for retaliatory protection be the same if bomber protection were left out?

Packard: This deployment does not provide *rational base* for going to thick system. We can state this categorically.

Smith: I must testify tomorrow. It would help if I could state that there is no consideration to going with a thick system.

Nixon: Leave thick system hanging out there a bit and let's come down from it. You could say you strongly oppose it. It didn't disturb me that Bill and Mel came out differently on ABM.[3] But matter is still up for consideration.

Packard: To Richardson's second question. We could consider lesser deployments: command only, missiles only. No capability against China unless we have complete area defense.

Nixon: I may want to meet with all of you again.

Packard: Talking points on p. 17. I stressed retaliating here partly because this is a new feature. Public statement puts China first, retaliatory protection second.[4]

Nixon: Thick system wouldn't provide any protection against surprise attack?

Packard: Only a little.

Nixon: That's the point.

Agnew: Could we push this off a little in the interest of flexibility?

Packard: We concluded it would be unwise to delay the deployment.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting lasted from 8:42 to 10:32 a.m., was held the Cabinet Room of the White House, and was attended by the President, Kissinger, Vice President Agnew, Rogers, Laird, David Kennedy, Lincoln, Wheeler, Helms, Richardson, Gerard Smith, Mayo, Lee A. DuBridge, Packard, Lynn, and Haig. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] Not found.

[3] In his February 20 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Laird stated that the United States should deploy a missile defense system because of the "very rapid" progress made by the Soviet Union in the strategic arms race. Rogers, in his testimony of February 18 before the same committee, had advocated delaying further deployment of an ABM system pending the outcome of arms control negotiations with the Soviets. (*New York Times*, February 21, 1969)

[4] See footnote 3, Document 15.

17. Minutes of Meeting Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), and Other Department of Defense Officials[1]

Washington, March 5, 1969.

HAK: Explain Minuteman defense.

Foster: 2 stages: 1st stage provides 1st level of protection. Reason for change is protection of Minuteman sites. McNamara didn't want Sprints where they weren't absolutely needed.

Packard: Two goals: Change emphasis; not spend more money.

Selin: New deployment will protect 100–150 more MM because radars are defended.

HAK: Clear rationale for new deployment.

What old did.

What new does.

Explain growth options.

Foster: Have made no attempt to design so it could be moved to cities. Sitings depend on bomber fields, which in turn may be near cities.

HAK: President wouldn't be heart broken if we had a cities defense option.

Packard: Let's get facts down. I have decided to reorient to protect retaliatory capacity. We need a map.

HAK—map of old vs. new.

HAK: Will military tell a different story?

Packard: Moorer will support. Westy [Westmoreland] wants to expand to cities. McConnell is the problem. He won't say bombers need any protection.

I will have to take an understanding with him. Wheeler will support it.

HAK: Next Monday[2] or Tuesday he [Nixon] wants to go on TV with a 10 minute statement of general rationale.

Say he had choice of 4 approaches, choose least provocative one consistent with our interests.

Then he wants to put into a general context of talks, U.S. posture.

He is determined to have parallel progress in political and military issues.

He isn't going to promise starting arms control talks.

We ought to try to play for political progress for 3–4 months.

He shouldn't pledge to give this up. He should say it will be part of discussion.

HAK: I see the division of labor as follows:

1. Larry [Lynn] do 10 minute statement.
2. DOD do toughest set of questions, develop answers.
3. DOD to do a backgrounder the same day or day after.
4. Packard work on background material.
5. President should put his prestige behind the program. Show he has mastered it. He will work with your paper,[3] paper we did,[4] before he gets your book.[5]

HAK said he would check who will take care of Congress. President wants it to be his decision.

Tomorrow night—exchange materials; get together on Friday.[6] Packard brief on Wednesday. Fryklund says shouldn't wait for opposition to build up. We want open, on the record press conference.

HAK: We should see the background briefing.

Nixon would probably prefer Omaha, Colorado Springs be included. Suggest Colorado Springs.

NATO/Canada—HAK says DOD do it after President's OK. Foster go up there.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the minutes. Also attending were Lynn, Haig, Ralph Earle, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) Ivan Selin, Deputy Director of the Nuclear Monitoring Research Office Verne Charles Fryklund, Jr., and Director of Defense Research and Engineering John S. Foster, Jr.

[2] March 10.

[3] Document 14.
[4] Document 18.
[5] Not further identified.
[6] March 7.

18. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

ISSUES CONCERNING ABM DEPLOYMENT

The DOD paper discusses four options for an ABM decision:[2]

1. Defense of cities against the Soviet Union.
2. Area Defense Against Chinese ICBM (Sentinel).
3. Modified Sentinel.
4. No Missile Defense Deployment.

DOD recommends, with the unanimous endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, alternative 3. This paper discusses (1) exactly how in fact the proposed deployment differs from the Sentinel system, (2) important differences of opinion within the Government about the real reasons for going ahead with this deployment, differences which could create "credibility gap" problems concerning the Administration's real intent, and (3) legitimate issues that can be raised concerning this deployment, issues which we must be prepared to deal with if they arise in public debate.

Differences Between DOD Proposal and Sentinel

The DOD proposal will save about $500 million in the FY 69–70 budget,[3] will delay initial deployment 9–12 months and full deployment by about 9 months, and will have the following implications for our strategic posture.

Defense of Minuteman

Sentinel	*Modified Sentinel*
Provided some defense of Minuteman and an option for additional defense by putting radar sites near four Minuteman fields. Additional 264 missiles would be needed for first level of effective defense (other levels could be deployed to meet greater threats by accurate MIRVs)	No real change; fewer Sprints will be deployed in Minuteman fields, but they will be better distributed.

Area Defense

Complete protection against early, unsophisticated Chinese ICBM threat, or against accidental ICBM attack by any	Provides more extensive area defense in all directions but is thinner in some directions and has some gaps. Somewhat lower growth potential because system has

country. Protection against more sophisticated Chinese threat.	fewer radars.
No significant area protection of bombers or cities against attacks from Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SLBMs) or fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS).	By reducing number and relocating radar and missile sites and by enabling radars to look other than Northward, provides protection for bomber bases and cities against Soviet submarine launched or orbital space launched attacks. (Radars and missiles will be relocated away from cities.) Eliminates defense of Alaska and Hawaii by deleting radars, missile deployments there.

Defense of National Command Authorities

Same as for rest of country.	Adds about 20 Spartan, 50 Sprint missiles to protect Washington, D.C. against moderately heavy Soviet attack. (Protection may also be put in for Colorado Springs.)

Protection or Damage Limitation Against USSR

Very limited and only against attacks from North; not designed for this purpose. However, maintains option of cities defense against Soviet threat.	Still very limited, but better directional coverage. No rational basis for later installation of a cities defense.

The chart[4] shows that the basic change in the physical system is the improved directional coverage of the radar system, which protects the bomber bases against Soviet SLBM or FOBS attack. Otherwise, the area defense system is somewhat thinner, except around Washington, but with better regional distribution of Sprint missiles. Because the modified system has fewer radars, its growth potential is less than that of Sentinel. *The Minuteman defense features and the virtual absence of major damage limiting capability vis-à-vis the Soviets are about the same for both systems*.

The relocation of the radar and missile sites away from cities will not in and of itself alter the capabilities of the system if the new sites remain within 50 miles of the cities but will substantially reduce or eliminate the growth potential if the sites are beyond 50 miles.

Major Differences of Opinion

It is important to recognize that believers in at least two fundamentally different views have united behind the Modified Sentinel proposal.

1. One view is that the Modified Sentinel deployment fills important gaps in the

protection of our deterrent and provides options for meeting possible new threats to our deterrent that have not yet appeared, such as accurate Soviet MIRVs. Area protection of our population is a valuable feature of this deployment, but no greater protection of our cities should be contemplated because this would stimulate a costly arms race, increase the instability in U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships, and ultimately leave us no better off.

2. The second view regards the deployment primarily as a useful *first step* toward obtaining a major damage limiting capability against the Soviet Union as well as a necessary step in maintaining an invulnerable deterrent. Holders of this view fully expect to propose additional deployments for the defense of cities later on unless arms control agreements make such deployments unnecessary. They will do so even if the growth option is eliminated from the Modified Sentinel deployment.

The Modified Sentinel proposal can be supported by both groups as long as the radars and their defending missiles are deployed within 25–50 miles of cities and as long as there are prospects for strategic arms limitation agreements which would make subsequent U.S. defensive deployments unnecessary. Radars located beyond about 50 miles are not as effective for city defense and cannot control the Sprint missiles that would be deployed around cities in a population protection system. Thus, growth to such a system would be virtually impossible without major investments for extra radars.

Thus, some of the Chiefs would probably oppose remote locations for the radars. On the other hand, if the radars and missiles stay within 50 miles of the cities, it would probably be impossible to convince Congressional and other critics of Sentinel that the new system is not also an initial step toward a thick system; the relocations that do take place will probably be viewed by ABM critics simply as an attempt to reduce public criticism of the system. An administration pledge not to deploy a thick system, while leaving the radar/missile sites within 50 miles of cities, would probably both be opposed by some Chiefs and scorned by critics, who will challenge the Administration to support its pledge by moving the radars and missiles farther out.

Three alternatives are:

1. Preclude growth to a cities defense by placing all sites beyond 50 miles of cities, concede that DOD officials and the JCS may have disagreements on this point, and live with the resulting criticism—perhaps overt attempts to change the Administration's plan—from the Congressional Armed Services Committees and others favoring a thick defense.
2. Pledge not to deploy a thick system but leave the option open in fact and face "credibility gap" charges and charges that the site relocations are a cynical attempt to reduce public opposition.
3. Indicate that there are no plans to deploy a thick system, that we now believe it would be self-defeating to do so, but that it would be foolish to throw away the option, since we don't know what the Soviets might do in the future. This rationale would mean

continued heavy opposition by ABM critics.

Soviet reactions are likely to be based more on what they learn of the modified system than on the Administration rationale. Whether or not we publicly hold the cities defense option open, the Soviets will note the deletion of the Alaska and Hawaii defenses and the elimination of radar/missile sites near New York, Chicago, and Salt Lake City. Therefore, they can conclude on their own that the Modified Sentinel deployment looks significantly less like a prelude to cities defense than Sentinel.

Key Issues

Command and Control. One particularly thorny issue should be highlighted at the outset. As noted, the major new capability is defense of bomber bases against SLBM and FOBS attack. The DOD paper points out that SLBM warning time would be 3–15 minutes. Thus, because it takes minutes to report a possible attack to the President and get nuclear release authority, such authority for defensive missiles might have to be *predelegated* to the ABM defense commander. Otherwise, the time between warning and release authority may mean the missiles cannot be intercepted.

It is possible, however, that the nature of the required predelegation authority will not be significantly different from the current situation with respect to our nuclear air defense systems.

Technical Issues. There are two kinds of technical questions that will arise: (1) How well will the system perform in fulfilling its primary missions? and (2) How well will the system perform against threats other than those for which it was designed?

1. For the system to work as advertised, a number of technical problems must be solved. Examples follow:
   a. The radiation from a Spartan missile exploding above the atmosphere could "black out" the defense system's radars and complicate the conduct of a coordinated or efficient defense.
   b. Similarly, exploding Spartan missiles could knock out Minuteman and Titan missiles being fired in retaliation to a Soviet attack. This might require a costly coordinating system or restrictive operational procedures.
   c. The system can operate in an "area defense mode" with central direction over the defense operation, in "regional defense mode" with more decentralized control, and in "autonomous mode," with all radar sites operating independently. A problem with the first mode is the rapid and detailed exchange of information about incoming weapons among the various command centers so that missiles aren't wasted. The problem exists for the regional mode to a lesser extent. A problem with the antonomous mode is developing an effective means of defending preferentially against those missiles with the greatest damage potential.
   d. Kill assessments, i.e. deciding whether an incoming weapon has been destroyed,

must be based on information on how close to the weapon the warhead exploded and on how "hard," i.e. explosion resistant, the weapon is. We have no choice but to make assumptions about weapon hardness. A wrong assumption can mean that a weapon may be allowed to get through to its target.

2. An argument raised by critics is that the system can be defeated by heavy attacks which overwhelm the defending radars and their missiles and by sophisticated attacks using penetration aids. Thus, a thin area defense system can provide no significant population protection against the Soviet Union and only limited protection against a sophisticated Chinese threat.

Such arguments are generally correct. The Administration can make no claim that the system will be effective against other than surprise attacks on bombers, accidental attacks, or early Chinese ICBM attacks, and very limited attacks on Minuteman.

The remaining issues are discussed in terms of the major missions of ABM systems.

Defense of Minuteman

Why Should We Plan to Protect Minuteman?

The highest Soviet threat currently estimated by the intelligence community would not be enough to destroy our Minuteman force throughout most of the 1970s. However, the Greater Than Expected threat used by OSD in force planning assumes the Soviets deploy enough accurate MIRVs to destroy all of our Minuteman by 1976. Thus, one of the three components of our strategic posture could be taken out, so that our retaliatory capability would depend on the effectiveness of our bombers and our Polaris/Poseidon submarines.

The principal argument for buying *the option* to protect Minuteman now is, first, that we want to buy insurance against two very unlikely but possible events: (1) the greater than expected threat will become the actual threat a few years from now, meaning that our Minuteman force will become highly vulnerable by 1976, and (2) our bombers and ballistic missile submarines will either become vulnerable to attack or fail to work as expected so that our retaliatory capability isn't assured. That is, we want our eggs in three baskets, not two. Second, we plan to use our Minuteman to destroy Soviet forces and thereby limit damage to us and our Allies. Therefore we want to preserve at least some of the damage limiting capability of our Minuteman force.

However, not a single member of the JCS wants to plan now to take up the option to install a significant Minuteman defense. All want the option to do so, but they also want to wait and see if, how, and when the threat develops.

Is An ABM System the Best Protection for Minuteman?

DOD calculations show that ABM is the cheapest way to protect Minuteman capability (specifically, to insure 300 surviving Minuteman) against the threat of accurate Soviet

MIRVs when compared to the principal alternative: placing our Minuteman in hard rock silos and buying no ABMs. However, it is likely that because of technical uncertainties, DOD would not rely solely on ABM to protect Minuteman if the GTE threat emerged; some silo hardening would probably also be done. Also, there are wide differences of opinion about what different options will really cost. It appears that questions of cost are not decisive in choosing how best to protect Minuteman and that active Minuteman defense is a relatively efficient choice for the present GTE threat.

Conclusion

It is not essential to the maintenance of our deterrent to decide now to buy the option to defend Minuteman if we accept current intelligence estimates of probable Soviet threats. This option should be viewed as an insurance policy against unlikely but possible Soviet threats and as an additional guarantee that our strategic retaliatory posture will perform reliably.

Defense of Strategic Bomber Forces

U.S. bombers and tankers are vulnerable to a surprise attack by Soviet submarine-launched missiles—perhaps on depressed trajectories—whose launch could not be known in time to get even our alert bombers off the ground. With the early warning systems DOD plans to deploy, as few as 15% of our bombers would survive a surprise depressed trajectory SLBM attack by 1974, assuming the High-NIPP Soviet threat. At least half of our bombers could survive an attack if the missiles did not come in on depressed trajectories.

The alternatives for protecting our bombers against depressed trajectories are:

1. Disperse them to many bases to increase and complicate Soviet targeting problem.
2. Buy more capability to detect and destroy Soviet submarines before they can launch a significant number of SLBMs.
3. Put a sizeable fraction of the bomber force on airborne alert.
4. Buy area ABM protection for our bomber bases.

DOD argues against the first three on the basis of high cost and doubtful effectiveness. However, there are a number of shortcomings in their analysis:

1. They do not indicate how much of the cost of their ABM system is incurred to defend the bombers, so comparing the costs of alternatives is impossible. It may be they believe bomber defense is largely a by-product of providing capability for other purposes, e.g. defending against the Chinese threat or the Minuteman option. If not, the bomber defense rationale is open to the charge that other alternatives are potentially more efficient.
2. The bomber alert rate can be changed on short notice. Hence, if we noted Soviet

submarines getting in position for possible attack, particularly during a crisis, a large part of our force could be put on airborne alert. This may be adequate insurance against threats to our bombers.

Conclusion

On balance, the ABM bomber defense is probably justified if it is viewed as a low cost by-product of a system deployed for other reasons. We would probably never justify an ABM deployment solely to defend bombers against SLBMs.

Defense Against Chinese ICBMs

The DOD proposal would provide virtually complete protection against a Chinese first strike with unsophisticated ICBMs in the mid-1970s. However, as the Chinese develop and deploy penetration aids for their missiles, they will be able to inflict some damage on the U.S. The system could be improved later, however, to insure low levels of damage against a sophisticated Chinese threat into the 1980s.

The differences between the DOD proposal and Sentinel are: (a) elimination of protection for Alaska and Hawaii and (b) elimination of three other radar sites, two of which had provided some protection of Chicago and New York against a sophisticated Chinese attack.

By relating our ABM deployment to the Chinese threat, we would be providing a rationale for further growth in the system. For example, both Chicago and New York would be vulnerable under the proposed deployment to a sophisticated Chinese attack. Second, if we tie the deployment too closely to the Chinese threat, we make it difficult to give it up if we should want to in an arms limitation agreement.[5]

The question is, must we justify the proposal as a defense against the Chinese? The answer is probably no for the following reason: if we set out to design a system to defend only Minuteman and our bomber force, we would almost certainly come up with the DOD proposed deployment. There are probably no features of their proposal solely for the Chinese threat. Thus, we can if we want avoid providing a rationale for further growth by not emphasizing the Chinese threat.[6]

Conclusion

We could justify the deployment as a defense against China with the defense of our retaliatory forces as an add-on. Alternatively we could justify the deployment as a defense of our retaliatory forces and treat the defense against China as an add-on.[7]

Defensive Damage Limiting

A key issue in any ABM deployment is the amount of damage limiting capability intended and actually obtained. Though the Modified Sentinel deployment is not intended primarily to defend U.S. cities, it does provide some protection. For example,

1. The DOD deployment protects against accidental attack from all quarters. Such an attack cannot be deterred and could do serious damage.[8]
2. The deployment also provides significant population defense against a Chinese attack. However, such protection can be considered almost entirely derivative from the ABM deployment required by our strategic retaliatory forces.
3. The deployment provides some defense against a deliberate Soviet attack on our cities, though less so than Sentinel.

The issues are:

1. Is this damage limiting capability useful?
2. If so, do we want to maintain the option to buy additional damage limiting capability at some later time or, alternatively, do we want to deny ourselves this option on grounds that it is provocative to the Soviets and to domestic opponents of ABM systems.
3. If we elect the option, under what conditions do we take it up—as a reaction to a visible Soviet threat or as an initiative which we judge will not be negated by Soviet reactions and thus will leave us better off? On what basis shall we make such judgments?

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, ABM—Memoranda. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, but internal evidence indicates that it was drafted by the NSC Staff. A note attached to the paper indicates that it was hand-carried to the President on the evening of March 5. Nixon wrote the following at the bottom of Kissinger's March 5 covering memorandum: "1) They *have* closed the gap. 2) They continue to *increase*. 3) They want to talk. 4) We must see that the gap is not widened on *other side*."

[2] Document 14.

[3] The FY 70 ABM Military Construction Budget will contain $130 million for Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota; $111 million for Boston; $67 million for Whiteman AFB, Missouri; and $70 million for Washington, D.C.; plus $79 million for planning, design and survey work at other sites. [Footnote in the original.]

[4] Not found.

[5] Nixon underlined this sentence.

[6] The President underlined most of this paragraph. He expressed concern about the growing threat posed by a Chinese nuclear attack. On a draft statement, sent to him by Kissinger on March 8, announcing the administration's decision to proceed with a modified ABM system, Nixon wrote: "Statements by some Chicom leaders indicate relatively little concern for human life and *increase* in risk of irrational action." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, ABM System)

[7] Nixon underlined this sentence.
[8] Nixon underlined and highlighted example 1 and underlined portions of the following two examples.

19. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, March 6, 1969.

SUBJECT
ABM Decision—ACTION MEMORANDUM

Discussion of ABMs this morning[2] got no further than system options and strategic rationales. The most important issues affecting our foreign relations were not touched. These are the relationship to prospective SALT negotiations and consultation with allies.[3] In particular, the following three points emerging from your briefing session yesterday still ought to be covered:

a. The President's decision on the ABM program, and the public rationale, should make clear that implementation of the program is subject to modification depending on the outcome of negotiations with the Soviets. This is essential if our negotiator is to have latitude for meaningful SALT negotiations.[4]
b. The President should state at the time of the ABM announcement that the Administration now believes that it will be in a position to commence SALT talks in June, assuming that the international political climate is propitious at that time. (In this connection it should be noted that the time of the announcement proposed by DOD (March 18) is the date for the opening of the ENDC in Geneva.[5] If the announcement can be made prior to March 18, and tied to some indication of movement toward SALT, it would help mitigate adverse reactions from ENDC members.)
c. There should be sufficient time prior to any public announcement of the decision to inform and consult with our allies, and inform the USSR, along the lines suggested in yesterday's briefing memorandum.[6] (The President's statement at the March 4 news conference that he planned to make and announce a decision the first part of next week would seem to make genuine consultation impractical.)[7]

Even if the rationale for the modified ABM system is weighted more toward the Chinese threat, it would still be necessary to consider these points. However, we wish to point out, that too heavy an emphasis on the Chinese threat may make it more difficult for the US to modify the program in the light of SALT negotiations.

Accordingly, we recommend that you arrange with the President for further discussion, either in the NSC or more informally, so that these essential matters can be taken account of in the President's final decision on substance and timing.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Entry No. 5000, S/S–NSC Meeting Files, 1969–70: Lot 71 D 175, Box 3, NSC Meeting, March 5, 1969. Secret. Apparently drafted on March 5. Cleared by Johnson.

[2] See Document 16.

[3] In a memorandum to Rogers following the NSC meeting of March 5, Hillenbrand also recommended full allied consultations. ABM deployments, he argued, had "a substantial impact on the political and security interests of the major NATO governments," including their "perception of U.S. strategy and the reliability of the strategic deterrent, of U.S. policy and prospects for East-West agreements in the disarmament field, and of the problems with which each government will be confronted domestically in reacting to announcements of such import." Rogers wrote "I agree" on the memorandum, which was forwarded to Kissinger the following day. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, ABM Memoranda)

[4] Richardson added a handwritten comment following this paragraph that reads: "This needs to be thought through *in re* Chicom threat."

[5] The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened in Geneva on March 18 after a 7–month recess.

[6] See footnote 4, Document 14.

[7] President Nixon held a news conference the evening of March 4 after his return from Europe. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 179–194.

20. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, March 9, 1969.

SUBJECT
ABM Decision

We continue to have serious reservations regarding an ABM decision at this time. It is not clear why this decision has to be taken now. We are concerned that, due to the shortness of time, the rationale has not been fully thought through—and the Administration is going to be subject to informed skeptical probing by the Congress, the press, the public and our Allies. The Senate Disarmament Subcommittee of the SFRC, for example, has just begun its hearings on the ABM.

More broadly, the ABM program is only one aspect of the strategic weapon balance between the U.S. and the USSR, which in turn is only one part of the broader military stance being studied by Deputy Secretary Packard pursuant to NSSM 3[2] —which has been well publicized. Also, weapons build-ups—as contrasted with arms control negotiations—are only one option in trying to assure a future stable and secure balance.

To the extent that any one weapons system such as ABM is costly but perhaps marginal in improving our security, there is presumably a decision to be made as to whether in a time of budget stringency we should give priority to the ABM or other weapons over whatever domestic program is most pressing.

Any such decision will be scrutinized by Congress, by the press, and the public, not just in a partisan spirit but out of real and informed concern as to whether this is the right thing to do and the right time to do it.

Quite aside from whether the Administration wins such a debate, the wrong image could result for the President and the Administration. A premature decision is contrary to an image of calm, balanced, objective action rather than hurried and over-dramatic action.

There is also the serious consideration that, if Congress refuses to appropriate funds for this ABM program, the U.S. SALT negotiating position may well be weakened.

The President has said publicly he will take and announce a decision early this week. If there is opportunity to pause and reflect, is there an alternative?

We believe there may be. We recommend that the President ask the DOD why it would

not be consistent with the national security to proceed as follows: The President would decide and announce that he considered the proper ABM system to be the one recommended by Packard, with the switch from defense of cities to protection of retaliatory forces. But the President would confine action now to that conclusion and to ordering redesign, survey for sites, continued research and development, and perhaps some contracts for long-lead-time equipment. Any decision as to initiating construction and deployment could be taken in coming months as (a) the broad strategic review is completed, and (b) the possibilities of SALT negotiations are ascertained.

This is an approach which would maintain Presidential control and direction without drift or loss of initiative, but does not preempt Congressional and public consideration and debate or appear to give undue priority to individual military proposals over broad strategic, foreign policy, and domestic interests. It would command broad Congressional support and preserve a firm basis for SALT negotiations.

Elliot Richardson has not seen this memorandum, but it reflects the views he expressed on seeing the White House draft Presidential statement.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Entry No. 5000, S/S–NSC Meeting Files, 1969–70: Lot 71 D 175, Box 3, NSC Meeting, March 5, 1969. Top Secret. Drafted by Farley. Printed from a copy that was not initialed by Smith or Johnson. There is no indication on this copy of the memorandum that Rogers saw it.
[2] Document 2.

21. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Congressional Relations (Harlow) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, March 10, 1969.

SUBJECT
Congressional Status of ABM Issue

Careful analysis of the *immediate* situation in the Senate strongly indicates:

1) The ABM system advanced by LBJ has no chance whatsoever;
2) Even a modified system can now be passed only with maximum effort, including all-out Presidential participation.

We estimate that right now in the Senate the modified plan would lose by 58–42. Dick Russell believes even a modified system doesn't have a chance. John Cooper and Chuck Percy, ardent opponents, claim up to 54 votes against. UPI reports (March 8) 46 against, out of 91 responding. AP (March 9) reports 47 against out of 100. Both report 25 to 30 more undecided. AP shows only 24 in favor; UPI only 20. Over a third of the Republicans have stated they are opposed.

Your own Senate leaders are divided. Dirksen and Tower are the only ones categorically for. Allott is weakly for; Young, likewise. Scott will go only for a prototype system advocated by Russell and Young. Margaret Smith is flat against. The House situation is considerably more encouraging. We think a modified system could pass the House.

I emphasize that the foregoing bleak prospect exists because opponents have had a field day, lacking Administration counterforce. It is reasonable to assume that a careful exposition of Administration views will influence numerous Senators. Of the 58 Senators we now expect to oppose, only 40 appear to be fixed in opposition. The remaining 18 may well be susceptible to Administration arguments if they are cogently and powerfully advanced.

It is important not to under-estimate the impact of all-out Presidential involvement. If you present this system forcefully to the country and the Congress as imperative for the national security, the impact on Capitol Hill is bound to be heavy.

You may recall that we won fights of this kind before in 1958 (National Defense Reorganization) and 1960 (Landrum–Griffin Act) by allout use of Presidential influence. I dare say this can be done again—but only if you are willing to invest greatly in the effort.

If it is your decision to proceed with a modified plan, I envision a launching along the

following lines:

1) Announce it late Thursday[2] afternoon to a specially called bipartisan leadership meeting;
2) Immediately on the heels of this meeting, address the nation on the necessity of this program for the security of the United States;
3) On Friday begin Pentagon briefings of the press, affected Congressional committees, and interested civilian groups;
4) Beginning the following Monday, an extensive mailing of personal letters over your signature to influential leading citizens around the country requesting their active support in their communities and with Congress;
5) Your staff be directed to identify suitable forums and occasions for you to drive home week after week your determination to obtain Congressional approval of this program—such as, for example, your Business Council dinner; national organizations convening in Washington; press conference statements; using White House visitors to transmit your message to White House press; publicized meetings with Congressional groups; use of members of your Cabinet and other top Administration officials to carry the message across the country. Press backgrounders would be an adjunct of this program to build public support.

My belief is that, given a total effort, you would prevail in the Congress—but even with this it would be a very tough fight. As you know, the Congressional issue is now being deliberately broadened beyond the ABM. It is being increasingly presented as a military versus social need.[3] Senators Kennedy and Mansfield will probably do their best to make this a party issue—and many believe it is an issue that will be ridden into the 1972 election campaign.

I understand there are alternatives to the present or modified systems—for example, a prototype approach, with active R & D. I would recommend that, unless it is determined to pull out all stops and go into this fight determined to win it and determined also to put such time as necessary against it, the fight should not be undertaken. But if the decision is to go full tilt, I think you would win.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, ABM—Memoranda. No classification marking.

[2] Because of the Congressional reception, perhaps Friday is better. [Handwritten footnote in the original. Thursday was March 13.]

[3] Daniel P. Moynihan, Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs, offered similar advice in a memorandum to Nixon on March 11: “You will *not* be able to give the Mayors the money they need, much less the minorities, et al. ABM is not an expensive weapons system, but it is being depicted as such, and will be blamed for the ‘failure’ to solve the ‘urban crisis.’ “Turning to Vietnam Moynihan continued, “So far, it is not ‘your’ war. But if

you should make a ‘hawkish’ move on ABM, I fear your enemies will be able to make it ‘your’ war, as there is clearly a strong association between these issues in public opinion of the moment. Conversely, a ‘dovish’ move on ABM might very well buy you the time you need to get out of those swamps.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, Sentinel ABM System, Vol. I) Copies of Moynehan’s memorandum were sent to Kissinger and Ehrlichman. Kissinger’s copy indicated that he had seen it. (Ibid.)

22. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 11, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

Pres—On another subject, I had an interesting time listening to some of the Congressmen and Senators tonight[2] —I will talk about that tomorrow.[3] Is Packard doing more for us on the ABM?

K—He made a proposal to us.[4] I am putting together a package so you can see the pros and cons of each.[5] Packard says we could conceivably sell the concept if we continue the R&D and buy the sites we need for $30 million, and begin construction on two sites at $800 million. We would get the deployment battle behind us.

Pres—We could call these basically prototypes.

K—That isn't so easy. You can't move on until you have tried them if they are called prototypes, and we won't be finished until 1972.

Pres—They have been affected by the basic question of 'will it work?' Some said the real problem they have is they hate to be divided by this issue at this time. Can we find something that will divide them just a little less?

K—told the President about the three scientists who visited him, and said there is nothing we can do to get them around.[6] It isn't the money—everyone agrees with money. The R&D is signal to everyone—a face-saving way out of the program. No one will believe the program will continue… Everybody opposed says continue it by doing R&D.

Pres—I say, if we just do R&D and everybody opposed says ok, I don't want them to win that much. Could we say: we are going to do R&D but not order full deployment. We are going forward on a limited basis until we get farther along on R&D.

K—We are doing it to give it a chance to gear it to the Soviet military capability.

Pres—We won't go forward; the extent to which we further deploy will depend on the Soviets.

K—This will give us a chance to test out the components. Pres—I could sell that language.

K—I've been thinking that too.[7]

Pres—Lay it out for the people who are for it and give them enough to fight for it.

K—with regard to the scientists, it is a question of whether they are willing to have the country defenseless. In any event, no serious person will claim it can threaten the Soviet Union. We should go ahead with the radar, buy the sites, and start on Spartans (?). Two sites will test out the system and defend a few Minuteman Missiles.

Pres—Whether we defend more will depend on the growth of the Soviet Union missile capability and what they do. That is closer to what's sellable. We don't need to try to sell the scientists.

K—I looked at the panel DuBridge set up for the ABM.[8] Everybody on it had published articles before they joined the panel.

Pres—What is your present inclination—to go Friday?[9]

K—The main thing is to go right—but have [*do*] you feel you have explored this thing completely?

Pres—There are no problems with delays?

K—No, we can even go with it Monday or Tuesday.

Pres—They will squeal all weekend. We can say we are examining it; they will think we are being thoughtful. I am not going to talk to a lot of people in State or Disarmament. I think tomorrow, I will have a 1/2 dozen House and Senate people over ostensibly for a political meeting. I will include Scott and Morton who will be the new chairman; also Bryce Harlow; and ask them how they feel about all of this. Dirksen said he would call Packard. Incidentally, what you just described was what Dirksen was feeling for. We have to get to the hawks also, like Mendel Rivers. We don't know what they are against.

K—Until recently, they had to be against the old system.

Pres—But the new system has leaked and they are fighting it.

K—Most scientists don't want any defensive system. In the early 50's, they were for air defense, the H-Bomb, shelters, etc.

Pres—This will have an impact on the Soviets. It will be susceptible to very significant expansion if we want to do so.

K—advised the Pres that the NSC meeting had been moved to Saturday.

President said he didn't think he would bring it before the NSC again; that *he* has to decide it, and that is it.

K—I think Rogers will not fight it—he will go along even with the full one.

Pres—I have to let Ziegler know by tomorrow noon whether to have a Press Conference Friday. If it is better to go Friday, we will do it; unless we think we will know an awful lot more, I favor moving. The more you wait the more susceptible we are. I don't want us to appear indecisive.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon spoke with Kissinger from 10:28 to 11:17 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] According to his Daily Diary, the President and the First Lady hosted a Congressional reception in the White House earlier that evening. (Ibid.)

[3] Nixon held several meetings on March 12, according to the Daily Diary. He met with Kissinger on five separate occasions and once each with Packard and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D–Washington), a leading supporter of the system. No other records of these meetings have been found. (Ibid.)

[4] Packard gave Kissinger two alternate ABM proposals on March 9. The first was to announce the Modified Sentinel program, but to stretch out deployment by delaying construction until FY 1970 at a savings of $700 million. The other was to delay deployment until FY 1971. The following day, Kissinger sent a memorandum to the President, arguing that while the first alternative merely had budgetary implications, the second "would imperil the program" and spark "pressures" to begin SALT talks immediately. Kissinger counseled Nixon to choose the new system and either deploy it according to the original schedule or stretch out deployment to FY 1970 only, a "choice dictated by budgetary considerations." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, ABM—Memoranda)

[5] In an attachment to a memorandum to Nixon, dated March 11, Kissinger summarized the benefits and drawbacks of four ABM alternatives: the Defense Department proposal made at the NSC meeting of March 5 to reorient Sentinel to protect U.S. retaliatory forces, Packard's two proposals of March 9 to save money by stretching out deployment of the program until either FY 1970 or FY 1971, and another cost-cutting variant put forward by Packard that envisioned construction actually beginning at only two Minuteman sites in FY 1970. (Ibid.) For the March 5 NSC meeting, see Document 16.

[6] No record of this meeting has been found.

[7] In his memoirs, Kissinger discussed his conviction to go forward with ABM. Two factors led to his support. First, both he and Nixon were opposed to unilaterally giving up ABM

without Soviet reciprocity. Instead, they agreed that pursuing an ABM "could become the major Soviet incentive for a SALT agreement." Second, according to Kissinger, "It seemed to me highly irresponsible simply to ignore the possibility of an accidental attack or the prospect of nuclear capabilities in the hands of yet more countries. China was only the first candidate; others would follow. Without any defense an accidental launch could do enormous damage. Even a small nuclear power would be able to blackmail the United States. I did not see the moral or political value of turning our people into hostages by deliberate choice." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 204–210)

[8] The Strategic Military Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee included NSC Staff member Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. and scientists Marvin Goldberger, Hans A. Bethe, Sidney D. Drell, Richard L. Garwin, Richard Latter, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Jack P. Ruina, and Kenneth M. Watson. In its February 17 report, which Keeny sent to Kissinger under a covering memorandum dated February 21, the panel questioned the technological capability of Sentinel to provide area defense against sophisticated attacks. The report made no formal recommendations, but it leaned toward either reorienting Sentinel to protect Minuteman sites or terminating the system's deployment by continuing R&D. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, ABM—Memoranda)

[9] March 14.

23. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, March 11, 1969.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Dr. Lee DuBridge

The purpose of this meeting was for Dr. DuBridge's periodic report to the President.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security.]

DuBridge opened the subject of ABM and made a strong statement in opposition to deployment on the basis that the key science advisors to the Defense Department are opposed on the grounds that the system planned can't really do the job and it will be at great cost. He pointed out that the real question is whether the slight improvement in defense is worth the total cost in dollars, prestige, political pressure, etc. He suggested postponement for a year to study the matter thoroughly and in the meantime to go ahead with R&D and experimentation. But the President questioned what more we would know in a year scientifically and Dr. DuBridge said there would be a great deal. It was left at this point.[2]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 77, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 9, 1969. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting, which lasted from 11:25 a.m. to 12:02 p.m., took place in the Oval Office. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

[2] According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon called Kissinger from 1:34 to 1:42 p.m. to discuss his meeting with DuBridge. The President said, "one point that was raised was with regard to defense against Chinese. President asked whether he [DuBridge] understands it is a defense against the Chinese even though it is deployment for purposes of defending Minuteman." When Kissinger replied affirmatively, Nixon "said this is not DuBridge's view and asked what Defense says. K[issinger] said Defense says it is a defense against a primitive attack by Chinese but not a sophisticated one. President mentioned Scott and other potential supporters in Senate talking about prototype—Dick Russell talked about this. President said what he needs to know is what could be done short of deployment which would still give us something." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological

File)

24. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, March 14, 1969.

(One observor's notes on the meeting wherein the President revealed to the bipartisan leadership his decision on the ABM.)[2]

The President began the discussion and held the floor for the first half of the session—without interruption. The President indicated he had been a supporter of the Sentinel system; but he had wanted to hear objections and alternate courses, so he waited until now. He might have taken several courses he said: 1) Go to the "full" or "thick" system. 2) Go with the Sentinel system "voted last year." 3) No System at all 4) Continue R & D. The President feels that "the best interests of our country" and the "minimum" essential to our security dictate the course he has decided upon.

"*If they had shown me a complete defense for our cities, I would have approved it,"* he said, but noted that the ABM could not guarantee that at the current "state of the art." What we are talking about is a reduction of casualties in the first strike from 60–80 million to the neighborhood of 20–40 million; that's the best we could do with city-defense ABM. This kind of city-defense ABM would be "highly provocative" to the Soviets.

The President made the above statement about "highly provocative" city-defense—but took pains to point out that he realized the Soviets had provided a city defense for Moscow and "are going ahead" with development of a "second generation" ABM.

What are the arguments for adopting no system; the President noted them. First, an ABM system "won't work". Second, even if it did provide a measure of defense, it "would escalate the arms race;" third, at this time it would "throw cold water" on the arms control talks.

What are the arguments for a "delay" in deployment: 1) We might have an arms agreement 2) We might learn more about it 3) We don't think a delay would be significant. The President called this option a "tempting proposition."

However, failing to act in this year would cause a delay; the way things now stand we will not, even going ahead, be able to have an ABM operationally deployed until 1973.

Delaying six months in our decision means a delay of two years in our deployment—the President said and pointed out that Packard would explain this to the Senators and Congressmen later on.

We are deploying a Modified Sentinel system because of our changed estimate of what the Soviets are doing. The Soviet SS–9 missile force presents today a "major hazard" to "our deterrent force." The Soviets have made "immense strides."

What will the modified system give us?

1) It would provide for defense against any currently conceivable Chinese attack for the next ten years. Whatever they can build in the next ten years, we do not think can get through our "area defense."
2) Protects the United States against an irrational or accidental firing of Soviet missiles.
3) Moves missiles completely away from the cities to protect our second-strike force. Our objectives are to defend our missile force; our bomber bases and our national command set-up. (Note: The President emphasized that even upon completion our entire second-strike force would not be guarded.)

The President emphasized that it is only necessary to defend enough of our force to make a second-strike credible. We have to defend enough to be a deterrent to visit "great devastation" upon the Soviet Union.

Fiscal '70 there is cut in half the amount asked for Sentinel—we are funding it over a period through 1973—first site in 1973 operational—we will have an annual review covering especially three standpoints:

1) Development of the art in ABM 2) Changes in the threat to the United States (In this the SAB is checking against the CIA) 3) The Development of our Diplomacy. If we make progress, there are steps we can take. "We have a phased system rather than a fixed system."

Packard indicated that it would require work to make sure the combination of radar and system would work—that is one argument behind putting the thing together.

However, the system can "be overwhelmed:" and there is the possibility of "fooling it." "In addition to being overwhelmed, it can probably be confused" said Packard speaking of the ABM system we will deploy.

Packard's argument and the President's argument is basically that the city protection is basically a damage limitation concept where you cut casualties in the event of a strike from 80 to 40 million people; the defense of the Minuteman sites and the bomber sites and the national command system is essentially defense of the deterrent—*it is designed to prevent conflict rather than limit damage.*

We have in effect a "modified Sentinel System". At this point Buchanan departed the meeting to write a memo to the President on suggested names for the new ABM system. Memo attached; the Safeguard System name was used ultimately in the press

conference.[3]

At this point Senator Fulbright asked "couldn't we double that Polaris Fleet?" Since it is a known quantity; and we know it works and what it costs precisely. Wouldn't more of these missiles insure the credibility of the United States deterrent force?

The President indicated to Senator Fulbright that the Polaris system would do this—but it would immediately be taken as a provocation by the Soviets, and would ignite a Soviet effort to increase their offensive force.

Fulbright said the only reason the ABM wouldn't be provocative is that the Soviets wouldn't think it would work.

RN responded again, noting that the ABM was not provocative; we have reason to believe that: 1) The Soviets did ask for arms talks after the Sentinel was announced; they themselves have termed ABM a "defensive weapon," they didn't believe theirs was provocative. 2) The Soviets have deployed their own ABM system; and the Soviets draw clear distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons. Also, the cost of the ABM is significantly less. Construction of more Polaris missiles might indicate we are thinking about a first strike. This ABM has "no first strike capability." "No first strike implications."

The problem of "Fratricide" was discussed—but Buchanan had left to work on his memorandum.

When all the arguments are put on the table, the President said, people reach different conclusions. "But I do not believe a President of the United States can do less; I do not believe a President of the United States can run the risk of leaving us naked" to a Soviet missile strike.

RN: When we see where the Soviets will be not only in 1973, but 1976 and '77 and '78, we feel this is the right decision. This is not 1962 when we had a 5–1 advantage over the Soviets in missiles. We are strong today; but the situation has changed; not because of anything we did; but because of what the Soviets did; they determined to close the strategic [gap] in 1962; they have come very far along that road; they have widened their lead over us in conventional arms; they have developed and deployed the world's only ABM system; we have none; they have increased their submarine force in quantity and quality; their plans for the future "are very significant;" and as for the Chinese, "all of our estimates of the Chinese force have been understated."

One other course, the President said, had considerable appeal and could have been taken.

"We could have substantially increased our offensive capability." But this would have 1) cost far more and 2) would have been far more provocative. Deployment of an ABM on the other hand is "not provocative." "No signal for an arms race." We retain the option to

change the system as the situation changes.

To Dirksen the President said, “This system is not a system with the seeds of growth. We have a limited objective—the protection of our Minuteman sites, the protection of our deterrent.”

David Packard

The Deputy Secretary of Defense now spoke, on the subject at length. Total cost $6 to $7 billion for what we have in mind. Somewhat higher because of the additional capability we are buying. Sentinel System only pointed north; however, the Soviet submarine threat is already developing in a serious way. We are thus buying the PARs radio [*radar*], which can look in any direction; and also the Minuteman site radar itself. (Note: this radar apparently was useful in detecting and the system in handling the Soviet FOBS system; this was mentioned in passing.) Though this ABM system adds some elements of capability, it is most assuredly not a system that can be used as a “base of expansion” into the thick ABM. The cities defense would have been a base to go to that system.

(Packard also repeated and emphasized a number of points the President had already touched upon.)

Packard also mentioned that this system would give us a chance to deploy and shake out bugs before putting the final system into operation. Result would be a $1 billion reduction in the FY 70 budget. Packard said he thinks we ought to proceed with the selection of sites and their purchase. When they are available we also have the opportunity to move with PARs.

Laird here interjected to point up the difference between initial deployment and operational deployment—the one being immediate and the last not until 1973.

This year’s funding is supposedly to help with purchase of the sites needed, of the sites on the periphery of the East and West Coast. Construction of PAR radar for one of the sites.

Senator Pastore asked the Deputy Secretary a single question: “Will it work?”

Packard’s answer was a qualified “yes.” The system is designed to look over the horizon; to identify an incoming warhead, through the use of computers to identify the point of impact and to use both the Sentinel system a few hundred miles out and the Sprint system as a “terminal protection.” “My view is that the system in its basic concept will work”, said Packard. Various elements have been tested to the point where we have to conclude it is workable. The testing we need to do (nukes) we can do underground. “Won’t have to go atmospheric.”

One thing mentioned here was a particularly sensitive subject; the smallness of the Polaris warhead and the hardening of the Soviet missile sites. Also, there is some

question about the capability of the American guidance system under an attack environment—both questions were to be discussed only within the room.

“They have to do with the credibility of the deterrent” Laird noted.

The Chinese ABM capability was pretty much dismissed by the President and his staff.

[Omitted here are pledges of support from, and comments by, some of the assembled Congressmen.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 77, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 9, 1969. No classification marking.

[2] According to the President’s Daily Diary, the following attended the meeting, held from 8:37 to 10:45 a.m. in the Cabinet Room: the President, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Packard, Helms, and Kissinger; Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Scott, Kennedy, Russell, Young, Stennis, Smith, Fulbright, Aiken, Pastore, Byrd, and Allott; and Representatives McCormack, Albert, Ford, Arends, Boggs, Mahon, Bow, Rivers, Bates, Adair, Holifield, Hosmer, Rhodes, and Anderson. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

[3] Buchanan’s March 14 memorandum to the President is attached, but not printed. Nixon held a news conference at noon; see Document 25.

25. Editorial Note

President Nixon described his decision on the ABM in his memoirs. "The Soviets had indicated that they were willing to reach agreement on defensive arms limitation. Most of the liberals in Congress, the media, and the academic community tended to take them at face value in this regard and feared that a congressional vote for an ABM system would destabilize the existing arms balance and compel the Soviets to increase their own construction programs, thus losing a precious opportunity and moving the arms race up another notch.

"I thought they were wrong. I thought the Soviets' primary interest in opening arms negotiations at that point was that without an ABM we would be in a disadvantageous negotiating position. Our intelligence reports indicated that in 1969 the Soviets spent the equivalent of $25 billion on nuclear weapons." (Nixon, *RN*, pages 415–416) Nixon's figure was not too far off the mark. The Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research estimated in its paper of January 31, 1969, "Soviet Spending for Defense and Space," "that the USSR will spend a record high of about 20.4 billion rubles—the equivalent of about $60 billion—for defense and space programs in 1969 compared with about 20.0 billion rubles in 1968." Soviet defense spending in 1968 had also set a record high. The CIA estimated that about 30 percent of the $60 billion expected to be spent by the Soviets in 1969 would be devoted to strategic offensive and defensive programs. The CIA assumed that Moscow would spend an additional, but indeterminate, amount on research and development. The CIA study is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 709, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. I.

In his memoirs, the President stated: "They [the Soviets] deployed more than a hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) while we deployed none; they added several nuclear missile-firing submarines to their Navy while we added none; and they deployed forty new ABMs around Moscow. We knew that even as the debate in Congress over an American ABM was raging, the Soviets had initiated work on more ICBMs and ABMs, as well as major new radar systems in conjunction with their deployment; they were also building additional submarine missiles. I felt that tactically we needed the ABM as a bargaining chip for negotiations with the Soviets: they already had an ABM system, so if we went into negotiations without one we might have to give up something else, perhaps something more vital. In that sense, we had to have it in order to be able to agree to forgo it. I tried to persuade Congress that what the ABM vote represented was really a philosophical turning point in America's strategic credibility.

"I knew that the vote on ABM would reverberate around the world as a measure of America's resolve. The minute the Europeans or the Japanese decided that we could not be depended upon to keep our commitments and stand up to the Soviets, the American position in Europe and the Far East would be severely damaged. But as I saw it, the ABM vote involved the much deeper question of whether Americans still believed that we stood

for something in the world and that we must be willing to bear the burden of resisting aggression against our allies and friends. I believed that the majority of Americans felt this way; but as long as there was any doubt about it among our enemies, the temptations to test us would be that much stronger. The ABM vote would be the first significant congressional vote on defense measures in my administration, and I wanted the signal to go out that we had not lost our national sense of purpose and resolve—because I did not think we had.

"Unfortunately, Vietnam soured the debate. It had convinced the liberals that America had suffered from too belligerent a posture and made them determined to curb our military spending."

After briefly comparing his views about Vietnam with those held by liberals, Nixon continued, "One good argument against the ABM was that many people—Eisenhower, incidentally, among them—doubted the efficacy of defensive weapons systems and preferred to put our money into building our offensive capability. There were also technical objections involving the cost of the system measured against the increased levels of defense it would actually produce. These arguments lost me support among some responsible conservatives and moderates whose votes I might otherwise have had." (Nixon, *RN*, pages 415–417)

The President announced his decision to develop and construct Safeguard, a modified ABM system, during a news conference held on March 14. According to a statement released by the White House that day, Nixon, after reviewing the options in light of two factors—U.S. security requirements and possible strategic arms limitation talks—ultimately pursued an ABM primarily in response to the emerging nuclear threat posed by China and the buildup of Soviet strategic forces. He rejected two other ABM options, either continuing Sentinel or pursuing research and development only while delaying deployment, which he felt left the United States vulnerable. Meanwhile, other alternatives, pursuing a thick ABM capable of fully defending U.S. cities or increasing U.S. offensive forces, would have seemed threatening to the Soviets, thereby provoking an arms race. In announcing his decision, the President emphasized the defensive nature of Safeguard. Rather than being directed against the Soviet offensive arsenal, it was designed to fulfill three objectives: protection of U.S. land-based retaliatory forces against an attack from the Soviet Union, defense of American cities from the kind of nuclear attack likely to be posed by China during the 1970s, and security against accidental attacks from any source. Safeguard, Nixon announced, would be deployed in phases, with the first phase consisting of two missile sites. Beyond that, future deployments depended upon changes in the Soviet and Chinese threats, progress in SALT, and technical developments. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pages 208–219)

Nixon's announcement opened divisions even within his own administration. The President responded on April 14 by sending a memorandum to William Rogers, Melvin Laird, Henry Kissinger, Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, and Ambassador to

Germany, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., bemoaning the fact that criticism of the administration's policies on troop withdrawals from Vietnam and the ABM had "reached a dangerous point where the President seems to have lost control of his team and everyone seems to be going off in different directions." On those two issues, Nixon insisted, "there must be a consistent line with no deviation whatever."

As for the ABM, he thought it "important for us not to be sucked into speculation as to what the intent of the Soviet Union is in building up their offensive capabilities, particularly with regard to the SS–9. Here the best line to take is that we are not going to base our policy on what we 'guess' are Soviet intentions. We can only base our policy on what the Soviet Union does." Since the Soviets, at a minimum, had achieved strategic parity with the United States, Nixon stated, "we have to consider what action the United States can take to maintain a credible position diplomatically as well as militarily if we are to play a major role in world affairs."

The President also established in his April 14 memorandum an administration line for handling a major controversy regarding Safeguard. "When the question is raised as to whether the system will work there are three answers—one, the Soviet Union has such a system and we have had to adjust our military planning on the *assumption* that it will work; two, we cannot afford to leave the U.S. defenseless against a mini-nuclear power threat since this would mean that our foreign policy in Asia and in the Pacific would lose an immense amount of credibility; three, we must at the very least not allow possible technical breakthroughs in this area to be in the sole capability of the Soviet Union as compared with ourselves."

Nixon then reiterated his major purpose in writing the memorandum. "What is most important is that we take a consistent affirmative line—brooking no compromise on the fundamental issue: we are going forward with this system as the best possible way to see to it that the United States [*Soviet Union*], at a time the Soviet Union has widened the conventional gap and has closed the strategic gap, does not move into a pre-eminent position and thereby leave the United States in the position of being basically a second-class power as far as overall nuclear capability is concerned.

"I know all the arguments of the unilateral disarmers that 'enough is enough.' The same argument could have been made at the time of the Cuban missile crisis when even though our advantage was four to one it could be said that the Soviet Union had enough that anything that we would do would still mean that their second-strike capability would deter us from acting. What is important for us to recognize is that the great fundamental issue involved is very simply whether during this Administration we allow the Soviet Union to pass the United States in overall nuclear capability and thereby leave us in a second-rate position. From a diplomatic standpoint this would be devastating to our policies all over the world and I do not intend to allow this to happen—whatever the political consequences may be."

The President then turned his attention to the relationship between possible strategic arms limitation negotiations and the ABM. He wrote, "it is unthinkable to me that we should go into arms talks with the Soviet Union with them having 'in being' a significant defensive capability and our having that capability only on the drawing boards." Repeating his public stance that an ABM, even in the event of successful talks, was crucial to U.S. defense against the emerging Chinese nuclear arsenal, Nixon added that, while "unilateral disarmers would say that our advantage over the Chinese and the Soviets [*sic*] is so enormous that no responsible leader of Communist China would dare launch an attack against either country," the "tragic fact of history is that most of the great wars were not started by responsible men and that we have to base our assumptions on what potentially irresponsible or irrational men may do rather than simply on what we, as responsible leaders, might do."

The President had concluded that the White House would win the ABM vote if he exerted maximum influence among Senators and if he received "complete and absolute backing from everybody in the Administration at all levels." Nixon recognized that there was "substantial disagreement with both our Vietnam policy and our ABM decision in the Department of State and in the Pentagon. "I understand and respect that difference of opinion. But I will not tolerate any further 'informed sources leaks' which increasingly appear in the papers under-cutting the Administration's policy. I will expect both Defense and State to insist on absolute discipline within their ranks with regard to any public or 'off the record' statements to press men on this subject. I want debate and discussion and dissent where people honestly disagree with policy in Administration councils. But the decision having been made on ABM and our plan of action having been determined with regard to Vietnam there must now be absolute discipline in supporting that decision." Nixon's April 14 memorandum is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/President Memorandums (1969–1970).

Once he had announced his decision, the President recalled in his memoirs that he "faced the biggest congressional battle of the first term." Confident that the House would approve additional appropriations to construct Safeguard, he was less sure of success in the Democratically-controlled Senate, where the vote "was clearly going to be very close." (Nixon, *RN*, page 417) In response, Nixon, in separate memoranda to Herb Klein, Director of Communications for the Executive Branch, on March 13 and to John Ehrlichman on April 10, ordered a vigorous "counter-offensive," including lobbying Senators who were undecided or opposed and a pro-ABM publicity campaign. The President's memoranda to Klein and Ehrlichman are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Personal File, Memoranda from the President, Box 1, Chronological File. The administration was particularly concerned about Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a likely contender for the Democratic nomination in the 1972 Presidential election, who led the opposition to the program. Patrick J. Buchanan sent a memorandum to Nixon on March 19 in which he argued that the ABM fight was an early but crucial showdown with Kennedy in the upcoming election cycle. Buchanan's memorandum is

ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files: Confidential Files, Box 43, Weapons-Ordnance-Munitions (ND 20).

The administration ultimately won the ABM battle. Congress did not actually pass the bill authorizing spending on defense projects, including the ABM, until November 9. But the Senate effectively approved Safeguard on August 6, when, by votes of 51–49 and 50–50, it defeated amendments that, if adopted, would have prohibited all funding for the system's deployment. Vice President Agnew cast the tie-breaking ballot in the latter vote. The next day Nixon wrote a memorandum in which he directed Kissinger, Ehrlichman, and H.R. Haldeman to get "out the true story," which was that the ABM victory was a result and reflection of the "Nixon Style." The President urged them to "point out that RN made the decision to tackle ABM head on against the advice of most of his major advisers, including particularly the State Department." Success in the Senate, he wrote, was mainly due to "the massive effort that was made by RN on this project." The President, for instance, "was in constant charge of PR [public relations] aspects of the ABM fight and dictated memoranda to be used by the PR people about getting out the positive line and also watched the press closely to knock down anything in the way of intelligence reports or other things that might be harmful." Nixon, however, cautioned his advisers not to oversell the forcefulness of the "Nixon Style," especially in the Senate, where opponents of the administration outnumbered supporters by a three-to-two margin. He concluded, "I cannot emphasize the importance of getting this story broadly circulated, not just in the *New York Times Magazine* or some other sheet that is never read, but by the wire service, a major weekly news magazine, a thoughtful television commentator like Howard K. Smith, [Eric] Sevareid, [Walter] Cronkite, and of course, the usual columns." Nixon's August 7 memorandum is ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, HAK/President Memorandums (1969–1970).

In his memoirs, Nixon concluded, "I am absolutely convinced that had we lost the ABM battle in the Senate, we would not have been able to negotiate the first nuclear arms control agreement in Moscow in 1972." (Nixon, *RN*, page 418)

26. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 21, 1969.

There are two points of recent intelligence I should bring to your attention regarding Soviet Union ICBM and ABM testing.

First, you will recall that the Soviets have been flying SS–9 type test missiles across their own country from Tyuratam to their impact area on the Kamchatka peninsula. These tests have involved a "heavy pay-load and configuration" of three re-entry vehicles. On Friday, 18 April, at 0055Z time, they fired a similar test SS–9 from Tyuratam to their broad open ocean impact area in the Pacific where they had four range ships stationed in a large rectangle. We had a U.S. Navy Destroyer within this rectangle to observe the tests. Although at this time only preliminary information is available, tentative conclusions indicate:

a. The range of the SS–9 in a 3 re-entry vehicle configuration when fired to the U.S. will be at least 4700 nautical miles. Data from other sources and events indicate the maximum range could be 5000 nautical miles. If this is indeed so, then the SS–9 with 3 re-entry vehicles could attack 5 or 6 Minuteman Wings, but it does not have the range necessary to attack major population areas on our East and West coast. However, using the "light payload configuration," they could deliver a single 15–megaton re-entry vehicle to greater ranges and cover all major population areas in the U.S.
b. The additional importance of these Pacific tests is that they indicate the Soviets are moving into another advanced phase of their multiple re-entry vehicle testing.

The second point concerns Soviet missile tests of an advanced ABM interceptor. [*5 lines not declassified*] The advantage of this technique is in effect to extend the radius of effectiveness of ballistic missile defense systems. We plan to use this technique in an advanced version of our own Spartan missile. The Soviet tests we have observed, and there was an additional one conducted over the weekend, may be associated with the Moscow Galosh interceptors.[2] If this proves so, it will indicate an improved capability to protect areas several hundred miles from Moscow.

Mel Laird

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 709, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. II. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]; No Foreign Dissem. Kissinger sent the memorandum to Nixon under a covering memorandum dated April 22. The covering memorandum, in which Kissinger summarized Laird's points, bears a

stamped note that reads, “The President has seen.”

[2] The Galosh was an interceptor missile deployed in an ABM mode around Moscow.

27. National Security Study Memorandum 50[1]

Washington, April 26, 1969.

TO
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
A Review of U.S. Naval Forces

The President has directed that a study be undertaken of U.S. Naval Forces.[2] The study should be conducted in two parts:

Part I will be a comparative analysis of U.S., Soviet, other NATO, and other Warsaw Pact naval forces from 1961 to the present. This analysis should include a comparison, to the extent possible, of numbers, types, capabilities, ages, unit costs (for those built since 1961 in U.S. dollars), and deployments of naval forces by major mission, including strategic forces. Projections of this information into the foreseeable future should be made to the extent possible. Part I should be completed and forwarded to the President by June 1, 1969.

Part II will consist of an analysis of U.S. requirements for naval forces in the 1970s, including the overseas bases necessary to support them. This analysis should be related to the extent appropriate to the results of the U.S. military posture review being conducted under NSSM 3[3] and should reflect decisions that may result from NSC discussion of the NSSM 3 study. Part II should be completed and forwarded to the President by September 1, 1969.

NSC discussion of the results of the overall study effort will be scheduled at a later date.

This study will be conducted under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. He will be assisted as appropriate by the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and other agencies whose assistance he may need. Close liaison should be maintained in all phases of the study with the office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.[4]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Secret. Copies were sent to Rogers, Helms, and Mayo.
[2] The study had its genesis in early April, when the President became concerned after reading a column by James Kilpatrick claiming that the aging U.S. Navy was losing its

edge to its Soviet counterpart. Laird responded on April 14 by sending President Nixon a rough comparison of the two fleets. The Secretary of Defense noted that the United States had maintained force levels since World War II "without debating seriously the size and composition of our Navy." (Ibid., Box 709, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. I) Nixon approved Kissinger's recommendation, contained in an April 21 memorandum to the President, that a full comparative analysis of U.S. and Soviet naval forces be conducted. (Ibid., Vol. II)

[3] Document 2.

[4] Under an October 21 covering memorandum, David Packard sent the Department of the Navy's two-part response to NSSM 50 to Kissinger. The study's first part compares the U.S. and Soviet navies; the second deals with the needs of the U.S. Navy in the 1970s. In his covering memorandum to Kissinger, the Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote that he saw "no reason" for the NSC "to address this report." In a November 21 reply to Packard, Kissinger wrote that he too was "reluctant" to forward it to the President, despite Nixon's "specific interest in this study." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–149, NSSM 50) In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled that bureaucratic resistance by the military establishment meant that this specific directive from the President "inquiring into the rationale of naval programs was never answered satisfactorily in the eight years I served in Washington. The response was always short of being insubordinate but also short of being useful. Despite semiannual reminders [NSSM 50] was listed as incomplete on the books when we left office." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 216–217)

28. National Security Study Memorandum 57[1]

Washington, May 23, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare
The Secretary of Housing & Urban Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Civil Defense Policies

The President has directed that a review be undertaken of U.S. civil defense policies, with specific attention to the shelter program.[2] This review should examine the civil defense options available to the Administration and their costs and probable consequences. It should take account of the decision to deploy a "Safeguard" ABM system, and of decisions to be reached on strategies and budget levels for U.S. military forces as a result of NSSM 3.[2]

The study should be prepared by an NSC Ad Hoc Group under the chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, with representatives of the following: Departments of State, Defense, HEW, and HUD; the Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of the Budget, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Other departments and agencies may be invited to participate at the discretion of the chairman.

The study should be forwarded to the National Security Council Review Group by November 1, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe, DuBridge, Gerard Smith, and Wheeler.

[2] Nixon was asked about the "shelter program" during his press conference of March 14, when he announced the Safeguard program. The President responded that he had already directed George Lincoln to conduct a review of U.S. civil defenses. (*Public Papers: Nixon,*

1969, p. 215)

[2] Document 2.

29. National Security Study Memorandum 58[1]

Washington, May 26, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Preparedness

The President has directed the preparation of a study of the planning assumptions for civil emergency preparedness for consideration by the National Security Council. The study should recommend specific planning assumptions and guidance to meet the full range of civil emergency situations which may face the United States. In this regard, it should reexamine the planning assumptions contained in "Guidance for Civil Emergency Preparedness," issued in April 1966 by the then-Office of Emergency Planning.

To conduct the study, the President has directed the establishment of an NSC Ad Hoc Group, under the chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, with representatives of the following: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Other departments and agencies may be invited to participate at the discretion of the chairman.

The study should be submitted by September 1 for consideration by the NSC Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Confidential. Copies were sent to Mayo, DuBridge, Gerard Smith, Wheeler, and Paul W. McCracken, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.

30. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 26, 1969.

SUBJECT
Significance and Implications of Soviet Multiple Reentry Vehicle Testing

1. The following information and assessment is forwarded in accordance with your request. I have included in the final paragraph a statement of opposing views which do not represent any significant differences in interpretation of the Soviet test data[2] but do represent differences in what this test data means.
2. There have been seven flight tests of the multiple reentry vehicle system on the Soviet SS–9 ICBM. Four of these tests, conducted in the last half of 1968, were from Tyuratam to Kamchatka, a distance of about 3,400 nautical miles. The last three tests were flown into the Pacific Ocean about 5,100 nautical miles from Tyuratam in April and May of this year. The first of these extended range tests exhibited a malfunction but all others were apparently successful. Analysis [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicates no significant difference in any of the tests other than the trajectories that were flown. It has been determined that the system consists of three identical reentry vehicles capable of delivering about five megatons. These vehicles are separated just prior to cutoff of the second stage engines, and acquire their separation forces from the missile's acceleration rather than using separate propulsion devices as in some U.S. multiple reentry systems.
3. The CIA believes that the system has been tested only in a simple multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) mode. We recognize that the separation system [*less than 1 line not declassified*] could be designed to allow independent targeting of each reentry vehicle (MIRV). The system in this case would have the capability to attack closely spaced targets such as Minuteman silos. We have conducted studies to determine how the system would have to work to perform the MIRV mission and have concluded that the capability has not been demonstrated in flight tests to date. [*2 lines not declassified*], and we expect to identify it at least a year before IOC.
4. The opposing view in some parts of the intelligence community is that a MRV of this type does not give the Soviets any advantage over a single reentry vehicle. They believe, therefore, that the system being tested is a MIRV intended for use against Minuteman silos. They further believe that the necessary capability of the system need not be demonstrated before making such a judgment. We cannot agree with this view since the Soviets have always tended to conduct very complete weapon systems tests. It would be a radical departure from normal practice if they were to deploy a weapon with the potential importance of MIRVs without complete testing.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM–MIRV, MIRV Test Program. Secret. Haig forwarded this memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on May 27 and requested comments on it by the following morning. (Ibid.)

[2] See Document 26.

[3] Richard Helms later recalled that, while CIA and Pentagon experts differed over the SS–9's throw-weight and accuracy, the deepest disagreement was whether or not the missile's three warheads were independently targetable. The Pentagon analysts held that each of the SS–9's warheads had its own independent guidance system, which would be a major Soviet step toward achieving a first-strike capability. "If anything was likely to unleash the dollars needed to create an ABM," Helms wrote, "the specter of a score of SS–9s delivering sixty precisely guided missiles in one volley should have carried the day." According to Helms, CIA analysts "remained convinced that any such independent guidance capability was beyond the grasp of Soviet science, and the research and testing so expensive it might unhinge the USSR's economy." The "USSR was not seeking a first-strike capability, and the SS–9 was some four years away from its first testing." (Helms, *Look Over My Shoulder*, pp. 384–388)

31. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 28, 1969.

SUBJECT
Significance and Implications of Soviet Multiple Reentry Vehicle Testing

1. At your request, I have the following comments on Dick Helms' memo concerning the significance and implications of Soviet Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) testing.[2]

2. I believe we have to reckon with the likelihood that the Soviets may already be testing an ICBM system designed to attack Minuteman missiles in their silos. This position is a consequence of the following indication:

a. Use of the SS–9 ICBM which has apparently exhibited three phases of improvement in accuracy.
b. A clear attempt to precisely deploy the RV's.
c. The use of Multiple RV's with sufficient yield potential to properly combine with CEP[3] accuracy.
d. A foot print size comparable with the spacing of Minuteman silos.

Considerable weight is given to this possibility because it is the only plausible explanation for the observed test program.

The full capability to target all Minuteman missiles in their silos has not been detected in flight test to date, however, analyses indicate that the system as we understand it could possess such a capability.

The state of our present evidence and analyses to date does not permit a clear conclusion that independent targeting for each reentry vehicle is a present or developing capability. It is adequate, however, to determine that a potential for such capability exists, and to determine that a much simpler mechanization for reentry vehicle deployment could have been designed if the objective were to deploy simple multiple reentry vehicles without independent aiming.

3. Concerning the identification of MIRV testing "at least a year prior to IOC", we may well have already detected the testing of a specialized small foot print type MIRV, and IOC for such a system could be achieved shortly after completion of testing. Should the Soviets make an effort to deny us information on their test programs, it would be even more difficult.[4]

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. Secret. A copy was sent to Richard Helms.

[2] Document 29.

[3] Circular Error Probable (or Probability), according to a glossary appended to NIE 11–8–69, is an index of accuracy defined as the radius of a circle centered on the intended target, within which 50 percent of the arriving missile warheads were expected to fall. See Document 46.

[4] Kissinger was scheduled to meet with Helms during the morning of May 28. While no record of the meeting has been found, Haig, in a memorandum to Kissinger that day, urged him to use the meeting "to minimize differences" within the intelligence community about the characteristics of the SS–9, in part to prevent Congressional critics of the administration's approaches to the ABM, MIRVs, and SALT from exploiting such disagreements. Haig concluded, "This issue cannot be permitted to gather any more emotional momentum which will work to the disservice of the Administration." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 207, Agency Files, CIA, Vol. I)

32. Minutes of Review Group Meeting[1]

Washington, May 29, 1969, 2:05–5:40 p.m.

SUBJECT
Review of U.S. Strategic Posture

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Arthur Hartman
Philip Farley
Donald McHenry

Defense
David Packard
Richard Ware
Ivan Selin

CIA
R. Jack Smith

JCS
LTG F. T. Unger

OEP
Haakon Lindjord

USIA
Henry Loomis

ACDA
Gerard Smith

BOB
James Schlesinger

Treasury
Anthony Jurich

NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Laurence Lynn
Morton Halperin
Winston Lord

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The Review Group went page by page through the revised summary paper of NSSM 3 distributed May 26[2] and agreed to a large number of drafting changes. These were to be incorporated in the paper by the NSC Staff and redistributed to Review Group members for their approval before forwarding to the NSC for its consideration. It was agreed that

this NSSM 3 on strategic forces and NSSM 28 on SALT[3] would be considered closely and consecutively in coming weeks. The NSC will devote more time to these two subjects than the usual two-hour sessions. There was general consensus that doctrinal decisions on how we should shape our strategic forces will heavily influence and guide our positions on SALT. However, strategic force decisions will not represent inflexible theology for SALT positions, particularly with regard to possible developments once arms talks are underway.

After some informal discussion at the outset of the meeting, it was agreed that on Page 7[4] of the summary paper there would be a notation that this study does not take into account civil defense measures which will be the subject of a separate NSSM.[5]

Kissinger said that the Packard Committee did a massive job on this subject, as thorough a review as he had seen. He believed that this subject and SALT should be looked at together, with strategic force posture decisions being the theoretical basis for SALT preparations. He has talked to the President, who agreed that the NSC would need more time to discuss these two subjects than the usual two-hour sessions. Kissinger asked the group, beginning with Secretary Packard, what the NSC could reasonably be asked to make judgments on. This would affect the preparation of the summary report since the principals could not be expected to read all the supporting documents.

Packard said that the subject could be approached in two ways. The NSC could be asked to recommend one of the various strategic forces listed, deciding whether there should be any change in present programs and what direction to take with regard to the specific alternatives proposed. A second approach, which he favored, was to address basic questions as well as specific recommendations. These could be looked at in terms of the revised paper before the group. The President and the NSC could focus on some of the broader issues. For example, one fundamental question is how we assess Soviet strategic objectives.

Jurich noted that budgetary constraints must be considered also. Kissinger said that this aspect was covered in the basic papers, and Packard stated that the various strategic alternatives were costed out. However, the budgetary aspects could not really be addressed until general purpose forces were considered. The latter were more important in terms of the budget than strategic forces. Thus, there is some budgetary flexibility for strategic forces; one could opt for more expensive ones while lowering GPF expenses, without changing the overall budget level. Schlesinger suggested that this point be noted in the paper. Strategic forces represent the tail of the budgetary dog, a three to four billion dollar swing in expenses.

Kissinger then asked G. Smith what his agency's requirements were. G. Smith generally endorsed the Packard approach to the problem. He believed that we need general guidance on whether current policies are sensible or whether different emphases are

needed. However, he did not want decisions on NSSM 3 to foreclose options for NSSM 28. For example, on page 9, there was Steering Group agreement that we can and should deploy damage-limiting defenses against small or accidental attacks. He hoped that such governmental doctrine would not rule out possible SALT options under NSSM 28. Selin said that the Steering Group didn't really address the question of no ballistic missile defense versus a small one; this was covered under the Safeguard decision. The Steering Group had instead concentrated on a small versus a large defensive deployment.

G. Smith repeated that he did not wish NSSM 3 decisions to rule out the possibility of dropping the ABM, which the Secretary of State had intimated might be considered. Kissinger said that he understood G. Smith's concern, but that we should be clear on the various components of the President's ABM decision. There were essentially three reasons for Safeguard, only one of which was directly related to Soviet positions. G. Smith interjected that he hoped there would be no decision by the US now that under no circumstances would we accept a zero ABM level. Kissinger responded that neither would there be a US decision now that if the Soviets freeze their ABM deployment, we would agree to forego any deployment on our part. He thought that a US decision would tend to be in the opposite direction. G. Smith wished only to keep this subject open. Kissinger repeated that we should keep in mind the different purposes of Safeguard as we consider SALT and alternative ways of dealing with the Soviets. He said that nothing decided with regard to NSSM 3 should be used as theology in developing our SALT positions. On the other hand, he did not wish to say that no decisions would be taken on our strategic force posture. The decisions on doctrinal issues taken in response to NSSM 3 should guide the decisions taken on NSSM 28, without establishing a firm, unchangeable line.

G. Smith said that this point was a valid one. Nevertheless he would like to think that nothing in this paper purports to limit Presidential options when NSSM 28 is considered, that in effect a zero ABM level cannot be considered because of prior decisions on NSSM 3. Farley pointed out that discussion on page 15, especially option 3, reflected recognition that a zero ABM level is a possible outcome that should not be foreclosed.[6] He agreed that doctrinal decisions on NSSM 3 could seriously constrain NSSM 28 options.

Kissinger said that for example, if the President decides, with regard to NSSM 3, not to limit MIRV testing before SALT discussions, we would not then go back on this decision when discussing NSSM 28. G. Smith said that he understood that the decisions on NSSM 3 would shape some decisions on NSSM 28 options. Packard suggested that the government try to reconcile the two subjects as it moved ahead. Kissinger declared that we could not deal with strategic force postures as if arms control were a completely different subject. The President should be aware of the interrelationship as he looks at NSSM 3. In any event G. Smith would be present at discussion on both issues.

G. Smith recalled BNSP papers in previous years where a single clause set theology and the government was boxed in by language ten years after it was written. Packard suggested that it was a matter of common sense, and Kissinger assured the group that the

President would be aware of the longer term significance of all decisions.

G. Smith again expressed his concern that the language in the paper (which he himself also had agreed to) could have a long life expectancy. Farley noted that the language confirmed that we will deploy Safeguard, while Selin repeated that the Steering Group never really addressed this question. Kissinger said that he could not reopen the ABM decision. Secretary Packard had addressed this question in great detail in March, and it could not be reopened on its merits as part of this present review. He understood that G. Smith was not attempting to do this but rather was worried that the paper's language could handicap our proposing a zero ABM level in the SALT discussions. He added that he thought the President (for whom he was reluctant to speak unless he were sure) would probably not decide upon a zero ABM level, i.e., giving up the anti-Chinese aspect, on the basis of Soviet actions alone. However, he might well be inclined to drop the anti-Soviet components in response to Russian moves. Packard added that a lower level of ABM launchers would not make much difference to the Soviets. Selin agreed that the Safeguard system as approved should not concern the Soviets, whether 200 or 500 launchers, but that G. Smith was worried about the principle of an anti-Chinese deployment. Packard believed that we should maintain the principle for the SALT talks that we be prepared to consider anything that would improve our position as negotiations develop. He believed that G. Smith should have faith that a reasonable approach would be followed during the talks in order to get the objectives that everyone wanted. The problem here concerns our opening position, which should be consistent with NSSM 3 decisions. Kissinger noted that the paper does not specifically rule out any SALT options. Unger added that he did not believe that anything in the summary or the basic paper should constrain G. Smith with regard to arms control discussions. He believed that both subjects should be considered closely at the NSC level.

G. Smith said that he was satisfied if the interpretation that Packard had just outlined was accepted.

The group then went through the paper page by page and agreed on drafting changes. The NSC staff was to incorporate these and shortly get out a revised version to Review Group members for their concurrence.

Kissinger noted that the paper reflected two views concerning how conservative we should be in carrying out US strategic purposes (II A 1).[7] We could be very conservative in our planning and decisions, leaving no doubt about our strategic posture; or we could be restrained in our actions so as not to generate Soviet over-reaction. He noted the danger of using the word "sufficiency" in a liturgical way, as if it were perfectly self-evident. Rather it should be used in contrast with other options. It would be a major accomplishment if this group could reach agreement on what constitutes "sufficiency".

Hartman suggested that it would be helpful for the Secretaries to have a summary of what our present posture looks like in terms of programs as the paper discusses maintaining

our present course. Selin suggested, and Packard agreed, that certain tables now in the back up sections could be affixed to the summary paper. Packard shared Kissinger's concern about using the word sufficiency, and thought that attention should be given to its definition. Unger noted that the basic paper contained 18 force structures with their costs. The tables indicate an order of magnitude for these forces rather than laying out sufficient details for selection of one of them. In these tables one could identify current forces and the objective requirements of the JCS, i.e., what they recommend as a target 18 months from now.

Lynn pointed out that paragraph 3 on pages 8 and 9 does attempt to define "sufficiency" and wondered whether this definition was adequate to distinguish the approach from other strategies.[8]

Kissinger said that he never understood the second point on page 9, i.e., maintaining the capability to cause at least as many deaths and industrial damage to the USSR as they could cause us in a nuclear war. Unger suggested that this point could be clarified by adding a fifth criterion in this section, "have the capability to insure relatively favorable outcomes if deterrence fails". In response to Kissinger's question as to what "relatively favorable" means, Unger stated that the number of deaths and industrial damage were not the only criteria in defining the outcome of a nuclear exchange. Other factors such as residual forces are also crucial, and that is why he believed a fifth point here was required.

Schlesinger did not believe that the Steering Group had agreed to this point 2 on page 9, and Kissinger wondered whether it was a meaningful statement in any event. Farley said that the Steering Group did agree we would not want a situation where the Soviets could cause significantly more damage than we, but it had not agreed to include this point as part of a definition of "sufficiency". It was a little imprudent to enshrine sufficiency and make these conditions theological sine qua nons. Kissinger asked G. Smith what effect this would have on his responsibilities, and the latter replied that he did not wish to enshrine war-fighting capability as part of sufficiency.

Lynn felt that this was a fundamental issue—are we going to make meaningful statements about structuring our strategic forces? Kissinger added that we must decide whether we want such statements and whether those under consideration were meaningful.

Packard declared that in the discussions concerning criteria for our strategic forces, the Joint Chiefs still maintained a divergent view to the effect that they wished to have more emphasis on "relatively favorable outcome" along the lines of Unger's suggested addition. The Steering Group decided, after some discussion, that rather than laying out too complex criteria, it was preferable to stick to numbers of deaths and industrial damage and that other criteria would not make much difference. Packard suggested that, if the Review Group agreed, perhaps the views of the Joint Chiefs on this point could be inserted.

When Unger suggested that this might be put on page 1, Selin responded that the first page laid out what is desirable, while later discussion in the paper centered on what is possible.[9] Our present analysis of nuclear exchanges indicated that sometimes we inflict more damage on the Soviet Union, sometimes the damage is about the same. He said that this analysis included weapons damage as well as fatalities. Kissinger suggested that if there were disagreement, both views should be presented fairly in the paper. Selin repeated that it was not a question of what we would like to do but whether we can assure our doing it, and Farley added: for a tolerable price.

Selin noted that point 2 on page 9 centered upon damage limitation for smaller nuclear exchanges, not those involving 80–100 million deaths. Kissinger wondered whether we could insure relatively favorable outcomes at lower levels of exchange, and Selin responded that relatively similar light defenses could result in unbalanced outcomes. Unger said that estimating outcomes depends on how one programs the computers. Annex J of the study treats deaths only, while Annex B is preferable because it includes other factors.

Jurich said that the word "sufficiency" will always be seen in a political context. For the Soviets we will interpret it as parity, while for the American people it could mean superiority. The NSC will call sufficiency whatever it decides upon with regard to strategic forces.

Packard suggested that the group return to a discussion of purposes on page 1; sufficiency would be those forces that can accomplish these purposes. Selin interjected that the paper shows that there is disagreement over which forces can do this.

Kissinger said that the President had asked to be spared agreed papers. It would be more useful to let the NSC talk about general disagreements rather than much energy being spent on reaching agreements.

Hartman suggested, and the withdrew his suggestion, that the phrase "under the weight of strategic military superiority" be dropped from the opening sentence of the paper.[10] Unger noted that the JCS had a series of recommended changes to the report. It was agreed that the substantive changes would be taken up in the course of discussion while the stylistic ones would be given to Lynn who would have the responsibility of reflecting all drafting changes in the paper. The paper would then be recirculated to the Review Group members for their concurrence before submission to agency principals.

There was some discussion of paragraph 3 on page 2[11] with G. Smith pointing out that presumably we already practice "restraint" in making strategic force decisions, and Farley noting that references to research and development as hedging measures had been dropped.

Kissinger thought, and the group agreed, that it would be useful to add a reference to

research and development as a hedge in this paragraph. Packard agreed that language could be inserted here, but commented that perhaps some would opt for retraints in our decisions even to the point of not wanting R&D.

Halperin believed that paragraphs 2 and 3 on page 2 represented two extremes, with almost everyone somewhere in the middle, and that they therefore did not give the President a real choice. Lynn mentioned Safeguard, and Halperin wondered under which optional view this decision would fall. Packard thought that these paragraphs set up a logical general range, and Kissinger added that the President could only choose a general tendency and could not make precise decisions.

Kissinger then turned to the question of assessing Soviet strategic objectives (II A 2). There were two schools identified. The first is that the Soviets look at the strategic situation and characterize our position in the same manner as we do, and are therefore looking for rough parity. The second school suggests that the Soviets are engaged in a deliberate attempt to achieve superiority. He asked whether these were the only two choices. J. Smith said that these represented broad statements of Soviet objectives and established general parameters. Selin believed that our decisions should be keyed more to Soviet reactions to our moves rather than the definition of Soviet strategic objectives. In response to Kissinger's question, Selin said that if we were convinced that the Soviets were after superiority, we would have no choice but to match them. Kissinger wondered whether the Soviet positions might just be reactions to our initiatives. J. Smith said this was conceivable, and that the question of defensive reactions had been left out. He nevertheless thought the paper staked out an adequate approach.

In reply to Kissinger's query, Sonnenfeldt said that we just don't know Soviet purposes. We are more geared to our evaluation of threats than they are geared to their evaluation of threats.

In continuing discussion of likely Soviet reactions to US strategic initiatives (II A 2b) on page 3, Kissinger outlined the paper's two alternatives. The Soviets would move to offset any attempts by the US to produce an unfavorable shift in the balance of power against them; or such initiatives on our part might induce the Soviets to seek détente. He did not believe that these two views were strictly inconsistent; the Soviets might do both simultaneously. Détente could happen either way, whether or not the Soviets attempted to match us. The operational question was whether it were true that the Soviets would always match what we are trying to achieve or whether they might stick to assured destruction at some point.

J. Smith believed that the latter was possible. In response to Kissinger's question, he said that he thought that their programs were sensitive to our own. He thought that the discussion under b on page 3 showed too much symmetry. Most people would agree that the Soviets would react to any attempt on our part to seek clearcut superiority or a first strike capability. The second point, whether the Soviets would be induced to move toward

détente, is more of a tactical question. He believed that it was much less likely that they would seek détente in the face of a build up on our part. Kissinger concluded that most agreed that the Soviets would match efforts by us.

Sonnenfeldt wondered, in light of this discussion, what had happened to the recently held view that the Soviets want an agreement to freeze the present strategic situation so as to be in a less disadvantageous position than they foresee in the coming four to five years because of our MIRVs and other programs. He said that this was the rationale for SALT last year. Selin pointed out that this section of the paper was treating attempts at clearcut superiority, not ambiguous nuances which might not produce a Soviet response. In response to Kissinger's query whether MIRVs were ambiguous, Selin said they were. On the one hand, they could be considered a threat to the Soviet retaliatory force, while on the other hand they could be construed as our deployment against their ABM system.

Kissinger suggested that the real question was whether or not the Soviets would match us, not whether they would seek détente in the face of a US build up. J. Smith noted that the Soviets were inferior strategically for a long period, but when they face gross inferiority, they act. Kissinger added that he wished to avoid presenting MIRV as an ambiguous program; this might be true, but it would not appear so to the principals. J. Smith believed that the Soviets would react to compensate (though not necessarily match) unfavorable shifts, and that history supports this thesis. Kissinger suggested therefore that there was no possibility of achieving superiority, since the other side would always offset our efforts. J. Smith corrected this statement to say that they always will *try* to match us. This is a far cry from previous years when we enjoyed some superiority.

G. Smith wondered who supported the view in the second paragraph under b on page 3 that the Soviets would react to major US build ups by seeking détente. Halperin suggested some clarifying language to help this section of the paper. He believed that the first question, on which there was general consensus, is whether the Soviets would react to prevent our attaining a first strike capability. More difficult questions included whether they would react to offset totally improvements in our programs short of those aiming for a first strike capability. Kissinger suggested, and there was agreement, that language along these lines would be more precise.

G. Smith again asked who believed that the Soviets would react to US build ups with a search for détente. Lynn replied that the evidence was not conclusive that this would not be their response if they were economically pressed. In the face of a determined effort on our part, they might decide to forego matching us temporarily and seek a relaxation in relations. Packard summarized by saying that the Soviets would react to our attempts at a first strike capability, but they might not react to US moves concerning deterrence and damage limitation.

Halperin noted that his formulation attempted to reflect this, and it was agreed that this type of presentation would be useful.

Farley believed that the first paragraph under b on page 3 referred to Soviet military reaction, while the second paragraph concerned political response. He said that State believed that in the face of major US arms initiatives, the Soviets would not only react militarily but would also generally harden their political attitudes. Kissinger said that the real disagreement centered on the political reaction rather than the hardware reaction. Ware thought that the economic situation might be one of the factors determining the Soviet political response. Kissinger said that he had seen strong arguments on both sides, i.e., that the Soviets were more conciliatory when scared or more conciliatory when they were not scared. Sonnenfeldt said that this was really an unknown problem and that history provided examples for each view. For example, many major Soviet weapons decisions were taken during 1955 and 1958–9, periods of relative détente.

Kissinger noted the group's agreement that in this section the Soviet military response would be rewritten while possible alternative political reactions would be stated.

In considering Allied interests (II A 3),[12] Unger suggested language which would indicate that our commitments impose additional requirements on US strategic forces, and Packard concurred in this suggestion.

Kissinger wondered which European countries would be scared if we increased our strategic capabilities, which was one view suggested by the paper. G. Smith said that there would be a negative reaction, more distaste than fear, in the United Kingdom if the US substantially increased its strategic capabilities. Loomis pointed out the difference between more realistic governmental opinion and public opinion which is more apt to be worried by an arms build up. Kissinger received the impression from European leaders that their publics would be amazed if they heard that we were not vastly superior to the Soviet Union. There would probably be a different reaction between letting European publics continue to think we are superior and attempting to increase our forces if they knew we were not superior. G. Smith believed that public opinion was aware of the concept of sufficiency, and that in an era of negotiations new decisions to increase our forces would incur public disapproval. Kissinger thought it depended on the public's view of the strategic situation.

J. Smith believed that the paper's statement on this question was a somewhat simplistic view of a highly complex problem. Europeans would be relieved if we had strategic superiority, but they prefer not to see arms build ups. Thus, they want to have both détente and superiority. Selin suggested treating this problem in concrete terms, e.g., what would be the British reaction to our building 300 new Minuteman silos. Kissinger agreed with G. Smith that this might present problems in the UK, but wondered where else in Europe this was the case. Sonnenfeldt opined that we were dealing with extremes. The Europeans would be worried either about marked US inferiority or a determination by the US to go for superiority. He thought that in between these extremes there would be relatively little sensitivity to programs like MIRVs or new Minutemen. Kissinger noted that the discussion refers to strategic improvements rather than superiority. G. Smith

suggested Italy as another country which could have a negative reaction. Kissinger repeated that a key factor was what the Europeans think of the US–USSR strategic situation. Loomis felt that the public distinguishes between defensive systems, like the ABM, and offensive ones, like 300 more Minuteman silos. This was true of public opinion throughout Europe; G. Smith added Canada. Farley believed that major initiatives by us in the arms race would create European concern. Packard thought that much would depend on how our programs were presented. For example, Europeans would welcome steps needed to deter war in Europe.

Kissinger suggested that it would be useful to have a paragraph in the paper on European reactions, put in terms of their perception of strategic problems. Halperin suggested that the paper's statements were not inconsistent unless one assumed a single European opinion; there are widely different views to be reflected.

Packard said that Europeans both want détente and are worried about deterring conventional attack. Loomis believed that Europeans were always worried about increasing the chances of war, and they would be unhappy if they assumed we were taking steps which would have this effect. Selin again suggested looking at this problem in terms of specific decisions, while Hartman stressed the importance of the rationale for our actions with regard to the US public. Kissinger again noted the importance of European perceptions concerning our programs. There would be different reactions to a situation in which we were ahead and sought to increase our lead, or behind and sought to catch up, or in a situation where Europeans were not clear about the strategic relationship.

Kissinger noted a JCS suggestion concerning nuclear assurances for our allies (II A 4)[13] and wondered about the status of such assurances. Farley thought that testimony during Senate hearings had walked us back somewhat from assurances under the NPT. Halperin said that this Administration had not made a policy of assurances along the lines of those of the previous Administration. Kissinger thought that we needed a NSSM concerning our assurances to non-nuclear countries against nuclear attacks or threats. Farley noted that our Allied commitments do not distinguish between nuclear and conventional attacks. Schlesinger believed that there was one type of general assurance given to our allies, and another type to non-allied countries. Halperin noted our reaffirmation of assurances in the United Nations, and Farley pointed out that this was through the Security Council only. Kissinger suggested to Unger that he consult with his principals; he did not believe the language recommended by the JCS was strictly accurate. Halperin agreed with General Unger that the original text of the paper on this point was not accurate either. Kissinger believed that the legal situation does not take us beyond the UN Charter except with regard to our allies.

J. Smith suggested deletion of the last paragraph under 4 on page 4 which said that the issue of nuclear assurances was outside the scope of this study.

Kissinger then took up military issues in designing our strategic posture (II B),[14] beginning with what kinds of attacks we must deter. Selin noted that the three general views on page 5 concerning this question were mistakenly set up as mutually exclusive. He suggested that the paper say that beyond assured destruction, there were other additional criteria to be used in evaluating the US strategic posture.

Kissinger said that the discussion on page 5 indicated that the Soviets would either launch a general nuclear attack or none at all. Selin replied that they are not apt to make a discriminating attack. In response, Kissinger wondered how one rationally could make a decision to kill 80 million people. To blow up the Hoover Dam might not be rational either, but it was not less rational than an all out attack. Selin and Unger noted that this doctrine of massive preemption by the Soviets reflected CIA's view.

J. Smith stated that a discriminating attack was the least likely contingency—one could not believe that the Soviets would launch a few nuclear ICBMs against the US. Kissinger probed this view, suggesting the possible use of a few missiles in a Berlin crisis.[15] Packard said this example underlined the need for an ABM system. Selin said that the issue is Soviet first use, and Lynn suggested the example of their hitting soft strategic targets and nothing else. Selin and Schlesinger stressed the unlikelihood of this; Lynn noted that he was the only one in the Steering Group supporting this possibility. Sonnenfeldt recalled that during the U–2 crisis Khrushchev threatened the selective use of nuclear weapons. J. Smith noted that we did not place much credence in this threat at the time.

Kissinger summarized the paper's view as being that if the Soviets launch a nuclear attack, it will be a general one, not a limited one. J. Smith said that studies indicate that Soviet strategic doctrine allows only for all out nuclear use and not limited attack. This could change, of course, but there were no indications that the Soviets seriously considered limited attack as part of their military doctrine. Packard said that he could envisage a scenario where we would not wish to fire all our missiles in five minutes, and he suggested that this was a good reason to have effective command and control. J. Smith noted this was useful at least for accidents. Kissinger wondered whether if we make limited use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets would make an all out response. J. Smith believed this was correct, for once nuclear weapons start landing, the response is likely to be irrational. Selin said that the Soviets would hope to hit our command and control and our cities, and thus avoid a suicide of 80 million lives. It would paralyze our response without hitting our weapons. Lynn suggested that the destruction of our command and control would make a spasmodic reaction more likely than if they chose to coerce us through destroying military weapons.

There was some further discussion of the language in this section. It was agreed both to delete the reference to Soviet military *tradition*, and to make clear that the discussion was referring to *nuclear* attacks only.

The group then discussed damage-limiting (II B 2). Kissinger suggested that beyond a

certain level of casualties, it did not make much difference whether more destruction and death occur on one side or the other (2nd para., page 6). No one really believes that we have "won" if we lose 90 million people and they lose 110 million people.

Lynn suggested that in the 90–120 million persons range there was rough equivalence, but that one should consider wide differences, such as between 80 and 150 million people. Schlesinger said that it was the Steering Group's judgment that this was one criterion for damage-limiting capabilities. Lynn believed the President would want this problem discussed. Kissinger wondered if we would be influenced by the prospect of the Soviets inflicting more damage upon us at mutually high fatality levels, and Lynn thought that perhaps we would be influenced in this situation. Kissinger thought that a mythology of relative deaths had grown up which was no longer relevant. Lynn replied that this was true in the context of assured destruction fatalities but not at lower death levels. Kissinger said that the question was therefore whether the ratio of fatalities would make a difference below certain levels. Halperin commented that the paper (3rd para. on page 6) states that you cannot keep our damage levels down in any event. Lynn said that this view in the paper said we should care about relative damage and casualties. Kissinger said that the necessity was to get our fatalities down to their levels so that they would not believe they could inflict significantly greater damage. Lynn and Selin declared that we now have rough parity in terms of damage and casualties, unless a thick ABM system is deployed. Kissinger repeated his view that beyond a certain level the casualty ratio makes no difference. Damage-limitation might be worth the effort for 10 million lives versus five-million lives, but the statement in the paper loses meaning beyond a certain point. Lynn said that we are in a position now to balance off fatalities and we would not wish to see the Soviets, through defensive deployment, cut into this balance even though we still maintained assured destruction. Halperin summarized that the paper's statement on this subject was meaningful only if casualty ratios above the 25–30% assured destruction level were meaningful.

Kissinger asked whether it was worth noting that we cannot get fatalities below a certain level. Selin confirmed that view. On intelligence grounds we are sure that the Soviets would respond to our initiatives, and on technical grounds it is easy for them to do this.

Unger suggested that the heading about controlling our forces in nuclear war (II B 3 on page 6) be made broader in terms of assuring a relatively advantageous outcome. Packard recommended a general observation be made in this section about the desirability of a favorable outcome which overrides other considerations in a nuclear war.

The group then discussed Section III, results of the analysis of the NSSM 3 study.

G. Smith wondered whether the JCS suggestion was designed to recommend more damage-limiting and war-fighting capabilities than we have at present or to better state present policy. Unger replied that the JCS were seeking a balance in the paper (including JSOP forces), without choosing a particular structure. Packard noted that the JCS wanted

more damage-limiting capabilities even in present forces. In assessing outcomes of nuclear exchanges, they would utilize other criteria than fatalities alone, such as military targets. They were seeking how to deploy present forces with a different emphasis, but this did not necessarily mean needing more than present capabilities. Unger summarized the JCS position as wanting "present forces appropriately modified".

G. Smith thought it was more a question of strategy than force structure. During 7–8 years of an assured destruction strategy, the Chiefs wanted more war-fighting and damage-limiting capabilities; this would have resulted in greater forces. They were never for a pure assured destruction strategy. He wondered whether the JCS believed that the strategy of the past few years should be changed. Unger responded that it was rather a question of assessing our posture in light of the increasing threat of the last five years and projections for future years. Selin stated that this year's JSOP objectives were closer than ever to the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense; the differences were in such areas as relative advantage and degree of conservatism in planning. The large strategic differences between the Chiefs and the Secretary have almost completely disappeared. Packard noted that there were no real OSD–JCS problems with strategic forces. The principal issues concerned general purpose forces.

Kissinger raised the question of protecting our allies against attack, and Sonnenfeldt/Lynn said that this would be covered in the remaining portion of the Packard study. Selin and Unger noted that it was decided not to attempt to discuss defense of our allies in strategic terms alone because of the close relationship with our conventional forces in Europe. Lynn noted on page 9 reference to the need for additional study on strategic forces required to support theater forces, while Selin added that decisions on general purpose forces affect our strategic forces.

Kissinger recalled that in NATO debates our allies expressed their belief that theater forces support strategic forces rather than vice versa. Packard believed that the issue of tactical nuclear policy in Europe was a very important one, and would be extremely significant both in his overall report and for SALT discussions. Kissinger suggested a cover note to this study saying that we have not included allied considerations.

Unger believed that the conventional situation in Europe impacts on the strategic relationship. G. Smith underlined the importance of our commitments to Western Europe to cover targets crucial to our allies. Unger questioned if our conventional strength were below that of our adversaries in Europe, how we would deter them if our strategic forces are on a par with or below theirs. Kissinger said that this important issue could be covered in a note that he and Packard could agree upon.

Kissinger questioned the degree of deterrence we now have against ground attack in Europe, given the changing strategic relationship of the past years. G. Smith did not believe the issue was so clearcut. With our 7th Army, tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic forces, the Europeans should not sense that our umbrella is eroding. He believed

that the uncertainty factor for the Soviets was crucial and just as high as it was ten years ago. Packard thought that we did have some problems. Our tactical nuclear weapons cannot reach the USSR. Given the prospect of 80–90 million fatalities, would we intervene with nuclear weapons if the Soviets moved into Berlin? Packard disagreed with G. Smith's assertion that the situation was not different than it was ten years ago. G. Smith repeated his view that the Soviets have no greater appetite than they did then to invade West Germany, and that tactical nuclear weapons were a factor in this situation. Selin declared that it would take a very large Soviet conventional attack to raise the question of whether we should go to nuclear weapons.

Kissinger believed that if our nuclear weapons deter the USSR, our different strategic relationship today must be reflected in the degree of deterrence. G. Smith said he was disturbed to hear the implication that Europe is in greater danger today with regard to the US nuclear umbrella. In response to Packard's belief that the President would be hard pressed to use nuclear weapons in Europe, G. Smith said that this has always been the case and that Europe is not in a different state of security today. J. Smith opined that we just did not know what constitutes deterrence. Kissinger continued to question how one could write a long disquisition on the changed strategic relationship that all agreed has taken place during the past few years, without acknowledging its impact on the ability of American strategic forces to provide local defense. He was not saying that local defense was not possible. He thought these questions should be flagged for the decision-makers' attention without prejudging them.

Farley referred to the four conditions on pages 8–9 which appeared to define strategic sufficiency.[16] He asked whether we would have insufficiency if we could not fulfill one of these four conditions. Packard reviewed each of the conditions and thought there was agreement that the first two (maintaining our second strike capability and insuring that the Soviets would have no first strike incentives) were ones that all could agree were necessary for sufficiency. There were questions about the meaningful casualty levels of the third condition (relative outcomes in a nuclear war) and arguments over the fourth condition (damage-limitation against small or accidental attacks).

Unger suggested his fifth condition of relatively advantageous outcomes, which Packard suggested be added. Farley said that the Steering Group had not agreed to this condition. Selin did not believe this element should be added; it could mean that one was always confronted with the choice of either insufficiency or an arms race. Packard suggested, and it was agreed, that the JCS suggestions would be inserted as their position, accompanied by a statement of OSD objections.

The group then reviewed Section IV, Strategic Options.

G. Smith emphasized the importance of our public posture. The way in which we describe our strategic forces is crucial to world opinion, and ACDA should have a look at any public statements. Kissinger promised that ACDA would have a crack at any Presidential

statements arising from NSSM 3.

In discussing the question of uncertainties in the future US–USSR strategic relationship, J. Smith pointed out that the role of intelligence was to give the President a tool for dealing with such unknowns. Intelligence can serve to mitigate uncertainties, given the lead times of 18–24 months required for most major weapons systems.

There followed a discussion of several of the pros and cons under the options in this section, and several drafting changes and additions were agreed to.

Under the discussion on estimating the threat (IV A 1) Selin pointed out that option a referred to the greater-than-expected threat and that therefore the first con should read to the effect: forces probably greater than needed.

It was agreed to drop the phrase "offsetting the least part of our advantage" under the third con for option a. Selin pointed out that our current policy is option b, not option a. Kissinger suggested that a pro for option b could be that it provides the greatest incentive to the Soviets to enter arms limitation talks. Lynn believed that option a could also provide incentive for SALT talks. It was agreed that pros along these lines would be inserted under both options a and b.

Farley thought that the first con under option c was overstated, and it was agreed to tone this down. The group also concurred in a JCS suggestion to change the first pro under option c to read: "forces needed against the estimated likely threat".

Kissinger wondered whether the second paragraph on page 12 was accurate, i.e., that option c would reduce our confidence in crises. He wondered whether 20% more missiles, for example, would give us more confidence in a crisis. Selin noted that we had confidence in past crises when we enjoyed a superior relationship. Lynn said that the thinner you slice your relative strategic posture the riskier it becomes to be firm during a crisis.

In response to Kissinger's query about our sensitivity to minor changes in the Soviet threat, Selin said that it was a question of which threat one was discussing and how much redundancy was needed beyond the assured destruction level of 25 to 30% fatalities. The discussion then centered on the question of redundancy (IV A 2). Halperin pointed out, and Selin agreed, that redundancy is related to deterrence, not damage-limitation.

Packard said that, speaking frankly, one had to admit that the issue of redundancy was being treated strictly in the context of the current components in our strategic forces, rather than taking a hard look at redundancy that might be caused by competition among the military services. Thus, this issue was being treated only in terms of the present facts of life, and there was no vigorous examination of possible new forces. Lynn suggested a background paragraph to this effect, and Kissinger agreed. There followed a brief

discussion of the question of the mix of our forces which Unger noted was relevant to all the conditions listed for sufficiency. Packard said this had been studied. G. Smith wondered, in this regard, why we placed our missiles near cities; he agreed with the Navy's emphasis on getting them out into the seas. Lynn noted the command and control problems of sea-based forces.

There was some discussion of how the options in this section would complicate Soviet planning. It was agreed that in addition to option a, option b would also serve this purpose to an extent.

Farley noted the seeming paradox between the two cons for option a (with regard to the adequacy of the forces). Unger pointed out that the first one referred to assured destruction, while the second one covered other factors such as damage limitation, contingencies, etc.

(Kissinger had to leave the meeting at this point, and Packard became Chairman.

Discussion continued about the pros and cons. Unger noted the second pro under option c, a sea-based force only would reduce Soviet incentives to attack the continental United States. Lynn again recalled the command and control problems related to submarines.

There was considerable discussion about the thrust of section B, beginning on page 13, and it was agreed to highlight the political and public aspects in the title for this section. Halperin noted that we will call whatever option we choose sufficiency. Selin suggested deleting a reference to emphasizing this concept under option 1, and this was agreed upon.

J. Smith wondered whether the first option, which included proceeding with MIRVs and Safeguard, could be characterized as emphasizing moderation. After some discussion it was agreed to reverse options 1 and 2, and to say that the new option 2 emphasized moderation in comparison to the new option 1. Selin did not perceive the difference between options 1 and 2 in terms of our strategic force decisions. He did not see how under the new option 2 we might be passing up opportunities to improve our relative strategic capabilities. Packard and Unger felt that this was a fair statement. Packard said that the discussion was merely treating the broad options of increasing, decreasing, or maintaining present strategic forces. This was an overlook at the general effect before dealing with specific programs; therefore under this broad option we might be passing up some opportunities to improve our capabilities. Farley said that if the con for the new option 1 of perhaps inducing the Soviets to seek détente was to be retained, there should also be a con to the effect that this option might harden Soviet attitudes, given our uncertainty about Soviet reactions.

After some further discussion on this section (IV B) Selin suggested, and it was agreed, to pick up language contained in the Steering Group report.

With regard to the final section on unresolved issues (V), Halperin suggested adding the problem of requirements generated by our NATO commitments. It could be noted that this issue, unlike the other three unresolved questions listed in this section, was being addressed in the remaining portion of the Packard study. This was agreed to.

There being no further questions, the meeting was then adjourned.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. No drafting information is provided.

[2] The paper, entitled "U.S. Strategic Posture: Basic Issues," was drafted by the NSC Staff and distributed to Review Group members. (Ibid., Box H–37, Review Group Meeting, Strategic Force Posture, 5/29/69) The paper, as revised by the Review Group, served as the basis for discussions at the NSC meetings held on June 13 and June 18. See Documents 35 and 36. The final version is printed as Document 34. The paper summarizes a report, entitled "A Review of the U.S. Strategic Posture," completed by the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group. The 24–page report includes the following sections: Introduction, The Political and Military Role of U.S. Strategic Forces, Results of the Analysis, and Key Issues for Presidential Consideration. Packard, the group's chair, sent the report to Kissinger under a May 12 covering memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 320.2, Strategic)

[3] NSSM 3 is Document 2. NSSM 28, issued on March 6, ordered the preparation of U.S. negotiating positions for possible strategic arms limitation talks. For the response to NSSM 28, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 14.

[4] Throughout these minutes references to page numbers are keyed to the version of the summary paper distributed May 26 by the NSC Secretariat. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] See Document 28.

[6] The summary paper under discussion listed three general alternatives for "managing the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship." The first two were either maintaining or improving U.S. strategic programs. The third, at page 15, reads as follows: "Exercise restraint on new strategic arms programs as a means of promoting prospects for strategic arms limitations. We would emphasize our interest in talks. We would delay MIRV testing and possibly reduce the Safeguard program, and we could suspend these programs if the Soviets reciprocated. We would also emphasize that our programs would be resumed or accelerated if no agreement were reached or early progress made."

[7] Section II of the summary paper explored two general factors—Political Issues (Part A) and Military Issues (Part B)—that shaped U.S. strategic posture. It also articulated two differing viewpoints for achieving strategic sufficiency: "Some will argue that we must

make decisions to deploy new strategic weapon systems in anticipation of possible threats in order to reduce the risks we face to the maximum feasible extent and leave no doubts as to our resolve to maintain or improve as necessary the capabilities of our strategic posture.

"Others will view deployments of new systems in anticipation of threats premature and as inconsistent with our defensive and non-provocative objectives. They will counsel restraint in making such decisions and the amassing of unambiguous evidence that the threat justifies them."

[8] This paragraph listed the following four conditions that defined strategic sufficiency: "maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all out Soviet surprise attack on our strategic forces; maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis; maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer; deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level." Kissinger highlighted and wrote "how about Europe" next to the third criterion.

[9] Section 1 of the summary paper outlined the general purposes for which the United States maintained strategic forces.

[10] The summary paper's first sentence reads, "There is general agreement that the overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive; to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority."

[11] See footnote 6 above.

[12] Section II, Part A, paragraph 3 of the summary paper noted that, while Steering Group members agreed that the allies would be troubled by U.S. indifference to growing Soviet strategic strength, they disagreed whether the allies would welcome or be critical of moves to improve the U.S. strategic position.

[13] Section II, Part A, paragraph 4 reads as follows: "The issue concerns the nuclear guarantees we extend to countries threatened by China's nuclear program. It has been our policy to extend general assurances of U.S. protection against nuclear threats or nuclear attacks while avoiding specifics. How can we make such guarantees credible, and is it in our interest to do so?"

[14] According to section II, Part B 1, a mix of three objectives—assured destruction, crisis stability, and deterring disarming attacks—determined the design of U.S. strategic posture.

[15] Kissinger recalled this reexamination of U.S. strategic doctrine in his memoirs. Given the advent of Soviet-American strategic parity, he remembered particular concern that the U.S. nuclear deterrent was no longer credible and that the Soviets might use their strategic forces for a less than all-out attack. (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 215–218)

[16] See footnote 8 above.

33. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, June 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

Implications of Soviet Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) Test Program

Since last August the Soviets have been testing their SS–9 missiles with a large heavy warhead containing three separate weapons or reentry vehicles. Four tests were conducted within the USSR. Three more tests were recently conducted at longer range into the Pacific. In all of the successful tests, the impact patterns of the three weapons formed triangles of similar shapes with sides no longer than five miles. The Intelligence Community and other experts have been reviewing the data from these tests and debating their implications. The key question has been whether each of the three weapons could be specifically directed against a different Minuteman silo, thus implying that the Soviets were well on their way toward a MIRV capability.

I have been aware that there have been differing views concerning what these tests implied about future Soviet capabilities.[2] Therefore, during the last few days, I have had a series of meetings with Dick Helms, Dave Packard and several other officials from CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense concerning the implications of these recent Soviet tests.[3]

In my judgment, these implications add up to a decisive confirmation of both the Safeguard program and of your decision to continue with the U.S. MIRV test program. Though these discussions covered complex technical questions, I think you will want to be aware of the main issues. In particular, I think it is now appropriate to revise our Safeguard rationale to take account of our best current judgment about the Soviet threat.

The discussions centered around two questions:

1. What are the technical characteristics of the Soviet MRV program based on tests conducted to date?
2. Based on these technical data, what conclusions can we draw concerning Soviet progress toward developing a full MIRV capability?

Technical Characteristics

There appears to be no significant disagreement about the demonstrated technical characteristics of the Soviet MRV program:

—The Soviets can launch successfully a single SS–9 containing three reentry vehicles of about 5 megatons each.
—Tests with the SS–9 missile indicate that a maximum range of 5000 nautical miles for the MRV system is clearly possible. (Some analyses indicate that even longer ranges are possible with a MRV payload.) With a 5000 mile range, the SS–9 MRV system can reach 5 out of 6 of our Minuteman complexes. (The sixth complex in Missouri can be reached by SS–9s with single 18 megaton warheads.)
—It is estimated that the present Soviet MRV system if deployed, probably in 1970, will have about one-half mile accuracy. With such accuracy, each weapon will have a 66% probability of destroying a Minuteman silo. If accuracies improve to one quarter mile, each weapon will have a 90% probability of destroying a Minuteman silo. The most recent intelligence estimate is that such accuracies will be achieved by 1972.
—The system the Soviets have been testing is significantly more complex than it would need to be if it were no more than a simple MRV program, that is, a program which could deploy three warheads but could not independently direct them to separate targets. Though the tests observed to date have not demonstrated the flexibility required for a MIRV system capable of attacking all of our Minuteman silos, any additional technical effort required to achieve such flexibility cannot be great compared to what the Soviets have already achieved with their system.
—The evidence seems to indicate that at least 60–65% of our Minuteman silos could be specifically targeted with triple warheads based on the patterns we have seen to date. The remainder would, of course, be targeted with single weapons as the Soviet SS–9 program increases.

Implications of MRV Test Results

On the issue of what conclusions we can draw from these technical data, there is agreement that at the very least, the experience gained by the Soviets from testing to date is a significant step towards a MIRV development.

There is disagreement, however, our whether or not the system the Soviets have tested is in fact a MIRV. One view, held mainly in DIA and DOD, is that the Soviet system is almost certainly a MIRV, because:

—the technical data, though not yet conclusive, are consistent with its being a MIRV, and
—there is no other plausible explanation for the Soviet system; a simple MRV for the SS–9 would give the Soviets no advantage over a single warhead.

The opposing view, held by CIA, is that we cannot conclude now that the Soviet system is a MIRV, because:

—the full capability has not been demonstrated in flight tests to date.
—it would be a radical departure from normal practice if they were to deploy a weapon with the potential importance of MIRV's without complete testing, and

—it would be unwise to draw conclusions about Soviet programs based on our views of what is plausible for the Soviets to do, because we've been wrong before when using such reasoning.

In the CIA view, two technical capabilities should be demonstrated before concluding that the Soviets have a MIRV.

—A capability to "roll" the SS–9 in flight in order to vary the directions in which the reentry vehicles are released.
—A greater time span between the release of the first and the third reentry vehicles in order to spread them over greater distances.

(From private conversations, I gather that demonstration of just the second capability would probably convince most of the skeptics that the Soviets had a MIRV.)

I think that the significance of these considerations can be summarized as follows:

—There is a positive technical evidence that the Soviets either have a MIRV system capable of attacking Minuteman or are making significant progress toward achieving one.
—By 1974, when our Safeguard ABM first becomes operational, the Soviets could have been deploying MIRV's for four years and highly accurate MIRV's for two years.
—Even the present multiple warhead is capable of covering at least 60–65% of our retaliatory force *with* multiple warheads.
—The Soviet MRV program appears to be designed to threaten our deterrent by making it possible for the Soviets to wipe out our land-based missiles; it certainly is not designed simply to penetrate ABM defenses. The main purpose of our MIRV program, on the other hand, is to protect our deterrent by insuring that we can penetrate ABM defenses, though we must admit that the Soviets may see it differently. Whereas our Poseidon MIRV's are 40 kilotons, a Soviet MIRV could be 5 megatons, or well over 100 times the yield of our Poseidon warheads.

In view of the importance of these conclusions, and because the three long-range Soviet MRV tests have taken place since your decision to deploy Safeguard, I have asked the CIA to have the United States Intelligence Board reassess certain aspects of the Soviet ICBM program, especially the SS–9 and multiple reentry vehicle programs.

Because we now have a better understanding of how the Soviet strategic threat is developing, I think it is important to update our rationale for the Safeguard deployment to reflect our best current judgment. Enclosed at Tab A is a Safeguard position paper which we prepared initially in early April.[4] It has been updated in the light of the above discussion, principally by amplifying the statement of the Soviet threat on page 2.

If you approve this rationale as modified, I will send copies to Mel Laird, Bill Rogers,

Herb Klein, Bryce Harlow and others who can make use of it in their efforts to win approval of the Safeguard program.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM–MIRV, MIRV Test Program. Top Secret. Drafted by Lynn. A stamped note on the first page reads: "The President has seen."

[2] See Documents 30 and 31. Kissinger recalled in his memoirs the controversy within the intelligence community about the SS–9. "Early in the Administration a school of thought developed that the triple warhead on the Soviet SS–9" was a MIRV "aimed at our Minuteman missile silos. The CIA maintained that the warheads could not be targeted independently. I leaned toward the more ominous interpretation. To clarify matters, I adopted a procedure much resented by traditionalists who jealously guarded the independence of the estimating process." Kissinger conceded that "Helms stood his ground; he was later proved right." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 37)

[3] After reading a summary of a *New York Times* article about an "intelligence gap" that arose when CIA opponents of the ABM allegedly briefed like-minded Senators to undercut Laird's testimony about the growing SS–9 threat, Nixon handwrote instructions to Kissinger to "(1) Give Helms unshirted hell for this! (2) We know it is part true (his Georgetown underlings). (3) Tell him to crack down. (4) Also—tell Cushman." (Memorandum from Butterfield to Kissinger, June 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 844, ABM–MIRV, Sentinel ABM System, Vol. III) Kissinger and Helms met on June 2. According to Haig's summary of the meeting, the two discussed "in considerable detail" the CIA's activities "with respect to the strategic threat and their impact on ABM legislation." Haig added, "You may be assured that Helms is aware of the President's views on this matter." (Ibid., Box 207, Agency Files, CIA, Vol. I) Nixon later instructed Kissinger, during a June 12 telephone conversation, "to call Helms and tell him he has fifteen minutes to decide which side he is on." Minutes after telephoning Helms, Kissinger called the President, who "asked if Helms had made up his mind yet which side he is on." Kissinger assured Nixon that Helms was "telling the truth to everyone" since there was "no evidence that [the SS–9's warheads] can be independently targeted. K[issinger] said he thinks he has Helms on the ball." All three transcripts are ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.

[4] Attached but not printed.

[5] The President initialed his approval.

34. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

Washington, June 5, 1969.

U.S. STRATEGIC POSTURE: BASIC ISSUES

I. For What Purposes Do We Maintain Strategic Forces?

There is general agreement that the overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority. We want all potential aggressors to know that a nuclear attack, nuclear blackmail, and acts—such as a large scale Soviet conventional attack on Europe—which could escalate to strategic nuclear war involve unacceptable risks to them.

There is also general agreement that the primary military purposes of our strategic forces are:

—to reduce the likelihood that nuclear war will occur.
—to protect ourselves and our Allies from the destructive consequence of nuclear wars, insofar as we can, and
—to be capable of controlling strategic nuclear conflicts so that the possible outcomes leave the United States and its Allies in a relatively advantageous position.

A fourth military purpose of our strategic forces is to deter or, if appropriate, cope with large scale conventional attacks on our allies. The strategic capability required for this purpose and its relationship to required tactical nuclear and conventional forces need further study. The second part of the NSSM–3 study will address these issues more fully.[2]

Though agreement can be reached on these purposes, it is no simple matter to translate them into strategic forces, plans and budgets. To do so, several basic issues must be resolved.

II. Basic Issues in Designing Our Strategic Posture

The evaluation of strategic options at the end of this paper will depend upon judgments on the following basic issues.

A. Political Issues

1. How conservative should we be in carrying out U.S. strategic purposes?

The Steering Group Report notes that our basic interests dictate that our strategic posture

be militarily sufficient at all times and that this sufficiency and our resolve to use it be evident and credible. It also notes that our basically defensive purposes must be unmistakably clear.

There are differing views about how best to achieve these ends. Some will argue that we must make decisions to deploy new strategic weapon systems in anticipation of possible threats in order to reduce the risks we face to the maximum feasible extent and leave no doubts as to our resolve to maintain or improve as necessary the capabilities of our strategic posture.

Others will view deployments of new systems in anticipation of threats as premature and inconsistent with our defensive and nonprovocative objectives. They will maintain that such deployments could and probably would stimulate Soviet responses and in effect create or at least make more likely the anticipated Soviet threat. They will counsel restraint in making such decisions and the amassing of unambiguous evidence that the threat justifies them. They will express the belief that a strong research and development effort will provide an adequate hedge against uncertainty.

2. How should we assess Soviet strategic objectives?

The Steering Group Report notes that the actions we must take to secure our interests, and the extent to which we must develop, buy and maintain strategic nuclear forces for this purpose, depend very much on the purposes of the Soviet Union. The Report also notes that Soviet strategic objectives may not be fixed and probably will be influenced by the ways we design our forces and communicate our intent. Thus, there are two partially overlapping issues:

—What are the Soviet Union's strategic objectives?
—How will Soviet strategic decisions be influenced by what we do?

a. Soviet strategic objectives.

One view, reflected in the Report of the Working Group on Soviet and Other Foreign Reactions,[3] emphasizes the likelihood that Soviet strategic objectives are similar to ours: mutual deterrence of nuclear attacks and the limitation of damage if deterrence fails and nuclear war occurs. The Soviets' most important political and military goal, at least for the foreseeable future, is a strategic posture which is roughly as capable as that of the U.S.[4]

The Steering Group Report notes the possibility, however, that the Soviets may have as a continuing goal clear superiority in at least some aspects of strategic capability. The Soviets' present buildup of strategic forces, together with what we know about their development and test programs, raises serious questions about where they are headed and the potential threats we and our allies face.[5]

b. Likely Soviet reactions to U.S. strategic initiatives.

The Steering Group agreed that if U.S. strategic policies and decisions convinced the

Soviet leadership that we were seeking to take away the Soviet deterrent, they would react immediately with the deployments needed to maintain their deterrent. However, it is impossible to say with confidence whether or not these Soviet reactions would offset fully our actions. It is also impossible to say whether or how the Soviets would increase their deployments in response to improvements in the U.S. strategic capability which did not signal a clear threat to the Soviet deterrent.

The Soviet political reaction to a substantial increase in U.S. strategic capabilities is also uncertain. Some believe that the Soviets would react by seeking détente, particularly if the Soviets were unwilling to increase significantly their budget for strategic forces at the expense of overall economic growth or at the expense of their general purpose force posture. Others believe that the Soviet reaction is more likely to result in a hardening of Soviet political positions and attitudes and an increase in tension.

3. How shall we take Allied interests into account?

There is agreement that our Allies and other non-nuclear countries have a major stake in the U.S. strategic posture. They look to our strength to deter nuclear war and to protect them from aggression or from coercion which is backed by a credible nuclear threat. Commitments to Allies impose additional requirements on U.S. strategic forces which must be considered in assessing the adequacy of these forces. Thus our strategic policies and forces are important elements in our relationships with Allies and other countries.

There is also agreement that our Allies would be deeply worried if the U.S. appeared to be indifferent to growing Soviet strategic strength. They might doubt that we were still willing to defend them if they faced an actual or threatened large scale conventional attack.

The issue is how our Allies, particularly in Europe, would react to a determined U.S. attempt to increase its relative strategic capabilities. The answer depends on how the present strategic relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is perceived. Widely different perceptions exist among our Allies and among important elements of political opinion within certain countries.

To some of those who view present U.S. strategic capabilities as clearly superior, U.S. initiatives would go against their hopes that East-West tensions could be reduced. They would fear that increased U.S.-Soviet strategic competition would increase the nuclear threat to Europe, particularly if a major Soviet strategic build-up seemed to be in prospect. Others, however, would tend to discount such concerns and emphasize the desirability of U.S. superiority as the best guarantee against Soviet attack or pressure.

Some of those who perceive a significant deterioration in relative U.S. strategic capabilities would probably welcome U.S. strategic initiatives as an indication of U.S. resolve to maintain powerful strategic forces to deter not only nuclear war but major aggression of any kind in Europe. Some, however, would question the necessity of such

initiatives under present circumstances on the grounds that the present and foreseeable balance is adequate to maintain deterrence.

4. What are the implications of China's nuclear program?

The Steering Group Report notes that we and the Soviet Union are faced with great uncertainties because it is possible that China, and perhaps other countries, may acquire a strategic nuclear capability. We may find it increasingly difficult to determine in the early stages whether Soviet strategic missile and ABM programs are directed at the U.S. or at China, and such uncertainties may make it more difficult to determine appropriate U.S. responses.

The issue concerns the nuclear guarantees we extend to countries threatened by China's nuclear program. It has been our policy to extend to our Allies general assurance of U.S. protection against nuclear threats or nuclear attacks while avoiding specifics. We have given no assurances to other states in Asia. How can we make such guarantees credible, and is it in our interest to do so?

B. Military Issues

1. What kinds of Soviet nuclear attacks on the U.S. must we deter?

Three general views were considered in the course of the study.

a. Emphasis on "assured destruction."
According to this view, the main criterion for evaluating the U.S. strategic deterrent is our capability to strike back and destroy Soviet society after absorbing an all-out, surprise Soviet attack on our strategic forces. If we can destroy with high confidence a fourth to a half of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our forces—a capability we can refer to as our assured destruction capability—nuclear war is effectively deterred. By and large, this is the view that has prevailed up to now.
b. Emphasis on crisis stability.
According to this view, there are additional criteria that should be used to evaluate the U.S. strategic posture. For example, the Soviets may launch an all-out attack against both U.S. forces and cities in a period of crisis or tension if they believe (1) that to do so will assure a significantly better result for them than absorbing a U.S. first strike, and (2) that a U.S. first strike is highly likely. Our forces must be designed to eliminate all Soviet incentives to strike first in a crisis as well as to provide a second strike capability as defined by the assured destruction criterion.
c. Additional emphasis on disarming attacks.
A third view emphasizes, in addition to the considerations above, the possibilities of less than all-out Soviet strikes on U.S. forces designed (1) to improve the Soviets relative military position and (2) to confront us with the possibility that it would be better to halt the war rather than retaliate and risk the loss of U.S. cities. Concern about such

attacks would lead to a greater emphasis on war fighting qualities in our forces and greatly improved command, control and decision mechanisms.[6]

Most of the Steering Group could not endorse the third view as a criterion for designing forces, noting that less than all-out attacks have no precedent in Soviet military doctrine. Nevertheless, the Steering Group believes the President can be provided options in this regard through proper design of command and control and crisis management mechanisms.

2. To what extent should we seek to limit damage to ourselves in a nuclear war?

The Steering Group agreed that we don't want the Soviet Union to believe that if it starts a war, significantly more destruction and death will occur in America than in the Soviet Union. There would be extreme psychological and political disadvantages to the United States if we were in such a position.

The Steering Group also agreed that within the time period of the study, there is no prospect that we could limit damage to ourselves so effectively that we would take away the Soviet Union's nuclear deterrent.

The issue is, between these two limits—i.e. holding U.S. deaths to a level no greater than Soviet deaths (now 90–120 million) and holding U.S. deaths to extremely low levels—where do we draw the line? Does it make sense for us to buy additional strategic forces, such as ballistic missile defenses, to bring U.S. deaths down to 60 million?

There is agreement that we would want such a capability if we could have it without sacrificing the attainment of other national objectives. There is disagreement about whether this is possible.

One view holds that this is possible, that we could buy more damage limiting capability without threatening the Soviet deterrent and thus without provoking an offsetting Soviet reaction.

The other view, held by most of the Steering Group, is that the Soviets, using pessimistic assumptions about our capabilities and intentions, would certainly react, perhaps even overreact, and largely offset the U.S. damage limiting initiatives.

The Steering Group also agreed that we can and should protect ourselves against small, including accidental, attacks from any source. We can expect forces bought for this purpose to be highly effective.

3. How well should we be able to control our forces in nuclear war?

The study did not undertake an in-depth review of our command, control and communications systems or of our plans for the use of our strategic forces.

The Steering Group Report noted, however, that strategic exchanges need not be spasm reactions. They may develop as a series of steps in an escalating crisis in which both sides want to avoid attacking cities, neither side can afford unilaterally to stop the exchange, and the situation is dominated by uncertainty.

The capability for selective use of strategic weapons gives us response options which may be more attractive than launching all-out attacks or not responding at all. Thus in the design of our forces we should consider not only a good command and control system, but also the additional system characteristics which are needed to perform the selective mission.

This and other considerations in the study strongly underscored the need for further study of these aspects of strategic capabilities.

III. Results of the Analysis

A. Summary of the Approach

The Department of Defense examined four nuclear strategies which varied widely in the military objectives they were designed to achieve.[7] These strategies differed in the emphasis they placed on the following factors: our confidence in our ability to deter nuclear attacks in a variety of circumstances, the extent to which we can limit damage to the United States in a nuclear war, and the relative advantage which the United States could achieve in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The strategies ranged from those which were designed to achieve "dominance" or "superiority" over the Soviet Union—mainly by seeking extremely effective damage limiting capability—to those which were designed primarily to deter an all-out Soviet attack on the United States and include additional forces to limit damage only from small attacks. The strategies do not take into account possible alternative civil defense postures, which will be the subject of NSSM 57.[8]

Eighteen representative U.S. strategic force structures were developed and grouped into five categories which correspond roughly to the four strategies. At the same time, a Working Group on Foreign Political and Military Reactions, chaired by the Central Intelligence Agency, estimated possible Soviet military responses to each of these strategies and force categories. Using a range of representative Soviet threats, including the postulated Soviet responses to each strategy, the U.S. forces were reevaluated to see how well they could meet the military objectives for which they were designed. The analysis was broken off at this point without considering further responses and reevaluations.

Another Working Group, chaired by the Department of State, evaluated the broad foreign policy implications of each strategy and force category.

B. Conclusions

Based on the results of the analysis, the Steering Group reached the following conclusions:

1. Though Soviet strategic capabilities are approaching our own, we are highly confident that the United States can maintain a credible strategic posture with respect to attacks on the U.S. no matter how Soviet strategic programs develop. However,
   a. We cannot expect to regain a posture that will be seen as markedly superior because the Soviets are unlikely to relinquish the gains they have worked so hard to achieve.
   b. Unilateral reductions in the U.S. posture, though they might not jeopardize our deterrent in many respects, would almost certainly raise doubts about U.S. resolve among our Allies and involve some important military risks.
2. As far as Soviet strategic objectives are concerned, we are confident that the Soviet Union is determined to deter attacks by the United States. However, the study could not resolve the following two uncertainties:
   a. What are Soviet long-term strategic objectives beyond that of deterring a deliberate all-out attack?
   b. How do the Soviets view the objectives of the U.S. strategic program and do they feel highly threatened by it?

Since both sides recognize that strategic decisions are interrelated, there may be opportunities to cooperate to reduce threats and uncertainties. Arms control criteria and procedures may be able to make important contributions.

3. As far as specific military capabilities are concerned, the Steering Group agrees that we can and should
   —maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out Soviet surprise attack on our strategic forces,
   —maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis,
   —maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer, and
   —deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.

These four conditions in effect define strategic sufficiency as far as nuclear attacks on the United States are concerned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would add as a fifth condition, “Have the capability to insure relatively favorable outcomes if deterrence fails.”[9] By this they mean a capability for a relatively favorable ratio of fatalities, industrial damage, and residual military assets, as well as for the destruction of a comprehensive military target system under a wide range of war-initiation, war-waging and war-termination analyses. They note that the ultimate measure of strategic sufficiency, if deterrence fails, is the resulting overall relative power relationship of opponents which would enable the U.S. and its Allies to control effectively

the course of a political or military situation. The rest of the Steering Group did not endorse this as a condition for sufficiency because it does not describe a specific capability which can be achieved.

As noted above, additional study is needed to define the strategic forces required to support theater forces and to determine the contribution of strategic forces to the deterrence of conventional war. These subjects are being considered in the second part of the NSSM–3 study.

The Steering Group also generally agreed that the Soviets have the capability to react and largely offset U.S. strategies designed to achieve a significantly greater capability to limit damage to ourselves in a nuclear war, though it is not clear just what the Soviets would judge to be a threat to their deterrent and precisely how they would react.

IV. Strategic Options

These conclusions do not resolve all major questions of strategic forces and policy. The Steering Group has identified two major issues for Presidential consideration:

—What principles should guide the design of our strategic forces in order to deal with uncertainties in the future strategic relationships between U.S. and the Soviet Union?
—What public posture should the President take at this time regarding U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships and what actions are necessary to support that posture?

A. Planning Strategic Forces

We deal with uncertainty when designing our strategic forces in two ways:

—by being pessimistic about the Soviet threat and
—by designing considerable redundancy into our posture.

The Steering Group believes that how and why we do this are essentially policy judgments which need to be made in the light of the overall political and military context.

The judgments relating to the adequacy, redundancy, and effectiveness of forces in the following options do not specifically address the requirements for the destruction of a comprehensive military target system, commitment to Allies or the interaction with General Purpose Forces.

1. Against what threat should we design our forces?

The options are:

a. Buy forces to counter threats considerably greater than the highest intelligence projections. This approach hedges against possible threats before they appear.

Pro:

—We could have extremely high confidence in our strategic capabilities.

—We would always have the initiative in force deployments.

—The Soviets might have a greater incentive to negotiate mutual restraints on strategic deployments.

Con:

—The forces would probably be larger than we need for sufficiency.

—These forces would cost $4 to $6 billion more per year than the current program, which costs $14–$15 billion per year.

—The Soviets would almost certainly deploy more forces than they would otherwise.

b. Buy forces against the high intelligence projections of the threat, but also maintain options to deploy new systems against greater threats. This is essentially what we do now.

Pro:

—We would have high confidence in our strategic capabilities, with adequate protection against surprise.

—Such an approach is less provocative than being extremely pessimistic and thus is less of a stimulus to strategic arms competition.

—The necessary forces could cost between $1 billion more to $1 billion less than the present program.

Con:

—We would still be buying more forces than we actually need if the threat turns out to be less than the high projection.

—On balance, we might be encouraging an acceleration in the strategic arms build-up by the Soviet Union.

—On the other hand, there would be some risk that we would be surprised by unexpected changes in Soviet objectives and technological breakthroughs.

c. Buy forces against the most likely Soviet threat, maintaining the options to deploy additional weapons if increased threats emerged. Put increased emphasis on advanced weapons development as insurance.

Pro:

—We would be buying forces adequate for sufficiency against the estimated likely threat.

—We could emphasize our restraint in strategic decisions and thereby encourage a more responsible Soviet weapons policy.

—The needed forces could cost $1 to $2 billion less per year than the present program.

Con:

—Our strategic capabilities would be more sensitive to relatively small changes in the Soviet threat.

—We would be accepting significant risks associated with changed Soviet objectives, covert deployments, or technological breakthroughs.

—Depending on Soviet forces at the time our confidence in crises might be reduced if we adopted such a policy.

2. How much redundancy should we buy in our deterrent?

The main way we buy redundancy in our deterrent is to maintain a significant strategic capability in each of three force components: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and bombers. Following are the options: a. Maintain an independent capability in each of the force categories. This is our present approach.

Pro:

—This policy gives us high confidence in our capabilities because we are not dependent on one or even two systems.
—Soviet offensive and defensive planning becomes more complicated and expensive than if we had our eggs in fewer baskets.

Con:

—This policy means that we maintain a much stronger force than we need for deterrence.
—Even with this policy, there is no guarantee that the combined force, operating in concert, will be adequate for the full range of possible contingencies.

b. Maintain three force components, but do not insist on an independent capability in each.

Pro:

—This policy still maintains redundancy and thus some confidence in our capabilities.
—It still forces Soviet planners to contend with three force components, but at less cost to us.
—It is more consistent with a policy of restraint in strategic decisions.
—We could save $1 to $2 billion per year compared to the present program.

Con:

—We would be running the risk that our forces were not sufficient in all aspects. For example, our ability to deter some Soviet attacks in periods of crisis might be questionable.

c. Do not maintain three force components.

We could phase out one or possibly two major force components, keeping, for example, only land-based and sea-based missiles or only sea-based missiles.

Pro:

—This policy would further emphasize our restraint in strategic decisions.

—A force of sea-based missiles only reduces Soviet incentives to make a first strike on the continental United States.
—In the long term, this policy would cost $2 to $3 billion less per year than the present program.

Con:

—Our strategic capabilities would be much more vulnerable to unexpected failures in the remaining components or to breakthroughs in Soviet countermeasures, such as unexpected increases in Soviet antisubmarine warfare capabilities.
—Our confidence in the sufficiency of our strategic posture would be reduced.
—A force of sea-based missiles only would be vulnerable to unexpected failures in our communications system.

B. U.S. Alternatives in Light of the Present U.S.-Soviet Strategic Relationship

The Steering Group raised the issue of preserving an image of strength and resolve while maintaining stability in the strategic balance. Weapons choices and public statements can and will convey powerful messages to the Communist states, our Allies, and other countries. There are three general levels of capability that encompass the broad policy choices that exist at present.

The options are:

1. Emphasize the need for improving the U.S. strategic position. We would indicate strong interest in initiatives to develop and deploy new systems in response to the continued build-up of Soviet strategic forces. For example, we could concentrate on additional offensive weapons, including substantially larger numbers of MIRVs than now planned, or we might add both offensive and defensive weapons.

Pro:

—This policy would clearly demonstrate, to the Soviet Union and our Allies, our determination to maintain our strategic strength with high confidence.
—The Soviets might respond to stepped up U.S. deployments with efforts at détente or increased willingness to make concessions in arms control talks.
—We could be confident we would retain the initiative in weapons deployments.

Con:

—This policy would strengthen the hand of Soviet military leaders who would like to continue the build-up of Soviet strategic forces against the U.S. threat.
—Such action and statements would jeopardize the success of strategic arms talks by calling into question our sincerity in seeking an agreement. It might lead to a general hardening of Soviet attitudes and positions.

2. Make minimum changes to our present programs. Proceed with MIRVs, Safeguard and eventually with other programs as needed to maintain sufficiency.

Pro:

—This policy emphasizes moderation and restraint compared to Option 1 and should provide an adequate deterrent against likely Soviet threats and viable hedges against unexpected threats.
—By proceeding with MIRVs and Safeguard, there would be no early need for further demonstrating to the Soviets that they have no hope of achieving strategic superiority.

Con:

—We might be passing up opportunities to improve our relative strategic capabilities.
—On the other hand, our deployment of MIRVs and ABMs could jeopardize prospects for arms control.

3. Exercise restraint on new strategic arms programs as a means of promoting prospects for strategic arms limitations. We would emphasize our interest in talks. We could delay MIRV testing and possibly reduce the Safeguard program, and we could suspend these programs if the Soviets reciprocated. We would also emphasize that our programs would be resumed or accelerated if no agreement were reached or early progress made.

Pro:

—We would be emphasizing our interest in strategic arms agreements without weakening our resolve not to be overtaken.
—We would provide the Soviets with incentives to expedite progress toward an agreement.
—If Soviet intransigence made decisions to resume our programs necessary, they would receive much broader support.

Con:

—We would be giving up our position of strategic strength in negotiating with the Soviet Union.
—Because the Soviets understand the political opposition to U.S. strategic programs, they would have an excuse to adopt dilatory tactics in talks.
—Those who now argue that we could resume our programs if talks showed no progress would then argue against any act which would jeopardize talks.

V. Unresolved Issues

The Steering Group identified three issues that require further analysis:

A. Do we have the capability—the preplanned and unplanned options and the command, control and decision system—to use our strategic forces to achieve U.S. military objectives in a slowly escalating strategic war of attrition? We need to examine whether our present posture is adequate to provide the President with the capability to use nuclear weapons in a selective manner during a nuclear crisis.
B. Under what circumstances would the United States use strategic nuclear weapons to respond to either a conventional or a nuclear attack on our Allies?
C. As far as the Chinese threat is concerned, are there further steps that we can and should take to assure countries that may feel threatened by China's nuclear capability that we will protect them?
D. What strategic capability is needed for the purpose of contributing to the deterrence of conventional war? What is its relationship to the required tactical nuclear and conventional forces? (These issues are being addressed in the second part of the NSSM–3 study.)

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting, June 13, 1969. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the paper, which is a revised summary of the interagency response to NSSM 3, submitted by Packard to Kissinger on May 12. (see footnote 2, Document 32). The paper was revised to reflect the discussion at the Review Group meeting on May 29 (see Document 32). The NSC Secretariat distributed this paper to Agnew, Rogers, and George Lincoln on June 11 with copies sent to Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, David Kennedy, Attorney General John Mitchell, Gerard Smith, and Mayo. It served as the basis for discussions at the NSC meetings held on June 13 and 18 (see Documents 35 and 36).
[2] See Documents 30 and 31. Kissinger recalled in his memoirs the controversy within the intelligence community about the SS–9. "Early in the Administration a school of thought developed that the triple warhead on the Soviet SS–9" was a MIRV "aimed at our Minuteman missile silos. The CIA maintained that the warheads could not be targeted independently. I leaned toward the more ominous interpretation. To clarify matters, I adopted a procedure much resented by traditionalists who jealously guarded the independence of the estimating process." Kissinger conceded that "Helms stood his ground; he was later proved right." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 37)
[3] In April, the Working Group on Soviet and Other Foreign Reactions, chaired by the CIA's Director of Strategic Research, submitted its response to NSSM 3. According to its summary, the paper, entitled "Foreign Political and Military Reactions to U.S. Strategies and Forces," reached the following conclusion about Soviet strategic objectives: Soviet "leaders probably are confident that they are achieving a rough strategic equality with the US and a strong deterrent capability which is recognized by the US and by the rest of the world. We believe the Soviets recognize, however, that for the foreseeable future it is not feasible for them to achieve damage limiting capabilities which would permit them to launch a first strike against the US without receiving a very high level of damage in return." The report was appended as Tab E to the NSSM 3 response submitted by Packard

to Kissinger on May 12. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 320.2, Strategic) The text of the report is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[4] Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote "*nonsense*!" above it.

[5] Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote "*correct*" above it.

[6] Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote "RN's view" in the margin next to it.

[7] On April 11, a Department of Defense working group completed a report, entitled "Analysis of Alternative Nuclear Strategies and Force Postures," which supplemented the response to NSSM 3 overseen by the Packard Committee. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 320.2, Strategic)

[8] Document 28.

[9] Nixon wrote in the margin next to this sentence: "RN agrees."

35. Editorial Note

The National Security Council met on June 13, 1969, to discuss the U.S. strategic posture. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 3:40 to 5:21 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) The following account of the meeting is based on the handwritten notes of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., the most complete record of the proceedings found. Haig's notes are ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969.

After introductory remarks by President Nixon, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert E. Cushman, Jr. briefed the National Security Council on current and projected Soviet strategic capabilities. Some Council members pointedly questioned the estimate of Soviet offensive capabilities. Secretary of State William P. Rogers asked whether the SS–9 was equipped with MIRVs or MRVs. Cushman responded that, while the issue was still "open," it was the opinion of the intelligence community that Soviet missiles were not equipped with independently targetable reentry vehicles. Nixon, paying particular attention to strategic aircraft, asked, "What is their bomber production status? Any new generations? [Are the Soviets] going up or staying level?" Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard responded that both superpowers were simply maintaining their strategic air forces.

The President then made sweeping critiques of the American intelligence community and its recent track record in estimating Soviet strength. The last such briefing given to President Johnson in 1968 had been "way off," he claimed. Worse, "Intelligence has been wrong on Soviet projections since 1962." Nixon, angered that critics of the administration's defense policies within the intelligence community were allegedly leaking misleading information to Congressional opponents and to the press, suggested that such experts only leaked low estimates of Soviet capabilities and kept high ones to themselves.

Cushman then gave a briefing on Soviet defensive capabilities, stating that intelligence indicated that the Soviets had "cut back" and were attempting to improve Tallinn, the ABM system surrounding Moscow, because they lacked confidence that it could cope effectively with United States offensive missiles. The President interrupted the briefing to critique the estimating process, insisting that the intelligence community was too willing to provide policymakers with a single "opinion" to explain such actions of Moscow's when several alternative interpretations were possible. Nixon, developing a question first raised by Rogers, illustrated his point by noting the intelligence community's estimate that by 1975 the Soviet ABM "would be effective against limited attack." Addressing Cushman, the President said, "You've expressed opinion on why Soviets cut back ABM. Why have they gone with new one? You say this is to get more effective ABM. What is effectiveness of their ABM against Chinese attack?"

A general discussion of ABMs followed. The President was skeptical that the Soviet ABM system actually worked. Packard, replying to a query from Rogers, stated that Moscow had conducted some successful tests of its missile defense system. He added that the Soviets had the equivalent of a 2-year lead on the United States in developing and deploying a missile defense, but that the Soviets' radar was not electronic and that the American system was technologically superior. Both Rogers and Kissinger were particularly concerned that the United States had not yet developed a loiter capability, whereby an interceptor missile can be launched before its target has been fully identified and flown in such a manner as to await the separation of a reentry vehicle from its penetration aids, and probably would not do so for another 2 years. Kissinger argued, "We must increase ours [ABM] to meet Soviet ABM." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler assured the NSC, however, that United States military planners had targeted Tallinn in order "to protect our capability" and that the nascent United States missile defense system had complicated Soviet planning. The President ended the discussion, saying simply "these are tough questions."

The discussion turned briefly to civil defense. George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, asserted that the United States had fallen behind in this area too. Reports about the relatively extensive program in the USSR suggested that the Soviets "are better organized than we are." Nixon agreed, asking "What happened to us on this?" Lincoln believed it was "important" to do something to augment American civil defenses once the analyses commissioned by National Security Study Memorandum 57 (Document 28) had been completed.

Nixon, Kissinger, Packard, Wheeler, and Attorney General John N. Mitchell then engaged in a discussion about Soviet strategic doctrine and war-fighting capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. The President was particularly concerned that he lacked sufficient options, short of all-out nuclear war, to employ American forces in regional conflicts, including the Middle East, with the Soviet Union.

Packard next summarized the analyses prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandum 3 (see Document 36), detailing five alternative strategic force postures first delineated by the Department of Defense and then reviewed by the Interagency Steering Committee that he chaired. According to Packard's talking points, the first option, Category I, would greatly expand and improve United States strategic offensive and defensive forces at an annual cost of $18–23 billion. This option would provide a hedge against a greater than expected Soviet threat and significantly reduce damage if either the United States or the Soviet Union struck first. The enhanced United States posture would likely stimulate a Soviet response, however. Category II would expand United States offensive capabilities, but only slightly increase its defensive forces at an annual cost of $15–23 billion. For $13 to 16 billion per year, Category III would maintain the current United States strategic program, allowing for some qualitative improvements in weapon systems. Category IV, projected to cost $13–14 billion each year, would slightly reduce

offensive and defensive weapons. Without a viable arms control agreement, Packard cautioned, forces in this category would involve considerable military risk. Finally, Category V, estimated to cost $15 billion per annum, depended upon an arms control agreement and emphasized defensive over offensive weapons.

Packard's committee had concluded that the United States could not hope to regain strategic superiority since the Soviets could effectively respond, neutralizing any temporary gains. On the other hand, unilateral reductions in the United States posture, although unlikely to jeopardize the deterrent, would almost certainly raise doubts about Washington's resolve among its allies. The committee also had determined that the United States retained and could maintain sufficient capability to deter a Soviet attack and emerge in an advantageous position if deterrence failed. Packard's group identified two major issues for consideration by the Council and the President. First was how to deal with uncertainty regarding the Soviet threat in planning United States strategic forces. The committee recommended that a defense posture be crafted with a conservative, i.e. high, estimate of the threat in mind and that redundancies be programmed in United States forces. Second, the President needed to choose one of the five strategic options, selecting the one that best improved the United States posture, conveyed an image of strength, and promoted prospects for strategic arms limitations. Packard's talking points are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H Files), Box H–127, NSSM 3.

Following Packard's briefing, according to Haig's notes, the President reminded the Council of the uncertainties involved in strategic planning, especially since some seemingly well-designed weapons systems would inevitably fail during wartime use. Yet, he said, "We must recognize that this game is all about diplomacy." Nixon used the Cuban missile crisis to illustrate the fact that the "diplomatic equation must be weighed heavily" when making military decisions. The United States had enjoyed a commanding four-to-one strategic edge on the Soviet Union in October 1962, he said, a military preponderance that "paid off" during the crisis. The Soviets had since redressed the strategic imbalance. But, according to Nixon, European allies still thought the United States was stronger. "They think this and it has effect. If we accept parity or inferiority, in a diplomatic sense we [would?] be in a tough" position. "We're not settling for second place," Nixon announced. Rogers agreed, arguing, "We need sufficiency, not parity."

The President then directed the National Security Council to examine the "China nuclear problem." The Chinese, armed even with primitive nuclear weapons, could effectively hold American cities hostage, thereby blackmailing United States policymakers and forcing them to surrender Manila, for instance, in exchange for their safety. This scenario, Nixon believed, offered yet another argument for Safeguard, which gave the United States additional credibility in the Pacific. "Diplomacy is problem," he concluded, "not cost effectiveness," adding that the United States could not appear to be weak in the eyes of its allies.

The attendees then discussed the U.S. strategic posture. Wheeler stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believing that shelters were effective, wanted to upgrade civil defense. Lincoln agreed, adding that an extensive shelter network could pay dividends in the event of natural disasters. Wheeler also recommended that policymakers respond to the increase in Soviet capabilities either by qualitatively improving U.S. offensive forces, deploying multiple reentry vehicles, or upgrading missile defense. He also disagreed with Rogers, arguing that strategic objectives, rather than a theoretical definition of "sufficiency," should guide the eventual National Security Decision Memorandum that established the United States defense posture.

Ultimately, the President declined to make a decision at meeting's end, preferring to wait until the Council had considered strategic issues and SALT more fully.

36. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, June 18, 1969.

RN: Let's see if we have agreement on our four criteria.[2] They are essential to our arms control discussions.

HAK: Note: Allies, general purpose forces.

1. Criteria for sufficiency: lists the four criteria, goes over missions on p. 5:[3] A.D., stability, less than all-out attacks.
2. Impact of arms control option on other aspects of capability: target coverage, threat to Europe.

Lists topics for additional study: all four named.

RN: Four criteria add up to massive retaliation; don't they? 70 million or nothing. This isn't adequate. Further study of further options in terms of our diplomacy, other areas you haven't covered: tac nucs, conventional others. We may miss the boat on what may really happen. Kind of confrontations we're likely to have, not unlikely to have. How do I react to lesser threats?

Looking at fourth criteria may be most important thing on chart. Gives us a viable foreign policy, for example in the Pacific.

RN: Today, we couldn't confront Soviet Union with first strike capability. 1962 edge is all gone, we can't help that. Paper is deficient in that it doesn't come up against other than massive retaliation. Report in 2 months.

Smith Briefing

RN: Are their subs under construction as good as ours?

Laird: They are Polaris type. They could be developing quieter subs.

RN: Civil defense should be included in the evaluations of capability. This is related to political warning. Not decisive, but should be there.

Major new factor is our verification capability.

Lincoln: Could capability be neutralized?

Helms: Sure, very easily.

RN: On-site inspection should be raised, and if you give it away get something for it.

Rogers: We would want to avoid making this a major issue. They would question our good faith. (Laird disagrees: don't bring it up later on.) Smith: Depends on what our proposal is.

RN: You must assume they will cheat.

Doubts "good faith" assertion, but discuss it later.

Smith: We should try for "old-fashioned" on-site inspection. But also seek supplemental measures. But some agreements would require neither.

RN: SWWA[4] is propaganda point, a gimmick. Neither side will negotiate on that basis. But it could be used as propaganda. Reserve it for later consideration. It's like a cease-fire in VN. Not serious.

RN: What will they ask for?

They will ask for flight test limits, because they have done so much of it to us.

What's purpose of Soviet MRV? (to Helms) Is it first-strike weapon or not? (Helms: oh, yes sir, it is.)

With cities, they don't need it. They aren't stupid.

Laird, Packard: Poseidon really isn't a hard target weapon. Subs can't navigate that well; we can't achieve the necessary accuracies.

RN: On Intelligence reports:

1. Strict separation between fact, opinion.
2. Intelligence information has been used to prove conclusions, rather than draw conclusions. Around this table, I don't want that kind of talk. We're here to learn the facts. In 1965–1968, Intelligence Community was 50% too low. We must be hard-headed in looking at the facts. (He laid line down hard to Helms.)

Helms: More than half our search areas are continuously covered by clouds.

Maintaining arms control agreement would *not* be easy. We can probably give timely warning of cheating on a scale that would alter the strategic balance.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Packard Briefing

Get Wheeler's talking points on targeting considerations.

1. *Today*, our capability gives you *limited* capability in other than A.D. situations.
2. Option IV[5] —MIRV ban—would not be in our best interests, because of targeting limitations.
3. Desirability of having an ABM of undetermined size.
4. 2–1 advantage in Soviet throw weight.

RN: Who would benefit from MIRV moratorium?

Wheeler: I don't think we would. Soviets might like to stop both our MIRVs and ABMs.

RN: Why not stop testing for a year? Would it bother you? Wheeler: Yes sir, it would. We can't be satisfied with ours. They might be OK. We would be constrained to stay with single RVs.

RN: Why is MIRV important? Forget payload; enough is enough. Is it because we can hit the additional targets? Is that what it comes down to?

Wheeler: Targets. We can get good accuracies on MM III.

RN: Do we tie MIRVs & ABMs together because of defending hard sites? Is ABM help against their MRV?

Wheeler: Spartan (4 MT) will kill all 3 RVs.

Our MIRVs clusters can't be killed with one warhead.

Laird: They can't read our program as having hard target capability.

Rogers: WRT payload, doesn't freezing numbers put us at a disadvantage?

Laird: Throw weight will make big difference in long run. We have to consider this point.

Smith: In 10 years, will we both be better off with MIRVs? With payload problem, we will both be worse off.

Laird: We only have 40 Titans with hard target capability.

RN: If we can maintain 30% a.d. how can we talk of Soviet first strike?

Laird: We would have to remain reliant on bombers.

Rogers: Who would benefit from MIRV ban?

Laird: Could make a case it would be about even. They believe all tests have been

successful. If so, they have moved ahead of us. They've had "confidence firings."

RN: Charts show that MIRV ban is our worst option. Is that right? What are charts up there for? (Maybe for fun.) Is option III worse or not?

Packard: Depends on whether we limit ICBMs. Gives us extra targeting capability. Should couple MIRV ban with ICBM limits. Must work out numbers problem.

Rogers: Point is that Soviets can target our missiles.

Packard: We couldn't deploy and have it unknown. They can.

Smith: Wouldn't we see their confidence firings?

Wheeler: Test it in an IR/MRBM.

Smith: Upgrade our detection capabilities.

Wheeler: It will increase the force we can apply against them.

RN: It all comes down to diplomacy as we all know. First strike, counterforce can be an asset.

Shouldn't tell the whole truth. Could talk about MRVs, however.

Rogers: Get something re approach. They're testing, we're testing.

HAK: Develop a single answer and clear it. (Party line.)

1. Who gains from deployment ban?
2. Who gains from testing ban?
3. Can you be sure? What about clandestine testing?

SALT Options Paper.[6]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1969. No classification marking. No drafting information is included. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting, during which participants considered SALT and continued their discussion of the U.S. strategic posture begun during the previous NSC meeting (see Document 35), was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:14 a.m. to 12:48 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] Among the briefing materials he sent to Nixon on June 17, Kissinger included a

summary of Presidential decisions that he recommended should result from the meeting. These included obtaining NSC endorsement of the four criteria of strategic sufficiency, indicating that the President desired no changes in U.S. strategic programs pending further analysis, and making clear Nixon's desire to continue to plan U.S. forces against high intelligence projections of the Soviet threat while also maintaining options to deploy new systems against unexpected developments. Kissinger also advised Nixon to initiate post-NSSM 3 studies on the relationship among U.S. strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear, and conventional postures; the implications of disarming attacks for force design and command and control systems; and additional evaluations of war fighting and various strategic force designs. (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting, June 18, 1969)

[3] See Document 34. Kissinger is referring to Section II B of the paper.

[4] A reference to Stop-Where-We-Are, an arms control proposal put forth by ACDA. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 16.

[5] The response to NSSM 28, initiated on March 6 and completed by June, outlined four packages for SALT negotiations, which began in November. The fourth package prohibited MIRVs; the third froze the deployment and modernization of offensive weapons. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 12, 14, 15, and 20.

[6] Reference is to the summary of the response to NSSM 28. See ibid., Document 14.

37. Editorial Note

President Nixon held his sixth press conference, broadcast nationally on television and radio from the East Room of the White House, at 7 p.m. on June 19, 1969. When asked about his position on MIRV testing, Nixon replied that the administration was "considering the possibility of a moratorium as part of any arms control agreement. However," he continued, "as far as any unilateral stopping of tests on our part, I do not think that would be in our interest. Only in the event that the Soviet Union and we could agree that a moratorium on tests could be mutually beneficial to us, would we be able to agree to do so."

The news conference ended with a question about Safeguard. The President took issue with the reporter's suggestion that the ABM was "in trouble" in the Senate and denied that the administration was preparing compromise language. To shore up support for the measure, Nixon added that he recommended Safeguard "based on intelligence information at that time. Since that time new intelligence information with regard to the Soviet success in testing multiple reentry vehicles—that kind of information, has convinced me that Safeguard is even more important. Because however we may argue about that intelligence, as to whether it has an independent guidance system as ours will have, there isn't any question but that it is a multiple weapon and its footprints indicate that it just happens to fall in somewhat the precise area in which our Minutemen silos are located. This would mean that by the year 1973, in the event the Soviet Union goes forward with that program, that 80 percent of our Minutemen would be in danger. ABM is needed particularly in order to meet that eventuality." The transcript of Nixon's press conference is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pages 470–480.

The President had written the phase "80 percent of our Minutemen" on his briefing materials prepared by the NSC staff in anticipation of questions about MIRVs during the press conference. Nixon also wrote the following: "(1) What they have is a multiple weapon—with mission of attacking our Minutemen. (2) This makes A.B.M. vital." Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, the President noted: "*Kennedy:* (1) courageous (2) able to do it because confident of our strength (3) I don't want Am. Pres. to be in position where in a crisis U.S. is *behind*." The President's briefing materials are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM–MIRV, MIRV Test Program, Vol. 1.

38. Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate 11–8–68[1]

M/H NIE 11–8–68 Washington, June 23, 1969.

SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

The Problem

To review recent evidence respecting Soviet strategic offensive missile capabilities and forces, and to assess its implications for revelant sections of NIE 11–8–68, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces," dated 3 October 1968, Top Secret, Ruff/[*codeword not declassified*] Restricted.

The Estimate

I. The SS–9 ICBM

A. Deployment

1. Since NIE 11–8–68 was issued we have detected the initiation of construction of five new groups of SS–9 launchers. We believe that three of these were started in the first quarter of 1969 (although one could have begun as early as December 1968), and two in the second quarter. The last previous group start was in May 1968. This system has six launchers to the group. When the 43 groups identified to date have been completed (probably in early 1971), the Soviets will have 258 SS–9 launchers operational; they now have 168.

2. [*1½ lines not declassified*] almost certain that all groups under construction as of about 1 April have been detected. The five new group starts of this year show a pace about like that of last year, when there were six group starts in the first six months. In the second half of last year, however, there were no new starts; we have of course no evidence of what may happen during the rest of this year. There is no evidence of the duration of the SS–9 deployment program or of the SS–9 force goal; we would judge now, however, that it will exceed 258 launchers.

B. Accuracy

3. We continue to estimate that the SS–9 has a CEP of .75 n.m. using an all-inertial guidance system and one of .50 n.m. if a radio-inertial system is employed.[2] No good basis exists for determining what portion of the SS–9 force has the more accurate guidance. [*7 lines not declassified*]

4. To give the missile a CEP of as little as .25 n.m. would require a new guidance system and a new re-entry vehicle, designed for either faster re-entry or some form of terminal guidance. Based on present evidence and what we believe about the Soviet state of the art, we continue to estimate that such accuracy could not be achieved before 1972. Some increase in accuracy could certainly be achieved by improving all-inertial guidance components without changing the present re-entry vehicle (RV). In our opinion, however, if the Soviets wish to reduce the CEP to something better than about .5 n.m.[3] they would be likely to do so by using a new guidance system and new RV. Our interpretation [*1½ lines not declassified*] not persuade us that the Soviets are trying to improve the accuracy of the system. We believe that we would detect efforts to improve accuracy during the flight-test phase—and certainly so if the improvement should be substantial.[4] ,[5]

C. Payload

5. The Soviets [*less than 1 line not declassified*] tests of the SS–9 with two sizes of RVs. We estimate that the lighter one could carry a war-head with a yield of [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The heavier one could carry a warhead with a yield of [*1½ lines not declassified*]. The SS–9 payload with multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) weighs the same as the heavy single payload.

D. Range

6. With the *lighter* payload, the SS–9 has an estimated maximum operational range of about 7,000 n.m.—more than enough to cover the entire US from present SS–9 deployment complexes.

7. With the *heavy* payload:

a. The observed facts are as follows: Since NIE 11–8–68 was published, the Soviets have fired the SS–9 with heavy payload into the Pacific to a distance of 5,100 n.m. These firings, however, took advantage of the earth's rotation; on the same trajectories but fired north toward the US the range would be only about 4,700 n.m. At this range the missile could not reach the US (except Alaska) from most of its present deployment complexes; only those in one complex could reach targets in the extreme northwestern corner of the US. This presents a problem, since it seems implausible that the Soviets would develop an ICBM with a payload so heavy that it could not reach important targets in the US.
b. The above-mentioned test flights [*1½ lines not declassified*]. By [*2½ lines not declassified*]—the SS–9 with heavy payload would go approximately 5,000 miles; coverage of the US by the SS–9 as presently deployed would reach to a line extending from San Francisco to Boston, though most would not reach that far. Specifically, an SS–9 from one of the complexes could reach five of the six Minuteman complexes; from another, it could reach four of the six; from the remaining four complexes, the three northernmost Minuteman complexes could be reached. Thus, even with this

range limitation, all currently deployed SS–9s could have Minuteman silos as their targets, and only the southernmost Minuteman complex would be completely out of range of the SS–9s with the heavy payload.

c. By [*2 lines not declassified*] the range could theoretically be increased sufficiently to allow some SS–9s with the heavy payload to reach the furthermost Minuteman complex. However, because of the uncertainty in performance which would be involved, we doubt that the Soviets would target their missiles in this manner without previous flight testing.[6]

E. Retargeting

8. If the Soviets have a requirement to retarget the SS–9—i.e., to target and launch a backup missile on information that the original missile failed in flight—we believe it to be within their capabilities. There is no evidence of such a development, but it is unlikely that we would obtain such evidence.

F. Multiple Re-entry Vehicles

9. At the time of our last estimate, the Soviets had conducted two tests of the SS–9 with three RVs; since then they have conducted five more. We believe that each of the three RVs weighs about 4,000 pounds and could carry a warhead yielding [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. All seven tests were of MRVs which followed simple ballistic trajectories—i.e., they were certainly not independently guided after separation from the launch vehicle.

10. So far, then these tests have demonstrated at least a simple MRV, and one hypothesis is that this is all they are intended to achieve. If so, they would represent the culmination, or something near the culmination, of a development program initiated several years ago as the first answer to the ABM, which had of course been long under discussion in both countries. The Soviets were aware of US development of MRVs without independent targeting in the Polaris system. They probably gained, as time went on, a fair understanding of the operational concept of the planned Sentinel system and the general capabilities of its components. They may nevertheless have been uncertain both of the kill capability of the Spartan's warhead, and of its method of kill—the Spartan relies upon a multimegaton warhead and nuclear effects to neutralize the target, while its predecessor the Nike Zeus had a much smaller warhead and was intended to physically destroy the target. When in September 1967 the US announced its intention to deploy the Sentinel, the Soviets may have decided to proceed with production of MRV hardware and go to the flight testing which began in August 1968. They would have done so, by this hypothesis, rather than wait longer for a system with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). A simple MRV system could reach IOC late this year.

11. As tested to date, this MRV system would confront the Sprint element of the US ABM system with three separate targets. If the RVs were sufficiently hardened it would present

Spartan with the same problem, and in any case the defenders would have to judge whether any incoming objects that survived had been neutralized. Except as a possible counter to ABM, however, the system as demonstrated does not improve Soviet capabilities to attack individual targets. In general, an ICBM so equipped would be no more effective against a soft target than one with a single large payload, and it would be less effective against a single hard target.

12. An alternative system can be postulated and related to the current Soviet test program —one with sufficient mechanical flexibility so that variations in the dispersal pattern of the RVs would allow each to be targeted against closely spaced individual targets, i.e., Minuteman silos. In considering this possibility the following points are pertinent:

a. Evidence [*less than 1 line not declassified*] suggests that the mechanism within the ICBM itself is more sophisticated than necessary if this development were only to achieve a simple MRV. In the hypothesized system, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. Variations in the size and shape of the impact pattern could be achieved [*2 lines not declassified*] to create the variety of patterns needed to target any substantial portion of the Minuteman force, i.e., so that each individual RV would fall within the required distance of the particular Minuteman silo which was its target.
b. The orientation of the impact pattern must also be variable to achieve independent targeting. To do this the orientation of the pay-load must be adjusted (i.e., "rolled") either before launch or during powered flight, prior to release of the RVs. [*3 lines not declassified*]
c. We believe that the Soviets would want to test a capability to vary the size, shape, and orientation of the impact pattern by the amount required to target the Minuteman force, and that we will detect such testing if it occurs. The question then arises: were the very slight observed variations in performance [*less than 1 line not declassified*] intentional [*less than 1 line not declassified*] or were they random, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. On this point [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. If the variations were intentional, this would indicate that the test series was indeed pointing toward eventual development of the independently targeted system we have hypothesized in this paragraph; if they were not intentional, the system would best be interpreted as a simple MRV.

13. If the Soviets are in fact aiming not for a simple MRV but for the system postulated in paragraph 12, this system could reach IOC in late 1970 at the earliest.[7] It would have no better accuracy than the SS–9, and its reliability would be somewhat less. Further testing would certainly be required to develop the flexibility in spread and dispersal pattern needed for such a system, and we would be able to identify such testing when it occurred.

G. Estimate

14. The system postulated in paragraph 12 offers a plausible explanation of the nature of the weapon system under test, but in our opinion the tests thus far observed provide

insufficient evidence to judge that it is the probable explanation.[8] If the postulated system is indeed under development, however, further tests will almost certainly provide data sufficient to demonstrate it.

15. The SS–9 is of course already a weapon with damage limiting capability. Equipped with the lighter payload it has the range, yield, and CEP to attack Minuteman silos with great effectiveness (though there are far from enough SS–9s to cover the entire Minuteman force). It seems quite likely that when this missile was first planned and developed the Soviets had in mind using only a single warhead, perhaps to attack Minuteman control centers. The feasibility of developing MRVs had not at that time become clear.

16. Equipped with the heavy payload—which is needed to carry the three separate RVs being tested—the SS–9 does appear to have range limitations,[9] if we assume it to be used against Minuteman silos from present deployment. But it would still reach a great many (as discussed in paragraph 7b and 7c above). Assuming that the three RVs were indeed independently targeted they would greatly increase the damage-limiting capability which the SS–9 already possesses. In any event, if the Soviets intend to create a force to target 1,000 Minuteman silos in a single strike, they will have to deploy many more SS–9 launchers than are now operational and under construction. Additional deployment could be in complexes nearer the US, or perhaps the range of the missile could be improved.

17. The SS–9 booster has been used for other things than operational ICBMs. It has powered a number of space flights. The SS–X–6 tests, which we think related to development of a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) or a depressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM), also employed the SS–9 vehicle. Conceivably it is being used now in the initial testing of multiple re-entry vehicles for eventual deployment on a new large ICBM. If and when a new missile does appear, there would of course be no reason why both it and the SS–9 should not have multiple re-entry vehicles.[10]

II. Other ICBMs

A. The SS–11

18. Since the issuance of NIE 11–8–68, we have discovered 11 new groups of launchers for the SS–11; this system has 10 launchers per group. When all the launchers in the 79 groups identified to date are completed there will be 790 operational; there are now 630. Nevertheless, when recent deployment activity is plotted against past construction starts, it seems clear that the SS–11 program passed its peak in 1966–1967. At present, construction is underway at five of the 10 SS–11 complexes at a rate roughly comparable to that of the last year or so.[11]

19. We continue to estimate the following characteristics for the SS–11 system: an operational range of about 5,500 n.m., [*1½ lines not declassified*]. To improve its

accuracy significantly would require a new guidance system and a new RV. We have at present no evidence of a development program to these ends; we believe that we would be able to detect one if it occurred, and to ascertain its objectives.

B. The SS–13

20. We have detected the start of construction of one new SS–13 group, but deployment of this system has still not extended beyond the single ICBM complex where it was first observed. We have now detected a total of 44 silos as compared to 22 at the time of the last estimate. The pattern of deployment currently indicates five groups with a total of 50 launchers. One of the groups is probably now operational and another soon will be. The slow pace and limited extent of SS–13 deployment constrasts sharply with the course of the SS–9 and the SS–11 programs. We have no better explanation of this than we had in NIE 11–8–68.

21. We believe that the small, solid-propellant SS–13 has capabilities roughly comparable to those of the SS–11. In all the SS–13 tests, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] it has never been flown to a range in excess of 4,700 n.m., and at this range it could not reach US targets from its present deployment area. In NIE 11–8–68 we estimated that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the range of the SS–13 would be about 5,500 n.m. but we have not seen it tested to this range. [*1½ lines not declassified*] we do not know what the maximum range of the SS–13 may be.

C. Follow-on ICBM Systems: The SS–Z–3

22. When NIE 11–8–68 was being prepared last fall the Soviets had been working on a new launch group at the Tyuratam test range which appeared to be intended for a large, liquid-propellant ICBM about the size of the SS–9 or somewhat larger. Based on this activity and on our estimate of the future Soviet state of the art in guidance technology we estimated that the Soviets were developing a new large ICBM as a follow-on to the SS–9. (In NIPP–69 it was designated the SS–Z–3.) We estimated that it could be ready for deployment in the 1970–1972 period, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. We considered this new system the best candidate for carrying a new sophisticated re-entry system, and in NIPP–69 we projected the deployment of the SS–Z–3 with MIRVs.

23. Over the past year work has not progressed as we expected it would at the particular area at Tyuratam originally associated with the SS–Z–3. Work on the launch silos themselves ceased over a year ago. Construction of a new group of silos, however, began this year in the same general area. Work on the new silos has not progressed to the point that we can judge the size of the missiles that will be used with these launchers, but they may be intended for a large liquid-propelled follow-on system with characteristics similar to those estimated for the SS–Z–3. If such a system is developed it is evident that IOC will be later than 1970.

24. In NIE 11–8–68, we estimated that the Soviets would develop a mobile version of the SS–13. We also judged that they would probably seek to improve the quality of their force by modification of the SS–11. And we held that they might develop a new, small, liquid-propellant ICBM and a new, small solid-propellant system. We have acquired no evidence since the issuance of NIE 11–8–68 that any of these developments are underway.

III. Ballistic Missile Submarines

25. Since NIE 11–8–68 was published, there is additional evidence, still inconclusive, that a second shipyard has begun production of the 16-tube Y-class ballistic missile submarine. Production rate of this second yard would be about two submarines annually; our estimate of Y-class production at the rate of 4–8 per year took account of this possibility on the high side of the range. Considering other submarine programs in being and the space currently available on existing ways, we think it unlikely that Y-class production will be further increased. We see no reason to change our estimate of 35–50 Y-class submarines as the Soviet force goal. We continue to estimate that the Soviets could have 35 Y-class submarines operational by mid-1973 and 50 by mid-1975, as projected on the high side of the range in NIPP–69.

IV. Size and Composition of the ICBM Force

26. When all identified launchers under construction are completed and all groups of silos are filled out the Soviets will have 1,318 operational ICBM launchers—258 SS–9s, 790 SS–11s, 50 SS–13s, and 220 for the older SS–7 and SS–8 systems.[12] This process could be completed some time in 1971. At that time the operational force will exceed the high side of the projection for that year in NIPP–69; it will be approximately at the middle of the range (1,100 to 1,500) projected as the Soviet force goal for the period 1974–1978. The Soviets will almost certainly build additional launchers; on the other hand, they will at some point almost certainly phase out some or all of the older launchers, which are far more vulnerable to attack than the newer ones. The total figure will be the net of these two developments.

27. It is quite likely that the Soviets have not yet fixed on definite force goals for the next decade. They still might for political, economic, and strategic considerations decide to stabilize their force of ICBM launchers at a numerical level roughly equal to that of the present US force. Or they might go for a substantially larger number than the US. We would continue as in NIE 11–8–68 to put this number at about 1,500.[13] This figure does not of course represent the limit of their *capability*. Indeed, past performance at times of most intensive construction activity shows that they could proceed at a very much higher rate than the figure implies. Our projection takes into account other factors—e.g., economic costs, problems of resource allocation, and our belief that the Soviet leaders would not wish to stimulate the US into a new arms race of large scale.

28. Unless there is a change in the deployment patterns observed thus far, the bulk of this

force will be composed of small ICBMs suitable chiefly for attacks on urban targets and other soft targets. The total megatonnage of the SS–9 force, however, is much greater, and the number of warheads potentially usable against hard targets would increase significantly if any sizable proportion of the SS–9 force was given MIRVs. The inventory of SS–11 and SS–13 silos is three times as large as the SS–9 total and if present trends continue the proportion of smaller missiles will increase. Because the SS–9 is a more expensive system, its deployment has cost about the same as the much larger SS–11 deployment; i.e., the equivalent of about $5 billion for each program.

29. It is clear that the SS–11 force will exceed the 700–750 that we projected in NIPP–69. But there is nothing as yet to establish that the total number of small ICBMs will exceed the 800–1,100 that we projected. This projected force included some 50–300 fixed launchers for the SS–13; we now question whether there will be much if any deployment of this system beyond the 50 now operational or under construction. If the Soviets decide to build toward the high side of our projections, we believe the SS–11, or possibly a small follow-on ICBM, may be a better candidate than the SS–13.

30. It is also clear that the SS–9 force will exceed the high side of the 234–246 launchers projected in NIPP–69. If, however, the SS–9 program should level off and if the Soviets do not develop the SS–Z–3 or its equivalent, the Soviet force of large, liquid-propelled ICBMs will probably fall short of the 334–396 launchers projected in NIPP–69, which included 100–150 launchers for the SS–Z–3. If the programs for one or both of these systems proceed, a force of this size can be attained by the mid-1970's as estimated. Until we obtain more evidence, we have no basis for confirming or changing our projections.

V. Soviet Strategic Goals

31. Our judgment of the doctrines and goals which govern strategic programs remain as we stated them in NIE 11–8–68.[14]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 341. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem; Talent–Keyhole–Comint; Ruff; [*codeword not declassified*]; Restricted Data. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of his jurisdiction. A memorandum from Cushman to recipients of the memorandum stressing its extreme sensitivity and a table of contents are not printed. For text of NSC 11–8–68, October 3, 1968 see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume X, National Security Policy, Document 217.

[2] For dissenting views regarding the estimated accuracy of the SS–9 using an all-inertial

guidance system, see the footnote to paragraph 4. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] [*Footnote in the original not declassified*.]

[4] Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Capt. Franklin G. Babbitt, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; and Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, believe that the evidence points to a different conclusion: i.e., the Soviets have an accuracy improvement program for the SS–9 utilizing existing RVs. [*1½ lines not declassified*] They believe the SS–9 system CEP for present deployment with these improvements would be .5 n.m. using all-inertial guidance. By 1970–1971 further refinements in these instruments could achieve a CEP of about .35 n.m. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, noting the differences of view on the question of the degree to which the Soviets have improved the accuracy of the SS–9 system, and recognizing the criticality and growing complexity of the debate on this point, reserves his position pending the results of a technical evaluation by the intelligence community beginning in July. [Footnote in the original.]

[6] Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Capt. Franklin G. Babbitt, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; and Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, believe that the SS–9 (heavy), configured for operational deployment, has a range of up to 5,400 n.m. This 5,400 n.m. operational range allows for [*1½ lines not declassified*]. They believe that this is feasible with no appreciable degradation of reliability. [*2 lines not declassified*]. They do not believe that the Soviets would deploy it so extensively if they had doubt about it reaching important targets in the US. [Footnote in the original.]

[7] Our estimate in NIE 11–8–68 that the Soviets could not attain a hard target MIRV capability before 1972 was based on development of a more sophisticated system with an accuracy of .25 n.m. [Footnote in the original.]

[8] Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Capt. Franklin G. Babbitt, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; and Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, believe that although there are still unresolved technical issues the system postulated in paragraph 12 offers the more plausible explanation of the nature of the weapon system under test because of the following indicators:

a. The SS–9 missile is the high-accuracy ICBM system of the Soviet Union;
b. In the observed flight tests a clear attempt has been made to minimize the degradation to the CEP [*less than 1 line not declassified*];
c. The use of multiple warheads independently targeted would multiply the effective number of boosters, while the limitation to only three RVs still provides sufficiently

great yield in each RV to be effective against hard targets;
d. The footprint size is comparable with the silo spacing in the Minuteman fields, although the specific variations required have not been demonstrated. [Footnote in the original.]

[9] See footnote to paragraph 7c. [Footnote in the original]

[10] Kissinger was scheduled to meet Cushman on June 13, the day after the USIB approved the revised NIE. No record of the meeting has been found. According to talking points prepared by Haig and bearing Kissinger's initials, however, the White House was concerned that the estimate did not reflect a consensus and that it included inadequate explanations for the range and footprint of the SS–9. More broadly, Haig advised Kissinger to ask Cushman why the CIA was willing "to prognosticate about Moscow's likely reactions to U.S. armament moves while in this instance the analysis reflects an unwillingness on the part of the intelligence community to go beyond very much more than a confirmation of absolutely proven facts." An estimate, Haig continued, "which avoids any reasoned predictions based on the synthesis of known and probable facts, raises the question of whether an intelligence analysis is needed in the first place." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 207, CIA, Vol. 1) Abbot Smith, Director of National Estimates, in a memorandum to USIB members dated June 16, called for another USIB meeting to approve the revised estimate, which had been redrafted following the discussion between Kissinger and Cushman. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 341)

[11] Very recent photography discloses what appear to be two SS–11 silos under construction at an IRBM complex near the Crimea. More extensive photographic coverage will be necessary before any useful estimate can be made on this matter. [Footnote in the original.]

[12] In addition to the ICBM launchers discussed above, each SS–9, SS–11, and SS–13 complex contains one additional silo and control facility not associated with any group in the complex. These are believed to be crew training facilities. There are now 6 such sites at the SS–9 complexes, 10 at the SS–11 complexes and 1 under construction at the SS–13 complex. Additionally, the Soviets have about 55 completed launchers and about 15 others under construction at Tyuratam and Plesetsk wich we associate with ICBM development. We believe that most of them, as well as the training sites, could be readied to fire at the U.S. We are unable to make any valid estimate of the time required to ready them, their reaction times, or the availability of missiles for them. [Footnote in the original.]

[13] Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Capt. Franklin G. Babbitt, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; and Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, believe that for the period of this estimate the Soviet ICBM launcher force goal may not exceed 1,500 launchers providing

the USSR operationally deploys a sizable number of ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. Otherwise, and particularly in view of the number of targets in the US and the planned US ABM capability, the Soviet Union probably will have considerably more than 1,500 launchers by the late 1970's. A program which added only about 100 launchers per year beyond those already identified would exceed 1,800 by mid-1978. [Footnote in the original.]

[14] According to NIE 11–8–68, "The primary objectives of Soviet strategic policy have been to achieve a more formidable deterrent and to narrow and eventually to overcome the U.S. lead in capabilities for intercontinental attack." Lieutenant Colonel William Lemnitzer of the Joint Staff, in a memorandum to Wheeler of June 24, stated, "the revised estimate supports (but not unanimously) a grim view of the Soviet strategic force growth—in both an absolute sense and in terms relative to the U.S. strategic posture. It would appear that a prudent planner would tend toward the pessimistic alternative." (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, White House Memoranda (1969))

39. National Security Decision Memorandum 16[1]

Washington, June 24, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Criteria for Strategic Sufficiency

As a result of the June 18, 1969 National Security Council meeting,[2] the President has made the following decision:

For planning purposes, strategic sufficiency as far as nuclear attacks on the United States are concerned should be defined as follows:[3]

1. Maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
2. Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis.
3. Maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer.
4. Deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.

Pending further studies, the President has directed that these criteria be used by all agencies in considering issues relating to the U.S. strategic posture.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret. Copies were sent to General Earle Wheeler, Robert Mayo, Gerard Smith, George Lincoln, Frank Shakespeare, and Lee DuBridge. In a June 23 memorandum to the President, Kissinger advised issuing a NSDM sanctioning the four criteria for strategic sufficiency, which would serve "as yardsticks not only in assessing the adequacy of U.S. strategic forces, but of immediate importance, in assessing the desirability of possible strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union." Moreover, Kissinger wrote, "In the absence of your formal endorsement, each agency will

still regard the results of the NSSM 3 study as ‘unofficial,’ and will still feel free to define the term ‘strategic sufficiency’ in its own way and design its policies according to its own view of what sufficiency implies.” (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–210, NSDM 16)

[2] See Document 36.

[3] Nixon elaborated on the concept of strategic sufficiency in a July 21 letter to Gerard Smith outlining his thoughts on the upcoming arms control talks with the Soviet Union. “When I speak of this country’s security, I fully realize that we cannot expect to return to an era when our country was literally immune to physical threat.” Nixon wrote. “Neither our military programs nor any negotiations with potential adversaries can achieve that. But I am speaking of a situation in which I, as President and Commander-in-Chief, have at my disposal military forces that will provide me with the best assurance attainable in present and foreseeable circumstances that no opponent can rationally expect to derive benefit from attacking, or threatening to attack us or our allies. I am determined, moreover, to pass on to my successor that same sense of assurance.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting, June 18, 1969) For the full text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 26.

40. Memorandum From Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Analysis of Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11–8–68[2]

Per your request, enclosed is my analysis of the recent Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11–8–68, Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces.

In my judgment, the Memorandum fails to present anything like a clear analysis of Soviet strategic offensive capabilities and of possible and probable developments in Soviet strategic offensive forces and their implications for the U.S.

Instead, the text, which is primarily the responsibility of the Director of CIA, appears to be a strenuous exercise in avoiding meaningful conclusions and postulations. As a result, this is, I am told, one of the most badly split estimates in some time; DIA, the Services and State have taken many exceptions to the text in footnotes, and some of the disagreements are fundamental.

I think we are faced with a rather serious problem. After all that has transpired, the intelligence community has still produced a murky and confused picture of Soviet strategic offensive forces and developments. I am confident that if we repeated the events of the last few weeks with respect to Soviet strategic defensive forces, we would get a similar result; the disagreements might be just as basic, e.g., over the capabilities of the Talinn system against ICBMs and the nature and purpose of Soviet ABM developments.

At the same time, we are being asked to have high confidence that the intelligence community can verify Soviet compliance with the most complex and far reaching arms control agreements and that they will keep the Government's key officials informed of the most subtle developments. I do not have that confidence.

Tab A
Analysis of Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11–8–68 Prepared by Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

Deployment

In the first half of 1969, we have detected a total of 30 additional SS-9 silos under construction; 12 of these new starts (two new groups) have been confirmed since June 22, 1969. When all current construction is completed, the Soviets will have 258 SS-9 launchers.

Last year, 36 new SS-9 starts occurred in the first six months, but no SS-9s were started in the last six months.

Comment. In the June 22, 1969 Memo to Holders of NIE 11–8–68,[3] it was noted, "the detection of only three group starts in the past 12 months … suggests no particular urgency in deployment activity …" With the discovery of two more group starts since that memo was written, this language has been dropped.

Accuracy

Present SS-9 accuracy is estimated to be 0.5–0.75 nautical miles CEP.[4] There are three views concerning future SS-9 accuracy improvements.

—The majority of USIB (principally CIA) believes it likely that the Soviets will use a new guidance system and a new re-entry vehicle (RV) to improve SS-9 accuracy over what it is now. They recognize that accuracy improvements could be achieved using the present RV. They are "not persuaded," however, that the Soviets are now trying to improve SS-9 accuracy; [*less than 1 line not declassified*] A CEP of 0.25 n.m. could not be achieved before 1972.
—DIA, Navy and Air Force believe, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that the Soviets do have an accuracy improvement program with existing RVs. By 1970–71 the Soviets could achieve 0.35 n.m. CEP (90% probability of destroying a hard silo) with the present RV.
—State (INR) reserves its position on this issue.

Comment. CIA seems to have established an arbitrary standard (0.25 n.m. CEP) by which to judge Soviet progress toward a hard target capability. However, it is irrelevant to estimate when the Soviets can achieve 0.25 n.m. CEP. What is relevant is when they can achieve a high probability of destroying a Minuteman silo and whether they are trying to do so. On this point, the CIA and DIA views are fundamentally different.

We are given no explanation as to why the evidence that persuaded DOD that the Soviets are increasing SS-9 accuracy did not persuade CIA.

Payload

SS-9s have been tested with a "light" 12–18 megaton payload and "heavy" payload

consisting of either a 25 megaton warhead or a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV). [*1 line not declassified*]

Range

With the light payload, SS-9 range is 7,000 n.m.

On the range with a heavy payload there are two views:

—The majority of USIB believes:
  —that the demonstrated range to date is 4,700 n.m., insufficient for the SS-9 to reach the continental United States; (The majority notes that "it seems implausible that the Soviets would develop an ICBM payload so heavy that it could not reach important targets in the U.S."),
  —a 5,000 n.m. range would be achieved [*4 lines not declassified*] At this range, the SS-9 would reach five of six Minuteman complexes.
  —longer ranges are possible by burning more fuel, but because of the uncertainties of planning down to such a small fuel residual, the Soviets would test at longer ranges before targeting their missiles.
  —in summary (page 14) that "the SS-9 does appear to have range limitations if we assume it to be used against Minuteman silos from present deployment."
  —DIA, Navy and Air Force believe the SS-9 configured for operational deployment, has a range of 5,400 n.m., enough to reach all six Minuteman complexes. "They do not believe that the Soviets would deploy [the SS-9] so extensively if they had doubt about it reaching important targets in the U.S."

Comment. CIA is reluctant to endorse estimates of longer ranges unless hard evidence is in hand, i.e. they refuse to rely on circumstantial evidence. Yet, from various places in this estimate we can determine that:

—[*1 line not declassified*]
—the MRV system requires the heavy payload,
—the original purpose of the SS-9 MRV program may have been to penetrate a U.S. ABM defense, presumably of our cities,
—at the range demonstrated to date, the SS-9 with a heavy pay-load could not reach the U.S.

It is difficult to understand the diffidence of the CIA on the range question, implying as it does a reluctance to endorse any explanation for the SS-9 MRV or heavy payload program. Yet they have supplied no hint of any other conceivable explanation for the SS-9 heavy pay-load developments.

Again the CIA and DIA view are fundamentally different.

Retargeting

The Soviets have the capability to retarget the SS-9—i.e. to target and launch a backup missile on information that the original missile failed in flight. "There is no evidence of such a development, but it is unlikely that we would obtain such evidence."

Multiple Re-entry Vehicles

The Soviets have conducted seven tests of a three RV system, each of which could carry a 5 megaton warhead. These RVs were "certainly not independently guided after separation from the launch vehicle." As to the implications of these tests, there are two "hypotheses:"

—The first hypothesis is that the Soviet objective is to achieve a simple MRV capability. The main purpose of the system has been and is to counter a U.S. ABM. "Except as a possible counter to ABM, ... the system as demonstrated does not improve Soviet capabilities to attack individual targets. In general, an ICBM so equipped would be no more effective against a soft target than one with a single large payload, and it would be less effective against a single hard target."
—The alternative hypothesis is that their system is designed with the mechanical flexibility to allow each RV to be targeted against closely spaced targets such as Minuteman silos. "Evidence [*less than 1 line not declassified*] suggests that the mechanism within the ICBM itself is more sophisticated than necessary if this development were to achieve a simple MRV." However, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have provided insufficient evidence that the size, shape and orientation of the impact pattern is adequate to target Minuteman silos. "Further testing would certainly be required to develop the flexibility in spread and dispersal pattern needed for such a system, and we would be able to identify such testing when it occurred."

Comment. The inconsistencies and logical flaws in the estimate are most evident in the development of these two hypotheses. If the first hypothesis is plausible.

—how do we explain the SS-9 range limitations?
—how can we explain the complexity of the MRV mechanism (do the Soviets typically overdesign their weapons)?
—how do we explain the continuation of MRV testing in the face of evidence that the system as a simple MRV will not be an effective ABM penetrator or hard target killer?

[*2 lines not declassified*] This raises the question as to how we can have such high confidence that we can rapidly and accurately interpret Soviet tests in the face of evident holes in our collection efforts.

There are two somewhat fuzzily drawn views about the purpose and future of the SS-9 program:

—The USIB majority believes "the tests thus far observed provide insufficient evidence

that the second hypothesis is the *probable* explanation. They go on to note that "in any event, if the Soviets intend to create a force to target 1,000 Minuteman silos in a single strike, they will have to deploy many more SS-9 launchers than are now operational and under construction."

—DIA, Navy and Air Force believe that "although there are still unresolved technical issues [the second hypothesis] offers the more plausible explanation of the nature of the weapon system under test …" (They concur, however, that more SS-9s would be needed for a first strike capability.)

Comment. Elsewhere in the estimate (page 3) it says "there is no evidence of the duration of the SS-9 deployment program or of the SS-9 force goal; we would judge now, however, that it will exceed 258 launchers."

It is difficult to see why the sentence downplaying the first strike threat was included or why DOD didn't object. No one knows what the Soviet SS-9 goal is. Moreover, it is quite possible for the Soviets to develop an accurate MIRV with more than 3 RVs. Last year's NIPP considered the possibility of 6 RVs "representative." A force of 258 SS-9s with the 6 RVs each and a retargeting capability would do nicely for targeting 1000 Minuteman silos.

Summary of SS-9

The overall impression created by the USIB majority view recorded in the text is that:

—We can say virtually nothing about the purposes and objectives of the SS-9 program; the evidence does not justify our making any presumptions or any projections.
—An improved system will not be deployed without further testing.
—[*2 lines not declassified*]

In general, the USIB majority (mainly CIA) appears to be quite conservative and unimaginative in developing the implications of available evidence, and quite optimistic about the ability of U.S. intelligence to stay abreast of Soviet weapons developments. (In justifying this view CIA analysts point out that they were wrong in calling the Tallinn system an ABM, implying that a major reason for caution now is the desire to avoid similar errors.)

The impression created by the minority view recorded in the footnotes is very different: a willingness to formulate and accept hypotheses based on a combination of limited evidence, inductive logic, and common sense.

If the purpose of an intelligence estimate is to present the evidence and indicate what it may mean, the USIB majority has clearly evaded its responsibility, preferring to avoid judgments rather than presenting informed judgments derived from available evidence.

Since last September we have discovered 110 new SS-11 launchers; 10 of these have been discovered since June 22, 1969. When all SS-11 launchers now under construction are completed, there will be a total of 790. "Nevertheless, it seems clear that the SS-11 program passed its peak in 1966–67."

To improve its accuracy significantly, (it is now 1.0–1.5 n.m. CEP) would require a new guidance system and a new RV. We have no evidence that they are doing this.

[*2 lines not declassified*]

Comment. What could be a highly significant event—deployment of SS-11s at an IRBM complex—is put in a footnote without comments.

SS-13

A new group of 10 launchers has been discovered since June 22, 1969. When completed, the single SS-13 complex active to date will include 50 launchers. One group is now operational and another soon will be.

Its maximum range to date is 4700 n. mi. [*2 lines not declassified*] we do not know what the maximum range may be.

Comment. After almost a year in which no new SS-13 starts were discovered, a new group of 10 silos was discovered in the last two weeks. This fact draws no comment.

SS-Z-3

Based on construction of new, large silos at the Tyuratam test area two years ago or so, USIB estimated that a large follow-on to the SS-9, the SS-Z-3, would be deployed in 1970–1972, that it would carry MIRVs and that it would have quarter mile accuracy.

Work on these silos ceased over a year ago, but construction on a new group in the same general area began this year. These may be for a new, large missile. If so, initial deployment will be later than 1970.

Other Missile Systems

There is no evidence that development of a mobile SS-13, an improved SS-11, a new, small solid-fueled ICBM, or a new, small liquid-fueled ICBM—all considered probable or possible last September—is underway.

Ballistic Missile Submarines

Since last September's estimate, production of Polaris type submarines has begun at a second shipyard. This possibility was taken into account in the high estimate, however, so

there is no reason to change the estimate of 35–50 Polaris-type submarines by 1973–75.

Size and Composition of the ICBM Force

When present construction is completed and all silo groups are filled out, the Soviets will have by 1971 1,318 operational ICBM launchers plus about 87 test and training launchers, most of which "could be readied to fire at the U.S." (The equivalent number of test and training launchers for the U.S. is 17.) They will doubtless build some more new launchers and phase out old, vulnerable ones.

By 1971, then, the Soviets will have reached the mid-point of the ICBM range of 1100–1500 predicted for 1974–1975.

Soviet force goals may not be fixed. They may seek either equality or a substantial advantage. There are two views about how far they might go.

—The USIB majority continues to endorse a high estimate of 1500. They point out, however, that this estimate is not the limit of their capability but one which takes into account costs, problems of resource allocation and the Soviet wish not to stimulate a new, large-scale arms race with the U.S.

"It is clear that the SS-11 force [now at 790] will exceed the 700–750 that we projected in NIPP-69[5] … It is also clear that the SS-9 force [now at 258] will exceed the high side of the 234–246 launchers projected in NIPP 69." However,

—the SS-13 force has not developed as expected, so there is no reason to believe that the number of small ICBMs [SS-11s & SS-13s] will exceed the earlier projection of 800–1,100 launchers.
—if the SS-9 program levels off, and if the Soviets do not develop a new large missile, the number of large ICBMs will fall short of the 334–396 projection. If both programs proceed, Soviets can build up to our projection.

Thus we have no basis for changing our projections.

—State, DIA, Army, Navy and Air Force believe 1500 may not be exceeded if Soviets deploy multiple re-entry vehicles extensively. Otherwise, the Soviets may have considerably more than 1500 launchers by the late 1970s. They note that construction of 100 launchers a year from now on would produce an ICBM force level in excess of 1800 by 1978.

Comment. The CIA reasoning on force goals is almost completely tautological: if they don't build as many missiles as we said they would, their force will fall short of our projections, etc. It is not surprising that virtually every other agency with intelligence responsibilities is starting to break away from the 1500 projection, though it is not a clean break.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files—Europe—U.S.S.R., SALT and U.S. Strategic Capabilities. Top Secret; Nodis; [*codeword not declassified*]. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum to Attorney General Mitchell on July 1 under cover of a memorandum in which he wrote: "Attached is an analysis of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet strategic threat prepared by a member of my staff. I am in substantial agreement with this analysis which again confirms the magnitude of the problem with which we have been dealing." (Ibid.)

[2] Document 38.

[3] An apparent reference to a draft of Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11–8–68, the final version of which was issued on June 23. The draft was not found.

[4] CEP stands for circular probable error, the radius of a circle around the target within which 50% of all missiles will impact. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] Issued on December 13, 1968. Not found.

41. National Security Study Memorandum 64[1]

Washington, July 8, 1969.

TO
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
U.S. Strategic Capabilities

As a result of National Security Council discussion of the U.S. strategic posture, prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums 3 and 24,[2] the President has directed that you prepare a follow-on study as follows:

With respect to strategic nuclear attacks on the United States, evaluate U.S. strategic forces projected through 1978 in terms of (a) their capability to deter and respond to less than all-out or disarming Soviet attacks, and (b) a range of possible war outcome measures in addition to surviving population and industry, such as surviving military and other economic assets. The analysis should be based on both low and high Soviet force levels in the National Intelligence Projections for Planning and on greater than expected threats.

The analysis should include consideration of the actual and required capabilities of the U.S. command and control system under the postulated operational situations.

The study should also address the following questions:

—What general strategic force levels and what types of force mixes and force characteristics are indicated to improve relative U.S. strategic capabilities as now projected?
—What improvements, if any, seem indicated for our programmed strategic command and control systems?
—Based on the analysis, what modifications or changes to the criteria for strategic sufficiency should be considered?

The study should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by October 1, 1969. Close liaison should be maintained in all phases of the study with the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Top Secret. Copies were sent to William Rogers, General Earle Wheeler, Richard Helms, and Robert Mayo. In a July 1 memorandum to the President, Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve a draft NSSM that examined "our strategic capabilities and force requirements under circumstances other than 'massive retaliation.' "According to Kissinger, "The objective will be to develop measures which are appropriate for the kinds of situations which the President might actually face in a crisis—specifically it should examine more discriminating options than the present SIOP." Nixon indicated his approval by initialing the memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–127, NSSM 3)

[2] Documents 2 and 10.

42. National Security Study Memorandum 69[1]

Washington, July 14, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia

The President has directed the preparation of a study on U.S. nuclear policy in Asia.

The study should examine four broad areas:

1. *U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China*. A range of possible situations in which a U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China would be useful should be examined. The study should consider possible target systems in China and U.S. capability to attack those systems. The implications for U.S. strategic force requirements, for war planning and the required command and control systems and procedures and for the definition of strategic sufficiency should be examined.
2. *U.S. theater nuclear capability in the Pacific*. The study should examine the role of the U.S. theater nuclear capability in the Pacific for both deterrence and defense against possible Chinese attacks and against other forms of aggression against both Allied and non-Allied countries. Under what types of circumstances and how might U.S. theater nuclear forces be employed in improving war outcomes? The study should examine alternative postures and basing arrangements for theater nuclear forces in the light of possible roles for U.S. strategic forces, taking account inter alia of the pending reversion of Okinawa to Japan.
3. *Nuclear assurances*. The study should analyze the current legal and political status of our commitments, both to Allied and non-Allied countries, concerning our actions in the face of nuclear aggression or threats of aggression. This should take into account our obligations under the UN Charter; our various alliances; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including the Security Council Resolution and Senate testimony), and statements by US officials. In the light of the results obtained under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, possible modifications to our assurances should be discussed and evaluated.
4. *Nuclear proliferation*. The paper should consider for each option examined the possible effects on proliferation of nuclear weapons and on prospects for wider adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This study should be performed by an Interagency Group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense and including representatives of the addressees of this

memorandum and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. A representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should participate in the Nuclear Assurances and Nuclear Proliferation phases of the study. This study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by 30 September 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Secret. Copies were sent to General Earle Wheeler and Gerard Smith. Kissinger sent the President a memorandum on July 11 recommending that Nixon approve the draft NSSM. The President indicated his approval by initialing the memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–161, NSSM 69)

43. Editorial Note

With the approach of preliminary strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, which were scheduled to begin on November 17, 1969, in Helsinki, Finland, some members of Congress began to consider the negotiating option of prohibiting flight tests of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Senator Edward W. Brooke (R–Massachusetts) sent President Nixon a letter on April 16 calling for a unilateral United States moratorium on the testing and deployment of MIRVs, a move that he argued would indicate restraint in the arms race, thereby facilitating an arms control agreement. The Senator suggested in his letter that he and other lawmakers would support Safeguard if Nixon reciprocated by endorsing Brooke's plan to introduce a resolution in the Senate calling for a MIRV moratorium. Brooke's letter is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM–MIRV, MIRV Test Program, Vol. I. The President delayed, sending Brooke a noncommittal reply on May 5 and refusing to discuss the matter with the Senator over the telephone. Nixon's letter is ibid. Brooke filed his resolution in the Senate on June 17, a measure co-sponsored by 40 others, including Senators Mike Mansfield (D–Montana) and Edward M. Kennedy (D–Massachusetts).

Such Congressional pressures helped spur the administration to address the larger issue of MIRVs. Under Secretary of State Elliott L. Richardson, in a May 22 memorandum to the President, generally agreed with Brooke's position, recommending either a stretch out of, or a moratorium on, MIRV testing. According to Richardson's memorandum, seen by Nixon after the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger forwarded it to him on May 27, the United States MIRV flight testing program had reached a "crucial stage," approaching the point at which reliable, accurate MIRVs could be deployed in Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles. "If, by the time SALT talks begin, we already have—or the Soviets think we have—substantially completed MIRV testing, any limitation of MIRVs will be difficult to achieve," Richardson wrote. Richardson's memorandum is in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 8. The Pentagon disagreed. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, on May 30, sent Kissinger a memorandum in which he expressed his opposition to any unilateral deceleration of MIRV testing, which he believed would erode confidence in the United States deterrent and encourage the Soviets to be dilatory in SALT negotiations. Rather, he argued, continued MIRV testing would "prove ultimately beneficial" in arms control talks by strengthening the United States negotiating position and by putting additional pressure on the Soviets to reach a deal. Packard's memorandum is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM/MIRV, MIRV Test Program, Vol. I.

In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled that he agreed with Packard. Congressional opposition to both Safeguard and MIRVs, he wrote, was occurring "while the Soviet missile arsenal

was growing at the rate of two to three hundred missiles a year. If the Soviets were building while we abandoned our programs, what would be their incentive to negotiate limitations in an agreement? Our unilateral restraint would be an incentive for the Soviets not to settle but to procrastinate, to tilt the balance as much in their favor as possible while we paralyzed ourselves. To abandon ABM and MIRV together would thus not only have undercut the prospects for any SALT agreement but probably guaranteed Soviet strategic superiority for a decade." Ultimately, Kissinger added, "Neither our ABM program nor MIRV testing created difficulties for SALT. On the contrary, they spurred it." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pages 210–212) Accordingly, he sent the President a memorandum on May 23 urging him to resist Congressional pressures for the moratorium, arguing that it was probably not in the United States' interest to do so. Kissinger's memorandum is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM/MIRV, MIRV Test Program, Vol. I. Nixon followed his advice. Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman, sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers on June 2 with the following instructions from Nixon: "I have decided to move ahead on MIRV testing regardless of Senatorial opposition. Inform all hands that there will be one Administration line." Haldeman's memorandum is ibid.

According to a June 17 memorandum to Kissinger from Alexander M. Haig, Jr., the moratorium controversy also had the effect of bringing "the technical details of the MIRV test program and the status of the Soviet MRV program" to the attention of top policymakers. To them, "it began to appear as though the Soviets might have already embarked on a program which would seriously threaten our Minuteman complexes" and that the Soviets "had already progressed considerably along the road to a MIRV or equivalent counterforce capability." Haig's memorandum is ibid. As a result, Kissinger formed a special panel to investigate MIRV technologies, the Soviet program, and the issues involved in including MIRVs in an arms control agreement. The MIRV Panel, sometimes called the MIRV Working Group, met on multiple occasions from June 19 through July 17. Members of the panel, chaired by Kissinger, included Frank H. Perez, representing the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roland F. Herbst and Ben T. Plymale of the Department of Defense's Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering, the Central Intelligence Agency's David Brandwein, Edward Ifft of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's Science and Technology Bureau, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Laurence E. Lynn of the National Security Council staff.

In addition to discussing various MIRV technologies, test ban packages, and the United States intelligence community's ability to verify Soviet compliance, the panel addressed two points relevant to national security policy: the status of the Soviet MRV program and the impact of a potential MIRV flight ban on United States and Soviet weapons systems. According to the minutes of the July 16 meeting, the panelists, after being closely questioned by Kissinger, generally agreed that the United States test program had advanced to the point where the United States was already equipped with MIRVs reliable

and accurate enough to employ in an assured destruction mode, i.e. against "soft" targets. They also agreed that, while a flight test ban would certainly hinder the United States from making the improvements in accuracy necessary for the system to have a counterforce (or hard target) capability, it would only negligibly lessen confidence in the current system. The minutes of the meeting are ibid., Vol. II.

The panel's final report, entitled "The Technological Consequences of a MIRV Flight Ban," was forwarded to Kissinger by Perez on July 23 and reflected this consensus. The panel, according to Perez's covering memorandum, was "confident" that MIRV-equipped Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles "could now be deployed in an assured destruction role without further flight testing with a reliability greater than 75 percent." However, the "confidence in achieving the design accuracy of the Poseidon and Minuteman systems would be subject to larger uncertainties if MIRV flight testing were suspended. Therefore, we would be less confident of our ability to employ them in a counterforce role against hard targets without additional full systems flight tests." The panel's report and Perez's covering memorandum are ibid., MIRV Panel Meeting, 2:30 p.m., Jul 16, Situation Room.

The following excerpt from the minutes of the July 16 panel meeting indicate how elusive agreement on Soviet capabilities proved to be:

"HAK: DOD believes that the Soviets could deploy without further testing with capability to destroy more than one target (i.e., 2 out of 3). If you don't believe that the Soviet system is a MIRV, what is it targeted against?

"Herbst: It could aim one RV at MM.

Brandwein: It makes no sense to aim at other than one target, that is, to target one RV against the MM and have the other two go off into cornfields.

"HAK: If it is not really a MIRV then the question of operational deployment is academic. How long would it take to turn it into a MIRV, if not already done?

"Brandwein: About twenty tests would do it; they have already had seven, so about fifteen more, which would mean more than a few months; the key word is 'reliable' for deployment.

"Plymale: If there is a MIRV ban, then there is no reason not to deploy the MRV.

"HAK: Is the DOD position that the Soviets *might* have a deployable MIRV now?

"Herbst: Yes, the key word is might, or could.

"HAK: Summarizing the discussion, then, if the Soviet system is not a MIRV it is aimed at a soft target and could be deployed; similarly, our system could be deployed with confidence against soft targets; the remaining issue is confidence of deployment against

hard targets. Is this agreed?"

After the panelists indicated their general agreement, the discussion turned toward the Soviets' ability to evade a flight ban and to conduct tests clandestinely.

The MIRV Panel's final report reflected these divisions as well. According to Perez's July 23 covering memorandum, the representatives of the Department of State, ACDA, CIA, and the Department of Defense's Office of Systems Analysis believed that the "Soviets have not yet progressed far enough in their testing, even assuming that the current SS–9 MRV test program is directed at MIRV development, to operationally deploy a reliable MIRV system." [*3 lines not declassified*] On the other hand, the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense's Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering believed "that the Soviets could deploy a MIRV system without further flight testing, that full-system flight tests would not be required, and that the Soviets could design and carry out a MIRV test program which could circumvent United States intelligence capabilities."

44. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, September 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on NSSM 3—U.S. Security Strategy and Force Posture. INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Background

Last January the President directed on interagency study of alternative U.S. security strategies and military forces for the post-Vietnam period.[2] Dave Packard has been Chairman of the "Steering Group" on which I represented the Department. The portion on strategic forces was previously completed and considered by the NSC.[3] The portion on general purpose forces, a copy of the summary of which is attached, is presently scheduled to be discussed by the NSC on September 10.[4]

The work on the military and budgetary aspects of the study has been done primarily by Systems Analysis in DOD, and as a general proposition the JCS feels that it understates the requirements (and therefore the cost) by about 40 percent. It should also be noted that the entire study and cost are based on a *post-Vietnam* situation and therefore, as far as FY '71 budget, which Defense will have to start working on very soon, the Vietnam increment will have to be added.

The study examines five strategies. The cost of Strategies 4 and 5 are so high (i.e., involving defense budgets of $90 and $100 billion annually) as to make further examination of them academic. The first three strategies differ only in the size of U.S.-based Army and Air forces for reinforcement in Asia in the event of a war there. In all five strategies, the U.S. peacetime posture in the Pacific would approximate that prior to Vietnam. The three strategies of greatest interest are summarized below:

Strategy 1—Would retain the present U.S. combat forces for Europe, which are designed to permit a 90–day initial conventional defense against a Warsaw Pact attack. In Asia the force would not provide reinforcements needed for a defense against a major attack by China or the USSR. (Prior to Vietnam, six divisions were held in the U.S. for this purpose.) The average annual cost of this strategy is $72 billion (the cost of GP forces together with presently programmed strategic nuclear forces). It requires an active military force of 1.9 million men as compared to 3.5 million today.

Strategy 2—Envisages the same 90–day defense strategy for Europe, but would permit a defense in either Korea or Southeast Asia against a major aggression. (Mobilization would be required to generate forces for a counter-offensive and evict the invader.) It would not permit us to fight a major war in Europe and Asia simultaneously. This

strategy adds 5 U.S.-based divisions and 540 aircraft over Strategy 1 for Asian contingencies. The average annual cost of this strategy in the early 1970's is $76 billion. It requires an active military force of about 2.0 million men.

Strategy 3—Provides the forces sufficient to meet simultaneously a major Asian and European attack (as in Strategy 2, mobilization would be required for a counter-offensive). Annual cost of this strategy is $81 billion. It requires two divisions and 840 aircraft more than the Strategy 2, for an active military force of 2.3 million men.

The forces and costs associated with these strategies are laid out on the attached table.[5] (More details and comparisons with our present forces are contained in the table following page 35 of the study.)

The study points out that the fiscal impact of these 3 Strategies on Federal domestic programs would be quite marked. If U.S. domestic programs are ranked in four tiers to reflect their priority and the Administration's commitment to them, Strategy 1 would permit funding of most of the first three tiers; Strategy 2 would permit funding of two tiers, whereas Strategy 3 would provide funds only for the highest priority programs in the first tier.

Comments

I have privately discussed the study and the concepts it contains at some length with Dave Packard. I have told him that as far as ground forces are concerned, it seemed clear to me with the development of the situation between the Soviet Union and Communist China it was no longer essential that we think in terms of being able to fight a major ground action simultaneously on both the European and Asian fronts. As I saw the situation in Asia in the post-Vietnam period I did not feel we should be thinking in terms of larger forces than we had before Vietnam; that is, two Army divisions in Korea and one Marine division in Okinawa. In fact, I hope that we could reduce our strength in Korea to one division. With respect to Korea, I proceeded on the assumption that with sufficient MAP support the South Koreans were capable of dealing with the North Koreans on the ground if the North Korean Air Force was knocked out. It was probably not practicable nor should we seek to give the South Koreans the full capability to deal with the North Korean Air Force and therefore we should maintain sufficient capability in the area to do this. I also thought it important that we maintain a U.S. "plate glass" presence on the ground in Korea, as well as some capability to exercise real influence on the South Koreans and felt that this should be in the order of one American division.

As far as the Soviets and Communist Chinese were concerned, I felt it very unlikely that as long as we maintained a sufficient "plate glass" of American presence in Korea, the Soviets would directly intervene and participate in a renewal of the attack on South Korea in conditions short of general war. Given the Soviet-Chinese situation as well as relations between North Korea and China, I thought it almost equally unlikely the Chinese Communists would directly and openly participate in a renewal of an attack on South

Korea. The danger of such intervention would probably lie in a situation in which the South Koreans had defeated the North Koreans and were advancing deep into North Korean territory.

Thus, as far as the Korean situation was concerned, I did not see the necessity of a large U.S. ground force reserve. We certainly could not justify a reserve on the basis of rescuing the South Koreans if they got into trouble by a deep advance into the North.

If contrary to our expectations there was a major Chinese Communist invasion of Korea, I could not see our again fighting a massive ground battle with American forces, but felt that we would face the decision of either using tactical nuclear weapons to deal with the situation or abandoning the enterprise. With the change in relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union, and the possession now by the Chinese of nuclear weapons, I felt that inhibitions on the use of such weapons on the battlefield against Communist China would, under such circumstances, be somewhat less than they were in the 1950s. On the other hand we would have to weigh the capability of the Chinese to use nuclear weapons against us. I was assuming that during the 1970 time frame this capability would still be very small and that our strategic deterrence would be effective.

As far as Southeast Asia was concerned, I also found it difficult to think in terms of a massive Chinese Communist invasion as long as the Chinese continued to face the situation they now do on their Northern frontiers with the Soviet Union. If, nevertheless, this turned out to be wrong, I also found it difficult to visualize the use of large American forces on the ground to oppose the Chinese. Under these circumstances, we would again face the issue of the use of nuclear weapons which for various reasons I felt would be more difficult in Southeast Asia than in Korea and also militarily probably less effective. Thus, again I did not see the necessity of a large American ground reserve for Southeast Asia.

However, in the case of both Korea and Southeast Asia we would not face the same constraints on our use of conventional air and naval power and this led me around the point of what I felt was the extreme importance and urgency of developing conventional air and naval capabilities that were really pertinent to the situation that we had, and probably in the future would continue to face in Asia. I felt that this was a field that had been badly neglected. We had and were continuing to develop ever more sophisticated and ever more expensive air weapons systems to deal with the sophisticated Soviet threat primarily in Western Europe. The use of these weapons systems in the environment of Southeast Asia was not only stupendously wasteful and expensive, but systems themselves were not designed to do the kind of a job that needed to be done. For example, it was my understanding that the multi-million dollar radar bomb sights on our attack aircraft were less accurate in dropping iron bombs than were our World War II bomb sights, and it seemed to me ridiculous to use $4 and $5 million supersonic aircraft to attack ox carts and guerrillas hidden in the jungle. If our air (both Air Force and Navy) was really to be pertinent to the situations we had and would continue to face in the area,

what was needed was a weapons system that could approach what the Air Force called "interdiction" but which was presently only harassment. In other words, we needed an air weapons system that could come at least close to establishing what might be called a "land blockade". Air weapons systems and doctrine that required ever enlarging the area of hostilities, as was presently the case, had and would continue to meet with strong political resistance from any government in Washington. I fully recognized and accepted the problem of developing such a weapons system but thought that we should immediately seek to devote at least a significant portion of resources now going into the development of more sophisticated systems to such an effort. It was not a question of stopping the development of sophisticated systems, but rather of relative weight of effort.

Similarly, I felt that attention should be paid to the question of carriers. While we undoubtedly need some highly sophisticated carriers to deal with the Soviet threat, we were undoubtedly going to run into increasing problems with land-based air abroad. Carriers would not have the problems of land-based air, they are flexible. Instead of reducing the number of carriers as is contemplated, I would like to see more, but with some of them of a less sophisticated and less expensive design, for use in situations short of general hostilities with the Soviet Union. Also, I felt that our ASW capabilities were very important and again, to the degree possible, thought that these should be designed around weapons systems which were not dependent on foreign land bases.

In sum, I felt that as far as land forces were concerned Strategy 2, under which we would have a single reserve for use *either* in Europe or Asia, was a prudent course of action.[6] It also seemed to me that the kind of air and naval capabilities that I had discussed should be possible within the budget levels contemplated by Strategy 2.

However, all of the foregoing is very much based upon a high level of MAP support for the countries of the area. The report itself assumed a Mutual Assistance Program of about $1 billion annually, which in fact is only about half of the $2 billion now scattered through the DOD budget for support of allied forces in Southeast Asia. Together with the MAP appropriation, this means our present level of actual MAP is about $2.4 billion.

I had the feeling that Dave Packard's thinking is not too different from my own. He indicated that as far as the NSC meeting is concerned he would be seeking only a guide on the general budget level that he should expect for FY '71 and the broad outlines of the force structure toward which DOD should work. He felt that the Vietnam aspects of the budget would be "manageable" but we did not discuss in detail how this could be done.

As I told you previously, those of us who have been dealing with this matter would welcome the opportunity of discussing it with you prior to the NSC meeting.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 3. Secret. No

drafting information appears on the memorandum.

[2] See Document 2.

[3] The NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group submitted its report on May 12. A summary prepared by the NSC Staff is printed as Document 34. The NSC Review Group and the full NSC considered the paper during its discussions of strategic policy held on May 29 and June 13 and 18; see Documents 32, 35, and 36.

[4] The NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group submitted the final version of the "General Purpose Forces" section of its report on September 5. See Document 45. The referenced summary, a 55–page working draft dated August 28, is attached but not printed. For the NSC discussion on September 10, see Document 48.

[5] The referenced page-length table, entitled "List of Strategies," is attached but not printed.

[6] On August 27, Ronald I. Spiers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, commented on the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group's draft report in a memorandum to Johnson. Spiers held that the report—while a useful guide to understanding "the fiscal impact of various DOD budget levels on other federal programs, and for setting broad, long-range goals"—placed "too little emphasis on political and psychological factors and the security implications of the alternative strategies are assessed only in very broad terms." Consequently, Spiers favored either the second or third strategy options. While strategies 4 and 5 "probably cost too much to be realistic," strategy 1, "if carried out too rapidly (i.e., in the next two or three years) and without consultation, could result in reactions by our allies and the Communist states that would be adverse to US foreign policy and security interests." (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 3)

45. Paper Prepared by the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group[1]

Washington, September 5, 1969.

U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power

General Purpose Forces Section

[omitted here is the Table of Contents]

I. Introduction

We maintain general purpose forces to deter or cope with threats to our interests and to the interests of our allies. Neither strategic nuclear forces nor the forces of our allies can deter or cope with all of the significant threats we and our allies face around the world.

About three-fourths of our general purpose forces are normally stationed in the United States. However, we plan to use most of them overseas to meet attacks on our allies in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. We signify our intentions in this regard by basing a large number of U.S. forces in allied countries in peacetime. These overseas deployments have a decisive influence on U.S.-allied relationships.

This report provides a comprehensive treatment of general purpose force issues. Five alternative worldwide general purpose force strategies and associated overseas deployments are developed which, with varying degrees of risk, will prepare us to meet possible threats to our interests.

A wide variety of issues must be considered before an intelligent choice can be made from among the alternative strategies. For example, we must weigh the risk of being less than fully prepared to meet possible contingencies against the budgetary and economic cost of maintaining the forces required to meet them. We must also analyze how our allies and our potential enemies will react to each alternative strategy.

The purpose of this report is to set forth the major general purpose force issues and develop alternative strategies for consideration and decision by the National Security Council. The strategies in this report are differentiated in terms of the ultimate posture we would reach. If we were to make any strategy changes which involved major changes in force structure, particularly in forces deployed overseas in peacetime, the timing of changes would also be an important factor in determining reactions of our allies and potential enemies.

In addition, the specific force structures associated with the strategies would require further study before implementation since different mixes of forces are possible within

the same overall budget total, and the analysis in this study is not refined enough to serve as a basis for detailed force structure decisions.

General purpose forces include:

(1) ground forces with their requisite combat and logistics support;
(2) tactical air forces to support ground forces, to engage enemy air forces, and to disrupt enemy supply lines;
(3) anti-submarine forces and other air and naval forces to protect essential air and sea lines of communication and to provide an amphibious capability;
(4) mobility forces to deploy and support forces overseas; and
(5) tactical nuclear weapons for use by ground, air, and naval forces.

General purpose ground forces—of which manpower is the primary element—are the only forces capable of exercising physical control over territory and people. Other forces, such as strategic nuclear forces or fighter bombers, can destroy enemy targets, but they cannot directly control an area or a population.

General purpose forces make up over 60% of the currently projected post-Vietnam defense budget, compared with less than 25% to be spent for strategic forces. Therefore, the size of our defense budget is quite sensitive to: (1) the *size* and *location* of the overseas areas (including the supporting lines of communications) the United States prepares to defend with general purpose forces, (2) the likely *threats* to those areas, (3) the *capabilities* of local forces, and (4) the *risks* which the United States is willing to bear.

II. Devising Alternative Strategies

In devising alternative worldwide strategies, we must first consider:

(1) the U.S. security objectives, that is, what our interests and treaty commitments imply about the possible areas we might want to defend with general purpose forces;
(2) estimates of the possible threats to these areas;
(3) the capabilities of local forces to meet these threats;
(4) the capabilities of U.S. general purpose forces to meet these threats; and
(5) the alternative strategies we can pursue in each country or region, that is, the specific components of a worldwide strategy.

A. Interests and Commitments

Besides defending its own borders, the United States has an interest in defending certain areas in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia as well as essential air and sea lines of communications. This interest derives from:

(1) the strategic value of essential international sea routes and contiguous land areas for political, military, and economic purposes—for example, the Mediterranean area and

the Dardanelles, the North Atlantic sea routes, and the Caribbean Basin;
(2) the political and economic importance of our ties with allies, such as Japan and Western Europe, and the probable risks to our security should a potential enemy control the resources and territory of these allies; and
(3) our interest in preventing the outbreak and continuation of hostilities which could lead to major conflicts and thereby endanger world peace.

[Omitted here is the remainder of Section II, which discusses U.S. collective defense commitments, including NATO, ANZUS, and SEATO, and the estimated threats posed by the Warsaw Pact and by Communist forces in Asia. Section III, also omitted, discusses various strategies for Asia, limited to either assisting allies or fighting a joint defense with allies, and for NATO, ranging from a token presence or an initial defense to a sustained defense or a total conventional defense.]

IV. Worldwide Strategies

The NATO and Asia defense strategies developed above should be viewed as the primary components of alternative worldwide defense strategies. The size and cost of each worldwide package depends on which NATO and Asian component packages are chosen and also on whether we want to have forces in being to meet the Asian and NATO threats simultaneously or only one at a time.

This section describes the five most plausible worldwide strategies. In addition to the major Asian and NATO capabilities of each strategy, all the strategies call for the capability to deploy U.S. forces to meet any two minor contingencies worldwide. The Middle East could be one such contingency. Each strategy also includes forces for a strategic reserve and anti-submarine forces to protect U.S. naval forces and military and economic support shipping for the United States and its allies.

The force structure for each global strategy includes U.S.-based forces for NATO and Asian contingencies and forces for the strategic reserve. These U.S.-based forces would be the major portion of our force structure and would represent about three-fourths of the total cost of our general purpose forces, that is, less than a quarter of the proposed general purpose force budgets is attributable to forces deployed overseas in peacetime.

For each of the strategies developed below, the total force structure gets successively larger. Therefore, though we describe the specific additional capability of each strategy, the larger active and reserve forces provided are available for general use anywhere the President and Congress choose.

On the other hand, this flexibility would be reduced by the deployment of forces overseas and by the specialized nature of some of the forces (for example, armored divisions).

To meet any specific contingency the President can:

(1) deploy active or reserve forces which are maintained either overseas or in the United States for that specific contingency;
(2) deploy active or reserve forces maintained to meet other contingencies, recognizing that we will then be unprepared to meet the contingency for which the diverted forces were intended; or
(3) create additional forces (available in one to three years, depending on the type of forces required).

The risk of not being prepared to meet a contingency is therefore not necessarily the loss of the territory in question. The relevant risk may be the risk of leaving other contingencies without their designated forces in order to divert those forces elsewhere. At worst, the risk is that associated with the implications of losing substantial territory to the enemy before U.S. forces would be created (at least a year later) to mount a counteroffensive. If we did this, however, the wartime cost and casualties would be much greater than if we had prepared to meet the contingency initially.

A. Strategy 1: NATO Initial Defense and Assistance for Allies in Asia

1. *Capabilities*

The forces for this strategy could conduct an initial defense of NATO Europe while simultaneously assisting our Asia Allies against a non-Chinese attack, including provisions for a direct "assistance" force.

2. *Cost*

This strategy would require average annual outlays for the FY 71–75 defense budget of about $72 billion.

3. *Major Risks*

As with current forces and deployments, NATO forces would be incapable of meeting a full-scale Warsaw Pact surprise attack following a concealed mobilization or of conducting a sustained conventional defense of NATO Europe. Therefore, if Warsaw Pact forces resolutely pursue aggression, they could probably overrun NATO Europe, even if tactical nuclear weapons were used. In Asia we would have no conventional capability against a Chinese invasion except possibly to defend one mainland Asian enclave; for example, in Korea, South Vietnam, or Thailand.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believe that the overall inadequacy of the force structure to fulfill U.S. defense commitments in Asia, even without a simultaneous requirement in Europe, would be evident to all. To the noncommunist countries this would indicate that the United States could not be relied on and probably would precipitate some realignments.

4. *Key Foreign Reactions*

No reaction is anticipated from our NATO Allies, because our NATO strategy, our peacetime deployments in Europe, and our CONUS-based forces committed to NATO would not change in any significant way. Since we would maintain a substantial base structure in Asia, including at least some combat forces in Korea, the expected political reaction of our Asian Allies would not necessarily preclude its implementation. However, they would be far more likely to accept such a strategy without a major change in their relations with the United States if the force reductions inherent in this strategy were implemented over a period of several years rather than abruptly.

The likelihood of Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO would remain unchanged. In Asia, with a reduced U.S. general purpose force capability, the Chinese might increase their support for "wars of national liberation" if they concluded that the circumstances of U.S. military intervention had become more circumscribed than in the past. However, assuming that we will continue to maintain a substantial base structure and assistance forces for Asia and assuming that we continue to make clear our interest in the security of Asia, the Chinese would probably not conclude that they were significantly freer to threaten our allies, and the likelihood of a large-scale Chinese attack would not change.

B. Strategy 2: NATO Initial Defense or Joint Defense in Asia (*Korea or Southeast Asia*)

1. *Capabilities*

The United States would be prepared for an initial defense of NATO Europe (as in Strategy 1) *or* a joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). The forces are designed so that major operations in one theater must be conducted at the expense of the major capability in the other, leaving a reduced capability in the non-war theater. For example, we could assist our allies in Asia against a non-Chinese attack while simultaneously providing an initial defense of NATO, but we could not conduct an initial NATO defense and a joint defense of Asia simultaneously. If initially engaged in Asia, by disengaging we would have the capability for an initial defense of NATO.

2. *Cost*

The forces for this strategy would require average annual FY 71–75 defense budget outlays of $76 billion, or $4 billion per year more than for the NATO Initial Defense and Assistance for Asian Allies Strategy (Strategy 1).

3. *Major Risks*

As with current forces and deployments, NATO forces would be incapable of meeting a full-scale Warsaw Pact surprise attack following concealed mobilization or of conducting a sustained conventional defense of NATO Europe. Therefore, if Warsaw Pact forces resolutely pursue aggression, they could probably overrun NATO Europe even if tactical

nuclear weapons were used. In the event of a simultaneous attack by Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Chinese forces in Asia, we could be incapable of defending either Korea or Southeast Asia.

The risk exists that in the event the Warsaw Pact forces attack in Europe while the United States is involved in a joint defense in Asia, delays will occur in meeting required force deployments to Europe for initial defense, since some forces will have to be redeployed.

Opinion is divided as to the likelihood of an attack on our allies by either the Soviet Union or Communist China if the United States were at war with the other. We can say that because of the Sino-Soviet split, the likelihood of a closely coordinated Soviet-Chinese attack has for the present disappeared and that each of the major communist powers is likely to arrive at its own independent assessment of the opportunity for aggression against our allies in one theater while we are engaged in the other. Some believe that the communist nation not at war would recognize the increased risks of U.S. retaliation with the nuclear weapons in the non-war theater and consequently act with restraint. Others believe that a major U.S. involvement in one sector would be viewed by the Soviet Union or China as an opportunity to press, either overtly or by proxy, for either limited or major advantages in the other area.

In the first view, the potential aggressor is seen as being deterred by the fact that we would have little else except nuclear weapons with which to protect our interests, and, therefore, we would be likely to use them. China, with a lesser strategic capability vis-à-vis the United States, especially after the deployment of Safeguard, might be deterred by our nuclear weapons. For example, they might expect that we would attack their limited industrial and military capacity if we were engaged in a conventional war in NATO Europe.

In the opposing view, the potential aggressor is seen as calculating that we would modify our objectives to match our military capabilities, and, if we were already heavily engaged, we might be unwilling to become engaged elsewhere with nuclear forces. Supporting this view is the fact that the Chinese would still have the capability to mount a limited nuclear attack against our allies or bases overseas and the likelihood of strong political inhibitions against the initial use of nuclear weapons by the United States.

4. *Key Foreign Reactions*

No adverse reaction by our allies is anticipated, provided that they perceive U.S. policy as adhering to existing commitments in all regions. In Asia, allied reactions would also depend on the pace at which CONUS-based forces oriented toward Asia were eliminated from the force structure. Nor is any increased threat envisioned except if the United States becomes involved in major conflicts in Europe and Asia simultaneously. In this respect, as noted, there is no agreement on whether the non-involved communist power would become more or less aggressive.

C. Strategy 3: NATO Initial Defense and Joint Defense in Asia (*Korea or Southeast Asia*)[2]

1. *Capabilities*

The forces for this strategy would allow the United States simultaneously to: (a) conduct an initial defense of NATO Europe, (b) conduct a defense of Korea *or* Southeast Asia against a Chinese invasion, and (c) provide forces to assist an ally threatened by a proxy war.

2. *Cost*

These forces would cost $81 billion annually—$5 billion more than the forces for the preceding strategy, which would not meet the Warsaw Pact and Chinese threats simultaneously.

3. *Major Risks*

As in the two previous strategies, and as with current forces and deployments, NATO forces would be incapable of meeting a full-scale Warsaw Pact surprise attack following concealed mobilization or of conducting a sustained conventional defense of NATO Europe. Therefore, if Warsaw Pact forces resolutely pursue aggression, they could probably overrun NATO Europe, even if tactical nuclear weapons were used. Since this strategy provides forces for only one mainland Asia contingency against the Chinese, we would not be able to defend Korea and Southeast Asia simultaneously in the event of a two-front Chinese attack and still withhold enough forces to defend NATO.

4. *Key Foreign Reactions*

None anticipated.

D. Strategy 4: Sustained NATO Defense and Holding Action in Asia or Initial Defense of NATO and Joint Defense of Asia (*Korea and Southeast Asia*)

1. *Capabilities*

Adoption of this strategy would permit the United States to conduct a sustained defense of NATO while simultaneously conducting a holding action against a Chinese invasion in both Korea and Southeast Asia. Alternatively, adoption of this strategy would permit the United States to provide for the initial defense of NATO while conducting a defense of Asia (Korea and Southeast Asia). The primary increase, compared with the previous strategy, is the capability to conduct a sustained conventional defense of NATO Europe pending the creation of additional forces for a counteroffensive.

2. *Cost*

The additional forces for this strategy would cost $12 billion more than the preceding strategy. The implied average FY 71–75 annual defense budget is $93 billion.

3. *Major Risks*

As with current forces and deployments, this strategy does not permit the United States to defend NATO Europe against a full-scale surprise attack by Warsaw Pact forces following a concealed mobilization. Also, if the United States is involved in a joint defense of Asia when Warsaw Pact forces attack Europe, the tasks of disengagement, redeployment, and reorientation for combat in Europe may not be accomplished in time to provide for the reinforcement required to prevent the loss of NATO Europe.

4. *Key Foreign Reactions*

Since this strategy contemplates no major changes in overseas force deployments, a direct allied response to its implementation is unlikely. However, when our NATO Allies realize that the United States is preparing for a sustained nonnuclear war in Europe, they would be uneasy with the thought that the U.S. nuclear threshold has been raised and that the link between our conventional and nuclear force deterrents has been weakened. Our NATO Allies view as unacceptable any strategy which contemplates sustained nuclear or nonnuclear combat in Europe.

The JCS disagree with the above assessment that our NATO Allies will be reluctant to accept a sustained defense strategy. The JCS note that our NATO Allies have already endorsed the "direct defense concept" for Europe with the implication that NATO will plan to "defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight."

No significant increase in the Warsaw Pact or Asian communist threat response is expected.

E. Strategy 5: Total NATO Defense and Joint Defense of Asia (*Korea and Southeast Asia*)

1. *Capabilities*

This strategy is the same as Strategy 4, except that the United States also prepares to meet the worst case NATO threat of an all-out Warsaw Pact surprise attack following a concealed mobilization. The required forces can conduct a sustained defense of NATO simultaneously with a joint defense of Asia.

2. *Cost*

These forces would cost $21 billion more than the Strategy 3 forces, implying an FY 71–75 average annual defense budget of $102 billion. Additional U.S. forces would probably have to be deployed to Europe.

3. *Major Risks*

This strategy has no major military risks.

4. *Key Foreign Reactions*

As in Strategy 4, we can expect our NATO Allies to oppose a U.S. decision to prepare for a conventional defense in Europe on the grounds that this will erode the credibility of our intention to use nuclear forces in Europe's defense.

As for Strategy 4 above, the JCS disagree with the assessment that our NATO Allies would interpret our sustained defense strategy as an indication that the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Europe had become less credible.

It is probable that if we deploy additional forces to Europe the Soviets will increase their general purpose forces now facing allied forces in Central Europe.

[Omitted here is a brief summary, including tables, of worldwide general purpose force strategies and their costs.]

V. Theater and Strategic Nuclear Capabilities and General Purpose Forces

A. Europe

In NATO our theater nuclear capability has deterrent value because these weapons could raise the Soviet estimate of the expected costs of aggression and add great uncertainty to their calculations. Beyond this, however, the value of our theater nuclear weapons is limited if the Soviets respond in kind. Since both sides have substantial theater nuclear capabilities, our theater nuclear forces would not necessarily enable us to overcome a disadvantage in conventional forces.

In addition, we might use strategic nuclear forces in the defense of NATO. For example, we could use or threaten to use U.S. strategic forces against one or a few Soviet cities or against military installations. (Similarly, the French and the British could use their strategic forces.) This would impose substantial costs on the Soviets, although it would also risk Soviet retaliation against our cities and bases and would not prevent the Soviets from fighting in Europe. Only a complete U.S. strategic nuclear disarming capability, which we do not have, would leave us in a position to threaten the Soviets with minimum risk that they could retaliate.

Therefore, the primary role of our nuclear forces in the defense of Europe is to raise the Soviet estimate of the expected costs of aggression and to add great uncertainty to their calculations, without necessarily having a decisive influence on the likelihood or form of aggression by Warsaw Pact general purpose forces.

B. *Communist China*

Our overwhelming strategic nuclear advantage against the Chinese and our expected Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capability to defend against their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat increases the deterrent and warfighting value of our forces. We can strike Chinese strategic forces, cities, or major military installations with little military risk, though there may well be political inhibitions to the initial use of nuclear weapons by the United States. At present the Chinese have no way of responding in kind against CONUS, although they could strike our Asian Allies. If the Chinese had ICBMs, they might be tempted to respond by striking U.S. cities, but it would be an irrational act, since the U.S. return strike, requiring only a small proportion of our nuclear weapons, could destroy all major Chinese cities.

Tactical nuclear weapons could be used against a conventional Chinese invasion if the Chinese forces massed for attack against a coherent territorial front or if we were willing to use nuclear weapons on large areas to destroy their reserve troops and support facilities. Even with tactical nuclear weapons, however, we could not destroy the Chinese capability to fight if they were determined to continue the war. Also, the Chinese could attack our bases and ports in Asia and the cities of our Asian Allies with nuclear weapons, a capability which lessens our nuclear weapons advantage.

Therefore, both our tactical and strategic nuclear forces add to our deterrence and war-fighting capability against a Chinese conventional attack in Asia. However, the advantage we would gain by using theater nuclear weapons has to be measured against the effects of a Chinese nuclear response in Asia.

In summary, neither in Asia nor in Europe are our nuclear forces a direct substitute for conventional forces. U.S. nuclear policy in Europe and Asia will be discussed in further detail in NSSM–65[3] and NSSM–69.[4]

VI. Impact on Non-Defense Programs and Budgets

A. General

In choosing among defense strategies and defense budgets, it is important to recognize the impact of such choices on non-defense programs and budgets. The competing demands from non-defense spending, the desire for tax cuts, and private sector demands on limited resources give rise to hard policy choices. We have no way of measuring whether extra dollars spent for defense are more important than extra dollars spent for non-defense programs. We can, however, describe the trade-offs between defense and non-defense programs.

The expected level of government resources and uncontrollable non-defense spending (for example, social security and interest payments) were projected through FY 75. Other

domestic programs not specifically tied to legislation were held to FY 70 levels except for pay, price, and minimal workload increases. No special consideration was given to the attainment of residential housing goals of the 1968 Housing Act. The yearly differences between the total revenue and uncontrollable expenditure projections represent the funds available for defense programs, controllable non-defense programs, and, if necessary, for a surplus to hold down inflation.

B. Priority Tiers

In order to obtain an idea of possible program trade-offs between the five defense strategies already described and non-defense program options, reasonable expansions of existing non-defense programs were grouped into four broad priority tiers. (It is, of course, possible to have many differing judgments on which programs should fall into which tier.)

(1) *First Tier* ($5 billion in FY 71 to $21 billion in FY 75) is composed of programs to which this Administration has made some commitment. The largest items in the First Tier are the President's recently announced welfare reform, revenue sharing, and urban mass transit programs. Expanded aid to elementary and secondary education, crime control, and highway safety also have first priority. Other items include water and air pollution, Head Start and vocational education, rural housing, water and waste disposal, child health and development, and others offset by a tightening of veteran programs.
(2) *Second Tier* ($2 billion in FY 71 to $8 billion in FY 75) includes Federal Aviation Agency airway modernization, expanded aid to higher education through direct grants and student aid, and a comprehensive manpower program. Other smaller programs include mental health and additional programs, environmental health including water supply, and multilateral banks and Agency for International Development programs.
(3) *Third Tier* ($2 billion in FY 71 to $11 billion in FY 75) contains as major items aid to urban areas through an enlarged capital outlay program for renewal of urban facilities and an expanded model cities program, medicare for the disabled, and initiation of a program to find public sector jobs for the disadvantaged. Also included are such items as environmental observation and prediction systems, recreation programs, timber management, more basic research, and Post Office construction and modernization.
(4) *Fourth Tier* ($5 billion in FY 71 to $20 billion in FY 75) includes an accelerated manned space program, additional benefits for veterans, and an expanded food stamp program. Prototype development of the Supersonic Transport (SST), Merchant Marine modernization, construction of scenic roads in national parks, and additional Corps of Engineers projects are included.

C. The Results

The funding levels of the five defense strategies and the four tiers of non-defense programs were examined for possible trade-offs within the resources available to the public sector. The results of this analysis are seen in the next table. The table depicts

options possible under the *existing tax structure*, assuming no surtax after FY 70.

Table 6

Defense vs. Non-Defense Program Combinations Within "Available" Resources (Current Outlays in $ Billions)

Defense	FY71	FY73	Non-Defense Priorities	FY71	FY73
1. Initial NATO Defense and Assistance to Allies in Asia	$72	$71	1st, 2nd, and 3rd Tiers ($ Billions)	$9	$27
2. Initial NATO Defense or Joint Asia Defense (One Area)	73	75	1st and 2nd Tiers ($ Billions)	$7	$20
3. Initial NATO Defense and Joint Asia Defense (One Area)	77	82	1st Tier ($ Billions)	$5	$15
4. Sustained NATO Defense and Holding Action in Asia (Two Areas)	81	96	Surtax Required for 1st Tier (%)	4%	6%
5. Total NATO Defense and Joint Asian Defense (Two Areas)	86	106	Surtax Required for 1st Tier(%)	9%	14%

The table shows that without a tax increase:

(1) defense Strategies 4 and 5 would not permit us to fund even the First Tier programs to which the Administration is already committed;
(2) Strategy 3 is compatible with the First Tier programs, but not with Second or Third Tier programs;
(3) Strategy 2 would permit us to fund the First and Second Tiers; and
(4) only Strategy 1 is compatible with three tiers of non-defense programs.

Additional calculations have been made on the assumption that the tax reform bill passed by the House of Representatives becomes law.[5] These calculations indicate that revenue loss would drastically reduce the financial feasibility of available options. *If the tax reform bill, as it stands, becomes law and no surtax is implemented, only Strategy 1 is compatible with the First Tier non-defense programs to which the Administration is committed.*

The hard choices we face, as just described, are based on optimistic assumptions about the performance of the economy (a high savings rate and full employment) and on the assumption that U.S. troops will not be fighting in Vietnam after June 30, 1970 and that the forces will be phased down to their permanent level over a two-year period. If these assumptions do not hold, our choices are even more constrained than suggested by this analysis. For example, if fighting continues into FY 71 while Vietnamization progresses, and a residual U.S. force of 2–1/3 divisions is retained until FY 73, the defense budget in

the preceding table would be increased by $5 to 10 billion in FY 71 and $2 to 3 billion in FY 73. This would reduce funds for domestic programs accordingly.

[Omitted here is Section VII on balance of payments and Section VIII on military and economic assistance programs.]

IX. Issues for Decision

The purpose of this paper is to set forth the major considerations which should influence the selection of a strategy to be used for planning our peacetime general purposes forces. The selection of a particular strategy in large part determines the cost of our general purpose forces.

We have found that:

(1) Our interests and commitments require that we maintain general purpose forces, and, along with the major threats, these interests and commitments are a general guide to the areas we might want to defend with these forces.
(2) We can devise alternative strategies and estimate the required forces, but given the nature of the threats and the limited resources available for defense programs, risks are inevitably associated with every major general purpose force strategy option.
(3) Whatever strategy is chosen, the forces available can be used wherever the President directs and additional forces can be created (within a one to three year period) by the President in a political crisis or at the initiation of hostilities.
(4) U.S. general purpose forces, both those in CONUS and especially those deployed overseas, are a visible indicator of U.S. interests. Changes in these deployments may influence the policies of both allies and potential enemies. To a large extent, however, peacetime overseas deployments could be maintained relatively constant at about current levels (except for Southeast Asia) for all five strategies considered in this report.
(5) Every strategy involves significant trade-offs, either in terms of non-defense programs or increased taxes.

A brief summary of each of the five strategies is presented below, followed by the major pro and con arguments.

A. Strategy 1: NATO Initial Defense and Assistance to Allies in Asia

The forces for this strategy can conduct an initial defense of NATO Europe while simultaneously assisting our allies against a non-Chinese threat in Asia. To maintain these illustrative forces would require average annual FY 71–75 defense budget outlays of $72 billion.

1. *Pro*
   (a) This is the most limited strategy that would permit us to continue our role as a

leading NATO ally and support our commitments in Asia against the most probable threats[6] as well as prepare to meet two minor contingencies elsewhere.

(b) Implementation of this strategy is not expected to give rise to an increased enemy threat.[6]

(c) A strategy of this kind, carried out over a period of time, and in close consultation with our allies, could help to encourage other nations to gradually assume greater responsibility for their own defense.

(d) Our ability to inflict significant damage on Communist China with nuclear weapons gives us a substantial ability to deter overt Chinese attacks.

(e) Of the strategies considered, this strategy is the most consistent with the assessment that there is no evidence that China intends to expand its borders by armed conquest or that its forces are well prepared for an overt conventional attack.

(f) This strategy provides NATO an initial conventional capability in what some believe to be the most likely contingencies (for example, conflict following a period of political crisis or a small-scale attack with limited objectives), and is consistent with official NATO strategy.

(g) This strategy is the least costly of those considered plausible and is the only strategy that would permit the funding of three tiers of non-defense programs, assuming a tax reform bill does not reduce revenue significantly.

2. *Con*

(a) The JCS believe that the forces called for by this strategy would be inadequate to fulfill U.S. defense commitments in Asia, and that its implementation would risk allied realignments and increased communist pressure in Asia.

(b) The State Department believes that the very substantial reductions in forces that are inherent in this strategy, if carried out too rapidly, that is, in the next two or three years, and by unilateral decisions, could create such uncertainty and concern with respect to U.S. policy as to cause at least some of our allies in Asia to loosen their ties with the United States and seek accommodation with China or the Soviet Union. Such reductions would also be likely to generate an atmosphere in which Communist China and other communist powers would feel they had greater freedom of action in pursuing their security and political interests in the area.

(c) Our ability to deter overt Chinese attacks with nuclear weapons is somewhat limited by the fact that we cannot prevent the Chinese from retaliating with attacks on our allies; our tactical nuclear weapons will not necessarily give us a decisive warfighting advantage if the Chinese are willing to bear the greatly increased cost of aggression, and there may be political inhibitions to their use.

(d) In the event of a Chinese attack on Korea or Southeast Asia, considerable allied territory would be lost, and U.S. wartime costs and casualties would be high if we attempted a counteroffensive with newly created forces.

(e) If Warsaw Pact forces mounted a surprise conventional attack following concealed mobilization or continued a determined conventional attack after a period of about 90 days, this strategy has a low nuclear threshold and risks recourse to nuclear weapons. Even with nuclear weapons this strategy risks the possible loss of NATO

Europe.

B. Strategy 2: NATO Initial Defense or Joint Defense in Asia (*Korea or Southeast Asia*)

Under this strategy the United States would prepare for a 90–day initial defense of NATO Europe *or* a joint defense in Asia. The illustrative forces for this strategy would require average annual FY 71–75 defense budget outlays of $76 billion.

1. *Pro*
   (a) The primary advantage of this strategy over the previous strategy is that it would permit us to defend against a Chinese attack on the mainland of Asia if we were not already engaged in Europe, and it would be less likely than the previous strategy to risk an adverse allied reaction.
   (b) This strategy has essentially the same pros with regard to NATO as the previous strategy.
   (c) It is the view of some that this strategy would meet our security requirements in NATO Europe and Asia even though the forces provided could not meet the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats simultaneously. They believe that because of major Sino-Soviet differences the likelihood of a coordinated or coincidental attack is small. They also believe that if we were engaged in war in Europe or Asia, the threat in the non-war theater would not become significantly greater because of our involvement; some, in fact, believe that the threat in the non-war area would be reduced because of a perceived lowering of the nuclear threshold.
   (d) Although more costly than Strategy 1 by $4 billion per year, this strategy would still permit us to fund the first and second non-defense program tiers without a tax increase, provided the tax reform bill is revised to prevent a net decrease in revenue.
2. *Con*
   (a) Some believe that if we were involved in a major war in Asia or in Europe, the non-involved communist power would become more aggressive. Therefore, those who hold this view believe that not to prepare to meet both major threats simultaneously would involve intolerable risks. For example, if by design or coincidence the Warsaw Pact and Chinese conventional forces attacked simultaneously, this strategy has essentially the same risks in Asia as Strategy 1.
   (b) The State Department believes that, as in the case of Strategy 1, rapid reductions in our total forces could have adverse consequences for U.S. security interests in Asia.
   (c) If we were not engaged in Europe, this strategy would not permit a simultaneous defense of Korea and Southeast Asia against a Chinese attack.
   (d) The cons with regard to NATO are essentially the same as for Strategy 1.

C. Strategy 3: NATO Initial Defense and Joint Defense in Asia (*Korea or Southeast Asia*)

In contrast to Strategy 2, this strategy would permit us to meet simultaneously a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO Europe and a Chinese Communist invasion of Southeast Asia or Korea. To maintain the illustrative forces for this strategy would require average annual

FY 71–75 defense budget outlays of $81 billion.

1. *Pro*
   (a) The primary advantage of this strategy over the previous strategies is that it would permit us to defend against a Chinese attack on the mainland of Asia at the same time we were engaged in a major war in Europe. Thus, the risk of loss of allied territory in the event of a Chinese attack would be reduced.
   (b) Because this strategy approximates our present stated strategy, it almost certainly risks no adverse allied reactions.
   (c) Of the strategies considered, this strategy calls for the largest force structure which would be fully acceptable to our NATO Allies that is, it is militarily the "safest" strategy of those proposed that does not risk opposition from our allies.[7]
   (d) The pros with regard to NATO would be essentially the same as in Strategy 1, except that the larger total force structure would give us more confidence of being able to execute the strategy as planned.
   (e) This strategy has the largest force structure that is compatible with the funding, with no tax increase, of those non-defense programs to which this Administration is already committed.
2. *Con*
   (a) This strategy has essentially the same cons with regard to NATO as Strategies 1 and 2.
   (b) This strategy still does not permit a simultaneous defense of Korea and Southeast Asia in the event of a two-front Chinese attack.
   (c) Some believe that a force this large is unnecessary because of the unlikelihood of an overt Chinese attack or of a simultaneous Chinese/Warsaw Pact attack.
   (d) The cost of this strategy would permit us to fund only the First Tier of non-defense programs; therefore, we could not fund any major new programs, other than those to which the Administration is already committed, without a tax increase.

D. Strategy 4: Sustained NATO Defense and Holding Action in Asia (*Korea and Southeast Asia*) *or Initial Defense of NATO and Joint Defense of Asia* (*Korea and Southeast Asia*)

This strategy provides forces for a sustained defense of NATO Europe and a simultaneous holding action in Asia (Korea and Southeast Asia). Alternatively, the forces could conduct a joint defense in Asia (Korea and Southeast Asia) simultaneously with an initial defense of NATO Europe. To maintain the illustrative forces for this strategy would require average annual FY 71–75 defense budget outlays of $93 billion.

1. *Pro*
   (a) Because this strategy would permit us to conduct a sustained nonnuclear defense of NATO Europe against a Warsaw Pact attack, we would not have to rely on nuclear weapons to defend Europe against any major Warsaw Pact attack, except a surprise attack following concealed mobilization.

(b) This strategy permits a simultaneous defense of Korea and Southeast Asia.
(c) The force structure for this strategy is the largest of the alternatives considered that would place us in a stronger position militarily without risking greater enemy buildups in response to its implementation.

2. *Con*
(a) It is the view of the Foreign Reactions Working Group and the Political Evaluations Working Group (except the JCS) that our NATO Allies would oppose this strategy because it envisions a sustained conventional defense of Europe; they think that the allies believe such a strategy might weaken the link between our general purpose force and nuclear force deterrents and thereby imply at best a rerun of World War II in Europe and at worst a conventional struggle followed by a nuclear exchange.
(b) If the Warsaw Pact mounted a surprise attack on NATO Europe following concealed mobilization, this strategy would still risk recourse to nuclear weapons and possible loss of territory.
(c) The same arguments apply with regard to the unlikelihood of the Chinese threat as in the previous strategy.
(d) The defense budget required by this strategy would preclude, barring a tax increase of 4 to 6%, the funding of any of the non-defense program tiers, including the First Tier which is composed of programs to which the Administration is already committed.

E. Strategy 5: Total NATO Defense and Joint Defense of Asia (*Korea and Southeast Asia*)

This strategy is designed to meet simultaneously any aggression the Warsaw Pact and Communist Chinese are capable of launching, to include an all-out Warsaw Pact surprise attack following a concealed mobilization. The forces for this strategy would require average annual FY 71–75 defense budget outlays of $102 billion.

1. *Pro*
(a) Of all the strategies discussed, this strategy gives us the greatest capability and the least risk.
(b) The forces required by this strategy can meet *simultaneously* all the major threats, including a Warsaw Pact surprise attack.

2. *Con*
(a) The cost of this strategy would preclude the funding of any of the non-defense program tiers without a tax increase of 9 to 14%.
(b) As for Strategy 4 above, it is the view of the Foreign Reactions and the Political Evaluations Working Groups (except the JCS) that our NATO Allies would object to this strategy because it contemplates sustained conflict in Europe and thereby erodes the credibility of our intention to use nuclear forces in Europe's defense.
(c) Additional U.S. troops would probably have to be deployed to Europe, a move which our allies and the Congress would probably oppose.
(d) Increased U.S. forces in Europe would probably prompt a buildup in Warsaw Pact general purpose forces in Central Europe.

(e) As in Strategies 3 and 4, the same arguments apply with regard to the unlikelihood of an overt Chinese attack.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969. Secret. This study was prepared in response to NSSM 3, Document 2. According to a covering memorandum from the NSC Secretariat, the paper was sent to NSC members on September 6 for their consideration prior to the NSC meeting scheduled for September 10. A summary of the paper was also included in Nixon's briefing materials for the NSC meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969)

[2] Of the strategies considered in this report, Strategy 3 most closely approximates the current Department of Defense (DOD) strategy as defined by the previous Administration, and therefore has been used as the baseline for comparison of the other strategies. However, the current strategy has never been as explicitly stated as the strategies in this report. Similarly, the forces for Strategy 3 are not identical with those in the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), since the forces in the FYDP are simply the projections into the future of specific force decisions already made, while the forces in this report are a result of a "fresh look" from the ground up of the overall cost of executing the various strategies. For this reason, the costs shown for Strategy 3 are only roughly comparable to the cost of the currently approved defense program. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] NSSM 65, issued on July 8 and entitled "Relationships Among Strategic and Theater Forces for NATO," is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. It is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972*.

[4] Document 42.

[5] The U.S. Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on December 22. Nixon, who had threatened to veto the measure, signed it into law on December 30. The Act reduced individual income taxes and extended the income tax surcharge at the rate of 5 percent through June 1970. (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1969, p. 589.)

[6] The JCS disagree; note the JCS con argument below. [Footnote in the original.]

[6] The JCS disagree; note the JCS con argument below. [Footnote in the original.]

[7] The JCS do not believe that larger forces would bring about adverse reactions from our NATO allies. [Footnote in the original.]

46. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–8–69 Washington, September 9, 1969.

SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces through mid-1971 and to estimate general trends in those forces over the next 10 years.

[Omitted here is the Foreword, explaining the estimate's organization.]

Conclusions

Soviet Strategic Policy

A. For several years, the primary objectives of Soviet strategic policy have evidently been to build a more formidable deterrent and to overcome the US lead in capabilities for intercontinental attack. Today, while the Soviets remain inferior in numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles, they have overtaken the US in numbers of operational ICBM launchers. Current programs will bring further improvements in the USSR's strategic position, already the most favorable of the post-war period. But the Soviets face in the future a strategic situation changed and complicated by projected improvements in US forces and by the threat of a hostile China with an emerging nuclear capability.

B. We can make only the most general conclusions as to the course of Soviet strategic policy over the 10 year period of this estimate. In the absence of an arms control agreement, Moscow will almost certainly continue to strengthen its strategic forces, giving first priority as in the recent past to the forces for intercontinental attack and for strategic defense. Although we have no direct evidence of Soviet force goals, we believe that the Soviets will seek as a minimum something that they can regard as rough parity with the US; it is equally possible that they will seek some measure of superiority.[2]

Forces for Intercontinental Attack

C. The Soviets have built forces for intercontinental attack capable of inflicting heavy damage on the US even if the US were to strike first. Most of the ICBMs and all of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles are best suited for attacks on soft targets. The SS–9 is the only ICBM with the combination of payload and accuracy to attack hard targets effectively, but in its present numbers with single warheads it could attack no more than a small percent of the US ICBM force. The USSR's capability to attack hard targets, however, is likely to increase considerably over the next 10 years. The Soviets

will probably introduce ICBMs of greater accuracy. They are now testing multiple re-entry vehicles on the SS–9 and though the purpose of these tests is unclear, we believe the Soviets will introduce MIRVs[3] capable of attacking hard targets. If the multiple re-entry vehicle tests are aimed at the development of a simple MRV, such a system could reach IOC late this year. If on the other hand they are aimed at the development of a MIRV system designed to attack Minuteman silos as described in paragraph 29 of the text, IOC could not be achieved before late 1970.[4] A highly accurate MIRV system or one employing more than three RVs probably could not be developed before 1972, although its IOC might be delayed until as late as the mid-1970's.

D. *ICBMs*. In the recent past, the Soviets have sought to improve their strategic position by a rapid buildup in the numbers of ICBM launchers. In the strategic situation that is emerging, qualitative improvements—particularly those related to accuracy, survivability, damage limitation, and the ability to penetrate defenses—become more important. Moreover, the number of launchers will probably become less significant in Soviet calculations than the numbers and kinds of re-entry vehicles. Considering current deployment activity and the probable phase out of older launchers, a Soviet ICBM force of some 1,300 launchers appears to be a minimum. Depending upon its composition and the extent to which it is supplemented by other weapons, such a force could in our view be consonant with a Soviet policy aimed either at rough parity or at some margin of advantage. Other factors, however, such as concern for survivability, a Soviet decision not to deploy MIRVs, a substantial delay in Soviet MIRV deployment, a try for superiority, or even the momentum of military programs could push these figures upward by some hundreds of launchers. We cannot now estimate the maximum size of the force which might result from such pressures.[5]

E. *Space Weapons*. There have been extensive flight tests which we think are related to development of a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS), a retrofired depressed trajectory ICBM, or perhaps a dual system to perform both missions.[6] We have observed no testing since October 1968. We still think the chances are better than even that some version of the system will be deployed. Until our evidence is more conclusive, however, we cannot make a confident estimate as to the type of system being developed, when it could become operational, or how it might be deployed.

F. *Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines*. Production of the 16-tube Y-class ballistic missile submarine continues; some five or six are now in commission. In addition, the Soviets may be developing a 3,000 n.m. submarine-launched ballistic missile. We continue to believe that the Soviets are building a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force which will be roughly comparable to the US Polaris fleet by the mid-1970's.

G. *Heavy Bombers*. The Soviets still have about 200 heavy bombers and tankers in operation. We have no evidence that any are currently being produced for Long Range Aviation, and we consider it unlikely that a new heavy bomber will enter service. Hence, by 1979 the heavy bomber force will probably be largely deactivated.[7]

Forces for Peripheral Operations

H. Soviet strategic forces for peripheral operations consist primarily of MRBMs, IRBMs, medium bombers, and diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines. In addition, the Soviets are probably deploying some short-range ballistic missiles and some ICBMs against targets in Eurasia. These forces are arrayed for the most part against Europe, and in massive strength—an emphasis that will probably continue. The conflict with China, however, has posed new requirements for strategic forces. These can be met to some extent by retargeting existing systems (e.g., bombers and ICBMs), but there will probably be some additional deployment of strategic missiles against China.

I. Within the period of this estimate, the MRBMs and IRBMs now in service will probably be completely replaced. Our evidence of new missile development is scanty and inconclusive, but a 1,500 n.m. solid-propellant missile and a missile of longer range (up to 3,000 n.m.) seem the likeliest possibilities. We project an MRBM/IRBM force of some 400–700 launchers, supplemented by additional short-range missiles and ICBMs. The medium bomber force will probably decline from its present level of some 700–750 aircraft.[8] It seems highly unlikely that any new diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines will be built.

[Omitted here are the Discussion section of the estimate covering Soviet strategic policy, Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, and Soviet forces for peripheral operations, and an Annex containing the glossary and several tables.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] For the views of Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., Acting Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, the Director, National Security Agency; and Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, see their footnotes to paragraph 12. [Footnote in the original. Paragraph 12 of the estimate deals with the question of whether the Soviet Union was seeking strategic parity or superiority vis-à-vis the United States. In the footnotes, Denney argued that the Soviet Union would "face great difficulties," including cost, the threat of exposure, and an eventual American response to Soviet advances, "in any attempt to achieve strategic superiority." On the other hand, Gaylor and Philpott believed that, given the Soviet R&D expenditures and the pace of deployment, "it is more likely than not that the Soviets are seeking some measure of superiority."]

[3] See the Glossary for definition of MRV and MIRV. In this estimate, the words "multiple re-entry vehicles" include both MRVs and MIRVs. [Footnote in the original. The

estimate's Glossary defines MRVs as a "payload package consisting of two or more RVs. The individual RVs are dispersed (but not independently-targeted or maneuvered) in order to confuse enemy radars, to aid penetration, and/or to increase kill area." It defined MIRVs as a "payload consisting of two or more RVs each of which is independently targeted."]

[4] According to paragraph 29, "An alternative [SS–9 reentry vehicle] system can be postulated and related to the current Soviet test program—one with sufficient flexibility so that variations in the dispersal pattern of the RVs would allow each to be targeted against closely spaced individual targets, i.e., Minuteman silos."

[5] For the views of Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., Acting Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Rear Adm. Daniel E. Bergin, for the Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Brig. Gen. DeWitt C. Armstrong, III, for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Rear Adm. Frederick J. Harlfinger, II, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; and Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, see their footnotes to paragraph 41. [Footnote in the original. In the footnotes to paragraph 41, which deals with measuring the Soviet ICBM force, Denney disagreed "with the statement that we cannot now estimate the maximum size which the Soviet ICBM force might reach." He projected a maximum of 1,800 Soviet ICBMs over the next decade. Bergin, Armstrong, Harlfinger, and Philpott agreed that, despite uncertainties, it was essential to attempt to estimate Soviet ICBM launchers, which they projected would number between 1,500 and 1,800 over the same period.]

[6] The glossary defines FOBS as "a system deployed on the ground, targeted prior to launch, and launched with intent to attack. Its operational and control requirements would be like those for an ICBM except for the need for a vehicle to place a warhead into an orbital trajectory and deorbit it on target. Such a vehicle would be targeted to attack prior to completion of the initial orbit."

[7] For the views of Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, see his footnotes to paragraphs 61 and 62. [Footnote in the original. In footnotes to paragraphs 61 and 62, dealing with Soviet bombers, Philpott expressed his belief that "the USSR will act to maintain a credible bomber threat to the US in the 1970s and that additional intercontinental bombers will be introduced into LRA."]

47. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

September 10 NSC Meeting on the NSSM 3 Review of U.S. Military Posture

Purpose of the NSC Meeting

The primary purpose of the September 10 NSC meeting is to review the alternative military strategies and defense budgets developed under NSSM 3.

At a meeting on June 19, 1969, the NSC reviewed that part of the NSSM 3 study concerned with U.S. strategic nuclear forces.[2] At the September 10 meeting, we will review alternative strategies for general purpose forces—Army and Marine divisions, carrier-based and land-based tactical air forces, anti-submarine warfare forces, airlift/sealift forces, and tactical nuclear weapons.

This review will concentrate specifically on strategies for NATO and for Asia (Korea and Southeast Asia), because these are the major determinants of our defense posture and budget.

In addition to presenting alternative strategies for general purpose forces, the report presents, for each strategy, the implied total defense budgets for 1971–1975.

General purpose forces account for over 60% of defense spending (strategic nuclear forces account for only 25%). Most of the interesting choices open to you with respect to our future defense posture and budgets are in the area of general purpose force strategies and forces. Thus, the NSSM 3 Steering Group chose to link general purpose forces issues and total defense budget issues in its final report.

The NSSM 3 Report

I have prepared a summary of the NSSM 3 Report and the issues it raises.[3] I suggest you read this summary in preparation for the meeting.

Issues for Decision

Following is a summary of the decisions I believe you should make as a result of the study. However, *I recommend that you postpone announcing your decisions and how they will be implemented until after the NSC meeting.*

1. *Strategy Guidelines and Budget Targets for FY 71–75.*

The outcome of this meeting is of overriding importance not only to our future strategy and force structure but also to orderly defense planning.

The opportunity now exists to establish the framework for defense planning and budgeting for the next several years and set important precedents. In particular, perhaps for the first time, you and the NSC will have the opportunity:

—to consider rationally defense strategy options in light of our political and military requirements to maintain general purpose forces;
—to weigh the cost of each strategy in terms of its impact on priority non-defense programs and on tax policy;
—to make decisions on defense strategy and budget guidelines that will serve as a sound basis for force and financial planning within the Department of Defense.

Today, it is not possible to get a clear statement of the rationale for our defense posture from the Defense Department. Without Presidential guidance, the JCS, Services and OSD will continue to disagree about the strategy for which we should develop and maintain forces.

Moreover, in the absence of forward financial guidelines, the JCS and Services will continue to design weapon systems and establish requirements which are not disciplined by budgetary considerations.

The alternative strategies are explained in your backup papers. There are five strategies ranging in cost from $71 billion to $102 billion per year.

I believe you will want to end up with Strategy 2.

2. *Five-Year Force Plan and Base Study.*

The specific forces shown in the study report are illustrative only. There is no agreement within DOD that these are the "right" forces for each strategy.

Accordingly, you should ask DOD to submit a five year force and program plan consistent with this guidance. Such a plan should be completed in coordination with the Department of State so that any effects on our allies can be carefully planned.

Also, so that we can begin to resolve the many outstanding issues associated with our requirements for overseas bases, you should ask for a study of the overseas bases needed to support the strategy.

3. *Establishment of Defense Program Review Committee.*

I believe *we should evaluate strategy and budgetary issues on more than a one-shot basis*. We must insure adequate attention to these issues as a matter of routine for several reasons:

—we are now faced with the apparent necessity to cut the 1970 defense budget by almost 4%. Yet I am not aware of any basis for determining whether a $3 billion cut will affect our ability to meet our strategy objectives or how best to go about making cuts of this magnitude.
—aside from this specific case, given the likelihood of continuing limits on defense spending, together with the possibility that funds will be released from Vietnam, there will be intense competition among the Military Services for the limited resources. This competition will be accompanied by extensive military public relations efforts and lobbying on the hill. If not carefully supervised in the light of national priorities, such competition could lead to a return of the inter-Service battles of the 1950s and overwhelm any rational defense planning.
—the growing Congressional concern and involvement with defense issues is not likely to abate. We will face it again when your first defense budget goes to the hill next year. Congressional efforts could lead to a piecemeal dismantling of important parts of our military posture. We will be much better able to cope with Congress in a manner consistent with the national interest if we have not only a national strategy, a well-developed rationale for it, and a forward budget plan, but also a means for continuous review.
—there are many divergent views within the Administration on questions of threats, strategy, forces and defense budgets. The Budget Bureau, Defense, State, CIA and ACDA are all involved. These issues should be resolved in an orderly manner and under firm National Security Council direction.
—future cuts in defense budgets may have significant impacts on our relationships with allies. For example, it will be difficult to cut the budget further, given a continuation of the Vietnam war, without cutting NATO committed forces. We should plan cuts carefully in the light of their broader implications and not be put in a position of having to pick up the pieces afterward.

I do not believe major strategy, force and budget issues should continue to be resolved in bilateral negotiations between the Budget Bureau and the Defense Department. In a separate memorandum, I will recommend a framework for orderly reviews and decisions on such issues which will ensure that your thinking is fully reflected in the shaping of our strategy and military posture.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969. Top Secret: Nodis. A September 9 memorandum from Lynn to Kissinger indicates that this memorandum to the President was drafted by Lynn. (Ibid.)

[2] The meeting was held on June 18; see Document 36. For the study, see Document 45.

[3] This 17–page summary prepared by the NSC Staff states that the choice of strategies turned upon whether to maintain U.S. forces sufficient to counter the Chinese threat, meet major threats in Asia and to NATO simultaneously or individually, and conduct a sustained or initial defense of NATO. Such judgments were complicated by expert disagreement about the proper mix of forces to achieve each strategy's objective. The summary notes that the Pentagon's "forces are typically designed without much imagination," and had not "changed much since World War II, with the exception of our extensive use of helicopters." The summary continues, "These forces are heavy, technically complex and expensive," and not "well suited to areas outside of Europe." Another important determinant of strategy, according to the summary, was "how much we can afford to spend for defense in the light of our non-defense priorities," a judgment that depended on economic forecasts, tax revenues, and funding needed to fight the war in Vietnam. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969)

48. Editorial Note

The National Security Council (NSC) met on September 10, 1969, at 10:05 a.m. to discuss the results of National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 3 on the United States military posture. According to the President's Daily Diary, the following attended the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room of the White House: President Nixon; Vice President Spiro T. Agnew; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird; Secretary of the Treasury David M. Kennedy; Attorney General John N. Mitchell; General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms; Robert P. Mayo, Director, Bureau of the Budget; Paul W. McCracken, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers; General George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness; Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson; Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard; Henry A. Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Laurence E. Lynn, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC staff; and Ivan Selin, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

The handwritten notes taken by Haig are the most complete record of the proceedings found, but his handwriting is often illegible. Haig's notes indicate that the discussion generally addressed alternative U.S. military strategies, particularly as they applied to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to Asia. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, 1969)

According to his talking points prepared by the National Security Council staff, President Nixon was advised to open the meeting by emphasizing that he and the Council "should take an active part in shaping our national strategy and in establishing fiscal guidelines for our defense programs." Nixon was advised to indicate his intention to play an active role in these decisions, but to state that he did not plan to make decisions at this meeting. The President then planned to introduce Helms, who would brief the NSC on the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO and the Chinese threat. Nixon's talking points are ibid., Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969. Haig's notes include no details about Helms' briefing, which lasted until 10:20 a.m., and no other record of his comments has been found.

Packard then planned to brief the Council on the results of the general purpose forces (GPF) section of the NSSM 3 report that the Inter-agency Steering Group, which he chaired, had submitted on September 5 (Document 45). According to his talking points, the Deputy Secretary of Defense was to review the following "four important points: First, we have considered alternative strategies, where by strategy we mean a set of objectives in each region of the world which is specific enough to allow us to plan our peacetime general purpose force structure. Second, we have considered alternative budgets and strategies simultaneously, not in isolation from each other. We have attempted to make realistic estimates of what objectives we can meet with various defense budgets. Third, we

have looked at force requirements for each strategy from the ground up, rather than simply estimating how we might make changes to our programmed forces, should we choose to change our strategy. Fourth, we have looked at the impact of each strategy and its implied defense budgets on the entire economy, including the impact on non-defense federal programs."

According to his talking points, Packard then planned to describe "the strategies we believe are realistic alternatives." The five alternatives identified in the steering group's report were as follows: Strategy 1, a NATO initial defense and assistance for United States allies in Asia; Strategy 2, which included the capability for either a NATO initial defense or a joint defense in Asia; Strategy 3, a NATO initial defense and a joint defense in Asia; Strategy 4 providing for either a sustained NATO defense and holding action in Asia or an initial defense of NATO and a joint defense of Asia; and Strategy 5, a total NATO defense and joint defense of Asia. Packard intended to acknowledge that there was one major exception taken to the group's report: The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that "significantly larger forces [were] needed to support each strategy." All strategies included "forces to meet two minor contingencies (such as in the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East), and forces for a strategic reserve." In addition, all alternatives provided for anti-submarine warfare and included approximately $9 billion of overhead and $17 billion for strategic forces, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, submarines, and such defensive systems as Safeguard. Finally, all strategies provided for at least a 90-day defense of NATO, with the major difference between each being various capabilities "provided to fight in Asia."

Another key difference was the expected foreign reaction to each strategy. While the steering group did not anticipate any significant foreign reactions to Strategy 3, which approximated the current U.S. posture, it expected that Asian allies would be "more likely" to accept Strategies 1 and 2 "without a major change in their relations with U.S. if force changes are not made abruptly." As for Strategy 4, the NATO allies were likely to oppose it "because they feel it would raise the nuclear threshold." Meanwhile, Strategy 5, which envisioned the deployment of an additional 125,000 United States troops to Europe, would probably provoke a buildup of Warsaw Pact forces, thereby bringing "about increased threat to NATO."

There was some uncertainty in the NSSM 3 steering group's projections, according to Packard's talking points. Future defense budgets would be "tighter" if Congress cut taxes, the gross national product grew less rapidly than assumed, the cost of domestic program unexpectedly increased, or the war in Vietnam did not end by June 1970. Budgets would be "looser" if the administration was willing to accept higher inflation or if federal revenues increased more than expected. Packard's briefing materials concluded by recommending that a Presidential decision be made on the United States' worldwide military strategy, a determination that in turn would affect force structures and budgets. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969)

Kissinger, according to talking points prepared by the National Security Council Staff, planned to state that the differences between the alternative strategies hinged on the following judgments:

"—the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Korea or on Vietnam or Thailand in Southeast Asia and whether it is in our interest to maintain forces to meet such an attack. (Strategy 1 does not call for forces to meet a Chinese attack but all the other strategies do.)
"—the likelihood of a simultaneous attack by the Warsaw Pact in Europe and by Chinese forces in Asia. (This issue differentiates Strategies 2 and 3. Strategy 2 does not include forces to meet both threats simultaneously whereas Strategy 3 and the succeeding strategies do.)" After this sentence, Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, "How do we meet them?"
"—whether we want to prepare to conduct a sustained conventional defense of NATO Europe. (Only Strategies 4 and 5 would give us this capability.)
"—whether we want to prepare to meet with conventional forces a Warsaw Pact surprise attack following concealed mobilization. (Only Strategy 5 would give us this capability.)"

Kissinger's preparatory materials also suggested that the Council be urged to consider the following issues in determining the U.S. defense posture: "the nature of the U.S. interests involved, the likelihood of the relevant threats, the budgetary cost of maintaining the required forces, [and] the diplomatic implications of implementing each strategy." The talking points then rehashed the arguments articulated in the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group's paper both for and against the first four alternative strategies. His materials did not address the merits of the fifth alternative. Kissinger's talking points are ibid.

Secretary of Defense Laird's point paper, prepared by staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), similarly reviewed the factors affecting GPF strategy. These factors included the following: the "security interests, regional priorities, and overseas commitment we plan to maintain," the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact and the People's Republic of China (PRC); allied capabilities; "domestic and foreign pressures for reduction/withdrawal of U.S. force," and the "cost of [each] strategy and [its budgetary] impact on non-Defense programs."

Laird's preparatory materials focused on the risks associated with each strategy. Strategy 1, which did not provide for a sustained conventional defense of Europe, risked a relatively rapid escalation to the use of nuclear weapons in the event that war there lasted more than 90 days and if the Warsaw Pact opted to pursue its objectives militarily. It also provided no defense against a surprise conventional attack following concealed mobilization by the Warsaw Pact. In Asia, the risks of Strategy 1 were that it offered only limited defense of Southeast Asia or Korea against a PRC attack and that its potential

wartime costs were high if the United States decided to retake territory in Korea or Southeast Asia initially lost during a Chinese attack. Finally, the OSD was concerned that its adoption would decrease "our influence in non-Communist Asia," increase "PRC/USSR activities in the area," and lead to "accommodations by our allies."

Strategy 2 carried European risks similar to those of Strategy 1, according to Laird's point paper. Among its risks in Asia were that the United States, if simultaneously engaged in Europe, would lack the ability to defend against a Chinese attack. In any event under Strategy 2, the United States would be unable to defend both Southeast Asia and Korea against a simultaneous attack from the PRC. Strategy 3's risks in Europe and Asia were similar to those of Strategies 1 and 2.

Although the OSD foresaw no risks for Strategy 4 in Europe, it did present potential challenges in Europe, including an inability to defend NATO against a surprise conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact following a concealed mobilization. Moreover, the OSD predicted that NATO allies would "resist a strategy envisioning sustained conventional warfare in Europe on the grounds it reduced the nuclear deterrent to [Warsaw] Pact aggression, and may result in a rerun of World War II."

Finally, Strategy 5 carried no risks in Asia, according to Laird's point paper. In Europe, the OSD predicted that it would spark concerns among the NATO allies similar to those likely to be caused by Strategy 4. The OSD also thought that the increased deployment of United States troops to Europe would cause the Warsaw Pact to build up its forces in turn. Laird's point paper is ibid.

Secretary of State Rogers also entered the meeting with some concerns. His talking points, prepared by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and sent to Rogers under a September 9 covering memorandum, suggested that the Secretary raise the following issues during the meeting:

"1. We should not plan forces for a major conventional land war against China. Unanswered [in the NSSM 3 paper] is the question of what kind of air and naval forces we should retain in the Pacific and what ground forces we should maintain to support our allies against non-Chinese aggression. However, we will have to plan on retaining some ground forces in Korea as a 'plate glass' presence (about a division) and air and naval support for ROK [Republic of Korea] forces.
"2. Major force reductions in Asia are inevitable in the next several years as the Vietnam war winds down. The pace of such withdrawals as well as the ultimate size of the forces that remain are most important from a political standpoint as this will be an indication of U.S. support of present commitments.
"3. Unrestricted availability of land bases overseas is unlikely in the future. Therefore, we should not plan a future force posture that is too heavily dependent on land bases.
"4. We should give greater attention to the development of equipment, forces and tactics tailored for use in the more likely forms of conflict outside of Europe. If we do not our

forces are likely to be too small and inflexible and poorly adapted to the types of conflict we are most likely to encounter.

"5. It will be important to gain Congressional support for adequate military aid programs if we hope to shift more of the common defense responsibility to allies.

"6. Further study is needed for the following specific issues: *Europe:* What U.S. force levels should we seek to maintain in Europe; what reliance will be placed on nuclear weapons (NSSM 65); what is the future role of European nuclear forces; etc.?

"*Asia:* What strategy should we adopt and what forces will be required for Southeast Asia; what bases will be needed to support whatever strategy we select in the Western Pacific; what role can nuclear weapons play in Asia (NSSM 69)?

"*Middle East:* How might U.S. force requirements be affected by a major Middle East war?" Rogers's talking points are ibid., RG 59, S/S–I Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 3. NSSM 65 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972. NSSM 69 is printed as Document 42.

President Nixon, according to his talking points, was prepared to close the meeting by again announcing his intention "to take time to think over these strategy and budget alternatives." It was also suggested that he indicate that he "did not believe that major strategy, force and budget issues should be decided annually as budgetary problems." Accordingly, he would "soon establish a framework to enable doctrinal considerations to be brought to bear." The meeting concluded at 12:30 p.m.

49. Editorial Note

President Nixon held a breakfast meeting on September 24, 1969, attended by Henry Kissinger, his Assistant for National Security Affairs; Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird; General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations; General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, United States Army; General John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting was found. However, Kissinger, in a September 24 memorandum to the President, informed Nixon that Laird had requested that day's meeting "to give the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman an opportunity to present the military's views on Defense expenditures for FY 70 and 71." In particular, Kissinger expected discussion to focus on a $3 billion reduction in the defense budget already announced by Laird, an additional $2 billion cut in the military's FY 70 budget then under consideration, and finally the Bureau of the Budget's proposed FY 71 budget level of $71 billion, all of "which the Chiefs will strongly oppose and assess as a grave impairment of our national security interests." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 222, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IV)

A press conference held by Secretary Laird on August 21, when the President was away from Washington at the Western White House in San Clemente, California, had led to the Joint Chiefs' concern. During his press conference, Laird had announced plans to reduce FY 1970 defense expenditures by up to $3 billion. The Secretary of Defense warned that the cuts, dubbed Project 703, would "reduce our capability to meet current commitments" and cause "an inevitable weakening of our worldwide military posture." (*New York Times*, August 22, 1969, page 1)

Nixon sent Kissinger a memorandum on September 22 that reads as follows: "I feel that most of the Laird cuts are simply shrinking the whole establishment without selectivity. I feel very strongly that we ought to be putting more into the strategic forces and less in the conventional forces, per reasons that we have previously discussed." Although no record of such discussions were found, Kissinger wrote at the end of Nixon's memorandum, "Basic pt. is good." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 222, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IV)

According to a talking paper prepared for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Wheeler planned to make the following opening remarks during his meeting with the President:

"Worldwide military commitments remain unchanged and no firm indication from enemy regarding scale-down in SVN.

"Financial resource availability continues to decline. Considering reductions in FY 69,

those made previously in FY 70, and additional reductions now being implemented mean a total reduction of about $14 billion in TOA in less than year."

Wheeler was also prepared to compare current defense spending with that in FY 1964, the year of the last peacetime military budget. His Talking Paper reads as follows:

"When the additional $3 billion reductions are implemented, DOD estimated FY 70 outlays, in FY 64 dollars, would be about $41.8 billion, after adjustments for inflation and costs of war. Although it is difficult to determine pure costs of Vietnam precisely, fact remains that considerably less will be spent for non-SEAsia defense posture in FY 70 than in FY 64. In this connection, estimated that about 40 percent of total Vietnam costs have been absorbed internally by Services through cutbacks in non-SEAsia programs.

"Forces in SVN best equipped and supplied in history; however, done to very large extent through draw-down of other forces and at expense of modernization and starts for new or improved weapons systems. Percent of budget spent for R&D steadily down. 9.3 percent ($7.1 billion TOA after 703) in FY 70 contrasted to estimated 20 percent (roughly estimated at $9.2 billion in '70 dollars if expended in US) of military budget for Soviets in calendar year 1970. Currently, projected US R&D TOA in FY 70 will be about $1.2 billion less than in FY 64 as expressed in '64 dollars."

Project 703, Wheeler's briefing materials warned, "seriously reduces our military capability in all areas—strategic and general purpose—and thereby decreases options available to NCA. This is occurring at a time when the Soviet Union is improving its force posture significantly, both qualitatively and quantitatively." Project 705, a proposed cut of an additional $2 billion from defense expenditures, "could be disastrous (NATO and war effort SEA). Could be done only by substantially reducing current forces and mortgaging heavily our future capability. This will result inevitably in a steady decline over the years in our force readiness posture." As for the changing strategic balance, Wheeler's briefing materials noted, "During past few years, while we have fought a war in SEAsia, our relative military posture position, vis-à-vis the Soviets, has suffered" in terms of both strategic and general purpose forces.

Wheeler's Talking Paper also outlined the following general comments pertaining to the budget cuts' potential effect on the United States defense posture:

"Deterrence of nuclear war basic national military objective of the US since World War II.

"US military capability to provide deterrence and cope with situations calling for military force composed of totality of strategic nuclear forces, tactical nuclear forces, and non-nuclear forces.

"Forces formerly provided credible warfighting ability to support national objectives since they were measurably superior in numbers and quality.

“Termination of Korean conflict, Lebanon crisis and Cuban missile crisis clear examples of how deterrent capability served national interest.

“Since 1964, overall erosion of strategic and general purpose force capability has been continuous. Gap between US-Soviets in numbers and quality steadily closed.

> “Without adequate strategic forces in-being probability of nuclear blackmail or aggression below level of general war is increased due to lack of clearly evident appropriate response.
>
> “By same token, if additional contingency requiring military action should arise while heavily engaged in SEAsia, considering current state of capability to respond with effective non-nuclear means, early decision on nuclear weapons employment could be required or use might become necessary in situations that would not ordinarily require them.”

In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded “that if further reductions in budget and in military capability, of the magnitude contemplated, are made, our ability to provide a desirable range of options in future contingencies would be greatly diminished and the protection of our national security interests would be *gravely* impaired.” (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 101, 337 Pres. Meeting With (April 68–May 70))

According to Kissinger’s September 24 memorandum to the President, both he and Laird advised Nixon to “listen sympathetically” and do three things during the meeting. First, they urged Nixon to direct “the Chiefs to carefully review their individual service postures, with a view toward minimizing reductions in essential operational components in favor of trimming less critical projects and eliminating fat.” Second, they recommended that Nixon express his “concern that special attention be paid to U.S. strategic forces in the light of the growing Soviet threat.” And third, they counseled him to “inform the Chiefs that you share their concern for maintaining a strong posture, thank them for their views and assure them that you will consider them carefully in future budget decisions.”

50. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, September 30, 1969.

One Observor's Notes from Republican Leadership Meeting, Tuesday, September 30, 1969

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to national security policy, including crime and Supreme Court nominations.]

Now we move into a very confidential area. The President said he had some new intelligence and this is extremely sensitive.[2] The Soviets are apparently going full speed ahead with their testing of MIRV. It is quite clear they don't mean any business with the SALT talks. In megatonnage they are now ahead of the United States, and in the total number of missiles, they have pulled abreast of the U.S. If they move as they have been moving with MIRV, the President said, they will be substantially ahead of us in a year or two. He said I[3] would hold the Democrats feet to the fire on this; it is an issue of national security. He said we might even pull the old Lombardi[4] trick that New Orleans looks awful tough. In other words, indicate that we are going to have a tough time getting it through.[5]

Mr. Kissinger spoke up now. He said the Soviets are continuing to test entirely new missile systems other than the SS–9 or SS–11 with an entirely new warhead on the 9, and another and much heavier war-head on the SS–11 which we don't even know anything about. He said it lends itself to any number of applications.[6] Kissinger stated "that the Soviets are conducting a broad-gauge, systematic, wide-ranging program, that not a week goes by without some new system being tested." The President said the Soviets have shown no interest in a moritorium on MIRV; he said if the other side has one of these things, then I want one too. He said it would be disastrous for the United States to be in a position inferior to the other, while the other side is making a great leap forward. He said we probably will get a response from the Soviets on the SALT talks in the next few days; once they make a response it will be a few months before they talk about verification of tests. In the meantime, one got the impression that the Soviets would be moving ahead full speed with deployment. The President said that in verification with our satellites, we can't know how many warheads are on top of their missiles, even if we know how many missiles there are.

Margaret Chase Smith said the President should keep quite close to the MIRV resolution now in the U.S. Senate, Senator Brooke's resolution.[7] Congressman Anderson spoke up and said he supported Brooke's effort in the House, but the basis was that MIRV was still a negotiable issue. Is it still negotiable, Mr. President? The President said yes it is. ABM is

also negotiable, except for the ABM directed against the China threat. The President said the Soviet ABM radar is now turned against China rather than against the United States.[8]

Congressman Rhodes said [if] the Soviets are engaged in a massive effort to build strategic weapons, certainly it would be good policy not to keep it quiet, but to take it to the public. The President said there were some problems with taking it to the public, for example, if the Socialists over in Germany should make a deal with this tiny 5% party, it would mean the Socialists would govern Germany, and you can be sure if they got the first inkling that the U.S. was strategically inferior to the Soviet Union, they would have every incentive to make a flip in their position.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger to speak for a few minutes. How many missiles did the enemy have in the Cuban missile crisis? Kissinger indicated they had about 35 long-range missiles, and the U.S. had close to 400, something like a 15–1 margin. That no longer exists, said the President. We have now reached parity and as I[9] indicated, the Soviets are now moving full speed ahead toward superiority. He said when Golda Meir was here she assumed that if they moved against the Israelis and smashed the Israelis that the United States would move in also if the Soviets did. The President said perhaps we would have done that awhile ago, but that has to be doubtful now. He said it's true that the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean is a "hostage there". The President said that the U.S. is the only power in the world that can deter war, and to keep our diplomacy credible, we have to keep our power credible.

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to national security policy, including the war in Vietnam and Congressional pressure for American withdrawal from Vietnam.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 79, President's Meetings File, Beginning September 28, 1969. Confidential. The following attended the meeting, held from 8:31 to 10:20 a.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House: Nixon; Richardson; Kissinger; Senators Hugh Scott (Minority Leader), Robert P. Griffin (Minority Whip), Margaret Chase Smith, Milton Young, Gordon Allott, and John G. Tower; and Representatives Gerald R. Ford (Minority Leader), Leslie C. Arends (Minority Whip), John B. Anderson, William C. Cramer, Richard H. Poff, John J. Rhodes, H. Allen Smith, Bob Wilson, and Robert Taft, Jr. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] The Soviets were prepared to resume testing MRVs, according to a September 13 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon based on CIA reports vetted by the NSC staff. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 10, President's Daily Briefs, September 1–22, 1969)

[3] Buchanan.

[4] Vince Lombardi, coach of the Green Bay Packers and Washington Redskins of the National Football League.

[5] Possibly a reference to the FY 1970 Defense Department appropriation authorization

bill, which was approved on November 19.

[6] An undated and uninitialed memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon informed the President of recent intelligence reports from the CIA indicating "that the Soviets are now testing what could be two different ballistic missiles of an unknown nature." According to Kissinger, the two missile systems, which the Soviets had been clandestinely developing for 17 months, raised serious questions about the United States' ability to monitor a strategic arms limitation agreement. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Consequences of MIRV Flight Ban)

[7] See Document 43.

[8] A July 7 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon summarized a DIA report estimating that Soviet ballistic missile defenses were oriented against China. A stamped note on the report reads, "President has seen." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 844, ABM–MIRV, Sentinel ABM System, Vol. 3)

[9] Nixon.

51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, October 2, 1969.

SUBJECT
U.S. Military Posture

The Problem

On September 10, 1969 the National Security Council reviewed five worldwide strategies for our general purpose forces.[2] Associated with each of these strategies were guidelines for force planning and projected FY 71–75 DOD budgets.

I believe it is of considerable importance that you approve specific strategy and budget guidelines for planning purposes as soon as possible.

Today it is not possible to get a clear statement of the rationale for our defense posture from the Defense Department. Without Presidential guidance, the JCS, Services, and OSD will continue to disagree about the strategy for which we should develop and maintain forces. Moreover, in the absence of forward financial guidelines, the JCS and Services will continue to design weapon systems and establish requirements which are not disciplined by budgetary considerations.

Your guidance is essential if your first defense budget, which goes to the Hill in late January, is to reflect fully your thinking and is to be based on a coherent strategy.

Strategies

Of the five strategies presented to the NSC, three should be considered seriously. (The other two would require increased forces for Europe and a defense budget which would preclude the funding of non-defense programs to which you are already committed.)

The three strategies are as follows:

Strategy 1: we would maintain forces for a NATO initial defense (a defense of NATO for about 90 days with conventional weapons against a major Warsaw Pact invasion) and for simultaneous assistance to an Asian ally against threats *short of a full-scale Chinese invasion*.
We would emphasize material and logistics support to our Asian allies, and maintain limited U.S. combat forces (up to four divisions with tactical air and naval support) to be used in Asia if necessary.
Strategy 2: we would maintain forces capable of either a NATO initial defense *or* a

defense, with our allies, against a full-scale Chinese attack in Korea or Southeast Asia. That is, we would not maintain forces to fight on a large scale in Europe and Asia simultaneously.

Strategy 3 is essentially our pre-Vietnam war strategy. U.S. forces would be maintained for a NATO initial defense *and* a defense of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack. The forces would be capable of meeting the major Warsaw Pact and Chinese threats *simultaneously*.

Issues

Choosing a strategy requires judgments on these basic issues:

—Is it in our interest to maintain U.S. forces to defend our Asian allies against a Chinese conventional threat?
—If the answer is no, we are safe to choose Strategy 1. The main problems would be diplomatic: how to reduce our force structure by 10 divisions and 2200 tactical aircraft without appearing to be making a headlong retreat from our commitments.
—If the answer is yes, we must have at least Strategy 2.

The next basic judgment is

—Should we maintain U.S. forces to meet a *simultaneous* attack by Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Chinese forces in Asia?

If the answer is yes, we stay with the present strategy, Strategy 3, though we can of course examine variants of it.

If the answer is no, we choose Strategy 2. (*Strategy 2 would not require us to change our NATO commitments*. We might want to "borrow" some of our NATO-committed strategic reserve forces based in the U.S. to use against the Chinese in the event of a major war in Asia, but it is probable we would not.)

To recapitulate, if we believe

—that a conventional war with China in Asia is unlikely or not in our interest,
—that a war with China and Russia simultaneously is unlikely,
—that we nevertheless want to maintain more capability than Strategy 1 allows us as a hedge against uncertainty *or* that we want to move to Strategy 1 in two phases rather than one,

then Strategy 2 is a good one, at least for the time being.

Strategy 2 will also enable you to fund new non-defense programs in addition to those to which your Administration is already committed. Strategy 3 would not permit the funding of new non-defense programs.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve strategy and budget guidelines for Strategy 2. I believe that a simultaneous Warsaw Pact attack in Europe and Chinese conventional attack in Asia is unlikely. In any event, I do not believe such a simultaneous attack could or should be met with ground forces, which the present strategy, Strategy 3, assumes.[3]

National Security Decision Memorandum

If you approve Strategy 2, I have prepared an appropriate NSDM at Tab A.[4] The NSDM:

—informs the addressees that Strategy 2, as described in the NSSM 3 study reviewed by the National Security Council on September 10, 1969, will constitute the approved general purpose force strategy for the United States, and
—issues budget guidelines consistent with Strategy 2, and noting that these guidelines will be adjusted in accordance with actual Vietnam requirements.

In addition, in order to insure that your decision is implemented, the NSDM directs:

—the Department of Defense to prepare a five year force program consistent with your decision;
—the Department of State to develop the appropriate diplomatic scenario; and
—the Department of Defense in coordination with the Department of State and Bryce Harlow's office to develop a plan for presenting the approved strategy and budget guidelines to the public and the Congress.

These tasks are to be accomplished and reports submitted to the Defense Program Review Committee by January 15, 1969 [*1970*].

The NSDM also establishes an annual submission by the Secretary of Defense of his recommended plan for the ensuing five years, plus periodic submission of any changes to approved guidelines proposed by the Agencies. All submissions are to be reviewed by the Defense Program Review Committee.

The NSDM rescinds NSC paper 5904/1, U.S. Policy in the Event of War.[5] This paper was last revised on April 27, 1960. The NSDM supercedes it.

Recommendation

That you approve the issuance of the NSDM at Tab A.[6]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, DPRC Working Group Meeting. Top Secret; Nodis. A

September 24 memorandum from Lynn to Kissinger indicates that Lynn drafted the memorandum to the President. (Ibid.)

[2] See Document 48.

[3] Nixon initialed his approval.

[4] Attached but not printed. See Document 56.

[5] Adopted on March 17, 1959, and last revised on April 27, 1960, NSC 5904/1, "U.S. Policy in the Event of War," specified the assumptions used in planning the U.S. military posture. See *Foreign Relations*, 1958–1960, volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 55.

[6] Nixon initialed his approval.

52. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–3–69 Washington, October 2, 1969.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces through mid-1971 and to estimate general trends in those forces over the next 10 years.[2]

Conclusions

A. Throughout the postwar period the USSR has devoted a major effort to strategic defense. This effort can be attributed primarily to the size and diversity of US strategic attack forces, although for the future the Soviets must consider the threat posed by third countries, particularly China.

Air Defense

B. The Soviets have deployed in depth a formidable system of air defenses, which is very effective against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft at medium and high altitudes. The system is less effective against higher performance aircraft and standoff weapons; it has virtually no capability against penetration below about 1,000 feet except in a few, limited areas.

C. At present, the major effort is directed against the threat posed by high-performance aircraft and standoff weapons. The SA–5, which represents a considerable improvement over older systems in terms of range, velocity, and firepower, is being deployed as a barrier defense around the European USSR and for point defense of selected targets. There are about 40 operational SA–5 complexes and we believe that about 100 complexes will be operational by 1973. In addition, the Soviets are deploying supersonic, high-altitude interceptors. They have an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) in limited operation. This system, when used in coastal areas and with long-range interceptors, could greatly extend the area in which incoming aircraft could be engaged.

D. To cope with low-altitude attack the Soviets have deployed all-weather interceptors with improved capabilities, and they are continuing to deploy the SA–3, primarily along the Black Sea and Baltic Sea approaches. More advanced radars, SAMs, AAMs, and interceptors better suited for low-altitude defense will probably be introduced. The primary limitation on low-altitude defense, however, is surveillance and control. Through the dense deployment of new radars, the Soviets have improved tracking capabilities in a few areas down to altitudes of 500 feet and even below, but we do not expect them to

extend such deployment to large areas of the USSR.

Ballistic Missile Defense[3]

E. Ballistic missile early warning and initial tracking would probably be provided by large, phased-array dual Hen House radars. Those now operational in the northern USSR are intended primarily to detect ICBMs launched from the US. They also provide some coverage of the Polaris threat from the north and northwest. The Soviets will probably take steps to provide additional early warning coverage against ICBMs, against Polaris, and against the Chinese missile threat.

F. The Moscow ABM system (ABM–1), under deployment since 1962, has achieved some operational capability. Apparently the Soviets will deploy only about half as many ABM–1 launchers as originally planned. The launch sites still under construction should be operational in 1970. The Soviets are probably also making some improvements in the ABM–1.

G. Our analysis of the Moscow system indicates that, as presently deployed, it will furnish a limited defense of the Moscow area, but that it has some weaknesses. It appears to have little ability to handle such sophisticated threats as long chaff clouds and certain other penetration aids; the small number of launchers and the apparent limitations of the fire control radars make the system highly susceptible to saturation and exhaustion. Its capability to deal with nuclear blackout is probably not high, and none of the system compounds appear to be hardened to withstand the effects of nuclear bursts. Finally, the Moscow system is primarily an anti-ICBM system; it provides long-range radar coverage of only a part of the multidirectional Polaris threat.

H. We believe that the Soviets are developing a follow-on ABM system. Like the Moscow system, it will probably be designed for long-range, exoatmospheric intercept; it could become operational in the 1974–1975 period. We have no evidence that the Soviets are developing a short-range intercept system comparable to the US Sprint. If they do, it would probably not begin to enter service before the late-1970's.

I. We still have no evidence of ABM deployment outside the Moscow area; any extension of ABM defenses will probably await the availability of the system now under development. The logical first step in any future deployment would be to augment the defenses of Moscow. The extent of deployment beyond Moscow will depend heavily upon economic as well as technical considerations. Deployment of a national defense system on a scale sufficient to cope with the full US missile threat does not appear to be a feasible course of action for the USSR within the period of this estimate. We believe that the Soviets will decide upon a program that would provide some defense for the most important target areas in the USSR. Some part of this defense would probably be deployed against Communist China and other third country threats.

Anti-satellite Capabilities

J. With existing radars and missiles armed with nuclear warheads, the Soviets could almost certainly destroy or neutralize current US satellites in near earth orbits during an early phase of their mission. With terminal guidance, they could probably use a non-nuclear war-head to neutralize satellites. During the last year we have seen evidence that the Soviets may be developing a co-orbital anti-satellite system. Neither inspection nor destruction operations have been specifically identified, but the activity observed seems more applicable to an anti-satellite mission than any other. This system now probably has a limited capacity to intercept US satellites, but a fully operational capability is not likely before 1971.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate covering Soviet strategic defense policy, air defense, missile defense, space surveillance and anti-satellite defense, and civil defense.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; Restricted Data. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] This estimate considers only those Soviet strategic defensive forces located in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The Soviet anti-submarine warfare effort, with its implications for Polaris, will be discussed in the forthcoming NIE 11–14–69, “Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces.” [Footnote in the original.]

[3] Maj. Gen. John F. Freund, Acting for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, consider that this section underestimates the Soviet missile defense (ABM) capability. For their views, see footnote on page 15. [Footnote in the original. According to the footnote on page 15 of the NIE, Freund and Philpott remained convinced that the estimate underrated Soviet missile defense capabilities primarily because they believed that “the state of available evidence is such that an ABM role cannot be excluded for the SA–5 (Tallinn) system.”]

53. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, October 4, 1969.

SUBJECT
Review of Selective Service Deferments and Exemptions

In your message to Congress on amendment of the Selective Service Act of 1967, you mentioned that you were "requesting the National Security Council and the Director of the Selective Service to conduct a thorough review of our guidelines, standards, and procedures for deferments and exemptions and to report their findings to me by December 1, 1969."[2] A NSSM to establish the review you requested is enclosed as Tab A.[3]

The Selective Service system has 37 million registrants, 20 million of whom are of draft age. Of the 20 million draft age registrants, 13 million are deferred, while 7 million will serve, are serving, or have served in the Armed Forces. The main reasons for deferment are:

—registrant is in school (2.4 million),
—registrant has a critical job (.3 million),
—registrant has children (4.1 million),
—registrant is serving in the National Guard (1.0 million),
—registrant does not meet the mental or physical standards of the Armed Forces (5.1 million).

The Administration's plan for draft reform envisages selecting men for induction on a "youngest first" basis through a process of random selection. This reform will not affect the type or number of deferments and exemptions granted by the Selective Service.

Deferment policy, however, has a greater influence on the distribution of the draft burden than the selection process itself. For instance, the "random selection" of registrants for induction will apply at any moment only to 1.3 million of the 14.3 million draft age registrants who haven't served. The other 13.0 million draft age eligibles will continue to be affected mainly by deferment policy. Therefore, a review of deferment standards is needed to insure that standards of deferment and exemption are fair and internally consistent.

In addition to a review of deferment standards, your message to Congress also called for a review of Selective Service guidelines and procedures. This review would be useful because of:

—the lack of binding national guidelines on deferments means that individuals are often treated unequally by the 4,000 local boards;
—the slowness and complexity of the Selective Service's procedures leaves individuals often unsure of their status and fearful of arbitrary treatment by their local boards.

However, there is some doubt as to the magnitude of these problems. The Selective Service does not believe that the inconsistencies and delays in its present system are significant.

The attached NSSM will initiate a thorough review of the NSC and Selective Service standards, guidelines, and procedures along the lines suggested by your May 13 speech to Congress. This review would be "low profile" with its Director reporting to the NSC staff and personnel drawn from the agencies. It has been coordinated with the Department of Defense, Selective Service and Peter Flanigan's staff.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached NSSM to initiate a review of U.S. deferment and exemption policy.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–163, NSSM 78. No classification marking. Sent for action.

[2] On May 13, the President, in his special message to Congress on reforming the military draft, asked lawmakers to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. Nixon's suggested draft reforms included changing from an oldest-first to a youngest-first order of call, reducing the period of prime draft vulnerability, implementing a random draft, and reviewing deferments. He recommended two specific deferment reforms: allow undergraduates to defer induction until completing their college educations and permit graduate students to defer induction until the end of the academic year rather than the end of the semester. Some 6 months later, on November 26, Nixon signed Public Law 91–124. The measure included three of the President's four suggested reforms: a youngest-first order of induction, a reduced period of prime draft vulnerability, and random selection. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 365–369, 970–971)

[3] Printed as Document 54.

[4] Nixon initialed his approval on October 8.

54. National Security Study Memorandum 78[1]

Washington, October 8, 1969.

TO

The Director of the Selective Service
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Deferment and Exemption Policy

The President has directed a review of the guidelines, standards, and procedures for deferments and exemptions.

1. *Standards for Deferment and Exemptions*. The present standards for deferment and exemption of Selective Service registrants should be evaluated. The objective and effects of each present standard should be analyzed with particular emphasis on (a) occupational deferments, (b) educational deferments. Alternative deferment and exemption standards should be developed for consideration consistent with the objectives of the President's Message to Congress on Amendment of the Selective Service Act of 1967.[2]
2. *Guidelines for Deferment and Exemption*. The National Security Council and Selective Service guidelines on deferments and exemptions should be evaluated in terms of their effectiveness at implementing the standards of deferment and exemption policy. Where necessary, new National Security Council advice or Selective Service guidelines on deferments should be developed for consideration.
3. *Procedures for Deferments and Exemptions*. The procedures of the Selective Service system should be analyzed in terms of (a) any inconsistency in the treatment of individuals and (b) any uncertainties of individuals about their status. Changes in existing procedures to maintain consistent treatment of individuals and reduce uncertainty should be formulated where appropriate. In particular, examination of all registrants prior to age 19 should be evaluated, as a measure that could reduce the uncertainty of individuals who do not meet the medical standards of the Armed Forces.

This study will be conducted by an Ad Hoc Group. The Group's Chairman will be chosen by the Director of the Selective Service. The Group's personnel will be drawn from the Selective Service and other addressee agencies. Administrative support for the study will be provided by the Selective Service and the other addressee agencies. The report of the

Ad Hoc Group will be completed and submitted to the President's Assistant to National Security Affairs by December 1, 1969.[3]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 365, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. No classification marking.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 53.

[3] Kissinger, in a memorandum dated December 26, informed the President of the preliminary results of the NSSM 78 review, which had found serious inequities in the Selective Service system caused by a lottery that was in fact not random and by the variable practices of local draft boards. Nixon wrote the following instruction, addressed to Kissinger and Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President, on the memorandum: "Very important to clean this up and to *publicize* the corrections." A handwritten note on a December 29 covering memorandum to Flanigan with the annotated memorandum attached indicates that Kissinger saw the President's comments. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Draft Reform [1969–1970])

55. National Security Decision Memorandum 26[1]

Washington, October 11, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the formation of the Defense Program Review Committee.

This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from

—proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets,
—proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.,[2]
—major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.

The Committee will meet as necessary and supervise the preparation of issue papers for consideration by the National Security Council. Issues will be brought to the attention of this group at the initiative of the addressee agencies or of the Chairman. Studies of defense policy and program issues undertaken in response to National Security Study Memorandums will be submitted to the Defense Program Review Committee prior to NSC consideration rather than to the NSC Review Group.

The membership of the Defense Program Review Committee shall include:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman)
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.[3]

Richard Nixon

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler. Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum on September 17 recommending that he sign an enclosed draft NSDM establishing the DPRC. Kissinger's memorandum begins as follows: "Your remarks at the NSC meeting [of September 10] on the U.S. military posture, strongly underscored your view that resolution of major defense strategy and program issues must no longer be the result of 'treaties' negotiated between DOD and BOB or compromises struck among the military services." Kissinger continued, "As a result of the NSC meeting, I recommend that we move to establish an interagency" DPRC. Nixon initialed his approval. (Ibid., Box 958, Haig Chronological File, September 1969) Regarding the September 10 NSC meeting, see Document 48.

[2] Laird had sent a memorandum on September 15 informing the President that he had approved certain naval force reductions that, according to the JCS, would seriously degrade the U.S. worldwide naval posture. Kissinger forwarded Laird's memorandum to Nixon on September 19, adding his belief that "these developments underscore the need for" a DPRC. The DPRC would accomplish several things, Kissinger wrote. It would "prevent you from being hit with faits accompli concerning important changes in our military posture" and "prevent our allies from being faced with unilateral U.S. decisions that affect their security without prior explanation or consultation." In addition, it would "give State and the other affected agencies the opportunity to work out coordinated diplomatic and public relations scenarios so that the Administration can speak with one voice" and "insure that all significant military policy and program decisions are in accordance with your policies and guidance." The President highlighted these comments and wrote in the margin, "I *completely* agree." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 222, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IV)

[3] On December 1, Laird sent Kissinger a letter insisting that the committee avoid "assessing the programs of individual weapons systems or alternative regional force levels." Instead, Laird believed that the DPRC should confine its activities to "major aggregate resource allocation issues ancillary to our top-most national goals," including balancing U.S. objectives with available national resources and defense and non-defense spending. (Ibid., Box 221, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. III) This and other resistance from the Pentagon led to a breakfast meeting about the DPRC between Kissinger and Laird on December 11. No record of the meeting was found. According to talking points prepared for Kissinger by the NSC Staff, he was advised to remind Laird that the President wanted the DPRC "to consider those issues with major doctrinal,

diplomatic, or economic implications." (Ibid.)

56. National Security Decision Memorandum 27[1]

Washington, October 11, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

U.S. Military Posture

As a result of the National Security Council meeting on September 10, 1969 the President has directed that Worldwide Strategy 2, as described in *National Security Study Memorandum 3, U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power, General Purpose Forces Section*, dated September 5, 1969,[2] will constitute the approved United States strategy for general purpose forces.

The President has further directed that the general budget guidelines for the next five fiscal years contained in Table 1 will be used for planning purposes.

TABLE 1

Budget Outlays[3]

(Billions)

Vietnam Assumption	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75
A. U.S. Combat Involvement ceases after 1 July 1970 (NSSM 3 assumption)	$73	$71	$72	$75	$76
B. Phase down to about 260,000 troops by 30 June 1971, continue combat through 30 June 1973, no combat involvement thereafter.	$76	$76	$75	$75	$76

Budget outlays should be adjusted in accordance with actual Vietnam requirements.

The President has directed that the following be accomplished:

—The Department of Defense will develop a five year force and program plan—including overseas deployments and NATO-committed forces—consistent with the approved

strategy and budget guidelines, together with an explanation and rationale for the forces in each major force category and the logistics guidance.

—The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, will develop a diplomatic scenario consistent with implementation of the approved strategy.

—The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and the White House Office of Congressional Liaison, will develop a plan for presenting the approved strategy and budget guidelines to the Congress and to the public.

Each of these tasks should be completed and a written report submitted to the Defense Program Review Committee by January 15, 1970.

The President emphasized that he will approve revisions to the strategy and budget guidelines and the five year force and program plan as required to maintain the security of the United States and its allies.

The President has directed that once each year, on September 15, the Secretary of Defense will submit to the Defense Program Review Committee his recommended five year force and program plan, together with its rationale, for the five fiscal years beginning the following July 1. This plan should be consistent with approved strategy and budget guidance and should note significant changes from the previous plan.

The President has further directed that proposals for significant changes in the approved five year force and program plan or in the strategy and budget guidelines be reviewed by the Defense Program Review Committee prior to consideration by the President and the National Security Council.

NSC 5904/1—U.S. Policy in the Event of War—is hereby rescinded.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret. Drafted by Lynn. Copies were sent to Wheeler and McCracken.

[2] See Document 45.

[3] These figures are in current dollars as in NSSM 3 (i.e. including projected inflation and pay raises). The cost of appropriate assistance to allies is included. [Footnote in the original. NSSM 3 is Document 2.]

57. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 13–8/1–69 Washington, October 30, 1969.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess China's strategic weapons program and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the mid-1970's.

Conclusions

A. China's nuclear test program continues to emphasize the development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons. The Chinese have developed a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] device that could be weaponized for delivery by the TU–16 jet medium bomber, or possibly configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead. They are probably at least two years away from having a thermonuclear weapon in the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) weight class, but fission warheads for such missiles could be available now. For the next several years at least, the production of nuclear materials can probably keep pace with or exceed the requirements of testing and the number of strategic missiles and TU–16s the Chinese are likely to be able to deploy.

B. The Chinese have recently begun production of medium bombers (TU–16s) at a rate of approximately one unit every two months. We estimate that production could reach a level of about four or five a month and that about 200 TU–16s might be available by mid-1975.

C. The evidence suggests strongly that the Chinese are moving toward MRBM deployment. We believe that any major deployment program will involve the construction of permanent complexes, but we have no evidence that such work has begun. Even if some complexes were started in early 1969, they would not be operational before about mid-1970. There is some inferential evidence, however, that suggests the existence of a few operational MRBM sites in China at this time. If so, they are probably temporary-type installations intended to provide an interim capability against the USSR.

D. [*1 line not declassified*] If a vehicle is available for testing within the next few months, IOC could be achieved by late 1972 or early 1973. It is more likely, however, that IOC will be later, perhaps by as much as two or three years. If the earliest possible IOC were achieved, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975. In the more likely event that IOC is later, achievement of a force this size would slip accordingly.

E. A large complex at Hu-ho-hao-t'e in Inner Mongolia has facilities and equipment

adequate for handling solid-propellant rocket motors ranging in size from short-range missiles through the MRBM/IRBM category and probably into the ICBM class. We lack any basis for judging how the Chinese will proceed with a solid-propellant program, but we presently doubt that the Chinese could have either an MRBM or ICBM with solid fuel motors in the field by 1975. Moreover, a concentrated effort in this field would probably force the Chinese to restrict severely the deployment of liquid-propellant missiles.

F. [2½ *lines not declassified*] the Chinese have ambitious space goals. It will probably be several years at least before the Chinese can use this facility to its full potential, and the Chinese will probably first attempt more modest space ventures, perhaps using a modified MRBM as a launch vehicle.

G. In general, it is clear that the Chinese continue to press ahead with high priority work on strategic weapon systems. Many uncertainties remain, however, which leave in great doubt the future pace, size, and scope of the program. Unlike the Soviet case, where we have observed numerous programs progress through development to deployment, most of the Chinese effort is not far enough along to provide an adequate historical background for judging China's technical and industrial capabilities for developing, producing, and deploying weapon systems embodying advanced technologies. [*4 lines not declassified*] China's disturbed political situation and the increased animosity in Sino-Soviet relations add further uncertainty about the course of Chinese weapon programs over the next few years.

[Omitted here is discussion of general considerations, trends, and prospects regarding China's strategic weapons program, including its nuclear program and delivery systems.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; [*code-words not declassified*]. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of his jurisdiction. The table of contents and a map of the locations of China's advanced weapons facilities are not printed. For the full text of this NIE see, *Tracking the Dragon*.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test

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58. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 2, 1969.

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59. Editorial Note

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60. Editorial Note

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61. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, August 12, 1969.

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62. Editorial Note

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63. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 18, 1969.

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64. Memorandum for the Record of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

San Clemente, September 4, 1969.

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65. President's Daily Brief

Washington, September 6, 1969.

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66. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, September 10, 1969.

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67. Editorial Note

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68. Minutes of Review Group Meeting

Washington, September 25, 1969, 2:25–3:35 p.m.

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69. Editorial Note

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70. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, September 29, 1969.

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71. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, October 6, 1969, 11:40 a.m.

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72. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 9, 1969.

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73. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 9, 1969.

[74. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)]

Washington, October 9, 1969.

[75. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird]

Washington, October 10, 1969.

[76. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commanders in Chief of Selected U.S. Commands]

Washington, October 10, 1969, 2205Z.

[77. Paper Prepared in the Operations Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]

Washington, undated.

[78. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Goodpaster) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)]

Brussels, October 11, 1969, 1155Z.

[79. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)]

Washington, October 13, 1969.

[80. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)]

Washington, October 14, 1969.

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81. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 14, 1969.

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82. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, October 15, 1969.

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83. Editorial Note

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84. Diary Entry by the President's Assistant (Haldeman)

Washington, October 17, 1969.

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85. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 20, 1969, 3:30 p.m.

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86. Editorial Note

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87. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, October 20, 1969.

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88. Editorial Note

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89. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, October 27, 1969.

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90. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to All Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands

Washington, October 28, 1969, 2313Z.

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91. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 6, 1969, noon

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92. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, November 6, 1969.

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93. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, December 1, 1969.

58. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 2, 1969.

SUBJECT
Memorandum from Secretary Laird Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam

—At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Laird enclosing the initial, albeit unsanctioned, plans prepared by the JCS in response to your request of January 27 for such a scenario.[2]
—At Tab B is a proposed reply to Secretary Laird for your signature with some suggestions for modifications which might be considered.[3]

The JCS plans, which have been forwarded, are I believe more extensive than the type you and the President visualized as acceptable signals of U.S. intent to escalate military operations in Vietnam in the face of continued enemy intransigence in Paris. Furthermore, any such plans should be forwarded with the views of the Chairman and the Secretary included. If implemented, they would require some level of coordination at State. The draft plan, in fact, recommends (Page 6 of the draft JCS memorandum)[4] that an appropriate interagency Task Force be formed to refine each of the scenarios which have been developed.

In brief, the plans provide:

1. Actual or feigned airborne/amphibious operations against several objectives in NVN (Appendix A).[5]
2. An actual or feigned airborne/airmobile expedition in force against enemy LOCs in Laos and Cambodia (Appendix B).
3. Actual or feigned renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN (Appendix C).
4. Actual or feigned subversion of the population and preparation for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi regime. (Appendix D).
5. A plan for actual or feigned technical escalation of war against North (nuclear) (Appendix E).[6]

Recommend

You sign the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Laird which:

1. Expresses your gratitude for the excellent draft plan.

2. Requests additional refinement to include lower level actions.
3. Requests resubmission in final form by March 15, 1969.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK Memcons, The President and General DeGaulle, Feb. 28–March 2, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

[2] Tab A, attached but not printed, is a covering memorandum from Laird to Kissinger, February 21, with an undated twenty-page draft paper including appendices prepared by the JCS. According to Laird's covering memorandum, during a luncheon held in the Secretary of Defense's dining room on January 27, he, Wheeler, and Kissinger had "discussed the possibility of working out a program of potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks." Laird also emphasized the preliminary nature of the attached paper, which had not been fully considered by the JCS or OSD. The paper's introduction begins as follows: "To preclude prolonged stalling tactics by the communists in Paris, a program of military, political, and psychological activities can be employed by the United States to create fear in the Hanoi leadership that the United States is preparing to undertake new highly damaging military actions against North Vietnamese (NVN) territory, installations, and interests."

[3] Kissinger's signed March 3 memorandum to Laird, attached but not printed, is at Tab B. In it, Kissinger expressed concern "that the 'realities' of the current domestic and international environment do not lend themselves to an acceptance of these risks at this time. There may be, however, some less elaborate actions which could be initiated which although more subtle in nature, might be undertaken with reduced risks of news media recognition or domestic turbulence." He asked Laird "to flesh-out the plans with a spectrum of lower profiled actions" and be prepared to discuss the resulting proposals with Nixon by March 15.

[4] The appropriate portion of page 6 of the JCS draft paper reads as follows: "If the concept of applying psychological pressure to change [North Vietnamese] negotiating tactics is approved, it is recommended that an appropriate interagency task force be formed to refine each of the attached scenarios and to prepare detailed plans for their implementation."

[5] Appendices A through E are attached to Tab A but not printed.

[6] According to Appendix E, a "technical escalation" translated as the threatened use of nuclear or chemical weapons. The JCS recommended 11 actions to implement the threatened escalation, including a public statement by a high U.S. military official that the United States was examining the use of "new and more modern weapons" in Vietnam and a visit by a "team of Pentagon technical experts in atomic and chemical warfare" to the Pacific.

59. Editorial Note

An outgrowth of the Nixon administration's policy of linkage, making negotiating progress in one area dependent on progress in another, was the threatened use of U.S. or allied military force to encourage North Vietnam and their Soviet patrons to reach a settlement to the conflict in Vietnam. On May 15, 1969, Nixon briefed a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Cabinet on his strategy of placing additional pressures on the enemy to achieve a settlement in Vietnam. A memorandum of the meeting reads as follows: "In a summary statement, the President began by pointing out that the end of World War II was delayed by the insistence on unconditional surrender. 'If the enemy knows there is no way out but military defeat, he has nothing to gain by offering a settlement. What we have provided is a way out. On the other side of the coin, some people feel that it is only necessary to put out a proposal to get peace. What must be realized is that we are talking to an enemy whose first objective is not peace. They want South Vietnam. So if we are going to get genuine negotiations, just putting out a proposal is not enough. We needed to threaten that if they don't talk they will suffer.'

"The President listed four principal factors in the U.S. position. One, we are for peace—we are reasonable. Two, we aim to convince the enemy that if there is no settlement, we have an option which is military action not only at the present level but an expanded level. Three, we want to make clear that they can't win by sitting us out. Four, we want to convince them that they aren't going to get what they want by erosion of the will of the U.S. So, said the President, we have offered them a way out. We have tried to indicate that we will not tolerate a continuation of their fight-talk strategy. We have tried to convince them that the time is coming when South Vietnam will be strong enough to handle a major part of the load. Beyond all this, said the President, it was necessary to give the impression to the enemy that the people of the U.S. are going to support a sound peace proposal and not accept peace at any price. Then and only then will the enemy realize that the war must be ended." (Memorandum of a meeting by James Keogh; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 1, Memoranda for the President's Files, Beginning May 11, 1969) See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 68.

Nixon made specific threats. On August 3, at the end of his worldwide trip that began on July 22, President Nixon met with Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu at the Council of States Building in Bucharest. In the course of asking Ceaucescu to help broker a deal between the United States and the Soviet Union, Nixon again threatened escalation of the war in Vietnam. According to a memorandum of conversation, Nixon said the following: "I am concerned by reports from Paris that the North Vietnamese leaders have concluded that their best tactics are to continue to talk in Paris with no substance and to continue to fight in Vietnam thinking that public opinion will force us to capitulate and get out. I never make idle threats; I do say that we can't indefinitely continue to have 200 deaths

per week with no progress in Paris. On November 1 this year—one year after the halt of the bombing, after the withdrawal of troops, after reasonable offers for peaceful negotiation—if there is no progress, we must re-evaluate our policy.

"Let me make one thing perfectly clear about North Vietnam. I don't hate the North Vietnamese. While I disagree with their government, I admire the courage of the people, their willingness to sacrifice. We want an equal chance for both sides; we want justice and peace for both sides. All we get from them is a take it or leave it position. There is nothing more important to me than to end this war on a fair basis. It will make possible the many Romanian-U.S. actions we talked about, could make possible U.S.-Chinese relations, and would help relations with the Soviet Union. All this is possible." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, President's Trip Files, Memcons—The President and President Ceaucescu, August 2–3, 1969)

According to H.R. Haldeman, the President's Assistant, Nixon intentionally planned to signal to Moscow and Hanoi that he was a "madman" capable of any irrational deed, up to and including using nuclear weapons, to end the stalemate at the negotiating table and bring about an end to the war. The so-called "madman theory" was first suggested in Haldeman's memoirs, published in 1978. Haldeman recalled: "the Communists feared Nixon above all other politicians in U.S. public life. And Nixon intended to manipulate that fear to bring an end to the War. The Communists regarded him as an uncompromising enemy whose hatred for their philosophy had been spelled out over and over again in two decades of public life. Nixon saw his advantage in that fact. 'They'll believe any threat of force that Nixon makes because it's Nixon,' he said."

Haldeman wrote of Nixon's belief that President Dwight D. Eisenhower had convinced North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union to end the Korean war in 1953 only by issuing a nuclear threat. "He saw a parallel in the action President Eisenhower had taken to end another war. When Eisenhower arrived in the White House, the Korean War was stalemated. Eisenhower ended the impasse in a hurry. He secretly got word to the Chinese that he would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea unless a truce was signed immediately. In a few weeks, the Chinese called for a truce and the Korean War ended."

Although it is unclear whether the Eisenhower's threat of nuclear expansion was received as such in China, Nixon planned to use the same tactic in Vietnam, Haldeman recalled. Although he lacked Eisenhower's long military résumé, "he believed his hardline anti-Communist rhetoric of twenty years would serve to convince the North Vietnamese equally as well that he really meant to do what he said. He expected to utilize the same principle of a threat of excessive force."

"The threat was the key, and Nixon coined a phrase for his theory," Haldeman continued. Nixon reportedly told Haldeman in the summer of 1968: "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I've reached the point that I might do *anything* to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that 'for God's sake, you know

Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button'—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace." Nixon himself recalled events differently, however. The former President, during an interview with historian Joan Hoff in 1984, denied using the term "madman theory" and claimed that he rarely discussed substantive foreign policy matters with Haldeman. (H.R. Haldeman with Joseph DiMona, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978), pages 82–83; Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: BasicBooks, 1994), page 177)

In October 1969, the U.S. military, including its nuclear forces, secretly went on alert, a fact that remained unknown for many years. The documentary record offers no definitive explanation as to why U.S. forces went on this alert, also known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Readiness Test. There are two main after-the-fact explanations: first, that nuclear brinkmanship was designed to convince the Soviets that President Nixon was prepared to launch a nuclear attack against North Vietnam in order to convince Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate an end to the war in Southeast Asia; second, that the President ordered the alert as a signal to deter a possible Soviet nuclear strike against China during the escalating Sino-Soviet border dispute.

The second explanation grew out of the intensification of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in early 1969, which lead to several armed clashes, raising concerns among U.S. officials that these skirmishes would provoke a broader clash between the two Communist powers. Fighting between Soviet and Chinese troops erupted in March along the Ussuri River, which formed part of the eastern border between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. After a brief inter-lude, armed clashes again took place, this time along the frontier separating the Chinese Autonomous Region of Sinkiang and the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, culminating in a serious engagement on August 13 that reportedly resulted in heavy casualties, particularly on the Chinese side. In the wake of that exchange, both the Soviet and Chinese Governments initiated civil defense measures in preparation for a possible escalation of hostilities. Negotiations ultimately staved off a Sino-Soviet war, including talks between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and his Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai in early September and bilateral talks on border questions, which were announced on October 7 and began in Beijing on October 20.

According to the second after-the-fact interpretation, President Nixon, on the recommendations of Henry Kissinger, initially considered placing U.S. forces on alert as a signal to the Soviet Union to deter a Soviet preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. As the following documentation shows, U.S. foreign policymakers received several credible, but incomplete, intelligence reports beginning in August 1969 that Soviet leaders were considering such a move.

Kissinger, although he did not specifically mention the alert, recalled in his memoirs that the United States "raised our profile somewhat to make clear that we were not indifferent to these Soviet threats." Such threats included a trial balloon floated by a Soviet journalist

with special ties to the Soviet Government, who on September 16 suggested "the possibility of a Soviet air strike" against a Chinese nuclear testing site. According to Kissinger, "A Soviet attack on China could not be ignored by us. It would upset the global balance of power; it would create around the world an impression of approaching Soviet dominance. But a direct American challenge would not be supported by our public opinion and might even accelerate what we sought to prevent." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pages 184–186)

Nixon offered the most direct evidence of the link between the JCS Readiness Test and Sino-Soviet hostilities during an interview published in the July 29, 1985, issue of *Time* magazine. The former President revealed that he had "considered using nuclear weapons" on four separate occasions during his Presidency. One was in Vietnam. In weighing options to end the war in Vietnam, Nixon said, "one of the options was the nuclear option, in other words, massive escalation: either bombing the dikes or the nuclear option." Having decided not to avail himself of that option in Vietnam, the ex-President recalled also considering using nuclear weapons during the war in the Middle East in October 1973 and during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani crisis.

Another time Nixon said he considered using nuclear weapons "involved China. There were border conflicts. Henry [Kissinger] used to come in and talk about the situation. Incidentally, this was before the tapes. You won't have these on the tapes." Nixon continued, "Henry said, 'Can the U.S. allow the Soviet Union to jump the Chinese?'—that is, to take out their nuclear capability. We had to let the Soviets know we would not tolerate that." (*Time*, July 29, 1985, pages 52–53)

60. Editorial Note

U.S. officials learned in early August 1969 about a standdown by Soviet air forces. General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), announced at Secretary of Defense Laird's weekly staff meeting of August 11 and attended by, among others, Laird; Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard; G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; General Westmoreland, U.S. Army Chief of Staff; and Admiral Moorer, then the Chief of Naval Operations," that one of the most curious and unexplainable situations is the current stand-down in Soviet Air Force activity since 1 August. We have also indications that the Fleet Air Arm of the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been inactive. There have been call-ups of Reservists and indications of improved maintenance." The JCS had failed to "identify any particular reason for these activities," but it anticipated "no immediate threat to the U.S. or its allies. Such an event hasn't happened in 10 years. Consequently, we have put all of the Commanders-in-Chiefs of the unified and specified commands on alert." (Minutes of Secretary's Laird's Staff Meeting; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0028, Box 9, June–August 1969)

The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence on August 8 prepared an Intelligence Memorandum entitled "Standdown of Soviet Air Forces." The memorandum bears Kissinger's initials. It reads in part as follows: "The virtual cessation of Soviet military air activity in the USSR and Eastern Europe that began on the weekend of 2–3 August 1969 is now in its seventh day, making this the longest and most widespread air standdown ever noted in the Soviet Union." It also noted, "A stand-down in military air activity is one of the classic indicators of preparations to initiate hostilities. Inactivity, however, is by no means a conclusive sign of such preparations." The memorandum continued, "Indeed, this standdown had endured beyond the time that would be expected for a pre-hostilities standdown."

The CIA offered several explanations for the standdown. One possibility was that August 21 marked the first anniversary of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviets were "concerned about continued restiveness there." Another alternative was the continuing tension with China: "During the past few months, there has been unusual military activity on the Soviet side of the border, including a large scale military exercise in late May and early June in which China was apparently the simulated enemy. The buildup of Soviet forces on the border—now double the force of a few years ago—almost certainly is continuing, possibly at an accelerated pace. Although Soviet forces on the border now have an offensive capability, they still do not appear capable of conducting protracted large-scale operations against China." Ultimately, the CIA concluded "that the USSR will not initiate hostile military action in the immediate future." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 709, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. 1)

Kissinger recalled the Soviet measures in his memoirs. "In late August," he wrote, "we

detected a standdown of the Soviet air force in the Far East. Such a move, which permits all aircraft to be brought to a high state of readiness simultaneously, is often a sign of a possible attack; at a minimum it is a brutal warning in an intensified war of nerves. The standdown continued through September." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, page 183)

61. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11/13–69 Washington, August 12, 1969.

THE USSR AND CHINA

The Problem

To estimate the general course of Sino-Soviet relations over the next three years.

Conclusions

A. Sino-Soviet relations, which have been tense and hostile for many years, have deteriorated even further since the armed clashes on the Ussuri River last March. There is little or no prospect for improvement in the relationship, and partly for this reason, no likelihood that the fragments of the world Communist movement will be pieced together.

B. For the first time, it is reasonable to ask whether a major Sino-Soviet war could break out in the near future. The potential for such a war clearly exists. Moreover, the Soviets have reasons, chiefly the emerging Chinese nuclear threat to the USSR, to argue that the most propitious time for an attack is soon, rather than several years hence. At the same time, the attendant military and political uncertainties must also weigh heavily upon the collective leadership in Moscow.

C. We do not look for a deliberate Chinese attack on the USSR. Nor do we believe the Soviets would wish to become involved in a prolonged, large-scale conflict. While we cannot say it is likely, we see some chance that Moscow might think it could launch a strike against China's nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved in such a conflict. In any case, a climate of high tension, marked by periodic clashes along the border, is likely to obtain. The scale of fighting may occasionally be greater than heretofore, and might even involve punitive cross-border raids by the Soviets. Under such circumstances, escalation is an ever present possibility.

D. In the light of the dispute, each side appears to be reassessing its foreign policy. The Soviets seem intent on attracting new allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, in order to "contain" the Chinese. To that end Moscow has signified some desire to improve the atmosphere of its relations with the West. The Chinese, who now appear to regard the USSR as their most immediate enemy, will face stiff competition from the Soviets in attempting to expand their influence in Asia.

[Omitted here is a ten-page Discussion section with four parts: Political Background, The Military Dimension, Prospects, and Impact of the Dispute Elsewhere in the World. The estimate also includes a three-page annex entitled Territorial Claims and a map of the Soviet-Chinese border.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The estimate is also published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 24.

62. Editorial Note

The National Security Council met in San Clemente, California on August 14, 1969, to discuss U.S. policy toward China and South Korea and Sino-Soviet hostilities. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting, which lasted from 9:39 a.m. to 12:25 p.m., was attended by President Nixon; Kissinger, his Assistant for National Security Affairs; Vice President Agnew; Secretary of State Rogers; Secretary of Defense Laird; Attorney General Mitchell; Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness; Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Under Secretary of State Richardson; Director of Central Intelligence Helms; Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and NSC Staff members Halperin, Haig, Laurence Lynn, and John Holdridge. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

For the minutes of the portion of the meeting dealing with China and its clash with the Soviet Union see Document 74, *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1972, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970. Nixon took handwritten notes during Helms' briefing about China's nuclear capabilities and political trends, including its tense relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. According to Nixon's notes, Helms stated that the most recent incident on the border between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan, which culminated in a clash on August 13 that reportedly resulted in heavy Chinese casualties, was less serious than "previous levels," presumably a reference to the March Ussuri River crisis. Helms also estimated that although Chinese leaders were "nervous now," they neither wanted nor expected a "Soviet attack." Nixon's notes are published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 25.

Kissinger provided an account of the NSC meeting in his memoirs. He recalled, "the President startled his Cabinet colleagues by his revolutionary thesis (which I strongly shared) that the Soviet Union was the more aggressive party and that it was against our interests to let China be 'smashed' in a Sino-Soviet war. It was a major event in American foreign policy when a President declared that we had a strategic interest in the survival of a major Communist country, long an enemy, and with which we had no contact. The reason a Sino-Soviet war was on his mind was that a new increase of tensions along the border caused us grave concern." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, page 182)

63. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

China: US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR Nuclear Capability; Significance of Latest Sino-Soviet Border Clash; Internal Opposition. *Vietnam:* US and Communist Intentions; Soviet Views. SALT: Reason for Soviet Delay. *Laos:* Soviet Role

PARTICIPANTS

Boris N. Davydov, Second Department of the Soviet Embassy
William L. Stearman, Special Assistant for North Vietnam, INR/REA

The reported conversation was during lunch at the Hotel America (Beef and Bird Restaurant) in Washington on August 18, 1969. Davydov, whom I have known for several years, was the host. Expectedly, he began the conversation with questions on our Vietnam policy, but quickly changed the subject to China with a rather startling line of questioning.

China

Davydov introduced this subject by asking about our intentions towards China. Specifically he wanted to know if recent US moves to improve relations with the CPR were aimed at an ultimate Sino-American collusion against the USSR.[2] I assured him that this was not the case and that the modest steps we are taking to improve relations with China should certainly not be interpreted this way. I told him that his knowledge of both the US and China ought really to rule out, in his mind, any serious possibility of such collusion. Davydov had posed this question in a previous conversation; so it was no surprise. His next question, however, was totally unexpected and has not, to my knowledge, ever been raised by the Soviets with any other US officials.

Davydov asked point blank what the US would do if the Soviet Union attacked and destroyed China's nuclear installations.[3] I replied by asking him if he really meant this to be a serious question. He assured me that he was completely serious and went on to elaborate. He said, in essence, that two objectives would be served by destroying China's nuclear capability. First, the Chinese nuclear threat would be eliminated for decades. Second, such a blow would so weaken and discredit the "Mao clique" that dissident senior officers and Party cadres could gain ascendancy in Peking. He pointed out that the Cultural Revolution proved there was a great deal of internal dissent in China and that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the policies of Mao and Lin Piao.[4] (He later added that basic changes could only be made by people in the upper levels of the Army and Party and not by any regional revolt of minority groups or "tribesmen.") He then rephrased his original question by asking: "What would the US do if Peking called for US

assistance in the event Chinese nuclear installations were attacked by us? Wouldn't the US try to take advantage of this situation?"

I replied that I was obviously in no position to predict exactly what the US would do in such a hypothetical contingency, but added that one could count on two things. One, the US would view any outbreak of major hostilities between the USSR and China with considerable concern as no one could predict the consequences. Two, the US would most certainly want to keep out of any such conflict. Davydov insisted that a strike against the nuclear facilities would not affect the US and there was nothing to fear from this; furthermore, he believed that this would not cause the Chinese to attack the Soviet Union because they would fear a more massive Soviet attack in retaliation and because Mao's position would be weakened by this blow.

At this point I asked Davydov whether he thought Chinese nuclear capability could ever come close to that of the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future. He answered that in the not too distant future this capability could become a serious threat to the Soviet Union. He reminded me that there was a time when the US seriously doubted the ability of the Soviet Union to catch up with it in the nuclear field and look what happened.

He again sought to elicit information on how we envisage the development of US–CPR relations. I told him that, at the present pace, it might be some time before these relations reached the present formal level of Soviet-Chinese relations. After all, these two countries still maintain diplomatic relations and, malgré tout, recently concluded an agreement on river navigation.[5] Davydov said that the maintenance of embassies in the respective capitals wasn't that significant and that Chinese behavior during the recent river navigation talks had been curious. At one point the Chinese broke off the talks without explanation and then resumed them a day later.

I asked him about the significance of the most recent border clashes, and he explained that this encounter with a "mob of peasants" on the Sinkiang border had nothing to do with the Soviet transportation network and could not be related to Chinese nuclear installations in Sinkiang. In general he felt that all of these border clashes were provoked by the Chinese to detract attention from internal problems. He said that Chinese border guards had been provoking their Soviet counterparts since 1963 when there were even instances of the Chinese biting Soviet guards. The Damansky Island "provocation" was the last straw as far as the Soviets were concerned, and the Chinese had to be shown that they couldn't continue to get away with these acts.[6] He inferred that there was a certain advantage to the Soviet Union in these provocations by saying that he actually feared the day when the Chinese began putting on a reasonable, peaceful front behind which they could quietly continue increasing their nuclear strength without raising any alarm.

Coming back to US reaction to the destruction of Chinese nuclear installations, Davydov asked if the US wouldn't really welcome this move since Chinese nuclear weapons could threaten it too; furthermore, the US was supposed to oppose the spread of nuclear

weapons. I answered that while we very much favor limiting the number of nuclear powers through the NPT, an attack on Chinese nuclear installations was quite another thing altogether.[7]

[Omitted here is discussion of the war in Vietnam, SALT, and Laos.]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12 CHICOM. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Stearman. On August 21, George C. Denney, Jr., Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, forwarded this memorandum to Helms and Vice Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Denney's covering memorandum to the latter reads as follows: "You might be interested in the attached memorandum of conversation, which Under Secretary Johnson has asked me to draw to your attention. He is, of course, anxious that all field posts of all agencies be alerted to report immediately any further indications that the Soviets might be considering a preemptive strike on China's nuclear facilities." No record of a response was found. (Central Intelligence Agency, ODDI Registry, Job 80–R01284A, Box 26, Communist China, 1967–69)

[2] President Nixon made an around-the-world trip from July 22 to August 3, during which he discussed China with the leaders of Pakistan and Romania. See Documents 59, 62 and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 20.

[3] Kissinger recalled in his memoirs that he took the contents of this conversation "sufficiently seriously" to convene the WSAG; see Document 64. Such hints by Soviet officials, he wrote, meant that Nixon's "conviction expressed at the August 14 NSC meeting that we could not allow China to be 'smashed' was no longer a hypothetical issue. If the cataclysm occurred, Nixon and I would have to confront it with little support in the rest of the government—and perhaps the country—for what we saw as the strategic necessity of supporting China." (*White House Years*, p. 183)

[4] Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Lin Biao (Lin Piao), PRC Minister of Defense and Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Committee.

[5] Talks between the Chinese and the Soviets on border river navigation, which had begun on June 18, ended on August 8 with the signing of an agreement to hold further talks in China in 1970.

[6] Competing claims to Damansky Island sparked a series of battles, beginning on March 2 and continuing into autumn 1969, which took the PRC and the Soviet Union to the brink of war. The Sino-Soviet dispute included numerous clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops along the border separating the Chinese region of Sinkiang and Soviet Kazakhstan which intensified in May and June of 1969.

[7] During a second conversation with Davydov in Washington on November 10, Stearman "noted that the question he had put to me (i.e., how would the U.S. react to a Soviet attack on China's nuclear installations) was highly unusual. I then probed to find out why he

asked the question in the first place. In replying he was evasive, but gave the impression that he had tried to get a (relatively low level) U.S. reaction to what he termed 'one of a number of contingency plans' which the Soviet Union was considering during that period of Sino-Soviet tension. When asked if he had posed this question on his own initiative, he was again evasive, but did not give the impression that this was the case." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHICOM–USSR)

64. Memorandum for the Record of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

San Clemente, September 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

WSAG Meeting, San Clemente, September 4, 1969

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger
The Attorney General
Admiral Nels Johnson
Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
Assistant Secretary G. Warren Nutter
Thomas Karamessines
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
John H. Holdridge

1. The group agreed that while the draft[2] was a good first cut, some adjustments would have to be made to make the paper more specific and more useful. It was agreed that the section on Vietnam should be strengthened and that the implications of a Soviet blockade of the China mainland would need to be examined from the legal standpoint in detail. An international study of neutrality was required. In addition, further study on the question of the US relationship with the Soviets was required. For example, in the event of a Soviet attack, would we drop discussions with the USSR on SALT, the Middle East and Berlin.
2. It was also generally agreed that the position of impartiality would have the practical consequences of helping the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger proposed, and the rest agreed, that in such circumstances we might try to get something from the Soviets. There were possibly opportunities which might exist for us in other areas such as Korea and Vietnam.
3. On the question of the public position to be taken by the US in the UN or elsewhere, there was concurrence on the point that we could not condone a nuclear exchange, and that if we wanted to quiet things down we must say so. On asking for a ceasefire, it was accepted that for the US to ask for one without at the same time condemning the Soviets would appear to the Chinese as “collusion”. With such a condemnation, however, it was acceptable to ask for a ceasefire.
4. Dr. Kissinger remarked that 2 factors are involved: the actual situation, and what the Chinese perceived. He felt strongly that the definition of impartiality would be to establish a position which in the next decade would focus Chinese resentment entirely on the Soviets, and not on the US.
5. Another point raised by Dr. Kissinger was the undesirability of creating a situation in which a country would establish a principle of resorting to nuclear weapons to settle a

dispute. If such a principle were established, the consequences for the US would be incalculable. It was not enough for us to deplore the effects of nuclear weapons on health and safety factors and we must make this very plain to the Soviets despite the US nuclear policy in Europe.

6. With respect to the paper itself, it was agreed that it should be refined into two alternatives: a situation in which major hostilities were in progress, and a situation in which the Soviets launched a surgical strike against Chinese nuclear centers. There was general agreement that a surgical strike would probably lead to greater hostilities, but for the purpose of the paper this distinction should be made.
7. The group also agreed that section four—what to do to deter—was most pertinent and urgent. The Soviets, in fact, might be getting the idea that we are encouraging them and our record should be clear.
8. Dr. Kissinger observed that as in the Korea papers[3] it would be helpful to know something about what DEFCON should be entered into. He added that it would be insane for Eastern European countries to attempt to approach the US if the Soviets were to knock out the Chinese nuclear capacity.

[Omitted here is discussion of the United States civil defense posture, the best method for communicating with the Chinese, and United States reconnaissance flights.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–71, Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 4, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held at the Western White House in San Clemente, where Nixon vacationed from August 18 to September 8. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) For the full text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 29.

[2] Reference is to a draft 60–page paper entitled "Immediate U.S. Policy Problems in Event of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities," with an Introduction and four sections: General Posture Alternatives, Immediate Policy Problems and Options, Impartiality Stance [and] Advantages in Negotiating With the Soviet Union, and Actions to Forestall Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities. The final section included five options: public statements, discussion at the United Nations, private diplomacy with the Soviet Union, U.S. approaches to the PRC via an intermediary, and encouraging third countries to influence the Soviet Union and the PRC. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–71, WSAG Meeting, September 17, 1969) The draft version of the paper was also discussed at the WSAG meeting of September 17, during which William I. Cargo, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, reported that some changes had been made in the paper since the September 4 meeting. "Alternative situations—a Soviet 'surgical' strike and a condition of widespread, major hostilities—have been built in," according to Cargo. For the final version see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 43. The minutes of the September 17 WSAG meeting are published in

Ibid., Document 32.

[3] NSSM 34, issued on March 21 and entitled "Contingency Planning for Korea," and NSSM 53, issued April 26 and entitled "Korean Contingency Planning," are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIX, Korea; Japan, 1969–1972.

65. President's Daily Brief

Washington, September 6, 1969.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 10, President's Daily Briefs, September 1–22, 1969. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified]

66. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon[1]

Washington, September 10, 1969.

SUBJECT
The Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Chinese Nuclear Facilities

Soviet Embassy Second Secretary Davydov brought up the idea of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities in a Washington luncheon conversation with a Department officer on August 18. I am enclosing the memorandum of conversation which details the rationale for such a move which he adduced in asking what the United States reaction might be.[2]

Davydov's conversation was unusual for the length of the argument that he presented for such a Soviet course of action. None of the other occasional references to the idea in talks with Soviets which have come to our attention have spelled out such a justification.

—In late March or early April Kosygin's son-in-law Gvishiani and Professor Artsimovich who were visiting in Boston reportedly said that the USSR would have to destroy Communist China's nuclear arsenal. They seemed to be soliciting the reaction of the American to whom they were speaking.
—Italian Communist Rossana Rossanda has claimed that, in July, the Italian Communist leadership received a message from Moscow asking how the Italians would react if, in self-defense, the Soviet Union were forced to make a preventive strike against Chinese missile and atomic installations. On the basis of past experience, Rossanda is not to be taken too literally as a reporter, and a more accurate version of her information may be contained in a Finnish Communist account of the consultations in Moscow at the World Communist Conference in June. According to this report, a Soviet leader then asserted that the USSR had a capability to deal China an immediate mortal blow (presumably more than just a strike at nuclear facilities), but did not wish to do something so un-Leninist," except as an extreme defensive measure.
—In June the science editor of *Izvestia*'s Sunday supplement asked an American Embassy officer in Moscow what the American reaction to a possible Soviet attack (nature of the blow not specified) on China might be. The same Russian has avoided the subject more recently, and in response to the American's latest query two weeks ago, the editor merely said that the USSR was trying to better its relations with China. In July Sidney Liu of *Newsweek* was asked by Delyusin of the Soviet Institute of Asian and African Affairs what he thought the Chinese popular reaction would be to a major Soviet attack on China (the nature of the attack was not otherwise defined in the report.)
—A Soviet communication to foreign Communist parties in early August left an impression of great concern over the future of Sino-Soviet relations, but neither of the

two accounts of the message that we have indicates that it discussed such specific courses of action as a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.

—Finally, the most recent Soviet statement on the subject was by Southeast Asia Chief Kapitsa of the Foreign Ministry who insisted to a Canadian newsman that a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear targets was "unthinkable" and that the very idea was an invention of the Western press.

It is extremely unlikely that Davydov would be privy to top-level Soviet discussions on this matter, much less any decisions taken. Rather, it is likely that he has been given the job of getting as much information as he can on American attitudes on the China issue, and his questioning about the strike hypothesis was in the context of trying to elicit discussion of American views of Sino-Soviet relations. The idea of a strike against Chinese nuclear targets is one which has been mentioned in the United States press and talked about among diplomats and newsmen in Washington. Moreover, Davydov had been asked —at a meeting with Congressional interns a few days before the above cited luncheon— what he thought the United States attitude ought to be in the event of a Sino-Soviet war, and thus would have had occasion to have thought through some of the argumentation he used in the memorandum.

What emerges clearly from the foregoing evidence—as well as from Soviet leaders' speeches, from Moscow's propaganda, and from clandestine source reports on Soviet diplomatic anxieties—is an obvious sense of Soviet concern over troubles with China and of great interest in how others view Sino-Soviet tensions. What remains doubtful is whether the Soviets have ordered their officials systematically to canvass for reactions to a specific potential course of action—attack on Chinese nuclear targets. Nevertheless, the Department has considered the possibility that Davydov's conversation might have been the first move in such a probing operation, and, with that in view, has alerted key American posts abroad to be certain to report analogous conversations. The only response so far was from the American Embassy in Rome. A Soviet First Secretary told Italian officials he foresaw new and more serious incidents; he was not reported to have sought reactions and there was no reference in the report to the idea of a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.

In the absence of a cluster of such reports in a relatively short time, it would appear that Davydov's recent conversation, as well as the remarks in Boston five months ago, are curiosities rather than signals. It is certain that Moscow remains preoccupied with its Chinese problem, and the Kremlin is probably reviewing all of its options. Thus the possibility of a Soviet strike at Chinese nuclear facilities cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, my advisers and I do not believe such a move to be probable. The Soviets would have to weigh the risk of triggering an all-out war with China, a war for which the Soviets are not likely to believe themselves yet well prepared despite their buildup since 1965. Moreover, they would not be sure of getting the entire inventory of Chinese bombs, and would in any case face the prospect that the Chinese would most likely rebuild their nuclear arsenal with renewed determination.

The National Intelligence Estimate of August 12, 1969[3] on the Sino-Soviet dispute notes that a conventional air strike aimed at destroying China's missile and nuclear facilities might be the most attractive military option available to Moscow, if the Soviets believed that they could do this without getting involved in a prolonged and full-scale war. The National Intelligence Estimate did not think it likely that the Kremlin would reach this conclusion, but felt that there was some chance that it would. Considering all of the military, political, economic, foreign policy, and ideological implications of any such Soviet attack, the Department's analysts judge that the chances of this particular course of action are still substantially less than fifty-fifty and that Sino-Soviet conflict, if it does occur, might more likely result from escalation of border clashes. That assessment seems reasonable to me.

WPR

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted on August 29 by Robert H. Baraz of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe (RSE). Cleared by INR Deputy Director George C. Denney, Jr., INR Deputy Director for Research David E. Mark, INR/RSE Acting Director Kenneth A. Kerst, Nicholas Platt of INR/Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific (REA), Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) Emory C. Swank, and Samuel G. Wise of EUR/Soviet Union (SOV). On September 12, Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge of the NSC Staff sent Kissinger a draft memorandum for the President informing him of these soundings and Rogers's opinion that a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear facilities was unlikely. Kissinger wrote the following on the covering memorandum: "I disagree with State analysis. Soviets would not ask such questions lightly—though this doesn't mean that they intend to attack." His note also directed Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge to prepare a new memorandum for the President that provided "a little more flavor of communist probes." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 710, Country Files, USSR, Vol. V) See Document 70.

[2] Printed as Document 63.

[3] Document 61.

67. Editorial Note

Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China conducted nuclear tests in late September 1969. China conducted its first underground nuclear test on September 22. United States intelligence detected the test [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The Central Intelligence Agency produced an intelligence memorandum two days later than began as follows: "[*2 lines not declassified*]." On September 25, President Nixon received a memorandum from his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarizing the CIA analysis. The real significance of the test, according to Kissinger, was that the PRC had made sufficient progress in its nuclear program to tackle the technical challenges involved in an underground test. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 958, Haig Chronological Files, September 1969 and ibid., Box 519, Country Files, Far East, Vol. III, respectively)

The Soviets conducted a nuclear test on September 25. On September 26, Kissinger sent to Nixon a memorandum reporting that the Soviets had tested an SS–9 inter-continental ballistic missile employing three reentry vehicles, the eighth such test since August 1968. [*1 line not declassified*] according to Kissinger's memorandum. Nixon highlighted this section of the memorandum and wrote in the margin, "K[issinger]—We'd better keep a close eye on this." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 11, President's Daily Briefs, September 23–30, 1969)

68. Minutes of Review Group Meeting[1]

Washington, September 25, 1969, 2:25–3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Differences (NSSM 63)[2]

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Richard F. Pedersen (came late)
William I. Cargo
Donald McHenry
Defense
G. Warren Nutter
CIA
R. Jack Smith
JCS
LTG F. T. Unger
OEP
Haakon Lindjord
USIA
Frank Shakespeare
NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
John Holdridge
William Hyland
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Ad Hoc Committee paper[3] is to be revised to spell out the consequences of policy choices in three situations:

a. Continued Sino-Soviet tension but no hostilities;
b. Active U.S. effort to deter hostilities
c. Hostilities
   1. one-shot strike, or
   2. protracted conflict

The revised paper[4] will be considered again at a Review Group meeting[5] and then by the NSC.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting saying that this was a difficult paper to write on a conjectural issue of which we do not know the dimensions. There were, in fact, two papers: a basic paper and a summary. There was, however, no inevitable relationship between the two, since parts of the basic paper were not covered in the summary. He

suggested, and it was agreed, that this meeting would deal with the summary paper plus certain points of the basic paper not covered in the summary.

He noted the summary's assumption that the President has already spoken in favor of Strategy D ("to assert an interest in improving relations with both contestants.").[6] He acknowledged this was true, but noted that usually the President's position was more complicated than what he said. He (Mr. Kissinger) did not wish to be in a position of announcing to the Review Group what the President's policy is, then structuring the meeting accordingly. The President is open to other suggestions if the judgment of this group indicates that another course would be more desirable. The President's position was contained in a public statement that we want to be friends with both sides.[7] Mr. Kissinger interpreted that to mean that in a non-hostilities situation we would be more inclined to lean toward China while publicly pronouncing that we favor neither. He thought the President's view was not so firm that it could not be changed by reasoned argument, and reiterated that there were no restrictions on this group's discussions.

He thought the situations could be stated more explicitly than in the paper, possibly as: (1) continued tension but not hostilities; (2) a U.S. policy to deter hostilities; (3) U.S. policy during hostilities. He could see the argument of leaning toward China on the grounds that in a non-war situation it was more logical to support the weaker against the stronger. During hostilities, neutrality would have the objective consequence of helping the USSR, and assistance to China would probably not make any difference to the outcome. Therefore, since policy in a pre-hostilities stage would not be applicable to a hostilities situation, it would be worth examining policy in both situations.

Mr. Cargo agreed, saying the deterrent policy was presumably a part of the contingency study under way in the WSAG.[8] He thought the first and third situations (no hostilities and hostilities) were addressed in the paper before the meeting. He noted that Section V examines the implications area by area in both situations.

[Omitted here is discussion of Japan within the context of Sino-American relations and the Department of Defense's position regarding NSSM 63.]

Mr. Kissinger commented that our stance depends on our idea of a desirable outcome; for example, if we lean toward China in a pre-hostilities period it would be on the assumption that China will be a functioning unit. If China breaks up, we are in a different universe and would no longer have the option of supporting China. We should get some assessment of the trends in a pre-hostilities phase but it would be more important in the event of hostilities. We should consider two possibilities: (1) a military situation where the Soviets have taken out China's nuclear capability and nothing else, and (2) a situation in which the Soviets have moved massively into a protracted ground war. In the first situation, we could make the best of a demonstration of impotence and in the second, we could enjoy the vicarious pleasures of someone else's Vietnam. It was not in our interest

for the USSR and China to become a monolithic bloc. If China breaks up, it would not be so much of a problem. He asked if we should postulate a few assumptions.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Mr. Kissinger said he could make no judgment on what will happen to China, but he thought we should make a judgment on the effect of a single Soviet strike on China vs. a massive ground war and that it would be worthwhile to look at the position the U.S. should take. He questioned whether it was worthwhile taking the time of senior people to consider possible political outcomes in China.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Mr. Kissinger said that, to the extent our policy in the Middle East is influenced by a fear of becoming embroiled with the USSR, we would have to consider Soviet reluctance to become involved with us in the Middle East and with China in the Far East. This would depend on the different possible war outcomes. If the Soviets were involved in a protracted war in the Far East, they would be reluctant to get into another war. *But*, if they could make a clean nuclear strike, it would enhance their fearsomeness and the temptation to intervene in the Middle East would be greater.

Mr. Shakespeare replied that, even so, the Soviets would have earned the implacable hostility of China. And they might be in difficulty in Eastern Europe. Would the U.S. be worse off?

Mr. Kissinger asked what the effect would be if the USSR knocked off the Chinese nuclear capability, even on top of the Czech invasion. What could China do in 10 or 15 years?

Mr. Shakespeare asked if we gained or lost from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Kissinger replied we lost.

Mr. Pedersen commented that we did not want a worldwide deterioration of the situation.

Mr. Kissinger thought the “implacable hostility” of China wouldn’t hurt the Soviets for 10 years. He cited the Chinese attack on India in 1962 which resulted in India’s loss of confidence in China. He thought hostilities might lead to an interesting situation in the Middle East. But, on the other hand, it might make the Soviets think they should clean up the situation in the West before they have to face the East again.

Mr. Shakespeare thought that we should consider whether the possibility of a protracted conflict between the USSR and China could have decided benefits.

Mr. Cargo thought we would analyze the possible types of conflicts which would be advantageous, although we would not have that kind of choice. He thought we must say

'no' to a Soviet-Chinese conflict. He thought the nuclear problems—the question of fallout alone—would require this position.

General Unger noted the third-country problem, and Mr. Cargo commented that we would be letting the genie out of the bottle.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt commented that arguing the methodology of advantage or disadvantage isn't going to get far. We should isolate the consequences and what problems each would pose. In the Middle East, what would Israel calculate the Soviet reaction to be if they should march. What would be the effect on the India–Pakistan situation?

Mr. Shakespeare agreed. While the paper assumes that hostilities should be avoided at all costs, he thought there was another side.

Mr. Kissinger asked whether, even if we assume our interest is in avoiding conflict, should we not consider it. He thought it would be very useful to expand the contingency paper[9] to 45 days plus. We could handle the Vietnam issue as a part of the contingency paper in view of its sensitivity.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted with regard to SALT that the paper says the Soviets might be more reluctant to go into SALT in the event of major hostilities. He thought this would be true in the event of protracted war, but, on the other hand, the Soviets might want to use SALT as a safety valve and to manipulate the Chinese into a bad position.

Mr. Pedersen noted that the interesting thing in Gromyko's speech to the General Assembly[10] was his statement that any radical disarmament must include all five powers. This was different from what he had said last year.

Mr. Kissinger thought this was suspicious unless the Soviets were getting ready to disarm China.

Mr. Kissinger recommended that, in order to make the NSC discussion useful, we lay out the consequences of various choices in various situations. He thought we might get useful directives as a result.

Mr. Kissinger noted there were overlapping (or possibly conflicting) interests between us and the Soviets which might lend themselves to negotiations in the case of a period of tension or of hostilities. Except for Taiwan, we might have few similar situations with China. Which would be easier?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted that disagreement over whether "overlapping" meant "converging" or "conflicting", citing the experience in drafting the BNSP.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should explore what is really hidden by "overlapping," get it explicitly analyzed and resolved.

Mr. Cargo thought we might highlight the principal choices and their operational consequences and attempt to project them further ahead.

Mr. Kissinger said we should separate hostilities from a period of tension and we should sub-divide the types of hostilities—a one-shot strike vs. protracted conflict. He thought we should bring the matter to the NSC as soon as possible.

Mr. Cargo noted that the "lean toward" option would be taken care of in such an approach.

Mr. Kissinger thought we would probably come out with a recommendation to keep open our options toward China in order to and to the extent that we could get concessions from the USSR. We should pose the question in terms of the three new basic options he had mentioned at the beginning of the meeting. He asked if we could get a revision of the paper in a week or two.

Mr. Cargo replied we could.

Mr. Kissinger said he foresaw a quick Review Group meeting on the revised paper, then to the NSC.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969 [2 of 3]. Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. The entire minutes are published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 36.

[2] For the text of NSSM 63, issued on July 3 and entitled "U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences," see ibid., Document 15.

[3] Reference is to the draft response to NSSM 63 submitted by the NSSM 63 Inter-departmental Ad Hoc Group on September 3. The paper included five sections: a review of intelligence regarding the Sino-Soviet relationship; an analysis of the relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China; Strategic Options Assuming Continuing Sino-Soviet Political Rivalry; Strategic Options Assuming Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities; and Implications for U.S. Policy in Specific Areas. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting, NSSM 63 Sino-Soviet Differences, September 25, 1969)

[4] On October 17, the NSSM 63 Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group submitted a revised 23–page paper divided into three major sections: 1. Options; 2. Analysis of the Interrelation: The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S.; and 3. Problems and Opportunities for the U.S. Assuming Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities. It recommended the following abbreviated

options: A. Support China, B. Support the USSR, C.1. Passive neutrality, and C.2. Current policy with more movement toward China. “Rising Soviet concern over the nuclear weapons capabilities and future military potential of China may be inducing the Soviet leadership to take a more aggressive view,” the paper noted, leading them “to feel that a major military move against China could remove the Chinese nuclear threat or even undermine the Mao–Lin leadership. In this case they might even encourage border tension to provide a pretext for wider military action.” One option available to the Soviet Union was “a preemptive strike, e.g., an attempt to destroy the Chinese nuclear and missile facilities.” The paper continued, “the possibilities that nuclear weapons might be used, that other countries might be drawn into the war, and that the outcome might shift the balance of power against us, are sufficiently great to make an escalation of hostilities something we should seek to avoid and to raise the question whether there are possible actions we could take to minimize the chances of a major Sino-Soviet military conflict.” (Ibid., Review Group Meeting, Sino-Soviet Differences, November 20, 1969) The paper’s summary is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 40.

[5] The minutes of the November 20 Review Group meeting are published ibid., Document 47.

[6] The September 3 draft listed four broad strategies open to the United States: “A. To support the Chinese position by collaborating with Peking in its efforts to avoid politico-economic isolation. B. To collaborate with the USSR in isolating China. C. To adopt a ‘hands-off’ attitude, refusing to have anything to do with either contestant that might be interpreted by the other as tilting the balance. D. To assert an interest in improving relations with both contestants, gaining leverage where we can from the dispute in pursuit of our own interests.” See footnote 3.

[7] Kissinger was referring to the President’s address before the 24th session of the UN General Assembly on September 18; see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 724–731.

[8] See footnote 2, Document 64.

[9] See footnote 8 above.

[10] In his speech at a plenary meeting of the 24th session of the UN General Assembly, September 19, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko introduced a plan for “the strengthening of international security,” which was placed on the agenda for the General Assembly. (United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, *Official Records*, 1756th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1969, pp. 7–14; ibid., *Annexes*, Agenda Item 103, Document A/7654 and A/7903, pp. 1–6)

69. Editorial Note

During the autumn of 1969, President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger searched for ways of achieving a negotiated settlement to the war in Vietnam by escalating, or by giving the appearance of escalating, the war, thereby encouraging the North Vietnamese to be more conciliatory in the Paris peace talks. In his memoirs, Nixon stated, "After half a year of sending peaceful signals to the Communists, I was ready to use whatever military pressure was necessary to prevent them from taking over South Vietnam by force. During several long sessions, Kissinger and I developed an elaborate orchestration of diplomatic, military, and publicity pressures we would bring to bear on Hanoi." (*RN*, pages 393, 398)

Kissinger's memoirs include a slightly different version of events. "Nixon tried to play for all the marbles; and as was not infrequently the case, he began it with a maneuver that appeared portentous though it reflected no definitive plan. In short, he was bluffing." Specifically, Kissinger recalled that the administration tried to create the impression that the November 1 anniversary of the United States' halt on bombing North Vietnamese targets "was a kind of deadline." The President, Kissinger wrote, "dropped less than subtle hints that his patience was running out and that if no progress had been made in Paris by November 1, he would take strong action. So far as I could tell, Nixon had only the vaguest idea of what he had in mind." (*White House Years*, pages 304–305)

Nixon and Kissinger, in a manifestation of linkage, gave Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin the impression that they were about to escalate the war on the assumption that the Soviets could and would pressure their North Vietnamese clients to reach a settlement in Paris. Kissinger held a meeting with Dobrynin on September 27. According to the memorandum of conversation, President Nixon, by prearrangement, called during the meeting. Once the conversation was completed, Kissinger told Dobrynin, "To us Vietnam was the critical issue. We were quite prepared to discuss other subjects, but the Soviet Union should not expect any special treatment until Vietnam was solved." Kissinger, after expressing regret "that all our efforts to negotiate had failed," informed Dobrynin that President Nixon "had told me in his call that the train had just left the station and was now headed down the track. Dobrynin responded that he hoped it was an airplane and not a train and would leave some maneuvering room. I said the President chooses his words very carefully and that I was sure he meant train." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President's Trip Files, Box 489, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969 [Part 2]) The full memorandum of conversation, which Kissinger sent to Nixon under a covering memorandum, October 1, is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 85. See also ibid., volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 125.

Nixon called Kissinger after the latter's meeting with Dobrynin. According to the transcript of the telephone conversation, the President asked Kissinger if Dobrynin

clearly understood “the fact we are going the hard route?” Kissinger assured Nixon that the Soviet Ambassador understood as Kissinger “had been very tough on him.” Kissinger then summarized their conversation. “D[obrynin] had asked what K[issinger] thought of the Sino-Soviet problem” and “whether he thought they (the Soviets) were going to attack the Chinese. K had replied that, as a historian, he thought the Soviets were considering it.” Later during their conversation, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the merits and timing of “making the tough move” regarding the war in Vietnam. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 489, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969 [Part 1])

70. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, September 29, 1969.

SUBJECT
The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China

In the last two months, the increase in Sino-Soviet tensions has led the Soviets to sound out numerous American contacts on their attitude toward a possible Soviet air strike against China's nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions. These probes have varied in character from point-blank questioning of our reaction to provocative musings by Soviets over what they might be forced to do against the Chinese, including the use of nuclear weapons. Some of these contacts have featured adamant denials that the Soviets were planning any military moves—thereby keeping the entire issue alive. (Secretary Rogers' Memorandum on this subject is at Tab A.)[2]

Our contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is well along, and NSC consideration of a basic policy paper on the Sino-Soviet dispute is scheduled for October 8.[3]

Meanwhile, I am concerned about our response to these probes. The Soviets may be quite uncertain over their China policy, and our reactions could figure in their calculations. Second, the Soviets may be using us to generate an impression in China and the world that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions.

[Omitted here is a paragraph dealing with PRC representation in the United Nations.]

I believe we should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics, in pursuance of your policy of avoiding the appearance of siding with the Soviets.

The principal gain in making our position clear would be in our stance with respect to China. The benefits would be long rather than short-term, but they may be none the less real. Behavior of Chinese Communist diplomats in recent months strongly suggests the existence of a body of opinion, presently submerged by Mao's doctrinal views, which might wish to put US/Chinese relations on a more rational and less ideological basis than has been true for the past two decades.[4]

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to ask the Department of State to prepare instructions to the field

setting forth guidance to be used with the USSR and others, deploring reports of a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May–December 1969. Secret. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Sonnenfeldt sent it to Kissinger under a covering memorandum of September 24. The entire memorandum is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 37.

[2] Printed as Document 66.

[3] The NSC did not discuss Sino-Soviet hostilities as scheduled. Rather, the NSC devoted its October 8 meeting to verification issues regarding a potential agreement to limit strategic arms. The NSSM 63 Ad Hoc Group produced on October 17 a paper on Sino-Soviet differences; see footnote 4, Document 68.

[4] In an August 28 memorandum to Kissinger, William Hyland of the NSC staff wrote the following: "The idea that we can build up political credit with the Chinese leaders by displaying our sympathies is not very convincing. If we were serious in this regard we should take actions to forestall a Soviet strike, which the Chinese could claim we have full knowledge of." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. 4)

[5] The President initialed his approval and added the following handwritten comment: "Base it on 'reports which have come here—etc.'"

71. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, October 6, 1969, 11:40 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of military briefing procedures.]

Kissinger asked if Laird thought that "it will be picked up?"

Laird said we can make sure it is, but I certainly don't want to announce it from here.

Kissinger said he saw that there is a SAC exercise going on in October. "I'm all for it—but I just want to know what it is. Has it been announced?"

Laird—no formal announcement.

Kissinger—"Will the other side pick this up? We want them to."

Laird—They will pick it up. The fact that we are exercising our bombers.

Kissinger—Could you exercise the "DevCons" (?) [DEFCON] for a day or so in October? I'll give you a brief as to why.

Laird—We can.

HAK—The President will appreciate it very much.

[Omitted here is discussion of Laos and an upcoming Nuclear Planning Group meeting.]

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 89, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. Top Secret.

72. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 9, 1969.

SUBJECT
Items to Discuss with the President, October 9

1. Discuss Soviet contact made by Sullivan with Tcherniakov. Reporting telegram received last night from State is at Tab A.[2] (While you may have been aware of this initiative which obviously did not come about by the happenstance suggested in the reporting telegram, I was not. I personally believe that we would have had to ferret out the meaning of the lowered activity in Vietnam before the first of November. However, professional poker players play their cards with far greater finesse. Certainly our cards should have been played after October 15 unless we believed serious upheavals were going to come on the 15th here at home.[3] I do not believe this and would have far preferred our playing the game at least to the 25th of October. Obviously the fat is now in the fire and the game has started but our chips are already considerably lower than they might have been.)

[Omitted here are points 2 and 3, dealing with Israel and Biafra respectively.]

4. Discuss with the President the specific alert measures which Defense can implement starting on the 13th[4] or soon thereafter as possible (Tab D). I have checked in pencil what I consider to be the acceptable options of those offered by Defense. They are preparing a detailed paper on each of these options as indicated in the Pursley memo. Basically, I would implement Items "a" and "b" in the attached memo for a period of 48 hours each. This would involve radio silence and a stand down of all combat aircraft in CONAD and EUCOM. I would also implement item "e" which involves ground alert of SAC bombers and tankers but preferably item "f" with dispersal of CONAD forces. This would involve movement to military DOB's but not to civilian DOB's and would involve both SAC aircraft and Air Defense aircraft.

Tab D

Washington, October 8, 1969.

Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Military Assistant (Pursley) to the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig)[5]

SUBJECT
Significant Military Actions

In response to your request, a number of concepts for military actions are outlined below which would, in our judgment, be considered by the Soviets as unusual and significant. The following criteria were employed in developing these potential actions:

a. Ease of detection by the Soviet Union.
b. High possibility of being considered unusual and significant.
c. Low public exposure in the United States.
d. Feasible of execution as early as 13 October, or as soon thereafter as possible.
e. Lasting sufficiently long to be convincing.

Concepts meeting these criteria would include:[6]

a. Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands, e.g., in SAC and Polaris forces.
b. Stand-down of flying of combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, e.g., for 48 hours in SAC and EUCOM.
c. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.
d. Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union.
e. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.
f. Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons to only military dispersal bases, with or without dispersal of CONAD forces.
g. Alerting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or by tender.

Modification of the Snow Time 70–2–E joint SAC/NORAD exercise has been considered, but does not appear to qualify under the given criteria.

The significance of the costs and risks entailed by the military actions outlined above must be related to the over-all effect desired, which is not known at this time. In absolute terms, neither the costs nor the risks seem to be high.

Robert E. Pursley[7]
Colonel, USAF
Military Assistant

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13–12/30/69. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

[2] Tab A was not found attached and is not further identified. The references are to Yuri N. Tcherniakov, Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and, presumably, to William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

[3] On October 15, approximately 250,000 protesters marched in Washington during a

nationwide Vietnam moratorium.

[4] Monday, October 13.

[5] Secret.

[6] Haig placed checkmarks next to options a, b, c, e, and f.

[7] The original bears Pursley's typed signature. A signed copy of this memorandum includes the following postscript that Pursley addressed to Haig: "This is bare-bones stuff tonight. I have asked the Joint Staff to amplify each of the alternatives listed above and provide me a follow-on paper in the morning [Thursday, October 10]." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 352, Subject Files, Schedule of Significant Military Exercises, Vol. 1 [Feb. 69–Oct. 70])

73. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, October 9, 1969.

SUBJECT
Military Alerts

Attached is a memorandum from Defense[2] which outlines a series of concept actions which could be executed as early as October 13th in order to convey the impression of increased U.S. readiness to the Soviets. There are seven conceptual operations suggested which include:

1. Implementation of a period of radio and communication silence in selected commands.
2. 48–hour stand-down of strategic and combat aircraft in selected commands.
3. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships enroute to North Vietnam.
4. Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union.
5. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.
6. Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons and Air Defense aircraft to their military dispersal bases.
7. Alert or dispatch to sea of nuclear submarines currently in port.

Of the above proposals, I would recommend that we implement, starting next week and phased appropriately through the week, the measures listed above as follows: 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6.

Recommendation:

That you approve the implementation of the readiness measures listed above, starting as early as October 13th, and to be completed on October 25.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 352, Subject Files, Schedule of Significant Military Exercises, Vol. I [Feb. 69–Oct. 70]. Secret. Sent for action.

[2] See the attachment to Document 72.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears no indication whether the President approved or disapproved the recommended measures. During a telephone conversation with Laird held at 12:40 p.m. on October 10, Kissinger assured Laird that Nixon had approved. A transcript of the conversation reads in part: "Concerning the exercises that are to laid on for October 13 and 14 and running through that week, L[aird] understood one thing—all

of these had been approved by the President last night. K said yes, the President went over them last night. L said there is no DEFCON business involved in this—we will not be contacting our allies (Canada or NATO) on any of these? K said that is what we want. We were worried about getting the allies involved. All of these activities will get some sort of signal—they will get the word but there will be no DEFCON. There is no military significance to this, and it won't cost much money, per Laird." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

74. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 9, 1969.

SUBJECT
Items to Discuss with the President, October 10

1. Inform the President that you have instructed Defense to proceed with the alert measures he approved yesterday.[2] (At Tab A is a list of pros and cons of each of the measures listed in the memo. Those which are being implemented and for which detailed plans are being prepared with a submission date of October 10, are checked.)

[Omitted here are points 2 through 5, which deal with unrelated matters.]

Tab A

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense[3]

Initial Evaluation of Possible Military Actions

1. Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands, e.g., in SAC and Polaris forces.[4]
   a. Pros:
      —low cost.
      —easily detected.
      —unusual U.S. action.
      —high initial impact; possibly alarming in significance.
      —could be puzzling for long period.
      —low public exposure.
      —feasible for early execution.
   b. Cons:
      —very restricting to normal operational and administrative requirements.
      —will gradually lose significance.
      —may be shown up as a sham as Soviet reconnaissance/surveillance fails to turn up complementing activity, such as alerting or movement of forces.
2. Stand-down of flying combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, e.g., for 48 hours in SAC and EUCOM.

a. Pros:
—rather easily detected in perhaps one day.
—would be considered both unusual and significant if event includes sizeable forces.
—feasible of early execution.
—negative cost.

b. Cons:
—moderately visible to public.
—difficult to extend beyond several days without disrupting training proficiency and administrative schedule.
—lack of supporting actions, such as recall of personnel on leave and dispersal of forces, might expose overall action as sham.

3. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.

a. Pros.
—low cost.
—easily detected by ship and promptly reported.
—significant departure from current operations.
—no direct public exposure.
—feasible of early execution.
—implies significant U.S. interest in Soviet actions.
—can be continued for long period.

b. Cons:
—diverts destroyer, helicopter and patrol aircraft from other important tasks.
—could provoke Soviet charges of interference with shipping on high seas, with attendant public exposure.
—increases chance of collision at sea.
—could encourage counterharassment of U.S. shipping.

4. Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

a. Pros:
—easily detected, perhaps over period of one week.
—no public exposure in U.S. unless Soviets take hostile action.
—can be integrated into over-all U.S. surveillance program.
—can be continued over long period.
—would be considered very significant, though not necessarily unusual.

b. Cons:
—will divert limited resources from other high priority tasks.
—increased risk of shoot-down by Soviets.
—risk of Soviet-sponsored initiatives by other Red countries against U.S. surveillance craft.

5. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.

a. Pros:
—rather easily detected over several days.
—particularly significant when coupled with nuclear weapon loading.
—low public exposure.

—feasible of early execution.
—low cost.

b. Cons:
—difficult to maintain for weeks without strain on air crews.

6. Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons to only military dispersal bases.

a. Pros:
—easily detected.
—highly significant to Soviets.
—low or negative costs after several days.
—can be executed quickly.
—can be sustained over long period.

b. Cons:
—could be publicly alarming, depending on situation and interpretation.

7. Alerting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or alongside tender.

a. Pros:
—easily detected by Soviet shore spotters, and promptly reported.
—recognized by Soviets as departure from scheduled operations.
—feasible of early execution for submarines not undergoing extensive repairs.
—absence from port can be maintained for long duration.
—Soviets cannot determine destination or mission.

b. Cons:
—stimulates speculation by dependents and results in positive public exposure in U.S.
—delays or interrupts repair and upkeep periods.
—degrades long-term readiness.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13–12/30/69. Secret.

[2] Nixon approved on October 9. See Document 73 and footnote 3 thereto.

[3] Pursley sent the paper to Haig under a covering memorandum, October 9, which reads as follows: “Yesterday, October 8, 1969, I provided a list of a number of possible military actions which the Soviet Union would consider as unusual and significant. Attached is an initial evaluation of possible advantages and disadvantages of such actions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 352, Subject Files, Schedule of Significant Military Exercises, Vol. I [Feb. 69–Oct. 70])

[4] Haig placed checkmarks next to options 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6.

75. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

CM–4624–69 Washington, October 10, 1969.

SUBJECT
Significant Military Actions

1. In accordance with instructions from higher authority,[2] an outline plan for testing military readiness of selected forces world-wide has been prepared (Tab A).
2. This plan calls for the standdown of flying training activities in selected commands, and for the development of increased readiness. Activities which require prior consultation with our Allies, the degradation of current essential missions, or increased funding requirements have been avoided. Commanders concerned have been requested to provide recommendations for additional actions to be taken during the 13–25 October period. These additional actions will be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening.
3. I have dispatched the messages to the commanders concerned, as indicated.
4. I recommend the President be informed of our planning and actions taken with the attached draft memorandum (Tab B).[3]

Earle G. Wheeler

Tab A

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared by the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[4]

OUTLINE PLAN FOR TESTING MILITARY READINESS

Objective—To achieve a readiness posture with selected US forces for the period 13–25 October in a manner which will be discernible to the Soviets, but not threatening.

Assumptions—Actions will: not require additional funding or resources; not require consultation or agreement with allies; can be taken without degradation of current essential missions; can be taken with plausible rationale for public information purposes; be readily apparent to Soviets as increased US readiness for confrontation.

Courses of Action—Selected US military forces worldwide will be directed to stand-down all flying training activity, and to take certain other measures.

a. A message will be dispatched to SAC no later than 1200 hours, 11 October, directing

stand-down of all flying training and reinstatement of degraded alert sorties to maximum extent possible. Stand-down will commence at 0800 local Omaha time on 13 October 1969. The stand-down will continue until otherwise directed by the JCS.

b. A message will be dispatched to CINCONAD, CINCPAC, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, no later than 1200 hours, 13 October, directing stand-down of all flying training activities and assumption of highest degree of combat readiness permitted by stand-down and consistent with no change in DEFCON. Stand-down will continue until otherwise directed by the JCS.

Timing—The stand-down postures will continue until US intelligence indicates Soviets have become aware of the increased readiness. A special intelligence watch has been established for this purpose. SAC will begin its stand-down 2 days earlier than other participating commands to permit appearance of intensification of US readiness over a period of several days. The US Sixth Fleet will impose EMCON to create impression of unusual fleet activity in addition to standing down normal flying training activity. The JCS will determine when commands will be selectively returned to normal posture.

Possible second Phase—Participating commands will be requested by separate message to suggest possible additional measures for second phase implementation. These measures will be considered by the JCS and directed for implementation as selected.

Termination—All operations will return to normal no later than 25 October, and possibly earlier, if directed by the JCS.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 1969). Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note indicates the memorandum was handcarried to Pursley at 7:15 p.m., October 10.

[2] Wheeler received a memorandum on October 9 from Lemnitzer informing him that Kissinger had "requested an integrated plan of military actions to demonstrate convincingly to the Soviet Union that the United States is getting ready for any eventuality on or about 1 November 1969." Lemnitzer added, "Rather than threatening a confrontation (which may or may not occur), the objective of these actions would be a demonstration of improving or confirming readiness to react should a confrontation occur." (Ibid.) Later that day, Wheeler sent a memorandum directing the Joint Staff "to prepare an integrated plan of actions which will physically test our military readiness in selected areas worldwide to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union. These actions should be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening in themselves." (Ibid.) More informally, Lemnitzer, in a handwritten memorandum dated October 9, informed Wheeler "that the President has directed the execution of the five major actions" that Kissinger recommended in his memorandum, Document 73.

[3] Attached but not printed is Tab B, an undated draft memorandum to President Nixon

informing him that “actions have been taken and are being planned to test the readiness posture of selected U.S. forces.” The memorandum was not sent to Nixon.

[4] Top Secret. Lemnitzer’s handwritten memorandum to Wheeler of October 9 indicates that Laird saw this plan and approved its “execution as directed by the White House.”

76. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commanders in Chief of Selected U.S. Commands[1]

Washington, October 10, 1969, 2205Z.

12650. 1. We have been directed by higher authority to institute a series of actions during the period 130000Z–250000Z Oct, to test our military readiness in selected areas world-wide to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union. These actions should be discernible to the Soviets, but not threatening in themselves. They may include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following type actions:

A. Stand-down of flying of combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, to improve operational readiness.
B. Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands.
C. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.
D. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.

2. To initiate actions within the time frame specified, certain commanders have been directed[2] to stand-down training flights and introduce varying degrees of EMCON. These initial actions will cover the first four days of the 14–day period.

3. I request that you nominate further actions compatible with the guidance herein, and cognizant of local problems peculiar to your areas, allies, and environment. These nominations are required NLT 122300Z. Actions proposed should be compatible with Project 703.[3]

4. Warm regards.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 1969). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Immediate. Drafted by Rear Admiral F. A. Bardshar in the Directorate of Operations, Joint Staff, JCS. Sent to General Bruce K. Holloway, CINCSAC; Admiral John S. McCain, Sr., CINCPAC; General Goodpaster, CINCEUR; Admiral Ephrain Holmes, CINCLANT; General Seth McKee, CINCNORAD and CINCONAD; General John Throckmorton, CINCSTRIKE; General George Mather, CINC, Southern Command; and Lieutenant General Robert Ruegg, CINC, Alaska.

[2] Wheeler on October 10 sent separate telegrams to each individual CINC informing them of the specific measures to be taken in their commands. (Ibid.)

[3] Laird, during his press conference of August 21, announced plans to reduce fiscal year

1970 defense expenditures by up to $3 billion, a cost-cutting effort dubbed Project 703. See Document 49.

77. Paper Prepared in the Operations Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

Point Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for a Meeting With the President

SUBJECT
Plan for US Military Readiness

Main Thrust of Point Paper

—Initial actions have been taken to achieve readiness posture with selected US forces for the period 12–25 October 1969. Posture will be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening.

Actions Taken

—*CINCSAC*

—Commencing at 0800 local, 13 October 1969 stand-down all training flights until further advised.
—Reinstate degraded alert sorties to maximum extent possible.
—(Actions taken will not affect SEA operations).

—*CINCPAC*

—Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights within the Korean ADIZ until further advised.
—Reinstate degraded SIOP alert sorties extent feasible.
—Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.

—*USCINCEUR*

—Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights until further advised.
—Sixth Fleet operate maximum practicable EMCON commensurate with safety.
—Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.

—*CINCSTRIKE/CINCONAD*

—Commencing at 0800 local, 15 October 1969 stand-down all training flights.
—Air units during stand-down will achieve maximum state of readiness. No DEFCON change.

Second Phase of Operations

—Dispatched personal message to CINCs[2] which:
—Alerts them to forthcoming operation.
—Requests their nomination further actions which can be taken under guidelines provided.
—All actions taken will be compatible with Project 703.
—Reaction from CINCs expected NLT 1900 EDT, 12 October—basis for further activity will stem from these inputs.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69). Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Colonel Jack L. Buckley, General Operations Division of the JCS. This paper was prepared for Wheeler's meeting with Nixon, held on October 11 from 9:45 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. and also attended by Laird, Kissinger, Moorer, Ryan, and Chapman. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)
[2] Document 76.

78. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Goodpaster) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)[1]

Brussels, October 11, 1969, 1155Z.

3162. Reference: JCS 12650 Oct 69.[2]

1. I anticipate that the actions contemplated in reference, when applied within USEUCOM area, will be quickly picked up by our allies, and will be the subject of speculation and possible concern. We are checking now for possible effects on ACE exercises.[3] They may find the actions hard to understand and to relate to the "sweetness and light" phase they have thought we were in (and have been promoting) reflected, for example, in US/USSR agreement on the seabeds negotiations and anticipated progress toward SALT discussions.[4] Since the rationale for the proposed actions will be obscure, we may well be subjected to sensitive questioning here.
2. Although I recognize the probable close-hold nature of the decisions leading to the directed actions, I would appreciate any further information you could provide which could give us our bearings a little more clearly and thus perhaps reduce the probability of exposing ourselves to unnecessary embarrassment with our allies. In particular, it would be good to know what notifications and responses will be given to them by U.S. officials. If a check of our commitments and obligations in this regard has been made, I would be grateful to have a copy.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69). Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. An information copy was sent to General David Burchinal, Deputy CINCEUR. A handwritten note on the telegram informed Wheeler that a response would await his meeting at the White House scheduled for that day. The telegram bears Wheeler's initials, indicating that he saw it.

[2] Document 76.

[3] According to a memorandum from Wheeler to Laird dated October 14, EUCOM was scheduled to participate in Fairplay 69, a NORAD command post exercise held concurrently with High Heels 69, an annual exercise by United States worldwide military commands and selected civilian agencies. (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69)) According to an undated brief prepared in the JCS, High Heels 69, to be held October 15–23, was "designed to exercise U.S. General War Plans on a worldwide basis in the course of simulated exercise play." (Ibid., Nixon

Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Haig Chronological Files, Box 958, September 1969)

[4] The United States and the Soviet Union submitted a joint draft seabed treaty to the United Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on October 7. The first round of strategic arms limitations talks between the United States and the Soviet Union began on November 17 in Helsinki, Finland.

[5] Wheeler responded to Goodpaster later that day. His telegram reads in part: "I share your concern over the paucity of information which we have provided. Since the beginning of this readiness test we have appreciated the difficulties you would encounter in working with our allies." However, Wheeler continued, "Direction for this operation stems from higher level and additional background information is not available. There is at present no plan to notify our allies of this operation." Wheeler concluded by informing Goodpaster of his hope "that as we get deeper into this test we can acquaint those across the river with the many complexities that may arise as we continue and modify our actions and disclosure policy accordingly." (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69))

79. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 13, 1969.

SUBJECT
Items to Discuss with the President, October 13

1. Inform the President that Defense is proceeding with the alert measures which he approved last week and that the first series of actions will involve a stand down on a selective basis of US worldwide flying training activities. The stand down posture will continue until our intelligence indicates that the Soviets have become aware of the increased readiness. We are awaiting recommendations from the field prior to initiating the other steps which include radio and other communications silence, increased surveillance of Soviet shipping to North Vietnam, increased ground alert of SAC tankers and bombers, and movement of SAC and Air Defense nuclear capable forces to their military dispersed operating bases. We expect detailed plans today or tomorrow from Defense.[2]
2. I believe you should discuss with the President the need to inform both Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson of the increased measures listed above.[3] Recognizing that they will probably object strongly, it is nonetheless essential in my view that they be cut in since feedback will most certainly come immediately through State channels. And while we may be able to live with confused Ambassadors in the field, I do not believe Rogers or Richardson will forgive our failure to keep them informed. In the final analysis, this failure will probably be brought to the attention of the press with accompanying criticism.[4]

[Omitted here are items 3 through 5, which deal with unrelated matters.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, 8/13/69–12/30/69. Secret.

[2] Kissinger highlighted the paragraph's final two sentences.

[3] During a telephone conversation held on October 13 at 12:05 p.m., Laird told Kissinger that he would instruct Pursley to notify Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, "that we are having a routine SAC exercise and that it has been discussed with the President." At 9:30 a.m. the following morning, Laird informed Kissinger that he had "played it low key with State on these exercises. Ted Eliot briefed Richardson. K[issinger] asked if they squawked. Laird

said they asked what it was all about and he told them they would have to ask the highest authority about it. He told them it was a training exercise." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[4] Kissinger highlighted this entire paragraph, drew a line through it, and wrote a marginal comment: "how?"

80. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 14, 1969.

SUBJECT
Significant Military Actions

Background:

On October 7 you informed me that the President had instructed you to have the Secretary of Defense initiate a series of increased alert measures designed to convey to the Soviets an increasing readiness by US strategic forces. You also informed me that the President had personally mentioned this to Secretary Laird on the evening of October 6 and that Defense had promised to send over some proposed plans the following day. On October 7 Col. Pursley called Col. Haig and informed him that Defense was sending a plan for increased SAC alert to Col. Haig. When the plan arrived it was merely a résumé of an already approved East Coast air defense exercise, which was not responsive to the President's instruction.

Later that day Col. Haig met with Col. Pursley and informed him that the actions taken should be based on the following criteria:

—be discernible to the Soviets and be both unusual and significant;
—not be threatening to the Soviets;
—not require substantial additional funding or resources;
—not require agreement with the allies;
—not degrade essential missions; and
—have minimum chance of public exposure.[2]

On the evening of October 8, Col. Haig received a memorandum from Col. Pursley (Tab A)[3] which listed seven specific concepts as possibly satisfying the President's instructions.

On October 9, you provided the President with a memorandum listing the options provided by Defense and recommending five of the seven for implementation starting October 13 and to be completed by October 25. The President approved your recommendations as indicated on the memo at Tab B.[4]

The President's approval action was provided to Col. Pursley. On the evening of October 9 an additional analysis of the seven operations was provided to Col. Haig by Col. Pursley (Tab C).[5]

On October 9 Col. Haig called Col. Pursley and asked for a detailed plan together with press guidance and implementing instructions required to implement each of the proposals which had been approved by the President.

On October 11 the Secretary of Defense forwarded a memorandum containing proposed initial actions which could be taken "without prior consultation with our allies, with no additional expenditures of funds and without degradation of current essential missions." (Tab D)

The Laird memorandum enclosed an outline plan at Enclosure #1[6] which would:

—Implement a stand-down of SAC flying training activity effective 0800 hours October 13 Omaha time. The stand-down to continue until further notice.
—Provide for dispatch of messages to CINCONAD, CINCPAC, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, no later than 1200 hours October 13, directing a stand-down of all flying training activities and assumption of highest degree of combat readiness permitted by stand-down and consistent with no change in DEFCON. The stand-down to continue until otherwise directed.

Concurrently, General Wheeler dispatched a message to his unified commanders on October 10[7] informing them that readiness measures might be implemented which would include:

—Stand-down of flying of combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, to improve operational readiness.
—Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands.
—Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.
—Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.

This message also informed unified commanders that certain commanders had been directed to stand-down training flights and introduce varying degrees of electronic emission controls (EMCON) and that these measures would last for four days of the prescribed 14–day period (October 13 thru 25). The message also requested addressees to nominate additional measures which might be taken.

Current Status:

At Tab E is a copy of a talking paper prepared for General Wheeler in conjunction with the JCS meeting with the President on October 11.[8] This talker confirms that three of the five approved measures had been directed but that two of the original actions *directed for execution*—increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam and dispersal of SAC and CONAD aircraft with nuclear weapons—had been held in abeyance because of additional costs and wide-spread implications.

On October 13, General Goodpaster dispatched a message (Tab F) to General Wheeler which indicated that the stand-down of activity would pose serious problems under existing guidance with respect to questions which would come from NATO allies. General Goodpaster also questioned to what extent Ambassador Ellsworth and General Spivy were informed.[9]

Concurrently, J–3 of the Joint Staff raised the question of possible conflict with the exercise High Heels 69[10] scheduled to commence October 14 and continue through October 23. Among the problem areas cited by J–3 are:

—Intelligence community concern that High Heels and the increased alert would make assessment of Soviet reaction difficult and would result in confused signals to the Soviets.
—Planning for exercise High Heels is essentially complete and considerable funds have been expended with field command posts activated and observers in place worldwide.
—High Heels will require a high volume of communications traffic, relocation of military headquarters worldwide to emergency locations, and a shift of numerous personnel from their normal locations.
—Exercise activity is not compatible with achievement of purpose of the Plan for Increased Readiness.
—Unified and specified commanders have apparently identified a number of problems with regard to implementation of the alert measures. (Cancellation of High Heels was apparently recommended by six of the either unified and specified commanders in order to respond to the increased readiness posture.)
—Commitment to certain allies for participation in other major exercises during the time will be a basis for possible questioning of US intent.
—Restriction of flying training will impact on production of combat crews for Southeast Asia.

A more detailed fact sheet is at Tab G.

Discussion:

I do not believe that General Goodpaster's suggestions are overriding since allies could be told that the stand-down of training flights was an additional aspect of the High Heels operations.

It does not appear that High Heels and increased alert measures are incompatible in the communications area. Rather, a one-day period of the High Heels exercise might be modified to provide for a total communications stand-down.

I believe that the other measures approved by the President should be undertaken at the end of this week and that they can be implemented without undo costs and risks. These involve:

—Increased ground alert for SAC bombers and tankers.
—Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.
—Dispersal of SAC and CONAD aircraft with nuclear weapons to military dispersal bases.

None of the above have been implemented because of alleged costs and political implications.

A careful review of the situation by Secretary Laird and General Wheeler (Wheeler should be included) should focus on making the communications control compatible with High Heels and also making the air stand-down compatible with requirements of High Heels.

Consultation indicated as a problem by General Goodpaster and also the CONAD commander with respect to the Canadians can be accomplished with little difficulty by informing the allies concerned that the stand-down is being directed in conjunction with High Heels as additional readiness measures.

It would appear that the primary problem is the failure of all concerned to understand the time sensitiveness of the measures directed by the President and the reasons for which they have been directed. I believe both General Wheeler and Secretary Laird should provide additional guidance on this and specify the need to have the measures completed sufficiently before November 3 for the President to ascertain beyond a doubt whether or not the signals have been effective.

Recommendation:

That you ask Secretary Laird to include General Wheeler in the 10:00 a.m. meeting.[11]

That the communications and air activity conflicts between High Heels and the directed alert measures be made compatible by prompt exchanges between the JCS and the executing commands.

That General Goodpaster and any other unified or specified commander concerned with consultation problems be directed to inform appropriate allies of the actions being undertaken with the rationale that these measures have been added to High Heels as additional readiness tests.

That the Secretary of Defense be encouraged to implement this week through additional messages those measures not already set en-train which were approved by the President. Specifically:

—increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam;
—preparatory measures and final execution of the movement of SAC and CONAD aircraft to military dispersed operating basis.

That a greater degree of coordination be effected with State immediately by Defense so

that the necessary alerting of affected ambassadors can be accomplished.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 958, Haig Chronological Files, October 1–October 15, 1969 [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Haig on October 13. Printed from a copy that does not bear Haig's initials.

[2] Laird telephoned Kissinger at 5:35 p.m. on October 14 to report that military authorities had received "their first inquiries" about the standdown from the press. They agreed that the official response to such inquiries should be that the United States Government does "not discuss readiness tests." But Kissinger wished to delay responding for another day so as to avoid making things "worse" and thereby getting "the peaceniks worked up about this." (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[3] No tabs were found attached. Tab A is Tab D of Document 72.

[4] Document 73.

[5] Tab A of Document 74.

[6] Tab A of Document 75.

[7] Document 76.

[8] Document 77.

[9] Goodpaster's message of October 13 contained similar reservations to those expressed in Document 79. Goodpaster's October 13 telegram noted that the questions allies were most likely to ask were as follows: "(1) What forces and measures are involved? (2) Who directed such measures? (3) Why?" He concluded by emphasizing "the extreme importance of the U.S. being ready with valid and adequate public (and private) statements as soon as speculation starts to build up. Without them, the possibilities for dis-array, resentment and embarrassment for the U.S. seem tremendous." (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69))

[10] See footnote 3, Document 78.

[11] According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Laird and Rogers from 12:20 to 12:42 p.m. on October 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) See footnote 4, Document 81.

81. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Items to Discuss with the President, October 14

1. Inform the President of Mel Laird's reluctance to proceed with the alert measures because of the conflict in exercise High Heels[2] and the view of General Goodpaster[3] that consultation with allies should precede the stand-down of military training flights. Tell the President that you are convinced that these objections are not overriding and that you will meet with Laird and Wheeler this morning to make the necessary adjustments in both High Heels and alert measures to ensure that the alerts are carried out this week. Emphasize to the President that evidence of reluctance in Defense may require some "tail twisting" which you are prepared to do providing you can rely on strong support from the President.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13/69–12/30/69. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

[2] In an October 14 memorandum to Laird, Wheeler wrote that the "overriding consideration is the fact that Exercise High Heels is conducted but once a year. We have put a great deal of effort into this exercise and to forego it now would impair our knowledge of command and control procedures as well as waste money and man hours." (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69))

[3] See Document 78 and footnote 9, Document 80.

[4] According to Haldeman's diary, on October 15, Nixon "had Rogers and Laird in after [that morning's] NSC [meeting regarding Latin America] to try to get them in line about Vietnam and November 3 speech. Apparently this uncovered all their problems with K[issinger], because P[resident] called me in to discuss it. Says he'll have to bring Mitchell in more because K can't deal with Rogers and Laird, has problem of communicating with them, and has become an issue." The underlying problem, according to Haldeman, was that Kissinger "injects himself too much into everything, between P and Cabinet officers, and they just won't buy it, so he becomes ineffective even at getting them to do what they already were ready to do." (Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries*, p. 100)

82. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

CM–4642–69 Washington, October 15, 1969.

SUBJECT
Additional Actions for US Military Readiness Tests—Worldwide

1. (TS) As a follow-on to actions currently underway to comply with the desires of higher authorities to test our military readiness, attached at Tabs[2] are proposed actions which will continue the operation through 30 October 1969.
2. (TS) The proposed actions incorporate recommendations received from the CINCs and remain in the parameters directed (discernible to the Soviets but not threatening).
3. (TS) With your concurrence we are prepared to start implementing actions phased over the next 15 days. These actions will be initiated so as to reflect an increase in intensity of signals received by the Soviets.
4. (TS) These proposed actions will be subject to continued review for budgetary implications, cumulative impact and relation to detected reactions.
5. (TS) Detailed timing and coordination of the several actions delineated in this paper are being developed and will be forwarded.[3]

Earle G. Wheeler

Attachment

CINCSAC

1. On 27 October, implement SEAGA in the Show of Force option for the [*1 line not declassified*] and does not require Canadian overflight.
2. To prevent the loss of critical items of combat crew training, authorize to perform selective flying training during the period 17 through 23 October. Flights to be held to the minimum commensurate with critical requirements. Resume stand down on 24 October.
3. Place maximum feasible number of additional aircraft in the highest state of maintenance readiness to include loading of weapons.

CINCPAC

1. [*3 lines not declassified*]
2. Retain *Mace* on Alert until 30 October 1969.
3. Increase tactical air [*less than 1 line not declassified*].
4. Increase Readiness of Tac Air/Air Defense Aircraft and Missiles.

5. Increase Surveillance of Soviet Shipping enroute to NVN and in CINCAL area.
6. Increase US Local Security and Anti-sabotage Measures in ROK and Japan.
7. Increase PACOM Intelligence Watch. 8. Selective Augmentation of Primary Command Centers and Selective Activation of Alternate Command Centers.
9. Conduct Exercise Focus Lens 22 October–1 November as Now Planned.
10. Authorize Flying Training to Meet Critical Requirements 17–23 October.

USCINCEUR

1. Occupy border observation posts.
2. Selectively increase border surveillance.
3. Increase readiness tests within caserns and bases.
4. Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) along West German border.
5. Increase surveillance of Soviet Military Liaison Mission.
6. Increase intelligence gathering along West German border.
7. Stand-down communications radiating for test or training only.
8. USCINCEUR will be authorized to perform selective flying training during the period 17 through 23 October 1969. Flights will be held to the minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

CINCLANT

1. Within budgetary restrictions:
   a. Sail *Newport News* from Brest, France, on 17 October as now scheduled. Proceed to rendezvous with *Yorktown* hunter killer group.
   b. Cancel *Yorktown* hunter killer group port visits; conduct emergency sortie on 17 October to renedzvous with *Newport News*. Stand-down all flight operations; maintain maximum deck alert.
   c. Direct USS *Forrestal* and USS *F. D. Roosevelt* to set EMCON and make high speed 400–500 mile transit towards southeast; transmit several messages; then reset EMCON. Time at your discretion. Stand-down flight operations on 24 October. Maintain maximum deck alert.
2. Execute emergency back load and sortie as soon as possible of CARIB Amphibious Squadron.
3. Stand-down all VP aircraft flight operations at Argentia, Iceland, and Azores.
4. Authorization to perform selective flight training during period 17–23 October. Flights will be held to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

CINCONAD

1. Continue increased alert (100% on one hour or less) majority of forces until further directed.
2. Deploy ADC College Tap interceptors to Richards Gebaur AFB, Mo, and Stewart AFB, New York for four days.

3. Increase the Air Defense Interceptor deployment to the two Western Alaska bases.
4. CINC is authorized to perform selective flight training during the period 17–23 October, but hold to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

USCINCSO

1. USCINCSO will place in effect security measures at military installations and facilities within the Canal Zone, and will enforce minimal communications to CONUS and to the Latin American MilGroups.

CINCAL

1. Increase the air defense interceptor deployment to the two Western Alaskan bases.
2. After deployment, maintain maximum ground alert of air defense forces at all bases.
3. Increased alert posture should be supported by appropriate Communications Security.
4. CINC is authorized to perform selective flight training during the period 17–23 October, but hold to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

CINCSTRIKE

1. Authorization to perform selective flight training during period 17–23 October. Flights will be held to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.
2. Return selected units to home stations. (Brigade of 82d Abn at Eglin AFB, Special Forces units engaged in training in West Virginia and Puerto Rico.)
3. MIDEASTFOR will accomplish following within budgeting restrictions.
   a. USS *Valcour* with COMIDEASTFOR abroad will make rapid un-scheduled departure from Port Bahrain and steam in Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
   b. Cancel COMIDEASTFOR scheduled visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan due to quote operational requirements unquote.
   c. Have USS *Rich* depart Djibouti early due to quote operational requirements unquote, and steam in Gulf of Aden.
   d. Have USS *Furse* visit Mombasa briefly for refueling on 16 Oct and then depart immediately due to quote operational requirements unquote. Upon departure Mombasa, have USS *Furse* join the USS *Rich* in Gulf of Aden.
   e. Superimpose on all operations a degree of in port security, readiness, and EMCON not normal in routine visits.
   f. Remain in port for minimum time during refueling visits.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69). Top Secret; Noforn.

[2] The attachment below combines eight separate tabs.

[3] Laird forwarded Wheeler's package of proposed additional military actions to Kissinger. According to his covering memorandum, Laird concurred with Wheeler's proposal. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 222, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IV) In an October 17 memorandum, Haig advised Kissinger to inform Nixon, during that day's scheduled meeting with the President, of the additional "worldwide alert measures designed to signal increased U.S. readiness. These measures will increase in intensity up to October 30 and will be monitored carefully for readout." (Ibid., Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13/69–12/30/69) Wheeler received a memorandum later that day from a member of his staff informing him "that the White House has approved the execution of all of the additional actions for U.S. Military Readiness Tests—Worldwide." (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69))

During an October 18 telephone conversation with Laird, "K[issinger] said the President asked him to thank L[aird] for the plan. K said it's a little early to tell, but maybe there will be a little payoff." Kissinger handicapped the gambit's likelihood of success during separate October 20 telephone conversations with New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and Fritz Kraemer, Kissinger's intellectual mentor. At 11:10 a.m., Kissinger told Rockefeller, "the thing they discussed the other day—it's gotten down to producing little twitches. K said there's now a 30 percent chance—it would be sheer gold if we could get away with it." At 12:30 p.m., he cryptically told Kraemer that "something we are doing" had a 10 percent chance of succeeding. "It has no business succeeding, but it may." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

83. Editorial Note

As part of its strategy of applying pressure on the Soviet Union and North Vietnam as a way to achieve a negotiated end to the war in Vietnam, the Nixon administration developed specific plans for military escalation in October 1969. The National Security Council staff developed one such plan, codenamed Duck Hook, consisting, among other things, of the mining of the Haiphong port complex, the quarantining of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville, and intense aerial bombing of selected targets. According to an October 2 memorandum to Nixon from Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the "basic objective" of Duck Hook was "to give Hanoi incentive to negotiate a compromise settlement through a series of military blows." The memorandum is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 129.

According to the handwritten journal of H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, he spoke with Kissinger the following day and found him to be "very concerned—feels we only have two alternatives [in Vietnam]—bugout or accelerate—and that we must escalate or P[resident] is lost." Haldeman also noted that Kissinger's "contingency plans don't include the domestic factor." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Handwritten Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman, Vol. 3, September 29, 1969–January 12, 1970)

Kissinger had held a series of meetings with the NSC staff in September to plan Duck Hook. According to a memorandum for the record of one such meeting, held on September 12 in the White House Situation Room with Kissinger in attendance, Soviet perceptions of Nixon's state of mind figured into the Duck Hook plan. "If USSR thinks President is a madman, then they've driven him to it [military escalation], and they'd better help calm him down." (Memorandum for the record; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 45, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Contingency Planning, Sept.–Oct. 1969)

Another memorandum from Kissinger to the President outlined a slightly different scenario under Duck Hook. The operation would begin with a diplomatic gambit that included warning "Dobrynin that unless Hanoi reversed its course in all these areas in the very near future—a matter of a few days, in fact—we would be obliged to take some form of action to show Hanoi that it could not escape the consequences of its behavior. We should expect as an immediate sign of Hanoi's changed intentions a significant constructive move on its part in the Paris negotiations." If Hanoi failed to respond, however, "we would proceed with our military measures." Once the conventional military measures were underway, the memorandum added, "We would assume a heightened PACOM and SAC alert posture militarily to show our resolve and to respond to whatever contingencies arise." (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 189, White House Memos (1969))

Nixon expressed reservations about Duck Hook during an October 9 lunchtime conversation with Haldeman. According to Haldeman's handwritten journal, the President was still "pondering the course" to take in Vietnam. Although the President had not yet ruled out Kissinger's plan to escalate the fighting, Haldeman wrote, he was leaning toward troop withdrawals, a course favored by Secretary of Defense Laird and Secretary of State Rogers. Nixon's "worry about K[issinger]'s plan is that it will take six–eight months—and fears can't hold the country that long at that level—where he *could* hold for same period of withdrawals." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, HJDHRD, Vol. 3, September 23, 1969–January 12, 1970)

The administration rejected Duck Hook. According to Kissinger's memoirs, on October 17 he recommended that the President defer consideration of the plan. President Nixon recalled in his memoirs that, as a consequence, it "was important that the Communists not mistake as weakness the lack of dramatic action on my part in carrying out the ultimatum. We would be able to demonstrate our continuing resolve to the North Vietnamese on the battlefield, but I thought that the Soviets would need a special reminder." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, page 285; Nixon, *RN*, page 405) Nixon was referring to the "ultimatum" he delivered to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on October 20; see Document 85.

84. Diary Entry by the President's Assistant (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, October 17, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion of Nixon's speech on Vietnam scheduled for November 3 and other matters unrelated to national security policy.]

K[issinger] has all sorts of signal-type activity going on around the world to try to jar Soviets and NVN—appears to be working because Dobrynin asked for early meeting—which we have set secretly for Monday.[2] K thinks this is good chance of being the big break, but that it will come in stages. P[resident] is more skeptical.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to national security policy.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Handwritten Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman, Vol. 3, September 29, 1969–January 12, 1970. No classification marking. The diary entry, which is handwritten by Haldeman, was transcribed by the editors.
[2] October 20.

85. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 20, 1969, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

[Omitted here is discussion of strategic arms limitation negotiations and Soviet-American relations as they pertained to the Middle East and China.]

The President[2] then turned to Vietnam. He said that prior to the bombing halt, "which you are aware will be one year old on November 1st," Ambassadors Bohlen, Thompson and Harriman[3] had pointed out that the Soviet Union could do nothing as long as the United States was bombing a fellow Socialist country, and that it would be very active afterwards. The bombing halt was agreed to and the Soviet Union has done nothing.

Of course, the President said, we now had an oblong table to the attainment of which the Soviet Union contributed something, but the U.S. did not consider that a great achievement. All conciliatory moves for the past year had been made by the United States. The President enumerated them.

The President said he therefore had concluded that maybe the Soviet Union did not want to end the war in Vietnam. They may think that they can break the President; they may believe that the U.S. domestic situation is unmanageable; they may think that the war in Vietnam costs the Soviet Union only a small amount of money and costs the U.S. a great many lives. The President did not propose to argue with the Soviet assessment. As a great power, it had the right to take its position. On the other hand, the Ambassador had to understand the following: the Soviet Union would be stuck with the President for the next three years and three months, and the President would keep in mind what was being done right now. If the Soviet Union would not help us to get peace, the U.S. would have to pursue its own methods for bringing the war to an end. It could not allow a talk-fight strategy without taking action.

The President said he hoped that the Ambassador would understand that such measures would not be directed against the Soviet Union, but would be in the U.S. interest of achieving peace. The U.S. recognized that a settlement must reflect the real situation. It recognized the right of all Vietnamese to participate in the political process. But up to now, there had been a complete refusal of North Vietnam to make its own proposals in order to have any serious discussion.

The President pointed out that all the Ambassador had done was to repeat the same tired

old slogans that the North Vietnamese had made already six months ago, and which he knew very well could lead nowhere. It was time to get discussions started. The humiliation of a defeat was absolutely unacceptable. The President recognized that the Soviet leaders were tough and courageous, but so was he.[4] He told Ambassador Dobrynin that he hoped that he would not mind this serious talk.

President Nixon said he did not believe much in personal diplomacy, and he recognized that the Ambassador was a strong defender of the interests of his own country. The President pointed out that if the Soviet Union found it possible to do something in Vietnam, and the Vietnam war ended, the U.S. might do something dramatic to improve Soviet-U.S. relations, indeed something more dramatic than they could now imagine. But until then, real progress would be difficult.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether this meant that there could be no progress. The President replied that progress was possible, but it would have to be confined essentially to what was attainable in diplomatic channels. He said that he was very happy to have Ambassador Dobrynin use the channel through Dr. Kissinger, and he would be prepared to talk to the Ambassador personally. He reiterated that the war could drag on, in which case the U.S. would find its own way to bring it to an end. There was no sense repeating the proposals of the last six months. However, he said, in the meantime, while the situation continued, we could all keep our tone down and talk correctly to each other. It would help, and would lay the basis for further progress, perhaps later on when conditions were more propitious.

The President said that the whole world wanted us to get together. He too wanted nothing so much as to have his Administration remembered as a watershed in U.S.-Soviet relations, but we would not hold still for being "diddled" to death in Vietnam.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin–Kissinger, 1969 [Part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Kissinger. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The full memorandum of conversation is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 93. See also ibid., volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 139.

[2] President Nixon received two memoranda from Kissinger on October 18 briefing him for his upcoming meeting with Dobrynin. Kissinger, in the longer 6–page memorandum, informed Nixon that "several developments" had probably led Dobrynin to request a meeting, including Sino-Soviet issues, Vietnam, and "Moscow's undoubted awareness of unusual military measures on our part, preceded by the stern comments I made to Dobrynin on September 27." If Dobrynin asked about the measures, Kissinger advised Nixon to "simply tell him that these are carefully controlled exercises which in view of the uncertainties of the future you felt it incumbent on you to undertake. They involve no

threat." However, Kissinger's other three-page memorandum counseled the President, if the subject was raised, to respond that the measures were "normal exercises relating to our military readiness." According to this memorandum, Nixon's basic purpose during his meeting with Dobrynin was "to keep the Soviets concerned about what we might do around November 1." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin–Kissinger 1969 [Part 1])

[3] Charles E. Bohlen, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., and W. Averell Harriman were all former Ambassadors to the Soviet Union.

[4] The day after his meeting with Dobrynin, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum analyzing the exchange with the Soviet Ambassador. "Dobrynin's basic mission was to test the seriousness of the threat element in our current posture and to throw out enough inducements (SALT, Berlin, direct informal contact with you) to make it politically and psychologically difficult for you to play it rough over Vietnam." Kissinger felt that a key point during the meeting had been the "Soviet acknowledgement of our allusions to possible military actions. Their response was relatively mild ('shortsighted' … 'extremely dangerous.') But there is no doubt they are concerned and your comments might just give them ammunition to use in Hanoi in lobbying for a more flexible position." Kissinger concluded, "it will be essential to continue backing up our verbal warnings with our present military moves." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin–Kissinger 1969 [Part 1]) The October 21 memorandum is printed in full in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 96.)

[5] That evening, the President called Kissinger and suggested that he should raise the subject of Vietnam with Dobrynin on the following day. Nixon instructed Kissinger "to shake his head and say 'I'm sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but he [Nixon] is out of control. Mr. Ambassador, as you know, I am very close to the President, but you don't know this man—he has been through more than the rest of us put together. He's made up his mind and unless there's some movement,' just shake your head and walk out. He is probably just figuring out what was said [at that afternoon's meeting]." Kissinger suggested typing up what the President said on a piece of paper and giving it to Dobrynin. The President agreed, noting that Dobrynin would ask, "What does this mean? Are you threatening me?" Nixon instructed Kissinger to respond, "Please now, Mr. Ambassador, the President isn't threatening you. He just wants a little movement." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

86. Editorial Note

Secretary of Defense Laird was scheduled to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 20, 1969. The agenda included discussion of National Security Decision Memorandum 27 on the U.S. military posture (Document 56), key issues involved in Vietnamization, and a status report on the "Readiness Tests" then ongoing. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Staff, in advance of the meeting, prepared briefing materials for Laird's use, which the Secretary saw according to a stamped note on the original. Laird's preparatory package included a section on "Issues on Special Exercise" which listed the following questions:

"—Are the 'Readiness Tests' being picked up by Soviet and/or NVN sources? If so, what impact are the 'Readiness Tests' having?
"—Are the 'tests' yet to be accomplished apt to have more, less, or about the same impact on the USSR/NVN?
"—What risks are implicit in the continuing 'tests'? Are the risks manageable?
"—Can we continue to abide by the public affairs posture taken so far? If not, what changes can and/or should be made?" (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 337, SD/JCS)

87. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

CM–4654–69 Washington, October 20, 1969.

SUBJECT
Movement of Carrier Task Force on Yankee Station Into Gulf of Tonkin in Connection With Test of Increased Readiness Posture (S)

(1) (U) The attached proposed memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs provides the recommended response to his request[2] for comments on subject.
2. (U) Recommend a response substantially the same as the attached be forwarded.

Earle G. Wheeler

Attachment

Washington, undated.

Draft Memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[3]

SUBJECT
Movement of Carrier Task Force from Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin In Connection With Test of Increased Readiness Posture (S)

1. (TS) Reference is made to your verbal request pertaining to the movement of the Carrier Task Force farther north in the Tonkin Gulf in connection with tests of increased readiness posture.
2. (C) At the present time the USS *Oriskany* and the USS *Hancock* are operating approximately 70 nautical miles southwest of Hainan Island in support of combat operations in Southeast Asia. Current operating stations are shown on the attached map.[4]
3. (TS) In March 1969, elements of Task Force 77 were directed to move farther north in the Gulf of Tonkin as an "indicator action" against North Vietnam. The forces in Task Force 77 which moved farther north consisted of the search and rescue (SAR) destroyers, and positive identification radar advisory zone (PIRAZ) ships. These units were ordered to proceed to the northern stations, remain for a short period, and repeat at frequent but irregular intervals. There was no unusual or significant reaction by North Vietnam which could be interpreted as having been in response to the northward positioning of Task Force 77 units.
4. (TS) It is recommended that Task Force 77 not be redeployed farther north in the Gulf

of Tonkin for the following reasons:

a. Loss of tactical capability in support of combat operations in Southeast Asia due to the reduction of ordnance carried and/or time on target, necessitated by the increase in distance to the targets in Laos and South Vietnam hence increase in aircraft fuel required.
b. The northern redeployment would not be to our tactical advantage in the support of manned reconnaissance flights in the Pan-handle of North Vietnam.
c. In the event it becomes necessary to launch CVA air strikes against North Vietnam, this can be done from current CVA locations. After initial strikes are launched the carriers could move north to optimum launch positions. Thus North Vietnam would not be alerted by carrier movements prior to first launch.
d. Though the redeployment would be evident to the enemy, it is unlikely that a significant response would be forthcoming.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69). Top Secret.

[2] No other record of Kissinger's request was found.

[3] No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Nels C. Johnson, Director, Joint Staff, JCS sent it to Wheeler for his consideration under a covering memorandum dated October 20. (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 1969)) There is no indication that it was sent to Kissinger.

[4] A map of Southeast Asia is attached, but not printed.

88. Editorial Note

There is documentary evidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test was detected (if belatedly) by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, which eventually initiated a strategic alert and a military exercise respectively in late October 1969. On October 17, General Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Laird, reported that as yet there had been "no significant activity by Soviet Military forces which can be judged as a reaction to U.S. operations. We believe, however, there has been some increase in Soviet intelligence collection activities." Even eight days later, on October 25, Wheeler sent two memoranda to Laird informing him that the Soviets had not reacted to a menu of specific alert measures, including the following: reduced communications in the Southern and European Commands (EUCOM), heightened alert of certain nuclear weapons systems in EUCOM and in the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), and enhanced security measures by naval forces in the Pacific Command (PACOM). Wheeler's memoranda are in the National Archives, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69). General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, in an un-dated memorandum to Laird, similarly reported that the Soviet Union had not reacted either to a communication standdown or increased surveillance of Soviet military facilities in EUCOM or to a training flight standdown in the Atlantic Command. Westmoreland consequently recommended that these actions continue as planned. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard concurred with Westmoreland's recommendation. (Ibid.)

Other reports indicated, however, that the PRC had initiated a strategic alert and the Soviet Union had launched a military exercise. These moves began just as the resumption of border negotiations in Beijing on October 20, first announced on October 7, had lessened the likelihood of Sino-Soviet warfare. During a telephone conversation held on October 21 at 6:23 p.m., Laird informed Kissinger that "we got a response from the Chinese on our exercise—they have gone on alert." The two again discussed the topic by telephone at 8:25 the following morning, during which Kissinger said he "didn't know whether it [the Chinese alert] was in reaction to us or what the Soviets did in reaction to us. L said he didn't know either." (Transcripts of telephone conversations; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[*18½ lines not declassified*] Kissinger received a memorandum on October 30 from James Fazio, a member of the National Security Council Staff assigned to the White House Situation Room, indicating that Chinese military activity was returning to normal. (Ibid.)

United States intelligence also began to detect that the Soviet Union had identified and reacted to certain elements of the alert. According to a memorandum from Wheeler to Laird dated October 22, "U.S. naval actions in the Gulf of Aden are believed to have

caused a change in the Soviet naval posture in that area." Specifically, two Soviet ships, spotted heading north in the Red Sea, suddenly reversed course on October 20 and headed toward either the Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean, along with at least four other Soviet vessels. (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69))

On October 25, Kissinger learned from a memorandum sent by David McManis, an NSC staff member assigned to the White House Situation Room, of a "possible large-scale Soviet strategic exercise." According to McManis' memorandum, [*3 lines not declassified*].

McManis' memorandum informed Kissinger that there was "some evidence, although not conclusive," that the Soviet exercise was initiated on October 10 and thus was not "a response to our readiness activities. However, some of the components of this Soviet exercise are of the kind which would be implemented in reaction to our operations." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 12, President's Daily Briefs, October 22–28, 1969)

89. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency[1]

Washington, October 27, 1969.

SUBJECT
Possible Communist Reactions to US Military Readiness Tests

1. CIA has cooperated with DIA in maintaining an all-source watch on Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Asian Communist military actions which might be in reaction to the US military readiness tests which began on 13 October. Of the military measures observed, only a few were sufficiently unusual to be considered as possible responses to the US readiness posture. Analysis of the reasons behind these military measures is complicated by Soviet awareness of exercise High Heels, by Operation Deep Furrow in the Aegean area, by the crises in Lebanon and Somalia, and by the possibility that some of the Chinese and Soviet measures in the Far East may be related to each other rather than to the US posture.

2. A list of the noteworthy Communist military measures follows:

[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

Comment: Because this action occurred less than two hours after the SAC standdown began and since it was apparently localized in the Far East, we doubt that it was a reaction to the US readiness test.

[*1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified*]

Comment: This predates actions taken by CINCEUR in the US readiness tests and probably reflects Soviet interest in exercise High Heels which began on 14 October and of which the Soviets were aware.

[*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]

Comment: US Naval Task Force 71 began operations in the Sea of Japan on 16 October. This would be sufficient cause for increased Soviet [*less than 1 line not declassified*] activity in the area.

[*1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified*]

Comment: This activity may reflect interest in the SAC standdown or the CINCEUR standdown of 16–17 October, or perhaps both.

[*1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified*]

Comment: [*4½ lines not declassified*] and covers the opening of Sino-Soviet border talks on 20 October. It also coincides with press stories of a US military readiness test based on the sudden breaking off of port visits by the USS *Yorktown* and *Newport News* and the deployment of Task Force 71 exercises into the Sea of Japan. Thus the Chinese action could be in response to either Soviet or US actions or both or [*less than 1 line not declassified*] may be the result of considerations of which we are not yet aware.

[*8 lines not declassified*]

21 October—Two Soviet Navy missile ships were in the Red Sea [*2 lines not declassified*]. On 21 October the two ships had reversed course and headed out of the Red Sea. They subsequently rendezvoused with several other Soviet ships near the island of Socotra off Somalia.

Comment: On 17 October three US Naval ships sailed to rendezvous in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia. The Soviets were almost certainly aware of their presence, which they may have associated with the 15 October assassination of the Somali president and the coup d'etat there on 21 October. Thus, although the movement of the Soviet ships was probably at least in part a reaction to the presence of the three US ships, it took place in the context of a local situation rather than as a reaction to a world-wide US military alert posture.

3. *Conclusions:* Of the many Communist military actions noted, only the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] activity seems clearly related to the US military readiness tests. And even this might be directed less at the world-wide US posture than at the specific operations of High Heels, Deep Furrow, Task Force 71, and the tensions in the Middle East. All of the other actions seem best explained by other considerations.

There has been no reflection of acute concern by the Soviets such as a nationwide military stand-down or general alert in the USSR. There has been no reflection of the US military alert posture in Soviet or Chinese news media or in diplomatic activity.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 351, Subject Files, Exercise High Heels—69. Top Secret; Sensitive; [*codeword not declassified*]. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Deputy Director for Intelligence R.J. Smith sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum dated October 27. Haig then forwarded it to Kissinger under an undated, handwritten memorandum that reads: "It appears we might spice up the package without undue risk." Kissinger initialed the CIA's memorandum. (Ibid.)

90. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to All Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands[1]

Washington, October 28, 1969, 2313Z.

JCS 3478. Subj: Increased readiness posture (U). Refs: A. JCS 12650/102205Z Oct 69;[2] B. JCS 12761/141959Z Oct 69.[3]

1. (TS) Ref A informed of worldwide readiness test and solicited comments from CINCs.
2. (TS) Ref B extended termination date of readiness test.
3. (TS) All activities supporting the increased readiness test will be terminated effective 300001Z October 69. Units involved will return to normal operating status.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69). Top Secret; Noforn; Immediate. Drafted by Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Sennewalt, Operations Directorate, Joint Staff, JCS. Copies were sent to Westmoreland, Moorer, Ryan, and Chapman. A handwritten note on the original indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard concurred.

[2] Document 76.

[3] In JCS telegram 12761, October 14, Wheeler informed Commanders in Chief that the readiness test had been extended until October 30. (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69))

91. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 6, 1969, noon

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

I began the conversation by saying that the President had wanted to make sure that Dobrynin understood the speech[2] properly: (1) the President wanted to point out the seriousness of the threat in case of escalation; (2) that Dobrynin should not be confused by the various arguments he had heard with respect to linkage—we considered linkage a fact and not a policy, and foreign policy was made in the White House and nowhere else; and (3) the President wanted to reiterate that we were in favor of major improvements in Soviet-U.S. relations but not until considerable progress had been made on the Vietnam issue.

Dobrynin said with respect to the first question that they had made their point of view clear and that any escalation by us would have dangerous consequences. I told him that we had taken it into account and that anything we did would not be directed against the Soviet Union; they were the best judge of their own interests and would have to decide what to do when the time came.

With respect to the second point, he said he had no illusions about the linkage problem, and he saw not much point in repeating our well-known position.

[Omitted here is discussion of conflicting reports about linkage.] With respect to the third point, Dobrynin said that his government was now beginning to understand the seriousness with which we took the position we had indicated, and had given up the illusion that they had held earlier in the year that major progress was possible even while the Vietnam war was going on. He added a little plaintively that he could not understand our attitude because the Soviet Union was not making trouble for us in Vietnam; they were not trying to embarrass us; but they could not get us out of a war into which we had gotten ourselves. I said I thought our position was clear, and there was no sense reiterating it.

[Omitted here is discussion of negotiations to end the war in Vietnam.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office. The entire memorandum is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976,*

volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 99.

[2] On November 3, Nixon gave a nationally televised address in which he announced his plan for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Vietnam. During his address, Nixon threatened to respond with “strong and effective” action in the event of an escalation in the intensity of fighting by the North Vietnamese. The full text of the speech is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 901–909.

92. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

CM–4700–69 Washington, November 6, 1969.

SUBJECT
U.S. Military Readiness Tests—Worldwide

1. Early in October, in response to direction from higher authority, I tasked the Joint Staff to prepare an integrated plan of actions which would physically test our military readiness in selected areas worldwide. The actions were to be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening in themselves. Additional limitations were that only U.S. forces would participate, no change in DEFCON status would be made, and actions would be accomplished within current budgetary levels. The tests began 13 October 1969 and were terminated on 30 October 1969. At Enclosure A is a display of the various actions accomplished in each CINC area.[2]
2. It is difficult to measure the success of this operation since, other than the stated reason to test readiness, the objectives of the test are unknown. Added to this problem were the aforementioned restraints which introduced a certain degree of artificiality. I am sure you realize that in no way was this exercise a test vehicle permitting an evaluation of U.S. forces' ability to respond to a threat by increasing readiness. Considering that Soviet awareness was a goal, the number of unusual or unexplained Soviet actions observed by the intelligence community indicates a degree of success. Tangible benefits resulting from the tests generally fall in the command and control area as evidenced by the professional competence and flexibility displayed at all levels of command and staff. Noteworthy was the cooperation between the operations and intelligence participants. The CINCs expressed satisfaction with experience gained in a number of areas. Some of the benefits accrued included: (a) an opportunity to highlight managerial problems at all command levels, (b) the exercise of command and staff techniques for crisis management, and (c) an opportunity to achieve, within prescribed limits and unencumbered by normal day-to-day activities, a maximum attainable readiness posture.
3. It is evident that the Soviets were aware of certain of the U.S. activities, [*6 lines not declassified*]. Details concerning these and other Soviet activities which may have been in reaction to our operations have been reported to you in a series of Special Intelligence Reports prepared by DIA and are summarized in Enclosure B.
4. The U.S. intelligence agencies were afforded a unique opportunity to test their procedures under realistic conditions. DIA believes that this operation confirms the validity of certain day-to-day procedures designed to maintain a continuing intelligence watch over Soviet actions and reactions, [*2½ lines not declassified*].
5. I would be remiss if I did not elaborate on some of the problems and possibly

counterproductive results which this test generated. The first, and probably foremost, was my inability to furnish the CINCs with more definitive guidance as to the objectives and goals of the operation. It seems prudent if maximum benefit is to be gained from an operation of this type that at least you and I and the senior commanders are informed of the objectives and goals. Second was the loss of vital flight training caused by the flying standdown. Third, although difficult to assess, was the possibly bruised feelings of our allies, especially in Europe and NORAD, because they were excluded from both the planning for and execution of the tests. Finally, in the same area of good relations, were the diplomatic problems caused by abrupt ship departures from foreign ports and the unexplained cancellation of longstanding, scheduled port visits.

6. As noted in Enclosure B, any additional intelligence acquired on this subject or on related Soviet activities—if significant—will be published in a supplemental report.

Earle G. Wheeler

Enclosure B

Washington, November 6, 1969.

Special Intelligence Summary Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency[3]

DIASIR 310–69

SOVIET REACTIONS TO US OPERATIONS

Summary

The Soviets were apparently aware of a change in the readiness posture of US forces [*6 lines not declassified*].

[*4 paragraphs (31 lines) not declassified*]

Increased sensitivity to US aerial reconnaissance activities was noted only in the Far East. During the period 12–29 October, 31 of the 33 US reconnaissance missions in the Far East provoked Soviet reaction, and 10 were intercepted. This reaction was well above what might normally have been expected.

With the exception of the activities cited above, the USSR's activities during the period were generally normal. With much of its strategic power in a continuous posture of high readiness, an increase in this readiness is not easily discernible—nor is such an increase essential from the Soviet standpoint.

A number of Soviet activities detected by US intelligence could not be confidently

identified as reaction to the US readiness tests because concurrent events could easily have been responsible. These events included the coup in the Somali Republic, the crisis in Lebanon, NATO Exercise Deep Furrow, and Sino-Soviet talks.

There was no evidence to indicate that certain unusual Chinese Communist activity was in response to US operations during the period. The timing and scope of Chinese activity suggested that it was related to the Sino-Soviet talks, which began in Peking on 20 October. There were no detectable reactions by North Korean forces which could be correlated with the US increase in readiness.

Details

Part I: USSR

[*13 paragraphs (116 lines) not declassified*]

7. *Ground Forces:* No reactions were noted.
8. *Naval Forces:* Naval activity during the period 13–30 October appeared generally normal. Two events, however, may have represented reaction.

An intelligence collector operating in the South China Sea on 17 October moved unusually close (about 5.7 nautical miles) to Da Nang and drew reaction from the Republic of Vietnam Navy. It is possible that her movement was part of an intensified collection effort to determine if detected anomolies in US air and communications activities reflected major changes in US military activity in Southeast Asia.

On 20 October, Kresta-class guided-missile light cruiser 532 and Kashin-class guided-missile frigate 527 were in the Red Sea [*2 lines not declassified*]. Late on the 20th or early on the 21st, however, the two ships [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reversed their course, exited the Red Sea, and proceeded to the Socotra Island area. By 24 October, five other naval units in the Indian Ocean and four space-event-associated ships had joined them there. The cruiser and frigate remained near Socotra with most of the other units throughout the period. Soviet concern for unexplained US military operations may have caused these naval units to leave the confined waters of the Red Sea.

9. *Naval Fleet Air Forces:* Normal activity included the surveillance of US units operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the southern Sea of Japan.

[*3 paragraphs (52 lines) not declassified*]

12. *Reconnaissance Activity:* Reconnaissance during the period was generally in accord with normal patterns. Some deviations were noted in response to particular US operations in the Sea of Japan and the Mediterranean Sea. [*7 lines not declassified*]
13. *Soviet Reaction to US Reconnaissance:* Unusual reactions to US reconnaissance were noted only in the Far East. Since mid-October, air defense facilities in the Vladivostok area have shown an increased level of reaction to such US activities. From 12 to 29 October, the Soviets reacted to 31 and intercepted 10 of the 33 reconnaissance missions flown over the Sea of Japan near the Soviet coast. This incidence of reaction and

interception is considerably above that to be expected during a period of ordinary US activity. Other possible explanations include increased Soviet training activity in the area, the introduction of Task Force 71 into the Sea of Japan, and an increase in US reconnaissance flights as well as US readiness operations.

Part II: European Communist Countries

On 22 and 23 October, Bulgarian fighters reacted to US reconnaissance aircraft over the Aegean Sea. In each case, the closest approach was about 75 nautical miles. Any Bulgarian reaction to US reconnaissance is unusual. In this case, the indicated increased air defense posture was probably in response to NATO Exercise Deep Furrow. Little flight activity was noted over East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia during the first week of the US test, probably because poor flying weather prevailed.

[*1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified*]

Part III: Asian Communist Countries

[*4 lines not declassified*] There is no available evidence to indicate that the unusual activity was in response to US operations during this period. The timing and scope of the activity suggests that it was related to the Sino-Soviet talks which began in Peking on 20 October.

There were no detected reactions by North Korean military forces to US military readiness operations.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 351, Subject Files, Exercise High Heels—69. Top Secret; Sensitive; [*codeword not declassified*]. A stamped note indicates that Laird saw it on November 10. Pursley forwarded the memorandum to Haig under a covering memorandum of November 10 that reads as follows: “Secretary Laird asked the Chiefs to evaluate the recent ‘Military Readiness’ exercise. Attached is General Wheeler’s report. Secretary Laird felt Dr. Kissinger would find the report interesting.” (Ibid.)

[2] Enclosed but not printed.

[3] Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only/Limited Distribution.

93. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 1, 1969.

SUBJECT
Soviet Reactions to U.S. Operations during October

Attached at Tab A[2] is a report of Soviet reactions to special U.S. military readiness measures taken at your request during the period October 13–30. The following significant Soviet responses were detected:

—Increased military signal intelligence collection activity indicated that the Soviets became aware of U.S. operations at least by October 15.
—General staff communications to selected major headquarters, utilizing a probable primary alert system, indicated increased concern on October 23.
—Some military staff elements were apparently moved to alternate command posts and a communications test with tactical air force headquarters was conducted from Moscow on October 27.
—Sensitivity to U. S. aerial reconnaissance activities in the Far East increased markedly.

The above measures, along with others contained in the report, indicate that Moscow was aware of U.S. activities and took some defensive precautions.

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive; [*codeword not declassified*]. Sent for information. Drafted by Jonathan Howe of the NSC Staff on November 30.

[2] Attached, but not printed, is a nine-page Special Intelligence Report, entitled "Final Summary of Soviet Reactions to U.S. Operations," produced by the DIA on November 6, 1969. The report noted that a "number of Soviet activities detected by U.S. intelligence could not be confidently identified as reaction to the U.S. readiness tests because concurrent events could easily have been responsible." Similarly, "There was no evidence to indicate that certain unusual Chinese Communist activity was in response to U.S. operations during the period." Instead, the DIA estimated that the Soviet and Chinese activities were related to the commencement of Sino-Soviet talks.

Chemical and Biological Warfare, Safeguard Phase II, the Draft

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94. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, February 13, 1969.

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95. National Security Study Memorandum 59

Washington, May 28, 1969.

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96. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, October 22, 1969.

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97. Minutes of Review Group Meeting

Washington, October 30, 1969, 2:25–3:55 p.m.

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98. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Washington, undated.

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99. Paper by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group in Response to NSSM 59

Washington, November 10, 1969.

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100. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, November 13, 1969.

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101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, November 13, 1969.

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102. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, November 17, 1969.

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103. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

Washington, November 18, 1969.

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104. National Security Decision Memorandum 35

Washington, November 25, 1969.

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105. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, November 26, 1969.

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106. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)

Washington, December 8, 1969.

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107. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, December 9, 1969.

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108. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

109. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, December 20, 1969.

110. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, December 20, 1969.

111. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 23, 1969, 7:10 p.m.

112. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, December 26, 1969.

113. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)

Washington, December 30, 1969, 9:20 a.m.

114. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, December 30, 1969.

115. National Security Study Memorandum 85

Washington, December 31, 1969.

116. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

January 6, 1970, 9:47 a.m.

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117. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, January 12, 1970.

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118. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, January 15, 1970.

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119. Editorial Note

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120. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

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121. Editorial Note

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122. Minutes of Review Group Meeting

Washington, January 29, 1970—2:37–4 p.m.

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123. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, January 29, 1970.

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124. Editorial Note

125. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

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126. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 6, 1970.

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127. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

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128. National Security Decision Memorandum 44

Washington, February 20, 1970.

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129. Study Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, undated.

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130. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, March 11, 1970.

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131. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, March 11, 1970.

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132. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, March 23, 1970.

133. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

134. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

135. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

Washington, March 24, 1970.

136. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Chairman of the Defense Program Review Committee (Kissinger)

Washington, April 2, 1970.

137. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, April 2, 1970.

138. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to President Nixon

Washington, April 8, 1970.

139. National Security Decision Memorandum 53

Washington, April 14, 1970.

94. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–11–69 Washington, February 13, 1969.

SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

The Estimate

I. Toxic Chemical Warfare

A. General

1. Throughout its history the Soviet Union has placed heavy emphasis on the development of chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. In early years this emphasis derived largely from the disastrous effects of World War I chemical attacks against the Russians by the Germans. Although CW was not used during World War II, the Soviets had an ample supply of chemical munitions and required no assistance in this respect from their allies. After World War II, the Soviets continued their CW development, aided by the seizure of German nerve agent production facilities and personnel.

2. In post-World War II years, the sharp expansion of the Soviet CW program was probably due in large part to a lag in nuclear weapons availability. Classified Soviet documents suggest that as late as 1961 up to two-thirds of the warheads for tactical missiles and Frogs were chemical rather than nuclear.

3. In recent years the numbers of nuclear weapons available to Soviet theater forces has increased significantly and the proportion of chemical warheads for tactical missiles and rockets has probably declined to about one-third. However, continued stress on the importance of chemical munitions is evident in Soviet military writings, organization, training, and armament, suggesting that the Soviets will continue to retain a significant proportion of chemical warheads in inventory.

B. Doctrine Governing Use

4. Soviet military documents and exercises indicate that the Soviets appreciate both the capabilities and limitations of toxic chemical weapons. They appear to be satisfied that these weapons can play an important part in theater operations; documents and exercises stress their utility in a number of specific tactical situations. On the other hand, we have no evidence of any consideration of the use of chemical munitions in long-range delivery systems, either independently or in conjunction with strategic nuclear weapons, and we believe that their use in a strategic role is not now planned.

5. While the USSR appears to have decided that chemical weapons are essentially tactical

weapons, toxic chemical agents have been regularly and consistently grouped with nuclear weapons as “weapons of mass destruction” in political declarations and in classified military writings. Soviet field service regulations characterize modern combat either as waged with weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, or as waged with conventional means. Thus it appears that the Soviets think of these chemical weapons as subject to the same political constraints as those imposed upon the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, we believe that the initial use of either of these types of weapons would be a matter for decision at the highest political level.

6. Classified and unclassified writings provide strong evidence that the Soviets see no restraints on the use of toxic chemicals in situations involving the use of nuclear weapons on any scale. They would almost certainly use chemical weapons in the event of general nuclear war. We believe, however, that they would not initiate their use in a conventional conflict against an opponent capable of retaliation in kind. They would almost certainly retaliate in kind if attacked with chemical weapons, and they might use toxic chemicals in a nonnuclear war against a power incapable of retaliation in kind.

C. Tactical Doctrine

7. Soviet tactical doctrine for the use of “weapons of mass destruction” prescribes the employment of CW primarily in close coordination with nuclear weapons, so as to capitalize on the particular attributes of each. The doctrine indicates that CW may be used instead of nuclear weapons, for example, in an area of engagement where material damage to the target is to be avoided. Through surprise and employment in mass, toxic agent munitions are intended to provide large-scale casualties and demoralization throughout the tactical zone of operations, thereby permitting rapid maneuver and seizure of critical objectives of fast-moving ground forces.

8. There is good evidence that, once the Soviet Government has decided to use weapons of mass destruction, the *front*[2] commander will normally determine the operations in which chemical agents will be used, the numbers and types of weapons allotted, and coordination with use of other munitions. To fulfill local tasks, chemical weapons would be used on the decision of divisional commanders.

9. Soviet CW doctrine provides for chemical attacks against the “rear areas as a whole,” indicating a more extensive use of toxic chemical weapons at greater distances behind front lines than is usually considered in Western planning. Such a concept is noted particularly in Soviet doctrine for neutralization of enemy missile sites, including those for longer range missiles designated as “operational-tactical,” and in the provision of chemical warhead options for missiles that have ranges up to 300 nautical miles (n.m.).

10. Targets for coverage by chemical weapons, designated in Soviet doctrine, include areas of offensive or defensive combat, areas of troop concentration, command posts, control points, missile sites, and reserves. Chemical munitions are particularly useful when an

attacking force wishes to cause casualties, but to leave undamaged enemy facilities such as airfields, bridges, and roads, as well as combat equipment and auxiliary materials. They can also be used to deny the use of terrain.

11. According to Soviet doctrine, tube and multiple rocket type artillery are the major means of disseminating toxic CW munitions in close combat. These means may be supplemented by chemical bombs delivered by fighter-bomber aircraft. The fire offensive is to begin with "massed group and single strikes" delivering chemical as well as nuclear and conventional munitions. Chemical agents delivered by missiles as well as by aircraft would be used against enemy targets in the rear and also to prepare for the landing of amphibious or airborne forces in enemy territory. Coordination of nuclear and chemical weapons, particularly in connection with missile delivery, is a well-published point in Soviet military doctrine. Operationally, the chemical missile would be targeted from 5 to 10 kilometers (km) from the predicted impact point of a nuclear missile and would be used at the same time. By this tactic, personnel that have been protected from nuclear radiation and blast by the "shadow effect" of terrain features would be exposed to the effect of the chemical agent.

12. In a 1961 Soviet Army exercise, use of 226 nuclear missiles and 277 missiles carrying chemical warheads was simulated. In the first mass strike, 63 nuclear and 24 chemical missiles were utilized; in the next two strikes, 194 chemical and 150 nuclear missiles were employed. The remaining missiles were used in subsequent smaller actions. This evidence indicates that it then was the Soviet practice to use the greater portion of the chemical warheads in operations subsequent to the initial, predominantly nuclear, strike. Since 1961, the ratio of chemical to nuclear warheads has declined. Recent evidence indicates the Soviets still intend to use the greater portion of chemical warheads subsequent to the initial strike.

13. Soviet CW doctrine seeks "practically instantaneous annihilation of personnel" through coverage of large areas by heavy, lethal concentrations of toxic agents. The Soviets envisage the delivery of such heavy concentrations by massive-fill missile warheads detonated at fairly high altitudes. Soviet military literature refers to the achievement of up to 80 percent casualties in impact areas; the 80 percent figure contrasts sharply with Western CW concepts which visualize no requirement to achieve over 30 percent casualties. This Soviet CW doctrine probably reflects both a traditional penchant for massed fires and the earlier need to compete with nuclear warheads as "weapons of mass destruction." The doctrine also helps to explain large Soviet CW agent stockpiles.

D. Chemical Agents

Nerve Agents

14. Nerve agents have never been employed in major warfare,[3] but laboratory and field

testing have shown them to be extremely toxic. Unlike the older agents, these organophosphorus chemicals are practically odorless, and the problem of timely warning has not been solved. One class of nerve agents, known in the West as “G” agents because of their German origin, is relatively volatile and presents a lethal hazard by either inhalation of a minute quantity or contamination of unbroken skin by about one gram of agent. A family of even more toxic nerve agents, known in the West as “V” agents, has been developed since World War II. These present a hazard primarily by skin contamination because of their much lower volatility, but a very small drop (on the order of 0.01 gram) can be lethal. Since World War II, the Soviets have produced several of these nerve agents of increasing toxicity and effectiveness.

15. The first nerve agent developed and adopted by the Soviets was tabun, a G-agent, the quantity production of which probably began about 1946 or shortly thereafter. Manufacture of the agent probably continued through the 1950’s, but stopped when emphasis shifted to other agents. Existing stocks of tabun, whether in bulk or in filled munitions, have gradually diminished as the result of agent deterioration. Nevertheless we believe that about half the Soviet tabun stock is still available.

16. The G-agent, sarin, became known to the Soviets at the close of World War II, when they took over the German production facility. Quantity production of sarin in the USSR probably began about 1960. Production of another G-agent, soman, probably began about a year later. It is more toxic than sarin; no adequate therapy is known. Both of these agents are now in the Soviet stockpile. Soman is available both in the normal liquid form and as a thickened agent.

17. At least one V-agent is in the Soviet arsenal and available for employment. This type of agent may have been known to the Soviets as early as 1953, but they definitely obtained information on V-agents from Western sources in 1955 and 1956. Under priority action and assuming Soviet knowledge of the existence of V-agents as early as 1953, V-agent production could have begun as early as 1956; in any case, at least one agent of this type had probably entered stockpile by the late 1950’s or early 1960’s.

18. The agent used as a chemical fill in tactical rockets, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles is described in Soviet sources as an “agent of the VR–55 type.” The lack of evidence as to the exact nature of this agent is a major gap in our knowledge of Soviet CW capabilities. It appears to be a persistent nerve agent or nerve agent mixture that is at least two or three times more toxic than the Western agent VX, and 25 times as toxic as sarin. According to Soviet sources, VR–55 reaches the ground in vapor, aerosol, and droplet form and is persistent for one to three days. To obtain this effect the Soviets may use a thickener to retard evaporation during the fall. It has also been suggested that VR–55 might be a mixture of a highly toxic V-agent with an unknown, extremely toxic, semi-persistent G-agent. The highly persistent V-agent might retard the evaporation of the more volatile G-agents to permit sufficient G-agent to reach the ground and supply the vapor hazard.

Older Agents

19. World War I-type agents still in the Soviet stockpile include hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and phosgene. Hydrogen cyanide is a tactical, nonpersistent agent. The Soviets claim the ability to produce and maintain an effective concentration lasting from 10 to 15 minutes over an area. A thickened or otherwise evaporation-retarded agent form may be used since hydrogen cyanide normally dissipates rapidly. Since the cyanides are common items produced by the chemical industry, military supply would probably come from diversion of industrial production rather than from a special facility.

20. The vesicant agent, mustard, either alone or mixed with lewisite, is an important agent in the Soviet arsenal. Manufacture of mustard in the USSR took place in both World Wars. There is no information which indicates current production.

21. Phosgene is another World War I agent that is still in the Soviet stockpile. The chemical industry uses phosgene as a common reactant, and the chemical is readily available. Although its toxicity is low compared to that of nerve agents and its volatility is high, its lack of persistence, cheapness, and ready availability seem to influence Soviet retention of the agent in their CW stockpile.

Incapacitants

22. The USSR is working on CW incapacitants such as the US hallucinogen BZ or an agent very closely related to it, as well as other types of hallucinogens. We believe that the Soviets have a good understanding of the chemistry of these agents and their mode of action, but there is no firm evidence that an incapacitant has been put into the Soviet CW stockpile.

Stockpile and Further Production

23. The Soviets have an extensive stockpile of various toxic chemical agents and munitions designed for employment with a variety of tactical ground, air and naval weapons. Central chemical depots under national control are believed to be in each military district. We estimate that the Soviet agent stockpile is on the order of 275,000 tons, but there is some recent evidence which suggests that this figure may be high. We believe that over half the stockpile consists of modern nerve agents and the remainder of older chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and phosgene.

24. Soviet toxic chemical production capacity is expanding. Current stockpiles appear adequate for wartime operational requirements; additional stocks may be deemed necessary by the Soviets on the assumption that some would be destroyed in the event of strategic attacks, or would be immobilized in their generally remote depots by the disruption of transportation systems.

E. Chemical Munitions

25. The USSR has a wide variety of modern ground, air, and naval munitions designed to disseminate lethal and harassing agents, screening and signaling smokes, and flame and incendiary agents. During World War II, toxic CW munitions included shells, mines, multiple ground-launched chemical rockets, massive-fill and cluster bombs, and aerial spray tanks. Since then the Soviets have been very successful in developing new toxic agents for dissemination by the most modern means, such as missiles, and also in adapting older agents for dissemination by modern weapons, such as highly mobile rocket artillery.

Ground Munitions

26. The Soviet ground forces have a variety of toxic chemical delivery means including artillery and mortar shells, multiple railand tube-launched rockets, Frog systems, and Scud tactical ballistic missiles. This array of offensive weapons would enable the Soviets to create a toxic environment over a large area. Any or all of these weapons could also be used in defensive tactics and could be supplemented by the Soviet stocks of chemical mines, used alone or interspersed in high explosive (HE) minefields. Burning-type munitions, such as grenades, pots, and candles, filled with irritant agents would also be used to produce casualties or to degrade the enemy's combat capability by forcing troops to mask.

27. Smaller caliber tube artillery rounds were toxic-filled up to and during the World War II years. Chemical rounds are probably now available for light and medium artillery and the 120 mm mortar. Sarin, soman, mustard, and mustard–lewisite mixtures would probably be used to fill Soviet artillery and mortar shells, and hydrogen cyanide might also be used. Chemical artillery shells are suitable for use on small area or point targets and would be available as "gas" (toxic) or "fragmentation-gas" rounds. Fragmentation-gas rounds have unthickened nerve agents or mustard as the fill and are fitted with relatively large bursters so that the chemical agent is disseminated almost entirely as an aerosol or vapor. Chemical rounds with low order bursters and point detonating fuzes are used to disseminate persistent chemical agents such as mustard for heavy liquid contamination on the target and to disseminate volatile nonpersistent agents such as hydrogen cyanide at ground level. Airburst rounds with low order bursters are designed to obtain larger, more even area coverage than can be obtained with the groundburst types. They are normally filled with persistent type agents such as mustard and possibly thickened soman.

28. Bulk-fill warheads are probably available for multiple-rail rocket launchers capable of firing 140 mm, 200 mm, or 240 mm rockets. Because of their high rate of fire and high ratio of chemical fill to total weight of round, these weapons are ideal for quickly covering large-area tactical targets with toxic concentrations of nonpersistent agents.

29. The Soviets consider chemical landmines especially useful in defensive situations.

The USSR has pressure-activated and electrically detonated chemical landmines. During World War II these were filled with mustard or mustard–lewisite mixtures; while some mines may still have these fillings, newer agents may be used now.

30. Soviet tactical missiles and rockets with massive-fill war-heads are the primary means for delivering heavy concentrations of VR–55. The Soviets maintain that the optimal altitude (i.e., altitude providing maximum ground coverage) for the detonation of Frog-delivered massive fill warheads is 400 meters, and that for Scud-delivered warheads, 1,600 to 2,000 meters. Using this technique, the results obtained with the Frog warhead are described by the Soviets as 80 percent casualties over one-third of a square mile; with the Scud warhead, 80 percent cas-ualties over three-fourths of a square mile. Lesser percentages of cas-ualties are claimed downwind from these areas of maximum agent concentration. The Soviet description of effects obtainable with these techniques is presumably based on optimum weather conditions. The inaccuracies in the Frog and Scud systems would also have to be taken into account in a Soviet decision to employ massive-fill, high-altitude CW attack. The Frog CW warhead probably contains about 400 pounds of agent, and the Scud warhead about 800.

Naval Munitions

31. Soviet literature indicates considerable training emphasis on CW in the navy. Any or all of the Soviet Navy's cruise missiles could carry chemical warheads, but shipboard storage might prove hazardous. The most likely candidate for such warheads are those cruise missiles used by naval coastal defense units.

32. The Shaddock cruise missile can carry an agent payload of about 1,200 pounds about 300 n.m. The warhead may be a massive-fill type such as those for the Frogs and Scuds, and similarly detonated. The Soviets may also have developed a technique for the release of chemicals on a line from a cruise missile.

33. The Soviet Navy probably has 85 mm and 100 mm chemical shells for naval guns. Recent information indicates the stockpiling of 130 mm chemical shells for destroyers and 152 mm chemical shells for cruisers. Such shells are stored in port and placed on ships only during major exercises or in wartime.

Air Munitions

34. Soviet air munitions include massive-fill and cluster bombs, and possibly spray dissemination devices. The specific characteristics of Soviet chemical bombs are not known positively, but World War II types included individual bombs and bomblet clusters for disseminating lethal and harassing agents. Soviet crop-dusting activity indicates an excellent capability for spraying toxic agents from low performance aircraft. Spray tanks were developed in World War II for both fighters and bombers, but we have no evidence of such equipment for modern Soviet high performance aircraft. The Soviets have air-to-

surface missiles which are capable of carrying CW agent payloads. Soviet aerial incendiary bombs probably include individual bombs filled with white phosphorus, thermite, napalm-type agents, or “Pirogel” (a mixture of powdered metal and petroleum products), and clusters of bomblets with thermite or thermite-HE fillings.

F. Chemical Warfare Defense

35. The Soviets possess large quantities of a wide range of equipment for use in chemical defense, much of it of recent design. Extensive training in its use is integral to military exercises for all Soviet and East European forces—ground, naval, and air—and dilute toxic agents are sometimes employed in this training. Equipment and training for CW defense are combined with that for radiological defense, and the special chemical troops are responsible for both types of defense. The dual nature of such defense is stressed in military training, and there are a number of recent examples of Soviet forces donning chemical defense equipment following simulated nuclear strikes.

36. The single most critical weakness in Soviet chemical defense is the problem of nerve agent detection. The Soviets have some manual and automatic devices for the detection of local concentrations of nerve agents, but we do not believe they are capable of giving timely warning of chemical attack.

37. We judge that the chemical defense equipment supplied the individual Soviet combat soldier is technically adequate to protect him in a toxic environment for a limited time, depending on the nature and concentration of the agent. Soviet troops exposed to contamination would be treated at decontamination facilities established by chemical troops. The equipment and procedures to be used at these facilities appear to be technically adequate.

38. Chemical warfare defense is stressed in Soviet civil defense indoctrination and exercises. Civil defense organizations are supplied with chemical defense equipment and gas masks are available for purchase by the general populace. We believe it unlikely, however, that any significant portion of the population has acquired protective equipment.

39. We believe that the Soviets will continue research and development on chemical defense, but we have no evidence regarding particular lines of development. We presume that major attention will be devoted to problems of nerve agent detection, protection, and treatment.

G. Direction and Organization of the Chemical Warfare Program

40. The principal responsibility for the program lies with the Chief of Chemical Troops, subordinate directly to the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces. Administrative control of the Chemical Troops, including those in the Military District organization, is

maintained by the Chief of Chemical Troops. Other activities under his supervision include various CW schools. The Central Chemical Proving Ground, at Shikhany, and other chemical test areas are directly under the Chief of Chemical Troops. Filling plants and central depots for storage of CW munitions, bulk agents, and other CW material are probably his responsibility.

41. Separate and distinct from the administrative control responsibilities of the Chief of Chemical Troops is the operational control of Chemical Troops, which is maintained by the commanders of military districts, groups of forces, armies, divisions, and smaller units, through the chiefs of chemical troops of the respective elements. The chemical officers so assigned advise their commanders on the use of CW weapons and other CW matters such as detection and decontamination. They also command the chemical troops, such as the chemical battalions assigned at the military district and army level. In peacetime a chemical company is an integral part of a division, and a chemical platoon is part of a regiment. In wartime, appropriate chemical units are also assigned to *fronts*, armies, and battalions. The main duties of these personnel are related to CW defense, including detection and decontamination; they are responsible also for handling toxic munitions and agents in storage and transport.

II. Biological Warfare

A. General

42. The Soviets are conducting research and development programs on the possible military applications of biological agents. In previous years, virtually all available evidence could be related to Soviet work in epidemiology, public health, and sanitation, and defensive aspects of biological warfare (BW), but recent evidence points to the development of BW weapons.

B. Doctrine Governing Use

43. Soviet documents indicate that the USSR expects NATO to employ BW in the event of war and is preparing to defend against it. We believe that political considerations would weigh heavily against Soviet initiation of BW. In Soviet writings the subject is linked with nuclear and chemical warfare in terms that indicate a high degree of political control and restraint. The Soviet assessment of relative military advantages and disadvantages of the use of BW weapons, as well as the vulnerability of the population, would also impose restraint.

44. We believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets would employ BW in an initial strategic attack, although it might subsequently be used in the course of a general war. BW is especially suitable for clandestine delivery. The Soviets probably believe that BW weapons are of doubtful effectiveness in many tactical situations because of delayed and unpredictable effects. There is, however, some evidence which indicates that *front*

commanders would be authorized to employ BW in circumstances in which Warsaw Pact forces were being compelled to withdraw, and that the means to do so could then be provided to them.

C. Availability of Biological Warfare Agents

45. We believe that, through their own research and open US literature, the Soviets are well aware of the properties of a variety of BW agents, and they have the technical capability to develop, produce, and stockpile them in militarily significant quantities. We have, however, insufficient evidence on which to base an estimate of the types and quantities of BW agents which might be available to the Soviets for offensive use. The Soviets have done research on increasing agent virulence and maintaining high virulence for extended periods of time, retarding aerobiological decay, adapting agents to unusual vectors and testing the infectivity of causative agents of diseases not endemic to a particular geographic area. Studies on multiple combinations of bacterial, rickettsial, viral and toxoid vaccines, which have been conducted primarily by military scientists, have little relevance to Soviet public health requirements. Similarly, aerogenic studies have featured combinations of antigens that most likely would be found only in a BW environment, making some of these studies highly suspect of offensive agent research and development. In particular, there appears to be no other satisfactory explanation for Soviet work on the aerosolization of botulinum toxin.

D. Defense Against Biological Warfare

46. The Soviet military establishment includes organizations charged with defense of troops against BW. The Chief Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has the prime responsibility for developing methods for defense of personnel and for numerous military and nonmilitary medical research centers which work on BW defense matters. In addition to medical service troops for BW defense, epidemiological services exist at all military levels to provide sanitation and disinfection facilities.

47. Soviet military forces are known to undergo training in BW defensive measures. Defense against BW has been included since 1956 in Soviet civil defense efforts which are now under the control of the Ministry of Defense. Protective equipment is available and contingency plans have been made for mass immunization. There have been some joint civil-military BW defense exercises. These efforts, however, are not of a scale to indicate any meaningful BW civil defense posture.

48. At present the Soviets rely on conventional laboratory techniques for detection and identification of biological agents. There are no indications that Soviet military forces are equipped with automatic BW alarm systems, but a number of prototypes continue to be evaluated.

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board with the exception of the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov). The NIE later served as a source for discussion at the NSC Review Group meeting of October 30 and the NSC meeting of November 18 regarding chemical and biological warfare issues. See Documents 97 and 103.

[2] In the Soviet Army, a *front* is a wartime organization composed of several field armies. Although similar to a US army group, a *front* is not directly comparable. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] Nerve agents may have been employed by the UAR in Yemen. [Footnote in the original.]

95. National Security Study Memorandum 59[1]

Washington, May 28, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
The Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents

The President has directed a study of U.S. policy, programs and operational concepts with regards to both chemical and biological warfare and agents.[2]

The study should examine present U.S. policy and programs on CBW, the main issues confronting that policy, and the range of possible alternatives thereto. The analysis should delineate (1) the nature of the threat to the U.S. and its Allies and possible alternative approaches in meeting this threat; (2) the utility of and circumstances for possible employment of chemical and biological agents, both lethal and incapacitating; (3) the operational concepts relating to possible use, testing and stockpiling; (4) the research and development objectives; (5) the nature of and alternative approaches to the distinction between lethal and non-lethal chemical and biological agents, including a review of current applications of U.S. policy relating to non-lethal agents such as chemical riot control agents and chemical defoliants; and (6) the U.S. position on arms control, including the question of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The study should include consideration of the effects upon U.S. international posture in general and upon relationships with Allies in particular; of the relevant legal questions; of the various cost factors; and of the environmental control and public affairs aspects of U.S. policy.

The President has directed that the NSC Political-Military Group perform this study and that the addressees be included in the PMG for purposes of this study. The President has authorized the PMG to establish the necessary subgroups for special or technical aspects of this study.

The report of this Group should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by September 5, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to General Wheeler.

[2] On April 30, Laird expressed his increasing concern to Henry Kissinger "about the structure of our chemical and biological warfare programs, our national policy relating to such programs, and our public posture vis-à-vis chemical and biological warfare activities." Laird requested immediate NSC consideration of the matter. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 3, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research) Kissinger replied on May 9 that he shared Laird's concerns. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. I) In a May 23 memorandum, Kissinger advised Nixon to authorize a NSSM on the matter. "In the light of the uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy and programs in this area, and in light of the increasing public concern and attention being given the subject," Kissinger believed "that an overall study of present policy and possible alternatives is required." (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 59)

96. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, October 22, 1969.

HAK [Kissinger]:[2] Originally, President found himself arbitrating defense issues on a line-by-line basis. He didn't like being put into this position.

We're concerned with political doctrinal implications of long-term force projections.

You've seen NSDM 26. Implications of force postures, in relation to five year projection,[3] and in relation to NSSMs. In this context, this Group performs same function NSC Review Group performs.

Other contexts are five-year plan due by Jan 15 and next year's DOD budget.

We can't reopen budget line-by-line. We can review implications, e.g., NATO implications, doctrinal implications, it's this problem we are here to deal with.

Defense strategy, overseas deployments and policies and programs. Comments Elliot?

ER [Richardson]: As a Group we should be concerned with regular mechanism between State and Defense, see that political implications are taken into account. We should improve this machinery.

DP [Packard]: Let me tell you what we're going to do in response to NSDM 26, developing a better planning base. Line item basis is impossible.

JCS developed JSOP. This hasn't worked well. No fiscal guidance, poor communications between Services, JCS, and OSD. We have a better plan.

We get initiation of force structure, fiscal guidance at an early date, come up with forces. Process has started.

FY 71 budget submissions have been made. JCS will go back and redo JSOP with guidance from NSDM 27, ISA political in part. This will give us some analysis of problem by Jan 15. Can't do thorough job, but can come up with strategic plan—NATO, SEA—that this Committee can look at.

DP: Five Year Plan will come into reasonable conformance with NSDM 27 by Jan 15. But it will be into FY 72 budget cycle before we can get it firm. But we're trying to put NSDM 27 guidance into specific terms. Force structure and budget will be fairly well in conformance with it.

We should [review?] political, budgetary issues, look at overall program, not line-by-line. We'll address the question of how many airplanes.

HAK: That's what we think.

Wheeler: I agree with Dave. His role on this body is an appropriate one, precluding line item approach. You can't strip out single lines.

HAK: We did this this Spring. I didn't know what we were doing.

Helms: Hear, hear.

HAK: Jim, what do you think?

Schlesinger: We need realistic fiscal objective from outside. Budgetary situation is growing grim. BOB has written to DOD about this problem.

In past there has been joint BOB–DOD review. They raise questions, which SecDef decides (subject/issues). They report back to Director. These subject/issues are reviewed by Director.

Budget must go to printer by first of January.

HAK: This won't work perfectly well for FY 71. We don't want to be widely inconsistent with NSDM 27.

DP: I don't object to you people having a look. We need help. I'm objecting saying that we must have responsibility for fitting plan into requirement of strategy, fiscal guidance. It's been helpful to have problem addressed within fiscal contexts.

Schlesinger: I introduce caveat that NSDM 27 doesn't replace ordinary process of budget review.

HAK: NSDM 27 is guidelines for general posture. This group is then supposed to work on some of this, along with other fiscal mechanisms.

DP: We should give you some definite dates.

HAK: Larry Lynn is my staff man on this.

Stein:[4] Can we make advanced provision for tension between fiscal requirements and DOD budgets?

DP: We're giving five-year guidance consistent with NSDM 27. We're trying to avoid bow-waves, designing programs consistent with FYs 72, 73, 74 and 75.

Wheeler: Fact that we don't have FY 70 budget puts hooker in what we do here. I don't know how you can do better than educated guess as to next year unless we can get something soon.

DP: I don't think it will be too bad. We will have a few problems. Our attempt is to keep flexibility with authorization, see how much money we want to spend. We've time to get on with cuts so all reductions don't have to come in second half of year.

HAK: Two problems.

1. When to get look at FY 71 budget.

Schlesinger: After December 1.

HAK: President is restive about having to overrule frozen position. He wants a crack at preliminary discussion before it becomes bureaucratic issue. December 1 is pretty late. You can get it now piecemeal.

Schlesinger: I don't know what can be done about it. Wheeler concurs.

ER: I don't understand this.

Schlesinger: You can't get overview, get only pieces.

HAK: What are pieces? GPF, Strategy F[5] or carriers, etc.

DP: We have a strategy now we're getting specific. When we get it done we ought to come in for review.

HAK: When?

DP: December 1 is target. Could do it sooner. Maybe Nov 20 for briefing.

HAK: Month from now.

DP: Then we have problem of arriving at force levels. One problem is getting end strength. Other problem is nuclear, strategic area, but no significant changes: we'll go ahead with basic elements. There's Phase I of Safeguard. We will probably record against Phase II.[6] We don't need this step at this time.

HAK: President will be very sensitive to this.

DP: We're not planning on this. Would require money. We can show what we are planning for in 71 budget. Force levels are important. Then there's Vietnam. Soviet naval threats, question of [MIRVs?]. Number of carriers. We can show you our plans, see

whether we're going in right direction.

ER: I would like to enter reservation for the record. I'm not sure I understand how this whole process will work, whether it's sufficient and adequate to insure that political issues get factioned [*factored*] in, that State should be excluded until December 1. Doesn't give us enough time.

DP: We can get your people involved. You, I and Alex[7] can handle this.

HAK: Let Larry sit in on this too.

[no response][8]

Stein: Will your [omission in the original] program be with [omission in the original].

HAK: To sum up.

Between November 20–December 1 we will get a look at next year's proposals.

When five year plan?

DP: Wait until next Jan 15 deadline to see five year plan.

HAK: Between these contexts we will see all these issues. In the meantime we will channel through this with the NSSMs and nuclear policy, deployment in Korea.[9]

I'd like to circulate to this group some suggestions about format, get your comments. Headings to enable this group to review it most effectively. I'd like to circulate a suggestion for comment. Useful for specific assignment of this group, i.e., not aircraft carrier per se.

ER: But a/c carriers vs bases is important.

HAK: We should show that trade off.

DP: Guidance that will help us is what to plan on [omission in the original] to bases.

Wheeler: Special staff, or putting existing staff together.

HAK: We'll see if we can use existing staff, not have special staff. Don't need new staff. We might want ad hoc working groups.

DP: Reserve Ad Hoc group for some problem.

Schlesinger: [omission in the original] on budget. [If [omission in the original] strategy, foxes or so in the hole.][10]

We gave DOD the most generous figure we could give. We face at least $9 billion decline in revenues, perhaps further. FY 71 may have less than FY 70. Largest wave of mandatory increase we've ever had.

It is [possible?] we could present budget with a deficit.

HAK: President is aware of budgetary constraints. NSDM 27 reflects the judgment of [what the Bureau?] of [the Budget?] is willing to stick with.

Wheeler: My forecast is that this group will be surprised at what U.S. strategic capabilities will be in light of money we are talking about. It will give our funds [*friends*] in State a very hard time in dealing with Allies, e.g., cutback in Navy ships, leak of NSDM decisions. It's going to have a major impact.

HAK: Does State not have time to work out a political scenario.

DP: What Buzz [Wheeler] says is right. We are at bottom of barrel in NATO.

HAK: We're putting out NSSM on this whole NATO doctrinal question.[11] [The NATO allies?] want maximum of Americans there if possible, but [do] not do enough to make them meaningful, make us use our strategic weapons.

We should get something everyone can agree to. We can't dribble forces out without creating crisis of confidence.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–1973. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The members of the DPRC, representing their various agencies, were as follows: Kissinger, Richardson, Packard, Helms, Wheeler, McCracken, and Mayo.

[2] According to talking points prepared by Lynn of the NSC Staff, Kissinger was prepared to discuss NSDM 26, specifically "the kinds of issues the DPRC should address," and NSDM 27, including the Defense Five Year Force and Program Plan (FYFPP). Kissinger wanted the DPRC to address strategy, budget, program, and overseas deployment issues. As for NSDM 27, Lynn recommended in the talking points the FYFPP, which would "display the programs, forces, and budget level which we should routinely monitor. Then, whenever an agency proposes to change a significant part of the defense plan, we in the DPRC will be notified automatically." (Ibid., Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, October 22, 1969) NSDM 26 is Document 55; NSDM 27 is Document 56.

[3] This and all such subsequent references are to the FYFPP. On October 31, Kissinger sent a memorandum, drafted by Lynn, to all DPRC members with an attached tentative format for the new FYFPP. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 301,

National Security Council, DPRC)

[4] Herbert Stein, representing the Council of Economic Advisers.

[5] An unclear reference. The report prepared by the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group, which served as the basis for the NSC meeting on September 10 and for NSDM 27, identified five worldwide strategies, numbered 1 through 5. See Document 45.

[6] Phase I of Safeguard, which Nixon opted to pursue in March 1969, consisted of construction of ABM defenses at two Minuteman complexes. Phase II, still under consideration at the time of the DPRC meeting, called for construction at additional sites. See Document 25.

[7] U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

[8] Brackets in the original.

[9] Kissinger was probably referring to NSSMs 64, "U.S. Strategic Capabilities," and 69, "U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia." See Documents 41 and 42.

[10] The outer brackets are in the original.

[11] NSSM 84, issued on November 21, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972*.

97. Minutes of Review Group Meeting[1]

Washington, October 30, 1969, 2:25–3:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents (NSSM 59)[2]

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State
- Richard F. Pedersen
- William I. Cargo
- Ronald Spiers
- Donald McHenry

Defense
- G. Warren Nutter

CIA
- Edward W. Proctor

JCS
- Rear Adm. Frank W. Vannoy
- Colonel James M. Bates

OEP
- Haakon Lindjord

USIA
- Henry Loomis

ACDA
- Howard E. Furnas

OST
- Vincent McRae

NSC Staff
- Michael Guhin
- Col. Richard Kennedy
- Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. The paper[3] is to be reworked by the IPMG to:
   a. regroup the 11 issues into three categories: biological warfare, chemical warfare, and the question of the Geneva Protocol with respect to tear gas and herbicides;
   b. clarify the distinction between offensive and defensive R&D;
   c. state the arguments for and against briefing the German Government on deployment of CW stocks in Germany;

d. include a specific policy issue on the UK draft convention on BW;
e. define an adequate CW retaliatory capability;
f. state the pros and cons for ratification of the Geneva Protocol[4] including the question of a reservation on tear gas;
g. raise the issue of a requirement for a Presidential decision to use tear gas in conflicts other than Vietnam.

2. The NSC meeting on CBW will be postponed from November 12 to November 19 in view of a conflict with the NPG meeting.[5]

Dr. Kissinger noted that the IPMG paper had been grouped into 11 issues. He would find it more useful, if the group agreed, to divide these into three basic categories: biological warfare, chemical warfare, and the question of the Geneva Protocol with respect to tear gas and herbicides. He suggested the discussion begin with *biological weapons* and identified the three choices: (1) retain full capability including lethal agents for deterrence and retaliation with an option for first use; (2) retain capability only for incapacitants; (3) retain only an R&D capability, for both offensive and defensive purposes or defense alone.

Mr. Pedersen asked if BW R&D could be broken down into offensive and defensive weapons.

Mr. Kissinger replied yes, saying defensive moves would include warning devices, immunization, etc., but with no capability to conduct biological warfare.

Mr. Spiers noted the military view that we would have to perform offensive R&D also.

Admiral Vannoy said we would have to have offensive weapons in order to test our defenses.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this meant there was no point in having defensive R&D only.

Admiral Vannoy agreed.

Dr. McRae noted that some aspects of R&D were specifically meant to strengthen our offensive capability, e.g., spray capabilities, weapons development, etc.

Mr. Nutter agreed but said it was hard to draw a line.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we could distinguish between offensive and defensive R&D.

Mr. Proctor said we would not prepare for mass production in R&D for defense.

Dr. McRae stated that, generally speaking, defensive R&D could be distinguished by leaving out engineering development.

Mr. Kissinger commented that an operational R&D program for defense would include

enough work on offensive to give meaning to the defensive aspect.

Dr. McRae said offensive R&D would include an engineering component which would enable quick production.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the issues were correctly stated, and if the JCS favors full capability.

Admiral Vannoy replied yes.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the paper adequately stated the JCS views.

Admiral Vannoy said they had circulated proposed changes to the paper to give a better balance to the pros and cons.[6]

Mr. Kissinger asked if everyone else opposed the JCS view.

Mr. Spiers noted that State had not taken a formal position since the Secretary had not considered the issue. However, State will recommend that he oppose JCS views.

Mr. Kissinger noted that the Secretary would of course express his views at the NSC meeting. He asked if the paper represented a fair statement.

Mr. Pedersen commented that some of the proposed JCS changes would cause trouble for State.

Mr. Kissinger summarized the arguments against a lethal BW capability in terms of its ineffectiveness for retaliatory purposes (e.g., delays in detecting attack, delivering a counterattack and in counterattack taking effect), and that it was not needed in the light of nuclear and other weapons. He asked about possible Soviet clandestine use.

Mr. Proctor replied that we have no information on Soviet plans. He noted that our information was at best ambiguous.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we get intelligence information in this area.

Mr. Proctor replied we have information on exercises in the USSR and in the Warsaw Pact countries on CW but none on BW.

Mr. Kissinger noted that a Czech chemist had told him a major effort was underway but that he was not sure whether this was CW or BW.

Mr. Loomis noted that the best use of BW would be clandestine and that such use would not appear to demand field exercises.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were not an incubation period and why field exercises would

be useful if the weapons were not immediately effective. He thought the major use of BW would be on centers of population over a period of time.

Dr. McRae pointed out that the military would probably not elect BW weapons because of their limited effectiveness except in rare circumstances. He cited the incubation period and the uncertain human response.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it was not easier to produce BW as an effective weapon than certain other alternatives.

Admiral Vannoy agreed, saying that it would be highly effective on a civilian population.

Mr. Kissinger asked if countries cannot achieve a BW capability before a nuclear capability. All agreed that this was true.

Mr. Loomis noted that experiments in this country indicated that BW would be extremely effective in any air-conditioned building.

Mr. Kissinger thought there would be very few occasions where we would use biological weapons first. If they were used against us, BW would not necessarily be the best response. He asked if, on moral grounds, we would not use BW first even if we could conceal it.

Mr. Spiers said he could see some circumstances for first use of BW, almost as a strategic weapon. In the circumstances, however, he thought we would also use nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we would need BW if we used nuclear weapons.

Admiral Vannoy replied that it would depend on the degree of destruction desired, giving Western Europe as an example.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could be sure that an epidemic in Western Europe would not spread to Eastern Europe.

Admiral Vannoy replied that the population could be prepared. He noted also the importance of developing a capability for flexible response. If a stringent nuclear arms control agreement were concluded we might face a strong Soviet BW capability not matched by the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger asked if General Wheeler would not make this point at the NSC meeting and Admiral Vannoy replied that the JCS Staff would so recommend.

Mr. Kissinger asked about the arguments for use of incapacitants and for an illustrative first-use scenario.

Admiral Vannoy cited an island situation, saying although we have BW incapacitants, we have no CW incapacitants. He cited a BW incapacitant which would, within two to four days, produce a high fever which would last a week or ten days. He noted we had no militarily significant quantities of lethal BW.

Mr. Kissinger asked if BW incapacitants might not kill people already weakened.

Admiral Vannoy acknowledged there would be a certain incidence of death, possibly among children, the elderly, and people with other illnesses, but this was not the primary purpose of the weapon.

Mr. Kissinger asked if everyone but the JCS rejects the island argument.

Mr. Spiers thought there was a consensus to retain R&D only with enough offensive R&D for defensive purposes.

Mr. Kissinger asked what the time lag was from R&D to production.

Mr. Spiers replied two to three years assuming we started from scratch.

Mr. Kissinger asked if R&D only implied no production facilities. Mr. Spiers said yes, but that some facilities would be required to produce offensive BW for defensive purposes—testing, etc.

Admiral Vannoy noted that we now have a plant at Pine Bluff [Arkansas] spending approximately $5 million a year producing BW for R&D purposes.

Mr. Kissinger saw two issues for the NSC to consider: (1) whether we should have both offensive and defensive R&D, or defensive only; and (2) whether we should or should not retain production facilities.

Mr. Pedersen asked if it would be necessary to build a plant from scratch or whether normal medical or pharmaceutical facilities could not produce BW.

Admiral Vannoy said it would not be possible to use commercial plants because of certain control and packaging requirements.

Mr. Pedersen asked if, in a state of war, adaptation of present commercial plants for BW purposes could not shorten the two to three-year period.

Admiral Vannoy agreed this might be possible. However, he thought an equally important problem would be development of a delivery and packaging system and that this would be as difficult as the production of the biological agents themselves.

Dr. McRae noted that we have little data with which to assess the effectiveness of BW

even in an island situation. He thought the degree of incapacity was ambiguous.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the UK draft convention on BW[7] and asked if the only decision consistent with the convention would be R&D for defensive purposes only. Would it be consistent to pursue offensive R&D for defensive purposes?

Mr. Spiers replied no.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there are reasons for supporting the UK convention other than those of substance.

Mr. Spiers noted the verification issue, and also commented that the UK paper was not widely supported, mainly because it separated BW from CW.

Admiral Vannoy noted that we have zero capability of determining whether or not there is a production capability without on-site inspection.

Mr. Proctor agreed.

Mr. Kissinger noted that the JCS believes defensive R&D is impossible without doing enough offensive work to know what to defend against. In itself, this is inconsistent with the UK draft. Also, we could not tell whether a plant was being used for BW, even less whether for offensive or defensive purposes, without an obtrusive inspection. Would we be bothered by such inspection?

Mr. Spiers said there would be complications.

Mr. Kissinger asked that we categorize the arguments in light of the above discussion in a reshaped paper.

Dr. McRae thought we could eliminate the possibility of acceptance of the UK draft excepting the proposal on R&D.

Mr. Spiers noted the complications of trying to separate continued production from continued R&D. He noted, however, that the UK draft was not a high priority problem.

Mr. Pedersen thought, however, that we would have a problem with both the Soviet and UK drafts and that we will need a position.

Mr. Spiers thought our position on these issues would be affected by what we want in the way of arms control.

Mr. Pedersen asked if it were possible to pursue this along tactical lines.

(At 2:55 p.m. Mr. Loomis left the discussion.)

Mr. Cargo commented that the verification issue is less acute if we limit ourselves to R&D.

Mr. Pedersen agreed that if we undertake a unilateral limitation, we could then argue for the treaty for what we would get out of it.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should offer this as an argument in favor of the UK draft, it we are moving in that direction anyhow. He commented that others may not know that we have adopted such a position unilaterally.

Mr. Spiers thought that there were other arguments.

Mr. Kissinger noted the low priority of the BW program, commenting that high level interest sometimes brings with it higher priorities. He thought the low priority interest in BW was a form of tacit arms control.

Mr. Kissinger moved to the subject of *chemical weapons* and raised two issues: (1) are incapacitants covered by the no first-use policy on lethals; (2) do we want to maintain a capacity for retaliation (both lethal and incapacitant) or limit ourselves to R&D? He assumed no one was in favor of first-use of lethal CW.

Admiral Vannoy noted that the JCS position was qualified by the knowledge that we would have a retaliatory capability. If we had a retaliatory capability, we would, in fact, have a first-use capability.

Mr. Kissinger asked what the difference was between first use and retaliatory capability.

Admiral Vannoy replied that we would need more to retaliate than to initiate, since we could assume some stocks would be destroyed by the enemy in an initial attack.

Mr. Kissinger assumed we would not be bothered by declaring a no first-use policy since we could always change our mind.

Mr. Nutter questioned the effect of a declaratory policy on our deterrent.

Mr. Kissinger asked if anyone believed we would undertake the first-use of CW.

Mr. Nutter noted that we had been careful not to make any such final statement on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger replied that we had, however, made a no first-use statement on CW. He asked if we would let Europe be overrun rather than use CW first.

Admiral Vannoy replied that at the present we would have no choice.

Mr. Spiers noted the difficulties involved in reversing present policy on no first-use CW.

Mr. Nutter noted that our statement is one of intention.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were any significant pressure for altering the no first-use policy for lethal CW.

Admiral Vannoy said the JCS would fight to retain the capability.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the no first-use policy applies to incapacitants.

Mr. Spiers said we had never said whether this applies to incapacitants. He noted that the only Presidential statement (President Roosevelt in 1943) referred to "poisonous or noxious gases" and that we had not had a CW incapacitant at that time.[8]

Admiral Vannoy replied that we did, in fact, have a CW incapacitant—49 tons of it—but that it was not very good and that we have had difficulty stabilizing it. In response to questions, he said that it became effective in the respiratory system in 1½ to 2 hours and lasted 3–5 days.

Dr. McRae described the effects of a CW incapacitant on the ability to coordinate bodily functions, giving illustrations.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this had been tested.

Dr. McRae replied that it had.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this were an issue if we have no effective CW incapacitant.

Mr. Spiers thought that it was an issue—do we want to retain a CW incapacitant capability because of the production aspect?

Mr. Kissinger asked what we know about the other side.

Dr. McRae replied that we had heard rumors about a Chinese Communist CW incapacitant but they were only rumors.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we would know about their CW capabilities when we know so little else about Communist China? He asked about possible use of a CW incapacitant—would we use it in an island situation?

Admiral Vannoy said yes, or wherever we want to acquire real estate without destroying it.

Dr. McRae thought it might possibly be useful if you could get an effective CW incapacitant—in fact, it would be more useful than BW because of its quick onset, predictable response, and the fact that it is not contagious.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the arguments for and against CW incapacitants (pp. 26–27 of the IPMG paper) had been adequately stated?[9]

Dr. McRae thought there was an additional question: should you plan for the use of a CW incapacitant or merely plan to retain a capability.

Mr. Kissinger thought the first question could be added to the question of first-use and that the second should be phrased "should we retain a capability even though we have agreed on no first-use?" He asked if there were a consensus that we should retain a capability for retaliation.

Mr. Spiers commented that the State Department would support Secretary Laird's recommendations on CW[10] including his recommendation that all stocks of mustard and phosgene gas should be destroyed or detoxified, and that production of other lethal CW agents should be discontinued until binary agents are fully developed. He thought they would recommend to the Secretary of State that once R&D on binary agents had been completed, we should request a Presidential decision whether or not to go into production.

Mr. Kissinger summarized Defense position as calling for an end to production of any more chemical weapons; detoxifying or destroying mustard and phosgene stocks, while maintaining other stocks (e.g., non-binary nerve gases); continuation of R&D on binary agents. State adds the issue of a Presidential decision on the production of binaries when development becomes possible.

Admiral Vannoy said that JCS wishes to maintain a retaliatory capability with lethal chemicals.

Mr. Spiers commented that State would not have raised the possibility of the destruction of existing stocks.

Mr. Kissinger noted the Defense Department debate on the definition of a lethal retaliatory capability. Secretary Laird has recommended some detoxification or destruction, and the replacement of existing lethals by binary weapons which could be put into production later. The JCS judgment is that destruction of stocks and failure to produce more would leave us without a retaliatory capability. He thought this issue should be raised in the paper so that the President could address all CW and BW problems together.

Dr. McRae asked if our existing retaliatory capability is adequate.

Admiral Vannoy replied that it is not.

Mr. Kissinger asked what would be considered an adequate retaliatory capability.

Admiral Vannoy replied 8 tons per division per day.

Mr. Kissinger asked for what objective?

Admiral Vannoy replied for the destruction of Warsaw Pact forces.

Mr. Kissinger asked if JCS was, therefore, defining a retaliatory capability as nothing short of the capability to destroy Warsaw Pact forces totally by CW.

Admiral Vannoy added in conjunction with conventional weapons.

Mr. Cargo commented that we should be able to retaliate until the enemy stops using the weapon.

Admiral Vannoy said that the JCS have stated an additional requirement for deployment in Western Europe.

Mr. Spiers noted that the JCS say stocks are inadequate without saying what is adequate.

Mr. Kissinger asked Dr. McRae what was meant by an inadequate retaliatory capability.

Dr. McRae noted that U.S. forces were concentrated in small areas in Europe such as air bases, they had no protective clothing, no de-contamination equipment, no safe transportation between buildings and their aircraft, etc. An attack by lethal CW could take out our attack air forces. He mentioned that a retaliatory capability would involve more than stocks.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could distinguish between retaliation and deterrence—could we deprive an attack of its effectiveness? If we should retain a deterrent/retaliatory capability, we would need a definition of what is needed. He thought the principals might call for a study of precisely what is required for retaliation.

Mr. Lindjord asked how far away we are from development of binary agents.

Admiral Vannoy thought it would be 1974 or later.

Mr. Pedersen noted that the IPMG paper stated that the Soviets have larger stocks than we have.

Mr. Proctor noted the CIA revision of the paragraph on information about the Soviet CW program[11] which qualifies our ability to estimate the size of Soviet stocks.

Mr. Pedersen thought, however, that the net impression of the paper was that the Soviets have larger stocks.

Mr. Proctor agreed that the stocks in Warsaw Pact countries are larger than those of

NATO countries, but said we did not know how much larger.

Dr. McRae thought this was not too relevant in determining policy.

Mr. Proctor agreed.

Admiral Vannoy thought it was relevant, however, if we were to have a retaliatory/deterrent capability.

Mr. Pedersen also thought it was relevant in the no first-use context—if the enemy is far ahead of us this is all the more reason for no first-use.

Mr. Kissinger said a sensible definition of a CW retaliatory capability would have to include some reference to nuclear weapons. He thought it inconceivable that we would rely on CW if we were attacked in Western Europe.

Mr. Proctor said that Soviet exercises clearly combined CW and nuclear elements with the ratio of CW to tactical nuclear weapons going down in recent years. He thought this could be attributed to the greater availability of tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger asked if CIA had an estimate of Soviet capabilities?

Mr. Proctor referred to an NIE of February 1969.[12] (This paper was later identified by the staff as having been partially overtaken by a reexamination within the intelligence community of the validity of the evidence on which it was based.)

Mr. Furnas said ACDA would place more emphasis on the development of binary agents—they would retain a lethal capability until we see about the development of binaries and until we can see the future of arms control efforts.

Mr. Kissinger concluded that the CW issues were fairly clearly stated for NSC consideration, and moved to the next question of *stockpiles overseas*. He noted that, with the withdrawal of stocks from Okinawa, we maintain stocks only in Germany and asked why.

Admiral Vannoy replied that one needed the deterrent in close proximity to where one intended to use it.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we would deliver it.

Admiral Vannoy replied by tactical air, missiles or artillery. In response to a question, he said that our airlift capacity would be over-committed in the first 15 days of any difficulty.

Mr. Kissinger said that, if we had no stocks in Germany, we would be faced with the question of introducing chemical weapons into the country and that any such

introduction would probably be too late to do any good.

Mr. Spiers commented that it would take 15 days to bring in even an initial supply, but would take 75 days to acquire the capacity for any sustained use.

Mr. Kissinger said we could bring them in as a crisis approaches, but would then be susceptible to the charge that we had intensified the crisis by bringing them in. Why could we not bring such stocks in during a quiet period. Is domestic pressure an argument?

Mr. Spiers said we should tell the new German government that we have CW stockpiles in Germany, ask them if this is a problem for them, and, if so, bring it back.

Mr. Kissinger asked why go to the Germans?

Mr. Spiers thought we should ask them to focus on the question before it becomes a major issue.

Mr. Kissinger asked, if CW stocks are necessary in Germany, why raise it with the Germans?

Mr. Spiers thought we needed to explain to them the rationale, brief the new government on what is there and get their reaction.

Mr. Kissinger thought it would present Brandt[13] with a very tough question if we asked for approval. If we are willing to take these supplies out, well and good. If we are unwilling, we should look very carefully at the question of reopening the question with the Germans.

Mr. Spiers commented that, if it should become a major issue, he thought the State Department would argue that the stocks in Germany wouldn't be worth a major confrontation.

Mr. Kissinger said that if the Germans did not already know we had CW stocks in Germany, it would be all right to brief them. But they do know about these stocks and he saw no reason to reopen the question. He thought the German government was already overloaded with domestic issues. At least he thought the White House should have a crack at any decision in this area.

Mr. Spiers agreed, saying that the Secretary had not yet been consulted and may not agree with the recommendation for briefing the new German Government.

Mr. Kissinger thought this issue might be included in the paper. If we don't care about retaining the stocks in Germany, it is okay to raise the question. State should lay out the arguments for and against briefing the Germans and let the principals decide.

Mr. Spiers agreed to do so.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we would take the weapons out of Germany if they asked us to or do we prefer to keep them in? If we choose to retain a retaliatory CW capability, he assumed we would want to keep them there. Is talking to the Germans the best way to keep them there?

Mr. Spiers thought it might be better to raise the question now than to run the risk that it might become a major issue and that we would then have to retreat under pressure.

Mr. Kissinger thought it unlikely that the Germans would make this a political issue. If not, why embarrass Brandt by asking him about it?

Mr. Nutter asked where we would put these stocks if we should remove them from Germany.

Portugal, Spain and the UK were suggested.

Mr. Pedersen asked whether there was a good argument for keeping stocks overseas if we were agreed on a no-first-use policy.

Mr. Nutter replied that NATO wants a retaliatory capability.

Mr. Cargo asked if any of our allies has any CW capability.

Mr. Spiers replied that there is some cooperative R&D for defensive purposes with the UK and the Germans.

Mr. Cargo asked if we could soak up anything from our allies to contribute to a retaliatory capability.

Admiral Vannoy thought we could get nothing useful from our NATO allies.

[Omitted here is discussion of the United States position regarding the Geneva Protocol.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Review Group Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. The minutes are also published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 155.

[2] Document 95.

[3] The Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG), chaired by Spiers, submitted a 47–page draft response to NSSM 59 on October 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group

Meeting, October 30, 1969) The revised paper is Document 99.

[4] By October 1969, 84 nations had become parties the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of bacteriological agents. While the United States had signed the Geneva Protocol, the U.S. Senate had not ratified it.

[5] The meeting was held on Tuesday, November 18. See Document 103.

[6] On October 17, Wheeler sent a memorandum to Laird with an appendix detailing the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommended chemical and biological warfare policy. The JCS was against declaring a no-first-use policy and advocated vigorous R&D programs to maintain chemical and biological agents with both offensive and defensive capabilities. The JCS also wanted to maintain some overseas stocks of chemical weapons. Notes on the memorandum indicate that both Laird and Packard saw it. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 4, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research)

[7] At the July 10 meeting of the ENDC in Geneva, the United Kingdom introduced a draft agreement to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological agents "in any circumstances." The proposed agreement also required the destruction of current stocks of biological weapons.

[8] On June 5, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "Authoritative reports are reaching this Government of the use by Japanese armed forces in various localities of China of poisonous or noxious gases. I desire to make it unmistakably clear that, if Japan persists in this inhuman form of warfare against China or against any other of the United Nations, such action will be regarded by this Government as though taken against the United States, and retaliation in kind and in full measure will be meted out. We shall be prepared to enforce complete retribution. Upon Japan will rest the responsibility." (*Foreign Relations*, 1942, China, p. 67)

[9] See Section II E of Document 99.

[10] The Defense Department's "Summary Report on Chemical Warfare Programs and Biological Research Programs," October 8, recommended that "All stocks of mustard and phosgene gas should be destroyed or detoxified, and production of other lethal chemical agents should be discontinued until binary agents (suitable for safe handling) are fully developed. Meanwhile, the chemical warfare program should concentrate entirely on R&D of binary agents." (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 4, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research)

[11] Not further identified and not found.

[12] NIE 11–11–69 is Document 94.

[13] Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from October 22, 1969.

98. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs[1]

Washington, undated.

EUROPE

A. Fundamental US interests continue to require a Western Europe that is stable, peaceful and secure from domination by any one state. While under present circumstances it is unlikely that the USSR would risk use of military force against Western Europe, the Soviet Union will continue efforts to expand its political influence, based upon its military power. The USSR will seek to reduce US influence in Western Europe by emphasizing and promoting differences between the US and its European allies. Political cohesiveness of the Western alliance is of vital importance, and our forces in Europe and committed to NATO are a major element in preserving solidarity.

B. While effective US military forces in NATO are essential to US security interests, their importance is at least equally measured in terms of the concrete evidence they provide of US commitment to common goals. Our allies will continue to display anxiety about any US reduction of its NATO forces, particularly those in Europe.

C. This Administration has made clear its intention to maintain US commitments to NATO. The firmness of the US commitment to NATO is measured in part by the stability of US force levels in Europe; thus the maintenance of existing force commitments is important from a political as well as a military standpoint. Current force planning should assume that the US will retain the present level of its combat forces in Europe, and will make every effort to retain present commitments to NATO of forces not based in Europe. In view of Congressional and other pressures, however, it will be necessary to consider thoroughly the strategic, political, military and budgetary consequences of reductions and the extent these consequences could be made more manageable by force or equipment restructuring, etc. If it appears that eventual force reductions will become necessary, on the basis of such a review, the US will seek in consultation with its allies stable levels of force commitments to NATO and troop levels in Europe for the long range.

D. It is highly unlikely that unilateral US reductions in Europe would lead to matching reductions by the USSR. And while also unlikely, we do not completely rule out some prospect over the next five years of mutual and balanced East-West force reductions, as a result of negotiation or even by process of “mutual example.” It will continue to be our objective to engage the Soviets in discussions on this subject.

E. Europeans face pressures for defense budget reductions and are not likely to increase their NATO commitments significantly. For political and economic reasons, increases in German force levels are very unlikely. If there were to be a significant US force reduction in Europe there would not be a compensating European increase. In fact, this action might trigger decreases in European forces.

F. The US and NATO allies will continue to rely on a combination of US strategic nuclear

forces, US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and US ground and air forces deployed in Europe to deter Soviet aggression. While realizing that the nuclear deterrent may not possess the credibility of earlier years, Europeans will continue to believe that the possibility of escalation to strategic nuclear levels will suffice to deter a Soviet attack so long as sufficient US forces and stocks of nuclear weapons are retained in Europe. In any event, they believe the Soviet propensity to attack is low. They are unlikely to seek or favor a major change in NATO strategy since they do not have a ready alternative to reliance on the US strategic deterrent. While an increasing interest in a European nuclear force centered around the existing French and British forces is possible over the next several years, this will not basically change the situation.

G. While development of a tactical nuclear or prolonged conventional war option may appear to the US to be attractive, the Europeans cannot be persuaded of this. They will continue to view conventional and tactical nuclear warfare as brief transition stages leading rather promptly to a strategic nuclear exchange. They view this as the heart of deterrence, and it is deterring a war, not fighting a war that concerns them. It is unlikely that major changes in the size or character of the current US conventional forces or nuclear stockpile in Europe could be made without destroying the political cohesiveness of the Alliance. US efforts to persuade the allies to accept a strategy calling for a prolonged conventional or tactical nuclear war would not only be unproductive but politically damaging to our Alliance relationships.

MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN

A. Despite the absence of formal security treaties with non-NATO powers in the Mediterranean Basin, four US administrations have made clear that the US has a special interest in the security of Israel.

B. In the Persian Gulf, current American Oil and other activities, which return some $1.5 billion annually to the US balance of payments, are likely to expand.

C. The requirement for US forces for this area has never been well defined, but air and naval forces appear to be considerably more important, at least from a political standpoint, than ground forces.

D. Restrictions on US base use (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Spain) if not outright denial (we must regard Wheelus as lost now[2]) will continue to be a significant factor in any contingency involving the Arabs and Israelis. Soviet involvement in such a contingency may relax these restrictions somewhat, but it should not be assumed that they will remove them. Ways to reduce dependence on these bases should be examined.

E. Reopening of the Suez Canal cannot be counted upon for the next two years, or even longer. Therefore, the importance of Diego Garcia and COMIDEASTFOR increases.

F. Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean will not diminish and may expand further. There is a good possibility that the Soviets will gain access to air bases in the Mediterranean area.

G. With the British departure from Aden and the Persian Gulf, the Soviets will continue to manifest increasing naval and other activity in the Arabian Sea region.

H. Any major changes in the Sixth fleet will have important political implications in the Mediterranean Basin and would have to be preceded by careful political-military consultations with allied and friendly governments.

I. While we have no intention of replacing the British in the Persian Gulf area after their withdrawal in 1971, we have no plans to terminate our naval presence there and believe we can maintain our home porting arrangements on Bahrain over the next few years.

EAST ASIA[3]

A. The US should not plan on the use of major US ground forces in a war against Communist China on the Asian mainland.

B. The strategic deterrent vis-à-vis the PRC should be effective, given the continued US superiority in nuclear weapons over the PRC. Although the possession now by the Chinese of nuclear weapons may reduce somewhat inhibitions on US use of such weapons on the battlefield against Communist China, such inhibitions will continue to exist. This is particularly true since it will become increasingly difficult for the United States to convince Asian allies that we can guarantee low levels of nuclear damage to them in the event the US initiates use of nuclear weapons.

C. For the foreseeable future, some US ground forces in South Korea will be an essential part of the deterrent against North Korean aggression. With political stability in the ROK, some reductions in the present level, however, would probably be politically manageable with compensatory ROK force modernization. Timing would largely depend upon political considerations. It is very unlikely, given continued US presence, that the Soviets would participate in an attack on South Korea in conditions short of general war. Given the state of Soviet-Chinese relations, as well as that between North Korea and China, it seems equally unlikely that the Chinese Communists would do so. However, if hostilities should occur and North Korea found themselves being driven back toward the Yalu River, it is likely that the Chinese Communists would again enter the conflict in their support. If PRC attack on South Korea should occur, we would be faced with the alternative of a major input of US air and ground forces, the use of nuclear weapons, or abandoning the defense of South Korea.

D. We should plan on the provision of major US air and naval forces, as well as some ground forces,[4] to support South Korea in the event of a North Korean attack. However, modernization of defensive capability of the South Korean air force without substantially increasing its offensive capability over a period of time would permit a reduction of the requirement for US air force support.

E. The US will stand by the existing SEATO commitment to the defense of Thailand. This commitment does not require US combat forces to assist the Thais in defeating communist-supported insurgency which, under present circumstances, they should be able to contain with their own forces. The main security threat is the possibility that China or North Vietnam may escalate support for the insurgency. This threat will vastly increase if all of Laos should fall under communist control. Substantial US military assistance will continue to be required if the Thai armed forces are to meet this threat

while also developing a limited self-defense capability which with US support, limited to MAP and air and naval forces, should be sufficient in the rather unlikely case of overt North Vietnamese aggression. Such assistance will also serve to sustain Thai confidence in the US. US forces now in Thailand are there primarily in support of the Vietnam war, and consequently they can be phased out as the Vietnam war winds down.

F. The probability of a Chinese Communist invasion of Southeast Asia is very low. If it were nonetheless to occur, it is difficult to visualize the use of large American ground forces to meet such an invasion. Under these circumstances, the US would have to face the issue of the use of nuclear weapons, or of abandoning Southeast Asia.

G. An attack on Taiwan by the PRC is highly unlikely, but if it were to occur, US support should be limited to air and naval forces, relying on GRC ground forces for ground defense.

H. A high level of MAP will be required to maintain and improve ROK and Thai military capabilities. The GRC could also effectively use somewhat more MAP than it is now getting. Military assistance for Indonesia should probably increase modestly. President Nixon's Guam doctrine[5] and the increased reliance on indigenous forces implies a greater emphasis on force modernization in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. The US must, therefore, be prepared to consider on its merits the provision of more modern equipment than would be the case if early direct US military intervention were contemplated.

I. The US base structure in the Western Pacific will shrink. However, mainland air bases (in Korea and Thailand), naval bases (Japan, the Philippines), off-shore air bases, and logistic facilities (Okinawa, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and if current negotiations are successful, the Singapore naval base) will probably be available over the next five years.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

A. The US base structure world wide will be subject to increasing pressure at home and abroad. New weapons systems, logistics, support, communications, and intelligence arrangements that promise to reduce dependence on specific bases or the structure as a whole should receive priority.

B. Given that it is a US objective to maximize the use of local forces in mainland Asia conflicts, it is imperative that high priority be given to the development of air and naval weapons, doctrine and tactics appropriate to the task of supporting these forces. It would be desirable, for example, to develop capabilities that would permit effective "land blockades" but which did not involve enlargement of the area of operations, assuming we may again have to deal with the sanctuary problem as in Korea and Vietnam.

C. There is an urgent requirement for the development of military equipment tailored to defense environments less sophisticated than that presented in Europe. In particular, it is important that the US have available high-performance aircraft suitable for MAP and credit sales to allies. We need to consider urgently whether these requirements can best

be met by less sophisticated versions of aircraft in or planned for the US inventory (e.g. A7 or F4), or by a new family of airframes and avionics designed specifically for these needs. Study might also be given to the utility of encouraging development of foreign-manufactured aircraft for this purpose (e.g. MRCA, Harrier).

MAP

The direction of US strategy in the early 1970's implies a shift from direct US intervention toward improving the ability of our allies to defend themselves with US air and naval support where this is necessary. This, in turn, will require increased military assistance programs in selected countries. If we are to obtain higher levels of military assistance, it will be necessary to develop a persuasive rationale based on the proposition that only through such aid can the US continue to protect important security interests while reducing the need from [*for*] direct US military involvement. The Departments of State and Defense should work together as a matter of urgency on this problem.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 US. Secret. Drafted by Leslie H. Brown of the Office of International Security Policy and Planning (ISP) and Leon Sloss, Director of ISP, on November 3. Cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George S. Springsteen, and Assistant Secretary Green. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Schlesinger, Gerard Smith, Lindjord of OEP, Clark of the CIA, General Vogt of the JCS, and Assistant Secretaries of State Green, Hillenbrand, Joseph J. Sisco, David D. Newsom, and Charles A. Meyer. On November 4, U. Alexis Johnson sent the paper, under the title "Foreign Policy Assumptions for Defense Planning," to Packard, who had requested it, under a covering memorandum that notes that the attached paper "is an effort to reduce to writing some of the more critical foreign policy assumptions that, in my view, should govern military planning in the next several years." (Ibid.) That same day, Johnson sent the paper to Rogers, who wrote at the bottom of the covering memorandum, "Alex, Good paper. See however p. 2 East Asia." (Ibid.)

[2] The United States announced on December 16 that it had begun to dismantle Wheelus Air Force Base, located near Tripoli, at the request of the new Libyan Government which had seized power on September 1. (*New York Times*, December 17, 1969, p. 6) The United States formally transferred Wheelus to the Libyan Government on June 11, 1970.

[3] Ex Vietnam and Laos, which require and are receiving separately more detailed treatment than can be provided here. [Footnote in the original.]

[4] Rogers circled and placed an exclamation mark next to the phrase, "as well as some ground forces."

[5] On July 25, during a tour of Asia, President Nixon outlined what was first called the Guam Doctrine and later the Nixon Doctrine. While Asia was crucial, he stated that in the future the United States, except in the case of aggression by "a major power involving nuclear weapons," would avoid direct military involvement in the region. Instead, the

United States would “encourage” Asian nations to be responsible for their own security. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 544–556)

99. Paper by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group in Response to NSSM 59[1]

Washington, November 10, 1969.

US POLICIES ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND AGENTS

[Omitted here are the first 22 pages of the paper comprising an Introduction and Part I, which contains background information on Soviet CBW capabilities, current United States policy, United States CBW capabilities, and international arms control initiatives.]

Part II: CW AND BW Policy Issues

Introduction

Before the nature, scope and direction of a coherent US policy for CW and BW can be decided upon, several underlying issues should be addressed and resolved. These issues fall into three categories.

The first two categories deal with CW and BW programs respectively, for policy will indeed be concerned with the objectives, scope and nature of future programs. The third category deals with a set of issues concerning the public and international posture of the US on CW and BW issues. This involves legal issues, arms control policy, and US positions in international conferences and negotiations.

Before examining the various policy issues, over which there is disagreement, a few areas of agreement deserve mention.

First, there is need for a continuing US RDT&E program to improve defenses and guard against technological surprise. Indeed, there is a consensus that, regardless of decisions on the following issues, there should be more emphasis upon defensive measures and programs.
Second, the US should continue to work on, develop and improve controls and safety measures in all chemical and biological programs.
Third, a requirement exists for more definitive intelligence on other nations' CBW capabilities.
Fourth, Declaratory policy with respect to lethal chemicals and lethal biological agents is and should continue to be "no first use."
Fifth, no agents except RCA's and/or herbicides can be used except with Presidential approval.

Finally, to try to keep public opinion problems manageable, public affairs policy should be planned and implemented on an inter-agency basis in close integration with substantive

policy.

I. BW Policy Issues[2]

A. *Should the US maintain a lethal biological capability?*

Pros:

1. Maintenance of such a capability could contribute to deterring the use of such agents by others.
2. Without any production capability and delivery means for lethal agents, the United States would not be able to reconstitute such a capability within likely warning times.
3. Retains an option for the United States at very little additional cost as a hedge against possible technological surprise or as a strategic option.

Cons:

1. Control of the area of effect of known BW agents is uncertain.[3]
2. A lethal BW capability does not appear necessary to deter strategic use of lethal BW.
3. Limits our flexibility in supporting arms control arrangements.

B. *Should the US maintain a capability for use of incapacitating biologicals?* (We now have two biological incapacitants in stock.)

Pros:

1. From a military standpoint, incapacitating biologicals might be an effective method of preparing for an amphibious invasion, disrupting rear-echelon military operations, or of neutralizing pockets of enemy forces.
2. Biological incapacitants could provide in some circumstances a method of capturing particular targets or areas which might be more humane than conventional weapons.
3. Without a production facility in being at the present state of readiness, it would take approximately 2–3 years, starting from scratch, to produce biological agents in militarily significant quantities.
4. Maintains the only existing US incapacitant capability for those situations where incapacitation over a period of several days is desirable.

Cons:

1. Biological incapacitants have a questionable deterrent or retaliatory value.
2. First-use of incapacitating biologicals would be construed by most nations, including most US Allies, to be contrary to international law and the Geneva Protocol.
3. An enemy may perceive no clear-cut distinction between incapacitating and lethal agents under wartime conditions.

C. *Should the US maintain only an RDT&E program?*

There are really two sub-issues here: (1) should the U.S. restrict its program to RDT&E for defensive purposes only or (2) should the U.S. conduct both offensive and defensive RDT&E? While it is agreed that even RDT&E for defensive purposes only would require some offensive R&D, it is also agreed that there is a distinction between the two issues. A defensive purposes only R&D program would emphasize basic and exploratory research on all aspects of BW, warning devices, medical treatment and prophylaxis. RDT&E for offensive purposes would emphasize work on mass production and

weaponization and would include standardization of new weapons and agents. If a decision were made to continue an RDT&E program for defensive purposes only, it would be necessary to review the necessity for retaining existing production facilities. (1)

—*in the offensive and defensive areas?*

Pros:

1. Minimizes risks of technological surprise.
2. Provides knowledge and capability for physical and medical defensive measures.
3. Retains a relatively short lead time for response to new threats (depending on level of RDT&E effort).

Cons:

1. Could be construed as preparation to use biological agents in war.
2. Would degrade US capability for response in kind.
3. Would reduce US response options.

(2)

—*in the defensive area only?* (Maintenance of a defensive RDT&E program inherently requires some offensive RDT&E effort.)

Pros:

1. Would provide some knowledge, although less than with the preceding option.
2. Would result in a more economical program.
3. Could not be construed as preparation for use in war.

Cons:

1. Would, as compared with (1) above, further degrade US capability to employ biological agents.
2. Could require disposal of certain material and facilities and loss of expertise.
3. Would increase the hazard of technological surprise.

[Omitted here is Part II, Section D, which deals with the question of whether the United States should support the draft convention prohibiting biological warfare introduced by July 10 by the United Kingdom at the ENDC in Geneva.]

II. CW Policy Issues[4]

A. *Should the US maintain a capability to retaliate with lethal chemical agents? (There is*

no consensus on what constitutes adequate retaliatory capability.)

Pros:

1. The principal argument in favor of the development and stockpiling of lethal chemical agents is that such a capability is needed to deter possible use against US or allied forces by others in war.
2. Reliance on nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against CW would deny to the decision-maker the lethal chemical option in retaliation, in the event US or allied forces were subject to a CW attack. Depending on the military capabilities of the enemy, an expanded conventional response could be inadequate and a nuclear response could prove too escalatory.
3. A response in kind would force an enemy to operate under the same cumbersome operational constraints (protective clothing, movement limitation and limited logistics) which would be imposed on our forces.
4. If the US were unilaterally to eliminate its lethal CW capability, this would remove a major bargaining lever for obtaining sound and effective arms control measures.

Cons:

1. The principal argument against the development and stockpiling of a lethal chemical capability is that other military means, including a whole range of nuclear weapons, are sufficient to deter the use of lethal chemicals.
2. The deterrent threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons against a CW attack could be more credible if the US were to eliminate its CW capability.

B. *Should the US destroy or detoxify its stockpiles of mustard* [*gas*]*? (All stocks of phosgene have been disposed of.*)

Pros:

1. Mustard is an obsolete World War I type gas which has considerably less military utility than modern nerve agents.
2. An announcement that we planned to dispose of these stocks would help to demonstrate US interest in controlling lethal chemical munitions and thus might have some political value.

Cons:

Would remove about 40% of existing lethal chemical artillery capability which although not as desirable as nerve agents do have a proven casualty producing capability. For these reasons, destruction is not appropriate until binary agents are available.

C. *Should the US continue to maintain stockpiles of Chemical munitions overseas (1) in Europe, and (2) in the Pacific? (European stockpile is only in Germany)*

Pros:

1. Stockpiles in close proximity to where they may be used are necessary for deterrence and for a timely and adequate response. Current stocks in Europe represent only 8–10 days of combat usage and in Asia about 15 days.
2. Not to continue to maintain chemical munitions overseas would impose a delay of at least 14 days for initial response and up to 75–90 days for sustained operations.
3. If stockpiles are not established during peacetime, it might be provocative to attempt to reinforce chemical stocks quickly in a crisis.

Cons:

1. Present stocks do not provide a significant operational capability; the expansion of overseas stocks necessary to create such a capability could involve increased political problems for the US.
2. Even maintaining present stockpiles of lethal chemical agents on foreign territory could become a source of political friction with the host country.

D. *Should the US consult with the FRG concerning the US CW stockpile in Germany?*

Pro:

Early discussion would help to remove a possible irritant in relations before it developed into a major issue.

Con:

If the US decides to retain these stocks, raising the issue could unnecessarily jeopardize this objective and place the FRG in an awkward position.

E. *Should the US preserve a first-use option for incapacitating chemicals?*[5]

Pros:

1. Successful development of an effective incapacitating agent could provide a capability to gain a military advantage, but with fewer casualties than is possible through the use of conventional, lethal chemical, or nuclear weapons.
2. Because they are non-lethal it may be possible to make these agents acceptable in world public opinion as being more humane than conventional or nuclear weapons.
3. Eliminating a first-use option without compensating political or military gains may unnecessarily deprive the US of a means of engaging in armed conflicts with resultant fewer casualties than in conventional war.

Cons:

1. First-use of incapacitating chemicals would probably be construed by most nations, including some US allies, to contravene international law and the Geneva Protocol and to be contrary to past expressions of US policy.[6]
2. First-use could lead to escalation to lethal chemical or biological warfare (if the enemy force had the capability) since the enemy might well not acknowledge any distinction between incapacitating and lethal agents.
3. First-use of incapacitating chemicals could lead to a loosening of international constraints on CW and BW, make effective arms control measures more difficult and probably bring the US considerable international and domestic criticism.

F. *Should the US maintain an option for unrestricted use of RCA's in warfare, and continue practicing this option in Vietnam?* (The discussion below excludes peacetime use by US forces for crowd control and base security which is not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol or international law generally.)

Pros:

1. In many military situations, use of RCA can contribute to military effectiveness; reduce US, civilian and enemy casualties and fatalities; decrease the destruction of civilian housing and public facilities; increase the possibilities of the capture of PWs; and impede enemy avenues of approach.

Cons:

1. The use of tear gases in combat situations could blur the "no first-use" doctrine and ultimately contribute to a lowering of barriers against use and proliferation of CW capabilities in general.
2. Use of tear gases in Vietnam as an adjunct to lethal weapons may be construed by some to be contrary to past US official statements on use of tear gases in Vietnam.
3. The use of tear gases in war (even if limited to humanitarian purposes) has been considered by many nations to be contrary to customary international law and by most to be prohibited by the Geneva Protocol.

G. If the US maintains an option for the use of tear gas in war, should it be limited to "humanitarian purposes"?[7]

Pros:

1. Would permit the US to ratify the Geneva Protocol with a public interpretation that would create a minimum of international opposition.
2. Wartime use would be allowed in much the same way as riot control agents are used in time of peace, allowing for broader use than most restrictive interpretations of the Geneva Protocol would permit.
3. Maintaining this option would help us to explain our use of tear gas in Vietnam as consistent with our interpretation of the Geneva Protocol.

Cons:

1. If accepted, the military might well have to be restricted to use of tear gas in wartime to crowd control and base security which would deprive the military commander of the most useful military applications of tear gas.
2. Implementation of this principle would cast doubt on the legality of our present use of tear gas in Vietnam.
3. "Humanitarian purposes" is a term difficult to define conclusively and field commanders and others would be constantly beset by doubts about particular proposals to use tear gas, especially if its use would save the lives of their own troops, perhaps at the possible expense of the lives of the enemy.[8]

H. *Should the US retain a policy permitting first-use of chemical herbicides?* (There is agreement that use of herbicides as a defoliant is not contrary to international law and is less likely to have international repercussions than use against crops. Thus the main issue centers on anti-crop use. Some believe that further research is required at least on possible long-term ecological effects of herbicides, and on such effects on human embryos as has led to the recent reaffirmation and extension of the policy banning the use of Agent 2, 4, 5 T in populated areas of CONUS and in Vietnam.)

Pros:

1. Herbicides have been used effectively in Vietnam to clear the sides of roads, canals and river and around encampments, thereby reducing the possibility of enemy ambush and concealment, and providing more protection to US and SVN forces.
2. Herbicides have been used effectively in Vietnam to destroy crops, thereby making it more difficult for the enemy to secure food supplies.

Cons:

1. The use of herbicides in an anti-crop role blurs a "no first-use" doctrine.

2. If the US continues to take the position that these agents are excluded from a "no first-use" policy, it could make international control of CW more difficult.
3. It is difficult to determine that crops are solely for the consumption of the armed forces which is the sole target sanctioned by international law.

I. *Should the use in war of all chemical and biological agents, including tear gas (riot control agents) and/or herbicides, require Presidential authorization?*

Pro:

The political implications of the unrestricted use of tear gas and/or herbicides in war could be of such magnitude that it would be unwise to have them introduced without Presidential authority.

Cons:

1. These non-lethal weapons should not be singled out of the US arsenal for special authorization.
2. This type decision should be predelegated in order for adequate planning and logistics support, if RCA is to be used.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969. Top Secret. The NSC Secretariat sent the paper to NSC members for their consideration prior to the November 18 NSC meeting. The paper, according to the covering memorandum, had been revised following the NSC Review Group meeting on October 30. (Ibid.) See Document 97. The portions of the paper omitted here are published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 156. NSSM 59 is Document 95.

[2] Relevant legal arguments are discussed in Section III E. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] Although BW agents do require large safety zones, their controllability under other than a strategic attack is possible, based on results of testing to date. [Footnote in the original.]

[4] Relevant legal arguments are discussed in Section III E. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] The US currently does not have an effective operational incapacitating chemical capability. [Footnote in the original.]

[6] DOD does not believe such would contravene international law. [Footnote in the original.]

[7] "Humanitarian purposes" has never been clearly defined. By way of illustration, however, the use of tear gas in Vietnam would be authorized where civilians and enemy forces were thought to be intermingled and the purpose of using tear gas was to save civilian lives. Tear gas would not be authorized where the primary purpose was to deny enemy troops cover or concealment and make conventional weapons such as artillery or airstrikes more effective. OSD/JCS believe that no "humanitarian purpose" doctrine on the use of weapons exists. [Footnote in the original.]

[8] ACDA believes that workable rules of engagement could be issued which, at a minimum, prohibited use of RCA's in conjunction with conventional weapons such as artillery or air

strikes to facilitate killing of enemy troops. OSD/JCS disagrees. [Footnote in the original.]

100. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, November 13, 1969.

In attendance: Dr. Kissinger, David Packard, General Wheeler, Alexis Johnson, Dr. Lynn, Jim Schlesinger, Ron Spiers, Richard Helms, Major Kanarowski.

DP: [Described the basic FY 71 budget and options using a tabular layout distributed at the meeting.][2] Vietnam reductions reflected on the tables begin as of 1 July 1969. The first option would withdraw roughly 100,000 troops more than we have now committed ourselves to take out as of Nov. [Packard referred to Phases IV and V, with which I am not familiar.][3]

HAK: As I understand it then, the extreme case would be to withdraw 300,000 troops by the end of calendar 70.

DP: The end strength figure is most important in these options. We can hit these figures without SVN withdrawals by reducing CONUS forces or readiness. What we need is guidance on one of these schedules: guidance on end strength figures. If we cannot meet the end strengths because SVN withdrawals proceed too slowly, then NATO readiness would have to give.

HAK: If the President decides on Option I, II, or III—I don't believe Schedule IV is realistic—will it show in the budget?

DP: If Defense adopts alternative I or II, the reduction could be related to a stand down in CONUS. Also, if we commit ourselves to a budget level, we might be able to find other program reductions to take the place of VN withdrawals. No matter how we go, I don't believe the budget can be reduced below $72.5 or $72 billion without the pay raise.

HAK: As I understand it then, you need an end strength decision only—not a withdrawal schedule. The President is most reluctant to commit himself to withdrawals.

DP: Yes, end strengths only.

GW: I don't believe that the withdrawal issue can easily be concealed; when Secretary Laird appears before Congress, the questions will get at the withdrawal assumptions.

DP: CONUS-based readiness will have to give.

AJ: What is the NATO worst case?

GW: The 1st, 2nd, and 5th Divisions now in CONUS and committed to NATO might have

to be used for training. This would be evident to our allies and should be reflected in the DPQ.[4]

DP: This issue will have to be examined more critically.

JS: I think we are going to have to stick with $72.5 billion or lower for defense: there is an unbalanced budget program and non-defense programs are increasing and the surtax issue is unresolved.

DP: We don't save much in FY 71 by reducing carriers to a lower level. The savings occur in out years. I believe the DPRC should address the CVA issue. As you know, during peace time we need three CVAs to maintain one on-station. During a period of crisis, one carrier out of two could be deployed; and during a war, eight out of ten. Denis Healy[5] told me the reasons the UK left the carrier business were that they don't want to move families overseas, and without doing that, the hardships associated with carrier duty became too great. With respect to ASW carriers, we reduced forces from six to four in order to reduce FY 70 costs by $3 billion. In general, we can count on one out of two ASW carriers being deployed since the stations are closer to CONUS.

[There then was a general discussion of deployments to the Atlantic, the Far East, and the Middle East and the risks and gambles.]

HAK: In the Middle East, more forces are needed for ASW.

JS: The S–3 needs to be developed. [Schlesinger also made reference to NSSM 3 force levels[6] and asked whether they are our guidance.]

DP: The NSSM 3 force levels are illustrative only.

We won't let the forces in NSSM 3 be used as guidance. NSSM 3 does not go into detail on the desirability of various force levels to meet a given strategy.

HAK & GW: Yes.

AJ: What is the relationship between the carriers and the SIOP? I understand they have a substantive role in the Pacific and the Mediterranean.

GW: When the carriers are not available, targets are not covered and other forces have to be committed. For example, the 7th Fleet was relieved from its SIOP task. During a contingency, these forces could be flipped back onto the SIOP with warning. Of course, they would have to move further north. The same general observations apply to B–52s. Every week I receive a briefing on the "number of degrades."

DP: With respect to carriers, we need to know how important they are for non-SIOP options.

HAK: We are losing land bases for aircraft. This raises serious doctrinal issues of what we should do with carriers. How are calculations for meeting our carrier needs made? From the point of view of non-military considerations, how many carriers are needed? I think the range is probably 12–15 with two in the Med. and probably two in SE Asia after SVN. Maybe we should have a discussion of this issue; Larry, prepare something.

GW: When we retire a CVA, we also retire four escorts and one replenishment ship.

JS: Can we rotate carrier crews like Polaris?

GW: The proposals don't meet the problem because people are the expensive item: in fact, the rotation might cost more.

HAK: CVSs are needed in the Med. I would like to leave issues III and IV on the Navy to Defense; I don't think the Committee can make a contribution.

[Dave Packard and General Wheeler went on to describe proposed reductions III and IV. There was some question as to whether we would want to maintain forces for an amphibious operation in NATO.]

HAK: Alex, should we look at the planning for amphibious operations?

[Dave Packard and General Wheeler then discussed the Marine air wing team. Dr. Kissinger said this issue could be resolved in DOD. He said what was involved were Systems Analysis-type issues, which were not DPRC concerns.]

GW: With respect to reductions of tactical Air Force capabilities, we can now deploy 14 squadrons to NATO in a short period. With the reductions proposed, a certain number of these aircraft will not be immediately ready for rapid deployment.

DP: The reductions in Air Force squadrons has an impact on deployments to Japan and Okinawa.

HAK: Alex, shouldn't we look at the effect of the Air Force reductions on our contingency plans?

AJ: Yes.

HAK: Could you give us an assessment of how this reduction in aircraft impacts on contingency plans? [I don't know who the "you" is—probably Packard and AJ together.]

DP: The F–111 is an internal defense issue. We have no specific commitment to NATO to deploy F–111; however, the deployment is expected as part of our force mobilization. When deployed, their primary purpose will be deep interdiction. A–7 and F–4 are also an internal matter.

RH: In other words, for big reductions in the budget, big decisions are needed.

HAK: Let's meet again on the NATO issue: I need a brief assessment of the effect of budget reductions on the readiness of NATO forces and State views of the diplomatic and political consequences of these reductions. Then we may have to make some recommendations to the President. Alexis Johnson and Ron Spiers should do this. Admiral Johnson will give them the impact of the reductions on our contingency plans.

DP: With respect to the F–14 and F–15 issue, these aircraft are useful in SE Asia. They have a longer range and better load capabilities. They also are the modernization aircraft we need for the 1975–83 period. However, getting cost down will be a big problem.

[Packard then turned to strategic force issues.]

DP: On Minuteman, we will have 10 in FY 70 and 110 in FY 71. This is a stretch-out and reduction of earlier planned deployments. FY 71 costs are reduced by $180 million, but the long-term cost will increase by about $50 million. We could have 210 by FY 72, 330 by FY 73, 446 by FY 74, 500[H11001] by FY 75. This decision pushes the Minuteman modernization problem out in front. As a result of Congressional action on Poseidon, we have reduced modernization from 7 to 3 for FY 71. [This means we would have 16 out of the 31 Poseidon modernized by the end of FY 71.] We also intend to implement the stellar navigational capability program. This will cost $21 million. We should take another look at this problem.

The strategic bomber presents a big problem in the long run; however, the FY 71 implications are not great. We are looking at three alternatives saving from $138 million up to $252 million: The Secretary of the Air Force is recommending something in between. Should we look at this issue (AMSA) in the Committee?

HAK: Larry, do this.

DP: I will furnish back-up material on the AMSA issue.

HAK: Do we have a big problem with Poseidon?

GW: It takes a long time to refit Poseidon missiles with MIRVs—one year. Three are now in for refit.

DP: The FY 71 budget includes $958 million for Safeguard. The FY 70 budget included $893 million. There is a little delay in the progress: completion date is now Sept 1974 for Phase I. There are three alternatives for Phase II: defense of MM, defense of bombers and areas, and overall China defense. Phase II would be completed by 1976. FY 71 outlay is roughly 1/3 what is shown on the table. I think we ought to discuss Safeguard next time.[7]

HAK: We need enough of Phase II to show a commitment to China area defense.[8]

DP: When we look at alternatives, we will have to decide whether we should include Washington, D. C.

HAK: The alternatives should focus on area defense for CONUS. I would like Dave to give us two alternatives for an area defense.

DP: The modified area defense would be using four sites covering the four corners of the U.S. and some radars oriented against SLBMs.

JS: I think we ought to start with the Northwest.

HAK: The President wants something like that—and let's keep away from Washington. Let's look at two alternatives, one high and one low, at a future meeting. We will also look at the NATO contingency and CVAs.[9]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–73. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes, but they were probably prepared by Lynn. The meeting was held to discuss the FY 1971 Defense budget. All brackets are in the original.

[2] Not found.

[3] See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 114.

[4] The United States annually submitted a Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) to NATO.

[5] U.K. Secretary of State for Defense.

[6] See Document 45.

[7] In a November 7 memorandum, Lynn informed Kissinger that the Department of Defense had concerns about Safeguard. Accordingly, Laird "may welcome delays in Phase I precisely because they enable him to postpone a decision on Phase II until FY 72. The political problems of convincing Congress that Phase II is necessary now, particularly since SALT will be underway, could appear so difficult to Defense that it may not want to raise the issue in the FY 71 budget." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting November 13, 1969)

[8] In an undated action memorandum, Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the issuance of directions to the Department of Defense "to include at least the area defense of Safeguard Phase II within the budget totals so that the President isn't forced into unpleasant decisions at the last minute." Nixon initialed his approval. (Ibid., Box 844, ABM/MIRV, Sentinel ABM System, Vol. III)

[9] In a December 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Lynn summarized the three decisions

taken by the DPRC in its November 13 meeting. The CVA force would remain at 15 rather than being cut back to 12. The Pentagon would "proceed with full engineering development of AMSA in FY 71, though there has been no formal commitment to procurement." And Defense anticipated "no need to cut NATO readiness" following its "decision on a residual force objective for Vietnam of 260,000 by June 30, 1971." Only one issue, the future of Safeguard, remained unresolved. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, December 9, 1969)

101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, November 13, 1969.

SUBJECT
Soviet SS–11 Modification

Since July 23, the Soviets have carried out seven tests of a modified SS–11. The evidence points to the testing of two improved pay-loads for the SS–11 ICBM, one very possibly carrying multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) or penetration aids.

The Test Evidence

The intelligence evidence on the seven modified SS–11 tests indicate that a MRV or penetration aids were probably tested on the third and sixth of the tests. The other five tests involved only the testing of a single RV, possibly one with increased accuracy.

While it is possible that our intelligence is misleading, the Soviets are probably testing both an improved single RV and a MRV payload for the SS–11. However, intelligence evidence is not yet precise enough to specify the performance characteristics of either new payload.

The most likely Soviet plan would seem to be to give some SS–11s a capability to destroy our ICBMs through improved accuracy and to give some SS–11s a capability to penetrate our defenses with MRVs or penetration aids. With 830 SS–11 missiles deployed or planned for deployment, the Soviets could substantially improve the effectiveness of their ICBM force through such modifications.

Deployments of the SS–11

Besides testing a modified SS–11 ICBM, the Soviets have also tested an unmodified SS–11 at intermediate range, and started construction of 70–100 SS–11 silos at intermediate/medium range missile (IR/MRBM) fields in Western Russia.

The most recent NIE[2] concludes that the SS–11 missiles to be deployed at IR/MRBM complexes are intended for use at IR/MRBM range against NATO. The Soviets could plan to modernize and harden their IR/MRBM forces by replacing the missiles now deployed, particularly those at soft sites, with SS–11 silos.

The Soviets have already deployed a large and effective IR/MRBM force targeted on NATO. If they plan further increases in their MR/IRBM forces, their incentive is not apparent. Since an unmodified SS–11 could cover most U.S. targets from the IR/MRBM

launch complexes, the Soviets may be deploying the SS–11 for use as an ICBM despite its location in IR/MRBM complexes and recent testing as a MRBM.

Summary

Since 1968, our understanding of SS–11 testing and deployments has been inadequate. The Soviet development of an improved SS–11 ICBM payload, particularly involving the use of MRVs or incorporation of accuracy improvements, has not been clearly anticipated and may have been dangerously discounted.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM–MIRV, MIRV Panel Meeting. Top Secret; Sensitive; [*codeword not declassified*]. Sent for information. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Lynn sent a draft to Kissinger under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

[2] Document 46.

102. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, November 17, 1969.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting on CBW, November 18

The NSC meeting is intended to consider the basis U.S. policy issues relating to Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW).

The objective of the meeting is to establish a policy framework for future CBW programs which will be consistent with both national security and arms control objectives. Because the subject of CBW is highly complex, it will be possible during the meeting to address only the key issues. Your decisions on these issues, however, will provide the policy direction for the groups of sub-issues.

There is consensus on a number of policy aspects of CBW. All agree that there is need for:

—Continuing research and development, with emphasis on defense.
—Refinement of controls and safety measures.
—Better intelligence on other nations' CBW capabilities.
—Doctrinal reliance on a "no first-use" policy for lethal chemical and biological weapons.
—A closely coordinated public affairs policy.

Attached and tabbed are:

—*Your talking points*, which will introduce the subject and structure the discussion. Briefings are called for by Mr. Helms and General Wheeler. I would propose to lead the discussion centering about the key issues. When I complete my outline of the issues, I suggest that you call on appropriate participants at the meeting for their views. Your talking points proceed in this way.[2]
—*An "Issues for Decision" paper* which includes my recommendation on each of the issues.

You need to read only your talking points and the "Issues for Decision" paper. Additional background material is enclosed in a separate background book.[3]

Briefly summarized, the topics for discussion are:

1. Policy on Biological Weapons

Specific Issues for Decision

a. Should we retain a capability for combat use of lethal or incapacitating biological weapons? If not, what should be the extent of research and development on biological weapons?
b. Can we or should we support the UK Draft Convention which would prohibit development, production and use of biological weapons?

2. Policy on Chemical Weapons

Specific Issues for Decision

a. Should we retain a capability for use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons or should we confine our chemical programs to research and development?
b. If we wish to retain a lethal chemical capability should we maintain stockpiles overseas?
c. If we wish to retain an incapacitating chemical capability should the "no first-use" policy apply to them as well as to lethal chemicals?

3. Policy on Tear Gas and our Position Toward the Geneva Protocol

Specific Issues for Decision

a. Do we wish to continue unrestricted use of tear gas in Vietnam and to keep this option open for the future?
b. Do we wish to ratify the Geneva Protocol which bans first use of chemical and biological weapons?
c. If so, are we willing to include incapacitating agents and tear gas within the strictures of the protocol or can we interpret the protocol to exclude them?

4. Policy on Authorization for Use of Tear Gas and Herbicides

Specific Issues for Decision

a. Should Presidential authorization be required for the use of tear gas and herbicides outside of Vietnam as it is for all other chemical and biological weapons?

2. If not, to what level should the authority be delegated?

Tab

ISSUES FOR DECISION

There are four principal policy issues for decision. Each major issue subsumes an additional number of specific questions.

Policy on Biological Warfare (BW)

There are two questions to be decided.

A. What should be the nature and scope of U.S. policy on biological warfare? There are four options:

1. Retain a Full Capability Including Both Lethal and Incapacitating Biological Weapons.
2. Retain a Capability for Incapacitating Weapons Only.
3. Research and Development Program Only, *but* for both Offensive and Defensive Purposes.
4. Research and Development Program for Defensive Purposes Only and to Protect against Technological surprise.

—Some argue that we should retain a full BW capability because (1) a *lethal BW* capability helps deter BW attack and gives us another strategic option; (2) because it would take considerable time to reconstitute stockpiles and delivery means; and (3) because *biological incapacitants*—the only effective incapacitating capability we maintain—could be useful in military operations such as amphibious invasion.
—Others argue that we should maintain a research and development program only because (1) our nuclear deterrent serves to deter strategic use of lethal BW; (2) the control and effectiveness of BW weapons are uncertain as are the deterrent or retaliatory value of incapacitants; (3) though they could possibly be useful in a "first-use" situation, such use could risk escalation and would be considered by most nations to be contrary to the international law; and (4) a research and development program would protect against technological surprise.

All agencies, except the Joint Chiefs, support Option 4.

Recommendation: That you approve Option 4, (research and development for defensive purposes) to include only enough offensive research and development to protect against technological surprise.

B. Should the U.S. support the U.K. Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Warfare? There are three options:

1. Defer any decision.
2. Associate *in principle* only.
3. Do not support.

—If our BW policy is to concentrate on research and development for defensive purposes (Option 4) we can support the Convention. Under any other policy we would have to oppose it or seek major modifications. The Convention provides for no on-site verification, but relies on procedures for investigation of treaty violations by agencies under UN auspices. Also, its relation to other CBW arms control proposals is unclear. No one argues that we should agree to the Convention as it stands.

—Some argue that we should associate in principle (1) to evidence our willingness to consider limitations on biological warfare, particularly if we maintain a research and development program only, and (2) because we could gain political benefits without tying our hands until questions such as scope of the Convention and suitable verification procedures were resolved.
—Others contend that there is no urgency to consider the Convention and that any association with it might weaken our opposition to unverifiable provisions in other arms control proposals.

Recommendation: That you approve Option 2 (Association in Principle) subject to the satisfactory resolution of such questions as verification procedures and the relation of the U.K. Draft Convention to other arms control measures.

II. Chemical Warfare (CW) Policy Issues

There are three basic issues.

A. Should we maintain a lethal chemical capability and if so where and at what level should we maintain stocks? There are two options:

1. Maintain lethal chemical stockpiles for deterrence or retaliation:
   a. In the U.S. only.
   b. In the U.S. and overseas.
2. Rely on Research and Development only.

—Some argue that we need lethal chemicals (1) to deter chemical attack, and (2) as a retaliatory option between a conventional response (which might be inadequate) and escalation to nuclear response. They also argue (1) that unilateral elimination of this capability would give up a valuable bargaining counter in arms control discussions and, (2) that so long as we maintain our declaratory policy of "no-first-use" the international political costs of retaining the capability are not excessive. They contend that stocks should be maintained overseas (particularly in Germany) to assure the capability for timely response and because, were they to be removed, attempts to replace them in a crisis could be both difficult and provocative. The JCS also believe that existing stocks of mustard gas should be retained until improved agents are developed because they represent a large portion of existing casualty producing chemical stocks.
—Others argue that (1) our tactical nuclear capability makes lethal chemicals unnecessary as a deterrent, and (2) that existence of the chemical capability may encourage chemical attack because the threshold of response appears lower to the enemy. They believe that an offensive and defensive research and development program would guard against technological surprise and the improvement of defensive measures could lessen the likelihood of chemical attack because of inevitable enemy uncertainty about the true extent of our CW capabilities. They contend that, in any event, we should not retain stocks overseas because (1) existing stocks are too small for an adequate

response and to increase them would cause political problems with our allies; (2) needed chemical support to theaters of operation can be provided from the United States quickly; and (3) continued presence of these stocks, particularly in Germany, could become a source of friction. They argue further that mustard gas is far less effective than our other chemical weapons and that its destruction would yield political benefit. The Secretary of Defense favors destruction of mustard gas.

Recommendation: That you approve retention of a lethal chemical capability and retention of the stocks in Germany (Option 1–b). That you also approve the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to destroy or detoxify the stocks of mustard gas, but in a phased manner to assure an adequate capability while the development of safer weapons is in progress.

B. Should the U.S. "no first-use" policy on lethal chemicals apply also to incapacitating chemicals? Two options:

1. Affirm that the U.S. policy of "no first-use" applies also to incapacitants.
2. Exclude incapacitants from a "no first-use" policy.

—All agencies support our declaratory policy of "no first-use" for lethal chemicals but there are differing views as to whether it should apply to incapacitants. The incapacitant we now have is not an operationally effective agent because of its uncertain effects, but research is continuing with some promise of development.
—The proponents of including incapacitants in the policy argue that (1) their deterrent or retaliatory value is questionable, and their principal utility would be in a "first-use" situation against an unprotected enemy; and (2) that most nations would see such use contrary to the Geneva Protocol, international law and past expressions of U.S. policy. They argue also that first-use could lead to escalation to lethal chemicals, and loosen international constraints on chemical warfare.
—The opponents argue that an effective agent, if developed, could give military advantage in a variety of situations with fewer casualties and might be accepted internationally as more "humane" than other weapons.
—The JCS position is uncertain but they probably favor retaining a "first-use" option. The Secretary of Defense may, and all other agencies will, support including incapacitants in our no "first-use" policy.

Recommendation: That you approve a "no first-use" policy for incapacitants with the understanding that this does not preclude continued research and development toward an effective agent.

[Omitted here are Sections III and IV, which discuss the use of tear gas and/or herbicides in Vietnam and the Geneva Protocol. On agreements to control the development and use of chemical and biological weapons, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969. Top Secret.

[2] Nixon's talking points, prepared by the NSC Staff, are attached but not printed.

[3] In addition to the President's talking points and "Issues for Decision," the enclosed additional background materials included such documents as NIE 11–11–69, NSSM 59, and the final version of the IPMG's response to that NSSM dated November 10. See Documents 94, 95, and 99.

103. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, November 18, 1969.

Minutes of NSC Meeting on Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Attorney General Mitchell
General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, JCS
Director of Intelligence Helms
U.S. Representative to the U.N. Yost
Assistant to the President Kissinger
Under Secretary of State Richardson
Lee DuBridge, Science Advisor to the President
Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA
Ronald J. Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
William Watts, NSC
Michael Guhin, NSC

RN—This is a difficult and unpleasant subject about which we have little real knowledge.

Helms—(Director Helms briefing is attached.)[2]

RN—I hope we know more about ours than about theirs.

Wheeler—At the end of World War II, we captured a great deal in the way of German shells and stockpiles.

There is an apocryphal story that the Germans planned to use (chemical warfare) against the Normandy landing. It is apocryphal because the German General Staff ignored orders.

The main use to us of Chemical Warfare is as a deterrent. I am inclined to think that the Soviets' capability is greater than ours, since ours is so small. They can resupply quickly by land to Europe or Asia.

They do show plans to use them. They have experimented with decontaminants.

If the enemy used chemical warfare and the U.S. lacked defenses, the advantage would accrue to the enemy.

Historically, the use of chemicals has never been initiated against a nation which had them. The Italians used them against Somalia, and the Egyptians used them in Yemen.

If we had no retaliatory equipment, we would have to be prepared all the way along the front. If both had such equipment than neither would have the advantage.

I therefore conclude that we should have a modest deterrent capability. Chemical warfare has many uses:

—Attrition
—in actions smaller than nuclear exchanges
—to give credibility
—for long-lasting effect

We must deploy our stocks forward; we can't move them rapidly in time of crisis.

There are chemical incapacitants which we don't have in large enough quantity. They have five too many.

With regard to our biological warfare program, its major value is deterrence. If this fails, then we have a modest ability to retaliate. Our stockpiles are in terms of pounds, not tons.

We don't know what the Soviets have, but they are interested.

If the enemy uses BW, we must take a massive conventional or nuclear response. A nuclear response means the risk of nuclear escalation. The psychological impact would be high. Our BW program is the only free-world program. Eighty percent of our program is RDT&E. It costs $7 million a year for agents and delivery systems.

Our facility at Pine Bluff can go into production in 30 days. If it were closed, it would take two to three years to reactivate.

The JCS believes that, on balance, it has a low cost, that it would be a catastrophe if we can't respond, and there is a difficulty in verifying enemy capabilities. Therefore, the JCS believes that we must retain our present stockpile and the options of production if needed.

With regard to riot control agents, these are primarily tear gas. They reduce casualties. They assist in withdrawal and breaking off contact. They can reduce the fire aimed at helicopters. They can be used to deny the enemy avenues of approach.

Herbicides improve vertical and horizontal visibility and help reduce ambushes.

Kissinger—(Presented the issues and options as contained in his talking points in attached NSC book.)[3]

RN—Charlie (Yost), any comment?

Yost—The only action to go to the UN on the subject has been the

Canadian procedural item which refers the subject back to Geneva.[4] There is general concern at the UN with CBW and seabeds. If we can present a generally cooperative position, then there is no immediate problem. We can go with the Canadian resolution.

Farley—We need to decide the security requirements first. It is difficult to devise an inspection scheme. We would welcome limiting our own efforts to R&D. We would then be willing to look at the UK initiative.[5] But we must look at verification, inspection and complaints procedures, and the question of aid to countries who claimed they were attacked.

DuBridge—There is great public interest in this subject. What is the military use? The value of a BW retaliatory capability is not clear. There is slow incubation, perhaps two weeks, and then 2 weeks to retaliate. We don't know how it spreads and we are unsure about possible epidemics.

The military retaliatory value of BW is not great. I would think it was better to go to chemical warfare than nuclear. We could be in a better situation.

The whole issue is not clear from the scientific side.

RN—The UK proposal would allow R&D for defensive purposes?

Farley—It is hard to be sure.

Rogers—The language is flexible. It could be done.

Wheeler—We don't feel as strongly about BW as about CW. We would like to see a minimal RDT&E program pointed to defense, guarding against offensive actions by the enemy.

Kissinger—On incapacitants, what we have is lethal to anyone without two nurses.

It would be unlikely that we would use lethal chemical weapons in a strategic attack. Nuclear weapons would be more cost-effective. We should therefore use chemical weapons for tactical purposes.

The tear gas question concerns ratification of the Geneva Protocol. It would ban the first use of CW and BW. It is not clear about tear gas and herbicides.

Rogers—Australia has ratified without making an interpretive statement.

Wasn't the Protocol withdrawn in 1948? Would we have to resubmit it? There is Congressional pressure to resubmit it, and we could say we comply.

Yost—In 1966, the Administration called for support of the Protocol.

Kissinger—If we ratify, we must fill in the gap about the first use of incapacitants. It would be another unverifiable arms control agreement.

Rogers—It we exclude tear gas, we wouldn't have really changed our position.

Laird—This was a good study.[6] We should go beyond it. I must defend these programs.[7]

We are falling into a bad trap. CW and BW should not be put together. People who are against biological warfare also go against chemical warfare. But the latter is necessary for deterrence. These are two entirely different subjects. We need to clarify what CW and BW really mean.

BW does not have a deterrent quality.

We need a strategy for CW. We need a simple and understandable policy statement on it. We need a legislative and public relations game plan. This paper doesn't do that.

I believe we should renounce biological warfare, but go forward with an immunization program and research. There are communicable disease programs in Atlanta and under HEW. The scientists there can do good work.

From the standpoint of deterrence, the deterrent program is good. We are on the verge of losing our CW capability. In the transport of phosgene gas, we do one percent and private industry does 99 percent.

RN—It is not a good paper.

Laird—Two points are particularly important: CW and BW should be separated, and a public relations and legislative game plan is not set forth.

Mitchell—There should be no prohibition of tear gas. This would be hard on our law enforcement. We need tear gas. And it makes your sinuses clearer.

Laird—It helps with the reduction of casualties in Vietnam. And not only necessarily in preparation for attack. It gets the enemy out so you can see who they are.

DuBridge—I agree with General Wheeler and Secretary Laird. CW has a deterrent effect. There is the danger of transportation. This can be lessened with binary weapons.

Laird—We are close to this.

RN—It is important to distinguish these. Also, you should move some programs to HEW and still get all the information you need. That relaxes the scientists.

Rogers—There is not really much disagreement.[8] We need decisions, and we can work out a scenario. We should not delay.

Laird—We shouldn't leak this around town.

RN—The public relations aspect is very important.

Kissinger—You should reflect for a day. We can then issue an NSDM and work out the public relations and game plan.

RN—We could take a forthcoming position.

Yost—And ratify the Geneva Protocol.

RN—Does this bother you?

Rogers—We should do it with no reservation.

RN—We should approve it without reservation, but make a statement of understanding. We need tear gas and will use it.

Kissinger—We can show this in the NSDM.

RN—We should clear this with Sato.[9] We have mixed CW and BW together and should get them separated.

Richardson—There is no significant international pressure for getting rid of CW stockpiles. The Protocol applied to its use.

Farley—It will go to Geneva, and then you can get it passed back to me.

RN—We can fuzz up the language. We should develop a simple statement within 48 hours. Then I want a positive public statement.[10]

It should emphasize that this is an example of the right leadership, but which has the national security in mind.

Wheeler—The last time this was before a National Security defense panel was during President Eisenhower's Administration.

Rogers—We shouldn't do this while Sato is here.

Laird—That is no problem.

RN—I want a well thought-out statement. It should be released Sunday for the Monday papers, Bill.

DuBridge—It should say we will destroy dangerous chemicals and are moving to binaries.

Laird—We would need three years to burn them.

RN—Bryce Harlow thinks it is imperative to brief the legislature on Okinawa. Phil Farley and Henry Kissinger did this on SALT. We should do it on Okinawa.

Rogers—Yes. Alex Johnson and Henry should do it at first, and then you should come in.

RN—We must brief the Armed Services Committee. They will be against it.[11]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meetings Minutes, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held from 3:44 to 5:27 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] According to a talking paper prepared one day in advance of the NSC meeting, Helms planned to begin his briefing by announcing, "Our knowledge of Soviet capabilities and intentions regarding biological and chemical warfare is very limited." Moreover, he acknowledged "a considerable controversy at present in the intelligence community over the size of the Soviet stockpile of chemical warfare weapons." The intelligence community did know a bit more about two things: Soviet defenses, which were "active," and Soviet doctrine, which regarded chemical and biological weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" to be used in retaliation within the context of general nuclear warfare. (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969)

[3] According to Kissinger's undated talking points, he was advised to assert that the following was required: "Continuing research and development, with emphasis on defense, refinement of controls and safety measures, better intelligence on other nation's CBW capabilities, continuation of our declaratory 'no first-use' policy for lethal chemical and biological weapons," and "a tightly controlled public affairs policy." Kissinger was also advised to focus the NSC's attention on four basic issues for decision: policy on biological warfare, chemical warfare, the use of tear gas and herbicides, and ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. For biological weapons, the issue was retaining "full capability including lethal agents," "capability for incapacitating agents only," or "only R&D capability for both offense and defense or for defense along." For chemical weapons, the two basic policy issues were: 1) "Should we maintain a lethal chemical capability for retaliation or deterrence, and, if so, what should we do about our stockpiles in the U.S. and overseas?" 2) "Should we preserve a 'first-use' option for incapacitating chemicals?" (Ibid.)

[4] The Canadian Delegation to the United Nations submitted a draft resolution on August 26 calling for strict observance by all member states of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.

[5] See footnote 7, Document 97.

[6] Laird was referring to the NSSM 59 response, Document 99. At 7 p.m. on November 17, Laird told Kissinger: "the public affairs part of these discussions had been completely overlooked in the paper. He [Laird] said biological research is something that can be supported but biological warfare cannot be supported by anyone." Kissinger and Laird discussed the issue again at 11:55 a.m. on November 18: "Laird said the thing about it is that this paper deals with some important issues down the line—it doesn't address the basic question—what kind of weapons, strategic, or [word omitted in transcript] that have conversion capability. Laird didn't think biological warfare is a strategic weapon." Kissinger agreed, stating his view "that we should keep R&D for" defensive purposes. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[7] According to Laird's talking points, Laird was advised to make numerous recommendations that, while the United States should forego offensive biological weapons, it must conduct a biological RDT&E program only for defensive purposes, retain the capability to retaliate with chemical weapons, and keep its European stockpiles of chemical munitions. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 3, Chemical Weapons and Biological Research) Laird explained his supporting rationale for such forward deployments during a meeting with his staff on July 28. "The quantities overseas are very small," he said. "When we compare these quantities to the Soviet capability, it is frightening." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0028, June–August, 1969)

[8] In a November 17 memorandum to Rogers and Richardson, Spiers urged them to support Laird's positions on biological and chemical weapons, including the maintenance of biological and chemical research and testing programs "for defensive purposes and to safeguard against technological surprise." Spiers also recommended that Rogers and Richardson "take the position that the US should *not* maintain an option for first-use of incapacitating chemicals." (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Meeting Files, 1969–1970: Lot 71 D 175, Box 6, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969)

[9] Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan, held meetings with Nixon in Washington from November 19 to 21.

[10] Nixon released a statement on Tuesday, November 25, announcing his decisions on chemical and biological warfare. The United States, he stated, reaffirmed its renunciation of the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons and renounced the use of "all methods of biological warfare." Nixon announced that he had directed the Department of Defense to make plans for the disposal of existing stocks of U.S. biological weapons and that the United States henceforth would "confine its biological research to defense measures such as immunization and safety measures." Finally, he stated that his administration would submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Senate for ratification. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 968–969)

[11] Nixon hosted a breakfast meeting in the White House on November 25 for select members of Congress during which he, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Moorer, and Kissinger explained the administration's decisions on chemical and biological weapons. (National

Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, 337, Meetings with President, April 1968–May 1970) After the meeting Nixon spoke to the press about his decisions. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 969–970)

104. National Security Decision Memorandum 35[1]

Washington, November 25, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT

United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/Biological Research Program

Following consideration by the National Security Council, the President has decided that:

1. The term Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) will no longer be used. The reference henceforth should be to the two categories separately—The Chemical Warfare Program and The Biological Research Program.
2. With respect to Chemical Warfare:
   a. The objective of the U.S. program will be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails.
   b. The renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons is reaffirmed.
   c. This renunciation is hereby applied to incapacitating chemical weapons as well.
   d. This renunciation does not apply to the use of riot control agents or herbicides. A special NSDM on authorization for their use will be issued.[2]
   e. The Administration will submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925, "Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare," to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. An appropriate interpretive statement will be prepared by the Department of State in coordination with the Department of Defense to the effect that the United States does not consider that the Protocol prohibits the use of chemical herbicides or riot control agents, widely used domestically, in war. The statement will be unilateral in form and will not be a formal reservation.
   f. Existing overseas stockpiles of chemical weapons can be maintained except in Okinawa without additional consultation. If the matter is raised by the FRG, we will agree to consultations about the future of stockpiles located in Germany.
   g. The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, shall continue to develop and improve controls and safety measures in all Chemical Warfare programs.
   h. The Director of Central Intelligence shall continue to maintain surveillance of the

Chemical Warfare capabilities of other states.

i. The Under Secretaries Committee shall conduct an annual review of United States Chemical Warfare programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President.

3. With respect to Bacteriological/Biological programs:

a. The United States will renounce the use of lethal methods of bacteriological/biological warfare.

b. The United States will similarly renounce the use of all other methods of bacteriological/biological warfare (for example, incapacitating agents).

c. The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes (immunization, safety measures, et cetera). This does not preclude research into those offensive aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what defensive measures are required.

d. The Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations about the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological/biological weapons.

e. The United States shall associate itself with the principles and objectives of the Draft Convention Prohibiting the Use of Biological Methods of Warfare presented by the United Kingdom at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, on 26 August 1969. Recommendation as to association with specific provisions of the Draft Convention should be prepared by the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in coordination with other interested agencies, for the President's consideration.

f. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, shall continue to develop controls and safety measures in all bacteriological/biological programs.

g. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall continue to maintain surveillance of the bacteriological/biological warfare capabilities of other states.

h. The Under Secretaries Committee shall conduct an annual review of United States Bacteriological/Biological Research Programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

[2] NSDM 78, "Authorization for Use of Riot Control Agents and Chemical Herbicides in War," issued August 11, 1970, required Presidential approval for the use of riot control agents and herbicides in war. Not printed.

105. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, November 26, 1969.

SUBJECT
NIE 11–8–69, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces"

Attached at Tab C[2] is the intelligence community's latest effort at a comprehensive estimate of present and future Soviet strategic attack capabilities. (A covering memo from Director Helms is at Tab B.)[3] A memorandum from Secretary Laird on the subject is at Tab D.[4]

I

The highlights of the NIE are:

—The Soviets continue the buildup of the basic units of their force—the SS–9, large payload ICBM; the SS–11, Minuteman-type ICBM; and Polaris-type ballistic missile submarines—at rates at least equal to those of the past two years.
—The SS–9 is a real threat to Minuteman *if* the Soviets have a MIRV system for it and can make the missile carry the heavy MIRV payload the required distance.
—It is agreed that the heavy payload SS–9 could be made to go far enough to reach five of the six Minuteman complexes. Whether it could reach the sixth from present SS–9 sites is disputed.
—The intelligence community is divided over whether the present tests of a triple warhead system for the SS–9 are aimed at developing a MIRV, but it is agreed that even if they are not, the Soviets could develop a hard-target MIRV capability for the SS–9 by 1972.
—The Soviets must be expected to develop a "next generation" of missiles. But progress this year on identified systems has been less than hectic. Work on solid fuel systems is going slowly; construction of test facilities for several systems has halted. However, several missiles, including a possible new land-based ballistic missile and a new submarine-launched missile have been tested.
—We know very little about the purposes of the Soviet force. That the Soviets desire strategic "parity" with the U.S. and will build at least 1,300 missiles is agreed. Whether they seek "superiority," how they would define it, and the likely upper limit of present ICBM construction plans are disputed. Moreover, little is known of Soviet doctrine on such matters as targeting or command and control.
—The force for "peripheral" strategic attacks, i.e., attacks on Europe and Asia but not the U.S.—which consists chiefly of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles (500–

3,000 miles) and medium bombers—continues to be maintained at approximately past levels.

The Soviets have begun deploying SS–11 ICBMs in what the intelligence community believes to be an IR/MRBM role and a prototype new medium-to-long range bomber has been sighted.

Numbers of major units are in the table at Tab A.[5]

II

This estimate illustrates what I believe are serious limitations in the process by which estimates are made. This process is an inadequate means for providing basic analysis of Soviet strategic developments and prospects for the future.[6]

1. The most serious defect is the lack of sharply-defined, clearly-argued discussions of the characteristics and purposes of Soviet strategic forces. Admittedly, it is harder to be precise about Soviet deployment objectives or war planning than about the wing span of a bomber prototype. But there is evidence relevant to these questions—ranging from studies of missile silo orientation to analyses of power relationships in the Politburo—and it should be reflected in the NIE.[7]

Since 1964, the Soviets have been steadily expanding their strategic forces. You are entitled to know from the intelligence community what evidence we have to support various possible hypotheses about the motive for that buildup. Examples of such hypotheses are:

—a conservatively planned second strike or "assured destruction" posture deliberately designed to deter a U.S. attack using our present forces;
—a posture which hedges against a possible U.S. effort to approach or achieve a "first strike" capability;
—a posture reflecting a simple quest for numerical equality or slight margin of superiority for political bargaining purposes;
—a posture reflecting the largely purposeless pressure from Soviet "military-industrial complex" for ever-larger forces;
—an attempt to achieve a significant "first use" offensive capability through force superiority.

Instead, what discussion of Soviet objectives there is in the NIE is superficial. There is no analysis of the evidence, no systematic presentation of the alternatives. Indeed, there is not even a precise definition of what our people disagree about and what evidence would resolve their disputes.[8]

2. The NIE is too often satisfied with reciting facts and reluctant to raise fundamental

questions about their significance.

As a typical example, the estimate notes that the Soviets have made two tests which may indicate development of a new, longer range (3,000 mile) submarine missile. The missile, however, appears to be too large to be fitted into the ballistic missile submarine they are now building without extensive modification.

Yet the NIE is silent on possible implications of this development.

—What are possible explanations for a new missile too large to be fitted into submarines now being built?
—Would a longer range missile complicate our ASW problem? Would it make continuous on-station patrolling easier for the Soviets?

3. The NIE too often fails to make explicit the judgments and background which underlie its conclusions.

For example, one disputed issue is whether the SS–9 has the range needed to target our whole Minuteman force.

—One side argues that we must assume it has because the Soviets would not continue to deploy SS–9 unless they were certain it had the range to carry out the anti-MM mission for which it is apparently intended.
—The other side says that the Soviets would not rely on their missile having the necessary range until they had tested it.

Both sides, therefore, are making assertions about likely patterns of Soviet behavior. But neither presents evidence about either the apparent "rationality" of past Soviet weapon system development or the thoroughness of Soviet testing in the past.

4. Even on more technical issues, the NIE is sometimes inadequate. Dissents are certainly better than meaningless compromise euphemisms. But, where the intelligence community cannot agree on such basic questions as the hardness of Soviet silos, the accuracy of the SS–9, or whether the Soviets are developing a MIRV for the SS–9, we can at least expect that the disputants will explain precisely what it is they disagree about and will marshal the evidence for the competing positions. This is seldom done.

Furthermore, on some issues, there are disturbing indications that differences of opinion are more the product of efforts to defend previous views, than of different evaluations of current evidence.

For example, the CIA has abandoned its earlier insistence, adhered to as recently as last June, that 1,500 was an upper bound on Soviet ICBM deployment,[9] but it now says the determinants of Soviet action are too uncertain to make any meaningful estimate of an upper limit.

III

Secretary Laird's memorandum at Tab D sets forth the DIA position on "recent trends in Soviet strategic forces." Except for some updating to include recently-acquired data, it recites the same facts as the NIE, presenting the analysis in a way which supports the DIA position, as expressed in their various dissents in the NIE. But it is also without any general themes or working hypotheses about what the Soviets' strategic purposes may be.

IV

I am continuing to examine what can be done to get more rigorous analysis and more effective presentation of evidence into the products of the intelligence community. I will have recommendations for improvements shortly.[10]

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, 1969. Top Secret; [*codewords not declassified*]. Sent for information. Lynn sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a November 15 covering memorandum.

[2] Not found attached. NIE 11–8–69 is Document 46.

[3] Attached but not printed is a September 15 covering memorandum from Helms to Nixon.

[4] Attached but not printed is Laird's October 7 memorandum to Nixon that summarized recent trends and developments in Soviet strategic forces and indicated that the Soviets continued to deploy an ABM system and two ICBMs—the SS–9 and the SS–11—to which qualitative improvements had been made. In addition, Laird reported that flight tests probably had begun on a new SLBM and an expanded and improved ASW program was underway.

[5] Attached but not printed is a page-length table, entitled "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces," that lists the numbers of Soviet ICBMs, MR/IRBMs, SSBNs, heavy bombers, and medium bombers for the years 1969 to 1971.

[6] Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote "agreed" in the left margin.

[7] Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote "Right" in the left margin.

[8] Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote "I agree" in the left margin.

[9] See Document 38.

[10] On December 8, Nixon wrote the following comments in the space below the final paragraph:

> "1. Improvments are essential
> "2. This report is virtually useless—except for a superficial, mindless recitation of what we know from the daily press—i.e.—the USSR is building lots of new missiles."

106. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, December 8, 1969.

SUBJECT
Safeguard Issues

Phase I of Safeguard was authorized in the 1970 budget (appropriations are not yet settled).

Two sites were authorized, one at Grand Forks and one at Malmstrom. The objectives of Phase I were:

1. To provide a practical engineering check-out of the system. This involves putting the system together in its operational configuration and going through the operational shake-down to make sure we have a system that works at the earliest possible date. (A program of R&D only could answer some of the questions yet to be resolved but many problems will not be solved until we have a fully operational system.) Two sites were considered necessary because there are important inter-site problems that need to be resolved.
2. The objectives of Safeguard when it is fully deployed are:
   a. To provide for the defense of our Minuteman missile force which is vulnerable to the developing Soviet force of large accurate missiles including their SS–9, their three warhead version of the SS–9, and the increasing numbers of SS–11.
   b. To provide for an area, country-wide, defense against a small number (tens or even a few hundred) of Chinese ICBMs, or an accidental launch from any country.
   c. To provide protection of our manned bomber force from a short range attack which would reduce warning time below a safe level.
   d. To provide protection for our national command control capability (Washington, D.C.).

When Safeguard was approved by the President,[2] it was stated that it would be a phased program and the next step (Phase II) would be:

1. Initiated when necessary in response to the threat or to the progress in SALT.
2. Oriented toward the development of the threat.

The developments since the Safeguard decision which need to be considered are as follows:

1. The Soviets have continued the deployment of SS–9 missiles (276 are now operational

or under construction).
2. The Soviets have continued with the development of the three warhead versions of the SS–9. There is not conclusive evidence that this development has the capability of destroying with high probability our Minuteman missile sites but also there is not conclusive evidence that they will not be able to do so. This possibility combined with the known SS–9 development, 276 sites operational or under construction and a construction rate of 48 per year, is a cause for serious concern for Minuteman survivability in the near future.
3. Continued deployment of SS–11 missiles, 900 in place or under construction, adds concern to Minuteman survivability.
4. More rapid production and deployment of Soviet Y Class submarines than was anticipated at the time of the Safeguard decision causes concern about the launch survivability of our bomber force.
5. Continung development of nuclear warheads by Communist China and continuing work on their missile test facilities supports concern about the potential threat of Chinese ICBM capability. Evidence points toward a possible capability in mid-1970 period of later.

In summary, the threat to our Minuteman force appears more serious now than in January 1969. The threat to bomber launch survivability looks more serious. The Chinese threat appears about the same; it is still realistic but the timing is still uncertain.

There are at least three courses possible in relation to our Minuteman force:

1. Continue with protection of present force using ABM and/or hard silos.
2. Abandon fixed Minuteman system and go to mobile missiles.
3. Accept vulnerability of MM force and place more reliance on SLBM and bombers.

There are several courses available for bomber survivability:

1. Go to a dispersed basing program.
2. Proceed with ABM protection of launch survivability.
3. Put less reliance on strategic manned bombers in future.
4. Develop new bomber with survivability against short warning time threat. This would involve such things as more protection, short time launch, etc.

Recommendation. We propose to proceed with Phase I of Safeguard on original schedule. We would recommend a limited Phase II program, limited to one or two additional sites authorized in FY 71.

A full Phase II has significant funding requirements in 1971 and 1972 (one extra billion in 1971 and two extra in 1972—over the one billion and 600 million for Phase I only in 1971 and 1972, respectively). It does not appear feasible to meet these requirements, in combination with other Department of Defense requirements, and remain within total

budgetary constraints. To live within these constraints, we would find it necessary to implement a delayed Phase II, which stretches out the program by limiting the rate of deployment to two sites per year. This limits Safeguard costs to roughly $1.5 billion per year and reduces the 71–72 peak. The result of this stretch-out is to delay completion of the nation-wide coverage from CY 76 until January 1980.

There are inconsistencies in such a program which should be recognized and which could be the source of much grief:

1. Our argument before the Congress last spring, to initiate Phase I, rested heavily on the Soviet threat to Minuteman. We made the point that we were not asking for city protection against the Soviets—that the Chinese threat seemed remote—and we initially wanted Minuteman protection against such threats as the SS–9 MRV.
2. We're in no different condition now than we were then, insofar as a Chinese threat to our cities is concerned. We are in worse shape, however, where our missiles are concerned. The Soviets are continuing to increase the size of their ICBM force which could threaten Minuteman.
3. In view of the above, if we go beyond Phase I, increased protection for Minuteman sites would seem to be more in order. The "no change" condition in Chinese threat between last spring and now would seem to provide heavy ammunition for those opposing the system to rise and challenge the urgency for area defense.
4. The Minuteman survival problem is quite complex (I intend to discuss another aspect of it below) and it is not readily apparent that the approach of Phase 2A is best. Other alternatives should be explored.

Within these constraints, the only alternatives in Safeguard deployment are variation in the sequence of site deployment. If we were to give complete precedence to Minuteman defense, we should start work on the Warren and Whiteman sites next. On the other hand, if we believe that light defense of our cities is most urgent, we should turn to Boston and Seattle next. There are compromises in between. For example, we could deploy next the Whiteman Minuteman site near St. Louis and the Washington, D. C. site, both of which form part of the defense of our strategic weapons and their command and control system against Soviet attack and are required also for the full Phase II area defense. Another compromise which leans more toward earlier provision of light city defense would be to deploy next the Washington, D. C. site and the New England site. This choice would have to be made at about the same time that we decide to proceed. A fact sheet[3] is available which shows various costs and improved Spartan footprints.

No matter how we optimize Safeguard deployment to match the observed threat we may not be able to keep pace with it at the funding levels we can afford. Consider defense of our population against a light attack. Unless all major population centers are covered, we face unacceptable losses since an enemy could attack the undefended population first. Completion of nationwide coverage by 1979 may well lag by several years the development of a limited nuclear ICBM force by Communist China. The defense of

Minuteman presents a similar dilemma because extrapolation of the present build-up of SS–9s plus better guidance for the growing SS–11 force would require a faster growth of ABM capability than the $1.5 billion/year limit allows. The rapid multiplication of Soviet capability to destroy Minuteman which would result from their retrofitting SS–9 with MIRV and retrofitting SS–11 with accurate guidance presses hard on the Safeguard deployment build-up even with no cut in Phase II funding. With this in mind, we are engaged in R&D on new ballistic missile defense components, particularly radar, which will provide a tougher and, hopefully, less expensive growth module, for defense of Minuteman.

It is important that the Department of Defense and the Administration consider carefully these issues, that we agree on a recommended course of action, and that we fully understand the rationale behind that recommendation before we recommend to Congress a FY 1971 defense budget.

There are problems in the funding for our strategic forces in future years. Two major considerations, here, are the growth of Soviet missile forces and the projected improvement in their accuracy, which are likely to make our land-based missiles vulnerable in the near future. Although our vulnerability is accelerated if the SS–9s MRV is a MIRV, Soviet ICBM forces are growing large enough that the smaller missiles, as they are made more accurate, will constitute a threat independent of MIRVs. Figure 1 shows the U.S. accuracy projections and our judgment of the accuracy of the SS–9.[4]

We must take appropriate expeditious action now to remedy this situation and the courses that can be pursued to provide a "fix" are as follows:

1. The continued development of Hard Point defense systems is one possibility; also, we have had under development, and are still working on, a Hard Rock Silo program.
2. We have recently started to explore several mobile schemes to add survivability to the Minuteman force.
3. By early spring we expect to be in a position to assess the relative merits of the Hard Rock Silo and Mobile systems and then, based upon that assessment, initiate action on development of the chosen system.

As a consequence of the situation described above, one can foresee the possibility that, because of greater inherent survivability, we may wish to shift the primary role in our strategic deterrent posture to our sea-based systems. Envisioning this, we are looking for chinks in our sea-based armor—in the Polaris/Poseidon system. Although we do not see any immediate chinks, we do see possible future problem areas. To forestall these, we are initiating development of ULMS (Underwater Long-Range Missile System). This is a new submarine based missile system characterized by a much longer range missile (up to 6,500 n.m.) and a quieter submarine, employing the latest in defensive measures and dedicated solely to the ULMS task. The longer range expands the searoom available for operation from the present approximate 3½ million square miles for Polaris/Poseidon, to

the order of 40–55 million square miles. It also lengthens and complicates the logistics of Soviet attackers, avoids the need for our submarines to operate in chain, permits CONUS basing and simplifies targeting. In combination with the improved, quieter submarine we believe ULMS will make us substantially independent—at least for many years—of threat technology advances against our sea-based system.

If we were to pursue all of these systems, the B–1 (AMSA),[5] a delayed Safeguard Phase II, ULMS and rebased Minuteman, Figure 2 would represent the increase in funding and Figure 3, the details of the strategic budget.

There is one specific point which has to do with the relative allocation and build-up rate of the MM Rebasing and ULMS programs. Although we expect to decide this spring on what MM Rebasing option to pursue, it may not be until possibly 1973 that we are able to determine with certainty our degree of success in "fixing" the MM problem. Should it turn out to be a good fix, giving us high confidence in the survivability of a significant quantity of our land-based force, then we may be able at that time to slow down the ULMS program somewhat and reduce the rate of expenditure. It could also affect our decision on hard point defense.

On the other hand, should it not turn our very successfully, we probably would wish to expedite the ULMS and hard point defense and possibly terminate MM rebasing.

David Packard

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 373.24, Safeguard. Top Secret. The memorandum was included in Kissinger's preparatory materials for the DPRC meeting held on December 9. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, December 9, 1969)

[2] See Document 25.

[3] Not found.

[4] The referenced Figures 1–3 are attached but not printed.

[5] A long-range bomber capable of flying intercontinental missions without refueling, the B–1 was expected to replace the B–52 as the mainstay of the U.S. bomber fleet.

107. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, December 9, 1969.

Packard briefs budget paper.[2]

Packard: Not sure 260,000 [residual force objective for Vietnam by June 30, 1971] assumption is safe. May be slippage. Could meet this figure from other sources, not NATO committed forces. Might hit readiness a little bit, munition levels.

Kissinger: How will handle this before Congress. The President doesn't want to show timetable, wants to preserve flexibility. Could you give me an analysis of what we will be facing before Congress?

Packard: We're afraid of leaks. Might get away with not revealing end strength.

Kissinger: Would they err on high side?

Wheeler: Yes. 260,000 to 300,000.

Packard: Doubts there will be a serious problem.

Wheeler: It will be leaked. They will have to have end strength.

Kissinger: We have to leave this issue open. Could destroy much of what President said on November 3.[3] [Asked me to think about it quickly.][4] Could we turn NATO divisions into [fighting or heavy?] divisions to fuzz things up?

Wheeler: This will be done anyway. We would have 6-1/3 divisions in Europe by M+30 rather than 8. We would not have 8 before M+120 days.

Packard: Maybe we could confuse issue by NATO readiness reductions.

Kissinger: If we say we will keep our NATO commitment and make VN drawdown look lower.

Packard: Let's work on this; send it over to Larry [Lynn].

Kissinger: OK.

Packard: Highlights uncertainty about C–5A [termination?] costs.[5]

We may be in a position of being in default. Maybe $300 million bill. What we have is the Air Force's optimistic projection. No money for Safeguard. We're at about the point. I will

recommend not going ahead with CVAN 70. I don't want to recommend anything else.

[Packard] goes to Phase II of Safeguard. MM survivability even worse. Submarines going ahead faster. Good argument for keeping emphasis on MM survivability. We have alternatives. I came out we should proceed with Phase I.[6] I think we can put Phase I auth[orization] level below $1 billion in FY 71. Improved Spartan can be had as early as regular Spartan.

Issue: what Pres[ident] wants to do.

Kissinger: He definitely wants to go into Phase II. Level is subject to discussion. This move (two sites?) would be consistent with SALT. [Wheeler?] stressed MM defense. Now we shift to area defense. President has always stressed area defense.

Packard: I pointed out we have other ways of protecting MM, but these four sites are needed.

Johnson: When is it too late to move these two sites?

Packard: Next spring. We could reorient it. Options get closed off next couple of months. I would go ahead with one additional site, but we could go ahead with two. Would [be willing to agree to] two.

[Packard] gives out funds phasing chart.[7] We ought to plan on a $10 billion level and fit it into that.

Kissinger: Pres[ident] feels strategic forces have been under-funded. Must do more after VN. Safeguard summary: issue is MM protection or area defense. With SALT, can stop at two sites, get reasonable protection if these footprints are right. Issue of going to Phase II is not open. Issue is what [to] get: added MM protection, area defense.

Farley: Best for SALT is area defense.

Packard: Simplest program is add one site.

Schlesinger: We can expect substantial cost overruns.

Kissinger: Will have to come out of other [programs?].

Packard: We can cover it.

Kissinger: Does this group believe we should go into area defense rather than MM defense? Alternatives are one extra site, two extra sites.

Packard: Get him [Nixon] to take a look, give us further guidance.

Kissinger: Important point is footprints.

Packard: I can show you footprints without improved Spartan. We ought to [illegible] for area coverage. Costs are for improved Spartan unless I tell you otherwise. Bomber issues: do we want one or not?

Kissinger: One would have to see some studies.[8] Packard: This group could get into detail.

Kissinger: What is doctrinal issue?

Wheeler: [Interjects][9] Three strings to bow-de-dow.

Kissinger: Maybe Lynn could circulate a paper with issues pro and con. Then put it up to President. Is this agreeable?

Bus [Wheeler]: Yes; Packard, yes.

Kissinger: If Pres[ident] says yes, then it is a DOD issue.

Packard: This is good. Issue doesn't have to be decided before FY 71 budget.

Kissinger: Right, we'll look at it in five-year review.

Packard: Carriers. Hold current level fifteen. I'm going to recommend not going ahead with new CVAN 70 carrier.

Kissinger: If it upsets services deeply, do it as part of five-year program.

Schlesinger: BOB may recommend taking force down some, say to twelve.

Kissinger: We can't make doctrinal recommendations on short notice.

Packard: I'm going to stay with $72.5 billion[10] when I get [illegible] from committee.

Schlesinger: Committee isn't always sure of guidance.

Kissinger: Two issues: obscure VN timetable; Phase II Safeguard. Dave [Packard], you'll make recommendations on first. I'll check with principals on second to make sure I've stated it fairly.

Schlesinger: To what extent does it fall within purview of this committee to relate '71 force structure to President's generally lower decision in NSDM 27.[11] Army and Marines cut down; Air Force, Navy very little.

Packard: Force structures in NSSM 3[12] stand eleven carriers. This was illustrative only.

Committee should get into this in long run. We haven't done enough study to know what force structure should be. We've moved ahead in all areas, e.g. CVAN 70.

Kissinger: I tend to agree with Dave. I think we learned how to go about these fundamental things thoughtfully. We should fix those things we can and then review five-year program for next budget cycle.

Packard: We're getting started on '72 budget cycle. We've got JSOP, strategy, first year or five-year program.

Johnson: We've got three major statements coming up. I'd welcome formation of a working group—a subgroup of this group—on these statements.[13]

Packard: We can get a statement over to you, Alex.

Kissinger: We should get a look at it.

Packard: We should have one statement agreed to by everybody.

Kissinger: I agree with having a group.

Johnson: Tom Pickering is my man.[14]

Packard: BOB may have cut out some key programs in AEC budget.

Schlesinger: AEC didn't request money.

Kissinger: Do you want to appeal, Dave? That's what I'm here [for].

Packard: Tac[tical] nuc[lear] modernization is important. We should get on with it.

Kissinger: Make an appeal, Dave, do it fairly soon.

Schlesinger: Wait. There is a formal review process. Agency should appeal.[15]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–73. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the notes, which are handwritten with the instruction "please type." According to a December 9 memorandum from the NSC Secretariat to the White House Police, the meeting was scheduled to begin at 4 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. The following attended the meeting: Kissinger, Johnson, Packard, Helms, Wheeler, Vannoy, Schlesinger, McCracken, Farley, and Thomas Pickering, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. The meeting, according to Lynn's December 6 memorandum to Kissinger, was called to address the FY 1971 Defense

budget, including Safeguard Phase II. (Ibid., Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, December 9, 1969)

[2] The Department of Defense budget paper cited here has not been found. It is apparently the same paper outlining the FY 1971 Defense budget that Packard introduced at the DPRC meeting on November 13. See Document 100.

[3] On November 3, Nixon gave a national address in which he announced his plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam. Rather than announcing a "timetable," the President stated that the rate of withdrawal depended upon progress at the Paris peace talks and enemy actions. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 901–909)

[4] Brackets in the original.

[5] First operational in June 1970, the C–5A is a heavy-cargo transport aircraft designed to provide strategic airlift for deployment and supply of combat and support forces.

[6] See Document 16.

[7] The chart is one of the figures attached to Document 106; not printed.

[8] According to his talking points prepared for him by Lynn, Kissinger was advised to ask Packard why the Pentagon was unenthusiastic about proceeding beyond Phase I of Safeguard. He was also advised to ask, "How important is a nation-wide area defense to the survivability of our bomber force? Are there other ways of assuring bomber survivability that are more efficient?" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, December 9, 1969)

[9] Brackets in the original.

[10] Laird and Kissinger discussed the aggregate defense budget during a telephone conversation at 11:40 a.m. on December 1. According to the transcript, Laird "said we can't bring the budget down below $72.5 [billion]. K said he completely supports L on that." Kissinger added that he "had talked to the P[resident]; it's out of the question to go below 72.5. K said he completely agrees with L on this. L said as far as NATO is concerned, we will probably have to make a few cuts even at 72.5. K said we'll probably have to reduce forces here. L said here, but not in Europe. L said we'll tell them we have a few budget problems, but fears of cutting back in NATO because of Vietnam are ill-founded." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[11] Document 56.

[12] Document 2.

[13] Not further identified.

[14] Thomas R. Pickering, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

[15] In a December 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Lynn summarized the results of the meeting and noted that Kissinger "indicated that the President is already committed to proceeding with Phase II of Safeguard, so that the issue is how to proceed." Moreover, "The Principals agreed that the additional FY 71 site(s) should be for the purpose of providing area defense rather than extending Minuteman defense. The alternatives, it was

agreed, are to construct one or two additional sites located so as to provide the broadest area coverage." On that note, "Packard indicated in this regard that we could count on deploying the Improved Spartan missile, which has a larger footprint than the regular Spartan missile, in both Phase I and Phase II." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, December 9, 1969)

108. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

Safeguard Deployment Alternatives

I. The Issue

How do we proceed with Safeguard in FY 71 in light of developments in the threat, progress in SALT, and technical developments to date? In particular, what are the options for defining and proceeding with the area defense component of the Safeguard Program?

II. Questions that Must be Resolved

1. *How many ABM Radars and Missiles are Needed to Provide Area Protection Against Accidental and Third Country Attacks?*
   —do we design the deployment against simple or complicated threats;
   —do we defend against accidental attacks from both China and the Soviet Union or from China only.
2. *What Modifications, if any, in the Accidental Attack/Third Country Deployment Would be Needed to Provide Area Defense for our Alert Bomber Forces?*
3. *Should We Extend Our Planned Defenses for Minuteman Silos Beyond Phase I?*
4. *On What Schedule Should we Proceed in Light of How Rapidly the Threats May Develop and the Availability of Funds in FY 71 and Later Years?*

III. Alternatives

Alternative I—Delay a Decision to Deploy New Sites Until Next Year (FY 72). (This is the DOD category I proposal)[2]

If this course were followed, Phase I programs would continue at their present pace. Some funding ($40 million +) might be included to retain a "fast start-up" capability and to continue R & D ($100 million) for improved Minuteman defense. The total FY 71 cost would be approximately $1,160 million.

Alternative 2—Deploy an Area Defense Against Non-Sophisticated Attacks from China. (This is alternative 1 in the Department of Army alternative listing.)[3]

This decision could be implemented by constructing two new sites, one in New England (or the Northeast) and one in the Northwest. This option would entail increasing Safeguard costs over Phase I by $600 million in NOA for a total of $1,650 million in FY 71 and would involve $930 million in FY 71 outlays.

Alternative 3—Deploy a More Extensive Defense Against the Soviet Threat to the Minuteman Force. (This is the DOD category 3 proposal)

This decision would include another site at Whiteman, Missouri, and possibly Warren, Wyoming, to provide protection for the Minuteman wings nearby. Additional missiles would be included for the two Phase I sites. Approval for these additional sites would be sought in FY 71, bringing total FY 71 costs to about $1,465 [million].

Alternative 4—Deploy an Area Defense Against Third Country Attacks and Soviet Accidental ICBM Attacks. (This is the DOD category 2 proposal.)

This decision could be implemented with a total of seven sites and 11 radars. Approval for three of these sites could be sought in FY 71 at a cost ranging from $1,640 to $1,760 million. The added sites would be deployed in the following order: Whiteman, Missouri; Washington, D. C.; and the Northwest site.

A variant would be to proceed with constructing only two sites now at a FY 71 total cost of $1,510 million. Authority to procure long lead time items and to survey for the remaining two sites—New England and Michigan/Detroit—would also be sought. *DOD believes this is the most logical step to take and that it could be better defended at this time.*

Alternative 5—Deploy an Area Defense Against Third Country Attacks and Soviet Accidental ICBM and SLBM Attacks.

This decision would call for the twelve-site Safeguard area defense option previously presented to the National Security Council by DOD.[4] It could be funded at an accelerated rate, beginning with $2.8 billion in FY 71 in order to have all sites in by beginning of 1977. Alternatively, construction could be initiated on only two sites in FY 71 and total FY 71 budget requirements kept at $1,760 million.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, December 20, 1969. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper. Under a December 19 covering memorandum, Lynn sent the paper to Kissinger in advance of the next day's DPRC meeting. The paper summarizes an undated 18-page paper, drafted by Lynn, that Lynn sent to Kissinger under a separate December 19 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

[2] In a December 16 letter to Kissinger, Packard outlined three alternatives for the Safeguard program. The first called for no additional steps in Phase II of the program, but placed additional emphasis on Minuteman defense R&D. The second would have implemented a first stage of Phase II directed toward a light area defense. This alternative included three options, 7–A through 7–C, consisting of varying deployment schedules for a seven-site light area defense. The third was to proceed with one or two ABM sites emphasizing the defense of Minuteman. Packard favored Alternative 2, option 7–C, the

slowest deployment schedule. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard)

[3] Not further identified and not found.

[4] See Documents 14 and 16.

109. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, December 20, 1969.

Safeguard

HAK: The President wants to go ahead with Phase II.[2] How we define it is open. One purpose is to describe our options for Phase II and how to do it.

Last time we discussed 1 site in Washington, or 1 in N.E. perhaps moving it westward to get area coverage with Improved Spartan.

Resor: [Speaks for DOD] Alt. 1[3] would add $0.7 Billion NOA to DOD Budget; outlays?

Starbird: I don't know what's in 1971 budget. It would add $110 million.

Resor: Alt. 3 is old 7C which Packard sent over.

HAK: What is difference between 2 & 3?

Starbird: Preserves option of moving all back to MM. It is old Phase II.

HAK: You lose area defense if you move to MM?

Starbird: Yes Resor: 3 gives you Washington, D. C. & Whiteman in FY 71.

AJ: Why Whiteman?

Resor: Strengthens MM defense. We made main pitch last year on defense of retaliatory forces.

HAK: If you had Whiteman and NW you would:

—add MM defense,
—add area defense for lower Texas.

Starbird: Timing problems; PAR in NW take 5 years. Washington, D.C. needs only MSR. You get extra time to react if Soviets bring subs in close.

(Discussion of how fast subs could fire; ours fire 1 minute apart; we assume theirs do. [Foster: we could cut this down.] Relevant to how long it would take to penetrate our defenses.)

Resor: Alt. 3 gives you money to shift Washington to Warren if MM threat gets large

enough. This is in DOD budget currently.

4 same as 3 except don't do advance eng. and procurement for others 3 sites.

Starbird: You lose a year in getting 7 sites.

5 same as 3 except substitute Warren for D. C. You don't abandon thin area coverage, but you defend your deterrent.

Whiteman is part of your area defense. Warren is part of your 12 site area defense.

(Discuss on acquisition assumptions in each option. Avoid going to Armed Services Committee for land acquisition.)

HAK: Why avoid this?

Starbird: The Committees ask, how far you are going to go? They object to your taking the land. If you stop short, they think the Administration isn't committed.

HAK: But that produces endless debate. Shouldn't you get that out of the way?

Resor: It's a judgment as to Congress. RN said do what is necessary but not more than is required.

HAK: To be Devil's Advocate, RN has said area defense isn't negotiable; shouldn't we get that out of the way? Show that MM is regulatable by SALT? If we go MM route, if SALT should get somewhere, he will be in position of not going any further with non-negotiable part.

Resor: Even if SALT is successful, you need at least this MM defense. Area Defense is where you have the toughest time with Panofsky.[4] You buy defense against China for only a short time. They will go pen aids route.

HAK: We took 10 years. They have primitive economy, no ICBMs yet. Why could they do it quickly?

Resor: We didn't go all out pen aids; they would.

Starbird: We didn't have any in pen aids. We published our problems. If he knew where our sites were, he would defeat them with simple exo pen aids. He could steal our secrets.

Wheeler: You will have problems with Congress if you go in with land acquisitions. I am not as pessimistic about time thin area defense. It would be useful against CPR. They are pressed, have a limited technology base.

Foster: There isn't any info on what they will do. You need radars that look at pen aids,

that is problem. But 7 years is a long time. Up until last year our scientists said pen aids wouldn't work; but we found Mark IA pen aid works. So you need radars, say on ships in Indian Ocean. No evidence of this.

Again 7 years is a long time.

HAK: Leaving aside CPR, other countries with nuclear potential would have lead time problems.

Foster: 7 site thin defense is fragile, or brittle. It takes 12 sites, original Spartan to make it pretty tough.

HAK: This building had nothing against 12 sites; we approved it last year. You came up with 7 sites. We could go with 12 sites.

Foster: Original plan presented by President and Laird to Congress is still valid. Phase II will do jobs we decided it would do. What has changed?

—Congress was hard on it.
—Money has become tighter.

HAK: We want to know what is right. RN will worry about Congress.

Foster: Both alternatives are driven by many considerations.

HAK: Why improve Spartan?

Foster: Old Spartan relied on large yield to attack large volume of objects. Subsequent to that, we saw we could get loiter capability. It can loiter 50–60 seconds. With last min. info, so you direct it, you don't need as much yield, and you can get greater ranges. So you could have fewer sites.

HAK: I don't understand. Original 12 sites gave you defense less easily spoofed, less subject to pen aids. What does it cost to get Improved Spartan?

Starbird: $450 million.

HAK: Why do we want it?

Foster: You can deal with advanced pen aids.

HAK: What you should do with advanced one is add more sites.

Starbird:

—The sites can reinforce each other, so fewer sites needed.

—If he uses depressed trajectory, big Spartan can't catch depressed trajectory.
—Improved Spartan gives you loiter, 150 mile effectiveness against advanced pen aids. Don't have to use Sprints.

HAK: We have major doctrinal problem. Chinese won't have SLBMs. If rationale is China, aren't you better off with old Spartan.

Starbird: No, with old, you get non-overlapping coverage. With Improved Spartan you have overlap. This is important as numbers build up.

HAK: Why, is it thinner?

Foster: You are carrying out low yield.

HAK: Why not 12 with a mixture?

Answer: That's what we have, on both.

AJ: Isn't 7 on way station to 12?

Foster: Yes.

HAK: I'm concerned about what we want. There isn't more than 2 or 3 next year. Big issue is location. Depends on what you go for, not Improved Spartan.

Starbird: Not quite right. If you want to fill 12 sites ASAP, need more than 2 or 3.

HAK: But 1 or 2 wouldn't get BOB approval.

Foster: You have to decide when you want it. If by 1976, you need 1 or 2. If you let it go until 1977 or 80 you can get away with less. You have to decide whether or not to choose to meet Chinese or Soviets on schedule.

HAK: What should we do?

—can't say

HAK: What if he wants to stay on schedule?

Starbird: 1 or 2

Foster: Whiteman and Warren are ready to go in now. If you want all 12, there advantages to putting in Southern MM sites first.

JS: If you want population coverage, you are driven to East Coast, West Coast first.

Foster: If in 1976, a piece is missing, there is a free side in.

HAK: Something has to be last.

Resor: But last summer, we stressed protection of deterrent, even if SALT is successful. So you have to go ahead with MM sites.

JS: You have to decide on objective.

Farley: Question. How do we maintain survivability of land based component? Why not land mobility?

Foster: People get enthused with new systems, but discover problems later. With mobile Minuteman, question is cost-effectiveness. We can put it in a truck, that's easy. Problem is with shelters. If garage costs $1 Million, we are out of business. If we get it for $0.25 mil., we can do it cheaper than they can build RVs. If this costs more than active defense, we should have active defense. We haven't looked at it enough.

HAK: We don't do this because we can do the other, but we don't do the other.

Foster: Cost of hard rock silos doesn't make it competitive with active defense.

Farley: Question is how fast we go into MM defense.

Foster: We hope you can select 2 or 3 approaches so we can study it in detail.

HAK: We have flexibility.

Foster: Unless we go full Phase II, full speed.

HAK: Can we squeeze $700 million out of other programs?

Wheeler, Resor: No, we would need larger ceiling.

HAK: OK

Resor: Buzz wants chance to make a recommendation. You could narrow area of debate.

Foster: Mel thinks we will have terrible time getting it through Congress. He's uncertain about how urgent or important area coverage is going to be. Congress rejected Chinese threat, even neglected bomber problem. As we saw debate, emphasis was on MM. Even if SALT is successful—a freeze—you should move ahead on MM. On area defense, not so much a military judgment. Area coverage is White House problem. MM defense is military problem.

Farley: Concept of 4 sites, minimum level, with this purpose, hasn't been a concept for

SALT. We have to decide this one. There isn't much understanding about what we mean by area defense.

HAK: If the President wants area defense, why isn't a military problem to provide it?

Resor: It's question of priorities.

HAK: It is a priority.

Basic problems

—What do we need for area defense?

I understand problem at Congressional hearing, area defense dropped.

Buzz: This was line taken by Congress. Other missions weren't addressed.

Foster: We in DOD have dug ourselves in. If we go ahead without MM extension, it looks like a major change.

HAK: We're going to have a Committee to get a basic paper for all the government to use. Before we go to Congressional Committees.

Foster: Therefore $1.5–1.7 billion we can proceed at a rate to give us area coverage for about 1978.

HAK: We should get a study

—What could you do if President wants to give priority to area defense.
—What to do if we give priority to MM defense, what this would do to area defense.
—What we could do with mixed system.

If you went with Whiteman, plus NW or NE, you would argue you are getting MM defense, also area defense.

There are three basic categories.

Subsidiary decision is what we mean by area defense:

—lightest
—12 sites
—something in between.

Wheeler: We should ultimately have 12 sites. Gives you best protection tech. can provide.

Alt. 3 is step to getting to 12 sites.

3, 4, 5 are way stations.

HAK: President doesn't want to proceed with D.C. in next year. He has always wanted to phase it in later. You can make a case for NCA if you want; gives fourth category.

It doesn't seem outrageous to protect heavily populated areas first. Make special case for NCA.

Are these fair statements of options?

Run D.C. consideration into each of these if you want to.

I think 6[5] and 1 and 2 are not in ball park.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–73. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the notes. The brackets are in the original. The following attended the meeting, scheduled to begin at 10:30 a.m. in the White House Situation Room: Kissinger, Johnson, Wheeler, Schlesinger, Farley, Foster, Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, and Safeguard System Manager Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird.

[2] Kissinger discussed President Nixon's wishes regarding Safeguard with Laird during a telephone conversation held at 7:40 p.m. on December 19. According to the transcript, Kissinger "said he had been told that Dave Packard had decided to eliminate Phase II. K said the President wants Phase II started to get the controversy out of the way. Now what level of Phase II should be discussed—the President doesn't care about the size." Kissinger added, "If Phase II isn't discussed now, it will never get off the ground." (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[3] See Document 108.

[4] Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Director of Stanford University's Linear Accelerator Center and consultant to the Office of Science and Technology and ACDA, wrote a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* on June 8 asserting that Safeguard would provide very little defense of the Minuteman's realiatory force because of its vulnerable radars and insufficient number of interceptors.

[5] Alternative 6, according to a table attached (not printed) to Document 108, called for a full 12-site Safeguard that included Phase I and Phase II of the program.

110. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 20, 1969.

SUBJECT
Soviet SS–11 Testing

The Soviets have been testing the SS–11 with new payloads since late Spring. Until recently the tests appeared to consist of the deployment of one re-entry vehicle and several other light objects which might be intended to be exoatmosphere penetration aids. Analysis of the re-entry vehicles on two of these tests indicate that their ballistic coefficient is considerably higher than that of the standard SS–11 re-entry vehicle, that is to say, the front of the re-entry vehicle is less blunt.

The more obvious reasons for deploying high ballistic coefficient systems are first, their re-entry errors tend to be less than that of low ballistic coefficient vehicles and hence give one method by which the accuracy of a missile system can be improved.[2] Second, in that they slow down less in the atmosphere they put a greater burden upon terminal defenses. Third, it is easier to build terminal decoys for some sleek re-entry vehicles than for blunt re-entry vehicles. At this time we do not have enough analysis of the flight to distinguish among these three possibilities. The preliminary analysis of data seems to indicate that the penetration aids as deployed would probably be ineffective against the Safeguard system.

Mel Laird

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. Top Secret.

[2] Laird discussed Soviet missile testing during his telephone conversation with Kissinger on December 9 at 6:55 p.m. According to the transcript, Laird said that, while "he was not trying to be an alarmist about it," new intelligence indicated that the Soviets had attained a one-mile CEP during the latest round of SS–11 tests. The data suggested that the Soviets, according to the Secretary of Defense, "have gone for better accuracy. K said that has been my nightmare on the SS–9. L said that might be the reason why they are keeping quiet on this." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

111. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 23, 1969, 7:10 p.m.

P said we are going to meet at 9:00 a.m.[2] but they are trying to push us to get the budget finished by tomorrow afternoon. P said I think it is too soon. P said it seems to me these decisions are so important—Defense, AEC, domestic issues. P said Schlesinger is too abrasive and dogmatic and I can't make decisions on just pushing. K said it was unfair to you to be confronted with decisions on the basis of one person. P said I should not decide some of these issues. P said I think they should be decided in a group and then brought up. P said in all agencies they need an outsider. P further said we are pushing some of these too fast. K said on the two bombs—there has not been a new tactical weapon in several years. K said you have to consider the impact on the military service. P said yes, I know the problem but on the other hand I sympathize with Mayo. P said I don't like Schlesinger—they know I don't want to go into every darn item. P said I should deal only with the big issues of doctrine, morale of services, etc. K said right. P said Mayo should not have brought in piddly things. K said either it should be decided or put in writing. K said one should not put the President in a position of arbitrator with decisions that can be settled by lower levels. P said Mayo probably talked to budget directors and they said get the President's ear. P said they are trying to rush us to get the budget to print. I am not going to let them do that. If they have to wait a week—let them wait. P said if we delay all we need is a good excuse—Congress has delayed its appropriations. P said what I want to do is get strategy with Mel and then follow from there. I don't think Mel and Schlesinger will hit it off. K said No, Mel dislikes him immensely. K said I think after you look at these items you decide if you want to cut any items and how much and then Mel and I will do it from there.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion about Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

[2] President Nixon met the next day with Mayo and Schlesinger from 10:48 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. No record of the meeting was found. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

112. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 26, 1969.

SUBJECT
Department of Defense FY 1971 Budget

There are two documents which should be signed by you today so that they can be officially transmitted to Secretary Laird on Monday, December 29th. The first is your decision on the FY 1971 Defense budget. The second is your approval of Secretary Laird's strategy for handling the Vietnamization Program and specifically our force levels in Vietnam within the context of the FY 1971 budget.

—At Tab A is a memorandum for your signature transmitting to the Secretary of Defense your decisions with respect to the Defense FY 1971 budget.[2] This memorandum confirms:

1. Stretchout of nuclear submarine construction and modification of the R&D program as it pertains to the Manned Strategic Bomber for a total savings of $100 million.
2. The decision memorandum also requires an additional reduction, the specifics of which are to be determined by Secretary Laird, of $335 million including at least a $75 million reduction in marginal naval forces.
3. Referral of the Manned Strategic Bomber issue to the Defense Program Review Committee for study prior to a commitment to buy the B–1A Strategic Bomber.[3]
4. Approval of the nuclear carrier, with the provision that no funds will be committed pending the completion of studies required by the Mondale Amendment,[4] the Armed Services Committee and the National Security Council.

—At Tab B is a memorandum for your signature to Secretary Laird conveying your approval of his proposed budget strategy which has been designed to prevent revelation, either directly or indirectly, of our timetable for Vietnamization.[5] Secretary Laird's memorandum to you on this subject is at Tab C[6] and provides inter alia:

1. Furnishing end strength figures for all of the services in the Department of Defense public budget, its posture statement and in unclassified testimony before the Congress.
2. Army and Marine Corps force structure figures and Southeast Asia and non-Southeast Asia cost breakdowns would only be provided in classified testimony before key committees.
3. FY 1971 strength figures for Vietnam would not be released in any version to any source.
4. Rationale for testimony would include the following elements:

—We have a plan and have assumed further reductions in the budget but we are not revealing the timetable for reasons stated in your November 3 speech.[7]
—Our budget is flexible enough to support a variable timetable, depending on decisions at the time.
—End strength reductions in the budget are a result of many factors besides specific Vietnam reductions.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommends, and in fact has already built his FY 1971 budget around, a strength of 260,000 men in Vietnam by June 1971.

I believe Secretary Laird's plan for finessing our Vietnamization plans in his budget presentation is sound although it will require maximum discipline within the Department of Defense if planned strength figures are not to be revealed either in the processing of the budget or through some other leak by a member of his planning staff. For this reason, I have included in your proposed approval of his plan, a strong admonition that maximum discipline be enforced on the whole issue of strength figures associated with Vietnamization.

Recommendation:

That you approve and sign the memoranda at Tab A and Tab B.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 206, Agency Files, Bureau of the Budget, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but Haig drafted the attachments, according to a carbon copy. (Ibid.)

[2] The memorandum at Tab A was signed by Nixon and sent to Laird on December 27. It is not printed.

[3] In a December 23 memorandum, Lynn informed Kissinger about his misgivings regarding AMSA, otherwise known as the B–1A, the prototype of the B–1 bomber. Lynn was "convinced that neither the concept nor the design for this aircraft has been thoughtfully considered at the policy level." As a remedy, he recommended that the DPRC carefully review the bomber's "strategic requirement and concept." Kissinger wrote "very interesting" and "Make sure this goes into budget order for Laird" on the memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 206, Agency Files, Bureau of the Budget, Vol. I) The first contract for construction of the B–1A was awarded in 1970.

[4] Senators Walter F. Mondale (D–Minnesota) and Clifford P. Case (R–New Jersey) in September 1969 proposed an amendment to the annual defense procurement bill that called for delaying the authorization of full funding for a new nuclear aircraft carrier pending a study of the program. The Senate approved the amendment by an 84–0 vote on September 12. (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969*, p. 275)

[5] The memorandum at Tab B was signed by Nixon and sent to Laird on December 27. It is

not printed.

[6] Not found.

[7] See footnote 3, Document 107.

113. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, December 30, 1969, 9:20 a.m.

Packard: Are you leaving today? I wanted to chat about Safeguard. We have got things worked out here so there are two courses we can go. Wanted to get your advice which way the President wants to go. One, is to take the next step with two additional sites going toward full 12 deployment with some emphasis on the area defense capability. Also going to include some money for R&D to upgrade Minuteman defense in case we need it. Involves $1-1/2 billion in authorization and about $900 million in expenditures. The other course would be to simply go ahead with phase 1 but put R&D toward area defense.

K: I am practically certain he wants the first course you mentioned. He wants to get into phase 2 if only for bargaining effect. We had a talk about that yesterday after Jerry Smith made his report.[2] He definitely wants to do that. We were wondering [if] we could start surveying some additional sites just to show we are moving.

P: We will do that. I think I have a pretty good interpretation of the conversation last week.[3] If you are sure the President wants to go that way, I will go ahead.

K: I am not sure which two sites he would pick—I would guess Whiteman and the Northwest.

P: It is perfectly—

K: I think he would prefer that to the National Command Authority.

P: I think it would save us an argument.

K: I am sure I speak for him on this.

P: I will have it set up that way. We have got to get it in the budget. I will get things moving ahead on that basis.

K: Could you send over a piece of paper?[4]

P: Yes.

K: I am sure I speak for him on this because we have talked on the budget review so we will do two sites and preserve some other ones.

P: The ultimate 12 sites so we have the whole picture and going ahead on the whole program.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking

[2] Nixon met with Gerard Smith from 10:22 to 11:15 on December 29. No other record of the meeting was found. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[3] Not further identified.

[4] See Document 117.

114. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 30, 1969.

SUBJECT
Number of Soviet and U.S. Missile Tests

You asked for information about the number of Soviet and U.S. missile tests in 1969.

In 1969, the U.S. conducted 104 tests of operational missiles; the Soviets, 108.

—This was a slight decrease for the Soviets from their 1968 level of 119, and a substantial increase for the U.S., which ran 78 missile flights in 1968.
The major reason for the decrease in Soviet tests was a sharp decline in troop training firings of their older SS–7 and SS–8 ICBMs.
The U.S. increased testing is accounted for equally by an increase in firings of operational missiles for training and confidence, and an increase in R&D flights.
—80 of the Soviet tests, as against 57 of the U.S., were of land-based ICBMs.
—Almost half the U.S. flights (47 of 104) were of submarine missiles. Reflecting their fewer operational ballistic missile subs, they ran only 28 SLBM tests.
—Both countries made substantial increases in the number of tests associated with research and development rather than training and confidence testing of operational systems:
  —The Soviets made 21 R&D flights, compared with 13 the year before.
  —40 of the U.S. flights were R&D-associated, compared with 25 the year before.
  —Most of the U.S. R&D flights were connected with the well-advanced Minuteman III and Poseidon programs; the Soviet R&D flights include two wholly new missiles.

The tables[2] show the figures in more detail.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Lynn sent it to Kissinger under a December 24 covering memorandum. Nixon wrote the following comments in the margins: "This doesn't make my point—what about tests of *new* weapons? How many new weapons have they developed in 5 years compared with us? 2) K[issinger]—also, I want a study made of the point I discussed with you re. How Soviet gets so much more for their 70 billion a year than we do."
[2] Attached but not printed is a table, entitled "Soviet and U.S. Missile Flights," showing

comparative figures in four categories—ICBMs, SLBMs, operational, and R&D—for 1968 and 1969.

115. National Security Study Memorandum 85[1]

Washington, December 31, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Toxins

As a follow-up to National Security Study Memorandum 59,[2] and in light of the decisions set forth in National Security Decision Memorandum 35,[3] the President has directed a study of all aspects of United States policy and programs with respect to toxins.[4]

The review should consist of a presentation of current and alternative United States policies and programs with respect to toxins and the pros and cons of each. It should include discussion of research and development programs and objectives, production methods, current capabilities, the military utility of toxins, and the effects upon the United States international position.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG) perform this study and that the addressees be included in the IPMG for purposes of this study.

The report of the IPMG should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by January 16, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Secret. Copies were sent to Helms and Wheeler.

[2] Document 95.

[3] Document 104.

[4] In a December 18 memorandum, Guhin informed Kissinger that “the real issue” requiring further study was as follows: “The question of the extent of the U.S. toxin program should” be decided on the basis of the toxins’ “relative utility as chemical weapons and whether or not their stockpiling contributes to national security.” Such a determination also involved the United States’ stance toward international agreements

regarding chemical and biological weapons. According to Guhin, “The current toxin program is not large and there is now no production other than for R&D.” A note on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on December 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare, Vol. 1)

116. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

January 6, 1970, 9:47 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to national security.]

K: Okay, we have ABM coming up again. We'll have the same old battle lines drawn again. It's in the budget going in for $_____[2] for one complete Safeguard 1 and going into Safeguard 2. If we are going to pull off what we are talking about, we need to have it moving so the Russians can see it. If that stops, the Russians can't see it. Over the weekend 10 scientists were invited to Defense. Most of them are opposed. There's a memo[3] on your desk about this, but you haven't seen it yet. We ought to get a game plan set on ABM for this year.

P: Yes. It can be won. I don't want to call Senators this time. We'll give it right to Harlow.

K: Packard should put 6 or 7 choices in front of the scientists—confuse them completely. Put what you choose in the middle. We will work out a game plan.

P: Yes. Congress came through this year in the second vote, and will again. I just don't want Smith and Thompson[4] to put out this nonsense.

K: Well, Mr. President, we're better off planning for 600 and getting 200.

P: Right. Let's be sure ACDA knows that and doesn't give up the game beforehand. I want to be able to bargain for something.

K: You might want to tell Smith nothing comprehensive; we will work out something more limited. I'll tell him that ABM is negotiable.

P: We are ready to negotiate, but we mustn't give it away in advance.[5]

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The President was vacationing in San Clemente from December 30 to January 8; Kissinger was in Washington.

[2] Omission in the original.

[3] Not found.

[4] Llewellyn E. Thompson, member of the United States SALT Delegation.

[5] On January 13, Nixon and Kissinger again discussed Safeguard during a telephone conversation. According to the transcript, the President, who had recently met with Laird on the matter, told Kissinger that Laird wanted to cut Safeguard. Laird told Nixon, however, that "he can't do too much because it involves our bargaining position." The President "said the whole question is whether it could be done in a way that is really credible due to the fact that we really don't know what to do. P said but under no circumstances can we take away our bargaining card." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

117. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense[1]

Washington, January 12, 1970.

MEMORANDUM ON THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM

The subject of ballistic missile defense has been under intensive review by the Department of Defense during the past year. The subject has been considered specifically in relation to the FY 1971 budget, and the following conclusions and recommendations have been arrived at.

A. Conclusions and Recommendations

Because the threat for which the Safeguard Program was designed continued to develop during 1969, it is necessary to undertake the next step toward the full twelve site system in the FY 1971 budget period. The following program is recommended:

1. Authorize the construction of two additional sites in FY 1971.[2] These sites should be chosen to—
   (a) Extend area defense against the Chinese Threat;
   (b) Broaden the base for Minuteman defense;
   (c) Begin to implement the defense against the SLBM threat.
2. Authorize engineering and site selection work for three additional sites.
3. Continue development of the Improved Spartan missile which will improve the area defense capability of the system.
4. Undertake R&D on a smaller radar and on missile modifications suitable for "hard-point" defense of Minuteman sites against the possibility of an even more severe threat to Minuteman survival than can be handled with the basic Safeguard system.
5. Plan the implementation of the full twelve site system in consideration of DOD budget constraints in FY 1971 and subsequent years.

This next step is, in fact, urgent at this time to assure that the country can have the protection of the full twelve site system by late 1977, if the threat continues to grow as is now indicated.[3]

Specific program recommended:

1. Commit in FY 71 the deployment of the Whiteman and the Northwest sites, and undertake advanced preparation of three more sites—Northeast, Michigan/Ohio and Washington, D. C.
2. Plan the deployment of all twelve sites within NOA funding (exclusive of AEC costs) of $1.5B in FY 71, $2.0B in FY 72, and not more than $2.3B in any subsequent year. (1969

dollars).
3. Add to the research and development program the development and evaluation of new defense components optimized for "hard-point" defense. These would be an improved Sprint and a smaller and cheaper radar and computer system which could be deployed in 1977 in larger numbers than the MSR to provide a higher level of defense of Minuteman and NCA if and as required. The complete development of this added capability is estimated to be $750M (RDT&E) at the rate of about $100M per year (not included in the NOA figures in the preceding paragraph).
4. Continue research and development on advanced concepts for ballistic missile defense, including consideration of the early mid-course intercept approach.

A discussion of the recommended deployment, together with the rationale for our choice follows.

B. Safeguard Objectives

The ABM missions and the design of Safeguard (then called modified Sentinel) were proposed by the Department of Defense early in March 1969. President Nixon accepted the proposed plan and on March 14, 1969, announced the following defense objectives:[4]

—"Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.
—Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.
—Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source."

He further elaborated.

—"We will provide for local defense of selected Minuteman missile sites and an area defense designed to protect our bomber bases and our command and control authorities."
—"By approving this system, it is possible to reduce U.S. fatalities to a minimum level in the event of a Chinese nuclear attack in the 1970's or in an accidental attack from any source."

The President also stated that "This program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (a) technical developments, (b) the threat, and (c) the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation". He emphasized protection of our deterrent as the best preventive for war. Congressional approval was secured to proceed with an initial increment of two site complexes to be located in Minuteman fields near Grand Forks AFB and Malmstrom AFB. The purpose of this deployment was to check out the entire system under realistic conditions and work out the problems that inevitably arise in the deployment of any new major weapon system, as well as to provide protection for at least a limited portion of the Minuteman force. Phase 1 Spartan coverage (see Figure 1)[5] forms

part of the Phase 2 area defense.

C. Threat

The specific threat as interpreted in February 1969 was in brief:

1. There had been no known firings of CPR ICBM's. It was projected that the CPR could have operational ICBM's as early as 1972 with 10 to 25 operational by mid-1975.
2. More than 225 SS–9's and more than 700 SS–11's were known to be deployed or under construction. It was predicted that this force would continue to grow, but even if no new SS–9's or SS–11's were constructed, conversion to MIRV's on the SS–9's and high accuracy for both would give a total of some 1400 accurate RV's on launcher. If all of these were targeted against Minuteman, they could destroy over 900 of the 1000.
3. It was known that 6–9 Yankee-class (Polaris type) ballistic missile submarines had been launched and that the evidence pointed to an increasing construction rate with a possible force of 35–50 Yankee-class boats by 1975. An on-station force of 15–20 would be capable of destroying up to 80% of our alert bomber force even with dispersed basing on 67 bases. Use of depressed trajectory SLBM's or the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) will decrease the warning and decision time of our national command authorities from 15–30 minutes to as little as 5–6 minutes for SLBM attack and essentially no useful warning against FOBS after deorbit.
4. Possibility of accidental launch from Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's.

Although the Soviet and CPR forces in existence in February, 1969, did not pose a serious threat, their projected growth did present a severe threat by the mid-1970's. Our present estimate of the threat follows:

1. Evidence indicates that China has not yet begun testing an ICBM. However, should a vehicle become available for testing within the next few months, IOC could be achieved by early 1973. It is more likely, however, that IOC will be later, perhaps by as much as two or three years if they encounter considerable difficulties. If the earliest possible IOC were achieved, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975. In the more likely event that IOC is later, achievement of a force this size would slip accordingly.
2. The Soviet buildup of SS–9's and SS–11's has continued as rapidly as predicted. More than 275 SS–9's and 800 SS–11's are now deployed or under construction. Although testing multiple RVs on the SS–9 has continued the system has not demonstrated the flexibility required for an independent targeting capability against a major fraction of the Minuteman force. New flight testing of the SS–11 starting in July 1969 suggests that some type of penetration aids and a new reentry vehicle are being developed. If sufficient improvements are made in the missile's guidance system the new reentry vehicle would allow accuracy improvements by the Mid 70's which would permit them to be effective against Minuteman silos as well as Safeguard radars.
3. Production of Yankee-class boats has continued during 1969. At present 22–24 Yankee-

class boats are believed to be either operational or under construction. Of these, 12 have been launched, 10 are believed to be operational, and one Yankee-class submarine has been continuously on patrol since June 1969. A second shipyard is known to be producing these submarines, which boosts last year's estimated construction rate of 4–8 annually to 6–8 annually.

It is clear that the threat against which Safeguard was configured last year has continued to evolve. Clearly, to implement Phase 1 only would not be adequate, and we therefore recommend proceeding with the first step of Phase 2 deployment.

D. Proposed Deployment

1. *Description*. The proposed deployment continues progress toward the full 12-site Phase 2 Safeguard system (Figure 2),[6] including the Sprints added for Minuteman defense and the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) additional seaward coverage needed for defense of our strategic bomber force against the Soviet SLBM's. This deployment continues progress toward the objectives set forth by the President. Funding (NOA) and schedules for this alternative are based on constraining NOA to approximately $1.5B for FY 71 and $2.0B for FY 72 with no constraints thereafter. (NOA funding rate is not expected to exceed $2.3B in any year.) These funding constraints cause the system completion date to slip from October 1976 to October 1977. However, without funding constraints, peak NOA would be $2.7B in FY 72 and peak expenditure would be $2.2B in FY 73 (all figures are 1969 dollars).

Under these constraints, we must commit in FY 71 the deployment of two more sites—Whiteman (in the Minuteman fields near St. Louis) and the Northwest site. In addition, we should undertake advanced preparation of three more sites—Northeast, Washington, D. C., and Michigan/Ohio.

The full 12-site deployment could be installed by October 1977. It provides area defense of the entire United States against a Chinese or other Nth country attack and of most of the strategic bomber bases against attack by depressed trajectory SLBM's. Against the Chinese, the system would be able to absorb about 100 warheads. Against the SLBM attack, the system could blunt the leading edge of the attack on the bomber fields and absorb about 20 to 30 warheads per Safeguard site. This should provide about 10 or more additional minutes for the protected alert bombers to escape to safety.

The Minuteman defense level increases as the four sites in the Minuteman fields become operational. The first two sites constitute Phase 1 with a total of 60 Spartans and 56 Sprints and will be installed by late 1974. The third site, Whiteman, will be installed by July 1975, and the fourth site, Warren, by April 1977. These four sites with a total of 120 Spartans and 264 Sprints provide a capability which depends on the level of threat against the Minuteman force. The Minuteman defense is expected to be aided by the existence of the area defense since the Soviets would be forced to divert some of their force to

negation of the area defense. Under these circumstances, if the Soviets stopped building at their present level, 200 to 300 Minuteman missiles are expected to survive. However, a Soviet expansion of several hundred more RVs would make the Minuteman defense relatively ineffective.

Because of this sensitivity to an increasing threat, we plan to add to the research and development program the development and evaluation of new defense components optimized for hard-point defense (e.g. Minuteman, National Command Authorities). These new components would be an improved Sprint, and a smaller and cheaper radar and computer system which could be deployed in 1977 in larger numbers than the MSR to provide a higher level of defense of Minuteman and the NCA as required. The complete development and evaluation cost of the new components is estimated to be about $750M (RDT&E funds, not included below) of which about $100M would be obligated in FY 71.

We will, of course, continue exploration of alternative concepts which might lead to even more effective defense against ballistic missiles.

2. *Deployment and Schedule.* Deployment cost and schedule are shown below. The NOA and expenditures are in 1969 dollars with no allowance for inflation. The schedule shows equipment readiness dates on which equipments will be installed and operable and the site turned over to military control. Following these dates, there will be a period of about six months of continuing checkout, training, and acceptance testing during which there will be a limited operational capability. Schedules are based on the assumption that public or political problems in site selection or acquisition will not cause delays.

(a) *Schedule (Equipment Readiness Dates)*

Apr 74	Oct 74	Jul 75	Jul 76	Oct 76
GF[Grand Forks]	Malm[strom]	Whit[eman]	NW	NE
Jan 77	**Apr 77**	**Jul 77**		**Oct 77**
DC	War[ren]	Tex		C. Cal.
	M/O [Michigan/Ohio]	S. Cal.		Fla/Ga

(b) *DOD Costs*

AEC costs of approximately $1.2 billion (exclusive of Improved Spartan, for which development costs have not yet been estimated) are not included.

	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	Total Through FY 78
NOA	$1.50	$2.0	$2.2	$1.6	$11.7
Expenditures	.93	1.3	1.8	1.9	11.7

(c) Sites requiring authorization in full in FY 71 would be White-man and Northwest with advanced preparations required for Northeast, D. C., and Michigan/Ohio.

E. Pros and Cons

1. Pro:

(a) Continues progress toward the announced objectives of the Safeguard program.

(b) Would continue the momentum of deployment and retain the production/construction base.

(c) While running some risk, this proposal comes as close to coping with the estimated Soviet and Communist Chinese threats as funding constraints permit.

(d) Provides a defense that will mean either the survival of 200 to 300 Minuteman or the absorption of 300 to 400 Soviet warheads otherwise useable against our cities, and complements other Minuteman survivability options such as new defense components, super hardening, or mobility.

(e) Is wholly consistent with the arguments based on the Soviet and Chinese threats used in recent Congressional debate.

(f) The modified R&D program is expected to provide more economical defense of Minuteman against the heavier threats which might develop, and thus lessen objections such as those raised in Congressional debate.

(g) The fact that the U.S. will be entering substantive Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviets in 1970 ought not to lead to modifications of the Safeguard program at this time. The reasons are three: First, because a part of the threat—the Chinese ICBM threat—is not under Soviet control; Second, because a number of plausible outcomes of SALT would not lead to such a reduction in the potential Soviet threat that the requirements for Safeguard were substantially altered; Third, because it is important to effective conduct of the SALT negotiations that the U.S. make clear its plans for Safeguard and the threats to which they are responsive in order that the threat reductions (or other means of satisfying Safeguard requirements) which would be needed to make reductions in Safeguard acceptable are also clear.[7]

An agreement which limits Soviet ICBM's to the number operational or under construction now or at any future date still threatens the survivability of undefended Minutemen unacceptably, because SS–9's may be upgraded with MRV deployment or SS–11's can be upgraded with accuracy improvements. There is serious question whether these potential upgradings will be prevented by agreement because of the difficulties of verifications and the expressed Soviet reluctance to consider "qualitative" limitations.

The proposed program does not preclude modification of the deployment or the expenditures if warranted by progress of SALT.

2. Con:

(a) Would increase our NOA requirement in FY 71 from $1060M to about $1500M, exclusive of $100M in FY 71 for RDT&E on improved Minuteman defense components.

(b) Implies a commitment to the full 12-site system.

(c) Will lead to debate about the need for further deployment and possible adverse effects on SALT.

(d) Opponents will certainly claim that Safeguard deployment is another step in the arms race.
(e) A claim that Soviets will just exhaust Minuteman defense and kill all Minuteman. Could also lead to the further claim that land-based ICBM's are obsolescent and unnecessary.
(f) A claim that the Chinese will use a kind of pen aid that will defeat Safeguard.

F. Response to Threats Beyond Safeguard Design Level

The two serious technical arguments against the system are Soviet ICBM force expansion to the point where they simply overwhelm the system and the advancement of Chinese technology to the point where area defense becomes very difficult.

If the Soviets continue to expand their ICBM forces and, in addition, deploy large MIRV (silo killers) and upgrade the accuracy of SS–11's, they could achieve an attack level which exceeds the design goals of the presently proposed deployment. In this event, the U.S. would have to take additional measures to insure survivability of its land-based deterrent. We would have a number of options open to us. One option would be to deploy more of the same Safeguard components (MSR's and Sprints), perhaps by diverting them from area defense sites. This is a reasonably quick and well understood solution. If time permitted, we would prefer to deploy the new less expensive and more effective hard-point defenses, the development of which we are starting. Since these defense options include hard-point defense of only a fraction of the Minuteman force, they are compatible with and complement other means of improving Minuteman survivability. Specifically, rebasing part of the Minuteman force in super hardened silos and/or rebasing part on mobile transporter-launchers are under study now.

The Chinese, because of their limited economy and lack of the very expensive, sophisticated range instrumentation needed to develop penetration aids, are not expected to be able to deploy penetration aids like our Mk 1a or "Antelope" system for many years after they deploy simple ICBM's. When they do begin to deploy sophisticated penetration aids we will find ourselves in a technology (rather than force level) race, which we should be able to win. Our advanced ballistic missile defense research program now includes the kind of work needed to counter the later Chinese threat. For example, we are investigating the use of long wavelength infra red (LWIR) optical sensors for both surveillance and long-range ABM interceptor homing. The LWIR sensors can detect a reentry vehicle in the presence of chaff because chaff does not resemble a reentry vehicle at infra red wavelengths.

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. On January 13, Packard sent the memorandum to Kissinger, Richardson, Helms, Wheeler, McCracken, and Mayo under a

covering memorandum that reads: "The threat described in this paper represents the combined judgment of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The document will be the basis of our discussion of Safeguard" at the DPRC meeting to be held two days later. (Ibid.) Kissinger also included the memorandum in President Nixon's preparatory materials for the January 23 NSC meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, January 23, 1970)

[2] The JCS endorsed this recommendation. In a December 31 memorandum to Laird, Wheeler stated that the JCS supported "a program to deploy, as a next step, two additional sites for Safeguard, one at Whiteman and one in the Northwest utilizing basic Spartans and Sprints, plus advance preparation for three additional sites. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff support continued selective research and development programs to exploit available technology for the attainment of an effective ballistic missile defense for the United States." (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard)

[3] On January 14, Packard sent Kissinger a report by the Ad Hoc Panel on Ballistic Missile Defense, assembled by the Department of Defense to study Safeguard deployment beyond Phase I. In its report, January 9, the panel of seven scientists drawn from universities and private think tanks recommended Phase II as the optimum deployment both to provide area defense and to protect the land-based deterrent force. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, January 15, 1970)

[4] See Documents 14 and 25.

[5] Figure 1, entitled "Basic Spartan CPR Coverage Provided by Phase 1," is attached but not printed.

[6] Figure 2, which illustrates area defense provided by a full 12-site ABM system, is attached but not printed.

[7] Packard sent Kissinger a memorandum on January 2 adding the following "fundamental point" to an earlier draft of this memorandum: The United States "must continue to deploy those systems which will be necessary for national security in the absence of an arms control agreement just as the Soviets are continuing to deploy. If we fail to do so, then it is to the Soviet advantage to procrastinate on agreement because the balance is shifting to their favor. It therefore increases the pressure on the U.S. to make further concessions to achieve early agreement. If, on the other hand, we have committed and funded the deployment of these systems, then they become real bargaining counters to trade for limitations on Soviet systems. Moreover, in the very possible event that a significant agreement is not reached, our national security is protected." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, 373.24, Safeguard)

118. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, January 15, 1970.

At the meeting were: Henry Kissinger, McCracken, Helms, Richardson, Alexis Johnson, Wheeler, Packard, Smith, Lynn, Schlesinger

DP: [Briefing][2] Costs as presented to Congress will include more this year: R&D, AEC.

GS: Is this the annual review?

DP: Part of it. Also intelligence board, scientific review, and NSC.

HAK: No formal NSC meeting. President will decide. Stop leaks. President may put before small group of NSC. But, no extended debate in newspapers.

DP: [resumes briefing]

Tests: no areas of serious concern

—some problems with Sprint, but not troublesome
—may be problem of computers and software, but no major problems so far.
—There will be Spartan intercept in fall, 1970; Sprint in early 1971.[3]

No technical problems.

HAK: There are people who claim it is no good for hard point defense.

EW: We have a refutation.

DP: ABMDA doesn't know status of program.

DP: [on threat] Chinese threat a year slip. Otherwise no easing of threat we were concerned about.

Alternatives considered:

—cancel Phase 1, R&D only
  —delay to 80's.
—Phase 1 only, R&D for HPD
  —questions raised about capability of SG to defend MM.

We agree that if the threat goes above 1400 RV, we need new R&D on system for HPD. But, that will work along with SG elements.

—MM defense only
—CPR defense only
—overall system
—various schedules.

Why Phase 2 now:

—IOC 1977
—Phase 1 only—delays IOC to meet threat
—Chinese delayed but continuing, but intelligence weak and nuclear program continuing.
—Even if there is an agreement by Soviets to stop building launchers, higher accuracy for existing launchers could threaten MM
—More SSBNs.
—technical progress on SG is promising

Recommendations:

—Step toward full 12-site Phase 2. Good area coverage with SPN. Full Phase 2 MM.
—Increased R&D on new HPD
—Begin deployment at Whiteman & NW
—Advanced preparation of 3 other sites: NE, D. C., Michigan/Ohio
—R&D on Improved SPN for area defense.

Budget ($ billion)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1978
NOA	1.5	2.0	2.2	1.6	11.7
Exp.	.93	1.3	1.8	1.9	11.7

Schedule for expenditures goes so that we could cut back if we got agreement this year or early next.

ER: Suppose the agreement allowed a 3rd country system only. How much of the $930 million would be useful?

DP: Half is R&D.

HAK: Anyway some MM defense is useful even under agreement.

ER: Of the non R&D part?

DP: Much of it is for first PAR, computers. Some engineering work on sites.

AJ: If you want a light area defense, all this is useful.

DP: Right.

HAK: The light area defense is not negotiable.

GS: But, the issue shouldn't be treated as untouchable dogma.

HAK: There is no point in arguing here. The President will decide and hear all arguments. For planning, we should assume that's what he wants now.

DP: All is useful for light area.

AJ: Why NW rather than NE?

DP: Have site, politically easier?

AJ: But fewer population.

HAK: Better for Chinese.

DP: Not really. Anyway, no benefit against Chinese unless you have full coverage, because of blackmail. There is an "interim" seven site system, which with Improved Spartan gives some coverage all over country.

[Chart showing usefulness of silos for MM and 7 site][4]

Chart showing effectiveness against China

Threat assumed

	Low	High
	5–60 &	10–125
ICBMs (74–80)	1m²	1m²
RCS (S band)	.01m²	.01m² (like RCS of our smaller RVs)

ER: What is in a "site"?

DP: Varies: [explain]

DP: On the area coverage against China: There is big debate:

—Will they get small RV?
—Penaids?

The scientific panel discussed the issue at length.[5] It has taken us 10 years to penaids. The preponderance of opinion is that the Chinese won't have the capability in 1974–80 to

develop technical measure to degrade system.

The people who know most about missile technique say that simple penaids like chaff and balloons won't work. Need more sophisticated devices.

HAK: Can we see report of scientific panel?

DP: Yes.

DP: [Chart on SAC Survivability]

—There will be serious problem in early–mid-70s no matter what we do.

Sch: Base structure?

DP: About as present—more dispersal is very costly.

McC: When will 5–6 Ys be on station? (50% of bombers lost)

RH: Early 70s.

HAK: But no point in attacking SAC before they have enough ICBMs to take out MM.

DP: [MM chart]

[Threat chart]

Sch: Query Soviet accuracies—our CEP estimates are done by error budgets; operational results much worse.

DP: Not true on latest figures for Polaris tests. Anyway, accuracy improves over time.

Sch: SLBM accuracy may be greater than ICBM.

DP: There really has been progress on accuracy.

HAK: What's an error budget?

DP: [Eff. measures chart

Surviving MM

Surviving alert aircraft

Time for NCA decision][6]

DP: How Soviets could expand MM threat—2000 RV by 1977. Phase

2 MM defense degraded if arriving RVs exceed 1300.

Alternatives:

—more SG
—new HPD
—rebase MM

Cautions

—Threats could develop faster;
—Timing/duration of defense against Chinese is judgmental
—bomber surprise tactics;
—bigger MM threat

HAK: After this year (FY 71) expenditures we can still go either way.

DP: True, except that NW site is not much good for MM. All work is useful for area defense.

ER: How about the HPD R&D?

DP: Report of Defense Science Panel:[7] [gives members]

HAK: My science advisers have come to the conclusion that:[8]

—MM defense won't work and therefore must be abandoned;[9]
—Area defense will work and therefore must [not?] be abandoned.

DP: [reads more of report] (from part assuming both objectives)

ER: Do they say the system can do the job?

DP: With exception

—heavy MM threat in which case the system will be overwhelmed;
—rapid Chinese movement to defeat system.

HAK: What is basis for argument that only 20 MM will survive?

DP: Depends on assumptions about:

—number of RVs;
—accuracy.

We don't give them an accuracy today for SS–11 that gives them enough RVs to give SG

much trouble.

HAK: Suppose they target radars? Blackout?

DP: We don't care how they use up their RVs. We can use the Sprints to protect radars or MM. Doesn't make any difference.

HAK: Blackout?

DP: We think we are in good shape on that.

HAK: Would area defense black out HPD?

DP: I think we are OK on that.

The issue not yet addressed is whether this is best of all possible means to protect strategic capability. Idea is to maintain triad.

Other devices:

—mobile MM.

ER: Political problem of moving them around.

GS: No. It's a garage system.

DP: One mile radius system.

DP: Or you could go to more subs?

ER: Isn't it likely that in SALT context that we'd be more likely to defend area defense more than MM.

GS: We have to ask the President about that.

DP: We recommend more homework on debate this year than last. Political problems will be serious.

ER: There is also the factor of position relating FY 71 deployments for Phase 2 to resumption of SALT. We need to be clear about the negotiability of ABM levels. This bears on rate of development and deployment. Must reflect fact that we don't know *if* or *what* agreement could be—must cover case of no agreement.

HAK: Do we need rationale when budget is submitted?

DP: Yes.

Sch: That's Feb. 2.

DP: Don't have to have arguments in budget documents, but there will be press questions.

HAK: Will be NSC meeting a week from Friday.[10]

ER: The SALT implications must go into the rationale from the outset.

HAK: No NSC possible before Friday a week. Assume decision will be made early the next week. Cannot have various agencies saying different things. Should be group in "here" to work out uniform rationale which all will use.

GS: I hadn't realized this was the "annual review." I thought it was fall out from budget. I'm in no position to give ACDA view now. If on Hill, I could not now say that I have been involved in annual review and am satisfied with outcome.

GS: I sensed that there is some suggestion that we need Phase 2 for bargaining purposes. I disagree: Phase 1 and R&D does as much for bargaining position as Phase 2.

DP: That's a key issue—a factor we must consider is effect of decision on SALT bargaining. But, must also consider what would happen if no agreement. Soviets are going ahead.

HAK: The issue is one for the President—same as last year.

GS: If you seek big program and lose in Congress, that really hurts bargaining position.

DP: I don't disagree. But, considering all the factors, I think this is the best thing to do. And we have to get together within the Government if there's to be any chance on the Hill.

GS: I will support program if President decides for it. But, there are unanswered issues apart from SALT:

—technical feasibility
—objectives

It is clear that Soviets are most interested in ABM; possibility of expansion.

HAK: I'm persuaded that if you stop Phase 2, the opposition will go after Phase 1—especially if it's unrelated to a bigger system.

The opposition scientists are implacable on anti-ABM and *they're only for alternative HPD because it doesn't exist*.

ER: I think Soviets have worked out bargaining position to give us maximum trouble:

—carriers, transfers, allied forces give them more bargaining counters.
—that they're worried about ABM—or say so—suggests that it is a valuable bargaining counter.

GS: The real counter to ABM is SSBN/ICBM construction.

HAK: If they would stop. ABM—Phase 2 or otherwise—is negotiable. The issue is what action by us alone now gives more bargaining power:

—on-going capability
—stop with threat to restart

Sch: Could put money in budget with details for later submission. Harlow is pessimistic.

DP: So is Laird.

HAK: We were told there was trouble over appropriations.

DP: Another factor is the computer facility. Soviets are well behind. They couldn't build such an ABM system now, because of software problems. They may be very worried about high U.S. SG capability, domestic criticisms notwithstanding.

GS: Can we put a paper before this group?[11]

HAK: Don't put it in posture where President will have to overrule ACDA.

ER: How position is put on SALT is very important.

DP: [DOD rationale plan][12]

AJ: Developing rationale will also help President decide.

HAK: Such group should be created—even before decision. I will talk with President on this.

DP: *Fiscal Guidance:*[13] "no decision necessary," unless you want to do something different.

—Final fiscal guidance *March 4*.

SEA Assumptions: U.S. Forces (thousands)

	end 1971	1972	1973

VN	260	144	29
Thai	38	24	4

Strategic—

ULMS, AMSA—stretched out

Phase 2

Continental Air Defense—minimal

Upgrade ICBMs

GPF:

	‘65	‘71	‘76
Down to 16–17 Divisions (3 lower than 65) 19 16-1/3 9 reserve against 7 in 65	19		16-1/3
Bigger lift capability (index)	100	230	360
Helicopters	4900	10,700	9000
Tac air	5100	5800	4600
CVA	16	15	12
Navy—SSN	21	52	70
CVS	9	4	3
Surface ships	278	241	178
Amphibious	1 Pac + 1 Atl	1-1/3	1-1/3
Manpower	2660	2920	2250

Issue is whether we can live with this level of program.

HAK: We should take this as a point of departure and use it to develop a long term military budget. Also:

CVA

ASW

DP: We recommend 1. A joint effort with BOB & CEA…

HAK: And Lynn.

DP: … to look at relation of defense to civilian budget and economy.

2. Get State/DOD study of commitments

AJ: Also deployments—bases, MAP

[Omitted here is discussion of proposed CY 1970 reductions in United States naval forces committed to NATO.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, January 15, 1970. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the original. The brackets are in the original.

[2] Rear Admiral Frank W. Vannoy, Deputy Director of the JCS Plans and Policy Directorate, prepared a memorandum for the record of the DPRC meeting that summarized Packard's briefing: Packard "reviewed the status of present program, the threat, the necessity for Phase II deployment, the alternatives considered, OSD recommendation (build toward full twelve site Phase II, with FY 71 funding from Whiteman and NW with advanced preparation NE, DC, Michigan/Ohio, with increased R&D to improve capability), costs, relative seven and twelve site effectiveness against CHICOM, and effect of full twelve site in defense of Minuteman and bombers." (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, Admiral Moorer, Box 84, DPRC File)

[3] A typed note in the margin next to this point reads: "Note: These are 5–6 month slips."

[4] None of the referenced charts was found.

[5] The Ad Hoc Panel on Ballistic Missile Defense (see footnote 3, Document 117) discussed the effectiveness of area defenses against Chinese ICBM attacks. According to their report, submitted to Laird on January 9 and sent by Packard to Kissinger five days later, some panelists believed "that the probability is high that a thin area defense will be highly effective; possibly achieving damage denial, for as much as a decade." Others believed that the Chinese "would respond to the presence of a U.S. area defense and materially reduce its effectiveness by the use of penetration aids and other measures." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, January 15, 1970)

[6] A hand-drawn brace next to these three items points to the typed and bracketed word: "[criteria]"

[7] An apparent reference to the Ad Hoc Panel on Ballistic Missile Defense.

[8] On December 30, 1969, DuBridge sent Kissinger a report by the President's Science Advisory Committee's (PSAC) Strategic Military Panel that expressed reservations about Safeguard's ability to defend Minuteman silos and instead favored a dedicated, hard-point defense system advocated by ABMDA. Lynn forwarded the report to Kissinger on January 5, 1970. Kissinger wrote two comments on Lynn's covering memorandum: "We must get

PSAC def strategy" and "What do the systems tell us about upgrading problem?" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 840, ABM–MIRV, ABM System, Vol. III)

[9] Bracketed correction added by the editor.

[10] January 23.

[11] On January 21, Gerard Smith sent a memorandum to Nixon in which he recommended deferring deployment of Phase II of Safeguard and instead increasing R&D. Such a course would, Smith argued, increase Congressional support for the system, maintain U.S. negotiating leverage in the SALT talks, and avoid provoking a Soviet offensive arms buildup. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 840, ABM/MIRV, ABM System, Vol. III)

[12] On January 14, Packard sent Kissinger an undated 1-page memorandum entitled "Plan for Disseminating Information About Safeguard." The memorandum outlined a strategy for crafting a well-coordinated, clear, and well-defended presentation of the Safeguard program to Congress and the public. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, January 15, 1970)

[13] On January 13, Packard sent the Defense Department's Fiscal Guidance to Kissinger, Richardson, Helms, Wheeler, McCracken, and Mayo. (Ibid.)

119. Editorial Note

On January 22, 1970, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, sent a memorandum to President Nixon informing him of indications that the Soviet Union was interested in limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems through a strategic arms limitation agreement. While there was some speculation that the Soviets wanted to prohibit all ABMs, Kissinger believed that "Moscow's preference was for a limited ABM system for protection against third country attacks." Nixon highlighted the above passage and wrote: "K[issinger]—This is what they will insist on." The memorandum is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 49.

120. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting on Safeguard

The purpose of the NSC meeting on Friday[2] is to consider the Defense Department's proposals for the ABM program in FY 71.

Proposal for Conduct of Meeting

So that the meeting will serve to expose the issues which affect your decision, and to give everyone the feeling that he has had ample opportunity to make his views known to you, I recommend that it be conducted as follows:

—Call on me to outline the background of the program, state the alternatives open to us, and review the principal issues;
—Ask the Defense spokesman to state the DOD position;
—Invite discussion, being particularly sure that Gerard Smith, who feels he has been inadequately involved in the review of the program, has a chance to express his views;
—Conclude the meeting by saying that you will make your decision shortly and that once it is made, you are determined that the Government, in presenting and explaining it to the public and to Congress, must adhere to the single, agreed rationale which will be developed by the special groups set up for that purpose.

Your *talking points*[3] proceed in this way.

Also included is an issues paper,[4] setting forth the background on the issue, the alternatives, and suggesting the arguments likely to be raised at the meeting.

[Omitted here is a list of the contents of Nixon's preparatory materials for the meeting.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, January 23, 1970. Top Secret; Nodis.
[2] January 23.
[3] Nixon's talking points were prepared by the NSC Staff; see Document 121.
[4] The 18-page Issues Paper, prepared by the NSC Staff, informed Nixon of his Safeguard options: continue Phase I with only R&D for additional Minuteman defense, build

additional sites designed primarily for Minuteman defense, pursue either a thick or thin area defense, or construct additional sites toward a full Phase II system of 12 sites capable of area, Minuteman, and NCA defense. The Pentagon favored the latter option, according to the paper. The paper indicated, however, that scientists had raised technical questions about Safeguard's ability to defend the land-based deterrent and that Gerard Smith, among others, believed that pursuing Phase II would torpedo SALT. The paper concluded, however, that Phase II would give the United States a bargaining chip during SALT and serve as a hedge in case talks failed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, January 23, 1970) See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, Document 50.

121. Editorial Note

The National Security Council met on January 23, 1970, to discuss Safeguard. According to the President's Daily Diary, attendees included President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger; Vice President Agnew, Secretary of State Rogers, Attorney General Mitchell, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Gerard Smith, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler, Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness Lincoln, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Under Secretary of State Richardson, and Science Adviser to the President DuBridge. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House beginning at 10:10 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

No complete record of the proceedings was found. But according to his talking points, prepared by the National Security Council Staff, Nixon was advised to open the meeting by reminding attendees of its purpose and by introducing Kissinger. (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–126, NSC Meeting, Safeguard (ABM), January 23, 1970) According to his talking points, Kissinger was prepared to recapitulate the major factors affecting the decision on the Safeguard deployment: the threat, technical developments, and SALT. (Ibid.) As for the threat, Kissinger's talking points noted that the Soviet force buildup had continued "at a steady pace without sign of slackening," while the "most likely date for the first operational Chinese ICBM has been pushed back a year." This data had led some to "give highest priority" to protecting Minuteman and to argue that area defense could be safely delayed. Others pointed out, however, "that the Chinese could still have significant numbers of ICBMs by the mid-1970s, which is as soon as a real nationwide area system could be ready." Turning to technical issues, Kissinger's talking points noted that, while its test program was proceeding smoothly, there was disagreement about whether Safeguard was the best way to defend the deterrent force. Finally, before outlining the deployment options, Kissinger's preparatory materials mentioned that principals also disagreed about how a decision to deploy Safeguard further would affect SALT.

Following Packard's briefing on the Department of Defense's review of the ABM system, Nixon's talking points advised him to invite general discussion, particularly from Smith, who felt that he had not had adequate opportunity to present his views. The President was also expected to announce that, rather than making a determination during the meeting, he would "take this problem under advisement and let you know of my decision shortly."

However, the President departed from his scripted remarks, according to the handwritten notes of Under Secretary of State Richardson, the only record of the meeting found. Richardson's notes of Nixon's comments read as follows: "China will be in roughly same position as Sovs at the time of Cuban missile crisis. People in SE Asia—part of Asia

petrified at possibility of Chinese. China is just big. They see the enormous threat of Chinese influence quite apart from crossing borders. They sit there with a few IBMs [*ICBM s*]. How many does it take to take out Taiwan, Jakarta, Manila? Doesn't take many missiles. Would they do it? If they have forty, we have 1,000. What American President is going to trade *any* American city for Jakarta or Manila. The answer is 'none.' They [...] huffing and puffing, threatening Singapore or Manila or Bangkok. We can say, 'lay off' (treaty obligations). No President is credible unless he has that kind of defense." According to Richardson's notes, Nixon indicated that in the United States 10 cities constituted 20 percent of the population. In the Soviet Union, it would take 100 cities to constitute 20 percent of the population, and in China 1,000 cities to measure up to the same percentage of the population. The President continued, "I have determined to go along with Defense Department." According to Richardson's notes, Nixon had recently reviewed the threat and had found that "not less than a year ago, Soviets slightly greater." Helms agreed that Soviet capabilities had grown "a little bit stronger lately." Continuing, Nixon stated that the Chinese threat had been "pushed back a year." "Lucky for us," Helms added. "We're talking about diplomacy," the President continued. "We have to have a credible policy in the Pacific. We see Japan sitting there. Some talk re. great responsibilities militarily. I will predict that within five years we'll be trying to restrain them. We'll guarantee to Japan its credibility."

According to Richardson's notes, Nixon then stated, "You come to the third point—SALT—that's a tough one. We must take into account men who are on the ground. My view is probably a minority one. Have never felt that what we did in this field had too much to do with their willingness to negotiate. Editorials thought otherwise. I don't believe going ahead with area defense. I have decided we will go forward with DOD program. Wash. Or NE, we can decide later," Nixon continued. "I don't want there to be any doubt that I'm committed to area defense. In terms of negotiations, I feel we must go forward with the plan, etc."

Nixon concluded, "Within admin. [...] must have a disciplined line in admin. We've got to play the game better than last time. I will write memo—take into account adv. Group's views. Criteria one may work. Threat probably greater. Negotiations: close point. I doubt the views of those who believe harmful. Will take into account in terms of how we lay out the program." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 97, Memcons, January 1970) The meeting concluded at 12:48 p.m.

122. Minutes of Review Group Meeting[1]

Washington, January 29, 1970—2:37–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM 85)[2]

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State
- Richard F. Pedersen
- William I. Cargo
- Capt. George Birdt
- Donald McHenry

Defense
- G. Warren Nutter

CIA
- R. Jack Smith

JCS
- RAdm. Frank W. Vannoy

OEP
- Haakon Lindjord

USIA
- Frank Shakespeare

ACDA
- Howard Furnas

OST
- Dr. Vincent McRae

NSC Staff
- Michael Guhin
- Winston Lord
- Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Review Group agreed to:

1. reverse the two sentences of Option 2 and rephrase both Options 1 and 2 more permissively so as to reverse the right of production and stockpiling,[3]
2. draft public justifications[4] for each option and clear with USIA,
3. ask OST to determine how many toxic bullets are produced commercially, the method of production and if any controls are exercised on their production or sale.

(JCS and ACDA circulated proposed changes and additions to the paper at the table prior to the meeting.)

Mr. Kissinger asked for a definition of a toxin.

Capt. Birdt referred to recent reports by the UN Secretary General and the World Health Organization which defined a toxin as a chemical, with the only difference between toxins and other chemical agents being that the former are also manufactured by living organisms. It is generally chemical in effect but biological in method of production.

Mr. Kissinger asked how it differs from nerve gas.

Mr. Cargo replied that nerve gas is not produced by living organisms.

Dr. McRae added that nerve gas changes the function of the organs.

Mr. Kissinger asked for a definition of disease.

Dr. McRae defined disease as the introduction of foreign matter into the body.

Mr. Kissinger asked if nerve gas or mustard gas did not constitute foreign matter. He asked if the considerations were how the material was produced or the nature of its effect.

Capt. Birdt noted that nerve gas affected only the respiratory system [*sic*] and caused almost instant death, whereas a botulinus toxin would cause death in a matter of hours.

Dr. McRae agreed that the difference could be characterized by the different methods of production or by their effects. He said biological agents reproduce themselves while chemical agents do not. Therefore, toxins are chemical although certain of their characteristics resemble biological agents; for example, the body develops antibodies to toxins. He thought the basic distinction was whether or not the agent replicates; if it does not, it should be treated as a chemical.

Mr. Kissinger asked if he were right in saying that the present form of toxins are biologically produced but that their effect is more analogous to chemical agents.

Dr. McRae agreed that this was true of the toxins that we can now produce in *quantity*.

Mr. Kissinger asked if a toxin were produced chemically, would it not be difficult to distinguish between it and a chemical weapon.

Dr. McRae and Capt. Birdt agreed.

Mr. Kissinger asked for the difference between full R&D and defensive R&D in toxins.

Admiral Vannoy replied that full R&D would give us the capacity to experiment with a

weapons system intended for retaliatory use; defensive R&D would not.

Mr. Kissinger asked what you could do under full R&D that you could not do under a defensive R&D program.

Admiral Vannoy said that under full R&D you could develop a toxin of a type you would propose to use. He also said full R&D could consider delivery systems and production techniques, and would vary in the amount of material produced.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we should announce a defensive R&D program, would the other side be able to tell that we are not doing full R&D?

Admiral Vannoy replied that they would not know without fairly full inspection.

Dr. McRae agreed that it would be difficult for the other side to see the distinction.

Mr. Kissinger asked, therefore, what we would accomplish by announcing a defensive R&D program. He recalled that defensive R&D in biological agents involved work on methods of immunization, etc.

Dr. McRae said that under a defensive R&D program we would not be developing delivery systems specifically for bacteriological agents or for toxins; for example, we would not have spray tanks. This, he thought, might be visible to the other side. He agreed that defensive R&D would permit all R&D short of actual engineering development—the same as the Presidential decision on bacteriological or biological agents.[5]

Mr. Kissinger asked what had been the practical effect of the Presidential decisions on biological weapons—were we closing down the Pine Bluff installation?

Admiral Vannoy replied that a decision had not yet been reached on Pine Bluff because that plant produced other things, such as riot control agents.

Dr. McRae said Defense and OST were examining the future of Pine Bluff. He said Pine Bluff has both chemical and biological programs and he saw no reason to maintain the biological programs. He said at Fort Detrick the research program has been reduced by approximately one-third, with a personnel cut of approximately 15 percent. He thought these were visible effects of the President's decision and that planned additional moves would make the effect even more visible.

Mr. Kissinger asked what toxins were good for.

Admiral Vannoy replied that with regard to military utility, toxins are an intermediate weapon between biological and chemical weapons. They are better than chemical weapons in *some* ways but not as effective in other ways as biological weapons. You could cover a larger area with a smaller amount of a toxin than with other chemicals. On the

negative side, however, toxins were not persistent.

Dr. McRae added toxins were not as stable as chemicals, and, because they deteriorate in sunlight, would require a heavier dose for an effect of similar duration.

Mr. Kissinger asked what we would use toxins for. He recalled that in a discussion of biological weapons it had been agreed that they were useful for offensive purposes but less useful for retaliation because of the time lag.[6]

Dr. McRae suggested that we separate the discussion into lethal and incapacitating toxins. He said we had one lethal toxin at present—botulinum—which he considered a poor military weapon. There is an effective toxoid which can be used to immunize troops which increases the amount required by 10^5.

Admiral Vannoy agreed that Dr. McRae's comments on botulinum but thought this was not the only lethal toxin on the horizon. He thought there were others possibly with greater potential, such as shell-fish poison.

Dr. McRae agreed that we do not expect to get an effective toxoid for shellfish poison and that it was more dangerous than botulinum. It can also probably be produced in significant quantities only synthetically. He thought, however, that masks still provide reasonably good protection.

With regard to chemical incapacitants, he considered they were of limited military utility since a mask can provide reasonably good protection. He cited their effects (high fever, faulty coordination, etc.) and compared them to food poisoning except that they were taken into the body through the nostrils. They take several hours to become effective and their effects last from six to thirty hours depending on the individual and the size of the dose.

Mr. Kissinger asked, since it was agreed that bacteriological weapons were primarily for offense, if toxins could be useful for retaliation.

Capt. Birdt commented that their incubation period was from one to six hours.

Dr. McRae added that, since masks provide good protection against toxins, they would be good primarily for first use.

Mr. Kissinger said that since we have renounced the first use of chemical weapons,[7] we would therefore not use toxins first. We must assume that if the other side uses toxins first, they would have masks; therefore, toxins would not be the most effective retaliatory weapon against toxins.

Dr. McRae agreed.

Admiral Vannoy commented that in the event of leakage a mask would not be as effective against toxins as against some other chemical agents, because the amount of toxin required to be dangerous is less than the amount of a chemical agent.

Mr. Kissinger commented, however, that some chemical weapons can be absorbed through the skin and that therefore masks would have no effect.

Admiral Vannoy replied that anyone using chemical weapons would be wearing decontamination suits.

Dr. McRae agreed that mask leakage would be more serious with toxins than with other chemical agents, adding that it was difficult to operate with masks on for long periods of time. He thought if a military commander faced a choice of retaliating with percutaneous agents or toxins he would use the former.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it would take a smaller dose of toxins than of nerve gas.

Dr. McRae thought toxins would be better than some nerve gas but would not be better than VX for retaliation. He thought a combination of nerve gas and toxins could be best because defending troops would have to be particularly careful of mask leakage and would have to wear bulky decontamination suits.

Mr. Kissinger commented that in the earlier discussion we had covered both chemical and biological agents as first use weapons and as retaliatory weapons. We had decided, with JCS endorsement, that biologicals would not be good as strategic weapons and that nuclear weapons would be preferable. We had agreed that chemical weapons were primarily for battlefield use. He asked if the same were true of toxins. Were they largely a battlefield weapon?

Admiral Vannoy agreed that they were.

Mr. Kissinger asked if, as a battlefield weapon, they would be used essentially in retaliation.

Mr. Smith asked if they could be used against civilian populations as an adjunct to an attack.

Dr. McRae agreed that this would be possible, saying that shell-fish poison would be better than nerve gas. However, we do not know how to produce shellfish poison in mass quantities and would have to be able to produce it chemically.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we would use a toxin if we were going to produce it chemically.

Dr. McRae said a chemically produced toxin would be identical in its chemical structure to that produced by the shellfish. He cited synthetic penicillin which differs from

bacteriologically grown penicillin only in the way it is made. He thought shellfish poison would be a more strategic weapon than nerve gas because a larger area could be covered with a similar dose.

Admiral Vannoy said that we know little about toxins. We had paid very slight attention to toxins when we were working on biological weapons. Because we knew so little, he thought it would not be in our interests to preclude our examination of various systems for possible future employment. He thought toxins may prove to be the best thing we have.

Mr. Kissinger repeated his understanding that while toxins also exist in nature, in fact, they act like chemicals.

Mr. Furnas added that toxins create a disease which is not transmissible.

Dr. McRae said scientists see the only difference between chemical and biological agents to be that biological agents reproduce themselves and chemical agents do not. While some toxins can reproduce themselves, you can get the same human response to a synthesized toxin although it might require twice as much. He said work was now being done in a laboratory in West Berlin on a synthetic toxin which could not be distinguished from a natural product—its chemical structure and the human response to it were exactly the same. He cited alcohol as a toxin because it is a poison, originally produced by a bacteriological process but now easily synthesized. The natural and synthetic products were exactly the same.

Mr. Pedersen asked if the effects of a toxin on the human body were not more analogous to the effects of a biological weapon than a chemical weapon.

Mr. Furnas agreed with the exception that these effects were not transmissible.

Dr. McRae agreed that this was true in bacteriological toxins.

Mr. Kissinger then moved to a discussion of the three options. He asked if anyone saw any other options.

All agreed that they did not.

Mr. Kissinger characterized our present program as including both offensive and defensive R&D: offensive R&D involving the production of agents and including the work on delivery systems with defensive R&D primarily devoted to immunization programs, plus an option to produce and stockpile weapons. We are not now doing this but, under Option I, would not be precluded from it by a Presidential decision.

Admiral Vannoy commented that we have no production facilities for producing in quantity. He said under Option I we would not renounce production but would not

necessarily opt for it.

Mr. Pedersen thought this option should be defined more clearly since he had understood that it would automatically include the production and stockpiling of toxins.

Admiral Vannoy replied that in practice we had no capability for production and stockpiling of toxins.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that this was true now but need not be true in the future.

Mr. Cargo cited the modest size of the stockpile indicated on Page 4 of the basic paper.[8]

Mr. Kissinger noted the 15 lbs of lethal toxins, but said he did not know how potent this would be.

Admiral Vannoy said these stocks were maintained basically for research purposes.

Mr. Kissinger asked about the “toxic bullets”.

Admiral Vannoy replied that those we have are old, are being removed from our stockpile and not being replaced. He noted that such bullets are produced and sold commercially for various uses—e.g., for use in zoos, fired from sporting rifles to kill a dangerous animal. In response to a question from Mr. Kissinger, he said these bullets are produced in civilian life, both in lethal and incapacitating forms.

Mr. Kissinger asked Dr. McRae to find out how many of these bullets are produced commercially and how, and if any controls are exercised either on their production or sale.

Dr. McRae commented that a botulinum toxin was produced commercially because it was necessary to produce the toxin before you could produce the toxoid.

Admiral Vannoy raised the problem of verification and control of such production.

Mr. Kissinger said that if there were substantial civilian production of toxins for whatever purpose, foregoing the military production would not be as significant—nor would it be as convincing to the other side.

He asked if we stay with Option 1 do we not in effect nullify the President’s decision on biological weapons. How could we answer expected arguments?

Mr. Furnas commented that it was very hard to distinguish between the effect of toxins and of biological agents except that the former are not communicable.

Dr. McRae said we were not producing toxins—a chemical—by biological process, would

we not also be building up our biological capability—getting into biological production by the back door. If the President announced that he is using biological laboratories to produce toxins what would be the effect on his decision on biological agents?

Mr. Shakespeare thought it would mitigate the entire effect of the President's statement.

Mr. Pedersen remarked that this then throws you into Option 2.

Mr. Kissinger said that under Option 2 we would not renounce toxins but we would renounce biological production and biological R&D except for defense; we would apply to bacteriological toxins the same criteria as to other biological weapons and would apply to chemically produced toxins the same criteria as to other chemical weapons. In other words, we would make a decision not on the effect of the weapons, but on their origin. The effect of such a decision would not necessarily eliminate toxins but would make the President's earlier decision on biological weapons stand up. Such a decision would be consistent with the earlier biological decision and would not differentiate between different kinds of chemical weapons, i.e., toxins and other chemical weapons.

Mr. Pedersen noted that under Option 2 we would retain the right to produce and stockpile synthetic toxins.

Mr. Kissinger added, however, that we have no present intention to do so.

Mr. Shakespeare referred to CON–6 of Option 2 and the vast PR problems that would be created by this option.[9]

Mr. Kissinger said his problem with Option 3 was that if we eliminated toxins, we would have to go through every weapon in our chemical arsenal to be sure that it does not also occur in a natural form. He asked if the President could not say that we could continue with chemical toxins if they were considered useful (but would not necessarily do so) and could reaffirm our renunciation of the first use of any chemical weapon.

Mr. Pedersen noted that under Option 3, since the only present method of producing toxins is biological, we would be left automatically with only a research program.

Mr. Nutter noted that the biological method might not be the only method of production in the future.

Mr. Kissinger thought that under Option 2 we could say that if chemical methods of production were developed, we could consider the resulting toxins the same as chemical weapons.

Dr. McRae noted that this would permit researchers to produce for R&D purposes but not to stockpile.

Mr. Shakespeare asked once chemical methods of production were developed, what would prevent people from producing by bacteriological methods and saying they were producing by chemical methods.

Mr. Kissinger thought we could close the bacteriological production facilities.

Dr. McRae thought the toxins we would want to produce chemically would be different than those we would want to produce biologically. He said that while Option 2 would permit the elimination of large bacteriological weapon production facilities, factories producing toxins could produce biological weapons.

Mr. Pedersen thought we might revise Option 2 to say that we reserved the right to produce chemically produced toxins.

Mr. Kissinger thought it would be hard to convince anyone that we were not chemically producing toxins if we have a chemical weapons production capability.

Mr. Shakespeare asked how this related to our problems with the Geneva Protocol and the UK Draft Convention.[10] He asked if we would have to oppose the UK.

Mr. Pedersen replied that the British statement in New York would preclude all bacteriological agents for military use. It would bar production of chemical toxins by bacteriological means but would not prevent production by chemical means.

Mr. Furnas said the UK was opposed to toxins but he did not know how they would react to toxins produced by chemical methods. He thought this distinction might stand up legally and ethically but would be hard to defend from an international and a PR point of view.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we would have to say anything about production and stockpiling. Could we just say we are stopping toxin programs? He thought the danger in Option 3 was that it might re-open the entire chemical warfare question. He said he was not convinced of the utility of toxins on military grounds. He noted that when the military had considered various chemical warfare programs it had focussed on other forms of weapons, not on toxins, and it had deployed other chemical weapons overseas. He said although he was not impressed with the arguments on military utility, he did not like to preclude all work on toxins.

Mr. Pedersen commented that although toxins are chemical, they are biological in the public mind.

Mr. Kissinger thought we would be accused of having made a grandstand play on biological weapons, and of now producing something biologically. He noted the President has renounced biological warfare and has retained only defensive R&D with enough offensive R&D to determine the threat and to test our defenses. Why could we not

renounce any weapon which was biologically produced—including toxins? For PR purposes we could make it clear that we have no chemical production capability. If we should acquire a chemical production capability, we would face the PR problem at that time. By this time we might be considering chemical weapons in the context of arms control discussions at which time we could again renounce first use of chemical weapons.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if, under Option 2, we would proceed with a crash program to synthesize toxins.

Mr. Cargo thought that any Presidential decision could require that any production of synthetic toxins would require specific Presidential authorization.

Admiral Vannoy replied to Mr. Shakespeare's question that, for budgetary reasons alone, there would be no crash program to develop synthetic production methods. He said this was not that high on the priority list.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the three options be revised to indicate that under Option 1 we would not necessarily be producing or stockpiling but would be reserving the right to do so, and to include statements of justification for Options 2 or 3 from a PR point of view.

Mr. Pedersen noted with regard to the international aspects of Options 2 and 3 that there was at present a strong drive to eliminate the production and stockpiling of both bacteriological and chemical weapons. When the focus shifts to toxins, everyone will want to ban them also.

Mr. Kissinger said we could certainly agree to consider banning toxins in an international framework but need not ban them unilaterally. He thought no options would be withdrawn from possible arms control negotiations.

Mr. Furnas thought this raised the problem of verification and questioned whether we would be willing to go into an international agreement without adequate verification and inspection.

Mr. Cargo thought that whatever was done would not preclude looking at the decision in the international environment.

Mr. Kissinger thought this was true in the entire range of issues.

Mr. Smith asked if we might break Option 2 into two parts.

Mr. Kissinger thought that under Option 2 we would reaffirm our renunciation of bacteriological warfare; we would renounce production and research in bacteriologically produced weapons, except for defensive purposes; and we would permit R&D on chemical weapons even if the chemical also exists in nature. We would leave the questions of stockpile and production for later decision.

Mr. Smith asked if the first part of Option 2 was not in fact a part of the chemical decision.

Mr. Kissinger thought that the first sentence of Option 2 was stated too positively—it should be rephrased permissively so as to reserve the right of production and stockpiling. He also thought the two sentences of the option should be reversed.

Mr. Cargo suggested that the same thing be done in Option 1.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the public justification for each option be drafted and shown to Mr. Shakespeare.

Mr. Nutter thought this should also include comments on the form in which any announcement should be made.

Mr. Kissinger noted the grave security problems on this item and the need to limit distribution of documents to prevent such things as the recent *New York Times* story.[11]

Mr. Cargo asked if, under Option 3, we limited R&D to defense only, what in fact would we be omitting which could be included under offensive R&D. Would we be precluded from R&D on a chemically produced toxin?

Mr. Kissinger thought we would be giving up the options of production and stockpiling.

Mr. Cargo asked if we would be doing R&D on both bacteriological and chemically produced toxins.

Mr. Kissinger asked why bother with chemically produced toxins if we were interested in defensive R&D only.

Mr. Nutter commented that they might be cheaper.

Dr. McRae noted that if, under Option 3, we were denied the right to produce and stockpile by a Presidential decision, the R&D people would probably not try to synthesize toxins since there would be no possibility of their production, stockpiling or use.

Mr. Cargo asked if we would not need agents for R&D purposes.

Dr. McRae agreed there would have to be some production but it would not be necessary to synthesize.

Mr. Cargo asked if there could not be possible variants between synthetic and naturally produced agents.

Dr. McRae agreed there theoretically could be variants but that naturally produced toxins

would be close enough. He thought the nature of our R&D might be different under Option 3 and the military services might order their priorities somewhat differently.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group Minutes, Originals, 1970. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House.

[2] Document 115.

[3] All such references are to a 22-page paper, January 21, entitled "U.S. Policy on Toxins," prepared by the IPMG in response to NSSM 85. The IPMG paper listed three policy options. Option I was to "carry out offensive and defensive research and development programs and produce and stockpile toxins and associated delivery systems." Option II was defined as follows: "For those toxins which can by synthesized chemically, carry out a program of full research and development, production and stockpiling. For those toxins which require bacteriological intermediates for production, carry out a defensive research and development program only." Finally, Option III was to "carry out a research and development program for defensive purposes only and to protect against technological surprise." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files, Box H–42, Review Group Meeting, January 29, 1970) The IPMG's January 30 paper, revised following the Review Group meeting, is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 177*.

[4] The White House Press Secretary issued a press release on February 14 announcing the administration's policy on toxins. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970)

[5] NSDM 35, Document 104.

[6] See Document 97.

[7] See footnote 10, Document 103.

[8] Page 4 of the January 21 IPMG paper stated that the United States possessed less than 15 pounds of bulk lethal toxins and 100 pounds of incapacitating toxins. These stockpiles were for R&D purposes only and "would provide only a token military capability." Three toxins—botulinum, shellfish poison, and staphylococcal enterotoxin—were considered to have potential military use. The paper also mentioned that the United States' stockpile of "poison bullets" was obsolete and scheduled for destruction.

[9] According to the January 21 IPMG paper, one argument against adopting Option II was that it "could continue the contentions over the existence of possible loopholes in the U.S. renunciation of biological warfare by creating questions as to the significance of differences based solely on the method of manufacture of toxins."

[10] See footnotes 4 and 7, Document 97.

[11] The *New York Times* reported on January 25 that Nixon had received an interagency paper that presented to him three options for retention of toxins in the U.S. chemical-

bacteriological arsenal. The article also contained details of agency differences on the issue and of the discussions in the Review Group.

123. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense[1]

Washington, January 29, 1970.

SUMMARY

Attached[2] are four alternate Safeguard deployments which differ one from the other with respect to the FY 71 authorization. For each the attachment describes: the alternate; the schedule and costs for the portion of the system authorized through FY 71; and the schedule and costs for the full Phase 2 deployment. These alternates are:

Alternate 1, which would authorize in FY 71 the Whiteman and Northwest site complexes and advanced preparation for Northeast, Michigan/Ohio, and the National Capital Area.
Alternate 2, which would authorize in FY 71 the Whiteman and National Capital Area site complexes and advanced preparation for Northwest, Northeast and Michigan/Ohio.
Alternate 3, which would authorize in FY 71 the Whiteman and Warren site complexes and advanced preparation for Northwest, Northeast, Michigan/Ohio, and the National Capital Area.
Alternate 4, which would authorize in FY 71 only the Whiteman site complex and advanced preparation for Northwest, Northeast, Michigan/Ohio, the National Capital Area, and Warren.

Contrast of Characteristics of the Alternates.

a. *Schedule and Costs*. As to schedules and costs, there is no great difference between alternates. Alternate 4, which would authorize in full only Whiteman would require slightly longer for completion of the 12 sites. It would require slightly less FY 71 NOA but the difference is not sufficient to warrant a change in the budget submission already prepared.
b. *Military Objectives*. As to progress made toward the several objectives of Safeguard by the sites fully authorized in FY 71:
   (1) Alternate 1 is relatively balanced in that it emphasizes about equally Minuteman, area and SLBM protection. However, it does not advance the protection of the NCA.
   (2) Alternate 2 advances the Minuteman and NCA protection but gives lesser progress in area and SLBM protection.
   (3) Alternate 3 emphasizes Minuteman protection, gives only small contribution to the area and SLBM protection, and makes no progress on NCA protection.
   (4) Alternate 4 is similar to Alternate 3 but gives lesser progress toward Minuteman protection.
c. *Opposition*. Opposition by those who disapprove of any deployments will probably be about equally severe for all four alternates. Sites in the Minuteman fields will receive significantly less local opposition than would the case for the Northwest and NCA

complexes of Alternates 1 and 2, respectively. (On the other hand, sites in the Minuteman fields using current Safeguard components will probably be attacked publicly by technical critics as being ineffective and expensive protection to Minuteman as compared with other approaches.) Opposition to an NCA site located close to the heavily built-up D. C. area (Alternate 2) will probably be severe, and it might be severe in the case of Northwest (Alternate 1). Overall in severity, the local opposition will probably be most intense for Alternate 2 over the NCA complex, somewhat less for Alternate 1 over the Northwest site, and much less for Alternates 3 and 4 which locate only in the Minuteman fields.

d. *SALT and Other International Considerations*. The four alternates differ in their possible effect on international negotiations, including SALT. (It is assumed in this discussion that whatever alternate is selected will be authorized by Congress.)

(1) Alternate 1, authorizing in FY 71 only Northwest and White-man, indicates a balanced response to the Soviet and Chinese threats. Since it demonstrates a desire to go ahead with an area defense system, it might serve as an incentive to the Soviets to negotiate if they do not want this kind of defense. Also, the initiation of area defense would demonstrate to our Asian allies a U.S. commitment to our nuclear policy in Asia. However, authorizing a first site which only contributes to area defense (Northwest) might be interpreted by critics in Congress as a commitment to an area defense system without allowing an adequate opportunity for SALT to eliminate the need for area defense. This issue would be avoided this year by deferring the request to Congress to authorize the Northwest site (or any other exclusively area defense site).

(2) Alternate 2, authorizing the National Capital Area and White-man complexes, presents balanced defense objectives (Minuteman, National Command Authorities, and some contribution to area defense) and consequently may have the advantage of allowing our negotiations to stress any one of these objectives at will. Also, defense of the National Capital Area can be argued to be similar to the Soviet defense of Moscow. However, the installation near Washington, D.C., might be misinterpreted by the Soviets as a first step toward a heavy urban defense.

(3) Alternate 3, which would authorize only Warren and White-man, would demonstrate to the Soviets our concern about the growing SS–9 and SS–11 threat to Minuteman. Since Warren makes less contribution to area defense than most sites, this alternate does not demonstrate concern for area defense. The emphasis on Minuteman defense could be interpreted by the Soviets as skepticism about the progress of SALT.

(4) Alternate 4, which would add Whiteman alone to the two Phase 1 sites authorized last year, demonstrates our concern about the SS–9 and SS–11 threat, but also might indicate a slowing down of Safeguard. This might be regarded by the Soviets as slowing down deployment in anticipation that SALT would reach a low or zero level ABM agreement and tend to lessen their incentive to negotiate.

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. Secret. On January 29, Packard sent the paper, to be used during the January 30 DPRC meeting, under a covering memorandum to Kissinger, Richardson, Helms, Wheeler, McCracken, Mayo, and Gerard Smith.

[2] Not found.

124. Editorial Note

The Defense Program Review Committee met on January 30, 1970, to discuss alternative Safeguard deployment sites for fiscal year 1971. Attendees included the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Under Secretary of State Richardson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson, Attorney General Mitchell, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith, Science Adviser to the President DuBridge, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler.

President Nixon, according to talking points prepared for Kissinger by the National Security Council Staff, had decided at the NSC meeting of January 23 "to accept the DOD recommendation that we begin construction in FY 71 of additional Safeguard sites as a first step toward the full Phase II system. In making that decision, the President is aware of the need to consider its relationship to SALT. He is determined that the details of the decision—namely which sites to build in FY 71 and the way the decision is presented publicly—be as constructive as possible from the SALT point of view. For that reason, he has deferred final, specific decision on sites for FY 71 construction until a further review of the SALT implications of different possibilities. It is the purpose of this meeting to undertake that review." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, January 30, 1970)

The record of the meeting consists of handwritten notes in an unknown hand. According to the notes, Kissinger began by stating that the "leaks must stop." He also announced that the "President has decided to go ahead with Phase II; area defense is a component of his program. So, issue here is what step for next year in light of strategic needs, SALT. Packard will present alternatives." (Ibid., Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–73) Packard's briefing closely followed the Summary of Safeguard alternatives prepared in the Department of Defense that Packard had distributed on January 29 to DPRC members. See Document 122.

According to the notes from the DPRC meeting, Kissinger, at the conclusion of Packard's briefing, asked if having a site at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, would contribute to area defense.

"Packard: Yes, but it is part of seven-site system. DOD would still say that on balance Alternative 1 is still best from the point of view of keeping up progress on all objectives. The choice is, however, really political and SALT—any one is appropriate from military point of view.

"DuBridge: The real issue is area defense against Chinese, [illegible—Soviet?] subs, or NCA.

“Richardson: The NW site has area value, but it’s also for bombers. Isn’t crucial question from the point of view of SALT and Congress the extent to which we want to rely on Chinese threat rationale? The problem: if you do rely on it and it becomes major subject of debate, then SALT [illegible] is outside Soviet-U.S. relations.

“Kissinger: Only if you assume zero ABM is among acceptable SALT outcomes. We did say that SALT agreement *must* allow enough ABM for China.

“Richardson: But if we say we need area with twelve sites against China and make it forcefully, we cannot go below twelve sites in SALT.

“Kissinger: It puts on a floor. It makes zero level impossible—but that doesn’t mean no agreement with Soviets is possible.

“Richardson: That’s right. It says below Phase II is not negotiable. Once we’re committed to this publicly, we don’t go below it for SALT. The question is whether President wants to accept that inflexibility in negotiations at this point. That raises the question whether [illegible] which one would want to subordinate China defense to get a certain kind of agreement. It just isn’t true and if we commit to Phase II this year you haven’t forced a negotiating position because of what had to be said in selling area defense to China.

“Mitchell: China threat was mentioned last year.

“Richardson: Yes, but no money.

“Kissinger: Every alternative has *some* area implication because each includes site preparation on ‘pure’ area sites. That difference may be pretty slight to public.

“Richardson: It is a question of what emphasis has to be put on China threat in argument.

“Kissinger: If we do area, we eliminate zero ABM. If we want to keep zero ABM open, doesn’t that preclude advance preparation at other area sites?

“Packard: Advance preparation involves site selection and survey, no actual construction on the site. Thus, quite a little difference in what is actually done and in degree of commitment.

“From the point of view of minimal area ABM levels, the area minimum is about Phase II equals 900. Smaller numbers are not much use because you need [double?] number of interceptors at every site to avoid saturation.

“Mitchell: Does government already [plan for a?] Northwest site?

“Packard: Yes, but Senator Jackson says we should do it somewhere else—way up in corner away from Seattle. NCA site, have to find several locations near Washington.

“DuBridge: So, there has to be some survey work on any alternative.

“Mitchell: Isn’t it quite clear that President insists on area defense against China?

“Smith: But he also said anything is negotiable.

“Richardson: We may have to protect President from himself. Make it clear what the implications of the President’s stated position may be.

“Mitchell: It’s not just a matter of his position, but the diplomatic base for it.

“Richardson: If that’s absolutely [fixed?]—there’s a lot to be said for being very clear about committing to area defense. But there are two counter-arguments we may want—and he may want—to go back to and look at the commitment in the future. [Illegible] would in the administration [illegible] enough China defense more than last year. Not yet sure of Soviet position on area defense on China.

“Smith: Soviet Union’s ABM defense [against] China is very much more unmanageable than ours. They didn’t design a system which would give them the defense Phase II would give us.

“Richardson: They may have concluded their only defense against China is deterrence and superiority. If they think they may not want us to have a Phase II because of possibility of thickening against Soviet second strike.

“Smith: Soviets have said would consider Phase II a thick system.

“Richardson: Some we recognize. Soviets may want zero. We have to decide whether President wants to close that option. Second, we should also look closely at the real usefulness of Phase II in Southeast Asia diplomacy. Haven’t done that adequately. The real question whether [illegible] effect on our diplomacy. Building of ABM system will do nothing but accelerate China’s own determination to achieve nuclear capability.”

Richardson then mentioned an article published in the April 1970 issue of *Foreign Affairs* by A. Doak Barnett, a leading China scholar. Barnett argued that China was determined to acquire some nuclear capability as a deterrent against a Soviet or U.S. attack. The United States, by deploying an ABM designed to provide area defense against a Chinese attack, would simply force China to quantitatively and qualitatively improve its nascent nuclear capabilities. Moreover, Barnett wrote, an ABM would only forestall the inevitable: a credible Chinese deterrent, the acquisition of which, he predicted, would actually lead Beijing to sign arms control measures. For the full text of the article, see *Foreign Affairs* (April 1970), pages 427–442.

According to the notes of the meeting, Richardson said that, if Barnett’s predictions came true, the United States would either have to “thicken” Safeguard or “give up effort to

neutralize. The President might want to review this argument about effect of Chinese ABM [illegible] of knowing what, if anything, he could get in terms of SALT by giving it up.

"Packard: As to presidential communication, it is possible [for] us to present ABM case without concerning President. Can keep defense on bombers, etc.

"DuBridge: But the President [illegible] area element clear. The congressional debate focused on Minuteman. Shift to NW would require [illegible] enough on China.

"Packard: Chinese won't accelerate nuclear effort on basis on U.S. actions.

"Richardson: The argument isn't they will move *faster*, but how it affects efforts to achieve accommodation with China. Will spur to out build Phase II as soon as possible. You will have paid a lot of money and maybe SALT for a few years of security against China. The issue is whether it's worth it.

"Kissinger: It might be. Chinese are easier to deal with while we *do* have nuclear superiority.

"Richardson: The argument may be wrong, as you suggest. But it must be made.

"Mitchell: The thrust of your argument is to stick to hard sites.

"Kissinger: President identified three objectives. Should we give up area?

"Richardson: It is not clear. There are five or seven sites which are useful *only* for area defense, not Minuteman or NCA. Once you build one of them, you'd have to dig in so hard on China.

"Johnson: Washington site covers both area and retaliatory force (command and control).

"Kissinger: The scientific community (PSAC) wants to kill ABM: area defense this year; Minuteman later on technical grounds. The scientists I talk to say we can go ahead with Phase I for political reasons. The dedicated system doesn't [illegible] and won't for some time. If we go on with a Minuteman-only plan, we will be attacked for pushing forward on technically weak Safeguard component defense of Minuteman.

"Packard: The scientists want us to upgrade Hawk and say SAM upgrade is impossible! I don't think 3 (two Minuteman) makes any sense. 4 has some area usefulness as well as Minuteman and slows down a bit. The problems in Washington [are?] impossible politically. The real choices are 4 and 1.

"Wheeler: Chiefs have reviewed alternatives. 1 and 2 make military sense. Already supports 1, which [moves?] into area defense. Shouldn't say NW is purely China. Also

SLBMs and bombers.

“As between 1 and 2:1 starts on SLBM, provides hard point defense. Safeguard does not do enough to defend Minuteman. 2 no SLBM until you get NE perimeter acquisition radar. Some additional decision time for NCA.

“Kissinger: How much time?

“Packard: Depends on weight of attack. Option less than thirty minutes against big attack. Time depends on rate of fire.

“Wheeler: JCS come down on 1 or 2 as militarily sensible. 3 and 4 most unattractive because of scientific critics and because Whiteman gives little area help. Choice [between] 1 or 2 is political. More heat from localities on 2 than 1.

“Packard: But we haven’t really looked closely at the importance of this additional 30 minutes for [illegible]. It’s an important factor. Six minutes is so short.

“DuBridge: PSAC’s position is that, for area defense, Phase II will work technologically. No better way. Safeguard isn’t enough for Minuteman defense. More radars are needed. If both objectives are important, go with Phase II. But also go to HPD radars.

“Kissinger: Do they want additional Minuteman defense with Safeguard?

“Packard: Only use for us is its contribution to area defense.

“Kissinger: If President gives up area defense for the time being and goes to 3, Minuteman defense only, we will face very serious technical criticism.

“Unidentified speaker: Argument then a mixed HPD system with small radars plus MSR.

“Packard: I would agree if we’re interested in Minuteman defense only, we shouldn’t push on with Safeguard.

“Mitchell: What do you get from NW on bombers?

“Wheeler: Bombers are now on twenty-nine bases. ‘Many eggs in each basket.’ There are plans, which are rather expensive, for dispersal and movement to the center of country to 76 bases. But B–52 is not optimal plane for such dispersed deployment. Also problem with number of planes you’d [equip] with nuclear weapons. Time for alert bombers to take off is crucial. Area defense buys time.

“Mitchell: How much covered by NW?

“Wheeler: Very small fraction. Real protection must wait for twelve sites.

“Packard: Have never developed bomber-only option.

“Mitchell: How much would Whiteman put you back on HPD?

“Packard: Can’t say. Maybe none because you would want MSR in Minuteman fields to help.

“Mitchell: So, if you go ahead with Whiteman site, no new sources of criticism?

“Kissinger: But there is still *area* at Whiteman.

“Richardson: True, but there is the matter of consistency between this year’s rationale and last year’s. From point of view, it’s better to have something other than area defense against China on which to rely.

“Packard: From point of view, Whiteman can be defended just like last year.

“Smith: How do we conceive Soviets will coordinate an ICBM/SLBM first strike.

“Kissinger: If you assume fire on warning …

“DuBridge: It’s not on warning, but on loss of bombers.

“Wheeler: Loss of bombers is significant. Also, there is the point of view of time for decision. Have to receive reports, get communications in. That’s the reason we in JCS put emphasis on defending the NCA to give time.

“Smith: You’d also be seeing the mass launch. So what is the importance of the bomber loss? Would trade 1,000 Minuteman fired for sure be worth loss of bombers?

“Kissinger: If you want to fire before impact, you know you’re in a war. But we don’t want to fire on warning.

“Smith: Thirty missiles on bombers is not ‘on warning.’

“DuBridge: Plus ICBMs on horizon.

“Kissinger: Your argument is really against the whole bomber rationale.

“Smith: Because it is hopeless to coordinate the problem of taking out bombers first.

“Wheeler: Disarming attack to reduce retaliatory force.

“Smith: But disarming attack by submarines against airfields isn’t sensible.

“Packard: Pindown. [The notetaker added parenthetically that Smith did “not know

answer," which was that "if there is a pindown ABM won't work."]

"Kissinger: Your choice?

"Smith: 2, if I had to pick an additional deployment. If we say in 1970 that we must have a defensive system to operate foreign policy and is a short-term asset. But the life of a defensive system is limited. And the [implication?] on defense in the interim will weaken Asian credibility in our deterrent when area defense doesn't work. Have we put question to Asians? There will be no ABMs in Asia.

"Johnson: Japanese have expressed support for U.S. ABM. Not a definitive view, of course.

"Richardson: There may be real drawbacks to arguing that the credibility of our Asian diplomacy depends on ABM, problems after it doesn't work they want one too.

"Johnson: Yes, our statement, that we need ABM for deterrence will have to convince them.

"Kissinger: Allies' reliance on U.S. deterrent—in Europe or Asia—will erode. In terms of selling 3 makes no sense. 4 has Minuteman defect from scientific point of view, some area defense (though debated).

"Richardson: I like a mixed motivation position.

"Kissinger: NW does have some non-Chinese use: SLBM, accidents. Why do you prefer 2?

"Smith: NCA protection. Matches Soviet system. Protecting command and control is useful.

"DuBridge: Protection of Washington is also useful against China.

"Richardson: Only argument against Washington is political.

"Johnson: Also site problems.

"Schlesinger: Pure area would be NW and NCA. Why?

"Packard: Political problem with NCA. But NW/NCA is possible, but less trouble with Whiteman.

"Kissinger: Isn't MSR problem just as bad with HPD with Washington? Why use SLBMs?

"DuBridge: Chinese could attack Washington. Also very important from the scientific point of view to have enough R&D money for HPD radars. 4 might free some money for that.

“Schlesinger: Should consider NW/NCA heavy commitment to area, no Minuteman problem.

“Packard: But case for the defense of Minuteman is strongest on *need desirability*.

“Kissinger: We will sum up options, dropping 3 [and leaving] 1, 2, 4, plus Smith’s Phase I plus R&D.

“Smith: [Illegible—Information?] study of pros and cons of 1 doesn’t say it puts pressure on Soviets to negotiate unless you are willing to consider zero ABM.

“Kissinger: In *any* deployment, we should *not* rely on China only in order to give flexibility in SALT. Should not now lock into area defense, so we couldn’t put arguments forward. I will sum up pros and cons and circulate to principals before they go to President.

“Richardson: A lot depends on how argument is put.

“Kissinger: After the President [makes his decision?], develop rationale in DPRC.”

In early February, Kissinger attached to an undated memorandum to President Nixon an 8-page list, prepared by the National Security Council Staff, of arguments for and against each Safeguard deployment option. See Document 125 and footnotes 5 and 6 thereto.

125. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Alternative Sites for FY 71 Safeguard ABM Deployment

At the NSC meeting on January 23,[2] you indicated that, while you had decided to accept the Defense Department's recommendation to begin construction in FY 71 of additional Safeguard sites as a step toward the full Phase 2, 12-site system, you wanted to have a further review of the particular sites for actual construction in FY 71.

The Defense Program Review Committee has met to consider alternative deployment options.[3] Although the number of theoretically possible combinations is very large, there appear to be only three plausible alternatives:

—*Whiteman* Air Force Base, Missouri (a Minuteman field) and in the Pacific *Northwest*, with "advanced preparation, "i.e., site selection and survey work for Washington D. C., New England (NE), and Michigan/Ohio (M/O) sites;
—*Whiteman and Washington, D.C.*, to defend the National Command Authority (NCA), with advanced preparation for NE, M/O, and Northwest;
—construction of *Whiteman only*, with advanced preparation of NE, NW, NCA, M/O, and Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming (another Minuteman site).

Each deployment combination would also provide funds for:

—substantial R&D funds for improving the Minuteman defense capability of the system to respond to technical criticisms—mostly about radars—of continued exclusive reliance on Safeguard components for Minuteman defense.

By contrast, no similar technical objections to the Safeguard system used for area defense have been advanced by the President's Science Advisory Committee or the special group of scientists the Defense Department asked to review the ABM program.[4] The technical concept of Safeguard for area defense is sound. (However, judgments about the size of attack the system can defeat, and the likelihood of rapid Chinese development of devices and methods to penetrate the system, differ sharply.)

The alternatives do not differ significantly in costs or completion schedules, and, because Whiteman would be built in each, all offer some increased protection for the Minuteman force.

In addition, ACDA has tried to revive its proposal that there be no additional deployments in FY 71, but that Phase 1's two sites be continued, with heavy funding of R&D on new hard point defense components and an express commitment to resume deployment unless a SALT agreement were reached promptly.

The pros and cons of the alternatives are discussed in detail in the paper at Tab A.[5]

Comments

The ACDA proposal to "leave Phase II in R&D" is completely incompatible with your decision to proceed with additional deployments.

Among the three deployment plans, *Whiteman plus Northwest* is in many respects the best, especially from the point of view of giving strong public emphasis and commitment to area defense against China. However, it appears to be ruled out as a practical possibility, because Senator Jackson, whose support is crucial to Senate approval of the program, strongly opposes having construction of a site in his home state begin in a year in which be must run for re-election.

Of the remaining possibilities, I believe *Whiteman plus Washington, D.C.* (*NCA*) is the better on the merits:

—There is a strong military case for protecting the NCA, which is explained at pages 3–4 of the paper at Tab A.[6]
—If we build the Washington site, we will have a militarily useful installation as soon as it is operational, and there need be no delay in completion of the full area system, providing Defense Department schedules for starting sites in FY 72 and subsequently are adhered to.
—Building the Washington site starts a site which (when adequate radar support is available from sites to the north) will make an important contribution to area defense. On the other hand, unlike the Northwest site, it serves other purposes and so in the debate this year need not be justified primarily by its area defense mission.
—NCA defense is more attractive to ACDA and State from the SALT point of view than the Northwest site because it is not a "pure" area site and can be presented as analogous to the Moscow system.

On the other hand, there are some substantive arguments against defense of the NCA, e.g., that the debate may serve only to call attention to the vulnerability of our command and control long before a defense is operational. More important, although Bryce Harlow believes that congressional opposition to NCA defense would be less than to Northwest, there are political disadvantages to the Washington site:

—Several sites must be found within 10–15 miles of the city, i.e. inside the Beltway, which is likely to set off strong local opposition.

—There may be protests, however irrational, against defending "politicians and generals but not ordinary people."
—Senator Jackson also opposes a Washington site for FY 72 on the ground that it introduces unnecessary complications into the debate.

That leaves the "*Whiteman only*" plan. Such a deployment has significant disadvantages:

—Any program which gives primary emphasis to Minuteman defense will focus attention on the technical criticisms, which could call into question continuing the two Phase I Minuteman sites, as well as starting a new one.
—Whiteman is, like all the other Phase 2 sites, a part of the full 12-site, and also the 7-site "interim," area defense system, but it does not protect the heavily populated parts of the country.
—A deployment limited to one new site might appear to the Soviets to be a backing away from your commitment to expand ABM and might, therefore, cause them to feel less incentive to be serious in the SALT talks.

On the other hand, it is essential that whatever is proposed receive Congressional approval and the "Whiteman only" plan has substantial support:

—Secretary Laird now favors this over the other alternatives.
—Our understanding is that the JCS would prefer to include the NCA or Northwest site along with Whiteman but that, should you choose the Whiteman only option, they would support you in your decision.
—ACDA's position is that, from the SALT point of view, it is better to have the fewest possible new sites and to build sites whose primary purpose is something other than area defense, so they would presumably prefer "Whiteman only" to the other possible new deployment plans.
—State's view is that a deployment program—such as "Whiteman only"—which does not require extremely heavy public emphasis on protection against China is advisable because it maintains flexibility in responding to Soviet initiatives in SALT, with only minimal delays in finishing the entire full anti-China system should we decide to proceed with it in FY 72.
—Senator Jackson favors having the FY 71 construction program focus entirely on Minuteman defense, with construction beginning on the Whiteman site only.

Whatever is proposed must get Congressional approval, and I cannot judge whether for that reason, a minimum deployment, i.e., White-man only, must be accepted for this year.

Whiteman plus Northwest[7]

Whiteman plus NCA

Whiteman only (Secretary Laird's recommendation)

No new deployments[8]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 840, ABM/MIRV, ABM System, Vol. III. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the first page of the original indicates that it was "OBE." Lynn sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a February 6 covering memorandum, recommending that Kissinger send it to the President. A handwritten note on Lynn's covering memorandum indicates that the memorandum was sent to the President on February 7.

[2] See Document 121.

[3] See Document 124.

[4] Kissinger was referring to the report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Ballistic Missile Defense, which raised no objections on technical grounds to using Safeguard for area defense. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–99, DPRC Meeting, January 15, 1970) See footnote 3, Document 117.

[5] Attached but not printed at Tab A is an 8-page paper prepared by the NSC Staff, February 4, entitled "Alternative Sites for FY 71 Safeguard ABM Development." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, January 23, 1970)

[6] The paper gives three military arguments in favor of defending the NCA: 1) "it would greatly reduce the possibility of a 'disorganizing' or 'catalytic' attack by a third country, hoping to set off a U.S. attack on the USSR;" 2) "The Soviets would be forced to launch a very large attack to be sure of destroying the NCA, thus eliminating a potentially attractive less-than-all-out attack option;" 3) "Even against a massive strike, the time for decision (or evacuation) by the President and other senior officials would be extended by some thirty minutes, [...] if submarine missiles were used to attack the capital."

[7] There is no indication on the memorandum that Nixon approved any of the proposed options, but Laird, in his first full military posture statement, asked Congress on February 20 for authorization to proceed with a Modified Phase II Safeguard ABM system. He specifically requested authorization for an ABM site at Whiteman and advanced preparation for five additional sites, including Warren, near Washington, D.C., and unspecified locations in the Northeast, Northwest, and Michigan/Ohio region. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 840, ABM–MIRV, ABM System, Vol. III)

[8] On September 24, a conference of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees limited the administration's plans when it agreed to accept a defense procurement and research authorization bill (P.L. 91–144) that provided for only two additional Safeguard sites—Whiteman and Warren—useful mainly for defending Minuteman bases. (*New York Times*, September 25, 1970, pp. 1, 5)

126. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 6, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 275, Agency Files, PFIAB, Vol. III. Top Secret; Code word. 5 pages not declassified.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Richard Kennedy of the NSC Staff forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a February 10 covering memorandum for Kissinger's review.

127. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM 85)[2]

The NSC Review Group has completed its study of U.S. Policy on Toxins (Tab—Basic Paper).[3] To assist you in your consideration of the issues, I have enclosed a brief background paper.[4]

The study was initiated because of the ambiguity regarding whether toxins were classified as chemical or biological and, therefore, where they were meant to fall under your announced policies for biological research and chemical warfare. This ambiguity flows essentially from the fact that while toxins are chemicals (non-living matter which does not reproduce itself), they currently are produced by biological processes from living organisms. Though their production by chemical synthesis is technically possible, none of military interest has yet been so produced. Moreover, if used, the effects of some toxins would be similar to those of biological agents in the sense that some toxins cause what is commonly described as disease. Toxins, however, do not cause contagious disease which is transmissible from man to man, and are therefore non-epidemic.

There are three options:

OPTION I: Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Produced by Either Biological Processes or Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option is an offensive, as well as defensive, research and development program for toxins, produced by either method, and for related delivery systems/weapons.)

—This option would retain (1) a capability to achieve significant logistic advantage or large area coverage in either a lethal or incapacitating role, (2) maximum flexibility to develop a variety of toxins which may have military utility, (3) the most promising current potential to achieve an incapacitating capability (staphylococcal enterotoxin—produced by biological processes), and possibly (4) a bargaining lever for future arms control discussions.

—But this policy could be used as basis for charging the U.S. with preparation for biological warfare. Production of toxins by biological processes would cast doubt on the significance and credibility of the U.S. renunciation of biological warfare and cause domestic political problems associated with production, storage, transportation and testing. Moreover, any use of toxins could be used as justification by others for

employing biological agents against U.S. forces. Also, our interpretation of the U.K. Draft Convention on biological warfare would differ from that of the U.K. itself if we take the position that the production of toxins by bacteriological/biological processes is permitted, and Senate ratification proceedings on the Geneva Protocol would be more complicated.[5]

OPTION II: Renounce the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Which are Produced by Biological Processes. Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Only Those Toxins Produced by Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are: (1) a defensive research and development program only for biologically-produced toxins; and (2) offensive, as well as defensive, research and development programs for the development of chemically-synthesized toxins and related delivery system/weapons.)

—This option would leave open the development of a toxin capability by chemical synthesis thereby retaining the advantages of flexibility and relative logistics simplicity of *Option 1* if synthesis is accomplished. Moreover, it (1) would not require modification of the U.K. Draft Convention and (2) would remove a basis for claiming that we were acting inconsistently with the November 25th announcement on biological programs.[6]

—*But*, it would tend to limit future capabilities to lethal toxins more amenable to synthesis than is the only known incapacitating toxin. It also would deny toxins to the U.S. for at least 3–5 years while chemical production methods are developed. Since the end product is identical regardless of production method, it also might be seen as a loophole in the renunciation of a biological warfare program based solely on the method of manufacture. It might complicate future arms control measures and verification (a country could produce toxins biologically and claim they were chemically synthesized).

OPTION III: Renounce the Use, and Hence the Development and Stockpiling, of Weapons Systems Using Toxins Produced Either by Chemical Synthesis or Biological Processes. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are only defensive research and development programs for all toxins with the purposes of assuring adequate defensive measures and of protecting against technological surprise.)

—This option would provide necessary defensive measures and protect against technological surprise. It also would (1) eliminate questions as to the significance and credibility of the U.S. policy on biological methods of warfare and research, (2) put us in the best position to ratify the Geneva Protocol with the type of reservation most closely corresponding to our policy on chemical warfare and biological research, (3) enable us to accept the U.K. position on the U.K. Draft Convention, and (4) be received favorably in public discussion avoiding any appearance of loopholes in U.S. policy on biological research;

—*But*, it would foreclose development of a weapons system which may have military utility and could place us at a disadvantage if other countries had toxin programs without similar restrictions. Moreover, it could expose us to a challenge as to why we are willing to unilaterally renounce one class of chemical agents but not others.

Unilateral renunciation of this class of chemicals could weaken our case for insisting on adequate verification of arms control agreements involving chemicals.

Agency positions and comments on the Review Group paper are enclosed and tabbed.[7]

Under Secretary of State Richardson and Ambassador Smith both favor Option III on the grounds that (1) the need for a retaliatory toxin capability in addition to current and planned chemical capabilities is highly questionable and (2) the international and domestic political costs of retaining the option to retaliate with toxins will be high. Both believe that preserving an option to retaliate with toxins (*Option I or Option II*) would (1) detract from the favorable impact of your November 25th announcement on U.S. chemical warfare and biological research policy, (2) make more difficult the winning of international support for the U.K. Draft Convention, and (3) complicate efforts to gain Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Both also believe that there is some risk that indication of U.S. interests in toxins could stimulate further interest in them by other countries. Ambassador Smith does not believe that renunciation of chemically synthesized toxins would affect our ability to insist on treating biological methods of warfare separately from chemical warfare in arms control negotiations or impair our ability to insist on verification requirements we deem necessary.

Dr. DuBridge favors Option II. He believes that it implements your announced policy on biological research. At the same time he notes that it would permit development of additional capabilities through chemical synthesis of toxins, and avoid introducing ambiguities into what was and was not allowable in the chemical field.

Mr. Shakespeare prefers Option III on the ground that it would be the clearest follow-through of your November 25th announcement and thus be most acceptable to the public at home and abroad.

I recommend that you approve Option II renouncing biologically produced toxins and confining U.S. programs involving them to research and development for defensive purposes only but reserving the option to produce chemically synthesized toxins. In so doing your renunciation of biological means of warfare will be reinforced and ambiguities in our position which could arise from biological production processes for toxins will be eliminated. We can continue to support the principles of the U.K. Draft Convention as you announced on November 25th. Though we will be questioned in the Geneva Protocol ratification proceedings, our position on chemically synthesized toxins will be the same as that for all chemical weapons and the reservations we will take need not be modified further. I believe it important to reserve the option for chemically synthesized toxins for two reasons. The field is new and we do not know where research will take us. I am not convinced that toxins will have significant military utility. But until we know what the potential is, we should not unilaterally foreclose development of what may be a useful weapon system. Moreover, toxins are chemicals however they are produced. If we unilaterally forego the research and possible future production of chemically synthesized

toxins we increase the risk that our entire retaliatory chemical program will come under attack. If we are willing to renounce one chemical weapon produced by chemical means, the argument will run, why should we not renounce all chemical weapons. I do not believe that we should run this risk.

I have enclosed a draft NSDM[8] and draft public statement[9] which give effect to a policy based upon Option II of the Review Group paper which I recommend you approve.

Draft NSDM

Approve[10]

Disapprove

See Me

Draft Public Statement

Approve

Disapprove

See Me

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Richard Kennedy of the NSC Staff forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a February 10 covering memorandum for Kissinger's review.

[2] Document 115.

[3] On January 30, the IPMG submitted the 27-page study, revised by the Review Group during its January 29 meeting (see Document 122). Part I of the study consisted of background discussion regarding toxins. Part II dealt with policy issues and program options, which Kissinger summarized for the President in this memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–168, NSSM 85) The study is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 177.

[4] Enclosed in Nixon's briefing materials was an undated background paper, entitled "Policy on Toxins," prepared by the NSC Staff. The 4-page paper summarized the methods of producing toxins, current U.S. capabilities, the military uses of toxins, and related political and arms control issues. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970)

[5] See footnotes 4 and 7, Document 97. The administration was preparing to submit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification, which President Nixon did on August

19. Documentation is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972.

[6] See foonote 10, Document 103.

[7] Several agencies submitted recommendations for future U.S. policy with respect to toxins, including the Department of State, ACDA, OST, and USIA. The recommendations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–168, NSSM 85; and ibid., Box H–26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970. Moorer, in an undated memorandum to Laird, recommended Option I. Packard recommended Option II in a memorandum to Kissinger, February 12. (Both in Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 3, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research)

[8] Printed as approved as Document 128.

[9] The White House Press Secretary issued this press release on February 14 announcing the administration's policy on toxins. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970) For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 189.

[10] The President initialed his approval of the NSDM and the draft statement. Written in an unknown hand above Nixon's initials is "Option III," suggesting that the President actually approved that option, the renunciation of the use, development, and stockpiling of toxins produced either by biological processes or chemical synthesis.

128. National Security Decision Memorandum 44[1]

Washington, February 20, 1970.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT

United States Policy on Toxins

Following a review of United States military programs for toxins,[2] the President has decided that:

1. The United States will renounce the production for operational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins produced either by bacteriological or biological processes or by chemical synthesis.
2. The United States military program for toxins will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes only.
3. The Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations concerning the disposal of existing stocks of toxin weapons and/or agents. These recommendations should accompany the recommendations pursuant to National Security Decision Memorandum 35[3] regarding the disposal of bacteriological/biological weapons.
4. The Under Secretaries Committee's annual review of United States chemical warfare programs and public information policy, as directed by National Security Decision Memorandum 35, will include review of United States military toxins programs.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

[2] See Document 122.

[3] Document 104.

129. Study Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

VOLUME I. SUMMARY

PART I. CONCEPT OF LIMITED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR

Section A. Introduction

1. (U) In that this report addresses basic issues of US strategy, it is appropriate to review briefly the evolution of nuclear power relationships, resultant strategies and limitations, and the effects on forces.

[Omitted here is Part I, Section A.2, which recapitulates the history of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.]

3. (TS) US/USSR Strategic Military Power Relationship—Present

The United States and the USSR are considered to be at parity in megatonnage in strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and Soviet forces are projected over the next decade to increase significantly above those of the United States in both strategic delivery vehicles and in mega-tonnage. Programmed US strategic warhead inventory will continue to exceed the projected Soviet inventory, but this should be considered in relation to the greater Soviet megatonnage and probable increase in BMD for Soviet urban areas. The US force mix is intended to provide assured survival, in any circumstances, of sufficient forces for a second strike to destroy the Soviet urban-industrial base. US strategic defensive forces are postured largely as protection against bomber attacks on urban-industrial (U/I) areas. Current and projected Soviet strategic defense forces are several times larger than comparable US forces. In a vigorous strategic offensive force buildup, the Soviets are emphasizing survivability by deploying SLBMs, and by constructing hard silos. Recent developments in Soviet ICBM weaponry indicate they may be seeking a capability for an effective first strike on US retaliatory forces. In summary, while the United States has an assured destruction capability, its damage-limiting capability in offensive and defensive forces is limited and may be expected to decrease.

Section B. Assured Destruction

1. (TS) Credibility

Under a strategy in which the concept of assured destruction is emphasized, deterrence is based on the threat of immediate and massive countervalue attack in response to a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. Further, according to US declaratory policy, a large-

scale Soviet nuclear attack on Europe could bring full US retaliation upon the Soviet homeland.

a. In the current strategic power relationship, a strategy which has as its major element the assured destruction concept may not be completely adequate for all circumstances. While the assured destruction capability makes a large-scale Soviet attack against the US unlikely, there is less assurance that it would deter a limited strategic nuclear attack against the United States. The Soviets could launch such a limited strategic nuclear attack, while reserving forces sufficient to destroy the United States, in the belief that the United States would be deterred from a massive countervalue response by fear of the ultimate consequences. Destruction in the United States which could follow might be considered a worse choice than accepting the conditions imposed by the initial Soviet attack.
b. Limitations in the credibility of assured destruction as the major element of our strategy would apply, in even greater measure, to the credibility of US nuclear strategy in support of allies. For example, NATO nuclear response to an all-out conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact has been credible because it was backed by the threat of employment of US strategic nuclear forces. If, in the assumed strategic relationship of assured destruction, it would appear irrational for the United States to strike massively with US strategic nuclear forces to protect allies because of the risk of very high levels of damage to the United States by the Soviets, the US assured destruction capability may no longer be credible in those circumstances.
c. *Risks*. The Soviets may infer from the changed strategic balance that the United States would be deterred from escalating to strategic nuclear war in response to a limited nuclear attack by the Soviets, either against the United States or its allies. They may infer that the US declaratory assured destruction policy is not credible in these situations and that they can employ their forces in conventional or limited nuclear attacks to gain limited objectives with acceptable risk.

Section C. Limited Strategic Nuclear War

1. (S) Introduction

The further development of the concept portion of this report is based on the assumptions that the possibility of limited strategic nuclear war is inherent in the strategic relationships as discussed above; and that to evaluate further concepts and capabilities for limited strategic nuclear warfare, limitations, employment constraints, objectives, deterrence criteria, and attack/response options should be developed.

2. (TS) Concept for Limited Strategic Nuclear War

a. The evolving problems discussed in the foregoing sections illustrate the need to reevaluate US strategic alternatives. While the assured destruction concept is an important component of national military strategy, it is only a part of the entire

structure. Because our nuclear retaliatory capability in the past has deferred a broad range of opponent actions, there is a tendency to persist in attributing to it and its assured destruction component a wider deterrent role than it may be able to perform. Other possibilities, options, and forces must be evaluated. US strategy and capabilities should provide clear and considered alternatives between accepting conditions which could be imposed by a deliberate, limited strategic nuclear attack by the Soviets, or immediately escalating to execution of the SIOP. In a relationship of mutual deterrence, the United States should develop options which have as their objective the reduction of risks and instability which exist for the lower levels of nuclear war.

b. *Relationship Between Objectives and Conflict Control*. Attacks in limited strategic nuclear war should be conceived and executed to achieve specific strategic objectives, including political objectives. These objectives should be designed to deter further conflict while achieving national security objectives. A US military objective in any war is to insure an advantageous position for the United States upon war termination. In limited strategic nuclear war, it must be recognized that without restraint this objective of gaining advantage could become self-defeating to deterrence of escalation, which is another objective implicit in the limited strategic nuclear war concept. For this reason, plus others in the following discussions of limitations and constraints, there is an overriding requirement for close control of the conflict in limited strategic nuclear war by the national command authorities (NCA). Control would become a principal feature of limited strategic nuclear war.

3. (TS) Limitations on Limited Strategic Nuclear War

Limitations discussed here primarily concern the political obstacles to changes or modifications of nuclear strategy which are designed to increase war-waging capability. The current capability of the NCA to retain effective control of a conflict is also addressed.

a. *Domestic Political Limitations*. The United States may face problems in implementing a capability for limited strategic nuclear war, even as a complement to assured destruction. To lend stability in the face of public pressures, Americans would need to be assured that the capability to conduct limited nuclear war would help deter the outbreak of such conflicts, and in the event deterrence should fail, that such a capability would increase the likelihood of terminating the conflict short of general war. To attain an effective capability, strategic defense improvements would be required and military spending for strategic forces might increase. These issues may lead to temporizing and to strategic force programming stretch-outs.

b. *International Political Limitations*

(1) In projecting a concept for limited strategic nuclear war there is a risk that we may incorrectly assume that the opponent will adopt a like strategy and force posture with like objectives.

(2) An immediate international political consideration is how the United States could reconcile advocating a capability to wage limited strategic nuclear war with the traditional US policy of limiting the possession and possible use of nuclear weapons.

The effect of US advocacy that limited strategic nuclear war is a feasible and necessary option would be unpredictable.

(3) Acceptance of the concept by allies would be problematical. Would they insist on agreement on strikes? Could the United States conduct strikes unilaterally while achieving objectives and maintaining control? Can control of such a conflict be successfully retained between two parties only? Should US strategic force employment be decoupled from theater forces and theater threats? What would be the relationship of US concept for limited strategic nuclear war to British and French nuclear forces?

(4) In paragraphs (2) and (3) above are some international political considerations which are outside the scope of this study. They appear to be issues which must be resolved in the process of determining the validity of the concept for limited strategic nuclear war.

c. *Command and Control by the NCA*. The physical effects of nuclear war may place severe limitations on the capability of the NCA for functions such as directing strategic forces employment, and obtaining timely and accurate information on both the US and Soviet strategic potential. A reliable capability to communicate with the opponent would be highly desirable. Accurate assessment of opponents' reactions, capabilities and options would be necessary.

4. (TS) Considerations and Constraints

There are considerations and constraints which are likely to influence force employment in limited strategic nuclear war. They can be broadly classed as control and planning.

a. *Control*. Control is directly related to the objective of limiting the conflict at the lowest possible level.

(1) For example, in selecting targets and the type of delivery vehicle, the possible and expected reactions of the opponent must be weighed as a constraint. In this sense, attacks on command and control or damaging attacks on urban defenses could result in attack escalation. The ability of the opponent to perceive the actual origin, scale, and intended objective, is an uncertainty. If warning or attack assessment systems were saturated or otherwise disabled, the level of conflict might exceed that desired by either side.

(2) Another control constraint is the capability for damage assessment. The critical need for timely intelligence in limited strategic nuclear war makes reconnaissance information and the supporting communications net to the NCA essential for attack planning. Furthermore, reconnaissance employment constraints must be considered such as penetration capability through undegraded defenses, ability to cover all desired targets with the level of detail required, and the tradeoff in time responsiveness versus level of detail.

b. *Planning*

(1) To demonstrate resolve and capability, success of strikes in limited strategic nuclear war is extremely important. This would place constraints on selecting attack

objectives, types of targets, delivery vehicles, and numbers of warheads.

(2) Weapons resources must be controlled during the conflict to ensure forces are available to provide for a credible deterrent at higher levels of conflict and to maintain the essential integrity of the assured destruction capability, while achieving the immediate objectives in limited strategic nuclear war. The broad range of options available and the selective employment of forces could cause overextension of weapon resources introducing the possibility of degradation of SIOP effectiveness. Should the targets selected for attack in a limited strategic nuclear war, particularly at the lower levels, be covered within the SIOP, this degradation would be minimized.

(3) Related to the foregoing consideration are the ability to predict or assess the relative balance in residual strategic potential at any point during nuclear exchanges and the relative strategic position of either side in war outcomes measures. A constraining factor would be the ability to identify the decision point in limited strategic nuclear war when further expenditure of forces would critically degrade the remaining capability of strategic forces.

(4) Collateral damage should be minimized because of the unpredictable perception of attack objectives by the opponent which might result from unintended gross effects such as collateral casualties. This would impose constraints in selection of delivery vehicles and targets so as to achieve desired effects as precisely as possible.

(5) Additional constraints are the requirements for delivery precision and probability of success of each attack attempted.

5. (TS) Force Implications in Limited Strategic Nuclear War

The constraints in control, attack precision, and probability of success indicate that an optimum capability for limited strategic nuclear war would require concepts and forces that go beyond current criteria for strategic forces. What would appear to be required is a US advantage in exploitable, usable military power, i.e., military forces that can survive and be committed to action across a full range of attack options. This would require a range of forces, weapons, and associated command and control, usable for controlled, selective, and discriminating attacks.

Section D. Objectives in Limited Strategic Nuclear War

1. (TS) The foregoing discussions suggest that an essential characteristic of limited strategic nuclear war is the close relationship between military actions and political objectives. Military actions would be paced by diplomatic and political events—their effectiveness being related to roles of allies, international and domestic opinion, and national objectives. These operations would require the coordination of military plans and action with political and diplomatic effort to achieve a set of objectives far broader than strictly military ones. These coordinated activities must seek to reduce the opponent's perceived national interest in the crisis versus the risks and possible losses. At the same time they must increase his awareness of the depth of US interest and US commitment to employ military force. They must seek, where possible, to gain

domestic and international support for US action and to develop such pressures against the opponent. They must seek to insure for the United States, and to deny to the opponent critical military support from other nations. They must emphasize to the opponent his vulnerability to US operations and that continuing hostilities will be increasingly to his disadvantage. They must communicate to the opponent what the United States desires him to do while signalling both the intent to limit actions and the readiness to terminate on reasonable terms. Finally, they must consider the long-term effects of a limited strategic nuclear war on the United States as a world power.

2. (TS) To achieve these objectives implies, on the military side, the discriminate and controlled application of force to communicate clearly demands and intentions and to achieve precisely specified effects—effects reflecting and supporting the objectives of the national authority.
3. (TS) Stated in broad terms, the military objectives would be: to deter limited strategic nuclear attacks on the United States; if deterrence fails, to defend against such attacks and to respond by coupling limited strategic nuclear attacks to support political objectives and maintain relative advantage; to limit damage to the United States and allies, and to terminate hostilities at the lowest possible level under conditions advantageous to the United States.

Section E. Deterrence in Limited Strategic Nucler War

1. (TS) Introduction

a. The focus thus far has been upon the needs to which our overall US strategy must respond in changing world strategic relationships and upon the role of a broadened nuclear capability within that larger framework. The question arises: how should such a capability be constructed and in what ways should the US nuclear policy be adjusted if we are to satisfy those needs? New criteria for deterrence in the limited strategic nuclear war context are indicated.
b. General war has been deterred by the prospect of broad devastation of the entire homeland of the United States or the USSR which would result from massive nuclear attacks. The measures of effectiveness of such attacks and the basis for deterrence has been damage to the urban-industrial base of each nation. Deterrence has been viewed as a preinitiation condition and as having little relevance after execution. However, for limited strategic nuclear war, a full range of factors which affect deterrence should be considered before and during the course of the conflict.

2. (S) Deterrence Criteria

a. The Soviet Union could be deterred from a contemplated limited strategic nuclear attack on the United States by a single influence or combination of influences sufficient to make the expected consequences of the attack disadvantageous. These deterrent influences can be grouped as follows:
(1) *Those Which Decrease the Incentive to Attack*. One measure which the United

States could take is to avoid confronting the Soviets with a situation in which limited strategic nuclear attacks would appear appropriate and instrumental for achieving some objective. A related measure is to avoid postures and force dispositions which appear to the Soviets as extremely threatening or particularly vulnerable.

(2) *Defense Military Influences*. ASW, missile, and air defense, depending on their size and effectiveness and extent of deployment, could deny or limit the prospect of success in limited strategic nuclear attack or create substantial uncertainty as to whether specific targets could actually be hit. Depending on the scope of attack, the Soviets might anticipate substantial losses of attacking vehicles to achieve attack objectives with any degree of certainty. If the forces required could be seen as disproportionately large relative to the overall strategic resources or potential gain, Soviet leaders might be deterred from such an attack. Effective defenses against both bombers and missiles would appear to be especially appropriate for defeating a limited attack because the defense would not be complicated or degraded by the conditions likely to exist in strategic nuclear war. While it is unlikely that defenses could prevent the Soviets from attacking certain targets, defenses could provide for preferential protection of those targets having the greatest political or military significance. Awareness of the difficulty and cost of attacking such targets would help deter the Soviets.

(3) *Offense Military Influences*. Offensive capabilities provide the basis for deterrence in its most familiar form—the threat of retaliation by inflicting unacceptable damage. This damage may be inflicted on countervalue targets or it may be directed against military forces. The threat of military losses adds to deterrence, e.g., the prospect that the surviving military balance may not favor the aggressor; the prospect of the loss of military forces essential to national independence and survival. Finally, there is the prospect that the defender's retaliatory counterforce attacks may reduce the aggressor's remaining offensive forces sufficiently to prevent or make highly uncertain the attainment of future objectives. Also, highly survivable offensive systems not only contribute to deterrence but also greatly reduce the incentive for and likelihood of small attacks aimed at eroding US retaliatory capability. Probably the most pervasive deterrent to nuclear attack of any scope is the prospect that it would lead to some form of offensive retaliation and carries the risk of escalation to general war. Whatever gains might have been sought by the initial attack would be far outweighed by the resultant losses.

(4) *Other Military Influences*. Given a gross comparability of parity in numbers between opposing strategic forces, what would be required to deter limited nuclear attacks is a qualitative superiority on the part of the United States in terms of technological improvements in existing systems and in the long term, development of improved weapons systems. Foreknowledge on the part of the Soviet leaders of the qualitative superiority of US forces across a full range of limited nuclear operations would most likely deter the USSR from initiating a limited attack.

b. *Summary of Deterrence Criteria*. The foregoing discussion suggests that the following criteria for strategy, force development, and force posture would contribute to

deterrence of limited strategic nuclear or disarming attacks. The United States should:

(1) Maintain a qualitative superiority in offensive and defensive capabilities so that Soviet leaders will believe that US forces would be more effective than Soviet forces and more efficient in achieving objectives in any limited strategic nuclear conflict.

(2) Maintain command and control systems to permit the controlled and flexible employment of forces in limited strategic nuclear war and to limit the possibilities for uncontrolled escalation.

(3) Make it clear to the Soviet leaders that any limited strategic nuclear attack would result in US reaction with its strategic forces which would be relatively disadvantageous to the USSR.

(4) Avoid emphasizing force compositions, postures, and dispositions which appear to the Soviets as first-strike oriented or which are vulnerable to limited strategic nuclear operations.

(5) Maintain forces of such a quality and quantity that the Soviets could never calculate, with any reasonable degree of certainty, that a limited strategic nuclear attack on the United States or our allies would lead to an outcome favorable to the USSR.

3. (TS) Stability

a. Development of a capability to support a limited strategic nuclear war strategy would probably be apparent to the Soviets. It raises the question as to whether any improvements would be destabilizing. The question cannot be answered with assurance and arguments can be made on both sides.

b. Major force improvements could be considered as destabilizing. However, the same arguments do not necessarily hold for improvements in command and control.

c. Soviet force improvements indicate an increasing counterforce capability, whereas US defenses and capability for damage-limiting counterforce strikes are limited. This disparity between the United States and Soviets is increasing and is destabilizing. US development of a capability for limited strategic nuclear war across a range of options could tend to counter this disparity.

d. It would be unacceptable to place the United States in a position where there is a serious possibility of a successful Soviet disarming attack, where the United States would have no credible response, and where the United States might have to accept conditions imposed by the Soviets. The possibility of such a situation could be minimized by appropriate force postures and measures to reduce vulnerability to disarming attacks by the Soviets.

Section F. Attack/Response Options

1. (TS) Strategic Significance of Levels of Attack

a. Nuclear capable forces employed could be considered as a measure of the level of attack. However, such a measure may be misleading in that the most important factor

is determining the objective of the attack.

b. Further, the use of nuclear weapons is most likely to achieve decisive results when some level of military effectiveness is achieved. Use at some lower level is least likely to be conclusive, and may be wasteful of resources. Economy in force employment is an important military consideration in selecting targets and establishing targeting objectives in limited strategic nuclear war.

c. Because the ultimate goal in warfare is political, demonstration attacks to indicate resolve or to warn may have a place as a strategic option. However, these are excluded from detailed analysis in this study as not being either measurable or militarily significant in determining US capabilities.

d. There is a requirement for small scale attacks to provide some economical return in damage achieved. Conversely, if large numbers of weapons were employed in response to a small scale attack, the attacker risks misinterpretation and escalation. This risk of escalation is the principal argument for keeping attacks at a low level.

e. An objective is to limit attacks to low numbers of weapons, while retaining the capability to advance to higher levels of attack. Thus, the concept of limited strategic nuclear war implies a war-fighting strategy with the capability of employing forces incrementally. Because US strategic offensive forces and associated command and control have been designed for massive attacks, incremental employment of forces introduces additional requirements for endurance of force command and control.

f. For pragmatic reasons, maximum deterrence would rest on US strategic capabilities for absorbing and applying a full range of limited strategic nuclear attacks, including major disarming attacks. Consequently, this analysis emphasized attack/response options in which military objectives are foremost, with major emphasis on militarily significant counterforce attacks.[2]

2. (TS) Counterforce Strikes

a. Counterforce attacks as discussed in this paragraph are attacks on targets which are a direct nuclear threat—primarily strategic offensive weapons systems including controls and weapons storage.

b. Noting the previous discussion of the credibility of assured destruction, large Soviet counterforce attacks may not be deterred. Projected Soviet force developments could be evidence of a move toward a counterforce first strike capability with favorable exchange ratios. The possibility of a Soviet counterforce attack at some level to gain relative strategic advantage over the United States must be considered in US strategic planning.

c. To accomplish US objectives in response to a counterforce attack, response in kind might be appropriate. A counterforce response may be preferred because it should not inflict high casualties and damage to nonmilitary resources. Such nonmilitary losses might strengthen the opponent's resolve and risks escalation to general war. Because of this, counterforce attacks might be more politically acceptable than countervalue attacks and therefore would be a credible option in limited strategic nuclear war.

3. (TS) Nuclear Strikes Against Other Military Targets (omt)

OMT includes all military assets except strategic forces, their controls and nuclear storage sites. OMT should be targeted to the extent possible considering political objectives and the competing military objectives of counterforce and countervalue. Targeting OMT may have value by itself in some circumstances. If the United States can gain no advantage in strategic counterforce or countervalue attacks, consideration should be given to OMT as appropriate targets to gain or maintain relative advantage.

4. (TS) Countervalue Strike

a. Countervalue attacks are an option in limited strategic nuclear war. Attacks on certain war-supporting resources, while minimizing collateral fatalities, would exact a high price and could give some assurance of preventing escalation. However, city attacks as such might be undesirable in countervalue targeting in limited strategic nuclear war because of long-term political and psychological effects and the probability of escalation.
b. In view of the above, this study has not treated countervalue attacks in which high civilian casualties were a likely result.

[Omitted here are 32 pages comprising Part II, “Information, Decision, and Control;” Part III, “Capabilities of Programmed Forces;” and Part IV, “Force Capabilities Requiring Improvement.”]

PART V. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

Section A. Significant Findings

1. (TS) Capability to Deter and Respond

Through the 1970s, the US capability to deter or respond to a limited strategic nuclear war becomes less credible. In general, military objectives of achieving relative advantage are not attainable and the United States is unable to control or force termination of conflict. The US ability to deter is directly related to our ability to respond. Further, the US command and control structure was not designed for timely and flexible response in limited strategic nuclear attacks on a large scale.

2. (TS) Capabilities for Conducting Limited Strategic Nuclear War

The United States possesses a good capability to execute a pre-planned attack, but does not have an adequate capability to control forces in multi-exchanges. This inadequate capability is the major limiting factor in conducting this type warfare.

3. (TS) Survivability of Command and Control

Vulnerability to nuclear attack is the primary limitation on the capability of our command and control systems. Existing command and control systems, which were designed for preattack and for support of SIOP cannot be relied upon for continuing effectiveness in multi-exchange limited strategic nuclear war.

4. (TS) Information

The gathering and employment of timely, accurate, and reliable intelligence are vital to the successful conduct of limited strategic nuclear war. Timely knowledge of the condition and location of targets and defenses is required. In addition to the more common prestrike intelligence requirements, selective and efficient employment of forces requires continuing damage assessment of strikes by the United States and the Soviet Union.

5. (TS) Target Categories

There are selective Soviet and US target categories which can be attacked which result in relatively few urban casualties. Targets may be selected for attack to achieve either political or military objectives.

6. (TS) Defenses

Currently the Soviets have a defensive advantage over the United States. Ballistic missile and air defenses can have a significant impact on limited strategic nuclear war and on the selection of the optimum system for a particular attack. In addition to limiting damage, defenses require the offense to attack to a proportionate level to insure attainment of desired objectives. The magnitude of the attack against defended targets is subject to misinterpretation and risks escalatory reaction. The US position could be improved if strategic defensive forces included a mix of complementary and mutually supporting defenses in-depth.

7. (TS) Alert Rates

Alert bombers and submarines tend to prevent the initiator of a counterforce strike from gaining a decisive advantage. The survivability of these alert forces tends to lend stability in a crisis and helps to preserve an assured destruction capability, thereby reducing the likelihood of war. There is little margin for improving alert/non-alert ratios of programmed forces over a sustained period.

8. (TS) Bomber Hard Target Kill

In our missile force, neither current nor programmed reentry systems have the desirable CEP-yield combination for effective employment against hard targets. An arriving bomber is presently the most effective hard target killer in our strategic arsenal. Current and programmed bomber weapons with relatively low CEP and high yield are very effective

against targets such as nuclear storage sites and missile silos. In some circumstances, the time sensitivity of certain targets such as missile silos may militate against employment of the bomber.

9. (TS) Mobility Concept

Mobile forces tend to prevent the initiator of a counterforce strike from gaining a decisive advantage. The relative immunity of these forces to disarming attacks enhances stability and could improve force potential.

10. (TS) Force Improvements

Qualitative and quantitative improvement in programmed forces can be made which would enhance their capabilities in limited strategic nuclear war. Further improvements in force capabilities, especially command and control, can be achieved by addition of redesigned or new systems.

Section B. Observations

1. (TS) Advantage After an Initial Attack

At the end of an initial disarming attack, the side attacked may deduce that it has superior offensive forces remaining. In this event, it is possible to conceive a situation in which the side attacked may perceive an advantage in refraining from a response and attempting to negotiate war termination from a position of presumed relative strength.

2. (TS) Survivability of Presidential Authority

Although survivable command centers can be available to the Presidential authority, the broader problem of insuring survivability of Presidential Authority must be addressed at the highest levels.

PART VI. ISSUES FOR DECISION

Section A. Fundamental Issues

There are two fundamental issues identified by the NSSM 64 study. The first is whether the concept of limited strategic nuclear war is valid in light of the present and projected strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The second is whether the United States should develop a credible capability for engaging in limited strategic nuclear war.

Section B. Validity of the Concept

1. (TS) Questions for Consideration

a. When debating the validity of the concept of limited strategic nuclear war, there are questions which should be considered. Some of these are:
   (1) What evidence is there that the Soviets might be considering limited strategic nuclear war as a viable option?
   (2) If a US capability were developed, what impact would this have on the credibility of SIOP and the assured destruction capability?
   (3) Is the ability to conduct limited strategic nuclear war capable of being countered by an opponent developing a similar strategy and capability?
   (4) What effect would development of this capability have on our allies and other nuclear powers?
   (5) If the concept is considered valid, what are the fiscal implications in relation to other national programs?
   (6) If the concept is not credible, how is this fact communicated to the Soviets in a convincing manner?
b. In treating the question of the validity of the concept, the options available are acceptance or rejection. Under either option, risks are encountered.

2. (TS) Risks in Rejecting the Concept

Some of the risks inherent in rejection of the concept are:

a. The Soviets may develop the capability. This would provide them with a range of options in the strategic use of nuclear weapons which the United States could not match. If they chose to make a large-scale limited attack, the United States would then be faced with the following immediately available courses of action: response with SIOP; negotiate the problem; do nothing. If they make a small-scale attack, the United States additionally could respond using an extemporaneous selective employment of either nuclear or other weapons. All of these options may fail to deal properly with the situation.
b. It may close the door on resolution of crises by use of nuclear weapons at levels less than strategic nuclear war.

3. (TS) Risks in Accepting the Concept

Some of the risks in accepting the concept and developing a capability are that these actions may:

a. Encourage Soviet acceleration of strategic arms development;
b. Degrade the credibility of the assured destruction capability;
c. Prove too costly to support;
d. Be construed as encouraging the use of nuclear weapons;
e. Be used as justification by smaller nuclear powers for their employment of nuclear weapons;
f. Tend to be destabilizing in certain crisis situations;

g. Tend to make more likely an ultimate escalation to general war through progressive steps in a sustained conflict.

Section C. Development of the Capability

1. (TS) Courses of Action

a. If the concept is considered neither valid nor necessary at this time, there is no basis for a strategy embodying the concept and development of a capability.
b. If the concept is considered valid but not necessary, a choice of developing or not developing a capability exists.
c. If the concept is considered valid and necessary, capability to conduct limited strategic nuclear war should be developed.

2. (TS) Guidance for Development of a Capability

If a capability for limited strategic nuclear war is to be developed, appropriate strategic guidance is required. Modification to the criteria for strategic sufficiency[3] could provide the basis for refinement of the strategy and the development of the capability. The following would appear to provide appropriate additional guidance:

a. *Change Criterion #4 to read:* "Deploy defenses to assist in deterrence of limited strategic nuclear attack or, in the event deterrence fails, to limit damage from such attacks as well as accidental launches to a low level."
b. *Add as fifth and sixth criteria:*
   (1) *Criterion #5.* "Maintain the capability to insure relatively favorable outcomes if deterrence fails. (This means a capability for a relatively favorable ratio of fatalities, industrial damage, and residual military assets, as well as for the destruction of a comprehensive military target system under a wide range of war-initiation, war-waging and war-termination situations)."
   (2) *Criterion #6.* "Maintain forces and supporting command and control systems to permit the enduring controlled employment of forces in limited strategic nuclear warfare."

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 320.2, Strategic (28 Nov 69). Top Secret. The JCS prepared this three-volume study in response to NSSM 64, Document 41. Volume I, printed here, is a summary of the entire study. Volumes II and III are entitled "Rationale and Discussion" and "Analysis, Methodology and Basic Data." The JCS submitted the study to Laird under a covering memorandum, November 28, 1969. Packard later sent the study to Kissinger under a March 2, 1970, covering memorandum with the following commentary: "The major issue posed at this time is doctrinal in nature—does the concept, or the threat, of limited strategic nuclear warfare (LSNW) warrant further exploration in order to develop alternative force

requirements and their estimated costs?" While the response to NSSM 64 contained "information and logic to support useful deliberation on this conceptual question," Packard continued, it failed to "contain enough system definition and cost information to produce program decisions." If the concept of LSNW warranted further consideration, he concluded, the JCS response would "provide a foundation for the next stage of DOD study and analysis including system requirements and costs." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–156, NSSM 64)

[2] An unidentified hand wrote in the margin next to this paragraph, "Could be wrong tgts [targets]."

[3] See Document 39.

130. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, March 11, 1970.

[Omitted here is discussion of the implications of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 43, "U.S. Policy Toward Spain: Base Negotiations," issued on February 20. Documentation on NSDM 43 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.]

HAK: Future work.

Pres. wants to establish rationale for claims on national resources. Need to understand threats, strategies, commitments. Pres. was faced last year with some of individual issues. He wants to use this group for doctrinal issues. When indiv. systems involved, it is from point of view, not mgt. First problem is the five year projections.[2]

DP: We're having reviews now with Services & JCS. Guidance for '71 is $71.8 billion. Service submissions are $74 billion.

We can put together a package identifying the problems for '72 and five years also. Can get a first cut at military and strategic problems. Tucker working on it. Get as simple a presentation as possible.

HAK: Need state of economic inputs, trade-offs. Need to know what is minimum. Need impact of force structure on threats, foreign policy. e.g. CVAs Concept of th[eater?] forces, availability of bases.

—What should our national security objective be?
—What are the trade-offs within which we have flexibility?

DP: Problem is carriers, can barely support to 12, number of divisions. We can get broad picture. Can do this very quickly and within next month.

HAK: Best process is to have a little working group to pull papers together, identify the issues. Larry Lynn has been designated to do this.[3]

McCracken: We've been extending our work on resource allocations.

HAK: Meeting before Easter—March 27.[4] Fundamental choices. So Pres. knows what he's got to give up & for what.

JS: Problem is piecemeal commitments on the domestic side so there is no room left in November.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–1973. No classification marking. Attendees included Johnson, Packard, Wheeler, Kissinger, Spiers, Schlesinger, and McCracken.

[2] In response to NSDM 27 (Document 56), the Department of Defense, on August 18, produced "Defense Planning, 1971–76." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–73 A–1971, 381, Defense Planning FY 71) The final version of the paper is Document 152.

[3] In a January 19 memorandum addressed to the committee, Kissinger established the DPRC Working Group and charged it with managing the preparation and review of studies initiated by the DPRC. Later, in a February 26 memorandum addressed to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Wheeler, McCracken, and Mayo, he named Lynn to chair the Working Group. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, 1969–February 1970)

[4] The DPRC meeting on the FY 1972 Defense budget was held on Monday, March 23. See Document 132.

131. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[1]

Washington, March 11, 1970.

SUBJECT
Future of the Draft

This memorandum presents DoD comments and recommendations on matters concerning the future of the draft, including the Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force.[2]

The Department of Defense endorses the basic conclusion of the Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force that the draft should be phased out. This should occur when assured of the capability to attract and retain an Armed Force of the required size and quality through voluntary means.

It is our view that as we proceed toward this goal, the main emphasis should be on reducing draft calls to zero rather than achieving the All-Volunteer Force, even though the objective of each is identical. There are many Americans, including some in Congress, who reject the idea of an All-Volunteer Armed Force but support reduced reliance on the draft. It will be easier to reach your objective by focusing public attention on eliminating the draft rather than stirring those who object to the concept of an All-Volunteer Force.

My recommendations on draft reform, which we previously discussed, went to the National Security Council on January 10, 1970.[3] For the purposes of this memorandum, it is sufficient to recommend the following actions on draft reform to be taken coincident with your forthcoming message to Congress:[4]

1. You should proceed with an Executive Order that would phase out occupational and paternity deferments, and with proposed legislation that would phase out undergraduate student deferments.
2. You should advocate legislation to place the draft on a national call in order of sequence numbers. A method which uses sequence numbers for calls of pre-induction examinations was introduced by the Selective Service System just a week ago, and it shows early promise of accomplishing a result which is more consistent with the draft lottery. Even so, a change in the law is the only way of assuring that local Draft Boards will use sequence numbers uniformly.
3. You should request a two-year extension of the Induction Authority beyond June 30, 1971, with the provision that you will end the draft by proclamation if it becomes clear during the two-year period that the draft can be shifted to Standby Status without jeopardizing national security. An alternative would be to request an extension with a

ceiling on the number that could be inducted in each of the extension years. The final result from Congress might be a one-year extension, or a ceiling, but I believe the initial request should be for two years without a ceiling.

Department of Defense studies confirm that, as currently-planned force level reductions occur, it will become increasingly feasible and less expensive to meet military manpower needs without reliance on the draft. Even if current relationships between military and civilian pay were to be maintained (and assuming that Vietnamization and other factors proceed favorably), it is reasonable to estimate that monthly draft calls will fall to the level of 5000–6000 by the beginning of FY 1973. With special pay increases and other actions to improve upon the attractiveness and satisfactions of military service, it may be possible to further reduce these draft call levels.

In a memorandum I sent to you on December 18, 1969, and in my statement before the Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees regarding the FY 1971 Defense Program and Budget, I recommended a 20% pay increase to be effective early in 1971 for enlisted personnel with less than two years of service.[5] This was to be in addition to the civilian-military general increase. Provision has been made in the FY 1971 Budget for both of these increases effective January 1, 1971.

We would like to be able to advance the effective date of this special increase to July 1, 1970, and to change the increase amount from 20% to 25%. To do so would demonstrate to the nation and to Congress the high priority you assign to getting on with eliminating the draft, and relieving the draftee and enlistee of a portion of the tax burden he carries in the form of inadequately low pay. Further, it would accelerate the timetable for reducing draft calls to zero, and thus increase the possibility that this objective might be achieved by the end of FY 1972.

The problem, however, is one of cost. The earlier effective date and the higher increase would involve an additional budget cost of $375 million over the $250 million already earmarked for FY 1971. Also, this action would invite nearly-certain action by Congress to make the civilian-military general increase effective July 1, 1970 instead of January 1, 1971, with a further additional cost to the Department of Defense of $800 million. It is simply not possible for this Department to absorb additional costs by cuts elsewhere in its FY 1971 budget. Reluctantly, therefore, we must decline to recommend either the earlier effective date or the higher amount. This leaves us with the civilian-military general increase and the 20% pay increase for enlisted personnel with less than two years of service, both to be effective January 1, 1971.

In the course of considering the special 20% increase for enlisted personnel with less than two years of service, consideration was given to skewing the pay line by assigning the recruit a different percent than the second year man. The rationale of the President's Commission would assign the higher percent to the recruit, on the grounds that his pay is lowest compared with his civilian counterpart. Others argue, however, for giving the

lower percent of increase to the recruit and holding back the higher amount, possibly to be paid as a lump sum bonus when he completes an honorable enlistment. While its power to attract new recruits may be questioned, this latter approach could encourage thrift when most military recruits, even though low paid, are able to assign a portion of their disposable income to savings. Further, by keeping entry pay at a low level, it would at least reduce the initial tax burden that would occur in the event of later mobilization.

Notwithstanding these considerations, we believe the 20% increase is the minimum that should be given to any enlisted personnel with less than two years of service. Equity demands no less, and a lower percent of increase would provide no basis for measuring the impact of a pay increase upon voluntary enlistments.

Three comments on the Report of the President's Commission are appropriate for this memorandum. The first is that the Department of Defense has considerably less confidence than is reflected in the President's Commission Report that draft calls could be reduced to zero by July 1, 1971.[6] This is because of factors of uncertainty beyond our current reach or control and they include the following:

—*The changing attitude of young people toward military service, and its effect upon enlistments and reenlistments*. Many of the manpower supply estimates for an All-Volunteer Force rely on pre-Vietnam data, and upon after-the-fact surveys of what induced "voluntary" enlistments. It is not known how youngsters of high school age have been affected by widespread anti-war propaganda, nor is it known how those already engaged in ground combat in Vietnam will respond to reenlistment.
—*The uncertainty of the effect of increased pay*. It is assumed that more pay will buy additional enlistments, but there simply is no way to know at this time the extent of its drawing power.
—*The availability of jobs in the labor market*. Our ability to attract young men to the Armed Forces will be influenced by the range of occupations and number of jobs they have to choose from, in addition to the military option.

My second comment is to point out that the Commission Report is in serious error in suggesting that little or no problem exists with respect to compensation of career military personnel. The report compares pay of military personnel with "average" civilian earnings on the basis of the number of years out of high school or college. This basis of comparison fails to take into account the degree of knowledge and responsibility required at various position levels and other factors which should be considered in determining pay relationships and levels of pay within the military services. It would be wrong to assume that military pay can be equated with civilian pay on the simple basis of age and basic education. Such standards are not used as the sole basis for testing the adequacy of pay levels in either private or public civilian jobs, and neither can they be so used to measure the adequacy of military pay.

My third and final comment about the Commission Report relates to the Guard/Reserve

Forces. The report relies primarily upon pay raises and increases in lower ranks as the means of assuring Reserve strength and readiness. Other factors besides these are vital as we increase reliance upon Guard/Reserve components. It is essential, for example, to retain more experienced officer and enlisted personnel to compensate for the losses of World War II and Korean veterans through retirement. This means attention to a broad range of Guard/Reserve interests, including the combat readiness of equipment on which they train, and the arrangements to compensate for the disruption of family and vocational pursuits while in training. The attitude of the civilian soldier toward military life, including his opinion of its performance quality, is a key factor in our national security.

In moving toward the goal of zero draft calls, the Department of Defense intends to take positive steps through leadership provided by this office, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, and its Project Volunteer Committee. In addition to what may be done with respect to pay, we plan the following initiatives to implement this essential goal:

1. Expand the recruiting effort by each of the Services for Active and Guard/Reserve Forces.
2. Restore the sense of "duty-honor-country" which should symbolize the uniform and the man in it. The spending of money for pay will not by itself restore this precious sense to our national life. In today's climate, with the military widely blamed for an unpopular war, and with the severe cutbacks in Department of Defense budgets, it is increasingly difficult to maintain morale. One of our major human goals is to enable the military serviceman to feel the highest pride in himself, his uniform and the military profession. This is paramount to the realization of a high-quality military organization, and it will receive our continuing attention.
3. Improve on-base military housing and increase housing allowances, particularly in high-cost metropolitan areas. The FY 1971 Budget already provides for substantial increases in military housing, and the recommendations to Congress in support of increased housing allowances and further increases in military housing will be made later this year.
4. Improve conditions of service and increase military career satisfaction through such actions as expansion of in-service educational opportunities, expansion of ROTC scholarships, extension of family moving expenses to short-service enlisted personnel, reduction of KP and other extra duty assignments, and a broader program to assist those leaving military service in their adjustment to civilian life.

I believe action on the foregoing recommendations will take us firmly and safely on our course of reducing draft calls to zero while at the same time supporting your determination to end inflation, preserve our defense strength, and keep the Administration in a strong and flexible position. The Administration cannot be placed in the position of having to reduce forces below National Security Council recommendations because it has acted too soon in taking irreversible steps to eliminate the draft.

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, 340, Volunteer Force. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

[2] Created on March 27, 1969, the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (known as the Gates Commission after its Chairman, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense during the Eisenhower administration) submitted its final report during a meeting with Nixon held on February 21, 1970. The Commission's major recommendation was that an all-volunteer armed force could supplant the draft by July 1, 1971, if military personnel were granted a $3 billion annual pay increase needed to attract enough enlistees to maintain the required 2.5 million soldiers. A copy of the report is ibid., NSC Files, Box 407, Subject Files, Volunteer Army. The record of the Commission's meeting with Nixon is ibid., White House Special Files, Box 80, President's Personal Files, Memoranda for the President, Beginning February 15, 1970.

[3] Laird's Januay 10 6-page memorandum to Kissinger provided the OSD's position on NSSM 78, (Document 54). Among Laird's recommendations were the phasing out of occupational, paternity, and student deferments and the implementation of a direct national draft call randomly chosen by registrants' birth dates. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, 340, Volunteer Force)

[4] See footnote 3, Document 139.

[5] Laird's December 18, 1969, memorandum to Nixon has not been found. Laird's letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1970, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to reduce draft calls by increasing the pay rates of certain enlisted members of the uniformed armed services, is in the *Congressional Record*, 91st Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 116, pt. 10, p. 12700.

[6] During his weekly staff meeting on February 24, Laird criticized the Gates Report for establishing this deadline for the elimination of the draft, a date that Laird felt would allow "everyone in the Congress who is against the Vietnam war to coalesce with those who are in favor of the all-volunteer force to come up with enough votes to defeat the extension of the Selective Service Act. If the draft should cease, we would not be able to meet our commitments. We want to move in that direction [the elimination of conscription] but the cessation of the draft in 1971 is not a possibility." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0028, Chronological File)

132. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, March 23, 1970.

JS [Schlesinger]: As side comment, mentioned problem of piecemeal commitments to domestic program throughout the year, so that DOD becomes the only place to chop.

The Committee should try to solve that problem.

Packard: Mentioned problem of $200 million not being enough. Would take $300 million.[2] HAK said we have no brief for any particular program.

I [Lynn?] commented you could never get it from Congress, they already get large credit sales.

Packard said that was probably true, but shouldn't specify an amount or else you'll blow the whole ball game.

JS: Gives briefing on his handout.[3] Emphasizes the likely need for a tax increase if a deficit is to be avoided. NSDM 27[4] low level can barely be met.

DP [Packard]: Mentions that they are up to over $74 billion including pay increases, not counting zero draft calls.

JS: Then points out that other programs—civil rights, environment—plus $2 billion postal settlement, could make pessimistic projections look realistic. We've allowed only what the President has already asked Congress for.

President should focus on this problem at this time of the year.

GT [Tucker]: Do we assume President has 100% batting average?

JS: There's a good chance this will happen, perhaps Congress will even increase them.

JS: It is possible to trim down on civ.[ilian] programs if President is determined to do so, but it's tough.

Appropriate inference is that if President wants low force structure in NSDM 27, he will have to observe extensive stringency on non-defense side.

Piecemeal commitments will produce a gap for DOD in November.

DP: This makes it important to get non-defense program into focus.

HAK [Kissinger]: Can we get tiers of non-defense program so we can see what is being traded off?

JS: There are no tiers. These are commitments.

HAK: So your asking him won't do anything now.

JS: Or to review other non-defense programs.

McC [McCracken]: Purpose here is to see totality of commitments. If we are strained, we have options

—defense vs non-defense
—within defense
—deficit
—tax increase. Admin. may have to face up to this.

HAK: We've got to give President idea of what he's up against, not just that he's got extreme stringency.

We should tell him priorities, the options, what this means.

JS: You don't want to change DOD guidance by $2 billion in November.

McC: Passes out handout, discusses balanced economy, fact that projections are in constant dollars.[5]

HAK: Basic point is that squeeze isn't going to get any easier.

McC: Right. If we run a deficit, it will make things worse.

DP: What would happen with a deficit?

McC: Deficits aren't bad per se. Problem is residential construction. Treasury shouldn't divert savings.

GT: What would tax increase do?

McC: Would defer personal construction expenditures.

HAK: So from that point of view, tax cut was a disaster.

GT: How long would it take to feed back on GNP?

McC: It would take up to 4 quarters to adjust.

Packard: Passes out talking paper. Our guidance is $70.8.[6]

HAK: Where did you get this?

DP: From NSDM 27, SEA assumption.

GT: Mentions assumption of much greater reserve capability in new posture.

HAK: Is this upgrading inactive reserves accepted for 12 budgets?

Ans. Yes, except for zero draft.

DP: We'll have to give you more details on this.

HAK: If we have zero draft, we'll have to change all the projections. Who will do this?

DP: We'll do it.

HAK: You need 2 CVAs to keep 1 on station?[7]

DP: 3 for 1. It depends on whether you want to station people overseas.

We should do it whether it makes any sense or not.

GT: We couldn't put 5 on station with 12 in the force.

HAK: So you cut force by 3, you cut number deployed by 1?

DP: You could probably cut 1 in SEA, though I know President wants contingency reserve.

If there is any likelihood this budget is on high side, we'll have to come down on 12.

I'm leaving CVAN 70 aside, political problems.

AJ [Johnson]: What if these SEA forces don't happen?

DP: This is one of big uncertainties. Based on linear phase down. On strategy, disengagement is a tricky business.

HAK: You could go to nuclear war.

GT: It pulls down threshold at which you escalate.

DP: This assures forces for 90 days in NATO.

GT: You have logistics support for one war.

HAK: You can fight for 90 days. This insures you lose in both places.

AJ: Support is for ourselves only.

Lee: It's much less than 90 days. Zero for some of our Allies.

HAK: They only have to punch through in one place.

I get two things out of this

—uncertainty of 90 days
—uncertainty we can get forces to Europe.

Spiers: Assures some strategic warning.

DP: We must do our homework. We should move right on with our studies.[8] This will define our problems more clearly.

DP: Subgroup to Working Group.

HAK: This would be a subgroup to Working Group in a manner similar to Verification Panel.

GT: Summary Report Group would be essentially the Working Group.

DP: We have resources study. We need a domestic group, say from Ehrlichman's shop.

HAK: Domestic staff isn't interested in purely strategic side, but when we get to trade-offs, they should show the options.

Now as I understand it, BOB says DOD budget $3.4 billion too high.

JS: At least.

HAK: So we must see what impact of aid would be on domestic and DOD side.

Could we see what various levels of cuts in DOD would be, just as we see it on the domestic side.

DP: We should.

HAK: Should we do it in three increments?

DP: We could ask each of the Services what they would do with $1 billion. Shouldn't arbitrarily allocate it.

HAK: President should see both sides. This group can do an analysis of commitments.

All the things people were writing about in the 1950s are coming true in the 1970s.

GT: There's a big difference if you take $3 billion out in '72 or take it out over five years.

HAK: But take it out in tiers.

JS: You should look at a '72 stretch as well as a cut.

DP: We need to make assumptions about out years, or else Services will show everything can be put off.

DP: We've got some issues even at the present level.

HAK: We might end up with net evaluation. Tough ones will be between forces and foreign policy. Carriers must be looked at from that point of view. We may want to start a more select group on Vietnamization.

DP: You can't do any better. We should stick to this plan. Anything else is plain guessing.

HAK: Let me discuss this work program with President, get some pieces of paper out.

Vannoy: We're concerned about Vietnamization. It looks like it will come at expense of NATO.

DP: JCS are also concerned about $70.8, don't think it's enough.

Vannoy: Also we're concerned about increasing Soviet capabilities.

HAK: This should be part of that.[9]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970. No classification marking. Attendees included the following: Schlesinger, Packard, Kissinger, McCracken, Johnson, Spiers, Vannoy, Tucker, Lynn, and Vice Admiral John Lee representing ACDA.
[2] Lynn sent Kissinger a memorandum on March 21 informing him of the meeting's agenda: the FY 1972 Defense budget within the context of the overall U.S. budgetary and economic outlook. The main problem, according to Lynn, was "how to reconcile the disagreements on the size of the budget and Vietnamization." Lynn advised Kissinger that Packard, during his briefing, was likely to discuss the Defense Department's MAP budget, which included $300 million for Korea. (Ibid., DPRC General, 1969–Feb. 1970)
[3] Not further identified.

[4] Document 56.

[5] The handout was not found. According to a memorandum for the record of this meeting, prepared by Vannoy, Schlesinger briefed the DPRC on the fiscal outlook for 1972–1976. Schlesinger provided two forecasts, both of which assumed no additional Presidential domestic initiatives. One indicated that the Defense Department's current fiscal guidance of $74.6 billion for FY 1972 would result in a shortfall of $3.4 billion. The other, more pessimistic forecast indicated a shortfall of $6.6 billion. Both Schlesinger and McCracken, Vannoy wrote, "made a strong case for the President to have a clear view of available resources and competing commitments in order to avoid existing piecemeal commitment of resources in uncoordinated non-defense programs." McCracken presented the CEA's "view of the economy and the demands on it," a review that "disclosed no significant excess resources until CY 75." (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, Admiral Moorer, 334, DPRC)

[6] The talking paper was not found. Packard, according to Vannoy's memorandum, identified Defense's FY 1972 fiscal guidance as $70.8 billion that, when corrected for inflation and with the addition of two pay raises for military personnel, equaled $74.6 billion. Packard stated, however, that even that greater figure did not include funds needed to move to an all-volunteer armed force.

[7] According to Vannoy's memorandum, discussion centered on the following topics: carrier force levels, the validity of disengaging in Asia to fight in NATO, the validity of the 90-day conventional war concept, and the implications of Southeast Asia planning assumptions.

[8] In a March 13 memorandum to Kissinger, Lynn stated that the Defense Department had proposed that the NSC Working Group oversee two studies: one on defense commitments and the second on defense versus domestic resources. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970)

[9] Vannoy summarized the meeting's results in his memorandum for the record: "There was agreement that the meeting had been a useful exploratory session; that we had real problems facing us in FY 72; and that the President needs to know what his options and associated risks are."

133. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

ISSUES PAPER

DRAFT REFORM AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCES

We face the problem of how best to meet our future military manpower needs. There are two principal issues:

—The timing of steps toward reducing draft calls and achieving an all-volunteer armed force. The Gates Commission has unanimously recommended the establishment of an all-volunteer army supported by an effective standby draft and four alternative plans for achieving that goal have been developed by an interagency working group.
—The reforms needed in our present draft system and the nature of standby draft mechanism to be maintained whenever draft calls are ended. A NSC review has recommended interim draft reforms phasing out certain types of deferments and changing the method of allocating the monthly draft call.

On these issues, Secretary Laird has stated that the Department of Defense favors an All-Volunteer Armed Force and endorses the basic conclusion of the Commission that the draft should be phased out. He recommends that, "this should occur when assured of the capability to attract and retain an Armed Force of the required size and quality through voluntary means."

Secretary Laird further recommends that … "as we proceed toward this goal, the main emphasis should be on reducing draft calls to zero rather than achieving the All-Volunteer Force, even though the objective of each is identical. There are many Americans, including some in Congress, who reject the idea of an All-Volunteer Armed Force but support reduced reliance on the draft. It will be easier to reach the objective by focusing public attention on eliminating the draft rather than stirring those who object to the concept of an All-Volunteer Force."

A considerable sentiment is building in the country against the draft and it may even be difficult to get an extension of *induction* authority when it expires on July 1, 1971. An alarmingly high number of young men are simply not reporting for their physical examination or for induction.

Moreover, if the Vietnam situation winds down, the pressures for draft abolition will likely increase, thus making it very difficult to maintain an armed force large enough to sustain our world-wide commitments. On the other hand, there are still forces, particularly among veteran's organizations, that support retention of the draft.

There are numerous strategies and options available. The options as to amount and timing of military pay increases can be simply stated: the earlier and bigger the increase, the better the chance of achieving an All-Volunteer Force at an early date and the greater the difficulty of absorbing it in the budget.

The budgetary situation is very tight. Any substantial amount of new spending in fiscal year 1971 would cause an inflationary deficit, deep cuts in existing programs, increased taxes or some combination of these. The current budget estimates for 1972, while admittedly uncertain, show very little, if any, room for new initiatives.

Because of a number of uncertainties in the picture, however, none of the options can guarantee the delivery of an All-Volunteer Force of the required quantity and quality on a specific date. Among the uncertainties are:

—*The effect on volunteerism of the changing attitude of young people toward military service*. It is not known how youngsters of high school age have been affected by widespread anti-war propaganda, nor is it known how those already engaged in ground combat in Vietnam will respond to reenlistment.
—*The uncertainty of the effect of increased pay on enlistment and reenlistment in both active and reserve forces*. It is assumed more pay will help, but there is no way to know at this time what its drawing power will be.
—*The availability of jobs in the civilian labor market*. Our ability to attract young men to the Armed Forces as volunteers will depend in part on the job options they have outside the military.
—*Active Force requirements and Vietnamization*. The U.S. presently plans major reductions in its active force with overall strength to decline from its present level of 3.1 million men to 2.25 million men. With this planned force reduction, draft calls could decline, even without any special action or pay, to the low level of about 60,000 inductions per year. However, our manpower requirements and the timing of our force reductions will depend largely upon the progress made in Vietnamization. It is possible that both our active force and budgetary requirements could be considerably higher than now anticipated.
—*The level of Reserve enlistments after draft calls for active forces fall to zero*. Assuming that we reach zero draft calls for active forces, there still remains the problem of manning Reserve units. Under the new military strategy and fiscal limits, the Army will place greater reliance than ever before on Reserves, so a shortfall there could be as critical as a shortfall in the active forces. The level of Reserve readiness required will involve more extensive training and it is difficult to estimate the effect of these training time commitments on current paid Reservists, more than 75% of whom are draft-motivated.

If all the uncertainties break in favor of increasing volunteerism, it would be possible to achieve an All-Volunteer Force for active forces other than doctors by the end of FY 1972 under the lowest cost of the options outlined. If the uncertainties break the other way,

even the most expensive option would not bring us to that point by that date.

In this connection it should be noted that the Department of Defense has stressed its inability to absorb additional costs associated with accelerating the elimination of the draft by taking cuts elsewhere in its budget or by reducing forces below recommended levels.

The Working Group has identified four optional courses of action, each with a different budgetary impact.

Optional Strategies

The first option—the recommendation of the Gates Commission—aims toward eliminating the draft by July 1, 1971. It is the highest cost option, requiring $3.4 billion more in the FY 1971 budget (the *net* cost to the Federal government after taxes would be $2.7 billion). The remaining options differ primarily in the timing and composition of the proposed pay increase, and in the distribution of money between pay and non-pay incentives. In each case, the bulk of any new spending is shifted into fiscal years 1972 and 1973.

All options also include the implementation of comprehensive improvements in the conditions of military service and personnel recruiting, many of which are recommended by the Gates Commission. These would include broadening the use of skill differential pay, increased hostile fire pay, retirement vesting, putting terms of enlisted men on the same basis as officers, expanding choice of military occupation, more lateral hiring, reimbursement of family travel expenses for enlisted men, and an expanded recruitment effort.

Option One

Goal: Elimination of all draft calls by July 1, 1971.

Cost: Starting July 1, 1970, the pay scale recommended by the Gates Commission would go into effect. This would increase the average pay of first-term enlisted men by 75% and officers by about 55%.

	FY 71	*FY 72*	*FY 73*
Budget Cost*	$3.4	$3.1	$2.8
Net Federal Cost (after taxes)	2.7	2.5	2.2

Arguments in Favor:

—Would be recognized as a clear and uncompromising commitment to move towards an all-volunteer force while draft calls are at fairly high levels (160,000

men per year).

Arguments Against:

—Would itself create very severe budgetary problems for FY 1971—problems that could be aggravated by pressures for moving up the general pay increase 6 months from January 1971 at an additional cost of $1.2 billion.
—Would make it difficult to get Congress to extend induction authority beyond July 1, 1971. If this happened there is considerable risk that not enough volunteers would be attracted to support our planned force structure before induction authority expired.

Option Two

Goal: Elimination of all draft calls by July 1, 1972.

Cost: This option would increase pay levels in two steps: (1) a 20% increase in pay for first-term enlisted men on January 1, 1971, (2) the full Gates Commission pay increase for first term personnel on July 3, 1971. The cost (in billions) is expected to be:

	FY 71	*FY 72*	*FY 73*
Budget Cost	$0.3	$3.1	$2.8
Net Federal Cost (after taxes)	0.2	2.5	2.2

Arguments For:

—Would provide an excellent chance of achieving an all-volunteer force by mid-1972, perhaps earlier.
—Reduces budget strain in FY 1971. The FY 1971 budget cost has already been budgeted and delaying the initial pay increase to January, 1971 would reduce pressure for a general pay increase on July 1, 1970.
—Would require a smaller increase in enlistments than Option 1. This reduces the risk of not getting enough volunteers to maintain planned force levels and thereby being forced to continue conscription beyond the target date.

Arguments Against:

—Still has a substantial cost, and would consume a significant part of budget flexibility for FY 1972.
—Would give appearance of weaker commitment to ending the draft than Option 1.

Option Three

Goal: Elimination of draft calls as early as possible, hopefully between mid-1972 and 1973.

Cost: This option is recommended by DOD and would increase pay in two steps: (1) a 20% pay increase on January 1, 1971, for enlisted personnel in the first two years of service (same as options 2 and 4) (2) a second pay increase, probably on January 1, 1972, for both short and long service personnel. In addition to increasing service pay, this option would increase expenditures for an expanded recruiting effort by each of the services, improved military housing, in-service educational opportunities and other conditions of service. The cost (in billions) [of] the pay *and* other expenditures is estimated to be:

	FY 71	*FY 72*	*FY 73*
Budget Cost	$0.3	$2.0	$3.5
Net Federal Cost	0.2	1.7	3.0

Arguments For:

—Reduces budget strain in FY 71. The FY 71 budget cost has already been budgeted and delaying the initial pay increase to January 1, 1971, would reduce pressure for a general pay increase on July 1, 1970.
—Keeps options open and retains budget flexibility for FY 72 and beyond; thus avoiding an early commitment to spend more money than needed to reach our goal or spending it in the wrong way.
—Avoids any significant risk of not obtaining sufficient volunteers to maintain our planned force levels, because of acting too soon in taking irreversible steps to eliminate the draft.

Arguments Against:

—Would strain the FY 72 budget and absorb a major portion of the funds available for new initiatives then.
—Would give appearance of a weaker commitment to ending inductions than Options 1 or 2. The greatest steps toward an all-volunteer force would be taken after draft calls had fallen to low levels (60,000 men per year).

Option Four

Goal: Elimination of all draft calls by July 1, 1973.

Cost: This option would increase pay levels in three steps: (1) a 20% pay increase on January 1, 1971 for military personnel with less than two years of service, (2) a second 20% increase on July 1, 1971, and (3) a substantial further increase on July 1, 1972. The cost (in billions) is expected to be:

	FY 71	*FY 72*	*FY 73*
Budget Cost	$0.3	$1.3	$2.8
Net Federal Cost (after taxes)	0.2	1.0	2.2

Arguments For:

—Postpones full budget burden until FY 73. Some picked up in FY 71, with a major portion delayed until FY 72.
—Keeps options open and retains budget flexibility for FY 72 and beyond. Gives one year of experience with effect of pay increases before deciding on amount of FY 73 increase.
—Avoids any risk of not obtaining sufficient volunteers to maintain our planned force levels.

Arguments Against:

—Would strain the FY 72 budget without achieving an all-volunteer force.
—Gives appearance of a weaker commitment to reducing inductions than the other options.
—Would not achieve an all-volunteer force until mid-1973 when draft inductions would be at a very low level.

Stand-By Draft

Under any of the proposals to achieve an all-volunteer armed force, there is provision for an effective stand-by draft mechanism. While the precise details of such machinery need not be determined now, there is one major issue which may have to be confronted in the current draft hearing. This issue is whether the Congress or the President would have the power to activate the stand-by draft once an all-volunteer force is achieved. There are three options with respect to this question:

—Delay a decision until an interagency group develops entire program for a stand-by draft;
—Decide now that Congress shall have the authority to activate the stand-by draft (Gates Commission recommendation)—

Comment: This alternative would be the most acceptable to the Congress and the least controversial. Furthermore, Congress has never given the President induction authority for an indefinite term of years.

—Decide now that the President shall have the authority to activate the stand-by draft.

Comment: This option would give the President maximum flexibility to meet a national emergency, but would probably be unacceptable to the Congress.

Draft Extension

Induction authority under the current draft law[2] expires on July 1, 1971. New induction authority for the period of its duration serves as an insurance policy against a possible failure to achieve the goal of all-volunteer armed force. However, the greater the

extension of induction authority requested, the weaker appears the administration's commitment to an all-volunteer force.

If the Gates Commission recommendations were fully implemented beginning in FY 71, conceivably no draft extension would need to be requested because an all-volunteer force might be achieved by mid-1971. However, if such a course were adopted, there would be no margin for error in achieving the all-volunteer force by mid-1971.

Three possible options regarding draft extension are set out below:

1. Two year extension of draft.

—A two-year extension of the draft beyond July 1, 1971, could be requested. Included in the request for extension would be a proviso that the President could, by Proclamation, end the draft at any time during this two-year period.

Argument for:

—Provides reasonable insurance for transition to all-volunteer armed force.
—Appears consistent with goal of achieving all-volunteer force.

Argument against:

—Appears to be a weaker commitment to an all-volunteer force than limiting the number of people to be inducted, as in option 3 below.

2. Three-year extension of draft.

Argument for:

—Greater manpower supply flexibility.

Argument against:

—Appears to be weak commitment to all-volunteer force.

3. Two or Three-year Extension (Limited Number of Inductees)

A possible fall-back option would be either a two or three year extension with a numerical limit on the number of men to be inducted. For example, under a two-year extension the administration could request limited authority to draft up to 125,000 men in FY 72 and 75,000 men in FY 73. Included would be a proviso that the draft could be ended by Proclamation at any time during this two-year period.

Argument for:

—Presents to the public a clear timetable for phasing out the draft, even while asking for an extension.

Argument against:

—Limits flexibility of manpower supply during next two years even though current DoD projected draft calls are lower than the limits set.

Interim Draft Reform

As compulsory inductions will continue for at least 15 months, and probably for several years, it seems worthwhile to consider interim draft reform.

The draft reform recommendations of the NSC study include changes that could be made by Executive Order in early April. Others require legislation, hopefully in 1970.

Proposal One: Defer No Undergraduates in Future Not Already Holding II–S Deferments

Proposal.

Ask Congress to amend the Military Selective Service Act to provide that undergraduate college students who do not hold II–S deferments as of some effective date (e.g., 6 April 1970) shall in future not be granted such deferments. If selected for induction they would receive an automatic postponement to the end of their current academic term. (Analogous changes would have to be made in Class II–A for apprentices and students not seeking baccalaureate degrees.)

The proposed change would result in about 50,000 students having their undergraduate education subject to interruption by the draft in 1971. For about half of these, the interruption would come at the end of the sophomore year. The impact on colleges would be approximately a 6% subtraction for two years in sophomore and junior enrollments below increases now expected.

Arguments for Phasing Out Student Deferments.

1. Undergraduate deferments are inequitable as they often enable individuals with more intelligence and/or money to avoid the draft completely or at least to choose a low-risk year in which they expose themselves to it.
2. Abolishing such deferments would probably not alter the number of baccalaureate degrees granted over the next 5 years. Drafted students will have GI benefits and be better able to finance completion of their studies.
3. Some students are now prolonging their college education by “changing majors” and by taking courses not required by their academic departments.
4. The American Council on Education has recommended an end to all future undergraduate deferments.

Argument Against:

In a message to Congress on May 13, 1969, the President expressed support of undergraduate deferments because they allow the student to complete his college education without interruption by the draft, and are "a wise national investment."[3]

Issue: Postponement for Current Academic Year or Term?

The NSC study recommends postponement to the end of the current *term* for those selected for induction because:

1. Undergraduate students pay fees and receive credits by the term and not the year. Today, for many particular students, it would be hard to define their current academic year.
2. A student selected in the fall quarter may be a poor student in subsequent quarters if deferred to June.
3. Most of the 30% of all inductees who will be ex-undergraduates would become available the same month of the year if postponement was to the end of the academic year. This will cause an uneven flow of manpower into the services.

The principal argument in favor of a postponement until the end of an academic year is that many students make their living and other personal arrangements on an academic year basis. To grant only a term postponement might impose a major hardship on such students.

Proposal Two: Occupational/Agricultural/Paternity Deferments

Proposal.

That the President should issue an Executive Order non-retroactively ending occupational, agricultural, and paternity deferments. A man not holding one of such deferments as of some date (e.g., 1 April 1970) would not in future be granted *that* deferment. However, until age 26, a man with an occupational deferment as of the date of the order would have it renewed each year if he stayed with the same employer and job.

Arguments For:

1. After 1970 the draft pool will consist of 19–20 year olds and hardly any of those will enter essential jobs in which they are irreplaceable.
2. There is no shortage of labor in industry or agriculture.
3. Determining what occupations and individuals are essential to community need produces inconsistencies that are a cause of public dissatisfaction with Selective Service.
4. Deferment in cases of proven financial hardship because of dependent children—about 10% of Class III–A deferments now—would still be granted.

5. Men who have had II–S deferments are not now allowed by law subsequently to receive III–A paternity deferments.
6. A rough estimate of the number of men who might be drafted in 1971 because of phasing out all three deferments is 10,000.

Arguments Against:

1. Occupational deferments now enable local government units, such as school boards and police departments to hire young men under age 26 for jobs they might not otherwise accept.
2. Certain employers will be inconvenienced by having to find other men or women to replace drafted men hired after April 1970.

Issue: Options on Timing.

1. Phase out occupational, agricultural, and paternity deferments by Executive Order soon (e.g., 1 April 1970) and request the Congress to require or permit undergraduate student deferments to be phased out on the same date, or at some date in the future.
2. Request the Congress to phase out undergraduate deferments as of some date, while undertaking to phase out the other deferments discussed above by Executive Order effective on the same date.
3. Request the Congress to phase out undergraduate deferments and undertake to phase out the other deferments when the Congress has acted on the undergraduate deferments. An assumption of all three options is that all student deferments (both II–S and II–A—i.e. undergraduate, junior college, and apprentice) would be treated alike and phased out after passage of legislation.

Option 1 represents strong Presidential leadership in that he acts immediately to do everything he can to create equity in the draft. It also places strong pressure on the Congress to act on the undergraduate student deferments.

Option 2 accomplishes almost the same result, but permits Congress to share some of the responsibility. Option 2 has the disadvantage of being likely to create a national gold rush to seek the soon-to-be phased out deferments.

Option 3 is not one of strong leadership, but requires Congress to share responsibility for ending the various types of deferments.

Issue: Phasing Out or Termination of Deferments.

The NSC study recommended phasing out the deferments discussed above by not granting any new ones after a given date. This recommendation was based on a desire to provide a gradual transition to an equitable draft without upsetting the reliance placed by individuals on a prior set of regulations. However, in the name of equity it could be argued that if undergraduate, paternity and occupational deferments are inequitable, they

should all be terminated at once including existing ones, rather than phased out gradually.

Proposal Three: Direct National Call

Proposal:

Request Congress to amend the Military Selective Service Act so as to permit Selective Service to "call" men for induction if I–A and qualified according to their random sequence number. This would replace the present system of assigning numerical quotas for states, and then in turn for local boards, with resultant board quotas being filled with men sometimes having widely differing random sequence numbers. In effect there would be a single national pool of I–A qualified men instead of over 4,000 local board pools.

Argument For:

1. The Direct National Call would provide what the public seems to have expected from the draft lottery system—namely, a system in which registrants with number one will be inducted ahead of registrants with number two, etc.
2. The present system of "spreading the call" is inequitable (e.g., law abiding registrants in states with high delinquency rates are more likely to be inducted), provides bad incentives (e.g., boards that qualify few of their I–A registrants attract a smaller quota from State Headquarters), and may be illegal (e.g., "credits" for local men already serving are not evidently granted as legally required).
3. A direct national call by comparison is simple in concept and operation, and as it would apply uniformly across the nation, the monthly call would be publicized at once by all media, thereby giving more advance notice to affected registrants.

Argument Against:

1. The discretion of State Directors in spreading the call among their boards is ended.
2. State Directors may appear to have less incentive to fill the monthly call for their state.
3. A number of Congressmen and current Selective Service personnel can be expected to oppose the direct national call on the ground that it is a first step toward greater centralization and national control of the traditionally autonomous and decentralized Selective Service state headquarters and local boards.
4. The direct national call conflicts with the traditional selective service concept of each state furnishing its numerically-determined proportional share of men for the nation's armed forces.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–27, NSC Meeting, March 24, 1970. Secret. Under March 23 covering memoranda, the NSC Secretariat sent the paper, which served as the basis for

discussion at the next day's NSC meeting, to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Shultz, Lincoln, Helms, Mayo, Hershey, and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert H. Finch. Copies were also sent to Mitchell, Wheeler, Richardson, Ehrlichman, Flanigan, and Special Assistant to the President Martin Anderson. This paper revised and summarized a 114-page report prepared in response to NSSM 78 (Document 54) and submitted on January 16 by the interagency Working Group, which included members drawn from the NSC, BOB, OEP, the Selective Service System, the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, and the Departments of Defense, Labor, Commerce, and Health, Education and Welfare. The Working Group's report included the following sections: Selective Service and National Needs, Fundamental Equity Questions, Methods of Selection and Deferment, Occupational Deferments, Student Deferments, "Spreading the Call," Improvements in Procedures, Fairness to Registrants, Proposed Selective Service Data Systems, and the Recommended System. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–163, NSSM 78; and Box H–215, NSDM 53)

[*] The cost is expected to decline because of the planned reductions in the level of the armed forces.

[2] The Military Selective Service Act of 1967.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 53.

134. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting on All-Volunteer Army and Draft Reforms

A NSC meeting on the all-volunteer army and draft reform proposals is scheduled for Tuesday, March 24, 1970 at 4:00 p.m.

The NSC Meeting

The basic problem for discussion is how best to meet our future military manpower needs. There are two basic issues:

—the desirability of establishing an all-volunteer force and the strategy for achieving it. Secretary Laird is prepared to present the issues and alternatives for discussion.
—the desirability of reforming our draft system while it remains in operation. Curtis Tarr, your new Director of the Selective Service, is prepared to discuss this issue.

Prior to initiating these presentations, your talking points[2] focus the discussion on the fundamental issues involved in meeting our future military manpower needs.

[Omitted here is a list of the contents of Nixon's preparatory materials for the meeting.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–27, NSC Meeting, March 24, 1970. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
[2] Nixon's talking points are attached but not printed.

135. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, March 24, 1970.

Minutes of the NSC Meeting on U.S. Deferment and Exemption Policy

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
General George A. Lincoln, Director of OEP
Director of Central Intelligence Helms
Acting Chairman, JCS, Gen. Westmoreland
Assistant to the President Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of HEW Finch
Secretary of Labor Shultz
Director of Selective Service Tarr
Director, Bureau of the Budget, Mayo
General Lewis B. Hershey
Peter Flanigan
Martin Anderson
John Ehrlichman
William Watts
Stephen Enke
John Court
Jonathan Rose

RN—This meeting has a special purpose. We will discuss the subjects of an all-volunteer army and draft reform. I would like to go immediately to Secretary Laird and Director Tarr.

There is considerable disagreement on the means and timing of this achievement. We will reach no decision today. We must weigh what is possible, especially with Congress, together with the national interest.

We must do what is best for the country in both areas.

Laird—We all can endorse the goals of the Gates Report.[2] Its conclusion is endorsed. Our goal should be to reduce the draft calls to zero.

There is controversy on the all-volunteer army.

These two goals arrive at the same place.

The uncertainties one must consider in reaching a zero draft call include:

—the changed attitude of young people.
—the uncertainty of the effect of increased pay. There is a retention problem, and a factor in housing and education opportunities.
—the availability of jobs.

The time to reach a zero draft call is tied closely to force requirements in Vietnam and Europe. To reach a zero draft call, progress in Vietnamization is very important.

As we reduce regular forces, there must be greater emphasis on the reserves and national guard. 75% of those in the reserves or national guard are motivated by the Selective Service System.

RN—It is a shot-gun wedding.

Laird—We will have to build up the reserves and national guard capability. There are four options:[3] First, the Gates Commission suggestion.

RN—That is out. We can't do it and shouldn't consider it.

Laird—The second option would be a 20% pay increase in January 1971 with the balance in July 1971. This would reduce pay and budget requirements. It would cost $3.1 billion in FY 72 and $2.8 billion in FY 73.

These are conservative estimates. They do not allow 8 reserve divisions.

The third option is for 20% pay increase for first termers in January '71 and for an additional increase in January '72. This would cost $2 billion in fiscal '72 and $3.5 billion in fiscal '73.

The fourth option is for a 20% pay increase in January '71, another 20% increase in July '71, only reaching the Gates level in July '72. This is the lowest cost option, and bypasses the Gates' recommendations. It shows a lack of desire and will be open to criticism.

The problem with the 3rd and 4th options is that they do not appear to be moving fast enough. But it is a danger to move faster as it could be a threat to Vietnamization.

The peace groups will unite behind Option 1, since it is the fastest.

I support Option 3. This helps with Congress on the extension of the draft.

RN—How do things look on getting draft extension through in July '71?

Laird—We'll get it through. It will be a difficult job. There will be a coalition of anti-war plus sincere peace groups against it.

RN—The effect on foreign policy of having no draft at all will be terrible. This is a must vote, just like ABM. Otherwise our credibility goes down the drain.

Rogers—A negative vote would be devastating to foreign policy.

RN—Let's go to the issue of draft reform.

Laird—Fine, they are tied together.

RN—What about student deferments?

Tarr—We still have little experience in this area. Many just don't believe in the draft system. The number of no-shows is remarkably high. There are 84 no-shows for every 100 in the State of Washington.

RN—That is because of all those Swedes there.

Tarr—There are many appeals, and individuals demand representation by counsel, and the presence of the entire draft board. We need to modify the system to make the law enforceable.

RN—Who have you talked with?

Tarr—The NSC study looked into three main problems.

First, there is undergraduate deferments. There are great inequities, since the more affluent and educated can find loop holes. The deferment policy induces people to go to college—a fact acknowledged by the National Council on Education.

RN—In a speech I made earlier,[4] someone said I was for deferments. I don't believe in that and they must come out. The draft must fall equally. When I was in Vietnam in 1967 I asked about morale. I was told it was great, but a *New York Times* reporter said that they were the drop-outs, and the ones back home were the college men. This is a reprehensible attitude.

Finch—There are a great many who go to community colleges to avoid the draft.

RN—That is even worse. Those who are studying religion or law or political science can get out of the draft. If the National Council on Education has come out against deferments, that is good. When would the deferments get cut off? After a person has reached 19?

Laird—Yes.

RN—We are only talking about 50,000 deferred students. It just doesn't sound right.

Tarr—It also hurts the educational system. It is not in the national interest.

RN—This is basically a political cause. It is the wrong thing to do.

Agricultural deferments—of course they go. We need less farmers rather than more.

What about paternity exemptions. Will there be deferments in hardship cases?

Tarr—Yes.

Laird—Hardships can apply to farming as well.

RN—I know; local draft boards will help out. You're from Wisconsin.

Tarr—The main group affected are the 19–20 year olds.

RN—They don't know what to do, so they go to divinity school.

Tarr—The younger people have never been better off.

RN—The preachers are the worst.

We should go to a lottery system first.

Hershey—It is difficult to work out how to get rid of deferments. It is hard to let those stay in a deferred category who are in it now. The President shouldn't be in a position of having to pick off on who is dependent and who isn't.

There is no question as to what is to be done, but when is another matter.

RN—We must find the practical way to go when we want to. Bob (Finch) will have some ideas.

Agnew—Can exemptions carry through the year?

Laird—Yes.

Tarr—You could break them in the middle of the year if you want to. This would let a person complete a semester or term, but not necessarily a whole academic year.

RN—I agree, but those in the law must go to the end of the year.

You can see the general direction of our thinking. The next step is to make some recommendations.

Tarr—I think we should go toward a national call rather than a local call. The lottery

system has focussed on the way the local boards act.

RN—There are high numbers eligible in some areas and low in others. Equity demands a national policy.

Laird—When we put the new system in effect we must get all physicals up to date. There will be a big pool this summer.

Tarr—If we are going to have a number lottery, then it must be a national call.

RN—We must have a national standard. They must have the same in New York as in Mississippi, just as we have national standards on education and welfare.

Hershey—But national standards can lead to a disaster if all records are wiped out simultaneously.

Tarr—We could have a national call, but push it through at the local level.

RN—I want to see the recommendations. For legislative purposes we need to check with our legislative people. What we can do by Executive action can go ahead first.

Laird—It should all go forward together.

RN—I must have a program. And I can send a message telling what we can do on Executive Order plus a call for legislative action, plus a call for a zero draft call.

Rogers—How realistic are projections on an all-volunteer army?

Laird—It is difficult to be sure what date. I worry about getting a set date and then not being able to meet it. This ties the hands of the President in other policy areas.

Rogers—I do worry about moving toward the all-volunteer army and then not making the date.

RN—We must move to an all-volunteer army. We must move the pay scale up, the respect for the military up, and the prestige up. The all-volunteer army is the best approach.

But what can we do to attain that? First, we must have draft renewal next July. Second, we should not hold out on an unachievable goal. We must have a program to accomplish the goal, but we must be careful in delineating the times. Some support the all-volunteer army concept as right and as the best way to maintain adequate force levels. Others want it to choke off our adequate force levels. It is a tough-judgment call.

Agnew—I agree. It is desirable to go for an all-volunteer army, but Mel Laird's concern is a real one. We would build up cumulative support for the all-volunteer army, which is not sincere and which could kill the draft bill.

Finch—We must lay out all the ingredients and then speak out at one point. You can't finesse one issue to get another one by.

Agnew—Maybe it would be easier to get an all-volunteer army in peace time.

RN—That would give a large supply of potential postal clerks. We must stand up for the armed services.

Laird—We don't want all 20-year men in the army. We must have some younger men who can carry the rifles.

Westmoreland—We must maintain senior men for some of the hard skills. We need young men for lower ranks, up to age 27. We don't want more than a 33% reenlistment rate for riflemen.

RN—How long should the volunteer service be for?

Westmoreland—For 3 years.

Laird—Maybe there should be two-year people as well. We may want a shorter first enlistment.

Westmoreland—There is a major savings in three-year enlistments.

Laird—There will still be deferments—ROTC, for example.

RN—Will there still be ROTC?

Tarr—Yes.

RN—Can we get along without Harvard? Basically I prefer Option 1, but we can't go that route because of the budget. We can't wheel that with Congress.

Laird—Yes, and it would also mean giving up the draft.

Flanigan—We have a time problem. We are committed to go before Stennis.

Laird—Yes, by April 1, but we could slip that a week.

RN—I don't want to delay. I want one package.

Laird—Stennis wants to slip the date, but he wants to put the blame on us.

RN—Why not set the date about the 10th.

Kissinger—The 14th would be even better.

RN—Okay.

Lincoln—I agree with the zero draft call approach. There is a real point here; the all-volunteer army would raise real problems with NATO.

RN—Bill (Rogers), get Ellsworth's views. We need to know the NATO viewpoint. There can be a subtle effect.

We must do the right thing. We should work the zero draft call and the rhetoric more subtly and at the right point.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1970. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held from 4:15 to 5:15 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

[2] See footnote 2, Document 131.

[3] See Document 133.

[4] Possibly a reference to his May 13, 1969, message to Congress; see footnote 2, Document 53.

136. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Chairman of the Defense Program Review Committee (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 2, 1970.

This year, I would like to review major defense policy and program issues when the Defense program is still in its formative stages, well in advance of the final review of the Defense Department's budget in December.

I would like the Defense Program Review Committee to assist me in this review by undertaking immediately a series of studies on our military posture and forwarding the results to me over the next six months.

I would like this review to cover the following subjects:

—a definition and analysis of our overall strategy for general purpose and theater nuclear forces in relation to the threats we face and to our interests and commitments;
—the availability of funds for defense and non-defense programs over the next five years and potential trade-offs between defense and non-defense expenditures;
—an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs of our general purpose forces in relation to specific military threats, in particular Army and Marine Corps land forces, carrier-based and land-based tactical air forces, and anti-submarine warfare forces;
—an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs of our strategic nuclear forces in relation to the Soviet and Chinese threats and to our criteria for strategic sufficiency, including analysis of U.S. requirements for a manned bomber and for continental air defense forces;
—an analysis of our overall concept and programs for military research and development in relation to projected requirements for new weapon systems.

Would you please have the Defense Program Review Committee prepare terms of reference and a schedule of completion for these studies and forward them to me for my review by April 10, 1970.[2]

Richard Nixon

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, Meeting Files, DPRC General, 1969–Feb. 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger sent the memorandum to Nixon under a covering memorandum, March 30, that reads as follows: "In order to prevent a repetition of the problems which we had with the FY 71 Budget as it pertained to Defense Department expenditures, a basic

charter is needed for the Defense Program Review Committee. It is requested that you sign the attached memorandum, which is designed to provide direction for this year's DPRC efforts."

[2] Kissinger breakfasted with Laird on April 8 and discussed, among other items, the President's directive to the DPRC. No record of the conversation was found, but in an April 7 memorandum, Haig advised Kissinger to insist that a representative from the NSC, rather than the Defense Department, chair the DPRC Working Group so as to moderate the expected "sharp" interagency divisions by retaining "at least the fig leaf of White House steerage." According to Kissinger's handwritten notes on the memorandum, although Laird still had misgivings about the DPRC, he was generally "Pleased with it." (Ibid., Box 224, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. VI, 1 Feb 70–20 Apr 70)

137. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 2, 1970.

SUBJECT
Attitudes of the NATO Allies Toward a Volunteer US Army

The following analysis of the likely reactions of our European Allies considers three alternative Administration courses of action, involving efforts to:

—Extend the present draft law that failed;
—Develop an all-volunteer army that failed to achieve required force levels; and
—Establish an all-volunteer army reaching required force levels over a period of time, while at the same time maintaining the draft.

Our European Allies would be very troubled by an Administration failure in an attempt to extend the present draft law. They would view such a defeat as a direct consequence of Congressional and public disenchantment with overseas commitments, growing out of the frustrations of the Viet Nam War.

The Allies would see a blocked attempt to extend the draft as further evidence of growing US “neo-isolationism” and antipathy toward the military. They would reason that these factors would erode continued US interest in collective security in Europe.

Knowledgeable Europeans would recognize that of the three Services, the Army is least able to meet its manpower needs without conscription. They would foresee an early reduction in the manning levels of Army divisions in Europe which, along with our Air Force squadrons, are the most tangible evidence of the US commitment to European defense. Our Allies would see such a defeat as a precursor of other Administration defeats on issues relating to the maintenance of US force levels in Europe, and thus the US commitment.

If the Administration tried to develop an all-volunteer military establishment, but in so doing failed to maintain manning levels and combat capability in NATO-committed forces, our Allies would also react negatively. However, the reaction would be less pronounced than that described above, because the Administration would have avoided a direct defeat on an issue which the Allies recognize is closely related to that of the maintenance of US force commitments to NATO. Negative Allied reaction would also be moderated because the effects of this course on our manning levels and combat capability in Europe would only be perceived over a period of time.

Nevertheless, the Allies would become convinced that a substantial reduction of US commitments to NATO, particularly forces in Europe, was inevitable.

The Allies would not react unfavorably to an Administration decision to move towards the establishment of an all-volunteer Army capable of attaining required force levels over a period of time, but to retain the draft in the interim. In this case, it would be vital that the Allies perceive that US force levels and commitments were, in fact, being maintained. If so, the Allies would see this option as evidence that, despite difficulties, the US intended to fulfill its commitments. In some European quarters, this option might be favorably viewed as a means to reduce domestic pressure on the President for force reductions in Europe.

The Allies would expect that within some years, the level of US troops in Viet Nam would be so reduced as not to compete for defense resources. Thus, they could anticipate, at least on the basis of US conscription policy, that our NATO commitments would be maintained over the medium term.

In my judgment, any US move to terminate the draft would inevitably cause our European Allies to re-examine their own conscription policies. If the US terminated the draft at an early date without allowing time for the volunteer concept to be tested, Allied governments, under parliamentary pressures, might thereupon be obliged to trim back their own conscription requirements. On the other hand, if the US retained the draft while seeking gradually to create an all-volunteer force, the Allies would be in a far better position to withstand domestic pressures to reduce their conscription requirements.

Ambassador Ellsworth's views have been incorporated in the foregoing.

A detailed description of current Allied conscription laws and reserve systems, based largely on information obtained from the Department of Defense, is enclosed.[2]

William P. Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 US. Secret. Drafted on March 28 by Jackson L. Smith, James E. Goodby, and J. L. Burns of EUR/RPM. Cleared by Ralph J. McGuire, Director, EUR/RPM. Copies were sent to S/S:RF, EUR, and EUR/RPM. Hillenbrand sent the memorandum to Rogers on March 30 under a covering memorandum. Nixon had asked Rogers for a study of NATO's views of the United States' potential adoption of an all-volunteer armed force during the NSC meeting held on March 24; see Document 135.

[2] Attached but not printed is an undated 9-page paper detailing the conscription laws and reserve systems in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

138. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 8, 1970.

SUBJECT
Draft Reform and All-Volunteer Army Decision

At the March 24 NSC meeting,[2] you indicated that the Administration should move toward reducing draft calls and achieving an all-volunteer force with the following provisos:

(1) We cannot spend the additional $3.4 billion in FY 1971 recommended by the Gates Commission.
(2) We should emphasize to Congress and the public that our goal is to reduce draft calls to zero.
(3) We must not commit ourselves to a timetable for ending the draft that we cannot achieve.
(4) We must get the draft renewed on July 1, 1971, if we expect our foreign policy to be credible.

Within this framework, we agree with Secretary Laird's recommendation that the following steps should be taken to reduce draft calls over the next few years:

—During FY 1971, a $300 million (20 percent) increase in first term military pay should be made to demonstrate your tangible commitment to the all-volunteer concept.
—During FY 1972, a large commitment of funds ($2 billion) should be made toward substantially reducing draft calls.
—During FY 1973, a larger expenditure ($3.5 billion) should be made in the expectation that draft calls could be ended between July 1972 and July 1973.

This incremental approach will probably obtain sufficient volunteers to maintain our planned force levels, although there are a number of uncertainties in the picture, namely:

—Active force requirements and the progress of Vietnamization.
—The effects on volunteerism of the changing attitude of young people toward military service.
—Enlistments in the active and reserve forces after draft calls fall to zero.

—The feasibility of further increasing military pay in light of the general pay increase already negotiated, and the strain expected on the FY 1972 and FY 1973 budgets. If all

these uncertainties break in favor of increasing volunteerism, it will be possible to eliminate the draft by July 1972. If the uncertainties break the other way, it will take considerably longer. Even so, we can probably plan on ending the draft by July 1973.

Because of these uncertainties, however, the extension of induction authority and the establishment of an effective standby draft are necessary components of this approach to obtaining an all-volunteer army.

(1) *Draft Extension in 1971*. Current induction authority expires on July 1, 1971. To maintain our armed forces, it will be necessary to extend the draft by two or three years beyond the date. While the Congress may be unwilling to grant a three-year extension now, such an extension would be desirable in light of the uncertainty regarding our Vietnam force levels and the practical difficulties of ending conscription. Furthermore, if it appears that we are running into problems getting needed support for the three-year extension, we would then have the option of compromising for a two-year extension and still meet our needs. *Therefore, we recommend that you initially seek a three-year extension of induction authority to July 1, 1974.*[3]

Seek 3 Year Extension

(Recommended by Harlow, Kissinger and DOD)

Seek 2 Year Extension

(2) *Standby Draft*. We believe that the establishment of an effective standby draft will be necessary at whatever time the draft ends. This should make it possible to reactivate the draft without delay in an emergency. A related issue is the question of who should have the authority—you or the Congress—to reactivate the draft if you place it on standby. *We recommend that you seek the authority to reactivate the draft during the balance of your induction authority.*[4]

Presidential Authority

(Recommended by DOD)

Congressional Authority

(Recommended by Harlow)

(3) *Draft Reform*. The major reforms possible in the draft were discussed at the March 24 NSC meeting. Your tentative decisions are outlined below:

—Request Congress to amend the law to permit Selective Service to induct men according to their random sequence number. In effect this would provide what the public has expected from the draft lottery system—that those with lottery number one will be

drafted before those with lottery number two, etc.
—Request Congress to amend the Military Service Act to restore discretionary authority over undergraduate student deferments to you. You could then issue an Executive Order providing that those college students, who do not now hold II–S deferments, would not be granted such deferments in the future.
—Continue to bar graduate student deferments except for students in medical and allied fields, for which DOD foresees a special draft call.
—Issue an Executive Order phasing out occupational, agricultural, and paternity deferments—except in case of "hardship." A man not now holding one of these deferments would not be granted that deferment in the future. [The Secretary of State recommends that an exception to this policy be made for Peace Corps volunteers; his views will be forwarded shortly for your consideration.]

Approve Draft Reform[5]

Dispprove Draft Reform

(4) *Timing of Executive Order Phasing Out Occupational, Agricultural and Paternity Deferments*. In phasing out existing deferments, you should decide whether to:

—*Take Independent Action*. You could phase out the above deferments by Executive Order, requesting Congress to require or permit undergraduate student deferments to be phased out on the same date. This would put pressure on Congress to act on the question of undergraduate student deferments but, if Congress did not act, it might look as if the students were being favored at the expense of other groups. Recommended by DOD, Kissinger and the Selective Service.
—*Require Congress to Act First*. You could request Congress to phase out undergraduate deferments with the understanding that when they acted, you would act to eliminate the other deferments by Executive Order. This could be interpreted as a weak commitment to ending inequities in the draft as fast as possible, however, it would require Congress to share the responsibility for ending deferments. Recommended by the Klein[6] media group and Harlow.

Take Independent Action[7]

Require Congress to Act First

(5) *Doctor's Draft*. All interested parties agree that the doctor's draft should be extended concurrently with the general induction authority. (There is some disagreement on the extension of draft liability for doctors which will be forwarded to you for decision in a separate memorandum).

Recommendation: That you approve an extension of the doctor's draft concurrently with the extension of the general induction authority.[8]

Approve

Disapprove

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 407, Subject Files, Volunteer Army. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten note at the bottom of the first page reads, “Presidential Action Indicated”

[2] See Document 135.

[3] Nixon approved neither of these two options. He instead wrote, “Hold til next year” in the margin.

[4] Nixon approved neither of these two options. He instead wrote, “Hold til next year” in the margin.

[5] Nixon checked this option. Brackets are in the original.

[6] Herbert G. Klein, White House Director of Communications.

[7] Nixon checked this option.

[8] Nixon, rather than approving or disapproving this recommendation, wrote “Hold.” A stamped note next to Nixon’s instruction reads: “Apr 9, 1970.”

139. National Security Decision Memorandum 53[1]

Washington, April 14, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director, Selective Service

SUBJECT

Draft Reform and the Elimination of Draft Calls

Following the NSC meeting of March 24th,[2] the President has decided to plan on reducing draft calls to zero while carrying out interim draft reforms.

1. Conditions

The President has decided that future reductions in draft calls shall be subject to the following conditions:

—the maintenance of active and reserve forces at levels consistent with the President's strategic and fiscal guidance;
—the extension of induction authority beyond its current expiration date of July 1, 1971;
—the availability of adequate funds to meet our timetable for reducing or eliminating draft calls.

The President wishes the Department of Defense to advise him when and if these conditions are not met, and to recommend changes, as necessary, in the implementation plan outlined below.

2. Implementation

To implement his decision, the President has directed that the Department of Defense take the following steps:

—during FY 1971, increase the pay of enlisted men with less than two years of service by 20 percent ($300 million) to demonstrate our tangible commitment to the zero draft call concept;
—during FY 1972, plan a large commitment of funds ($2.0 billion) toward substantially reducing draft calls;
—during FY 1973, plan a larger expenditure ($3.5 billion) in the expectation that draft calls should be eliminated between July 1972 and July 1973.

Within this framework, the President wishes the Department of Defense, in coordination with the other addressee agencies, to prepare a detailed annual plan of the source, composition, and timing of expenditures necessary and their expected effects upon enlistments and retention. This plan shall be prepared by September 1 of each year for the following fiscal year and submitted to the President.

3. Draft Reform

The President has also decided to take the following immediate action on draft reform:

—Request the Congress to permit the Selective Service to induct men according to their random sequence number.[3]
—Request the Congress to restore discretionary authority over undergraduate student deferments to the President. Then issue an Executive Order providing that those students, who do not now hold II–S deferments, would not be granted such deferments in the future. Students in two year colleges and apprentices should be treated similarly.
—Continue to bar graduate student deferments except for students in medicine and allied specialties for which the Department of Defense advises the National Security Council that a special draft call will be required.
—Take independent action in issuing an Executive Order phasing out occupational, agricultural, and paternity deferments. A man not now holding one of these deferments would not be granted one in the future. At the same time, the Congress will be requested to make provision for the other reforms outlined above.
—Grant postponement of induction to volunteers in government service programs, such as the Peace Corps, to complete their initial term of service. The granting of new postponements should be continued until the Director of the Selective Service determines, in cooperation with the interested agencies, that the denial of new postponements will not seriously disrupt these government programs.

The President wishes the Director of Selective Service to recommend any further procedural and administrative reforms necessary to make the Selective Service system as equitable and efficient as possible. These recommendations should be submitted to the President by July 1, 1970.

4. Induction Authority

The President deferred a decision on the following until next year:

—The extension of authority for general inductions and medical inductions.
—The establishment of an effective standby draft.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–215, Policy Papers, NSDM 53. Secret. Copies were sent to Rogers, Lincoln, and Wheeler.

[2] See Document 135.

[3] Nixon sent a Special Message to Congress on draft reform on April 23, stating that his objective was "to reduce draft calls to zero." To that end, he announced federal pay increases designed to attract volunteers to the military. Nixon also declared, however, that budgetary limitations and "overriding considerations of national security," including the ongoing war in Vietnam, prevented the immediate end to conscription, which he urged Congress to extend beyond its July 1, 1971, expiration. To make the draft more equitable in the meantime, the President announced the issuance of Executive Order 11527 that phased out employment and most paternity deferments. Moreover, he asked Congress to make two amendments to the Military Service Act of 1967: one to establish a direct national call by monthly lottery sequence numbers and the second to give him the authority necessary to eliminate new student deferments. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 394–398)

The Defense Budget and Safeguard Phase III

140. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, April 24, 1970.

141. National Security Decision Memorandum 59

Washington, May 9, 1970.

142. National Security Decision Memorandum 60

Washington, May 9, 1970.

143. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, May 30, 1970.

144. Summary Paper Prepared by the NSSM 58 Ad Hoc Group1

Washington, June 10, 1970.

145. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, July 17, 1970, 10:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

146. Editorial Note

147. Record of Meeting with President Nixon

San Clemente, California, July 28, 1970.

148. Summary of Meeting

San Clemente, California, July 28, 1970.

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149. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, August 10, 1970, 11 a.m.

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150. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 18, 1970.

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151. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, August 18, 1970.

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152. Paper Prepared by the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group

Washington, August 18, 1970.

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153. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 19, 1970, 9:45 a.m.

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154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, September 1, 1970.

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155. National Security Decision Memorandum 84

Washington, September 11, 1970.

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156. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 27, 1970.

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157. Editorial Note

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158. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, November 9, 1970, 4:10–5:40 p.m.

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159. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, November 10, 1970.

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160. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 24, 1970.

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161. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, November 24, 1970, 2:37–3:50 p.m.

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162. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, November 25, 1970.

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163. National Security Decision Memorandum 96

Washington, December 14, 1970.

164. Memorandum for Record

Washington, December 15, 1970.

165. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, December 16, 1970.

166. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)

Washington, January 13, 1971.

167. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting

Washington, January 16, 1971, 10:05–11:10 a.m.

168. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting

Washington, January 25, 1971, 3:40–5:00 p.m.

169. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

170. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, January 27, 1971.

171. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 27, 1971, 10:10 a.m.

172. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 3, 1971.

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173. National Security Decision Memorandum 97

Washington, February 8, 1971.

140. Notes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, April 24, 1970.

HAK [Kissinger]: We will work on model of Verification Panel

—W.G. under Lynn
—Study task forces under Tucker.

Studies come to working group, which will pull them together. Vast majority under DOD. East Asia base structure under Larry [Lynn] because it cuts across so many things.

Commitments

HAK: We could either focus on NSDM 27[2] or start fresh.

DP [Packard]: Don't do either. NSDM 27 as central point. Variants above and below that. Stick to realistic bases from budget standpoint.

Resources

HAK: This is what Mel [Laird] is so interested in. Ehrlichman staff represented on Working Group. Keep Ehrlichman man on this.

AJ [Johnson]: We want to keep a man involved, Lee Sloss.

JS [Schlesinger]: If we want to be non-inflationary in FY 71, DOD budget would be $65.6 billion.

DP: I don't doubt it. I disagree with taking it all out of defense.

GPF—Need mobilization potential analysis.[3]

DP: Don't want to get into too much detail on force levels. Tucker.

JS: Are we going to examine when Allies will join in and when they won't?

HAK: Good question.

R&D

HAK: First systematic study of this.

DP: I recommend that we look at this on broader basis than military R&D.

HAK: Is it still manageable?

DP: I think so. You have to assess level and what kinds of things are being done in non-military area. You'll get a distorted picture if you don't.

HAK: Can you focus on non-military aspects relevant to military?

DP: I think we should have OST in this. How about PSAC?

GT [Tucker]: OST & NSF should be on steering committee.

HAK: I don't want to tell you how to do this. Is June 15 realistic deadline for this?

DP: We'll have to do this.

GT: We can try this.

HAK: That leaves two studies. I want to keep Gardiner [Tucker] from monopolizing all the working groups.

Asia base structure—should State chair it, since Elliot [Richardson] suggested it?[4] Or at least do political assumption?

DP: It should be a sub-study, part of GPF.

HAK: How about under State chairmanship? Working Group should develop an outline for it, because it's so complex.

AJ: Where and how do we get intelligence communication into it? NSA.

HAK: Any member here should have access to any subcommittee.

DP: What's your concern on strategic posture?

HAK: Should Larry Lynn chair it?

DP: This is so enmeshed in DOD, Gardiner can do it.

HAK: OK. Larry has crack at it though. All should come to a point during June. Can you handle this Gardiner?

GT: We can do it. Why June?

HAK: They have to start cycling in June.

DP: GPF has to be done fairly soon or it's no use. Nuclear can be put out a bit. It will be

influenced by Vienna,[5] alternatives for FY 72 budget can be held open until later in the year. We've got a major study underway on strategic business.[6]

HAK: Larry, get Working Group to work out a schedule. You'll want to go over this in working group, then get them before us.

Does this seem reasonable?

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–1973. No classification marking. In an April 23 memorandum, Lynn informed Kissinger that the meeting's primary purpose was "to allow you to provide guidance to the DPRC concerning what the President wants from the studies he has directed and the desired schedule for their completion." (Ibid.) Lynn was referring to studies of strategy, available resources for defense and military commitments, general purpose forces, the U.S. strategic posture, military R&D, and the U.S. East Asia base structure, as formally called for by the President in his April 2 memorandum, Document 136. The DPRC had discussed the first two at its meeting on March 23; see Document 132 and footnote 8 thereto. According to Kissinger's un-dated talking points for the April 24 meeting, the President desired the studies so as "to avoid the situation he faced during last year's budget review, where he was asked to make fundamental decisions on the size and composition of the defense budget under extreme time pressure and without a thoughtful analysis to help him." Notes of the meeting and Kissinger's talking points are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting, April 24, 1970.

[2] Document 56.

[3] The unknown notetaker is presumably recording a discussion of general purpose forces.

[4] See Document 14.

[5] The second round of SALT negotiations began in Vienna on April 16.

[6] Not further identified. Packard may be referring to the NSSM 64 response, Document 129.

141. National Security Decision Memorandum 59[1]

Washington, May 9, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

FY 1971–72 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The President has approved the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for end FY 1972, the proposed adjusted stockpile composition for end FY 1971, and adjustments to the previously approved FY 1970–71 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile caused by fire damage at the Rocky Flats plant, submitted by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on February 6, 1970.[2]

Accordingly, the President has approved [*less than 1 line not declassified*] nuclear warheads as the stockpile composition for the end of FY 1972. He also approved [*less than 1 line not declassified*] nuclear war-heads as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1971. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] warheads and a planned retirement [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during FY 1972, resulting in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] nuclear warheads during FY 1972 from the adjusted FY 1971 stockpile.

The President directs the production and retirement of those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapons parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved stockpiles; as well as the production of the additional parts of nuclear weapons necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the agreement for cooperation.[3] Authority to produce parts of nuclear weapons for transfer to the United Kingdom will be operative only if the 1958 Agreement with the United Kingdom is extended to provide for the transfer of such parts during the period covered by this Memorandum.

The President has authorized the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long-lead-time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1973 production of warheads required by the Defense Management Summary.

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to produce and transfer to the Department of Defense parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special nuclear material, as may be agreed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, for utilization in nuclear weapons or other defense programs for training, research and

development, or manufacturing or production.

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY 1971 and FY 1972 as may be necessary to reflect changes in Atomic Energy Commission material availabilities, production/retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements, or as a result of related changes in military requirements, so long as the quantity of warheads involved in any single action does not exceed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for FY 1971 or [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for FY 1972. He further authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to make changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY 1971 and FY 1972 as may be necessary to reflect changes (not to exceed ±10%) in each year in strategic offensive, strategic defensive, tactical and fleet anti-submarine/anti-air warfare warhead totals as may be required by the Department of Defense because of changes in military requirements or adjustments in delivery assets. Any changes indicative of a major or significant shift in defense policy or Atomic Energy Commission production capabilities will be submitted for the President's approval.

The FY 1972–1973 stockpile approval request should be submitted with the Department of Defense deployments request in November, 1970. This request should address the issues of:

—the number of strategic bombs in the stockpile and the appropriate load factor for our strategic bomber force, and
—the size of the tactical nuclear weapon stockpile in light of the effect of NSDM 27[4] on the number of tactical aircraft and of decisions made in other NSDMs and on currently outstanding NSSMs on nuclear weapons and regional strategy issues.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 51–96. Top Secret.

[2] Packard and Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the AEC, submitted an undated memorandum to President Nixon with the following subject line: "FY 1971–72 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and Certain FY 1970 Adjustments." (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–216, NSDM 60)

[3] The United States and the United Kingdom reached two agreements pertinent to nuclear technology and weapons in 1958. The first became effective when the two nations exchanged notes on February 22. It stipulated that the United States would, as necessary, supply the United Kingdom with IRBMs. (9 UST 195; TIAS 3990) The second, which was signed on July 3 and became effective August 4, permitted greater exchange of nuclear information and materials between the two countries in order to improve their mutual

defense capabilities. (9 UST 1028; TIAS 4078) See Department of State *Bulletin*, March 17, 1958, pp. 418–419; July 28, 1958, p. 157; and August 25, 1958, p. 310.

[4] Document 56.

142. National Security Decision Memorandum 60[1]

Washington, May 9, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1971

The President has approved the proposed Nuclear Weapons Deployment Ceiling Plan for FY 1971 contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated February 6, 1970[2] with the following exceptions:

—the President desires that by May 15, 1970 the currently planned DOD FY 71 ceiling for NATO, rather than [*number not declassified*] as requested, be submitted with revised tables, for his approval, and that for FY 71 and in the future the NATO ceiling be treated on the same basis as the ceilings elsewhere in the world;
—accordingly, the authorized deployments outside of the U.S. as of the end of FY 1971 shall not exceed [*number not declassified*] plus the currently planned DOD NATO ceiling, rather than the [*number not declassified*] requested;
—approval of the deployment of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to NATO Europe for support of non-U.S. NATO forces is withheld pending the President's decision on the ADM Program of Cooperation and fulfillment of all the requirements for support of non-U.S. NATO forces.

[*1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified*]

The President agrees that the number of weapons shown reflect year end ceilings with specific conditional deployments treated on a separate basis and that actual deployments against these ceilings will be controlled by the Secretary of Defense.

The President is to be advised of any significant changes in contemplated actual overseas deployments within these ceilings. The Secretary of Defense is authorized reasonable flexibility to manage and alter quantities during the course of the year to cover unavoidable peaks in deployment due to logistical factors. The President will consider FY 1972 in the next year's plan, which will deal with FY 1972 and projections for FY 1973.

The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense in FY 1971 to:

1. Deploy nuclear weapons in the United States without limit.

2. Deploy nuclear weapons to areas outside the United States as indicated in Appendices A, B, and C,[3] hereto, with the provision that:
   a. The FY 1971 end-year total authorized in each separate country within each region and afloat (Appendix A) or the total by category of weapons within each region and afloat (Appendix B) may be exceeded by not more than 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies.
   b. Weapons to be deployed under the specific conditions cited in Appendix C may be deployed as additive to a. above and to the NATO Europe and outside of U.S. ceilings.
3. Support non-U.S. forces in accordance with the units and numbers of warheads indicated in Appendix D hereto, subject to the following conditions:
   a. The provisions of NSAM 197 and NSAM 143,[4] as amended by NSAM 370,[5] pertaining to additional support of non-U.S. forces, continue to apply.
   b. The Programs of Cooperation remain essentially the same as those pertaining when each NSAM 197 action was approved.
   c. Custodial arrangements and facilities requirements of NSAM 370 continue to apply.
   d. Weapons may be deployed in support of U.S. forces pending compliance with c., above.

In accordance with NSAM 370, all weapons deployed to NATO Europe must have permission action link devices installed. In addition, permissive action link devices will be installed by June 30, 1970 [*2 lines not declassified*]. The weapon/yield restrictions of NSAM 143, as amended by NSAM 199[6] and NSAM 370, apply.

The next deployment ceiling plan should be submitted in mid-November 1970 in conjunction with the stockpile approval request. At that time, or separately, the Department of Defense in coordination with the Department of State should submit a detailed proposal, with alternatives as appropriate, for the accomplishment of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the end of 1972.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 51–96. Top Secret.

[2] Packard sent a memorandum to President Nixon on February 6 requesting his approval of the nuclear weapons deployment plan for FY 1971. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–216, NSDM 60)

[3] Appendices A–D are not printed.

[4] NSAM 143, April 10, 1962, is entitled “Nuclear Weapons for NATO Forces.” NSAM 197, October 23, 1962, deals with communication to other countries of restricted data on nuclear weapons. Both are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs.

[5] NSAM 370, “Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1969 and FY 1970,”

June 11, 1968. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X*, National Security Policy, Document 207.

[6] For more information about NSAM 199, “Loading of SACEUR Land-Based Alert Strike Aircraft,” October 25, 1962, see ibid. and footnote 5 thereto.

143. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 30, 1970.

SUBJECT
The Defense Budget—Fiscal Year 1971 and Beyond

In order to make any discussion of what we plan to do in Southeast Asia more meaningful,[2] it is most essential that we consider first the severe fiscal problems we face both in FY 71 and FY 72. Not only must we live within the planned budget constraints for FY 71, but we must anticipate another $1B reduction in the FY 71 defense budget by the Congress.

On the basis of the latest projections of the economy and the federal budget for the next five years, it is clear to me that you may be forced to look to defense for reductions below what we had previously estimated.[3] Non-defense expenditures and decisions already approved make these circumstances almost a certainty. Lower levels of defense spending will reduce our military capabilities and require reductions in U.S. commitments; at this point in our planning I can only estimate possible consequences. In addition to the following summary of the fiscal situation, I plan to provide you a more detailed report by early July on some of the major decisions we must face on our strategy and commitments.[4]

Since last fall, our planning in the Defense Department has been based on the strategy and financial guidance in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 27 (issued October 11, 1969).[5] Based on the projections of federal revenues and expenditures shown below, it seems clear that the NSDM–27 levels of defense spending are high.

Projected Federal Budgets for FY 72–76

(Outlays in then-Year $ Billions)

	FY 72	*FY 73*	*FY 74*	*FY 75*	*FY 76*
Defense					
NSDM–27 Defense Budgets	76	75	75	76	77
Increased Inflation	1	2	3	4	5
Volunteer Service	2	3	3	3	3
Repriced NSDM–27 Budgets	79	80	81	83	85
Non-Defense Programs	154	162	172	182	194

Total Federal Budget	233	242	253	265	279
Total Federal Revenues	215	234	251	266	283
Margin	-18	-8	-2	+1	+4

The deficits shown are understated for two reasons. First, *no new Presidential initiatives beyond FY 71 are included*. Second, some domestic programs may still be underestimated. A "normal" amount of Presidential initiatives together with cost overruns on domestic programs, I predict, will widen the gap by $3–5 billion in FY 72, and by much larger amounts in later years. For example, your new initiatives in FY 71, after Congressional adjustments, are expected to grow from about $3 billion in FY 71 to about $11 billion in FY 72. Thus, the table above should not be interpreted to mean that we face only a one year problem in FY 72.

A budget deficit of even $18 billion in FY 72 would cause severe economic problems. The rate of inflation would rise again, unemployment would decline somewhat, government borrowing would increase the already high demand for savings, holding interest rates at high levels and holding down housing starts. Further pressures on thinly capitalized industries could cause failures and resulting severe economic dislocations.

A 10% surcharge on personal and corporate income taxes would increase revenues only $13 billion, not enough to close the gap.

I agree that we must take steps now to reduce planned federal expenditures. However, the figure that some are using in BOB and CEA as a defense expenditure rate for Fiscal Year 1972 of $69 billion is completely unrealistic. I realize that we in defense must face up to these fiscal problems but the maximum effort we can make would require an expenditure rate of at least $73 billion for Fiscal Year 1972. As a result the following are steps I presently contemplate:

	FY 72	*FY 73*	*FY 74*	*FY 75*	*FY 76*
Current defense totals	79	80	81	83	85
Reduction	–6	–7	–7	–8	–9
Revised defense planning level	73	73	74	75	76

These revised budgets will cause severe reductions in our military capabilities and will require some reductions in U.S. commitments. The following changes from FY 71 budget levels are illustrative of changes that I will have to initiate:

—retirement of 3–4 attack carriers, 1–2 fewer on forward station
—inactivation of 2 Army divisions, at least one withdrawn from Korea
—reduction of 4 Air Force fighter/attack wings
—retirement of all 4 anti-submarine warfare carriers
—reduction of 130–140 of our oldest B–52 bombers
—large reductions in continental air defense forces

—reduction of about 800,000 military and civilian personnel
—cancellation of some major procurement programs

These reductions will have to be started in FY 71 to help our FY 71 budget problem and to maximize the savings we get from them in FY 72. Indeed, our force reductions can be held to these illustrative levels *only if we meet our current budget planning assumptions for Southeast Asia deployments and sortie levels:*

End-Year Deployments and FY Average Sortie Rates

	as of 6/30/70	*Approved Budget FY 71*	*Suggested Budget FY 72*	*Suggested Bı*
deployments:				
South Vietnam	424,000	260,000	152,000	
Thailand	42,000	34,000	20,000	
fighter/attack sorties	20,700/mo	14,600/mo	10,200/mo	
B–52 sorties	1,400/mo	1,200/mo	900/mo	

Less rapid withdrawals or higher sortie levels will cause reductions in the forces not deployed in SEA and seriously affect our NATO commitments. For example, an increase of 3,000 fighter attack and 200 B–52 sorties per month for one year would cost $500 million. Slowing the rate of redeployments to only 60,000 prior to February 1971 would cost $400 million and require an increase of 30,000 draft calls. If offsets of this magnitude had to be found, in addition to the reductions shown above, we would have to withdraw a division force from Europe and inactivate it and reduce tactical air forces in Europe or our carrier forces in the Mediterranean.

The changes in forces, commitments and Vietnam levels shown above must be faced. We must pay for increases in one area with decreases in another. Therefore, unless I hear from you to the contrary I intend to base our defense program on the revised defense budget levels and on the Southeast Asia assumptions shown above. We will keep you informed of necessary changes in our strategy and commitments as our planning proceeds.[6]

Melvin R. Laird

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 28, Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Vol. 1. Top Secret.

[2] Nixon, Laird, Kissinger, Packard, Wheeler, Moorer, and others discussed the war in Vietnam during a meeting held at the Western White House in San Clemente, California

on May 31. For the record of the meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 313.

[3] According to the minutes of Laird's weekly staff meeting, June 2, Tucker announced, "The President has been alerted that we cannot sustain the present level of defense within the dollars targeted for Defense." Laird added that his purpose was "to alert various members of the Executive Branch that we can't keep approving new [domestic] program on a piecemeal basis." Laird found it necessary "to present a case [that] is not being adequately presented today. Defense shouldn't have this responsibility, but decision-making processes are going on without an over-all look." Laird, Packard, and Wheeler agreed that the DPRC was designed to examine defense spending within the larger fiscal context, but had not "accomplished its purpose." According to Wheeler, "there is a tendency for the DPRC to focus on [Defense] programs in detail and ignore the larger issues. Mr. Laird said if they ignore the larger issues we are not doing our job of protecting the security of the country." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0028, June 1970) See also Document 132 and footnote 5 thereto.

[4] Laird sent an 11-page memorandum to Nixon on July 8 in which he expanded on the issues presented in this memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–74–142, No. 24)

[5] Document 56.

[6] On May 31, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum in which he argued that, although Laird's memorandum painted a worst-case scenario, it "highlights the serious fiscal implication which should be sorted out in the immediate future" by the DPRC. In the meantime, Kissinger recommended that the President instruct Laird "to withhold" the actions proposed in the final paragraph of his memorandum pending consideration of the issues by the DPRC. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 65, Memoranda to the President, May 1970) Two days later, on June 2, Nixon sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, and Kissinger with Laird's May 30 memorandum attached. The President directed the DPRC to prepare a report by July 15 on the FY 1971 and beyond Defense budget for eventual consideration by the NSC. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, 1969–Feb. 1970)

144. Summary Paper Prepared by the NSSM 58 Ad Hoc Group[1]

Washington, June 10, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–152, NSSM 58. Secret. 12 pages not declassified. NSSM 58 is Document 29.]

145. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, July 17, 1970, 10:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT
Defense Budget

PARTICIPATION
Chairman
Henry A. Kissinger

State
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
Mr. Leon Sloss

Defense
Mr. David Packard
Dr. Gardiner Tucker
Dr. Donald Rice

JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Maj. Gen. Richard F. Shaefer

CIA
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Bruce Clarke

OMB
Mr. George Shultz
Mr. James R. Schlesinger

ACDA
Mr. Philip J. Farley
Vice Adm. John M. Lee

CEA
Mr. Paul W. McCracken
NSC Staff
Dr. Laurence E. Lynn
Mr. Keith Guthrie

Dr. Kissinger: Today we want to take a first cut at reviewing the Defense side of the budget. This meeting is an outgrowth of the President's directive of June 2[2] asking the DPRC to make a full review of the implications of the defense budget and program issues raised by the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum to the President of May 31.[3] I issued some additional guidance for the review on June 13.[4] The Working Group produced some working papers that seemed to get snatched back as soon as they appeared.[5] I understand that everyone is agreed on using the summary paper that has

been prepared as a basis for discussion even though no one is committed to everything that is in the paper.[6]

The Administration faces three problems. It must define a broad economic strategy; it must decide how to allocate outlays between non-defense and defense activities; and, of primary interest to this group, it must allocate the defense budget so that our defense posture and our strategic objectives are in balance.

At San Clemente the President, George Shultz, and I discussed how to help the President make his choices concerning the budget in the most effective way.[7] We want to avoid having the President make decisions on line items and to keep from foreclosing Presidential participation in resolving big issues because these issues get settled as a result of negotiations. We want to crystallize the broad alternative choices which the President can make within a responsible budget level and to point out the consequences of various levels of budgetary expenditure. The first choice is to consider the broad strategic choices. After decisions on these, individual line-items should come to the President for decision only if they have proved absolutely insoluble.

Today we want to start our review by considering the broad security choices—that is, what the implications for foreign and security policy are of allocating the Defense budget among different categories. This group cannot make decisions, or even recommendations, on what the domestic spending levels and strategy should be.

As I understand it, the overall economic situation has changed considerably since the time of our NSSM 3 review.[8] NSSM 3 foresaw an $11 million margin for FY 72, inflation at 2.4% and unemployment at about 4%. Now we face a budgetary deficit of $20–26 billion, 3.6% inflation and over 5% unemployment in FY 72. As I understand it, no matter what we do we face a sizable deficit in FY 72 and must cut our currently projected budget outlays. The choice seems to be between cutting the budget less, running larger deficits, and facing fairly tight monetary policy; and cutting the budget more, running smaller deficits, and having the prospect of easier monetary policy.

Could George Shultz or Paul McCracken give us a fuller review of the economic situation?

Mr. Shultz: The budget process is like solving a set of simultaneous equations; everything is related to everything. As regards our economic choices, I do not regard the economy as necessarily placing limits on what the DPRC might recommend or the President might want to do. If hard choices are involved, we have to face up to them. We might, for example, have to look at making a large increase in taxes. However, at the present we feel this is not wise and that it is not possible to get a tax increase from Congress. That being the case, we have to consider what the budgetary limitations are, given the existing revenue system and the performance of the economy. If we let things ride along and follow the path of least resistance, I foresee substantial deficits that we can't live with.

Right now there is a lot of evidence that the inflation is beginning to crack. The rate of price increase is coming down, and there was no change in GNP during the second quarter, compared to a previous quarter decline of 3% at an annual rate. We may be beginning to see a more healthy turn in the economy. Still, the constraints on the budgetary process look very severe to me. High appropriations seem to be in prospect for domestic programs like education and urban renewal.

Mr. McCracken: A $237 billion FY 72 budget is not too large for the US economy if we want to use our resources in such a way. But if we pay no attention to the revenue system we will produce the kind of deficit that will have significant consequences. It will, for example, scare hell out of the financial community, with a resultant adverse repercussion on trends in interest rates. In the monetary field, it would worry the Federal Reserve, which might start to pursue a policy inadequate to carry along our economic recovery at the rate we desire. Then we would get the worst of both worlds—a sluggish economy distorted by the Treasury's dipping into the financial market to cover a deficit. There is no question what a $235 billion budget would do to the financial community and the capital market—and the resultant effect on housing.

Mr. Johnson: What would happen?

Mr. McCracken: It will rekindle fears of inflation in the financial community. Interest rates reflect the community's expectations on inflation; thus, the rise in interest rates in 1968–69 was in part the effect of a long sustained inflation. We are just now beginning to get to the point where the financial community believes that the Administration's policies are going to counter inflation. The interest rate is edging down; this is good for the mortgage as well as the stock market. We need to have these trends continue; whether or not they do depends on maintaining the slow recovery of confidence in the financial markets. Other factors may also help; capital expenditures by business are not likely to be so monolithically strong as in recent years. The point of all this is that if we try to fit in a $23 billion budget deficit, we have to consider the effects in all of these areas.

In New York financial circles, $10 billion is being widely used as a ballpark estimate of the likely budget deficit. These people are up on the situation, and they never believed the Administration prediction of only a $1.3 billion deficit. If, as the paper before us points out, we are talking about an FY 72 budget in excess of $235 billion, it will be difficult to keep on course with our housing programs. If we go back to a budget in the range of $225 billion, the resultant deficit, given the current slack in the economy, will probably be manageable, since it will be roughly the size of what the financial community is currently expecting. At the other extreme, if we pursue a spartan policy, you would raise the question of whether we could get private demand expanding rapidly enough to stay on target in attaining full employment by the end of next year, which I believe we should aim for.

Mr. Packard: Timing is crucial. Now is just the wrong time to announce a deficit. But

we've got to do some planning now. It is possible that by the end of the year a $20 billion deficit might be less trouble. The situation may get better if pressure is put on wages, and inflation is coming down a little more.

Mr. McCracken: That's right. In the view of the financial community, a $23 billion deficit would just mean that that amount of money would be taken out of the market.

Mr. Packard: Unless the Federal Reserve finances the deficit.

Mr. Shultz: We should remember that the President has criticized the Johnson Administration for running a similar-sized deficit.

Mr. Packard: But the deficit has a different meaning now. I don't see any possibility for getting spending down below about the $230 billion level. It is not wise to go as far as cutting DOD by $6 billion. We might do this if we postponed the all-volunteer army and some other things. If we take $6 billion out of the defense forces, it will be disastrous. As far as non-defense programs are concerned, we need to get a better handle, George.

Dr. Kissinger: As a matter of legislative strategy, experience has shown that cuts in defense appropriations tend to stick while nondefense cuts can often be restored. Therefore, you can make a case for being a little more conservative in cutting the defense budget.

Mr. Shultz: That's the same as letting Congress allocate the resources; they are going to cut DOD, raise the domestic side.

Dr. Kissinger: I also feel that we need some program analysis on the non-defense side, comparable to the defense side.

Mr. Shultz: That's a fair comment. I am working with Ehrlichman on trying to construct something. We want to set up a procedure for examining domestic options somewhat like that used in the NSC process. We want to get it worked out right away in the hope of having some impact on Congressional spending plans in the domestic sphere.

Mr. Johnson: Where do the figures we have on non-defense expenditures come from?

Mr. Packard: From Budget.

Mr. Schlesinger: They are derived from existing programs plus Presidential requests.

Mr. McCracken: I don't want to say that overall economic policy sets limits on what we can do. Nevertheless, within a given financial system, there is a defined range of expenditure levels which the system can handle. If we go outside that limit, we have to consider adjusting our revenue system.

Mr. Packard: We should not summarily eliminate the possibility of a tax hike. This may be the only course available.

Mr. Shultz: That is a fair comment, but we should leave it at that. We should not start out to make our plans on the assumption that we can always get more taxes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's get to the main business of this group. Last year, in NSDM 16,[9] the President approved four criteria for strategic sufficiency to govern the design of our strategic posture. Then in NSDM 27[10] he approved a world-wide strategy for general purpose forces and a five-year projection of defense outlays. At a spending level of $225–230 billion, it is clear that some reductions will be required in the Defense budget even though the existing budget is already below what is required to carry out approved policy according to the JSOP. I recognize that JCS is reluctant to change strategy on account of a one or two year shortfall. However, *we should know how a continuation of the existing situation will affect our strategy*.

We have looked at basically two options for making cuts. Option 1 would cut $6 billion from general purpose forces, leaving projected strategic budgets as is. Option 2 would cut about $3 billion from both general purpose forces and strategic forces.[11] A possible third option would be to take all the cuts from strategic forces.

Can we discuss what would be involved in cuts at alternative levels of $3 billion, $6 billion, and $9 billion?

Mr. Packard: The $79 billion figure for FY 72 in current projections is based on the $76 billion set for FY 72 by NSDM 27, with the addition of $2 billion for the all-volunteer service and $1 billion for increased costs due to inflation. Our current programs are based on NSDM 27. But there is a big range in what people think. The JCS felt that the NSDM 27 force levels were on the low side; on the other hand, in NSSM 3, there was an OSD budget and force level, but they were too low. The $79 billion figure was worked out by OSD, and I think it is the lowest practicable figure. That is what is in NSDM 27.

With regard to strategic forces we considered two alternatives: (1) maintaining the current program or (2) reductions of $3 billion. It is difficult to determine the adequacy of strategic forces. Our current concept is based on three separate pillars: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Each is on its own supposed to be adequate to provide sufficient deterrence against an enemy attack. Soviet build-ups during the next few years will bring their total strategic forces up to levels roughly comparable to ours.

A $3 billion cut would mean that we would reduce our air defense capability by about half. Our air defense is based on interceptors and surface-to-air missiles and is already at a low level.

Dr. Kissinger: What job is it supposed to do?

Mr. Packard: Defend against the Soviet strategic bomber force. Adm. Moorer: Today if an enemy aircraft succeeds in getting to the periphery of the United States, it is free to move at will.

Dr. Kissinger: What does the Soviet bomber force consist of?

Mr. Packard: It is about one-third the size of ours. They maintain a level of about 200 bombers.

Adm. Moorer: They are developing a new bomber.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a rationale for ABM; we want Safeguard to provide against accidents, a minor attack from a major country or a major attack from a minor country. Don't we also need a rationale for continental air defense?

Mr. Packard: We can't build a good air defense system until we develop AWACS. This is a vertical radar mounted in aircraft and needed in order to detect low-flying aircraft. We can save money on the current air defense system, which is not too good, and put the funds into technology to develop the improved system we need. It doesn't make any difference what we decide today if we don't develop the technology we need.

Dr. Kissinger: Still, we could try to find out what is the desirable lower limit on our current air defense system.

Mr. Packard: Perhaps that might be useful. I don't know.

To continue with the implications of a $3 billion cut, this would mean reducing Safeguard to 7 sites rather than 12. We would reduce our bomber force (bombers are expensive to operate), and we would go ahead with developing a new bomber but on a longer range production program. We would reduce programs for Minuteman survivability; this means we would be placing more reliance on our SLBMs.

Mr. Johnson: There would be no increase in our SLBMs?

Mr. Packard: That's right, although they would be improved through installation of Poseidon missiles. If there is a strategic arms limitation agreement, the reductions in programs for Minuteman survivability and for Safeguard would be more acceptable.

Dr. Kissinger: Tom, what do you think?

Adm. Moorer: I generally agree with what Dave has said. I think we should not look at SALT as a means to save money. It is important to keep the requirements of national security in mind. There has been a feeling that if we can't afford our present strategy, we should get one we can afford. However, never before have the Soviets been building up their strategic and general purpose forces at such a rate. In some ways the Soviets

determine the strategy we have to follow.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't change our strategy; we just say our forces have only a marginal capability.

Adm. Moorer: We are moving into a situation where the President will have no options in a confrontation with the Soviets. We have fought the Vietnam war unlike any other in our history in that we did not call up the reserves. Thus a cutback requires a reduction in our regular forces.

Dr. Kissinger: The impact of cuts depends on our strategy. We don't have a precise definition of our strategy. Our strategy as far as bombers are concerned depends on what we think the impact of cuts would be. If our bombers are intended to provide a first-strike counterforce against China, will that capability be affected by the planned reductions?

Mr. Packard: It would not present any problem today. I don't know about five years from now.

Dr. Kissinger: But today's decision affects what happens five years from now.

Dr. Tucker: The reductions don't deprive us of a capability to launch a pre-emptive strike against Chinese ICBMs. We can use Polaris for this.

Dr. Kissinger: But the bombers must do something.

Adm. Moorer: The bombers provide throw-weight. They are also part of our triad concept of three separate deterrent forces.

Mr. Packard: Each of the three forces has the capability of destroying 25% of the enemy population.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no trouble understanding that the bomber cuts will not affect our capability for destruction of population. But to the extent we rely on bomber forces against China, B–52s do play a role. I need to know what the impact would be on our strategy of deterring a first strike.

Adm. Moorer: That is a problem primarily associated with the USSR.

Dr. Tucker: We could still use our bombers against China but this would require us to use forces we now rely on against the Soviets. Thus our security with respect to the Soviets would be reduced.

Dr. Kissinger: What does "reduced security" mean?

Dr. Tucker: It means we would be changing the triad concept. We would not have an

independent capability with each of three forces; instead, our capability would be based on a combination of three forces.

Dr. Kissinger: I am just playing the devil's advocate. I don't have any position on this.

Another item on the list is a cutback in programs to insure Minuteman survivability. This means that the Minutemen become extremely vulnerable, and we are left to rely on submarine-launched missiles. Is that a fair statement?

Dr. Tucker: Yes. If Minuteman becomes vulnerable, crisis stability will be affected, since there will be a greater temptation for the Soviets to strike first.

Mr. Packard: If a strategic arms agreement limits large missiles, we can stand the loss in Minuteman survivability.

Dr. Kissinger: *I want a paper that will tell the President: "If you do this, these are the consequences."*[12]

Mr. Johnson: According to the way the SIOP is structured, we have up to now assumed we had the capability to deal simultaneously with China and the Soviet Union. If the President decides a simultaneous defense is not required, what effect would this have on the forces we need?

Mr. Packard: That is a complex issue. Right now we do not have enough warheads to cover all targets; we never have had. The question is how we find a rational basis to deal with this problem. One thing we are doing is to install Poseidon missiles in our submarines. This does not increase destructive power but it does increase our flexibility. We are also putting multiple-warheads on Minuteman and developing SRAM to improve the penetrability of our bombers. Thus, we are taking steps to improve our capabilities, although this progress has to be evaluated against the Soviet build-up. I think it is all more a matter of the psychological impact. It depends on what the Soviets think of our capabilities.

Adm. Moorer: The answer to Alex's question is that there would be no difference in force requirements.

Mr. Schlesinger: The SIOP is a single integrated plan. If we want to deter the Soviets while mopping up the Chinese, bombers would be useful.

Adm. Moorer: We must remember that many of the targets in China are covered by tactical aircraft.

Mr. Packard: There is a good deal of flexibility.

Mr. Farley: On the subject of Minuteman survivability, it is worth pointing out that if we

fail to get a strategic arms agreement, the conclusion would not be automatic that we would want to put money into survivability measures.

Mr. Packard: That is one of the problems. Increased hardening can easily be offset by improved accuracy. We could try to improve the mobility of Minuteman.

Adm. Moorer: What we are looking for is two or three budget levels and a clear statement of the impact of each. We can prepare that.

Dr. Kissinger: If the conclusion is that it makes no difference whether we cut $3 billion (we only uncover another third of the Soviet strategic force), then let's go on to another subject.

However, *I think we need to know what the shortfall in the existing projections means and what are the implications of a $3 billion cut*. We are not trying to allocate Defense funds for you, and we don't want to second-guess on war plans. *The question is whether the differences we are speaking of are strategically and politically significant*.

The NAC consultation on SALT has shown that the Europeans are living in a never-never land. They are concerned because we might be uncovering additional targets, when all targets have never been covered. It is a tremendous charade.

Mr. Johnson: The $3 billion cut does not involve strategic forces?

Mr. Packard: Yes, it is a strategic force reduction.

Dr. Tucker: You can define separate cuts in strategic and general purpose forces, and you can combine them.

Dr. Kissinger: What is involved if the entire $3 billion reduction comes out of strategic forces?

Mr. Packard: The specific reductions are outlined in Table 6 of the summary paper.[13] The $3 billion cut would involve reductions below current force planning in bombers, interceptors, surface-to-air missiles, and Safeguard sites.

Mr. Spiers: Why is there such a small cut in surface-to-air missiles and a large cut in interceptors?

Dr. Tucker: With interceptors you get more money out.

Mr. Packard: In relation to strategic forces, the big issue is Safeguard. Budget cuts may mean giving up the area defense. If we also give up hardpoint defense as a result of a strategic arms agreement, in my view we might as well limit the whole Safeguard program to research and development.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't have to decide that now. Safeguard is a card we need during SALT. It is the program of greatest interest to the Soviets.

Mr. Farley: That's right. Gerry Smith agrees.

(Mr. Shultz left the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Kissinger: *The Working Group should prepare an assessment of a $3 billion cut giving both strategic and political implications*. This would *not necessarily mean changing the allocation proposed by Defense* within the limitations established by such a cut. The *Working Group should accept the Defense proposals and see what they mean*.

The President says he does not want to make defense decisions on budget considerations alone. On the question of whether to cut surface-to-air missiles or interceptors, he would not like to get the answer that we can get more money out by cutting one rather than the other.

Mr. Packard: That is not the only reason. The surface-to-air missiles have a greater capability.

Dr. Kissinger: If you reduce Minuteman survivability and the bomber force, you are putting a lot of chips on submarines.

I think I have now posed the question that needs to be answered by the time of the budget review. The table in the summary paper is an excellent one.

Mr. Schlesinger: *The discussion on page 11 of the summary paper needs to be made consistent with the data presented in Table 6.*[14]

Dr. Kissinger: Larry Lynn can take care of that.

Now we should take up general purpose forces.

Mr. Packard: There are two problems: (1) determining long-term levels and (2) the problem of making the transition to them. The transition problem has several aspects. For example, if a cut is to be made during FY 72, it will be necessary to focus on *personnel* reductions. In Vietnam if forces are cut back to 220,000 rather than 260,000 in 1971, $400 million could be saved. Cutting tactical air sorties by 3,000 per month would lop off another $400 million. If the end-of-1972 troop level were reduced from 130,000 to 120,000, another $200 million could be saved.

Illustrative packages of general purpose forces reductions are shown in Table 6 of the summary report. The individual items can, of course, be combined in various ways.

Dr. Kissinger: The reductions in divisions would get us down to pre-Korean War levels.

Mr. Packard: The cuts in escort vessels are particularly severe.

Adm. Moorer: We will be down to the 1930 level.

Mr. Packard: The Chief of Naval Operations says a $6 billion general purpose forces reduction will cut his ability to maintain control of the seas in the event of a US-Soviet confrontation from 55% to 20%.[15]

Dr. Kissinger: What does that mean?

Adm. Moorer: In World War II we kept graphs of the amount of enemy and allied shipping destroyed. At first our losses were greater than theirs. When the curves crossed, we reached the turning point. The CNO's estimate measures the chances of reaching this turning point in the event of a US-Soviet conflict.

Dr. Kissinger: Would there be any chance at all of reaching it?

Mr. Packard: We can get a definition for you.

Dr. Tucker: In considering this, we need to take into account the significant anti-submarine capability of some of our European allies.

Adm. Moorer: They don't have a significant capability. And they won't be defending US coasts.

The reductions involved mean a cut from 794 to 514 in the number of ships.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard) Obviously the Air Force got to you. Mr. Packard: The impact of large defense budget reductions is just too great to be seriously considered. We just have to find alternatives to taking such reductions.

Mr. Schlesinger: At a $230 billion overall budget level, it won't be necessary to make large cuts.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we make cuts of $3 billion each in strategic and general purpose forces?

Mr. Packard: I believe that by allocating our funds a little differently, we can make a maximum cut of $3 billion.

Dr. Kissinger: This would mean reductions in both strategic and general purpose forces?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I know nobody here wants to recommend a $9 billion cut. Should we even present such an option to the President?

Mr. Packard: It might be useful in order to show him what a drastic step it would be in case he were forced to cut back by that amount.

Dr. Kissinger: In the 1950's we talked about a superiority that didn't exist; we didn't appreciate our margin. A situation is developing under which there is no rational reason to be found for going to general nuclear war. The situation we talked of in the 1950's is coming true with a vengeance. With 400 Soviet targets uncovered, it simply can't be done. At the same time, we are cutting our general purpose forces and getting out of places like Korea. *How are we going to defend these areas? This question has to be put to the President. He must know what we are heading into.*

Mr. Packard: We have to figure out how to make the best allocation of the cuts we will be forced to make. For example, I believe we should cut manpower levels, while maintaining the Air Force and Navy.

Mr. Johnson: The point is that if we cut general purpose forces, we are more dependent on massive retaliation; yet, massive retaliation is not adequate.

Dr. Kissinger: At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets did not blockade Berlin because they were afraid of a pre-emptive attack by us. They now know this can't happen. If we attack with our entire force, they would have several hundred missiles left to clobber us. With cuts in general purpose forces, this could create a nightmare by 1974.

Mr. Packard: There are various alternatives. One is to cut ground forces. We need the Navy to supply the ground forces and keep the sea lanes open.

Dr. Kissinger: I detect in the Government a predisposition to bring forces out of Europe. *These issues must be presented clearly to the President.*

Mr. Packard: A faster withdrawal from Vietnam would help.

Dr. Kissinger: Everything that comes out of Vietnam is to be disbanded. The President may get out of Vietnam faster than presently planned, but if so, it will not be for budgetary reasons.

Let's put together an assessment of the implications of a $3 billion total cut, a $3 billion general purpose forces cut, and a $6 billion general purpose forces cut. We can then present it to the President, along with some suggestions on remedial measures.

Mr. Packard: I think we should come up with a Defense Department recommended program.

Dr. Kissinger: This Committee will not make up a program. The options should be presented to the President. After we get Presidential guidance, we will ask the Defense Department to come up with a recommended program.

Mr. McCracken: A $9 billion cut will not be included.

Dr. Kissinger: A $9 billion cut would be a combination of a $3 billion strategic and $6 billion general purpose forces cut.

Mr. McCracken: The "in" thing at the present is to take all budget cuts out of defense funds. I think we may be going too far. We have to know what the successive levels of insecurity are.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes Originals '69–'73. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House.

[2] See footnote 6, Document 143.

[3] Laird's memorandum is dated May 30, Document 143.

[4] On June 13, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Richardson, Packard, Helms, Wheeler, McCracken, and Mayo specifying that the DPRC's review of the defense budget should include analyses of available resources, trade-offs between defense and non-defense expenditures, and alternative defense postures and their effect on the United States' capabilities and its ability to meet its commitments and its strategic objectives. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, 1969–Feb. 1970)

[5] In preparation for the Committee's meeting scheduled for the following day, the DPRC Working Group met on July 16 to discuss four papers: two prepared by the Defense Department, "Defense Planning, 1971–1976" and "Defense Alternatives;" one by the State Department, "An Analysis of Possible Reductions in U.S. Defense Programs and Their Effect on U.S. Foreign Policy;" and one by the CEA, "Economic and Fiscal Implications of the Defense Budget." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting 7–17–70)

[6] The Committee based its discussion of the defense budget on a draft summary paper, accepted during the previous day's DPRC Working Group meeting and entitled "Summary: Defense Planning 1971–76." The 17-page paper included the following sections: Introduction, Economic Analysis, Defense Options, and Combined Options. (Ibid.) The final version of the paper is Document 152.

[7] The President's Daily Diary does not record a formal meeting among Nixon, Kissinger, and Shultz during the President's stay in San Clemente from May 28 to June 1. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

[8] See Documents 2, 45, and 48.

[9] Document 39.

[10] Document 56.

[11] Table 5 of the summary of "Defense Planning 1971–76" lists several possibilities. Alternative A was to maintain the current strategic forces and general purpose forces

programs. Alternative B included two options: the first reduced strategic programs by $3 billion; the other also reduced GPF programs by the same amount. Alternative C also included two options: either "low" GPF programs cut by $6 billion or "reduced" GPF and strategic programs resulting in the same savings. Alternative D slashed $8 billion from the defense budget, resulting in "reduced" strategic forces and "low" GPF.

[12] No such paper was found.

[13] Table 6 of the summary of "Defense Planning 1971–76" outlines the costs and risks of alternative strategic and general purpose forces postures.

[14] Page 11 of the summary paper dealt with "Additional Impacts on National Security" of various reductions in strategic and general purpose forces.

[15] In a July 15 memorandum to Laird, Zumwalt wrote, "an approximate 10% budget reduction for FY 72 has reduced my confidence in any confrontation vis-à-vis the Russian Navy from 55% to about 20%." A stamped note on the memorandum indicates that Packard saw it. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–076, 110.01, Budget)

146. Editorial Note

President Nixon held a series of meetings in the summer of 1970 during which he discussed the fiscal year 1972 Department of Defense budget. On July 21, Nixon hosted Republican Congressional leaders in the White House Cabinet Room. Attendees at the meeting, which lasted from 8:37 to 10:41 a.m., included Vice President Agnew; Director of the Office of Management and Budget Shultz; Senators Scott, Griffin, Young, Allott, and Tower; and Representatives Ford, Arends, Taft, Rhodes, Anderson, Smith, Poff, Cramer, Wilson, and Bow. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

After covering the economy and domestic spending, the meeting turned to the Defense budget. President Nixon spoke "about the Soviet strategic capability, that they had more missiles than we did, they were ahead of us in conventional weaponry, they had a 3–1 advantage in throw-weight. We were not building any more missiles, by 1974 the President said they will catch and pass us in nuclear submarines. While we are ahead in MIRV, the Soviets have an MRV which carried 3–5 warheads in the 5 megaton range, which is 5 times the size of our Minuteman Missile. He said American power and superiority which has been responsible for avoiding a world war thus far; it is the only thing now standing between the expansion of powers and their expansion.

"He noted that the Soviets had built 40 land-based missiles in the last few months. The President said further that he is utterly convinced that the decisions we make now about defense are the decisions this country is going to have to live with the next few decades. I know it is not fashionable to put things in cold war rhetoric, but we've got to come out and tell the truth about these things." (Notes of the meeting; ibid., White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 81, Memoranda for the President, Beginning July 19, 1970)

Six days later, on July 27, according to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Secretary of Defense Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger at his office in San Clemente, California. No record of the meeting has been found. According to a July 26 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, the main subject of discussion was expected to be the FY 1972 Defense budget. Kissinger advised the President that Laird would "emphasize that reduced defense expenditures" would have numerous harmful results, including base closures, reduced research and development, and delays in force modernization and the move toward an all-volunteer armed force. Kissinger recommended that Nixon assure Laird that he placed great stock in the ongoing Defense Program Review Committee deliberations, which were "designed to surface the very problems" raised by Laird. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 225, Agency Files, Dept of Defense, Vol. 8, 21 Jul 70–Sep 70)

Following his return from San Clemente, Laird discussed the budget situation, "the

toughest problem we face now," at length during his weekly meeting with his staff on August 3. According to the minutes of the meeting:

> "Laird said we need to make an all-out effort to save as much as we can whenever we can with as little public exposure as possible. This will be the take-off point for the Congress. The President will probably veto several appropriations bills to dramatize his concern. He will emphasize security and foreign policy concerns. The U.S. faces the SALT negotiations, the NATO/Warsaw Pact problems, the Middle East problems, etc; and this is not the time to use the National Security Budget as a substitute for taxation and other problems. Each Presidential veto hardens the Congressional attitude and they will generally override future Presidential vetos. We are coming to a period where the President will make an all-out effort to dramatize the need for present Defense budget. The over-all situation puts us in kind of a bind. We will not only have to go through much of FY 1971 without a budget, but will have problems in FY 1972 as well."

Laird added, "we have to make an all-out fight in FY 1971 to keep our powder dry for FY 1972." Packard later echoed those comments. "Defense is the dog getting wagged by the tail. We have to make a greater effort than ever made before," he said. Although Packard "thought we were in bad shape last year," the Defense Department was now in a more serious "appropriations crunch." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-0028, Chronological File)

147. Record of Meeting with President Nixon[1]

San Clemente, California, July 28, 1970.

PRESIDENT'S REVIEW OF DEFENSE POSTURE

Selected Comments

RN: "We are at a hell of a disadvantage in conventional forces with respect to the Soviet Union."

He notes in two tables he was given that non-Vietnam DOD budget is going up as the costs of the war come down. "I want to look at that, where it's going."

"You've got to increase your conventional forces in the light of strategic considerations."

"If you limit [*build*?] ABM, why have air defenses? It's just ridiculous. Air defense makes damn little sense."

"Primitive area defense makes diplomacy credible for ten years."

The President placed considerable emphasis on role of forces in supporting diplomacy, indicating repeatedly that diplomacy is what really matters.

"Foolish to throw in Titans[2] before agreements."

"ABM opponents don't want defense, don't believe Russia is a threat."

"B–1 ridiculous."

B–52s useful as a deterrent against N. Korea.

"We are 8 years away from when you can put land-based missiles to sea."

Ehrlichman: "There will be a strong wave of resentment at standing down the bombers."

RN: Schlesinger's idea is a good one: cut crews but keep bombers, just not flying around.

"Air Force is a disgrace. Unbelievable bureaucracy. Still fighting World War II."

Navy is one we need the most. Credible power in area of world where we have brush fires. Navy, Marines, airlift are important. Navy has done better planning in Vietnam.

"Using a carrier against a major enemy is ridiculous. You get the issue of 15 vs. 12, etc.

Carrier is battleship of today; gunboat diplomacy is now carrier diplomacy."

"Amount you can take out of defense safely is damn small."

"We have to do some very tough thinking, crack a hell of a lot of heads in the Pentagon. Don't need assistant secretaries of Services, even Service secretaries. Laird knows this. Unbelievable to see layers of bureaucracy. We shouldn't take busy men, give them these jobs. Pentagon is in hell of a shape. [Ehrlichman: In DOD, they have a pudgy ex-advance man as assistant secretary with full colonel carrying his bag.][3] Taking the Services down evenly to keep everyone happy is coming. We should decide what we need; otherwise, they will keep chicken colonels, take out the guts.

HAK: We should use DPRC mechanism. We've wasted 8 years.

RN: "Eight years of $80–90 billion per year and what have we to show for it?"

HAK: Should go back to bureaucracy and ask questions we raised here. [Discusses GPF. Big disagreements, e.g. NATO planning horrendously sloppy.]

RN: "We've been here 18 months, they were here 8 years. We're waddling along at the same damn thing; we've done nothing."

HAK: You've got to let me do some bloodletting in the Pentagon.

RN: We've got to do it.

HAK: SIOP is a horror strategy.[4] [goes on at length] [goes on about NATO]

RN: "Isn't it time we get at this thing?"

HAK: If you order study, you will get answers.

RN: I don't want a study. We've got to. We've got to bite the NATO bullet.

HAK: We could probably afford reduced program plus some strategic cuts. We could get $5 billion, perhaps down to $4 billion. I was initially opposed to any cuts.

RN: I was too. In this case, it doesn't cut our real strength. But, we must beef up our strength in other areas.

HAK: Our analysis isn't good enough to justify the low program.

RN: It's important not to have impression that budget tail wags defense dog. We've got to ask for budget review for purpose of doing some fundamental thinking. We've done a lot, but we've got to grab it more.

HAK: DPRC meeting next Tuesday or Wednesday.[5] We can get limited or reduced GPF, $1 billion from strategy, say limited reduction and more air defense. We must change SIOP.

RN: Slip Volunteer Service to FY 73.

Schlesinger: Need not slip program. Can get attractive power for $1 billion because of smaller manpower base.

HAK: I think defense budgets not going to go up.

Ehrlichman: Can we find out what it will take?

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting 7–28–70. Top Secret. Nixon visited San Clemente from July 24 to August 3. On July 28, he held a budget meeting with Kissinger, Shultz, Weinberger, Schlesinger, and Ehrlichman, among others. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) See also Document 148.

[2] A reference to the Titan II, a liquid-fueled ICBM carrying a single 9-megaton war-head with penetration aids deployed in 1963.

[3] These and the remaining brackets are in the original.

[4] Kissinger's talking points for the meeting, prepared by the NSC Staff, noted, "We have no coherent doctrine for how to use our strategic nuclear forces under today's circumstances in which the Soviet Union also has an assured destruction capability." In particular, the current SIOP included only the options of a massive retaliation against either all Soviet military targets or those targets plus Soviet cities. "We can withhold whole countries from an attack," the talking points continued, "but not parts of countries. We cannot attack a limited number of targets for specific reasons with a specific type of weapon." In the section of the talking points dealing with SIOP, Kissinger wrote, "No retargeting." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting 7–28–70)

[5] The next DPRC meeting was held on Monday, August 10. See Document 149.

148. Summary of Meeting[1]

San Clemente, California, July 28, 1970.

Defense Budget Preview Session

I. Major Program Areas

1. *Strategic Forces*. Of the $2 billion cut in the strategic package, the Safeguard item was felt to be most critical. Safeguard provides a major bargaining element in SALT, and, failing a satisfactory agreement, an essential [element] in the force structure. Bomber reduction and Titan II phaseout were of lesser inherent importance, but should *not* be implemented prior to a SALT agreement, since they provide bargaining counters. Some interest was expressed in O&M reductions, while retaining bombers in the force structure. Substantial Air Defense reductions could begin in the immediate future—with no untoward consequences for SALT.

Approximately $1 billion in FY 72 reductions could take place. With completion of SALT, it might go higher, perhaps $1¼ billion, from the $2 billion enumerated in the strategic list.[2] But, success in the SALT negotiations *might also permit an additional $1 billion or more of cuts in outlays for strategic forces*.

2. *General Purpose Forces*. Dr. Kissinger emphasized possible inadequacies in the general purpose forces. A contrast was drawn between reductions in previously programmed forces and reductions in the ability to perform relevant missions—in light of force ineffectiveness or inadequate rationale regarding their employment. In essence, the $3 billion reduction associated with the Reduced Program seemed appropriate, though *no hard decisions were made regarding the individual elements*. The Low Program seemed imprudent. Concern was expressed regarding any further reduction of land forces. Emphasis was placed on avoiding equal share allocation of budget reductions among the Services.

3. *All Volunteer Force*. The President felt that the program might have to be slipped to FY 1973. It was indicated that, due to the projected decline of military manpower, the same attractive power for volunteers outlined in NSDM 53[3] could be obtained with $1 billion FY 72 outlays as with the $2 billion mentioned in the NSDM. Discussion was left at that point, with the President retaining the option to defer till FY 73.

4. *Total Indicated Cuts*

Prior to SALT Agreement $4.8–5.0 billion

Subsequent to Agreement possibly $5.2–5.3 billion[4]

II. Future Trends and Problems

1. It was indicated that, barring a transformation of the international climate, the trend for defense spending would be upward in light of pay and price increases and the need for strengthening the general purpose forces. Stress was placed by Dr. Kissinger on the need to develop serious, non-suicidal options for the strategic forces by expanding upon or supplementing the standard SIOP options. Beneath the strategic umbrella, it will be necessary to strengthen and improve the General Purpose Forces to insure that the President has adequate options in various contingencies, especially NATO.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting 7–28–70. Top Secret. See also Document 147.

[2] Following the DPRC meeting held on July 17 (see Document 145), the DPRC Working Group submitted the fourth revision of its summary paper, "Defense Planning, 1971–76," on July 23. The seventh and final revision of the paper is Document 152. A revised table, which was included in Kissinger's talking points for the July 28 meeting, outlined five alternative Defense Department programs and budgets. Alternative A was the current Defense program. Alternative B included two options: either a $2 billion reduction in strategic forces programs or a $3 billion cut in GPF programs. Alternative C called for "limited reductions" in both strategic and GPF programs totaling $3 billion. Alternative D included two options: either "reduced" strategic and GPF programs totaling $5 billion or "low" GPF programs also resulting in a $5 billion cut. Alternative E called for reduced strategic programs and low GPF programs totaling $7 billion in cuts. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting. 7–28–70)

[3] Document 139.

[4] A handwritten notation indicated that SALT was expected to yield an additional $1 billion in savings.

[5] Kissinger sent a memorandum to DPRC members on August 4 informing them that the President had "decided to postpone issuing revised fiscal guidance" to the Defense Department until the Committee had reviewed a host of issues, including the U.S. air defense posture and air, sea, and ground forces deployments, including those assigned to NATO. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, DPRC Working Group Meetings)

149. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, August 10, 1970, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
Defense Budget

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
Mr. Leslie H. Brown

Defense
Mr. David Packard
Dr. Gardiner Tucker
Dr. Donald Rice

JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Maj. Gen. Richard F. Shaefer

CIA
Lt. Gen. R. E. Cushman
[*name not declassified*]

OMB
Mr. George P. Shultz
Mr. James R. Schlesinger
Mr. Caspar Weinberger

ACDA
Mr. Philip J. Farley
Vice Adm. John M. Lee

CEA
Mr. Herbert Stein

NSC Staff
Dr. Laurence E. Lynn
Col. Jack N. Merritt
Mr. David White

Dr. Kissinger: Our discussion today will be a continuation of the discussion at the last DPRC meeting.[2] At that time we reviewed the general categories contained in the defense budget, and following the meeting we asked for separate packages on these categories. We wanted each category evaluated separately. After that meeting, we had an internal review of the defense budget at San Clemente by the White House staff. At that time, we simply brought the President up to date on our discussions.[3] In reviewing the tables that had been prepared, one of the things that concerned the President most was that these tables

were telling him the impact of various budget cuts on current programs, but they were not telling him what the purpose of the programs was nor what overall effectiveness could be expected. Thus, after the San Clemente discussions, we circulated a number of questions reflecting the President's concerns.[4] Certainly all these questions can not be answered this year, but we must make a start.

With respect to SIOP, [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Adm. Moorer: [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: We have also been told that over 85% of the force is targeted in a damage-limiting role. This would seem to lead me to ask: Just what are we trying to do with our weapons systems? What are we designing our forces for? Other questions which arise are: What are we trying to accomplish with tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? How do we intend to use these forces, if ever? How do these weapons relate to our NATO strategy?

The paper[5] we have before us tells us how budget cuts will affect current programs. But the paper doesn't tell us the value of the programs themselves. There is also the question of our air defense capabilities. On this subject the annex paper is very good.

Mr. Packard: Yes, the annex is a very good study.

Dr. Kissinger: The paper before us has developed three options for strategic weapons: continuing the current program, a limited reductions program, and a reduced program. It has also developed four options for our general purpose forces: the current program, a limited reduction program, a reduced program, and a low program.

We plan a NSC meeting on August 19 on this subject. Separate from this meeting, the military chiefs will have an opportunity to present their views to the President.

Bombers

Dr. Kissinger: Let's look at some of the tables. In the table on page 10[6] there are big differences in the number of bombers in the alternative programs, and also in the amount to be spent for air defense. Another consequence of a reduced budget seems to be the stretching out of programs such as the B-1 bomber.

Mr. Packard: In considering the defense budget, we must separate the different issues such as Safeguard, bombers, air defense, and general purpose forces.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, there are a number of problems to be solved. Of course, some, such as SIOP, can not be solved now.

On the question of bombers: What are they for? In relation to SALT, I'm worried that a

unilateral reduction in bombers and in the Safeguard program would have a profound effect upon the SALT negotiations.

Mr. Packard: I agree completely. If we unilaterally reduce our bomber force, and do not continue with the Safeguard program, the SALT negotiations will be undermined.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem we face is this: The final SALT session in Vienna will be held this week, and the members will not meet again until November 2 in Helsinki. Thus, there will be no further substantive talks on SALT until after the budget has been locked up. It has been suggested that rather than reducing the number of bombers, we could simply reduce the number of crews. This would allow us to cut the budget without unilaterally reducing our visible bomber force.

Mr. Packard: Yes, there are several things that we could do to pare the budget without reducing the number of bombers. We should agree to maintain the current visible bomber force until the end of the year.

Dr. Kissinger: Does everyone agree? We shall not cut the visible bomber force until the SALT talks have been resolved, but the Department of Defense will attempt to reduce its operating costs within this framework.

Adm. Moorer: Everyone should understand that once a crew has been separated it will take more than one month to reactivate them. It will take at least one year to reactivate and retrain the crews that are going to be released.

Mr. Packard: That's true. But we must reduce the budget while keeping the visible level of bombers up.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard) Could you work up a presentation for the NSC meeting on how to accomplish this? The plan should give the President an idea of the direction this action will take. I will assume that there will be no visible reduction in bombers until the SALT talks are concluded.

Dr. Rice: On page 13 we discussed this option.

Mr. Packard: We will work out the details.

Dr. Kissinger: Larry (Lynn) says that the option on page 13 reduces the number of bombers.

Dr. Rice: No, it just reduces the number of crews.

Adm. Moorer: Specifically, it reduces the number of crews on alert. Mr. Packard: It cuts out 24 alert sorties.

Mr. Farley: I agree that the preferred course is the one you have decided upon. But maybe we should still consider how important the bombers are in the SALT bargaining processes. Certainly the bombers are not as important as Safeguard, especially when you consider the modernization program involving the B–1's.

Safeguard

Dr. Kissinger: What about Safeguard?

Mr. Packard: It must be continued.

Dr. Lynn: What will be our proposal to the Congress?

Mr. Packard: That we continue the current program. Our Congressional people tell us that we are now one vote ahead in Congress. We are telling the Congress that we only want to continue the current program, and that we are not recommending further increases at this time.

Mr. Farley: Does that change the figures on the number of sites?

Mr. Packard: I don't know. The present plans call for 12 sites at a cost of $2 billion. Probably there will be a slight reduction.

Mr. Spiers: Does that mean that there will be no new sites in 1972?

Dr. Kissinger: There has been advanced preparation on a number of sites this year. What do we do with them?

Mr. Packard: Hold down the costs on these sites.

Dr. Kissinger: So we will be working on only three sites this year?

Mr. Packard: We will have to analyze that.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we get the analysis immediately?

Mr. Packard: We'll have it in time for budget recommendations at the end of the year.

Mr. Johnson: It seems to me that we need it today.

Mr. Packard: We'll come out not affecting the FY 71 budget level, or even the FY 72 level. The figures depend primarily upon the question of what we do with the additional sites.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it's clear that we can't do anything until the vote in Congress. But we should look at the implications of various steps in Safeguard. We need to get several alternatives from which to choose.

Titans

Dr. Kissinger: What about our Titans? Everyone agrees that they are not strategically useful, but they are the largest we have.

Mr. Packard: We have to have them throughout the SALT negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: How much does the program cost?

Dr. Rice: About $50 million a year.

Mr. Schlesinger: That could go down.

Mr. Packard: We will see if we can't minimize expenditures without reducing visibility.

Dr. Kissinger: *Then we have concluded that the impact of SALT on Titans, bomber levels, and Safeguard is to make it necessary to hold these programs at their current levels. On bombers, however, we will try to cut the budget without reducing the visibility. On Safeguard, we will need to look at the choices involving the various alternatives, but this will not be required at the next meeting. We have also agreed that the Titans should be kept until a SALT agreement is reached.*

Air Defense

Dr. Kissinger: Let's turn to the air defense question. The required level of air defense is not related to SALT. My view is that we don't have a very clear concept of what our air defenses are supposed to accomplish. The annex is useful for this, but much more needs to be done. (to Packard) What posture do you propose?

Mr. Packard: I've looked at the question of our air defenses for some time. Our current force is designed to counter a high-level attack under all circumstances except severe jamming. Our current forces will not be effective against a low level attack. The table on page 4 of the annex shows that in the assumed cases, only 2 to 20 million fatalities would be averted by perfect air defenses. We could go to a lower level of air defense by taking out the surface-to-air missiles. However, this would not take us down to the recommended level.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem is that unless we know what is necessary, we can't decide what level of air defense to develop. When we look at the number of Soviet missiles, it's reasonable to ask whether they would use bombers to destroy the American population.

Mr. Packard: But we don't want to invite them to use bombers.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we trying to prevent a bomber attack on the U.S. population then?

Adm. Moorer: We just don't want to give the enemy a free ride.

Dr. Kissinger: Does the current defense program assume simultaneous air and missile attack?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: After the enemy missiles have struck, will our air defense be working?

Adm. Moorer: Some of it. If we have no air defense then we will lose sovereignity of our air space.

Dr. Kissinger: I need a definition of what sort of air defense we need. We agree that the present air defense can't defend the U.S. population against a low level attack.

Adm. Moorer: But it's effective today. The Soviets don't have a low level attack force at this time.

Mr. Packard: The present system isn't very effective even for an attack today. But we don't want to give the enemy a free ride if they decide to attack us. That is the reason we are developing AWAC and other programs. If the budget is cut too low, then everybody would be able to fly around over our heads. However, we have a lot of tactical air divisions around the globe made up of F–4's and F–100's. Maybe we can make some of these planes available for our defense program.

Dr. Kissinger: The landing of the Cuban plane at Homestead Air Base when the President was only a few miles away is strong evidence that our current air defense system is not working.[7]

Mr. Packard: We can't do anything about one plane. We don't know whether it's private or commercial, where it is going, or what it is up to.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know what the right level should be for our air defense system. *Can we get a statement of objectives?* (*to Packard*) *Can we have some recommendations on improving our present system within the current budget, such as your suggestion of reassigning F–4's? At least then we will have a yardstick by which we can measure our needs*.

Mr. Packard: I don't know how much we can do in a short time.

Dr. Kissinger: The annex is a good start.

Mr. Shultz: What budget level would be necessary to build an effective surveillance system?

Dr. Kissinger: *Let's do with air defense what we have done with the other topics in this paper. Let's have a separate package on the different possible levels of air defense.*

General Purpose Forces

Dr. Kissinger: In the MBFR study[8] we reviewed many questions whose answers will affect our general purpose forces strategy: What is the role of tactical nuclear weapons? What should be our role in NATO? What role will the French forces play? Do we plan for the level necessary to defeat the Warsaw Pact forces? Is a 90-day supply of equipment sufficient in the NATO area?

Certainly we want to avoid the present situation, in which our main forces in NATO are in the least critical areas. Our main forces are now in areas which are the least likely to be involved in battle. Further, we have much larger stockpiles in NATO than any other areas.

When I looked at Tables 5 and 6, it seemed that the biggest difference was in the level of tactical air and naval forces, particularly in tactical air. There was a big difference in the number of tactical air wings under the various alternatives. The problem with deciding what tactical air level to support is like the question raised by our bombing study in Southeast Asia. We don't know what we're trying to accomplish with our tactical air program. The tables vary the number of air wings in Europe from 23 to 25. What does this mean? How many wings are required?

Adm. Moorer: All you can do is make the best estimate possible of the requirements.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm not challenging your judgment. All I'm saying is that there is a difference of two wings in the two plans. What does that mean? What can you do with 25 wings that you can't do with 23?

Adm. Moorer: There's only a difference in degree. What you must do is assume a scenario with each. Our forces are designed so that we will have to take no more than a prudent risk.

Dr. Kissinger: In the Southeast Asia bombing study we discovered that only 30% of the missions were being used for close support of ground troops. The remaining missions were for deep interdiction bombing. Is this a general planning rule? Or is this just the case in Southeast Asia?

Adm. Moorer: This percentage just applies to Southeast Asia. The attrition of planes in Europe would be much higher. In a war with Russia, our first goal would be to gain control of the air. Further, the Navy would have to protect ships rather than fly support missions for ground troops. The percentage of planes used in different missions in WWII changed as the war progressed. In WWII, close support of troops was only 15% of the overall air effort.

Mr. Packard: We have 4,600 U.S. tactical aircraft assigned to NATO. If you include the 2,500 NATO allied planes you arrive at a total of 7,100 allied aircraft in the NATO area. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have only 6,100. And we not only have more planes, but we also have better planes than the Warsaw Pact forces. When we talk about reducing the number of planes committed to NATO, we are only talking about removing F–105's and F–100's. Since these are our least capable planes, the reduction is not as significant as it might be.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we assuming that we are going to be attacked?

Adm. Moorer: The Soviets are producing Foxbat 2's and Flagons.[9] These aircraft are in full production.

Dr. Kissinger: How many planes would survive a Soviet attack?

Adm. Moorer: What kind of an attack?

Dr. Kissinger: An attack designed to achieve their objectives.

Adm. Moorer: At this time we are concentrating more and more of our fleets on fewer and fewer fields. This makes budgetary sense but increases vulnerability.

Dr. Kissinger: How many fields are they concentrated on now?

Adm. Moorer: Most of our planes are on five fields.

Dr. Lynn: Can they be dispersed rapidly or will they be caught off guard in an attack?

Mr. Packard: It depends on how it starts. Their planes have a shorter range than ours. If we can force them back, then we would minimize their effectiveness. But there is no simple answer.

Dr. Kissinger: In trying to decide the answer to this problem, shouldn't we recognize that there is a big difference between a first strike by them and a first strike by us? Another question: In the MBFR discussion[10] it was assumed that we would need tactical nuclear weapons early. Can any of the current fields be used for this purpose after an attack?

Adm. Moorer: Not all the fields would be usable, but some could be used. The use of tactical nuclear weapons would decrease the time needed to decide the outcome of the war. The tempo of the war would be increased and the outcome would be obvious sooner.

Dr. Kissinger: Whoever uses nuclear weapons first could make the air fields of the enemy unusable?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we shift between conventional and nuclear weapons on an aircraft?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Tucker: Every war game we have played results in extensive damage to both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: How sensitive is our nuclear force to the number of planes that we have? Is the effective nuclear capability significantly affected by the difference between 7,100 and 6,100 planes?

Adm. Moorer: As the battle progresses and planes are shot down, it would become significant.

Mr. Packard: The most important objective is to avoid nuclear war; and the smaller our general purpose force, the more likely that a nuclear war will occur early. Without general purpose forces, if a conflict starts the only alternative is to go to nuclear weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: Unless the Russians believe that a large conventional war makes nuclear war less likely. This is like the old circular discussion with the Europeans that building up conventional forces makes a nuclear war less likely, which makes a conventional war more likely, thereby making a nuclear war more likely. This is a serious question. Hillenbrand argues that if the Russians see that we have only a 90-day supply for our forces in Europe, they might conclude that we will have to go to nuclear weapons early.

Adm. Moorer: We keep conventional weapons in order to give them pause, that is, to provide a deterrent.

Dr. Kissinger: *We agree that right now we don't need to take any major steps in order to have a sufficient conventional war capability. What we do need is a recasting of the NATO structure.*

Mr. Packard: But we don't have sufficient conventional capabilities against surprise attacks.

Dr. Kissinger: The U.S. has only a 90-say supply for forces in NATO, but the Germans have supplies for only three weeks, and the Belgians for two days. In a conventional war, if the enemy broke through our lines this supply shortage would be critical.

Mr. Packard: If we have a satisfactory warning, then we can solve this problem.

Dr. Kissinger: *Can we get a figure on how long it would take to solve the supply problem?*

Dr. Lynn: We are doing that.

Adm. Moorer: We have wrestled with the supply problem in NATO for 15 years, but NATO

just will not face up to it. A big question concerns the French. If we have to supply our forces in a hurry what will the French do? We would need their ports for a rapid supply operation.

Dr. Kissinger: NATO could refuse to face this problem in the 50's and 60's. However, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and the balance might look much more attractive to the Soviets. In 1961 we could put SAC on alert; but now, can we afford not to answer these questions? I know that such questions would blow the lid off NATO, but these questions are facts of life. They are not even policy questions.

Mr. Packard: The U.S. tactical air program is in good shape. The question is, what would our European allies do? We can take out our lower-capability planes and cut costs without seriously affecting our situation. We could go down to 21 wings if all the F–100's and F–105's were removed. We can go down some without serious risk. Our ground forces are good, but they are not prepared to handle a surprise attack. However, the allies are in bad shape.

Dr. Kissinger: The only possible conclusion is that we must make our allies face the facts of life.

Adm. Moorer: For years the defense ministers in NATO countries have used our nuclear umbrella as an excuse for their inaction.

Dr. Kissinger: If we're going to stumble through the 70's in the same way, we want to know why. Some of our moves over Berlin did not make sense. But there was a question in the minds of the Soviets as to whether they should take steps that might lead to war. *The President and the principals must decide whether to rock the boat in NATO, but we are agreed that we can't go much further with our current discussions until we know what our NATO allies will be willing to do.*

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: We *must* realize, however, that it *will* rock the boat.

Dr. Kissinger: And we must be careful how it's presented. In the 1961–63 period we asked the right questions, but the way we asked them had a serious adverse affect. *That is why we need the NSSM 84 study.*[11]

Mr. Packard: That is why we shouldn't reduce significantly our general purpose forces until some of these questions are answered.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. Reductions would be very dangerous given the current strategic balance.

Carriers

Dr. Kissinger: How does one think about the right size for our carrier forces?

Mr. Packard: I think we will have to come down to 12 carriers while continuing the S–3A program.

If you look at our overall naval program, you can see that we must keep our tactical submarines. The number of Russian submarines is going up. We must also keep the number of escort vessels up. If we keep these levels up, then only 12 carriers would be necessary. We would like to build less expensive ASW carriers.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know what we need in the way of carriers. How do we decide this?

Mr. Packard: The ASW paper is well done.

Dr. Lynn: You have an advantage over us, we have not seen that paper.

Mr. Packard: Well, it shows where we come out on the issue of carriers. We will distribute the paper. Basically, it says that we will keep our present ASW program, and with the new developments that are already planned we'll be in good shape. We would then be in a position to limit our tactical air program.

Dr. Kissinger: In some places there is no land to base aircraft on. Adm. Moorer: This has always bothered me about our swing strategy. The Soviets have a large force in the Pacific. Even if we are fighting a NATO war we will have to have a lot of ships in the Pacific. The objective of an aircraft carrier is to destroy the enemy. We can't switch CVS/CVA uses. Fighting against ASW aircraft and against submarines is completely different. We must build smaller, simpler ASW carriers so that we can switch ASW's to a strike posture. We must realize the differences in the various operations. We can put some anti-sub weapons on other ships. Generally, however, an ASW war is a war of attrition. Twelve attack carriers, with six in each ocean, is absolutely the minimum. At many places in the Pacific we have no bases, and the Pacific is very large. The Navy is required to cover a very large area there.

Mr. Johnson: Could you give ASW's dual capabilities against carrier based air support and against submarines?

Adm. Moorer: We could take off the anti-submarine and go to air support planes.

Dr. Kissinger: We could go to smaller ships with more limited war functions.

Adm. Moorer: The big cost of a carrier is its electronic and other special equipment. The ship itself, the platform, is only 40% of the entire cost. The more aircraft you can put on a platform, the cheaper the overall operating cost of each plane. However, one ship can not be in two places at once, and we need to cover as much area as possible. These are the factors that must be considered in deciding on the size of vessels.

Mr. Packard: The first objective of the Navy is to insure freedom of the seas: both over, under, and on the seas. The second objective is to support amphibious operations where there are no bases. Only after these objectives have been reached should we argue whether we need carriers where we have land bases.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Johnson) What was your speech on Asia?

Mr. Johnson: What trade-offs between carrier and land-based air support and U.S. land forces will we be making in Asia? As negotiations proceed under the Nixon Doctrine, I suspect that we will have a need for more carrier-based and land-based air support and less need for U.S. land forces. I also assume that we will have fewer land-based air facilities. Thus, we will definitely need more carrier air support in that area.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you saying that we need a larger defense budget?

Mr. Packard: How safe do you want to be?

Dr. Kissinger: Alex's question is one of basic strategy.

Dr. Lynn: In charting our budget needs in order to gain air-to-air superiority, what percentage of the total air effort would be required?

Adm. Moorer: You can't separate the various functions of air power. Your first objective is to destroy the air fields of the enemy. After you have gained air superiority, you shift the mission of your Air Force. Thus, air power must be flexible.

Mr. Packard: The Israelis are a good example. In 1967 they bombed the air fields of the Arabs in order to gain air superiority. A percentage breakdown of the various missions is a very complex question.

Dr. Lynn: What force is required to gain superiority?

Dr. Kissinger: That question has already been asked.

Adm. Moorer: The first thing you must do is go for the other fellow's planes.

Mr. Packard: If you look at current forces levels, we have a good chance of maintaining superiority without nuclear weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: *The President doesn't want to know what you can buy at different budget levels. He wants to know what the consequences at the various budget levels would be. The question he is asking is: If I give up this program, what does it mean? If you go down 1, 2, or 3 steps in the budget, how will you affect the situation? Apparently our strategic situation is pretty good. In the NSC meeting we need to decide what each level of military spending means. What will be the consequences of buying at the various*

levels. I will check with each of you on these questions before the meeting. (to Packard) I know your problems with planning the current budget.

Mr. Johnson: What needs to be done?

Dr. Kissinger: *The current paper does most of the work. With one more round on this paper, with the ASW paper, and with an initial look at the carrier situation, we should have enough material for the NSC meeting.*

SIOP

Mr. Packard: With regard to SIOP, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. Its maximum effectiveness is not in destroying population but in striking the military forces of the other side after the fight has started.

Dr. Kissinger: But conditions have changed in the last few years.

Mr. Packard: Not all that much. Targets are still air fields, silos, etc. In the short term our weapons, such as Poseidon, will be effective against these targets.

Dr. Kissinger: Is SIOP budgeting handled the right way? Under the conditions now emerging, won't greater flexibility be needed? Of course, if we look at the options regarding SIOP today, we will be constrained by basic philosophical questions.

Mr. Shultz: What does all this come down to? Before the meeting began, Alex said that the military budget for FY 72 was $79 billion, but that $3 billion might be taken off. Where would the $3 billion reduction come from—the volunteer army program or what? Of course there are a lot of strategic questions to think through. But a lot of things discussed here today don't seem to fit into the strategic needs. That would take my thinking for FY 72 somewhere below the $76 billion figure.

Mr. Packard: The biggest variable is Vietnam. At present we have to hold tight on our budget there. In our overall budget, we might come down under $76 billion a little, if we could come back up if necessary later on.

Adm. Moorer: We must keep in mind the question of credibility with both our enemies and our friends. To a great extent, the threat we face determines the budget we must have. If the U.S. is to maintain its position as a leader of the free world forces, we must not let our budget determine our military force level.

Mr. Shultz: I agree. But if an increase in the defense budget is needed, we will have to have a tax increase. If that is the situation, then there is much work to be done.

Dr. Kissinger: That should not be necessary. But we do need the answers to several questions. After the NSC meeting, we will make a stab at some of the answers. Until that

time, we should continue our efforts to find ways to decrease the budget.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] See Document 145.

[3] See Documents 147 and 148

[4] See footnote 5, Document 148.

[5] An apparent reference to a revised version of "Defense Planning, 1971–76." Neither the paper nor its annex was found, but the paper's seventh and final revision is Document 152.

[6] The table, entitled "Comparison of Illustrative Strategic Forces" and included in Kissinger's talking points, listed the number of strategic forces, including bombers, Titan and Minuteman missiles, Polaris/Poseidon boats, air defense interceptors, SAM missiles, and planned Safeguard sites, available under the Current, Limited Reduction, Reduced, and other programs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970)

[7] On October 5, 1969, a Cuban Air Force MIG–17 unexpectedly landed at Homestead Air Force Base, located near Miami, at the same time that Air Force One was at the base preparing to fly President Nixon to Washington after his stay at Key Biscayne. (*New York Times*, October 6, 1969, p. 15)

[8] An apparent reference to NSSM 92, "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Between NATO and Warsaw Pact," issued on April 13. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, 1969–1976, Document 21. Regarding the MBFR papers prepared in response to NSSM 92, see ibid., Document 32, footnotes 4 and 5.

[9] The Foxbat and Flagon were Soviet high-altitude interceptor aircraft.

[10] The Verification Panel discussed MBFR on July 30. See ibid., Document 32, footnote 4.

[11] NSSM 84, "U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO," was issued on November 21, 1969. It is scheduled for publication ibid., volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

150. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 18, 1970.

RE

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tuesday, August 18, 1970, 10:37 a.m.–11:46 a.m.

The President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to consult them prior to the NSC meeting on the Defense budget of August 19, 1970, on the impact of possible Defense budget reductions. The session was intended to reassure the Chiefs that the President understood their concerns and would take their views most seriously when contemplating budget decisions.[2] A list of those who attended is at Tab A.[3]

After a brief photo opportunity for the press the President asked Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the JCS, to monitor the discussion. Admiral Moorer then called on each Service head in turn to present the major problems of his Service together with the impact of possible budget reductions.

General Westmoreland began by giving a rundown on the condition of the Army and the impact of the draft, pointing out that draft calls had failed to supply the necessary personnel and consequently the Army was running short worldwide. He felt that the single most critical issue facing the Army was the extension of the draft. He stressed that for the next several years the Army would be heavily dependent on the draft and indicated concern that Congress and the public might have the impression that it had an alternative to the draft in the short run.

During the discussion of the draft which ensued all the Chiefs agreed that it was not feasible to have a volunteer Army with the present public attitude and that failure to reinstate the draft would create a chaotic situation wherein the Army could not meet its commitments.

In stressing his concern for the need to proceed with Army modernization General Westmoreland reported that our enemies will be superior to us on the field of battle before the end of this decade unless we begin modernization. With respect to the personnel situation he counseled that there are limits to the speed with which we can reduce our manpower programs and that we have reached those limits.

In their presentations most of the Service Chiefs stressed that reductions in general purpose forces should be carefully evaluated in the context of strategic nuclear parity. General Westmoreland felt the Soviet Union would not be deterred by threats of nuclear retaliation from putting pressure on the United States in Berlin or the Middle East and

that they would base their judgments on suitable strategies on a realistic assessment of our overall conventional capabilities.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated that a budget cut would further reduce our confidence in the narrow edge of deterrence. In commenting on the increasing divergence between the missile and aircraft strengths of the Soviets and the United States, he noted that the Soviet trend was up, in both numbers and quality, while ours was either stable or diminishing. He also briefly touched on the threat from China. After detailing the impact of recent budget cuts on the Air Force, he spelled out what the effect of a further $1 billion reduction would be on both strategic and general purpose forces.

Like the other Service Chiefs, General Ryan emphasized that the biggest problem of accommodating a cut would be the personnel turbulence caused by the large numbers of persons released and that those remaining would incur personal hardships that would affect recruitment and retention for many years.

The Chief of Naval Operations began by briefly outlining the significance of strategic forces and the relationship of conventional forces to them. He then turned to conventional forces, distributing a series of charts which indicated that by each measure Soviet capabilities are improving relative to our own. He emphasized that at issue is whether the restraint of the past will continue in light of changes in relative strength of the two Navies. He stated he had only 55 per cent confidence we could retain control of the seas in a conflict with the Soviet Union and that with other anticipated reductions his confidence would be reduced to 30 per cent.[4] He commented that Soviet analyses would conclude that their maritime policy could be more aggressive and their risk taking greater than in the past. In concluding, he stated that a reduction in the FY 72 budget below the current guidance level would be tempting to the Soviets and reduce below a reasonable margin our confidence in the control of the seas which is essential to the reliability of our sea-based strategic system and our conventional projection of power.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps then commented that the Marines had gotten too big and were enthusiastically reducing in size. He indicated that the FY 72 guidance, while imposing some constraints, would not materially affect the combat capabilities of the four Division/Wing teams, although amphibious lift capability would be much lower. The main impact on the Marines would be in reduced personnel strength, down to about 2/3, and increased personnel turbulence.

Admiral Moorer then summarized by stressing the need to reverse the public attitude with respect to the Services. In response to a question from the President, he said that if we were unable to do this it was very likely that the Russians would do it for us and that their buildup, while we cut back, had significantly reduced our options. He also stated that in order for the Nixon Doctrine to succeed we must maintain our credibility and must also have a suitable MAP program.

The President then concluded by indicating to the group his understanding of their concerns, his determination to meet national security needs, and his appreciation of the outstanding performance of the Service leaders in particularly difficult times. The President commented that it had been an excellent meeting. The group left with the feeling that the President had a full understanding of the situation.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Box 82, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Beginning August 16, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that Haig drafted it. (Ibid., Box 245, Agency Files, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. I, 1969 & 1971)

[2] In an August 11 memorandum to Haldeman and Chapin, Haig requested that a meeting with the JCS be scheduled and described its purpose as follows: "Were the President to approve the FY 1972 Budget without prior consultation with the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we could be subject to severe criticism in the light of the reductions currently contemplated. The meetings, therefore, are designed to give both groups an opportunity to air their concerns and to minimize the kind of criticism that might come out of the Defense Department were the President to fail to meet them." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 225, Agency Files, Deptartment of Defense, Vol. VIII, 21 Jul 70–Sep 70)

[3] A list of the attendees is attached but not printed. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was attended by Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, Moorer, Westmore-land, Zumwalt, Ryan, and Chapman and was held in the Oval Office. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

[4] See footnote 15, Document 145.

151. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, August 18, 1970.

SUBJECT
August 19 NSC Meeting on the Defense Program

Background

On June 2, you directed (see Tab A)[2] the DPRC to review the implications of the issues raised by the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum of May 31, 1970 (see Tab B).[3]

I presented a preliminary review of the DPRC work to you in San Clemente on July 28.[4] At that time you had a number of questions. Subsequently, I conveyed these questions to the DPRC (see Tab C).[5] The paper we will be considering in the NSC was revised to address the issues you raised.

Much thoughtful work has gone into preparing this paper and, while we continue to have a number of basic questions, we can act with much greater confidence as a result of exploring the issues in depth as we have.

It is generally agreed that the Department of Defense can and must accept some budgetary reductions for FY 72. Following are the major issues:

All Volunteer Force

It is agreed that there can be reductions of $700 million in FY 72, and perhaps more, without seriously affecting the credibility of your commitment to the All-Volunteer Armed Force.

Strategtic Force

The DPRC agreed that we must not make visible reductions in our strategic forces which would undermine our position in SALT.[6] However, there are ways of reducing costs without seriously affecting the visible force and without serious loss to our strategic capabilities.

Strategic Bombers. The Department of Defense Current Program reduces B–52 bombers by 76 aircraft while adding about 40 FB–111s, giving a force of 503 bombers in FY 72 as compared to the existing 540 bomber force. If we accept that there can be no visible reductions to the strategic bomber force, we may still be able to develop options which

reduce operating costs for the retained force.

Titan Missiles. Ultimately, we intend to phase out Titan missiles since they are both inaccurate and unreliable.

Safeguard. If we get a SALT agreement by July of 1971 which limits or bans ABM, we would be able to save more than $1 billion for the NCA option or about $2 billion for the zero option.

If SALT discussions continue beyond January 1971, however, we must send up the next phase of the program in the FY 72 DOD budget. We can consider a full-speed-ahead program for Safeguard in FY 72, or we can select the option of zero, one, or two new sites for FY 72, which will mean smaller outlays. However, slowing down the program delays the completion of Safeguard two to four years and increases total costs $1 to $3 billion.

Air Defense. There is general agreement that we can make significant reductions in CONUS air defenses. Not only is our defense relatively ineffective against Soviet low-level attack techniques, there is also the question as to the value of building air defenses without having a missile defense.

We may want to make some qualitative improvements in our air defense at a later date, but no decisions are needed now.

General Purpose Forces

The DPRC looked at reductions of $2.4, $3.0, and $5.0 billion in outlays for General Purpose Forces. It was generally agreed that a reduction of $5 billion would seriously impair the capability of our General Purpose Forces and should not be considered.

The likely reductions appear to be in the area of tactical air forces, attack carriers, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, and amphibious task forces.

While we can probably make these reductions without serious risk, we do not have a good understanding of the role of tactical air forces and their contribution to our capability. It may well be that some of the missions for tactical air forces do not make an important contribution (we believe this to be so in Vietnam), but I believe much more thoughtful work needs to be done.

Similarly, we do not to my satisfaction understand the role and capabilities of our ASW forces. This will be covered in the Defense review I am starting at San Clemente.

Ground forces remain the same in all the feasible alternatives. We will have about 830,000 men in the Army, the lowest level since the Korean War. Yet, there are serious questions about the adequacy of our NATO posture and many argue that we should put more reliance on our nuclear deterrent. However, with a balance in both strategic and

tactical nuclear forces, which now exists, if we reduce our General Purpose Forces too far, we may be inviting exploitation in the area of our greater weakness.

In summary, I think we have reasonable understanding of our strategic forces and have developed sensible options, although some additional work has to be done. While there is much less certainty surrounding our General Purpose Forces, I think we have identified suitable areas for reduction, given that reductions must be made.

The NSC Meeting

I recommend that:

—you defer decision on specific items during the NSC meeting;
—you state that, after deciding, you will provide revised budgetary guidance and your priorities for shaping the defense posture.

Your talking points are in your book.[7]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–29, NSC Meeting—Defense Budget 8/19/70 [1 of 2]. Top Secret.
[2] Nixon's June 2 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, and Kissinger is attached but not printed.
[3] Laird's memorandum, sent on May 30, is Document 143.
[4] See Documents 147 and 148.
[5] Kissinger's August 4 memorandum to the DPRC is attached but not printed.
[6] See Document 149.
[7] Nixon's briefing book for the NSC meeting included his talking points, a 1-page paper prepared by the NSC Staff that scripted the President's opening and closing remarks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–29, NSC Meeting—Defense Budget 8/19/70 [1 of 2])

152. Paper Prepared by the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group[1]

Washington, August 18, 1970.

DEFENSE PLANNING 1971–76

I. Introduction

The last National Security Council review of this subject occurred in September 1969 when the results of NSSM–3 were considered.[2] Subsequently, the President issued five-year fiscal guidance and selected a strategy which calls for military capabilities for an initial defense of NATO Europe *or* a joint defense of Asia (Korea *or* Southeast Asia) together with support of Asian Allies against non-Chinese attacks plus a minor contingency (NSDM–27, October 11, 1969).[3]

During the past year, the economic and fiscal projections on which NSDM–27 was based have changed substantially for the entire planning period, as illustrated by:

—revenues in FY 72 have been reduced $7 billion because of the Tax Reform Act of 1969[4] and softness in the economy;
—costs of non-defense programs in FY 72 are $24 billion higher because of Administration initiatives ($11 billion), higher costs in formula-controlled programs, Congressional changes to Administration proposals, higher interest costs, and less rapid decline in inflation (totalling $13 billion);
—costs of defense programs in FY 72 are $3 billion higher because of increased pay costs, the decision in NSDM–53[5] to provide a Volunteer Service, and less rapid decline in inflation;
—a $23 billion budget deficit is projected for FY 72 rather than a surplus.

Table 1 shows the current projections of the costs of defense and non-defense programs, estimates of federal revenues, and the resulting budget deficits. These projections *include no new Presidential initiatives beyond those announced to date by the Administration*. Past experience would indicate that new initiatives add from $1–3 billion in the first year (FY 72) and $5–15 billion in succeeding years. The budgetary projections shown in Table 1, together with current estimates of the behavior of the economy under current policies, call for a reevaluation of defense and non-defense programs.

TABLE 1

Federal Budget Projections

(Then-Year $ Billions)

	FY 71	*FY 72*	*FY 73*	*FY 74*	*FY 75*	*FY 76*
Federal Revenues	$198	$214	$231	$253	$280	$306
Federal Expenditures						
Defense[6]	74	79	80	81	83	85
Non-Defense base	138	147	158	165	174	185
Announced initiatives[7]	1	11	13	15	18	21
Total	213	237	251	261	275	291
Margin	$15	−$23	−$20	−$8	+$5	+$15

The following sections of this paper describe the relevant economic considerations for alternative federal budgets, the range of defense and non-defense programs consistent with those budgets, and the implications of these program changes.

II. Economic Analysis

Given the projections of Federal outlays above, the range of possible FY 72 budgets is $220–$240 billion, though the lower end would require some very substantial and severe budget reductions. The relevant issues are:

—Would budget expenditures within this range be consistent with reasonable stability of the economy?
—Would budget expenditures within this range be consistent with satisfaction of high-priority non-Federal claims for resources?
—Would budget expenditures within this range be consistent with the Administration's credibility upon which its leadership depends?

The answers to these questions depend in part on tax and monetary policy. The questions are discussed on the assumption of no general tax increase, which means revenues around $210–$215 billion in FY 72. The answers also assume that the monetary authorities have a basically similar perception of economic conditions and needs, and respond in an expected and appropriate way. Based on these assumptions, the $220–$240 billion expenditure range can be structured at three budget levels:

1. *Expenditures in excess of $235 billion* are probably inconsistent with achievement of high-priority goals for housing construction and for State and local expenditures, including expenditures for environmental improvement.
2. *Expenditures between $225 and $235 billion* are probably consistent with achievement of high-priority non-Federal goals and with economic stability, but they involve certain risks which would be smaller, the lower in the range actual expenditures are. These *risks* are:
   a. Recommendation of a deficit of, for example, $20 billion would so contradict popular

notions of economic soundness and statements of the Administration as to create doubts about the Administration's ability or desire to manage its economic affairs and would, accordingly, raise questions about the Administration's leadership.

b. The announcement of a deficit of $20 billion would generate an expectation of inflation which, even though not "really" justified, would at least temporarily set back the decline of long-term interest rates and the revival of housing and State and local investment.

c. The Federal Reserve might exaggerate the extent to which the budget deficit requires monetary restraint to offset it, and consequently hold the real economy below the levels that are feasible and would be achieved if the budget deficit were smaller.

d. The estimate that a $235 billion budget is consistent with achieving other goals assumes that the economy will be allowed to rise to its potential by mid-1972. If the Federal Reserve, out of concern with inflation, stretches the recovery out over a longer period, there will be less real resources in FY 72, and our ability to meet both a $235 billion budget and greater goals will be correspondingly reduced.

e. The higher expenditures are in FY 72, the higher they are likely to be in subsequent years when total claims on resources are likely to be greater than in FY 71 and 72. A large budget in FY 72, therefore, endangers the achievement of other goals in later years (for example, projected revenues for FY 73 are $231 billion, see Table 2).

3. *Expenditures below $225 billion* raise a risk of another kind. This is the risk that monetary policy could not stimulate expansion of non-Federal expenditures *fast enough* to prevent a lag in the recovery of the economy to its potential.

On the assumption of no general tax increase, the foregoing considerations lead to an expenditure target in the $225–$230 billion range in FY 72, yielding a deficit around $10–$15 billion. These considerations, of course, have to be balanced against the benefits of some $8–$13 billion of Federal programs that would be sacrificed in getting the budget down to this range.

The safe level of budget expenditures could be raised by increasing taxes. However, it is generally believed that such a step would be extremely unpopular—i.e., inconsistent with the public's priorities—and most unlikely to be approved by Congress. Planning for the expenditure side of the budget should proceed on the assumption of no tax increase until the impossibility of a satisfactory solution on that basis has been demonstrated.

The receipts, outlays, and surplus (or deficit) for two feasible budgets are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Two Feasible Federal Budgets

(Then-Year $ Billions)

	FY 71	*FY 72*	*FY 73*	*FY 74*	*FY 75*	*FY 76*
High Budget						
Receipts	198	213	231	253	280	306
Outlays	213	232	251	261	275	289
Surplus (deficit)	(15)	(19)	(20)	(8)	5	17
Low Budget						
Receipts	198	212	230	252	279	305
Outlays	211	225	240	252	267	280
Surplus (deficit)	(13)	(13)	(13)	0	12	25

III. Defense Options

The projections of total Federal budgets and the economic analysis cited above point up the need to examine the alternative levels of defense budgets. This section describes the impact of several alternative defense budget levels on defense strategy and national security interests and commitments, and highlights the management and timing problems associated with large reductions.

A. Review of Current Planning

1. *Budget Guidance*

For planning purposes, NSDM–27 specified DOD budgets for FY 71–75. Since NSDM–27, there have been two major changes in the assumptions on which these budgets were based: (1) there have been pay and price increases due to greater than expected inflation; and (2) NSDM–53 added provisions for a Volunteer Service. The NSDM–27 budget, these changes, and the resulting current projections are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Projections of Defense Outlays for FY 71–76

(Then-Year $ Billions)

	FY 71	*FY 72*	*FY 73*	*FY 74*	*FY 75*	*FY 76*
NSDM–27	$76	$76	$75	$75	$76	$77[8]
Increased inflation		+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Volunteer Service		+2	+3	+3	+3	+3
Current Projection	$74	$79	$80	$81	$83	$85

Thus, simply to keep defense costs within NSDM–27 levels, about an overall 10% reduction in programmed forces, procurement, manpower, etc., would be required in the

out-years. In FY 72, cuts of about $3 billion would be required. In addition, defense might be forced to absorb further reductions to keep Federal deficits within the bounds noted in Section II.

As a result, a major review is needed to display the potential impacts of alternative reductions in defense budgets. Because orderly planning of even a $3 billion reduction in FY 72 will have major impacts in FY 71, decisions on defense planning targets are needed soon. Should actions on a FY 72 defense budget cut of $5 billion or more be delayed until January 1971, the transition problems will become almost unmanageable, as is discussed in Section D.

The current projections in Table 3 are based on the assumptions in Table 4 for the war in Southeast Asia. DOD budgets in the future will be very sensitive to changes in these assumptions. For example, increasing or decreasing the planning level of 260,000 men in South Vietnam by 50,000 men by the end of FY 71 would increase or decrease the incremental cost of the war in FY 72 by $500 million. Increasing or decreasing tactical air sorties by 4,000 per month and B–52 sorties by 200 per month would also change the war costs by about $500 million. The remaining sections of this paper do not vary the assumptions in Table 4.

TABLE 4

Southeast Asia Assumptions

(End-Year Deployments and Average Sortie Rates)

	FY 70 Actual	*FY 71 Budget*	*FY 72 Projected*	*FY 73 Projected*
Men in SVN	424,000	260,000	152,000	43,000
Men in Thailand	42,000	34,000	20,000	4,000
Fighter-Attack sorties/month	20,000	14,600	10,000	3,000
B–52 sorties/month	1,400	1,200	900	300
Incremental Cost of the War (outlays in then-year $ billions)		$12	$8	$4

The current projections in Table 3 assume that a Volunteer Service is to be created and that it will cost as much as was indicated in NSDM–53. The remaining sections of this paper do not vary this assumption. However, NSDM–53 may need re-evaluation in conjunction with this review of total defense budgets. If the defense budget is reduced significantly, the resulting force levels may be lower than those assumed in NSDM–53, and the costs of a Volunteer Service might therefore be lower. In view of the total Federal budget situation, it may also be appropriate to review the goal of a Volunteer Service and the timing of spending to achieve it.

Two alternatives are available for reducing spending on the Volunteer Service from NSDM–53 levels. The first would defer spending in FY 72 except for that which is already committed (e.g., the 20% first term pay raise effective in mid-FY 71). This alternative would save about $1.4 billion in FY 72 outlays. A second alternative would slow the pace of spending designed to achieve a Volunteer Service while allowing additional actions in FY 72 to improve pay and benefits (primarily for first termers), and improve recruiting and retention for active and reserve forces. This alternative might save $0.4–0.7 billion. Both alternatives would be designed only for delaying attainment of the Volunteer Service. However, the first alternative could be interpreted as cancelling the commitment made by the President in April,[9] since there would be much less overt action taken toward the objective in FY 72. The second alternative would allow the implementation in FY 72 of a number of specific actions designed to move toward a Volunteer Service, and would help maintain credence in the President's commitment. If adopted, savings from these alternatives would be additive to the illustrative reductions in forces and budgets shown in Table 10.

2. *Strategy Guidance*

For planning purposes, the following strategy guidance was established after the NSSM–3 review of strategic and general purpose forces:

a. *Strategic Forces*. NSDM–16[10] directed that planning for strategic forces would be based on the following sufficiency criteria:
   "a. Maintain high confidence that the U.S. second-strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out attack on our strategic forces.
   "b. Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the U.S. first in a crisis.
   "c. Maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the U.S. in nuclear war than they would suffer.
   "d. Deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level."
b. *General Purpose Forces*. NSDM–27 directed that planning for general purpose forces would be based on strategy 2 of NSSM–3. In addition to providing forces for a "minor contingency" and a "strategic reserve," strategy 2 provides that:

> "The United States would be prepared for an initial defense of NATO Europe *or* a joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). The forces are designed so that major operations in one theater must be conducted at the expense of the major capability in the other, leaving a reduced capability in the non-war theater. For example, we could assist our allies in Asia against a non-Chinese attack while simultaneously providing an initial defense of NATO, but we could not conduct an initial NATO defense and a joint defense of Asia simultaneously. If initially engaged in Asia, by disengaging we would have the capability for an initial

defense of NATO."

The President has also announced a policy for assisting Asian nations against conventional aggression:

> "We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.
>
> "This approach requires our commitment to helping our partners develop their own strength. In doing so, we must strike a careful balance. If we do too little to help them—and erode their belief in our commitments—they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own self-defense or become disheartened about prospects of development. Yet, if we do too much, and American forces do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote dependence rather than independence.
>
> "In providing for a more responsible role for Asian nations in their own defense, the Nixon Doctrine means not only a more effective use of common resources, but also an American policy which can best be sustained over the long run." (Message to Congress, February 18, 1970)[11]

This guidance was the initial product of the comprehensive review of national security policy initiated by this Administration. In evaluating the alternative defense programs discussed in the next section of this paper, it is important to note that the strategy guidance itself is under review. At the President's direction, the DPRC is preparing studies of the strategy guidance in order to define its implications and to re-evaluate its adequacy in relation to our national security interests.

It may be necessary to modify the NSDM–16 strategic sufficiency criteria. For example, the United States no longer has clear strategic superiority over the Soviet Union; in some areas (for example, total mega-tonnage and numbers of ICBMs) the Soviets have superiority. Since the Soviets have an assured destruction capability, we cannot rely on a favorable strategic balance to assist us in managing crises such as Berlin and Cuba. In addition, the Soviets may be developing a capability to make an initial strike, then threaten U.S. cities with their remaining weapons, which would be hardened so that we could not destroy them. Therefore, it might be desirable to change the sufficiency criteria to include an increased capability for strategic warfighting.

On the other hand, our strategy and foreign policy have assumed that the Soviet Union, in a first or second strike, could do unacceptable damage to the United States and its allies. A Soviet initial strike which withheld enough weapons to hold our population hostage would be a dangerous tactic. While U.S. strategic forces could not be used reliably for destroying hardened Soviet missiles, they would provide the President with a variety of

nuclear options short of all-out retaliation against Soviet cities. Some believe that a U.S. capability to destroy hardened Soviet missiles would threaten the overall Soviet deterrent and thus could provide a stimulus to the strategic arms race.

The NSDM–27 strategy for general purpose forces needs to be reevaluated and clarified as a basis for force planning. For example, the strategy includes the concept of curtailing operations in Asia and re-deploying selected forces to Europe if necessary for an initial defense of NATO. This concept is subject to considerable uncertainty. The NSDM–27 strategy does not specify how far forward we would want to defend in Europe, or what defense perimeter we would want to maintain in the Pacific in a war with the Soviet Union. We may also wish to reconsider the requirement that we be able to meet Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia with U.S. land forces, because providing for this contingency is a large restriction on our planning flexibility. Large differences in force levels depend on these factors.

B. Alternative Defense Programs

The alternatives that follow should be considered illustrative only and representative of what could be done at various budget levels.

If, for example, we were to reduce ABM funding to an R&D-only level, we could maintain one additional active Army division, two additional tactical fighter wings, an additional attack carrier with its associated aircraft, and an additional one-third of an amphibious task force. Such action would increase our general purpose force capability at the expense of meeting the fourth NSDM–16 sufficiency criterion.

1. *Strategic Force Alternatives*

General. The strategic forces needed to implement any set of strategic sufficiency criteria are subject to uncertainty about the threat, differing views on the amount of redundancy and thus confidence that is needed, and various interpretations of the scenarios against which we should design our forces. For example, we currently maintain an assured destruction capability in each of three forces: bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs. This Triad concept hedges against Soviet development of counters to our forces and against unexpected failures in our forces. As the Soviet counterforce capability improves, one or more of these systems may become vulnerable, making it an attractive target in a crisis. We must then either make the investment necessary to restore its survivability, or remove it, abandoning the Triad concept. In the latter case, to maintain the same total confidence in our assured destruction capability, compensating improvements in the reliability, survivability, and penetrability of the remaining strategic forces would have to be made. To maintain the same total destruction capability, the level of these remaining forces would have to be increased. The adequacy of alternative strategic force postures must be assessed in light of the inherent uncertainties and different possible design assumptions.

Some of the illustrative programs described below show major reductions in continental air defense forces. Appendix A gives a more complete discussion of objectives and alternatives for air defense programs.[12]

Four alternative illustrative forces considered below are summarized in the following table, with end-FY 70 forces shown for comparison:

TABLE 5

Comparison of Illustrative Strategic Forces[13]

		End FY 70	*JSOP*	*Current Program*	*Limited Reduction Program*	*Reduced Program*
Strategic Forces						
	Bombers	540	503	503	443	346
	Titans	54	36	36	—	—
	Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
	Polaris/Poseidon Subs	41	41	41	41	41
	Air Defense Interceptors	650	627	579	410	266
	Surface-to-Air Missiles	1,570	1,685	1,370	290	290
	Planned Safeguard Sites	12	12	12	8	4[14]
Cost of Strategic Forces[15]						
	FY 72 Outlays		$15	$12	$11	$10
	FY 76 Outlays		$14	$12	$11	$ 9
	Average Annual Outlays FY 72–76		$15	$11	$10	$ 9

a. *JCS Recommended Objective Forces*. This alternative (JSOP) was developed by the JCS in consideration of NSDM–16, with no specific fiscal restraints. It represents the JCS view of attainable forces with a prudent level of risk. These strategic forces would cost about $15 billion in FY 72. The JSOP objective levels include the B–1 starting in FY 77, the Undersea Long-range Missile System (ULMS) in FY 78, and the rebasing of 140 Minuteman III into hard rock silos (3,000 psi) by FY 77. The JSOP forces are intended to

meet all the NSDM–16 strategic sufficiency criteria.

b. *Current Program*. This alternative was developed under fiscal guidance consistent with NSDM–27 and would cost about $12 billion in FY 72. It would contain about the same offensive forces as the JSOP, but the Minuteman hard rock silo program would be replaced with a hardening program to upgrade existing silos, and ULMS would become operational in FY 80 versus FY 78. The forces under this alternative are still designed to meet all the strategic sufficiency criteria. If the Soviet strategic threat increased at rates above those projected in intelligence estimates for planning, and we did not adapt to such changes, some of the NSDM–16 sufficiency criteria might not be met in the late 1970s. The substitution of a hardening program for Minuteman III in existing silos versus rebasing Minuteman III in hard rock silos could result in as many as 150 fewer survivors (375 fewer RVs) in the late 1970s. Possibly less than 100 missiles would survive. Air defense capabilities would be as described for the Current Program option in Appendix A.

c. *Limited Reduction Program*. As part of an annual overall defense reduction of $3 billion in outlays, strategic forces could be reduced by about $0.6–0.7 billion from the Current Program. The eight-site Safeguard deployment plan would provide a light area defense of the country and some protection of Minuteman. This planned deployment would provide the basis for emphasizing National Command Authority (NCA) and Minuteman defense or could be a step towards a 12-site defense level deployed at a reduced rate. Damage limiting capability against aircraft attacks, small missile attacks, and accidental missile launches would be reduced with this program. Thus, the fourth NSDM–16 sufficiency criterion might have to be changed. The first three NSDM–16 sufficiency criteria should be met with limited risk against the greatest threat projected in the National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP). An independent assured destruction capability in each of the three force components should be maintained through the mid 1970s. The phase out of 36 Titans would result in the loss of 325 megatons and our only missile warheads with yields of over 1.2 megatons. However, there would be no significant loss in counter-force capability because of the limited accuracy of Titan. The current capability to use bombers against the CPR would be retained, though at the cost of a temporary degradation in some Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) tasks against the Soviet Union. However, our flexibility to use strategic bombers for conventional operations would be reduced.

All strategic bombers would continue to be included in the SIOP. They would continue to be targeted against all categories of targets including urban industrial targets, key military installations, and nuclear threat targets such as heavy and medium bomber bases, command and control facilities, submarine bases, ICBM sites, and hardened nuclear storage sites. Our capability to execute the SIOP would be decreased because of the lower force levels; we would lose up to 240 (264 megatons) high-yield gravity weapons out of about 2,000. Strategic bombers could be diverted to other than the SIOP commitment, but SIOP effectiveness would be reduced if this were done. The direct effect on the SIOP would be a function of the size and the location of the force that was diverted. For

example, current support of Southeast Asia causes degradation of 20 alert (out of about 170) and 20 non-alert (out of about 280) B–52 sorties from Guam. These sorties are responsible for targets in Communist China and North Korea. Elimination of these 40 sorties, with no compensating retargeting, would result in 38 CPR targets (out of about 270 targets covered by bombers) being completely uncovered.

The air defenses in the early 1970s would have approximately the same capabilities as those described for the Austere option in Appendix A, but the retention of 410, instead of 266, interceptors would provide some additional confidence against light bomber attacks. In the mid to late 1970s, the air defenses would have approximately the same capabilities as the fourth or "Expanded" option in Appendix A, when the Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar[16] and AWACS aircraft become operational.

d. *Reduced Program*. Under this alternative, annual outlays for strategic forces would be reduced by about $2 billion (including related intelligence and R&D reductions) as compared with the current program. There would be either a very light (seven-site) area defense system against ICBMs or a four-site system that could defend portions of four Minuteman fields. Alternately, if SALT terminated installation of Safeguard at Minuteman sites by 1 July 1971, a reinforced NCA site complex could be installed by mid-1978. If the seven-site light area defense of the country were chosen, rather than the four-site system which could defend portions of four Minuteman fields (or alternatively the NCA and three Minuteman fields), it would be necessary to cancel the Malmstrom site already authorized and underway and the Whiteman site for which authorization is now being sought before Congress. Also, it is unlikely that long leadtime funding for the additional sites could be obtained until 1972 in light of Congressional opposition to the concept of the area ABM defense. Under those conditions, the full operational capability of the system could not be obtained until FY 80, at which time the CPR could possibly have the missile capability to penetrate such a defense.

The reduced program would not fully maintain the Triad concept, because an independent retaliatory capability in the land-based missile force would not be assured beyond the mid-1970s, and the number of bombers would also be reduced. The capability of the land-based missile force would be reduced in the mid to late 1970s as Minuteman survivability against the estimated Soviet threat decreased. However, the capability of the sea-based missile force would be increased as Poseidon missiles with MIRVs were deployed. Thus, Soviet incentives to concentrate on ASW would be increased since a larger proportion of our overall surviving capability would be in sea-based missiles. The reduced Minuteman survivability would result in less damage-limiting capability, and there would be reduced confidence that Soviet incentive to strike first was sufficiently low. Our flexibility to use strategic bombers in conventional conflicts while maintaining SIOP alert would be severely reduced. Sufficient bombers would be available for strategic attacks on China only by accepting a temporary loss in capability against the Soviet Union. Simultaneous attacks against the Soviet Union and the CPR would have reduced coverage. If ABM

funding were used for defense of Minuteman, the fourth NSDM–16 sufficiency criterion would not be satisfied. The reduced air defenses would provide approximately the same capabilities as described for the Austere option in Appendix A in the early 1970s. In the mid to late 1970s the capabilities would be essentially those described for the third or "Austere and OTH" option.

All strategic bombers would continue to be included in the SIOP. They would continue to be targeted against all categories of targets as under the Limited Reduction Program. Our capability to support the SIOP tasks will be affected because of the lower force levels; we would lose 628 (690 megatons) high yield gravity weapons out of about 2,000 in the total bomber force loading. In addition to this permanent reduction of SIOP weapons, continued support of the war in Southeast Asia would create further temporary SIOP degradation. While strategic bombers could be diverted to other than the SIOP commitment, there would be a resulting reduction in SIOP effectiveness based on the size and the location of the force that was diverted. In a crisis, we would be forced to execute the SIOP with a reduced bomber contribution. In addition to targets currently uncovered because of the diversion of bombers to Southeast Asia, some additional targets requiring accurate weapon delivery and some more non time-sensitive targets would be left untargeted (e.g., nuclear storage sites and submarine bases).

Support of the war in Southeast Asia is currently being performed by specially modified B–52 C–F aircraft. If the bomber force levels in the Reduced Program were reached prior to the desired end of B–52 bombing in Southeast Asia, we would have to use B–52 G/H aircraft to fly Arc Light missions. This would necessitate modification of some of the B–52 G/H aircraft. For example, at least 21 months would be required to modify 60 aircraft at a cost of $24 million.

e. SALT. The JSOP or Current Program would have no significant effect on SALT. The Limited Reduction Program and the Reduced Program, with reductions in Safeguard and retirement of Titan and some B–52s, might weaken our bargaining position, but the reduced forces, instead of being destroyed, could be retained in non-operational status to mitigate any adverse impacts. Alternatively, in order to minimize the effect of strategic bomber reductions on the US–SALT negotiating position, we could keep a force of about 500 bombers in FY 72. To reduce costs, four bomber squadrons could be deactivated and the 65 aircraft, together with reduced ground and flight crews, could be redistributed from these units to the remaining B–52 bases. There would be an attendant loss of 24 out of about 170 SIOP day-to-day alert sorties; however, in times of emergency, manning and basing would be adequate to generate virtually all bomber aircraft to an alert status in about 48 hours (compared to 24 hours with the current program). Such an increased alert status could be maintained for short periods of up to 30 days. The FY 72 savings for this alternative would be $0.2 billion, as compared with $0.3 billion for the Limited Reduction Program or $0.4 billion for the Reduced Program. Neither of the alternatives with strategic force reductions is based on any presumption of a SALT agreement which would cause an alteration in force planning. A SALT agreement, as contemplated by NSDMs 69

and 73,[17] could allow reductions in strategic forces beyond those in the Reduced Program. As examples, if ABM spending were reduced to R&D only, FY 72 outlays could be reduced about $0.8 billion; if bombers were reduced by about 100 below the Reduced Program, FY 72 outlays would be cut $0.3 billion. However, annual savings over the longer term cannot be projected with certainty until a complete agreement is reached.

f. *Additional Considerations*. If U.S. strategic forces were reduced, the Soviet Union might perceive itself to have achieved a position of relative strategic advantage and, so believing, embark on even more aggressive courses of action. On the other hand, the Soviets might be satisfied with a rough strategic balance, and U.S. reductions could provide them with the opportunity to devote a greater share of their economic resources to priority non-defense programs or to general purpose defense programs.

If the planned Safeguard program were reduced to a four-site defense of Minuteman under the Reduced Program, it would not be possible to meet the fourth NSDM–16 sufficiency criterion. Such action would deprive us of the added flexibility in crises involving a Chinese nuclear threat, which is one of the major purposes of the Safeguard program.

While we currently maintain sufficient forces to provide an independent retaliatory capability in each of three offensive force components (the Triad concept), reductions in strategic forces would make it unlikely that an independent retaliatory capability could be maintained in the Minuteman force. A more vulnerable Minuteman force could increase the Soviet's incentive to strike first and possibly violate the second NSDM–16 sufficiency criterion.

The reduced strategic defensive force levels in the Limited Reduction and Reduced Programs would require coordination with the Canadian Government. Diplomatic efforts would be needed to preserve Canada's participation in the air defense of North America.

2. *General Purpose Force Alternatives*

The general purpose forces required to meet the broad goals described in NSDM–27 are subject to uncertainties concerning the size and quality of the threat, the availability and quality of allied forces, and the performance of our own forces. There are also varying views concerning the specific interpretation to be placed on the NSDM–27 goals and the degree of risk acceptable in implementing them. Table 6[18] shows a range of force requirements for NATO, for the Pacific against the CPR, and for minor contingencies. The higher forces are those recommended by the JCS for meeting the requirements of NSDM–27 with a prudent level of risk. Moving toward the lower levels introduces additional risk by making favorable assumptions for some of the following issues:

(1) Whether French forces are included with NATO forces.
(2) Whether forces are sized to give a NATO commander confidence of defeating the Pact

or sized to match capabilities, giving neither side assurance of success, and perhaps deterring the Pact from initiating military actions.
(3) Whether allied air ASW forces can be relied upon for area ASW. In all cases, allied escorts must be relied upon for convoy protection during the first month of a war.
(4) The percentage of USSR tactical aircraft assumed active in a NATO war.
(5) The size of the enemy force that can be sustained in combat.
(6) The quantity of tactical aircraft allocated for deep interdiction missions.
(7) The relative quality of U.S. and enemy forces.
(8) The capabilities of allied forces.

The land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces which support sea-based tactical air forces shown in Table 6 for different theaters will not add to give total forces because simultaneity is not assumed. For other naval forces, a war with the USSR would probably be a two ocean war, and area ASW forces and escorts must be provided for both the Atlantic and Pacific. On the other hand, an Asian conflict with the Chinese would have little impact on the naval balance between the Atlantic and Pacific. Therefore, these naval forces are displayed as allocated between Atlantic and Pacific in a ratio of 2 to 1.

Table 7[19] compares the capability of the forces in each of the five alternative general purpose force programs described below to the requirements shown in Table 6. In Table 7, the columns headed NATO show for each alternative the force levels that can be deployed to NATO within 90 days, while simultaneously retaining peacetime deployments in the Pacific and withholding the forces shown for Minor Contingencies and Strategic Reserve. The columns headed Pacific show the maximum deployments possible to a war with the CPR in Korea or Southeast Asia while retaining the capability to reinforce NATO.

In the reduced force alternatives, older ASW escorts would be retired in numbers consistent with the reductions in aircraft carriers needing protection. The reduced programs would continue to rely on allied, U.S. naval reserve, and Coast Guard escorts for convoys. The JSOP, current planning, and all reduced programs provide escorts for naval forces (e.g., aircraft carriers, amphibious groups, and underway replenishment ships), but do not provide active escorts for military or economic support shipping. Thus, the escort force levels shown in the reduced force alternatives represent no change in force planning factors from previous plans, but the resulting escort levels provide less flexibility in meeting possible requirements of the strategy.

Each of the alternatives for reduced forces would retire ASW aircraft carriers. However, using ASW aircraft on CVAs could restore ASW capability lost with the CVS reductions. There would, however, be displacement of tactical aircraft by ASW aircraft on CVAs and a resultant reduction in sea-based tactical air capability. Currently, because of the limitations of the S–2 ASW aircraft, CVSs are only marginally effective for ASW. None of the illustrative reductions described below would alter our planning for nuclear submarines. The Reduced and Low GPF options would reduce land-based patrol aircraft about 10%.

Since FY 71 is a year of transition, decisions for FY 72 should set the basis for our plans for the 1970s. In addition to defense budget issues, it is important to consider the possibility of changes to to the NSDM–27 strategy guidance. All of the alternative general purpose forces considered below are based on attempting to satisfy the NSDM–27 strategy and are evaluated with respect to their ability to meet it. It would be possible, however, to consider different degrees of emphasis on various force components and to develop different general purpose programs at the same budget levels, with or without changes in the NSDM–27 strategy. Trades between tactical air forces, naval forces, and land forces could be made, as well as trades between strategic and general purpose forces, as discussed in the previous section. For example, a roughly equal cost trade would be one Army division with its associated initial support increments for one-third of an amphibious task group or three Air Force F–4 wings. Moreover, as is discussed later, trades could be made between expensive procurement programs and the retention of additional forces with less expensive modernization programs. Thus, all the alternatives discussed below should be considered only illustrative; other mixes of forces could be developed at the same budget levels.

The following table summarizes the five illustrative forces considered in the next section, and for comparison, the end-FY 70 forces:

TABLE 8

Comparison of Illustrative General Purpose Forces[20]

	End FY 70	*JSOP*	*Current Program*	*Limited Reduction Program*	*Reduced Program*	*Low Program*
General Purpose Forces						
Active Divisions	20⅓	19⅓	16⅓	16⅓	16⅓	14⅓
Total Divisions	29⅓	28⅓	25⅓	25⅓	25⅓	23⅓
Fighter Attack Aircraft[21]	5,800	6,100	5,300	4,900	4,400	4,100
CVAs/CVSs	15/4	16/8	13/4	14[22]	12	12
Escorts	240	265	204	172	169	169
Amphibious Task Forces	1⅓	1⅔	1⅓	1	1	1
C–5A	20	111	78	78	78	78
C–141	275	275	275	275	275	195
Cost of General Purpose Forces[23]						
FY 72 Outlays		$58	$49	$47	$46	$44

FY 76 Outlays	55	42	39	36	32
Average Annual Outlays (FY 72–76)	55	43	41	37	35

a. *JCS Recommended Objective Program*. This alternative (JSOP) was developed by the JCS in consideration of the NSDM–27 strategy guidance with no fiscal restraints. It represents their view of a prudent level of risk, and the general purpose forces, including the cost of the war in Southeast Asia, would cost about $58 billion in FY 72. Of the total divisions, 16 are active Army and 3 are active Marine divisions, and there are 26 Air Force, 16 Navy, and 3 Marine tactical fighter wings. With these force levels, the higher range of requirements shown in Table 6 could be met for all theaters, but not simultaneously. CVA deployments and commitments could remain at current levels, as could the commitment of Navy ships to NATO.

b. *Current Program*. This alternative was developed under fiscal guidance consistent with NSDM–27 and would cost about $49 billion in FY 72. Compared to the JSOP, this alternative would have three fewer Navy carrier wings and three fewer Air Force fighter attack wings. Peacetime forward deployments would be reduced by one wing in both NATO and the Pacific. CVA deployments to Southeast Asia would be reduced by one (as is currently planned), and the commitment of Navy ships to NATO would have to be reduced somewhat. Compared to the JSOP, the Current Program would involve increased levels of risk in meeting the NSDM–27 strategy because of the reduced levels of active forces and increased reliance on strategic warning, an earlier decision to mobilize, and reserve readiness. With the forces in this alternative, a total of 16 divisions (14 Army and 2 Marine) and 31 tactical fighter attack wings (six on CVAs) could be deployed to NATO within 90 days, compared to the ranges of 14 to 17 divisions and 27 to 42 tactical fighter attack wings, shown as requirements in Table 6. With regard to Pacific areas, the high side of the requirements range could be met for all but naval forces, which would exceed the low side of the range of requirements, causing increased risk. As in the JSOP, active U.S. ASW escorts would be sufficient for meeting only naval forces escort requirements.

c. *Limited Reduction Program*. This program would reduce general purpose forces by about $2.3 billion annually from the Current Program. With the reduction in amphibious task forces, a division-sized amphibious assault capability would be lost in one theater. (There would be a one-brigade assault capability in the Atlantic and a two-brigade capability in the Pacific, with a "swing" of one brigade between oceans being possible within about 30 days.) Changes in current deployments would be the same as for the Current Program. In addition to planned land force reductions in SEA, one division would withdraw from Korea in FY 71 and two-thirds in FY 73 (one brigade would be left), and one attack carrier would withdraw from Southeast Asia in FY 71.

The general purpose forces in the Limited Reduction Program would be sufficient to meet the NSDM–27 strategy, but at greater risk than in the Current Program. Two fewer fighter

attack wings could be deployed to NATO or the Pacific by M+90 than under the Current Program, but capabilities would still be greater than the low side of the range of requirements in Table 6 (with acceptance of risks and favorable assumptions previously discussed) except for Navy escorts. This alternative maintains ASW modernization programs at the expense of retiring older, less capable ASW forces. This would result in a degraded ASW capability, especially during the early 1970s. The U.S. force would have a marginal capability to contain the Soviet submarine threat in the Atlantic; sea lines of communication in the Pacific might be exposed during a NATO war. As in the current program, full reliance would have to be placed on some 315 allied, 35 naval reserve, and 15 Coast Guard escorts for point defense of convoys (NATO Allies have about 225 escorts, Pacific Allies about 90).

d. *Reduced Program*. This program would make a $3 billion annual reduction in outlays for general purpose forces. Support and modernization levels for the forces would also be reduced relative to the Limited Reduction Program. Forward deployments would be the same as in the Limited Reduction Program, with the exception of a decrease of one more tactical air wing for the Pacific and one more in Europe. Both reductions would not have to be made in FY 72, but it would be desirable to do so.

This program would involve more risk than the Limited Reduction Program, but capabilities for NATO and Asian conflicts would exceed the low side of the requirements range in Table 6 (with acceptance of risk and favorable assumptions previously discussed) except for the capability to deploy one additional air wing. The ASW escort level would involve about the same level of risk as in the Current Program. As in the Limited Reduction Program, full reliance would have to be placed on allied, naval reserve, and Coast Guard escorts for point defense of convoys.

e. *Low Program*. This program would result in an annual $5 billion reduction in outlays for general purpose forces. It would be desirable to accelerate the withdrawal of the ⅔ division from Korea to FY 72 instead of FY 73. These reductions would make it desirable to change the NSDM–27 strategy by reducing forces available for deployment to Asia, because the extremely heavy reliance upon strategic warning, coupled with severe reductions in forces, would provide no flexibility of response except at the expense of a marginal NATO initial defense posture. This change could be consistent with the Nixon Doctrine only if our Asian Allies develop their self-defense capability at an accelerated rate.

f. *Additional Considerations*. The five general purpose forces programs discussed above reflect a progressive degradation of capability in meeting elements of the approved strategy. Compared to the JSOP program, which the JCS designed to provide the capability of meeting all elements of the strategy at a prudent level of risk, the Current Program and Limited Reduction should meet the various strategy elements with some increased risk, primarily involving reliance on strategic warning, an early decision to mobilize, and on reserve readiness. These plans call for greater reliance on ready reserves

in the 1970s than in the 1960s. Yet it may be difficult to maintain even current levels of reserve readiness as we move toward a Volunteer Service, since the draft is a major stimulus to participation in the reserves. The Reduced Program would involve increased risks, particularly for tactical air and naval forces, but also for land forces, as support and modernization would be curtailed significantly. While the NSDM–27 strategy could be supported under the Reduced Program at substantial risk, it probably could not be supported under the Low Program, since our potential future commitment of forces to Asia would have to be reduced.

Force modernization would be progressively reduced with decreased funding for general purpose forces. At the Reduced Program level, many modernization programs previously delayed as a result of Southeast Asia funding would be eliminated. On the other hand, many high cost modernization programs are included in all alternatives, although they are slipped or reduced in some cases. For example, the B–1, ULMS, DD–963, S–3A, F–14, and F–15 are included in all alternatives. It would be possible at equal cost to replace some of these programs with less costly ones to retain more operational forces. For example, if the DD–963 and DLGN programs were replaced with less expensive destroyer and missile escort programs, it would be possible to retain one more active Army division or two to three more F–4 fighter attack wings. We could keep such additional forces at the expense of adopting more austere procurement programs under any budget level, but there would be the potential increased risk in the performance of the less expensive systems against the Soviets.

As the total general purpose forces are reduced, our ability to maintain overseas deployments would be degraded. Major end-FY 70 deployments and FY 72 changes thereto that would be necessary under the various general purpose force alternatives are shown in the following table. In addition to these changes, an additional two-thirds of a division would be withdrawn from Korea in FY 73 under all cases except the Low Program, where it would come out in FY 72.

It should be noted that large sections of the NATO–Warsaw Pact front are manned by our allies, and not by U.S. forces. Currently these allied forces are not adequate in size, nor adequately equipped, to defend conventionally against a Warsaw Pact offensive for 90 days. In considering U.S. force levels in Europe, it should therefore be emphasized that the outcome is greatly dependent on our allies' performance and is not solely dependent upon the U.S. force structure. Another consideration for U.S. force planning is that since the opening weeks of a war in Europe would be critical, forward deployed forces are much more important than long-term reinforcement capability.

Reductions in overall force posture and forward deployments could lead potential aggressors to conclude that they could pursue their objectives with less risk, thereby leading to more aggressive foreign policies and hostile initiatives. Rapid and precipitous reductions in deployment might preclude orderly and fruitful consultation with allies.

Our commitments of naval and tactical air forces to NATO would have to be changed under the various reduced programs, as is shown in Table 9 on page 20. The reductions in the commitments of naval forces would be politically significant, since they would continue the series of reductions in NATO committed forces that have been going on for the last two years. The change in commitment of tactical air forces under the Low Program would also cause concern on the part of our allies about our ability to support the current NATO strategy.

[Omitted here are Table 9, "Illustrative General Purpose Force Deployments in FY 72," and Table 10, "NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) Commitments and Changes That Would Be Required As Result of Reduced Programs."]

In general, the force reductions included in the Current Program should present no unmanageable foreign policy problems. The reductions in deployments included for the Low Program would present more serious political problems. The cut in Korean-based forces, if accelerated as shown, could cause the Asian Allies to have misgivings about the Nixon Doctrine and its implementation. The cuts in the Low Program, particularly if combined with major strategic force cuts, could undermine Japanese confidence in U.S. security guarantees and cause a change in the direction of Japanese security planning. On the other hand, some believe that American force cutbacks have been anticipated and probably discounted by our allies and our potential opponents alike for some time.

g. *Other Mission Changes*. All of the illustrative reduction options include changes in other defense missions, such as intelligence, communications, and research and development. The combined $7 billion reduction of reduced strategic forces and low general purpose forces includes a $0.6 billion cut in other missions. The reduction in intelligence programs would cut only marginal programs, but it would thereby reduce flexibility to respond to new requirements. The reductions in research and development would hold the FY 72 level about even with that for FY 71. Some believe that reduced programs could require increased intelligence programs, because the reduced programs plan increased reliance on strategic warning. Similarly, it could be necessary to expand R&D efforts to provide hedges against the decreased capabilities in the reduced programs.

h. *Support to Other Nations*. The Nixon Doctrine relies on increases in support for our allies as a partial substitute for U.S. forces. This Support to Other Nations includes the Military Assistance Program (including Foreign Military Credit Sales) funding in the DOD budget for procurement of war reserve stocks for our allies, and on-going combat support of allied forces in SEA. All alternatives provide for continued support of South Vietnamese combat forces at declining levels of activity through the FY 72–76 period ($2.6B in FY 72 declining to $1.1B by FY 75–76). All alternatives provide MAP/FMCS at $1.0–1.1B per year ($0.3–0.4 above FY 70–71 levels) and a total of approximately $2B in FY 73–76 for building war reserve stocks of ammunition and equipment for U.S. allies. Given current Congressional attitudes and problems with Support to Other Nations authorizations, it may prove difficult to win Congressional authorization for these

increases.

B. *Total Defense Program Alternatives*

Table 10A shows alternative defense budgets and alternative combinations of strategic and general purpose forces programs. The reductions shown for FY 72 are from the current defense budget projections in Table 3. Table 11 summarizes illustrative force changes and other impacts associated with each of the strategic and general purpose forces illustrative alternatives discussed above. The impacts of any case in Table 10A can be determined by referring to the appropriate sections of Table 11. For example, Case D2 is described by the right column of Strategic Forces and the next to the last column of General Purpose Forces. For all cases in Table 10A, reducing the Safeguard program to research and development only would produce an additional $0.8 billion reduction in FY 72 (an $11.5 billion reduction in FY 72–80). An additional $0.4–1.4 billion reduction could be obtained by deferring the Volunteer Service.

TABLE 10A

Alternative DOD Programs and Budgets

Case	*Strategic Forces Programs*	*General Purpose Forces Programs*	*Budget Changes from Current Planning*[24] (Outlays in FY 72 $ Billions)
A	Current	Current	0
B1	Reduced	Current	−2
B2	Current	Reduced	−3
C	Limited Reductions	Limited Reductions	−3
D1	Current	Low	−5
D2	Reduced	Reduced	−5
E	Reduced	Low	−7

C. Evaluation of National Security Impact and Possible Effects of Defense Programs

Decisions regarding U.S. strategic and general purpose force levels must be made in the context of national security interests and commitments and the possible effects various defense programs would have. In the past decade the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union has shifted from one of U.S. nuclear superiority to one of nuclear parity. Some believe the Soviets will attempt to achieve nuclear superiority. Whereas a decade ago the strategic balance appeared to constitute a real constraint on the Soviets, these advantages may no longer pertain in the future. Despite U.S. nuclear superiority, the United States has assumed for at least eight years that the Soviets have a

strong second-strike capability. Thus, Soviet advances leading to rough numerical parity may not change the impacts of this long-held assumption.

It is within this broader context that the preceding illustrative reductions between FY 70 and FY 72 of up to 25% in active divisions, 25% in carrier decks, 20%–25% in fighter attack aircraft, 35% in strategic bombers, and 50% in air defense fighters must be weighed. Some believe that our potential adversaries, under economic pressures substantially like those which confront the United States, would use U.S. force reductions to justify comparable reductions in their armament investments. Others hold that our adversaries would see in U.S. defense program reductions an opportunity to acquire military advantages and greater freedom for political initiatives.

[Omitted here is Table 11, "Comparison of Illustrative Forces and Implications on Strategy and Commitments."]

Any major changes in U.S. force levels will be visible to allies and enemies alike. The chance will exist that our capabilities, intentions, and resolve might be misinterpreted. Reductions in U.S. military forces will be used by factions within the Soviet Union and elsewhere to argue for further testing of our abilities and commitments to our allies. Historical precedents, such as Berlin—1948, Korea—1950, Berlin—1961, Cuba—1962, and Vietnam—1961–1965, suggest that Communist aggression may be induced, in part, by reduced U.S. force levels. At the times of the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, the Soviets apparently perceived the United States as having the capability to pre-empt their strategic weapons, which may have been the major factor in their decisions not to escalate those crises further. Since the Soviets now have rough strategic parity with the United States, the U.S. strategic forces could form less of a deterrent to Soviet escalation in a crisis. We may therefore be more dependent on our general purpose forces to handle crisis situations.

The Nixon Doctrine calls for U.S. allies to assume a greater burden of their defense, particularly with respect to ground forces. Thus, reductions in U.S. forces do not necessarily reduce total free-world capabilities if our allies increase their own capabilities and strengthen regional security arrangements. There are, however, major political barriers to substantial increases in the military forces and budgets of our NATO Allies. Increases in allied capability in Asia will be dependent, for at least several years, on increased U.S. materiel support.

Our allies already have considerable capability as indicated below. They generally, however, spend a lesser share of GNP on defense than does the United States. Thus, consideration can be given to increased allied defense spending, especially with U.S. assistance, and at least the question of what is the U.S. and allied fair share of defense should be raised.

TABLE 12

Selected U.S. and Allied Defense Forces

	U.S[25]	*Other NATO*	*Japan*	*S. Korea*
Ground Forces, Active Manpower	1,000,000	1,000,000	200,000	600,000
Fighter/Attack Aircraft	5,200	2,500	400	230
Naval Escorts	200	232	35	6
Submarines	85	119	10	—
Defense Exp. as % of GNP	6.5%	4.5%	0.9%	4.0%
Defense Exp. per Capita	$380	$78	$11	$6

It has been suggested that reduced conventional forces for defense of Europe are made more acceptable by the fact that we can, if necessary, fall back on tactical nuclear weapons for European defense. For the past decade, we have maintained forces designed to avoid primary reliance on tactical nuclear weapons against the more likely conventional threats in NATO. We would continue to do so under the Reduced or Low Programs considered in this paper. (Against the unlikely threat of mobilization by the Pact with no corresponding NATO mobilization, our conventional forces would be inadequate to prevent the Pact from making a deep penetration into Western Europe, but nuclear weapons would not be likely to provide a more favorable outcome.) We maintain tactical nuclear forces primarily to deter the Pact from starting a nuclear conflict and to cause them to be uncertain as to our response if they mount any type of aggression. Thus, NATO's nuclear forces assist in preventing the Pact from making a confident assessment that they could achieve a favorable outcome in any conflict, even one that started with only conventional weapons. Our nuclear forces also provide a capability to engage in a nuclear conflict and destroy Pact forces if deterrence fails. Reliance on tactical nuclear forces in NATO Europe for waging war (as opposed to deterring war) would provide little assurance that the ultimate war outcome would be favorable to NATO. Both sides have significant inventories of survivable tactical nuclear weapons. An exchange would result in heavy destruction to both sides, with the ultimate outcome highly uncertain. The military and civilian losses in a tactical nuclear exchange are likely to be considerably larger than in conventional conflict. Therefore, such a strategy would not lead to reductions in conventional force requirements.

In Asia, our long-range plans call for the Asian Allies to develop more effective armed forces and alliances for self-defense. Our experiences in Korea and Vietnam show that it takes years of steady effort and a reasonable degree of security to achieve a self-defense capability. A deliberate plan of phased reductions with reserve capability to respond to crises, coupled with extensive diplomatic efforts and MAP programs, is essential to effective implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

We have also maintained forces designed to avoid reliance on the use of nuclear weapons to counter the more likely conventional threats in Asia. Such a policy could be continued

under the Current Program or the Reduced Program. (In the event of concurrent major CPR and Soviet aggression, which the NSDM–27 guidance does not provide for, adequate conventional forces would not be available in Asia.) The more likely threats in Asia, with the exception of Korea, have been and continue to be insurgencies rather than large overt attacks with a relatively well defined battle line. Against such threats, nuclear weapons would have limited tactical utility at best. Tactical nuclear forces are maintained primarily to deter the use of nuclear weapons by the CPR and to cause them to be uncertain as to our response if they mount any type of large overt attack. Thus, our nuclear forces oriented toward Asia assist in preventing Asian communists from making a confident assessment that they could be successful in an overt attack. Such forces also provide a capability to counter Asian communist aggression if deterrence fails.

The issue arises whether tactical nuclear powers (as opposed to a major strategic nuclear strike) would provide an adequate hedge or option against the CPR in cases where general purpose forces appear insufficient. As the CPR develops its nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities (IR/MRBMs in particular) such a strategy becomes increasingly less attractive. Because of the concentration of U.S. forces and the difficulties of support and supply, a tactical nuclear campaign in Korea or Southeast Asia against the CPR when it has the ability to retaliate is not likely to be to U.S. advantage. Such a situation should exist by the the mid-1970s at the latest. Thus, while reliance on tactical nuclear weapons might appear to be an attractive alternative to modifying our Asian strategy (e.g., by redefining potential lines of defense) when conventional forces appear to be inadequate, tactical nuclear forces actually are not a reasonable alternative for conventional defenses. Thus, under the Low Program it would be more appropriate to modify the strategy rather than rely on tactical nuclear forces.

D. Transition Problems

The problems of transition to lower defense budgets and force levels fall into two categories, those relating to foreign policy and relations with our allies and those relating to the management of reductions within DOD. As discussed below, there will be serious transition problems in FY 71 and FY 72 even if the defense budget is maintained at current planning levels. During this period, we are already planning major reductions in defense programs for two reasons: (1) we plan reduced activity in Southeast Asia, and (2) we are reducing our post-war baseline forces in keeping with the strategy and budgets in NSDM–27. Further reductions will magnify these already serious transition problems. The severity of the transition problems will depend on the extent of the reduction and the lead-time available for phasing. The most critical aspect of the transition problem is timing. To make large reductions, action must start soon to minimize management problems within the Defense Department and to allow time to explain strategy and force changes to both Congress and foreign governments to maintain their confidence in Administration policies.

1. *Foreign Policy Considerations*

The possible adverse effect on SALT of reductions in strategic forces prior to any agreement has been discussed earlier. Also mentioned earlier was the need for a deliberate transition plan, coordinating our planned force and deployment changes with diplomatic efforts to preserve the confidence of the allies in NATO's continuing effectiveness and to induce the allies to make compensating increases in their commitments to match our reductions.

Vietnamization is a keystone in the Nixon Doctrine. But flexibility to slow or stop currently planned reductions in activity levels to meet unexpected developments in Southeast Asia is severely constrained at defense budgets $6 billion below the currently planned level. The force reductions shown for the reduced and low general purpose force levels depend on meeting the currently programmed schedule of withdrawals from Southeast Asia (see Table 4). For example, the higher levels of Vietnam activity cited on page 5 would cost a total of $1 billion. Offsetting such an increase within the defense budget would require additional force or procurement reductions, such as inactivation of a CONUS division committed to NATO ($500 million), retirement of two CVAs ($200 million), and cancellation or deferral of major procurement such as nuclear frigates and the B–1 bomber. Thus, at reductions as large as $6 billion, the President's options to slow programmed cuts in Vietnam force and activity levels would be sharply limited, unless he were willing to accept substantial reductions in our capability to reinforce NATO.

2. *DOD Personnel Management Problems*

To bring about a $6 billion reduction in the defense program in FY 72, it would be necessary to reduce defense manpower levels by over 700,000 during FY 71 and another 500,000 during FY 72 (see Table 13). This total reduction of 1,200,000 personnel in two years is about 500,000 more than would be necessary under current planning. It may not be possible to reduce manpower this rapidly. If this were so, for each 100,000 reduction not made by the end of FY 71, an additional $1 billion of procurement and R&D budget authority would have to be cut to reach the FY 72 outlay target.

TABLE 13

Total DOD Manpower

(Millions at End Year)

	FY 69	*FY 70*	*FY 71*	*FY 72*
Current plans	4.9	4.4	4.0	3.7
$6 billion reduction		4.4	3.7	3.2

These large and rapid reductions would cause a number of serious problems which would affect the attractiveness of military careers, and would make it more difficult to attract and retain career personnel. The following are possible resulting consequences:

a. A combination of involuntary discharges and reduced promotion opportunity for military personnel would be necessary. For example, to maintain "normal" promotion opportunity, over 100,000 (of a total of 1.1 million) senior enlisted men would have to be forced out in FY 72. This could be partly alleviated by forced retirement of some of the 130,000 enlisted personnel with over 20 years service. Legislation may be required to release regular officers, temporarily increase officer grade structure, and obtain severance pay for career enlisted men.
b. About 200,000 men would be released early from service while over 100,000 others are being drafted to meet Vietnam requirements in FY 71.
c. There would be a 30–40% increase in transfers of military personnel, with attendant personal hardships and reduced combat readiness.
d. There would be involuntary assignments to Vietnam for second or third tours, particularly in special skills. For example, about 2,000 (12% of the total) Infantry, Armor, and Engineer Captains and Majors would have return tours in FY 71.

3. *Effect of Defense Reduction on National Economy*

The reductions in defense manpower, coupled with reduced procurement programs and the 40–50 base closures that would be necessary, would cause large economic dislocations. In addition to the defense personnel reductions, employment in defense products industries would fall by 700,000 (200,000 more than under current planning). Thus, the total reduction in defense-related jobs would reach nearly 2,000,000 (700,000 more than under current planning), or about 2% of the nation's labor force. Even if the decision to reduce were made today, the phasing of the reduction would not be sufficiently gradual that these workers could be immediately absorbed into other sectors of the economy. As a result, unemployment might be 0.2–0.3% higher by the end of 1971 than at current defense planning levels.

4. *Timing Considerations*

All of the impacts described above would be alleviated by a more gradual phasedown of manpower. This would result from either a smaller budget reduction or from deferral of the uncommitted Volunteer Service spending as part of whatever reduction must be made. Conversely, all of these effects would be exacerbated by a delay in decision, whatever the magnitude of reduction that must be made. For example, a delay until January 1971 in deciding to reduce defense by $6 billion in FY 72 would mean that manpower reductions would be smaller in that year and that reductions of an additional $2 billion in procurement and R&D budget authority would be needed to reach the outlay target.

[Omitted here are Section IV, which outlines non-Defense program options, and Section V, which includes a table representing 12 combined Defense and non-Defense budgetary options.]

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–73A–1971, 381, Defense Planning FY 71. Top Secret. Previous drafts of this paper were discussed at the DPRC meetings of July 17 and August 10 and a special meeting, attended by Nixon, held on July 28 at the Western White House in San Clemente to discuss the defense budget. See Documents 145, 149, and 148, respectively.

[2] The NSC met on September 10, 1969, to discuss the response to NSSM 3, submitted 5 days earlier. See Documents 45 and 49.

[3] Document 56.

[4] The Tax Reform Act of 1969 (P.L. 91–172), which cleared both Houses of Congress on December 22 and was signed by Nixon on December 30, was the most comprehensive revision of the tax code since the implementation of the income tax in 1913. The measure provided for annual tax cuts totaling $9.1 billion and long-term tax reform expected to generate $6.6 billion in additional revenues. (*Congress and the Nation, 1969–1972*, pp. 2–3, 79–85)

[5] Document 139.

[6] NSDM–27 budget, adjusted for pay and price increases and Volunteer Service (NSDM–53). [Footnote in the original.]

[7] Includes *only* initiatives announced to date; not new ones. Figures are *net* with increases offset by $2.2 billion reduction each year in proposed program reforms. [Footnote in the original.]

[8] Not given in NSDM-27; based on extrapolation from FY 74-75. [Footnote in the original.]

[9] See Document 139.

[10] Document 39.

[11] A reference to President Nixon's First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, issued on February 18. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 115–190)

[12] Seven appendices are attached but not printed: A. Continental Air Defense, B. Theater Nuclear Forces, C. Alternative Safeguard Programs, D. Non Visible Bomber Force Reductions, E. Anti-Submarine Warfare, F. Tactical Air Force Levels, G. NATO—Strategy Forces and Burden Sharing.

[13] Out-year objectives. In most cases these force levels would be obtained by end-FY 72. [Footnote in the original.]

[14] Could be seven if a light area defense of CONUS were deployed rather than a four-site defense of three Minuteman fields and the National Command authority. [Footnote in the original.]

[15] FY 72 $ billions. [Footnote in the original.]

[16] A radar system that uses atmospheric reflection and refraction phenomena to extend its range of detection beyond the line of sight. Over-the-horizon (OTH) radars may be either forward scatter or back scatter systems.

[17] For the texts of NSDM 69, "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," July 10, and NSDM 74,

"Detailed Statement of Provisions of U.S. SALT Position," July 22, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 94* and 100.

[18] Attached but not printed is Table 6, entitled "Range of U.S. Force Requirements in Mid-1970s."

[19] Attached but not printed is Table 7, entitled "U.S. Forces Available in Mid-1970s To Meet Requirements Under Alternative Illustrative Programs."

[20] Out-year objectives. In most cases these force levels would be obtained by end-FY 72. [Footnote in the original.]

[21] Includes active and reserve. [Footnote in the original.]

[22] Total carriers; the mix of CVAs and CVSs to be determined; four ASW air groups would be retained, possibly operating from CVAs. [Footnote in the original.]

[23] Cost in FY 72 $ billions. Includes incremental cost of the war in Southeast Asia, as shown in Table 4. [Footnote in the original.]

[24] Includes appropriate changes to support programs and Other Mission Programs (such as intelligence and research and development). [Footnote in the original.]

[25] Based on current planning for FY 73. [Footnote in the original.]

153. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 19, 1970, 9:45 a.m.

National Security Council Meetings

SUBJECT
Defense Budget

President: Let me introduce the subject. This discussion is coming earlier this year than usual. The Defense budget is so large a part of the total that we want to think about what our defense posture should be and what we can do to get the funds needed.

I've been meeting with the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries[2] and the JCS[3] and others on this subject. We are at a time when we can say the USSR has reached nuclear parity with the US. Do we have a viable defense posture in light of the other areas of world where we have responsibilities? Dulles[4] talked of massive retaliation; it worked then because they [the Soviets] had only 70 ICBMs. It's not true today. We want a defense policy which makes it possible for us to have a foreign policy. We need the confidence of others. We think there is some question abroad about that confidence. Budget cutting may then raise questions about our role in the world, resulting from our posture. Dick [Helms]?

Helms: Let me review the principal developments:

—They are continuing their SS–9 and SS–11 ICBM deployments. We have detected four new groups. 1969 was their busiest deployment year. By mid-1972 they will have 306 launchers in service. Of the SS–11, 86 groups are now identified. That means 790 launchers now operational. Of the SS–13, two new groups have been identified; that means 20 operational. Sixty more are in the works, all to be completed in 1972. That's a total of 1252 launchers now. They'll have 1466 at least by 1972. Testing of new versions of each continues. The Soviets could deploy an MRV soon if they want to.
—The SS–9 has been tested also in a fractional orbital mode.
—An SS–11 modified for longer range (6,000 miles) is also ready. Also a shorter-range version.
—There is an SS–15 test program going on now.
—In their navy, their 17th Y-class ballistic missile submarine has been launched. They have two units in the Atlantic now. They have been testing a new 3,000-mile missile last summer.
—In air defense, no significant new developments.
—They have a new swing-wing bomber.

President: Is the swing-wing bomber a significant weapon?

Moorer: Yes. It is longer-range and higher-performance than our B–52. Our F–111 is one of these.

President: When did they start this development?

Helms: About 1966–67 the decision was probably made.

Laird: If we decided today on the B–1, the first one would come in in 1978.

Helms: The Soviets design a plane for a single purpose, not multiple purposes.

President: They seem to have made decisions to move ahead all across the board, without too much selectivity.

Helms: Yes.

Smith: What range does the bomber have?

Helms: It can reach the US with refueling. It is a medium-range bomber.

Smith: Do they have a tankers fleet?

Helms: About 60.

Mitchell: But the lead time for tanker building is short.

Smith: They make tankers out of bombers.

Helms: Let me review their General Purpose Forces:

—They have 1.5 million ground forces and 3000 tactical aircraft.
—Those opposite NATO are 31 divisions—421,000 men—all combat-ready, in Eastern Europe. In 1960 they had only 26 divisions. And there are 26 divisions in Western Russia.
—Their Air Force has 1500 fighters in air defense and 1000 fighters for ground attack.
—They are also improving Pact forces. There are 830,000 in ground forces (52 divisions, 7 brigades). There were only 47 two years ago. Their reliability will depend on their political reliability in a war with NATO. Pact Doctrine is for an attack on NATO forces in 2 echelons—31 divisions.

Let me discuss the Soviet approach to a war with NATO. In 1950 the USSR thought it would begin with massive nuclear attacks. In the past few years they have come to think that a long period of tension gives warning. War begins with: first, a conventional attack; then a NATO tactical nuclear response; and then the Pact forces advance using nuclears.

They have been increasing the nuclear and conventional fire-power of their divisions. They have developed and stockpiled nuclear warheads for use by the Scud, Frog and tactical aircraft.

On the Sino-Soviet border, the USSR has increased its ground and air forces on the border. There are 36 divisions on the border, 320,000 men. China has 34 divisions, and 294 aircraft—600,000 men.

President: What was it before?

Helms: All the Soviets came there since 1965.

Rogers: What is the relation between an American and a Soviet division?

Moorer: An American division is twice as large but the Soviets have the same number of tanks per division as we.

Vice President: Is our bulge mostly in support?

Lincoln: Do ours have greater staying power?

Moorer: Yes, mostly in staying power. They have greater shock effect but they do not have the staying power.

Laird: They rely on the civilian economy for support.

Shultz: In Czechoslovakia didn't they have to press people into service from the economy?

Laird: They did, but it was a good operation.

Rogers: Did you [Moorer] say we estimated it was 1.5 to 1 for an American to a Soviet division?

Moorer: Yes. The men are more in an American division but weapons are closer to even.

Laird: They use equipment—trucks—from the economy for support.

Vice President: Back to the breakdown of troops in a division. Do we have more combat personnel in one division than they?

Laird and Moorer: Yes, 1-1/2 to 1.

Helms: Soviet military equipment is very good.

Their build-up opposite China is not at a cost of forces opposite NATO. Peking has been

cautious in its response but now it has moved some forces into the area. They have 600,000 men in the area bordering the Soviet Union and Mongolia.

Chinese General Purpose Forces have a new look compared to 1960. They now produce their own hardware on copies of Soviet equipment.

Rogers: How many Soviet divisions have moved to the China border since this Administration took office?

Helms: About 10.

President: How do they do this?

Helms: They move into newly constructed bases right on the border area.

President: How about the China "Pentagons" we saw?[5] What are they?

Helms: We think they may be for conventional artillery firing. There is no evidence that they have a nuclear capability. The Chinese are deployed well back from the border. It's a defense in depth.

President: Thank you. What are the Service Secretaries speaking of?

Laird: Their present fiscal guidance is NSDM 27.[6] They fear the impact of any further cuts.

The Titan operating cost savings will only be about $10 million.

Kissinger: All of the proposals for the budget assume that a SALT agreement will not be reached by the time the budget is to be submitted. If an agreement is reached later, we may get some savings but it should not show in the budget.

President: I want a full update on this intelligence briefing by December 1.

Kissinger: On ABM, some changes can be made. We will present the alternatives to you in the next few weeks.

Our land-based missile force will increase in vulnerability.

President: What does MIRV do for us?

Moorer: In retargetting we would put Poseidon on the targets that are now covered by Minutemen and move the Minutemen against missile targets. MIRV increases our capability against urban industrial targets.

Kissinger: The problem is that we can't retarget, thus we might be attacking empty silos if

they struck first.

Packard: It increases the assurance that we can deliver warheads on target, including through an ABM. You are not increasing total destructive capability for the Minutemen and only a slight increase in Poseidon, but you can cover a few more targets. It's important to keep until we get an agreement from the other side. We have an adequate capability to attack urban industrial targets but do not have a good counterforce capability. We need to improve this.

Moorer: By the three criteria: In number of weapons, the USSR is moving up. In total megatons too.

Helms: By mid-1974 we will be way behind unless we have the MIRV.

President: What of diplomacy—the numbers are important.

Rogers: Shouldn't we emphasize to our allies that we are ahead with MIRV numbers?

President: That's why I raised the question—we have to keep our allies and friends aware that we are ahead in MIRVs—we don't want to give impression we are withdrawing.

Rogers: We want to take any cuts very carefully. The impression of our withdrawal would be disastrous.

President: We must maintain the credibility of our posture. I am concerned over the Navy and what the Soviets have done.

Rogers: All our friends must be assured that what we say we really will do. We must be careful of any announcements.

President: I agree we must be careful of how it's presented.

Packard: The USSR doesn't have a Navy like ours. We are building more tonnage; they are building more ships.

Smith: All of us seem to be agreed that we shouldn't cut bombers before a SALT agreement. But probably it wouldn't really have any effect on the Soviets. If we don't need them—or if we keep Titan—then don't keep them just for the effect on SALT. But we must keep up R&D for future weapons.

President: But doesn't it make sense to hold even these to give up in an agreement?

Smith: It's not necessarily any real advantage.

Vice President: Is there something we could do in Asia to offset the effect of our withdrawals?

Rogers: We have proposed a $1.5 billion additional Korea program.[7]

President: We must sell that to Congress.

Vice President: That's good but more important is a presence and a commitment.

Laird: But this is difficult—will have to reduce carriers on station under the fiscal guidance.

President: I can't see the Navy cut backs.

Johnson: We could do some "big lift" exercises.

Laird: With the C–5's, which are impressive and useful. It takes six carriers to keep two on station in the Mediterranean.

Kissinger: The Vice President's question is the key question on the issue of reassurance. We are in danger of sliding into a period of massive retaliation even though this is absurd. Our general purpose forces must be looked at. We have to have forces in which we can believe before we can project. We must be able to project a credible power abroad in a situation where general nuclear war is no longer a likely or reasonable alternative. The general purpose forces are the way we are seen by allies—they are the contact and the reality.

Rogers: This problem is already past us. We already have cut.

Vice President: McCain speaks of Diego Garcia[8] —in the Indian Ocean. An American military presence there in the Indian Ocean before the Suez Canal opens could be symbolic.

Laird: We have Diego Garcia before the Congress. It's been a long, two-year fight. The Soviets have built two facilities in the area meanwhile.

Vice President: It's a symbolic act.

President: I like the symbolism of this modest proposal.

Kissinger: Any major reductions in our general purpose forces would …

President: How about the All-Volunteer Army. The Service Secretaries seem not to believe it will work.

Laird: They think it will work okay except for a war situation, and provided that we put in the support it takes. This costs. Can you devote the needed additional resources to this in

a time of reducing the budget?

President: Can the draft be extended?

Laird: Probably we will have to.

President: The deeper problem we have to think about is whether we can develop an opinion in this country on which we can base the defense we need. We have to try to see how this can be done. The question is whether the people will support the very significant defense we will need for a long time. We have to start by knowing ourselves and having the conviction. As we wind down Vietnam, we must develop a new defense posture which we can make people understand the need for.

Bring in the three Service Secretaries and the Chiefs to the NSC group for a briefing on their problems. Laird should set this up.

Packard: The problem gets down to the question of manpower—100,000 men are a $1 billion. We could put more into ships and aircraft if we can cut our commitments of ground forces.

President: We should make sure that the commands are lean and tight—they shouldn't have too many people; they should have what is needed. We may have to move to higher-paid, higher-quality but smaller forces. We should look at all the ways we could slim out people and get lean. We must look at the Services to see exactly what programs should be kept and what not kept. Between now and December 15 we must have a new concept for a national defense program—one which can be sold around the world—one which will be supported by the American people and one which does not destroy the morale of the Services.

Vice President: The chance of success of the volunteer force depends on how the people of America treat and regard them. We need to develop public acceptance of a lean, tough professional force. How do we encourage high-school youngsters to move away from the dropout class to recruit for our military?

President: We have to think in terms of Armed Services of the right size and that the American people are proud of them. They key is leadership. The academies are important in this.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Minutes Originals 1970 [3 of 3]. Top Secret. The NSC meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House and lasted until 11:50 a.m., according to the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Brackets are in the original.

[2] On August 17, Nixon met with Laird, Kissinger, and the three Service Secretaries, Resor, Chafee, and Seamans. The meeting's purpose was to give the Secretaries "an opportunity to air their concerns over the diminishing allocation of national resources to Defense." The Secretaries expressed their concern that decreased Defense expenditures would reduce combat effectiveness and R&D, delay force modernization and the move to an all-volunteer armed force, and result in base closures. Nixon concluded the meeting by assuring the Service Secretaries "that the budget could not be the sole determinant of decisions concerning the strength of the armed forces. He also indicated that force levels must be designed to accommodate essential national interests and objectives and that our problem was to bring our strategic objectives, defense posture and defense budget into balance." The President also "indicated that some less essential programs might have to be eliminated." (Memorandum for the President's File; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 225, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. VIII, 21 Jul 70–Sep 70)

[3] See Document 150.

[4] John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, 1953–1959.

[5] In a September 15 memorandum, Kissinger informed Nixon of the conclusions reached in an Intelligence Memorandum, "The Large Mounded Strongpoints in Communist China," issued by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence on September 3. Kissinger wrote that the CIA had determined that the "most likely explanation" for some 18 unusual mounds discovered in China was "that they are ground defense strongpoints to protect certain strategic areas from invasion." Kissinger added "that the mystery of the mounds has not yet been solved. It is inconceivable to me that the Chinese would construct Pentagon size structures for only four to six [conventional] firing positions." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V)

[6] Document 56.

[7] Two days after the NSC meeting, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum informing him that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee had recommended an additional $1.5 billion in spending on modernizing Korea's armed forces. Nixon approved the recommendation. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 291, Memoranda to the President, July–Aug. 1970)

[8] Diego Garcia is an atoll in the Indian Ocean that became a United States naval base. NSSM 104, "Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 1971–1975," November 9, initiated a review of the Soviet naval threat and United States interests and basing alternatives in the region. On December 9, the Review Group discussed the results of the study. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Arabian Peninsula; Middle East Region, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Documents 42, 44, 49, and 50.

154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, September 1, 1970.

SUBJECT
Defense Budget Guidance

As a result of the DPRC studies,[2] my discussions with you, and the discussions in the NSC on August 19,[3] I have prepared a draft NSDM which sets forth your revised fiscal guidance for the Department of Defense for FY 72–76. (See Tab A)[4]

The issues surrounding the development of the guidance are explained below. First, however, I have included an issue somewhat apart from the fiscal guidance but which arose during the discussions.

Separate Issue

There are two views as to what we should do with our bomber force pending the outcome of SALT. For some time, the Department of Defense has planned on phasing out 76 B–52s by the end of FY 72 while activating some 40 FB–111s.

—Some argue, Gerry Smith, for example, that we could make the reduction without serious impact on SALT because the bombers involved are not strategically very significant; further, the Soviets probably expect substantial reductions in older B–52s, so they already have reduced value for bargaining purposes.
—On the other hand, the reduction could affect SALT in one of the following ways:
1. Our negotiating position could be weakened if the Soviets believed that we will be forced to make strategic force reductions for budgetary reasons, regardless of SALT.
2. Since we have advanced the position that bombers in storage should not count in the negotiations, the Soviets might charge us with duplicity if we start to put large numbers of additional B–52s into storage.
3. Finally, we argue, in the SALT negotiations, that the FB–111 is not a strategic bomber. The reduction of B–52s with the simultaneous activation of the FB–111s gives the Soviets good grounds to argue that the FB–111s should be counted as equivalent to B–52s for arms control purposes.

The draft NSDM maintains the existing force of 540 bombers for the time being. If you prefer to adopt the other course, please indicate below and I will revise the NSDM.

Do not revise the NSDM, maintain the existing bomber force (my recommendation)[5]

Revise the NSDM to permit the planned reductions

The Fiscal Guidance

Strategic Forces.

We plan to preserve the existing strategic force posture until the completion of SALT except for air defense (and, possibly, bombers, depending on your decision above). There are, of course, substantial savings to be made in connection with a strategic arms limitation agreement.

Air Defense. There is general agreement that we can make sharp reductions in CONUS air defense missiles and aircraft. Originally designed against a high altitude attack, our air defenses are relatively ineffective against Soviet low-level attack techniques. Moreover, there is a serious question as to the value of air defense without a similar defense against missiles. In reducing the air defense we would be making very little reduction in capability since the most important part, the warning and surveillance system, would be retained. The reductions in air defense will save about $400 million.

Safeguard. While we do not recommend changes in Safeguard at this time, you should be aware of the fiscal implications. If we get a SALT agreement by July of 1971 which limits or bans ABM, we should be able to save more than $1 billion for the NCA option or about $2 billion for the zero option.

If SALT discussions continue, however, we can consider alternatives to our current full-speed-ahead program. By selecting the option of zero, one, or two new sites in FY 72, we can reduce outlays, although at the expense of both stretching out the program and increasing its total cost. No one recommends selecting such an option at this time, and the fiscal guidance is consistent with the current program of three sites in FY 72.

Titan Missiles. While we think the Titan should remain in the force until after SALT, there are some minor reductions which can be made in the operating costs. After SALT, we can retire the Titans at a savings of about $50 million a year.

General Purpose Forces.

It is generally agreed that we can accept a reduction of about $3 billion in general purpose forces. While it is true that we have a far better understanding of strategic forces, I think we have gained some insight into the general purpose forces during the DPRC study. Given that reductions must be made, I believe that they should be made in the following areas: tactical air forces, escort ships, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, and amphibious task forces. While these forces contribute to our capability, it is not certain how much. Compared to the alternative of cutting divisions, there is little doubt that we should reduce in these areas.

In the draft NSDM, I have been quite specific as to the priorities to ensure that we protect the division forces which make the fundamental contribution to the NSDM 27 strategy.

Volunteer Force. The $2 billion for the volunteer force which you directed in NSDM 53[6] is reduced to $800 million. When added to about $500 million in pay increases for enlisted personnel with less than two years service, we have $1.3 billion as tangible evidence of your commitment to the zero draft concept. I have retained the NSDM 53 level of $3.5 billion for the FY 73–76 guidance. This amount may be larger than required for the force levels we are now envisaging and we may want to reduce it later.

Support Costs. Finally, the NSDM includes reductions in support costs of $300 to $400 million. This is a reasonable reduction which Defense can spread across all programs.

Summary

The above reductions total about $4.5 billion. The FY 72 Defense outlays for the current program are estimated at $79 billion. Thus, the revised guidance for FY 72 is $74.5 billion. The FY 73–76 guidance is adjusted accordingly and rounded to the nearest billion dollars.

Additional Consideration

Since you have been pressing the Congress to pass the Defense Appropriation prior to the elections, the publication of a formal document making the kinds of reductions we have made might well be used in an attempt to make substantial reductions in the FY 71 appropriation.

However, I feel that it is important to issue the guidance, along with your priorities, if we are to avoid a last minute crunch with the cuts being apportioned uniformly across the Services or having ground forces and support items reduced while retaining procurement programs and hardware-intensive forces which we believe make a lesser contribution to our overall capability.

If you choose not to issue the NSDM until after passage of the Defense Appropriation and after the election, I can see that Defense gets the FY 72 figure for planning.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve the draft NSDM:

Approved, issue the NSDM[7]

Disapproved, give the FY 72 fiscal guidance to Defense informally

Disapproved, withhold any guidance until later

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, NSDM 84. Top Secret. Sent for action. Lynn sent the memorandum to Kissinger on August 28 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger wrote two comments near the top of the memorandum's first page. The first reads, "Hold implementation 'till Monday [September 7]." The other, addressed to Wayne Smith of the NSC Staff, reads, "Run this past Schlesinger." In a September 7 memorandum, Haig informed Kissinger that Schlesinger concurred. (Ibid.)

[2] See Document 152.

[3] See Document 153.

[4] Attached but not printed is Tab A, an undated, unsigned draft of Document 155.

[5] Nixon initialed this option.

[6] Document 139.

[7] Nixon approved this option and added the following comment: "K—Talk to Shultz (per our telephone conversation—9/2)". The referenced telephone conversation was not further identified and no record of it has been found.

155. National Security Decision Memorandum 84[1]

Washington, September 11, 1970.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Defense Program FY 72–76

As a result of the National Security Council meeting on August 19, 1970,[2] the President has directed the budget guidelines displayed in the following table. These guidelines constitute a revision to Table 1 of National Security Decision Memorandum 27, dated October 11, 1969.[3]

Budget Outlays[4]

FY 72	*FY 73*	*FY 74*	*FY 75*	*FY 76*
74.5	75	76	78	79

The President has directed the following priorities for reductions in the current FY 72 defense program:

1. The President reaffirms his continuing commitment to the Volunteer Force concept. The FY 72 outlay includes about $1.3 billion for the Volunteer Force, including cumulative costs. Precise allocations for FY 72 will be determined after considering the plan requested by NSDM 53.[5] The guidelines for FY 73–76 include $3.5 billion for Volunteer Force implementation.
2. Strategic programs (except for air defense) for FY 72 should reflect no visible reductions from existing levels pending resolution of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The FY 72 outlays for strategic programs should be reduced by making reductions in air defense force and operating costs for strategic bombers.
3. The priority for General Purpose Forces reductions should be given to tactical air forces, ASW forces, escort ships and amphibious task forces. The Defense Program should maintain no fewer than 16-1/3 active divisions.

In the event of agreement on strategic arms limitations, the above guidelines will be adjusted to reflect such agreement.[6]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 51–96. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Moorer and McCracken.

[2] See Document 153.

[3] See Document 56.

[4] a. Current dollars (to nearest billion beyond FY 72) including projected inflation, future pay raises, and the all-volunteer force. Also includes support of allies. b. Vietnam assumptions are as stated in Table 4 of DPRC report, Defense Planning 1971–76 (Revision 7). Budget outlays should be adjusted to reflect actual Vietnam activity rates. [Footnote in the original. The DPRC report is Document 152.]

[5] Document 139.

[6] Nixon submitted his FY 1972 defense budget to Congress on January 29, 1971. Congress passed a Defense appropriations bill on December 15, 1971, authorizing $70.5 billion in spending. (*Congress and the Nation, 1969–1972*, pp. 205, 211–213)

156. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 27, 1970.

Dear Henry:

As I indicated in our telephone conversation earlier today,[2] I am seriously concerned about the Minuteman survivability question and the tremendous cost implications associated with insuring its invulnerability in the face of the growing Soviet counterforce threat.

In my view, it is particularly important for the President to address this question and be aware of its central importance with regard to our negotiating position at Helsinki[3] and our overall strategic posture for the future.

The negotiating proposal defined by NSDM–74[4] and tabled at Vienna[5] contains provisions which, in their aggregate, preclude all effective measures by which the United States could provide fixed land-based ICBM survivability in the long term. At the same time, this proposal does not preclude the improvements to Soviet ICBMs which could result in a credible first strike threat to Minuteman.

Recent intelligence indicates that the Soviets are vigorously developing a payload for the SS–11 with three re-entry vehicles and the potential for improved accuracy. The character of this development, which was not specifically forecast last year, suggests it is designed to penetrate Safeguard. We cannot discount the possibility that this SS–11 program is intended to evolve into a MIRV capability against Minuteman.

The Soviets have also resumed testing of the triple re-entry vehicle payload for the SS–9, which we have regarded as a possible counterforce weapon against Minuteman. There is little doubt that the Soviets could deploy an accurate MIRV system with a greater number of warheads in the 1972–74 period which would give one SS–9 missile a clear capability to destroy more than one Minuteman silo.

The successful development and deployment of accurate MIRV payloads on the SS–9 and improvements in SS–11 accuracy, even with the limitation on the number of launchers in the NSDM–74 proposal, could give the Soviets the capability by the mid-70s to destroy most of our Minuteman silos unless we take timely measures to increase their survivability or make a conscious decision to concede potential Minuteman vulnerability as a trade-off to permit acquiring additional offensive capability.

1. Improving Minuteman survivability

Possible measures for long term improvement in Minuteman survivability include relocating Minuteman into hard rock silos, defending Minuteman fields with Safeguard or other ABM defenses (i.e., "hard point defenses"), or placing Minuteman missiles on mobile launchers. We do not yet have full technical confidence in the feasibility and adequacy of any of these measures. Some combination may be required. But the present formulation of the NSDM–74 proposal prohibits them all, except for the option to relocate 250 silos, or to replace Minuteman land launchers on a one-for-one basis with sea-based launchers or bombers. This proposal does permit the hardening of existing Minuteman silos, but this measure is only an interim solution which can be overcome by continued improvements in Soviet missile accuracy and MIRV payloads.

2. Other Alternatives

As noted above, NSDM–74 does provide for the replacement of fixed land-based ICBM capability with other systems within overall limitation on strategic delivery vehicles. This "freedom to mix" would permit the construction or retention of bombers, the relocation of Minuteman to a mobile platform afloat, or the substitution of other sea-based ballistic missile capability (surface or submerged platform), should such a path be indicated by developments in the threat to Minuteman.

3. Discussion

Under the current SALT options, there appear to be three ways to approach the Minuteman survivability issue. First, the most desirable to an arms control agreement remains the reduction approach embodied in our earlier Option D.[6] This option provides for mutual U.S.-Soviet reductions in the number of land-based strategic delivery vehicles over the next five years and, therefore, would allow us to reduce our most vulnerable systems without incurring a numerical disadvantage. It could also result in reduced strategic force budgets, whereas savings are less likely under NSDM–74 provisions. Even though the negotiability of Option D is questionable, we should keep it as an active proposal.

If we were successful in negotiating Option D, then the problem of Minuteman survivability would essentially be solved by negotiations.

On the other hand, if Option D did not serve as a basis for agreement, and we proceeded with Option E, we still retain the flexibility of adjusting our force mix, should the Soviets give indications that they are continuing to pursue a capability to destroy fixed land-based ICBMs. This is the second alternative.

A third approach is to modify NSDM–74 to permit land-based mobile launchers in addition to the other options noted above. Presumably, such an option might be acceptable to the Soviet Union, since its "basic provisions" would allow mobiles, but this would require modification of our negotiating position and severely complicate

verification requirements. We could also propose other changes in our negotiating position such as permitting a hard-point ABM defense of fixed silos.

In sum, the issue revolves around our commitment to the invulnerability of fixed land-based ICBMs. If it is national policy to remain committed to the invulnerability of our fixed land-based ICBM force, then the provisions of NSDM–74 could cause us severe problems. If, on the other hand, we adhere to the "freedom to mix" concept of NSDM–74 and take steps to insure that we can preserve our offensive capability by this means, then we need not be overly concerned about a developing Soviet counterforce capability.

The concern about fixed land-based missile vulnerability can be viewed as a major trap or a major opportunity. Given the current situation: namely, approval of Safeguard for Minuteman defense only; recognition that such defense may not be adequate or justified in itself for only Minuteman protection; our SALT position; and the increasing threat—a continued commitment to the invulnerability of fixed land-based ICBMs could become a major trap. We could be faced with a situation of devoting substantial and scarce resources to preserving the current capability in Minuteman at the expense of added offensive capabilities in the face of a growing threat.

Convincing Congress of the need for devoting an ever-increasing percentage of scarce strategic dollars to defense of Minuteman alone with no apparent guarantee that the defense can keep up with the offensive countermeasures poses difficult problems indeed.

On the other hand, we could take advantage of the current situation and use it as a major opportunity to make carefully reasoned and politically acceptable adjustments in our forces; or, we could take steps this year to preserve the flexibility to do so through appropriate options. Either course could be a clear signal to the Soviet Union, a signal that we recognize that they are developing such a counterforce capability, but that we can bypass the problem through appropriate alternative force decisions which do not contemplate a defense of Minuteman at any cost. NSDM–74, as now written, does permit the latter action.

Henry, I have given considerable thought to this problem and several others relating to our broad National Security Strategy for the 1970's and beyond. I will be communicating with the President and with you on the broader aspects of our strategy in the near future but in light of the resumption of talks next week in Helsinki, I thought it important to bring this aspect of the problem to your attention at this time.[7]

Mel Laird

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 225, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IX, 1 Oct 70–Nov 70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger initialed the letter. In an October 29 memorandum, Wayne Smith informed Kissinger that

Laird "has sent you a brief against Minuteman defense and for sea-based systems." (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–217, NSDM 74)

[2] Laird expressed concerns about Minuteman survivability, and the cost of protecting it, during his October 27 telephone conversation with Kissinger. According to the transcript of the conversation, Laird said, "The Soviet Union have made changes in their program and we shouldn't do what they are doing but take measure[s] to screw up their program." Kissinger concurred and said, "We have to look at survivability problem." (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[3] The third round of SALT talks began in Helsinki on November 2.

[4] NSDM 74, issued on July 31, consists of a detailed statement of Option E, a U.S. SALT negotiating proposal. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 100.

[5] Vienna was the site for the second round of SALT negotiations that began on April 16.

[6] NSDM 51, issued on April 10, established Option D as a negotiating proposal for the U.S. SALT Delegation heading into the Vienna talks. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 68.

[7] On October 30, Kissinger sent Laird a letter informing him that the President had seen his letter and that Nixon had directed the DPRC to undertake a study of the issue. That same day, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Shultz, Helms, McCracken, and Moorer, informing them that Nixon had ordered "a study of U.S. strategic force survivability and effectiveness." (Both in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 225, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IX, 1 Oct 70–Nov 70)

157. Editorial Note

In a November 6, 1970, memorandum to President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird proposed a new national security strategy, called "Strategy for Peace—A National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence." According to Laird's memorandum, his "basic goal" was "to make the transition from war to lasting peace and freedom with a restructured U.S. military force that would require 7 percent or less of GNP, made up of 2.5 million volunteers or less. Such a force, combined with adequate strength, true partnership and progress in negotiations, would be designed to deter war, and contrasts with the force requiring more than 9 percent of GNP, made up of a draft-heavy strength of 3.5 million men engaged in war, which you inherited." Laird wrote that his proposed strategy was sufficiently flexible to provide for program options, including the development of new weapons—specifically Safeguard and the Undersea Long-range Missile System—that could be adopted depending upon the outcome of strategic arms limitation negotiations and changes in the military threat presented by the Soviet Union. Laird's proposed strategy rested on the following goals:

> "A larger share of free world security burden to be taken by those free world nations which have enjoyed major U.S. support since World War II, rapid economic growth, and a relatively low defense contribution.
>
> "A strong emphasis on regional defense arrangements.
>
> "A U.S. military force which in a stable peacetime environment would require 7 percent or less of our annual GNP.
>
> "Volunteerism for U.S. manpower."

Laird claimed it was time "to make hard decisions," and defined his strategy: "It is not a policy of warfighting; it is not a policy of status quo; it is a policy to move this country and the world towards a generation of peace based on three principles—partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate."

Laird stated that his "new strategy of realistic deterrence would use as its basic premise the prevention or deterrence of war at all levels of conflict." Accordingly, he recommended that nuclear and conventional weapons be "coupled" by adopting two revised "strategy assumptions." One assumption of current U.S. strategy held that "U.S. strategic power will be sufficient to deter a nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies. Under Laird's proposed strategy that assumption would read: "Nuclear power will be sufficient to deter nuclear or major attack by a nuclear power on the U.S. and its allies." Current U.S. strategy also assumed "U.S. diplomatic and political efforts will actively foster political and military arrangements among our allies that, coupled with U.S. assistance, will become adequate to provide for common security." Under Laird's proposal, that

assumption would read: “U.S. diplomatic and political efforts will actively foster political and military arrangements among our allies that, coupled with U.S. assistance, will become adequate to provide for common security and will tend to deter aggression at all levels.” The Secretary acknowledged that acceptance of these revised assumptions would “necessitate revisions to the current military strategy following by Defense in its planning.” According to a February 3, 1971, memorandum from Kissinger to Laird, Nixon read Laird’s proposal “with great interest.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense: “Your Strategy for Peace,” 11/6/70; ibid., Box 236, Agency Files, DPRC and Defense Budget, 1971, respectively)

Laird explained his rationale for submitting the proposal during his weekly staff meeting on December 14. He stated, “we still face tremendous problems in having everyone fully understand our national strategy. This is of major concern to him. We will have tremendous problems in preserving our present force capabilities and to gain or create options to add to our capabilities. We have cut the Defense budget as far as we can. The President has expressed a desire for a new strategic concept that is tied to his foreign policy objectives and that is not necessarily tied to detailed specifics on forces and weapons. Mr. Laird said his basic desire in responding to the President’s desire is to develop a strategy comprehended by a majority of the country and one which both House and Senate can support. We must recognize realities, protect the FY 1972 forces as a minimum, provide the basis for increased flexibility in the short-term, and lay the foundation now for strengthening forces of all major categories during the next five years.” (Memorandum of conversation; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0028, Chronological File)

The next day, Laird, in preparation for his annual Defense Report, submitted his proposed strategy as a Tentative Strategy Guidance to the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. The Joint Chiefs subsequently expressed reservations about Laird’s proposals. In a February 9, 1971, memorandum to Laird, Admiral Moorer wrote that the Tentative Strategy Guidance “adopts a conceptual approach in which available resources seem to predetermine strategy.” According to Moorer, the Joint Chiefs “consider that U.S. security interests and threats to those interests should be the prime factors in defining U.S. military strategy.” Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs objected to Laird’s suggested decoupling of deterrence from warfighting capability. Moorer wrote, “in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deterrence can best be achieved by maintaining both a full range of warfighting capabilities and a manifest national determination to use them when necessary, in order to make unmistakably clear to our adversaries that the price for aggression, at any level of conflict, would far outweigh any possible gain.” (Ibid.: FRC 330–76–207, 320.2, Strategic)

158. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, November 9, 1970, 4:10–5:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Defense Programs—NSDM 84

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Under Secretary John Irwin
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
Mr. Leon Sloss

Defense

Mr. David Packard
Dr. Gardiner I. Tucker

CIA

Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Bruce C. Clarke

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Maj. Gen. John Elder

OMB

Mr. George P. Shultz
Mr. Caspar Weinberger
Mr. James Schlesinger

ACDA

Mr. Philip J. Farley
Vice Adm. John M. Lee

CEA

Mr. Herbert Stein

NSC Staff

Brig. Gen. Alexander Haig
Dr. K. Wayne Smith
Mr. John C. Court
Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Chairman emphasized the need to provide the President with clear information on the strategic, political, and economic implications of the Defense Department budget proposals, particularly in the light of the altered strategic situation which the United States will face in the 1970s. Accordingly, it was agreed that the Defense Department

would submit additional analysis of force and program alternatives. This analysis should cover different force mixes and deployments and should evaluate trade-offs between maintaining deployments and decreasing readiness and between maintaining existing force structures and providing for modernization.[2]

Dr. Kissinger: I thought I would review briefly the origin of this study, and then we can go on to the substance. On September 11 we put out NSDM 84,[3] which was based on discussion at an NSC meeting.[4] NSDM 84 gave defense budget guidelines for FY 72–76 and indicated that because of SALT there were to be no visible reductions below existing levels in strategic programs. It also established certain priorities for general purpose forces reductions.

Some questions arose in connection with general purpose forces. NSDM 84 was based on the illustrative forces in the Reduced Program developed earlier by the DPRC.[5] Some thought that other ways of packaging should be considered. Since we did not wish to make a decision on the basis of what was only an illustrative program, we then put out another memorandum asking for various alternative packages—and the implications of each—within the general fiscal guidance approved by the President.[6]

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss those packages. However, we do not exactly have a set of alternative packages. What we have is another overall program, with strategic forces based on a modification of the NSDM and with another package of general purpose forces.[7] We will discuss this program, but it is difficult to make a judgment on it beyond saying that it probably fits the general fiscal guidance. Unless we choose to consider Paragraph 3 of NSDM 84 as an alternative package, then the only thing we have available to discuss this morning is another comprehensive program.

I have some questions on specifics. However, first I want to make one other point—with regard to overseas deployments. The Defense paper includes assumptions on FY 73 deployments from Korea about which the Secretary of State has raised serious questions. We also need to consider more carefully what our alternatives are for deployments in Europe.

Mr. Packard: (to Dr. Kissinger) Let me go through the presentation we have prepared, and perhaps some of the issues you have raised will come out. Our purpose in undertaking this study has been to arrive at specific decisions on the FY 72 budget and to develop planning guidelines for the FY 72–76 period, together with alternative force levels. The conclusion we have reached is that we have gone just about as far as we can go in reducing forces at the present time. As noted in Section II of our paper, while we recognize the importance of shifting from defense to non-defense expenditures, we must point out that we have already made some very serious cuts.[8] We have difficulty assessing what our general purpose forces should be several years hence. As concerns strategic forces we have made no visible reductions, and we see little likelihood of substantial

savings even given a SALT agreement. There are a number of problems to be taken into consideration if we are to make further reductions in general purpose forces. Many of these are political and diplomatic in nature, e.g. developments in NATO, the rate of withdrawals from Southeast Asia, the level of appropriations available to provide military aid to strengthen our allies, and, of course, what the Soviets do. I think that for the present our planning should be kept targeted on the force structure we have outlined in our paper. I expect that the modifications we are proposing will have to be tailored to future developments; we cannot commit ourselves to particular changes in particular programs.

There have already been significant reductions in the Defense budget. Let's see what we are buying with our dollars in the FY 71–72 budget. We can compare with what we were spending earlier in the decade and see where we have come in terms of real purchasing power as measured in 1970 dollars. [Mr. Packard was referring to the chart entitled "DOD Budget for Selected Fiscal Years" in the Defense paper.][9] Note that our Vietnam war expenses are going down, and also that we are including funds in FY 72–73 for the volunteer army. Taking these factors into account, our baseline budget in FY 72–73 will be around $56 billion. This is lower than at any time back to 1955.

The next chart ["Military Forces for Selected Fiscal Years"] shows trends in force levels over the past decade. The FY 72 figures are not in terms of the NSDM 84 guidance, but we think we can still find enough reductions when we make our budget scrub to attain about the NSDM 84 levels. If we cut much below that, we will be in serious difficulties.

For strategic missiles there will be no change, with the total remaining at 1710. Strategic bombers dropped a little in FY 70 but will increase again in FY 71 with activation of the FB–111.

Some savings are possible on air defense. One possibility is to come down further on SAMs and interceptors.

Army divisions will be down to 12⅔—the lowest level in recent history. This is just enough to meet our NATO commitment and our minimum commitment in Southeast Asia.

There was a proposal to cut back to 12 CVAs, but in view of our recent experience in the Mediterranean, it was decided to maintain a level of 15. This will enable us to continue stationing two in the Mediterranean and two in Southeast Asia. Incidentally, this CVA question provides a good example of what I mean when I say that planning should be kept on a flexible basis at this time. We should keep in mind that if Soviet power is to be countered in the Mediterranean, the US is the only country to do it; and for that we need two CVAs.

We are proposing to retire a number of older submarines, but the introduction of newer attack submarines will keep the total level about the same. There were proposals to cut

further on escort ships, but we think we should maintain a level of 204 as shown on the chart.

These items I have been discussing point up areas where tradeoffs are possible; however, they should be examined carefully. As regards tactical air, we plan to cut the Navy and thus lower the number of wings to be used with our fifteen carriers. There has been a slight reduction in Marine tactical air, and the Air Force capability is already down somewhat from the 1968 level. Our total of active fighter-attack aircraft will be about 4,000, which is much lower than in 1961. However, the aircraft—F–4s and F–111s—are better, and our capability is therefore probably improved. Our tactical air reserves have increased by the transfer to them of aircraft formerly in the active category. The overall total of tactical aircraft is now about 600 less than in 1961.

To conclude, this is the lowest level of forces that I can recommend in view of our commitments. Whether we can achieve it depends on many things, including the actions taken on the FY 71 budget.

Our next chart ["Military Manpower for Selected Fiscal Years"] deals with manpower. The FY 72 level for the Army would be 915,000, the lowest since 1961. The Navy will be at the lowest level since 1955, the Marines at about the same level as in 1955, and the Air Force at a low level. The overall manpower total will be 2,457,000. This is about the same as the 1961 level, which was the lowest since 1950.

The next chart ["Defense Manpower"] shows in graphic form the downward trend in manpower. The red dotted lines show the maximum rate at which personnel levels could be brought down, but we believe we ought not to aim at this maximum because of the effect on the morale of our people.

The economic impact [referring to chart entitled "Total DOD Procurement"] of the program we are proposing is very important. Generally we feel that the defense and non-defense interests of the country are better served by a healthy economy. The defense budget particularly affects the capital goods and research and development sectors—both of which are currently depressed. Under NSDM 84, DOD procurement would be down to $12.4 billion, measured in 1970 dollars. We are proposing to level off at the figure set in the March fiscal guidance [$14.7 billion]. Keep in mind that a cut of $3 billion means 300,000 men out of work.

I am sure that we all realize that we have not been able to get the MAP levels required to support the Nixon Doctrine. (to Tucker) Is that in our budget?

Dr. Tucker: What is in the budget is what we have now. Note that the level would be higher if we get a supplemental.

Mr. Irwin: Are these NSDM 84 figures with or without MAP?

Dr. Kissinger: MAP is included.

Dr. Tucker: MAP is included at the levels we have had in prior years.

Mr. Packard: We have another chart ["Defense and the National Economy"] to indicate the effect on the economy. Defense contract awards are declining from $42.3 billion in 1968–69 to $34.4 billion at end FY 70 and $28.0 billion at end FY 71. Industrial defense-related employment is falling from 3.5 million in 1968–69 to 2.8 million at end FY 70 and 2.4 million at end FY 71. Under the NSDM 84 guidance, employment at end FY 72 would drop further to 2.2 million. 1.3 million workers have already been affected by the action taken to date to reduce the Defense budget, and this will rise to 2.1 million in the next year. If we figure on the NSDM 84 level for FY 72, then we have about as far to go in terms of additional unemployment as we have already gone [since 1968–69]. Those who are concerned about political considerations will note that that would be just before the 1972 election.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you saying that we shouldn't go down to that level? Or are you saying that we can go down that far and that you can handle it?

Mr. Packard: We should not cut down on items that affect the economy. The impact both from an economic and security standpoint indicates we should not go down so far.

Mr. Shultz: There are two broadly independent questions involved here. One is the right level of spending in terms of overall economic policy and available revenues. The other is the right mix of programs with a given overall level of spending. The argument that the right combination would be one which emphasizes defense over non-defense spending doesn't have much to recommend it. Obviously there is a problem during the transition period.

However, if we are not moving fast enough on other efforts, such as environmental programs, then let's get moving. Our struggle on the overall budget has involved trying to get the domestic agencies to examine questionable programs and make room for spending on the environment. In that context, I hate to see defense spending justified in this way. There are ways to spend more money if we want to.

Mr. Packard: I quite agree. All I am saying is that if we look at defense requirements, there are legitimate reasons not to cut back so fast on the budget. This can also have a helpful impact on the economy.

Adm. Moorer: The first thing to do is to look at defense requirements. We think that it is dangerous to have the other side building up while we keep cutting down. These force levels are low. We don't know how the war in Southeast Asia will come out, and we may need flexibility. We are destroying career incentives with these reductions; this goes against the objective of an all-volunteer force. As for research and development, the

personnel involved in that have very special qualifications. It is very difficult to get them back once they have been cut off. We need to develop better weapons. In addition, we haven't had a chance to talk to our allies about what we are planning, and we haven't completely scrubbed the budget.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean by scrubbing the budget?

Mr. Packard: There are thousands of items in the defense budget that have been delayed and on which it is possible and desirable to cut back a little. Since we can't actually spend as much as is budgeted on these items, we can trim that much from the current budget. I have lots of these items coming to me all the time for decision.

Adm. Moorer: There is no straight-line relationship between a budget at Level A and Level B. Later on in the 1973 part of the planning cycle, we will know more about Vietnamization, Cambodia, SALT, European forces, and Congressional support for the Nixon Doctrine. I think we are going too far right now. $74.5 billion is too low. $77 billion is the rock-bottom figure needed now. We can look in the out-years for additional cutbacks.

Mr. Shultz: The appropriate discussion here is what is needed for defense in the light of the issues you have raised. The issue of economic policy involves deciding what the budget can stand, taking into account such factors as the prospects for an increases in taxes. All I was doing was just criticizing the notion of defense spending for the purpose of pumping up the economy.

Mr. Weinberger: (to Moorer) Has anything happened from the strategic point of view that has made your concerns more explicit than they were earlier? Or are you in general reiterating the same concerns?

Adm. Moorer: The points I am making are basically a reiteration of our earlier position, but they also reflect the fact that we are confronted with further development of the Soviet threat, and there is no indication that the Soviets are levelling off.

Mr. Weinberger: You are not proposing an increase in missiles but do want more divisions and carriers.

Adm. Moorer: There are a number of things that are happening in connection with strategic forces that should generate a fallout favorable to our strategic situation. More important, it is important to remember that our last two wars—Korea and Vietnam—were fought with general purpose forces, and this was also the case with the incidents in the Middle East.

Dr. Tucker: Nobody is proposing an increase in the budget.

Mr. Packard: I intend to meet the $74.5 billion target, but I don't want to cut the spending

in out-years down to the NSDM 84 levels.[10]

We have to talk to our NATO allies. There are decisions that have to be made in the out-years that should not be made at this time. We have got to keep flexible.

Dr. Kissinger: This shows what I have been having a spectacular lack of success getting done in this Committee. This is a good example of how you get a $74.5 billion program by having the Armed Services negotiate with each other. We are sure the program is do-able. Nobody questions that. But we have not provided an answer to Cap's [Weinberger's] question: What are these forces to do? What can you do with one that you can't do with the other?

At the NSC meeting we recognized that we were moving into a new age, strategically speaking. The decision to go to nuclear war is qualitatively different now. That is a fact of life. We are currently cutting our general purpose forces. This may be logical but it is not at all self-evident. When we make these changes in army divisions, in tactical air wings, in carriers, we really don't know how this affects our capabilities. (to Moorer) Tom, on this basis, you are going to get cut and cut and cut year after year. If every year the defense program is decided strictly on the basis of budgetary consequences, no one can prove that half a million makes any difference in a budget of $74.5 billion.

Mr. Packard: These issues have been looked at.

Adm. Moorer: That's right.

Mr. Irwin: The budget situation is obviously very tight whatever you do. If you stick with the $74.5 billion, does that mean we keep our NATO forces without cuts and that we maintain our troops in Korea without cuts? If that can be done, then we have no problem with the budget. If that cannot be achieved, then we do have problems on broad national security grounds.

Another question I have relates to procurement. Will the level of our procurement programs have an effect on our active troop strength?

Adm. Moorer: That is not an issue.

Mr. Packard: The issue is whether we will have forces adequate for the end of the decade. We can have more troops if we don't want to buy any new equipment.

We can take another look at our strategic forces. We could make reductions in bombers and perhaps in continental air defense.

Dr. Kissinger: If we can go back to my point, the fact that we are meeting commitments made five years ago doesn't answer the question of where we will be five years from now. Look at the figures on the REFORGER units in NATO. They show that readiness is

slower. The time frame for their employment no longer makes any sense. If keeping the units means decreasing their readiness, we ought to know this.

Mr. Packard: There definitely is a question about readiness. We will be prepared to provide an analysis but it hasn't all been completed yet. The trade-off is between decreasing readiness or increasing the budget.

We can cut back on tactical aircraft, but this affects NATO and our support in Korea and Southeast Asia.

Adm. Moorer: The problem is that we don't have any back-up. We can't cut the force requirements down to the level specified in the contingency plans; otherwise, we wouldn't have enough to sustain operations in the face of losses that will occur.

Dr. Kissinger: You are saying that this program enables us to meet our commitments in terms of numbers but not in terms of readiness.

Mr. Packard: Essentially this enables us to meet our commitments in NATO and Southeast Asia, although there will be some reduction in NATO because some ships will be deactivated.

Adm. Moorer: Any NATO war by definition is a war with the Russians. Russian submarines will be active in the Atlantic and the Pacific. To maintain our lines of communication, we must have an antisubmarine capability.

Mr. Johnson: What do we do on the air side of NATO?

Dr. Tucker: We maintain the deployed aircraft, and we maintain a reinforcement capability up to 21 wings, the minimum JCS requirement.

Adm. Moorer: That doesn't provide for a sustained effort.

Mr. Johnson: Will NATO ground forces be substantially the same for FY 72?

Dr. Tucker: The deployed ground forces will.

Mr. Johnson: Another division will come out of Korea in 1973?

Dr. Tucker: Yes.

Mr. Packard: On Page 29 of our paper is a discussion of what 12⅓ divisions can do. "We still would be able to deploy a total of 16 divisions to NATO by M + 90." Page 30 explains the situation on tactical air. It states we could cut active wings to 20 if we were willing to reduce the reinforcement capability to NATO by M + 90 to 22 wings and the reinforcement capability in the Pacific by M + 90 to 14 wings.[11]

Dr. Kissinger: Let me ask if all this is true, why does the JCS want $77 billion? What would you do with it?

Adm. Moorer: It would have an effect all the way across the budget—on army divisions (we could have a higher number), on carriers, tactical air, research and development. Our readiness would be generally improved.

Dr. Kissinger: But if we can meet our commitments with the present budget, why is this necessary?

Adm. Moorer: Our NATO commitments don't represent all the forces we require in a NATO war. The Soviets have forces in the Pacific.

Mr. Packard: We have looked at the levels carefully and think this is the minimum we need to meet our commitments.

Mr. Johnson: I am worried about the out-years.

Mr. Packard: I don't want to make a commitment on the out-years. We need flexibility. We have to see what happens. We should keep our planning level high.

Dr. Kissinger: We are meeting commitments made for a period that is giving way to a new period. We have already pointed up many of the new problems in the NSSM 84 study.[12] We are proceeding into the 1970s with a scrubbed-down, low-readiness version of the forces designed for the 1960s.

Adm. Moorer: We are talking about the forces that have been earmarked for NATO according to SACEUR plans. There will be reductions in submarines and in our sustaining power.

Dr. Kissinger: When were these commitments made?

Adm. Moorer: At the outset of the 1950s.

Dr. Tucker: This program is specifically designed to implement the

NSDM 27 strategy, which was adopted just last year.[13]

Mr. Packard: We have talked about the new strategy, but we are not far enough along to be sure how to implement it. If we reassess the forces we need, we can make changes. If there is a change in the strategic situation due to SALT, we can make other changes. We have got to keep flexible.

Adm. Moorer: We have to look at the threat. This is what determines our requirements. The capability of the other side is a fact of life.

Dr. Kissinger: NSDM 27 was an abstract statement of contingencies we needed to prepare for. The assumption was that we would examine the content of those contingencies during the next fiscal year. In NATO every analysis we have made concluded that the problem was how to insure NATO's survival between M and M + 15. Now this shifts back to M + 26 in some cases. What I am suggesting is that there is grave danger in fulfilling commitments in the abstract made 15 to 20 years ago when there is a totally new strategic situation. We don't know what we are doing.

Maybe this is the best we can do this year. I recognize the pressures on the Defense Department to get its budget assembled. But we are running enormous risks to national security if we don't examine these questions.

Mr. Irwin: We should try to find some criteria to evaluate national security.

Mr. Packard: We can make changes. But some of these policies have not been settled yet. We have to keep flexible.

Dr. Kissinger: Take Korea, for example. A point could be reached where our drawdown in Korea produces the nuclear rearmament of Japan. This would be a substantial political cost to us. This is the sort of thing for which we lack a yardstick.

Mr. Packard: In the case of Korea, we still haven't been able to come up with an aid package.

Dr. Kissinger: The MAP question will be settled next week.

Mr. Packard: It has to be approved by Congress, and that will not happen next week.

Adm. Moorer: These forces have been planned in accordance with the fiscal guidance. Your questions are addressed in the JSOP. The figures are not absolutely fixed. They are best estimates. We can give figures for what we think would be required under various sets of circumstances. This can be done. But we know the cuts that have been made constrain the President's options.

Mr. Packard: We have tried some of these alternatives out in naval war games. We found that there was only a 20% chance that our navy would survive a naval war with the Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: After the Jordan crisis,[14] one of the Chiefs—perhaps it was Admiral Zumwalt—told the President: "Next year you won't be able to do this."

Mr. Packard: You won't have that problem with the forces we are proposing in this program.

Adm. Moorer: That is true in the Atlantic, but not in the Pacific.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to know what we can do with one set of forces that we can't do with another.

Mr. Packard: I can give you some analysis based on the war games. Dr. Kissinger: I have seen a table of defense expenditures with constant prices that shows that we are now spending the same amount as several years ago but have fewer forces.

Mr. Stein: The prices of equipment have gone up.

Dr. Kissinger: But this is with constant prices.

Mr. Packard: Yes, but equipment costs have gone up.

Adm. Moorer: You have got to compare your new equipment with the other side's new equipment. The Soviets have many new weapons. For example, they have developed a 30-knot submarine.

Mr. Packard: You can't afford to have an $80 million submarine anymore, when the Soviets have built a better one.

Mr. Shultz: Isn't this another way of saying what Henry [Kissinger] has been pointing out? All sorts of things have changed in the last ten to twenty years, including the development of new weapons systems. In the light of these changes, what is the appropriate strategy? What forces are needed?

We have terrific budgetary constraints to worry about. Our job is not to cut the budget but to get a grasp of what the needs are and to make sure that the President understands what is involved.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard) Dave, what do you want out of this Committee?

Mr. Packard: Specific guidance on the FY 72 budget. We plan to meet the $74.5 billion limit and to do it with the force structure we have outlined here. We have analyzed the hell out of it, but we can give you more analysis.

We do need to give you more on the question of readiness. If forced to choose, the Services generally prefer to hang on to forces and to go light on readiness.

Dr. Kissinger: We found out that in Europe there is only a 37-day supply of ammunition.

Adm. Moorer: The reason is that you can always get more ammunition.

Mr. Packard: The budget has already been squeezed pretty hard.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not trying to squeeze fat out of the budget. This Committee must relate the budget to national policy. We need to assess the impact of force levels on the

ability of our diplomacy to achieve its objectives. We can't scrub the budget for you, but we can develop criteria for evaluating it.

Mr. Irwin: I would like to recap what Gardiner Tucker said about NATO. Ground, air, and navy forces will remain the same, but reserve forces will be decreased.

Adm. Moorer: The categories will be changed—from 30 days to six months readiness. Also there will be a difference in staying power.

Mr. Irwin: Once we understand that, it is our obligation to say whether what you propose is adequate. From our point of view there shouldn't be any change in NATO forces during the balance of this Administration. If you say this involves giving up all new aircraft, then something has obviously got to give.

Dr. Kissinger: We should be analyzing what it means to us when we have a situation in which Soviet nuclear forces are growing, our land bases are shrinking, Chinese strength is increasing, and the Nixon Doctrine has to be implemented.

Mr. Helms: One can only be impressed with how well off we were in the 1960s.

Adm. Moorer: That is why the Soviets backed down in Cuba.

Mr. Johnson: With the strategic situation changing to one of nuclear parity, general purpose forces are now the ones to be used as instruments of national policy around the world. What are we going to do if we cut our general purpose forces while the Soviet general purpose forces are increasing?

Mr. Packard: That is what we have looked at. We think we have gone as far down as we should go, perhaps farther.

Mr. Johnson: I am thinking about our deterrent capacity. Will we have what we need in Southeast Asia?

Dr. Kissinger: Without challenging this budget, could we obtain some data on what one could do with additional forces and with other mixes that you cannot do under this program. NSSM 84 has turned up several problems related to NATO and will lead to recommendations for changes in that area. It is very worrisome when we face a new strategic situation with forces designed for the 1960s.

Mr. Weinberger: Could I get a clarification? There is no proposal to increase the budget over $74.5 billion?

Mr. Packard: That's right. We will do our best to hit that figure.

Mr. Weinberger: The flexibility is in the planning for subsequent years?

Mr. Packard: We will have to resolve the budget level each year.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the rationale for the trade-off between a decrease of one army division and an increase of two tactical air wings?

Mr. Packard: That is answered on Page 30 of our paper. It has to do with protecting our capability to respond to NATO commitments.

Dr. Kissinger: It has to do with NATO?

Mr. Packard: Yes, although I don't know specifically what the difference of one or two wings there means.

Adm. Moorer: No one can give you finite requirements.

Dr. Kissinger: My concern is that we are giving the President a budget that has been sort of negotiated out and are saying that this meets our commitments—without having redefined what our needs are for the 1970s. What can he do? What happens if he rejects it?

Mr. Packard: We can give you some other ways of saving money.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not trying to save money. What we want to do is to develop forces to support national policy. We want to be able to say: "If you do this, the consequences are as follows." I don't want him to be rubberstamping something he will have to live with in every crisis. I would not want him to find that a carrier is not available for use in a crisis such as Jordan and say that he wasn't warned.

Mr. Packard: We can give you this sort of information, for example, carrier availabilities. There are so many alternatives.

Dr. Kissinger: I think that except for Jim Schlesinger there is not a person here who can argue line items. What we should be concerned with is the relation between foreign and domestic policies and between different packages of defense programs.

Mr. Helms: Back in the 1950s, we were in a much better position. There was really nothing against us.

Dr. Kissinger: That minor league operation in Jordan a few weeks ago tied up our whole strategic reserve. The Cubans could have invaded Florida, and we wouldn't have had any forces to deal with them.

Mr. Packard: Let me see if we can put something together to answer these questions.

Mr. Irwin: What does this do to the anticipated MAP for FY 72? Do we have what is

needed in Southeast Asia?

Mr. Packard: Some of it is included, but not all.

Mr. Johnson: We will continue to need massive funding for Southeast Asia.

Dr. Tucker: We need about $1 billion.

Adm. Moorer: (to Johnson) You want to have a force level that will meet the NATO earmark requirements?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Irwin: We do not want to see a reduction. I don't know what this means precisely, but perhaps Ron Spiers could tell us.

Mr. Spiers: This means no changes in deployments. There would be changes in readiness, but these are not critical from a political standpoint.

Dr. Kissinger: We lose the war, but we have good NATO Council meetings.

Mr. Shultz: The NATO problem troubles me. As I understand it, we have a strategy that we are not in a position to implement tactically because the Allies are not equipped to do so. That suggests that either we improve our tactical capability or change the strategy to fit our tactics. This is very different from meeting a commitment to have *x* number of divisions in place. This really troubles me. I would like to see a strong defense.

Mr. Packard: Tactical nuclear weapons are a particular problem.

Adm. Moorer: On strategy, we can take the present one, which we got our allies to accept by twisting their arms. Or we can go back to the earlier strategy. However, there is no magic strategy. It is determined by what the Soviets do and the forces they have.

Dr. Kissinger: In our discussions on NATO, we were not able to show that the use of nuclear weapons would not make the situation worse.

Adm. Moorer: The alternative is to have all of Western Europe overrun. If we employ a strategy of controlled response and the Soviets nevertheless break through, we can shift to a nuclear strategy or get out.

Dr. Kissinger: But we need a theory of how to use nuclear weapons in Europe.

Mr. Packard: The truth is that there is no way to use them and no way to get rid of them.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 235, Agency Files, DPRC & Def Budget—Vol. 2–1970. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.

[2] In a November 18 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Shultz, Helms, and McCracken, Kissinger directed the preparation of additional analyses of alternative GPF packages for FY 72–76. The analyses were to include the following: an assessment of the current U.S. readiness posture, rationales for and evaluations of alternative GPF structures, and projections of the financial and manpower resources required to support each alternative package. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970)

[3] Document 155.

[4] See Document 153.

[5] See Document 152.

[6] In a September 14 memorandum to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Shultz, Helms, and Lincoln, Kissinger requested the submission of alternative packages on GPF and their strategic and military implications. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting, Defense Programs, 11–9–70)

[7] On November 9, the Defense Department responded to Kissinger's September 14 memorandum with a paper entitled "Defense Planning 1972–1976," which Tucker circulated to DPRC members under a covering memorandum. The 36-page paper includes 5 sections: Introduction, Economic Implications of Defense Expenditures 1971–76, National Security Policy and Strategy, DOD Planning, and Planning Alternatives for U.S. Force Reductions—FY 72–76. In it, the Defense Department recommended a further drawdown of two brigades from Korea in FY 73. (Ibid.) The Department of State considered such a proposed reduction "unacceptable on political grounds," according to an undated and unsigned memorandum from Irwin briefing Rogers following the November 9 DPRC meeting. (Ibid., RG 59, PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 503, DEF 1–DPRC–DOD Budget, 10/70–8/71)

[8] Section II of the paper, entitled "Economic Implications of Defense Expenditures 1971–76," stated the Defense Department's opposition to further cuts in the FY 72 Defense budget. Section II also recommended a study of how "to minimize dislocations caused by large regional and sectoral shifts" in force deployments undertaken to balance "our national security requirements and non-defense needs."

[9] The referenced chart and 11 other charts are attached to "Defense Planning 1972–1976."

[10] On November 12, Packard sent a memorandum to Kissinger in which he argued that $75.7 billion, rather than the $74.5 billion established by NSDM 84, was the "rock bottom needed to protect U.S. security interests." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–73A–1971, 381, National Security)

[11] The referenced pages of "Defense Planning 1972–1976" dealt with land forces and tactical air forces, two portions of the paper's fourth section on "DOD Planning."

[12] See footnote 11, Document 149.

[13] Document 56.

[14] A reference to the war pitting Jordan against Palestine Liberation Organization insurgents and Syria in September 1970 that resulted in a show of force by the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

159. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency[1]

Washington, November 10, 1970.

SUBJECT
Recent Tests of the Soviet SS–9

In mid 1968 the Soviets began testing a multiple re-entry vehicle version of their largest ICBM, the SS–9. We have referred to that system as the SS–9 Mod 4. The program consisted of flight tests over their normal test range within the Soviet Union and to longer ranges in the Pacific Ocean. As of April 1970, there had been seventeen tests of the system —[*1½ lines not declassified*].

[*1 paragraph* (*13½ lines*) *not declassified*]

As a result, the intelligence community has been in agreement that the system, as tested, was a Multiple Re-entry Vehicle (MRV) system rather than a Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV).

There was a break in the SS–9 Mod 4 testing program from [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Since [*less than 1 line not declassified*] there have been four triple re-entry vehicle tests of the SS–9. At least two of these and possibly a third suggest that development of a MIRV system is under way.[2]

[*4 paragraphs* (*20 lines*) *not declassified*]

[*5½ lines not declassified*] Such a system could not be used against widely separated targets, however, as can Minuteman III and Poseidon.

The guidance system employed on the SS–9 Mod 4 through at least April 1970 did not provide the three re-entry vehicles with the accuracy needed to produce a high probability of knocking out hard targets such as Minuteman silos even if they were independently targetable. If the suggestion that testing of a MIRV system is under way is correct, it is possible that the Soviets may also attempt to improve the guidance system. We have not yet determined whether the guidance accuracy has been improved but we are studying all aspects of the problem.

Should the Soviets decide to deploy a MIRV system based on these tests without improving other parts of the system such as the guidance components, it could reach operational status in late 1971. If improvements are made to the guidance system in order to achieve a high probability of killing three hard targets with the three warheads, then the system would probably not be operational until late 1972.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X. Top Secret; Sensitive. Helms sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a November 10 covering memorandum that begins, “Here is the paper requested on your behalf last evening.” Wayne Smith summarized the CIA memorandum in a November 13 memorandum to Kissinger, who initialed Smith’s memorandum. (Ibid.)

[2] Wayne Smith first alerted Kissinger to the possible outcome of the renewed round of SS–9 tests in a memorandum of November 4. Smith wrote, “if the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] tests reflect a test of [*3 lines not declassified*] then the Soviets have begun a new stage of SS–9 Mod 4 flight testing which could lead to a MIRV system.” (Ibid.)

[3] The CIA sent the NSC an Intelligence Memorandum on December 7 reporting that the SS–9 deployment program had slowed and perhaps temporarily stopped. There were also preliminary indications that deployment of the SS–11 and SS–13 had ended. In a December 15 memorandum, Wayne Smith informed Kissinger of this new intelligence regarding the slowdown, which he suggested could be interpreted as a “signal” from the Soviet Union regarding SALT. (Both ibid., Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI)

160. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–8–70 Washington, November 24, 1970.

SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK

The Problem

To assess the strength and capabilities of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, to estimate their size and composition through mid-1975, and to forecast general trends thereafter.

Summary Conclusions

I. Present Status of Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces

General

A. The intercontinental attack forces considered in this paper include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. In the course of the past 10 years the Soviets have engaged in a vigorous and costly buildup of these elements of their military establishment. While all defense spending increased during the period, the estimated share allocated to these forces doubled, going from about 5 percent in 1960 to more than 10 percent in the later years of the decade. The 1969 level—an estimated 2.3 billion rubles (the equivalent of $5.6 billion)[2] —was more than three times as high as the 1960 level. For the decade as a whole, spending on intercontinental attack forces accumulated to about 16 billion rubles (about $36 billion) with ICBMs accounting for about 80 percent of this amount. These figures do not include the cost of research and development (R&D), which rose faster during the 1960s than any other component of Soviet defense spending, and which we estimate has now surpassed that of the US.

B. As a result of this effort, the Soviets had on 1 October 1970 an estimated 1,291 operational ICBM launchers at operational ICBM complexes, and they will have an estimated 1,445 launchers operational by mid-1972. To this number may be added: (1) an estimated 80 SS–11 launchers (120 by mid-1972) believed to be deployed at intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) complexes and possibly intended for use against Eurasian targets, which are nevertheless capable of reaching the US, and (2) some 90 launchers which we believe are located at test or training sites. Of the 1,445 ICBMs estimated to be at operational complexes by mid-1972, 306 probably will be of the large SS–9 type and 850 the smaller SS–11. The remainder will consist of older SS–7 and SS–8 missiles, plus an estimated 80 of the small, solid-propellant SS–13s.

C. While these ICBM programs were under way, the Soviets were also energetically developing nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile-firing submarines. Of these the most notable is the Y-class, which, like the US Polaris, has 16 tubes for launching missiles. The missile presently carried by this class has an estimated range of about 1,300 n.m., a yield of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and a system Circular Error Probable (CEP) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Y-class submarines are now being produced at the estimated rate of 7–8 a year; we believe that 14 are now operational and that some 5 others are in various stages of fitting out and sea trials. Another 12 or 13 are believed to be in various stages of assembly. Besides the Y-class there are submarines of earlier design which could contribute to the intercontinental attack mission.

D. The USSR has not, in recent years, shown equal interest in manned bombers of intercontinental capability. At present there are 195 heavy bombers and tankers operational, all of them of the Bison and Bear types, whose designs date from the 1950s. We believe that a prototype now exists of a new aircraft, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. It might be used in an intercontinental role, and the force may be built up beginning about 1974 or 1975.

The Principal Types of ICBMs

E. The SS–11, by far the most numerous of Soviet ICBMs, is estimated to have a CEP of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and a yield [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. It is thus a weapon best suited for use against soft targets—cities, industrial installations, and some military targets. It can reach all parts of the US, but has also been tested to ranges as short as 500–600 n.m., indicating much flexibility in its possible uses. In 1969 testing began of a modified version. Analysis of these tests has not yet produced a full understanding of their implications; we remain confident nevertheless that the modified SS–11 will still be a soft-target weapon, designed to improve the ability to penetrate antiballistic missile defenses. Deployment of the SS–11 may have ceased at ICBM complexes, and appears to be tapering off at IRBM and MRBM complexes.

F. The SS–9 now exists in four variants: Mod 1, which carries a re-entry vehicle (RV) weighing about 9,500 pounds; Mod 2, whose RV weighs about 13,000 pounds; Mod 3, which has been tested both as a depressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) and as a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS); and Mod 4, which carries three RVs. Leaving Mod 3 aside for the time being, our analysis of evidence on the capabilities of Mods 1, 2, and 4 turns up some perplexing problems.

G. There is general agreement that the SS–9 was developed, early in the 1960s, to provide better accuracy and a larger payload than the SS–7, presumably for use against hard targets—i.e., the US Minuteman system. The Mod 1 appears reasonably well adapted for this purpose. In 1965, however, the Soviets began to test the Mod 2, which with its heavier payload was estimated to have a yield of [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. These tests were pursued with great vigor, and the Mod 2 was actually deployed before the Mod 1. [*4 lines not declassified*] But the Mod 2 has never in its numerous flight tests actually demonstrated enough range to reach any Minuteman complexes. We believe that its demonstrated range could be increased sufficiently to cover most or all of them (there are differences on this point) by using up more of the available

propellant, removing telemetry packages, etc. Yet it remains curious that the Mod 2, alone among ICBMs except the SS–13, has never been tested to what we would presume to be its intended operational range.

H. The kill probability of a missile against hard targets is more sensitive to accuracy than to yield. The accuracy of the SS–9 cannot be ascertained from observations. It must be deduced [*3½ lines not declassified*]. In the Intelligence Community, opinions as to the CEP of the SS–9 range from a low of 0.4 n.m. to a high of 0.7, with the most probable figures being either 0.5 or 0.6. Small as they may appear, the significance of these differences is considerable.[3] It is generally agreed that in actual operational employment, accuracies in the force as a whole would be somewhat poorer.

I. In sum, with respect to the capability of the Mod 2 against Minuteman, we have estimated that it can have sufficient range to reach most or all targets even though such range has not been demonstrated in tests. We see no reason to doubt that in the event of general war the Soviets would use it for whatever it could accomplish against the Minuteman system. But, the Soviets would have to deploy several times the present number of SS–9 Mod 1 and Mod 2, with their present capabilities, before achieving a force which would pose a serious threat to the Minuteman force as a whole. This brings us to a consideration of the Mod 4.

J. In August 1968, the Soviets began testing the SS–9 Mod 4, carrying three RVs. By April 1970, they had carried out 17 tests, about the usual number for a missile before it goes into operational deployment. In these tests, the three RVs [*2 lines not declassified*] were not independently targetable, and the weapon as tested was not a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). [*less than 1 line not declassified*] we presume that the Mod 4 has not been operationally deployed, though it could be at any time.

K. In October 1970, tests resumed, and by 5 November there had been four more. One of these was like the earlier tests; one was a failure. The two others exhibited [*5 lines not declassified*] one practicable method of developing a MIRV, though it is a different method from that used by the US. Data are still scanty, and analysis far from complete. Should the Soviets decide to deploy a MIRV system based on these tests they could probably begin to do so in late 1971, using the present SS–9 guidance system. This guidance system would give each RV a CEP no better than that of the SS–9 with a single RV. The yield of each of the three RVs is estimated to be [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The Mod 4 has sufficient range to reach Minuteman silos.

L. Returning now to the SS–9 Mod 3, as observed above it has been tested both as a DICBM and as a FOBS. In neither form does it have sufficient accuracy to attack hard targets effectively; its apparent function would be to attack soft strategic targets, avoiding early detection by the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. (New US warning systems give promise of reducing or eliminating this advantage.) There is some difference of opinion as to the capability of this vehicle operating as a FOBS. It is agreed, however, that the Mod 3 has been deployed only to a very limited extent, and that its future deployment will also be limited.

II. Soviet Policy and Future Programs

M. The broader reasons for the USSR's energetic buildup of intercontinental attack forces are neither complex nor obscure. In the early 1960s the Soviet leaders, politically and ideologically hostile to the US, and thinking and behaving as rulers of a great power, perceived that in this particular respect their military forces were conspicuously inferior to those of their most dangerous rival, the US. Consequently, they set themselves to rectify the imbalance—to achieve at a minimum a relation of rough parity. Parity in this sense cannot be objectively measured; it is essentially a state of mind. Such evidence as we have, much of it from the strategic arms limitation talks, indicates that the Soviet leaders think that they have now achieved this position, or are about to achieve it, at least in respect to weapons of intercontinental range.

N. Many aspects of the present force structure are also susceptible to simple and probably correct explanation. The Soviets built a large number of ICBMs in order to match—and now to surpass—the number of US ICBMs, and also to increase the probability that many would survive an initial US attack. They built missile-launching-submarines which are virtually invulnerable to attack when deployed, and they retained a manned bomber force as yet another option.[4] The intercontinental attack force is obviously capable of being used in war, but there is no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders intend deliberately to make nuclear war. The force is an attribute of power, an instrument to support policy, a deterrent to the US.

O. Looking to the future, it seems clear that the Soviet leaders intend to maintain at a minimum such forces as will continue to give them—in their own phrase—a sense of "equal security" with the US. One method of doing so might be through an arms limitation agreement; they appear seriously interested in this possibility. We do not know whether an agreement will be reached, or on what terms. If it were indeed concluded, the development of Soviet intercontinental attack forces would be subject to its terms, but in this Estimate we confine ourselves mainly to a consideration of the situation in the absence of agreement.

P. With the general attitudes and policies of the USSR being what they are, it might seem obvious to infer that the Soviet leaders will strive to achieve marked superiority over the US in strategic weaponry. We do not doubt that they would like to attain such a position. The question is whether they consider it a feasible objective—whether they believe the chances of success good enough to justify allocation of the necessary resources, adjustment to the political implication of an all-out arms race, and acceptance of the risk that instead of surpassing the US they might fall behind, especially in the technological competition. They might, in any case, think it feasible to seek a strategic posture that, while falling short of marked superiority, makes clear that the Soviets have advantages over the US in certain specific areas. For example, they can now claim an advantage in numbers of ICBM launchers. While this might not be significant militarily, it would help to dramatize the strategic power of the Soviet Union.

Q. But even if Soviet intentions go no further than maintenance of "equal security," their

arms programs are bound to be vigorous and demanding. This is in part because Soviet leaders must have an eye not to what forces the US has at present, but to what it can have, or may have, in future years. In this respect they are likely to be cautious—to overestimate rather than underestimate the US threat. Moreover, the weapons competition nowadays is largely a technological race; each side is impelled to press forward its R&D lest it be left behind. Weapons programs also tend to attain a momentum of their own; the immense apparatus of organizations, installations, personnel, vested interests, and so on, tends to proceed in its endeavors unless checked by some decisive political authority.

R. On the other hand, there are constraints upon Soviet arms programs. The most obvious is economic; resources are not unbounded; the civilian economy demands its share; one weapon system competes with another for allocations; and intercontinental attack forces compete with strategic defense and general purpose forces. The various bureaucracies with interests in one or another area compete partly with rational argument and partly in sheer political infighting. Soviet leaders must also consider how far they may wish to press their own programs lest they provoke countervailing programs in the US. And they must assess not only the present and future US threat, but also that from China, and elsewhere.

S. While the foregoing considerations probably govern the nature of Soviet decisions as to future weapons programs, they provide us with little or no basis on which to estimate in detail what these programs will be. We have never had solid evidence on the problem, and there is no reason to expect that we shall have such evidence in the future. Moreover, in the present era the rapidity of technological advance tends to produce especially vigorous action and reaction between military programs of the USSR and the US, and it has made the strategic relationship more susceptible to change than ever before.

T. Yet the possibilities are not unlimited, certainly in the next five years or so. For one thing, intercontinental weapons systems are of such complexity that their development, testing, and deployment take a long time. We can observe the testing phase, and thus project potential deployments. It usually takes about two years from the time we observe the first flight test of a new ICBM until that system becomes operational in the field. The interval for SLBMs is about the same or longer, and for bombers it is much longer. We can therefore estimate with much confidence that the *kinds* of weapons systems deployed by the Soviets during the next two years or so will be those already in operation or in the late stages of development. Even in the period from two to five years from now the force will be composed largely of existing kinds of delivery vehicles, though towards the end of the period some new ones may come into operational status, and some older ones be retired.

U. Because of the lead times involved in construction and deployment, we can also be highly confident of the *number* of launchers of intercontinental weapons which will be operational up to about two years from now. Beyond two years uncertainty increases as the time period of projection increases. Some reasonable limits to this uncertainty can nevertheless be derived from our knowledge of past deployment rates, especially those

obtaining at a time when the Soviets appeared to be making a particularly vigorous effort.

V. But it is not in new types of weapon systems or in gross numbers of launchers that the most significant developments in Soviet forces for intercontinental attack will probably lie during the next several years. Rather it is in *qualitative improvements* to present systems, and of these the most important are in accuracy of missiles and multiple re-entry vehicles for them.

1. *Accuracy*. On technical grounds, we believe that the Soviets, without going to new guidance concepts but mainly by improving the components of the present guidance systems and changing the configuration of their RVs, could in two years achieve CEPs of about 0.25 n.m. for their ICBMs, and begin to introduce these improvements into the force. Hitherto, the Soviets have demonstrated no urgent disposition to achieve high accuracies. But they are likely to do so—at least for the SS–9—in the next few years, primarily because of the great increase in capability against hard targets which this development would afford them, and because, if for no other reason, the necessary technical developments are sure to occur in the normal course of product improvements.
2. *Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles*. We continue to expect the Soviets to develop MIRVs capable of attacking hard targets such as Minuteman. These could proceed from the current SS–9 Mod 4 program, or from a different concept such as that represented by the "bus" system used by the US. With the high order of accuracy desired in a hard target MIRV, we think that neither could be operational before late 1972 at the earliest. A MIRV with no more accuracy than the present SS–9 Mod 1 or Mod 2 could eventuate from the current Mod 4 program by late 1971.
3. *Land-Mobile ICBMs*. The Soviets will probably continue work on these, but it remains to be seen how extensively they may deploy them. There are many difficulties of maintenance, security, transportation, and the like which cause us to believe that the Soviets might have doubts about the practicability of such a system. In any event we would not expect it to become operational before 1975.

W. With respect to submarines, the Soviets will almost certainly continue to increase their Y-class fleet at the rate of about eight per year, for some time to come. Meanwhile, a new missile, the SS–NX–8, has been undergoing flight tests at a deliberate pace since June of 1969. Its range is indicated to be about 3,000 n.m., a substantial improvement over the missile presently carried by the Y-class. A puzzling aspect, however, is that the SS–NX–8 appears too large to be fitted into the Y-class. Moreover, we have no evidence of a new submarine class designed to carry this missile. We think it likely that, at a minimum, the SS–NX–8 will be deployed on 10 modified diesel-powered G-class units. Evidence is insufficient, however, for us to make a confident estimate as to the nature or extent of any further deployment. By about 1975 Soviet submarines could have missiles equipped with multiple warheads or penetration aids; the system CEP would probably be about 0.5 n.m. or worse.

X. The fleet of intercontinental manned bombers will probably diminish in numbers

gradually until at least 1975, when the new [*less than 1 line not declassified*] could begin to enter operational units. We believe that the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is best suited for peripheral operations, but that it has some capability for intercontinental attack. All but the Air Force believe that our knowledge of this aircraft is still too limited to justify a confident judgment of its capabilities and future employment. The Air Force believes that the capabilities of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as now assessed, indicate a Soviet intent to employ the aircraft in both intercontinental and peripheral operations.

Y. The various uncertainties summarized above make it evident that no exact estimate of the future Soviet force structure, at least after about the end of 1972, could be defended. We have therefore constructed, in Section XII of this Estimate, several illustrative models to depict various possibilities.[5] The first, called Force A, represents little more than a completion of programs presently under way; it seems highly unlikely that the Soviets would stop at this. Another model, Force D, is a sample of what we believe would be a maximum effort short of converting to a wartime basis; this also appears highly unlikely. Force C, without going as far as Force D, represents something the Soviets might undertake if they were to place top priority on the early acquisition of a capability to knock out virtually all of the US ICBM force; we also think this unlikely.[6]

Z. Between these outer limits of reasonable force structures we have set forth three others designated respectively B1, B2, and B3. These differ primarily in the rapidity with which the Soviets, either for technological or other reasons, deploy MIRVs, and they reflect also some differences in general force structure which would seem likely to obtain because of such differences in MIRV development. Our estimate is that Soviet intercontinental attack forces are most likely to fall somewhere in the area depicted by these B-models, but we wish to emphasize that these and the other models are strictly illustrative, and not to be regarded as confident estimates or as projections for planning. As one moves beyond the next two years or so, all projections become increasingly uncertain; beyond five years they are highly speculative.[7]

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of the CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov). Nixon sent a letter to Helms on March 8, 1971, thanking him for the NIE, which marked "a considerable improvement over last year's version." The President commended the NIE's "frequent sharply-defined, clearly argued discussions of various contested issues;" its "attempt to incorporate a wide range of sources," including Soviet SALT statements; its attempt to

identify the most likely Soviet force models and goals; and its quantitative detail. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A, 157, White House) NIE 11–8–69, September 9, 1969, is Document 46.

[2] The dollar figures (appearing in parentheses after the rubles) are approximations of what it would cost to purchase and operate the estimated Soviet programs in the US. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] See paragraphs 52–54 for a discussion of the effect of differences in accuracy and yield. [Footnote in the original. Paragraphs 52–54 examined a table, "Kill Probability Against Minuteman," illustrating the effects of differences in accuracy and yield. The NIE explained that 65 percent of single SS–9 Mod 2 RVs with yields between 18 and 25 MT and a 0.5 n.m. CEP would knock out their targeted Minuteman silos. If the CEP were 0.6 n.m., 55 to 60 percent of the attacking missiles would accomplish their missions.]

[4] Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not believe Soviet missile-launching submarines are virtually invulnerable to attack. Based on the discussion of Soviet submarine patrol activity (paragraphs 127–132), only a few appear to be deployed at any one time; the remainder become vulnerable soft-targets in port. In view of extensive US efforts in ASW operations he further believes that some portion of the deployed subs would also be vulnerable and that vulnerability will increase as ASW technology improves. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] Section XII, "Future Forces," included four sections: A Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, Possible Forces in the Absence of an Agreement, Soviet Perception of the Threat, and Multiple Re-entry Vehicles and Accuracy. The section outlined three broad strategic alternatives available to Soviet military planners: allowing their "relative position to deteriorate somewhat" while still maintaining a credible deterrent, "maintaining a position of rough parity with the US, either through an arms control agreement or by making appropriate changes in their forces in the absence of an agreement," or improving "their position by trying to outrun the US in an arms race."

[6] Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not agree with the judgments in this paragraph. For his views, see his footnote to Section XII, page 61. [Footnote in the original. Triantafellu's reservations stemmed from two factors: the estimate's analytical methodology and its projection of Soviet force goals in the absence of a strategic arms limitation agreement, which he felt was low.]

[7] Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not agree with the judgments in this paragraph. For his views, see his footnote to Section XII, page 61. [Footnote in the original.]

161. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, November 24, 1970, 2:37–3:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Military Manpower Policy

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Secy. John Irwin
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Thomas Pickering
Mr. Seymour Weiss[2]

Defense

Mr. David Packard
Dr. Gardiner I. Tucker
Mr. Roger T. Kelley
Mr. William K. Brehm

CIA

Mr. Bruce C. Clarke

JCS

Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles
Maj. Gen. Richard F. Shaefer

ACDA

Vice Adm. John M. Lee

OMB

Mr. James Schlesinger
Mr. Caspar Weinberger[2]

CEA

Mr. Herbert Stein

White House

Mr. Peter Flanigan

Selective Service System

Mr. Curtis Tarr[2]
Mr. Byron Pepitone

OST

Dr. Edward David

NSC Staff

Mr. K. Wayne Smith
Col. Richard Kennedy
Mr. John Court
Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. A memorandum will be forwarded to the President analyzing the relationship between planned draft calls for the first half of 1971 and the maintenance of planned overseas deployments through FY 72.[3] The memorandum should clearly set forth the implications of maintaining draft calls at the present rate in terms of shortfalls in Army strength in Vietnam and other areas. It should also explain how draft calls would have to be increased in order to meet presently planned deployments.
2. A working group will be established under the DPRC to review important issues relating to overall manpower policies, including those identified in Secretary Laird's memorandum of November 19, 1970.[4] The Working Group's conclusions will be submitted to the DPRC for review prior to being forwarded to the NSC.

Dr. Kissinger: We got this meeting together because we have found on a number of occasions that our deployment decisions were being driven by manpower decisions. Also the Secretary of Defense has requested that a broad manpower review be undertaken within the NSC system. As we move toward a volunteer force and project the Defense budget over the next few years, we face some crucial manpower issues. This meeting is to define the issues.

(to Packard) You are ready to present your preliminary conclusions on the question of manpower and overseas deployments.

Mr. Packard: We are going to present the specific problem the Army faces. It is the Army which has a problem; the other services are not dependent on the draft. The relationships linking draft calls, the war in Southeast Asia, and the shortfall problem can be brought into focus by looking at the situation the Army confronts. I am going to ask Bill Brehm to present the briefing.

(Mr. Brehm's briefing was based on a series of charts, copies of which are appended to these minutes.[5] Individual charts are referred to by number at appropriate places in the minutes.)

Mr. Brehm: We want to show what serious alternatives exist for combining various deployments in Vietnam during FY 72 with different draft call levels during the next few months. First, I want to point out certain ground rules and assumptions on which our analysis is based. (Chart 1) Manpower procurement lead time is at least seven months. This is an attempt to give the Selective Service at least two months lead time and to provide five months for training. Lead time for carrying out manpower reductions is one to two months. In general, it is better to err on the high side in planning manpower procurement. This increases options and protects against uncertainty. For instance, there are variations in the number of enlistments and in the rate at which people get out of the Army. At present the latter rate is 55,000 enlisted men per month.

I would like to describe the situation in Vietnam. (Chart 2) It brings out the importance of lead time. When the Army was developing its FY 71 budget, we made the assumption that Army strength would decrease in a straight line until June 1971. Shortly thereafter, in January [1970], the decision was made to hold Army strength constant for an extended period of time, and this decision became the basis for our current plan. Because of the lead time requirement, we could not bring people into the Army to build up its strength. Nevertheless, we tried to implement the decision, but we had to do so at the expense of other areas. The shortfall in Vietnam was about 14,000 in August [1970]; however, in October we made the planned level. Shortfalls were the price we paid for not knowing soon enough that we were going to have more men in Vietnam than we planned.

Dr. Kissinger: Would the shortfall have been greater than shown if the Marines had been taken out earlier? I take it that the gap you describe is in Army strength and not in total strength.

Mr. Brehm: The Marine Corps withdrawal schedule was taken into account in our plan.

Mr. Packard: The Army did not have time to carry out manpower planning.

Mr. Brehm: In Korea (Chart 3) the Army had planned to make withdrawals during the three-month January–March 1971 period. That plan has changed, and Army strength is now to be sustained longer. Because of the diversions to Vietnam, we had a peak shortfall in Korea of 10,000 in August [1970].

To define specifically what we mean by a shortfall, let me present some figures for the 4th Armored Division in Europe (Chart 4). The current authorized manning level is about 90% of full wartime strength. However, current strength is even lower. The shortfall is the difference between the authorized manning level and the actual current strength.

Dr. Kissinger: Do the Europeans know this?

Mr. Brehm: I don’t know.

Mr. Packard: They probably do, but they have worse problems of their own.

Dr. Kissinger: Everybody trades off his own shortages, and nobody talks about those of others.

Mr. Irwin: What type of shortfall is involved?

Mr. Brehm: It is mostly at the lowest level—the squads and platoons. The aggregate shortfall [in August 1970] was 58,000. (Chart 5) When we break down this shortfall, we find that 24,000 was in Korea and Vietnam. In any further manpower program, we wouldn’t want to put the shortfalls in Korea and Vietnam. Europe and CONUS would have to bear the brunt.

Let's see what has happened in Europe. (Chart 6) In August 1970, we had 10 tank crews per tank company instead of the 17 authorized under the TO&E. In the artillery, there were 3.5 crews per battery versus 6 under the TO&E. As for hard combat skills, we had 31,000 personnel as compared to 38,000 needed under the authorized manning level. The shortfall is concentrated in these areas.

In October 1970 we were better off. (Chart 7).

Dr. Kissinger: Practically, wasn't it about the same? Rather than show a shortfall, we were just redeploying faster. You were just reducing the ceiling so that you did not have a shortfall.

Mr. Packard: One important point is that it is the fellows on the front line who are cut back.

Mr. Schlesinger: The driving force behind these developments is lower draft calls?

Mr. Packard: Yes. We'll get to that later.

Mr. Brehm: We have three major variables (Chart 8): vary accessions, vary Army strength in Vietnam, or vary Army manpower shortage outside Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: To my untutored mind, this amounts to a choice of increasing draft calls, decreasing Army strength in Vietnam, or decreasing Army strength outside Vietnam.

Mr. Brehm: That's correct.

Mr. Irwin: Could you reduce the required strength?

Dr. Kissinger: That amounts to changing the target.

Mr. Schlesinger: How about varying the loss rate?

Dr. Kissinger: The practical effect of the second and third options [of Chart 8] is to change our overseas deployments. We decrease our strength in Vietnam and/or some place else. We either lower the authorized level or just have a shortfall.

Mr. Brehm: That's right.

Let me point out some of the ground rules on which we operate.

[These are set forth in Chart 9]. The early release policy used to apply to those who had three months or less to serve. However, most of these people have one month leave when they get back, and it requires a couple of weeks to process them into a unit. Besides, they are not well motivated.

Lt. Gen. Knowles: They have had their war.

Mr. Brehm: Hence we changed our policy and now provide early release for those with five months or less to serve. Many commanding officers are unhappy about this. They want to let returnees out right away.

The assumption that there will be one additional enlistee for each additional draftee may be shaky in the short run. Personally, I think it is questionable. As for the assumption that there will be no enhancement of enlistments in the next eighteen months, we have a program for stepping up enlistments, but it is still in the proposal stage.

Mr. Schlesinger: How sensitive are your final conclusions to that assumption?

Mr. Brehm: Not very. Any enhancement of enlistments would be deferred into FY 72 or perhaps until the last quarter of FY 71.

Mr. Kelley: This also follows from the six to seven month lead time requirement.

Mr. Brehm: The extent of DOD reliance on the draft is shown in the next chart. (Chart 10) The figures on draft-induced volunteers are based on an analysis of the lottery sequence numbers of enlistees.

Dr. Kissinger: It has been said that if all our combat forces were taken out of Vietnam, we would only need to draft 50,000 men per year to support our forces. Yet, you are planning to spend $3.5 billion on an all-volunteer force. Is that because we need to compensate for the losses [in draft-induced volunteers] of the other services if the draft is ended?

Mr. Brehm: Perhaps.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a hell of a lot of money to spend to avoid drafting 50,000 people.

Mr. Packard: That must be a wrong estimate.

Dr. Kissinger: Can somebody find out?

Mr. Brehm: We have three draft-call options. [These are set forth in Chart 11]. The low option will involve draft calls of 10,000 per month during January–June 1971. The medium option requires 14,000 per month during the same period; and the high option from 15,000 to 17,000 per month.

Dr. Kissinger: Which option is our present program following?

Mr. Brehm: That is what we are trying to determine.

Dr. Tucker: We haven't yet established the January draft call.

Mr. Brehm: We are three weeks behind in advising Curtis Tarr of our requirements. It is urgent to decide soon.

Our planning assumptions for Vietnam call for a decrease in Army strength from 203,000 at the end of FY 71 to 115,000 at the end of FY 72. (Charts 12 and 13) The total DOD strength in Vietnam at the end of FY 71 will be 260,000. The highest curve [of Chart 13] shows the impact of maintaining a ceiling of 10,000 per month on draft calls. There will be a shortfall of 40–60,000. We will continue to have the readiness problems we have today, and we will have special difficulties in CONUS and Europe. The two lower curves show the shortfalls under the medium and high draft call programs.

Mr. Irwin: Is it a fair question to ask how this relates to the budget?

Mr. Brehm: The swing [over the three options] amounts to about $350 million for FY 72.

Mr. Packard: Today we are looking at the problem apart from the budget.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right.

Mr. Packard: This shows that with a 10,000 per month ceiling on draft calls, we will be in serious trouble under the current 203–115 reduction plan.

Mr. Kelley: Unless we take some action that has impact toward achieving zero draft calls.

Mr. Packard: There is not much that we are likely to be able to do on this during the early period.

Dr. Kissinger: This 40,000 shortfall has to be distributed over Europe and CONUS?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Mr. Schlesinger: Can we hit other than divisional forces, for example, the brigades in Alaska and the ones in Panama?

Mr. Brehm: There is not much gold to be mined there.

Let's go on to the other alternatives. One would be a 192–115 plan from end FY 71 to end FY 72. (Charts 14 and 15)

Dr. Kissinger: That would make only a difference of 10,000 in the total shortfall?

Mr. Brehm: Yes.

The lowest projection is from 180,000 at end FY 71 to 102,000 at end FY 72. (Charts 16 and 17)

Mr. Packard: This represents the optimum balance unless we are willing to increase draft calls. If we adopt this plan and if we can also make progress in increasing the number of volunteers, we would do fairly well. We could live with this. A 30,000 shortfall is no worse than what we have lived with before.

If we want to maintain our strength in Vietnam and keep the shortfall down, there is no alternative but to go to higher draft calls—up to 15,000 per month.

Dr. Kissinger: If we cut back to 180,000 in Vietnam [at the end of FY 71], we will still have a shortfall.

Lt. Gen. Knowles: There will be 20,000 fewer than the CINC says he requires.

Mr. Kelley: The time of maximum shortfall is the point at which we ought to be making some progress on the all-volunteer force. As we go ahead, we should be able to flatten out that [shortfall] curve.

Mr. Packard: These are all lower force levels than under the current plan.

Dr. Kissinger: Can the situation in Vietnam be helped by keeping the Marines there?

Lt. Gen. Knowles: According to the Marine Corps Commandant, he has a drastic personnel turbulence problem. The Marines do have a problem of repetitive tours overseas.

Mr. Schlesinger: How high a draft call would eliminate the shortfall?

Mr. Packard: 15,000 per month.

Mr. Schlesinger: With the 180–120 option?

Mr. Packard: If you went up to the 203–115 option, the required draft calls would go up to 20,000 per month.

Dr. Kissinger: The 203,000 level is the present plan?

Mr. Packard: Yes. We would have to go up to a 20,000 per month draft call in January in order to eliminate any shortfall.

Mr. Brehm: The hump [in the shortfall curve] relates to the fact that our training base is limited. We could put more people in if we changed that assumption.

There are two other variations. One would be if the President decided to hold our strength in Vietnam constant for a period after the beginning of FY 72. (Charts 18 and 19) If Army strength were maintained for three months, then there would be very steep spikes in the shortfall curve.

Dr. Kissinger: If there was an offensive any time during these periods [of peak shortfall], we would be in the position of having to withdraw while the offensive was going on.

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Mr. Flanigan: We could put most of the shortfall in the United States.

Lt. Gen. Knowles: We need to maintain a training base in the US.

Mr. Irwin: What is it practicable to reduce in the US?

Lt. Gen. Knowles: I don't think you can cut much. We need the training base.

Mr. Irwin: Then substantially all of the cuts will come out of Europe in FY 72.

Mr. Packard: We are just down to bare bones as far as strategic reserve is concerned.

Dr. Kissinger: Remember what we were up against in the Jordan crisis.

Mr. Packard: The problem is not the budget but the draft. Even if we get all the money we are asking for, we couldn't do what is required.

Dr. Kissinger: What creates the draft problem?

Mr. Flanigan: It's a little bit of a political problem. Having kept calls at the present low level for a while, it is difficult to raise them.

Mr. Packard: What has been the recent draft call level?

Mr. Pepitone: Around 10,000 per month.

Mr. Packard: There is a political question whether we can indeed raise calls over 10,000 per month.

Mr. Brehm: In August 1970 an announcement was made on this. We advertised the calls as less than 10,000 per month.

Mr. Packard: If we go up to 15,000 we might generate a political problem.

Mr. Irwin: It is a choice of which political problem to face—the one here or in Europe.

Mr. Schlesinger: What would it cost to extend the tour of duty in Vietnam?

Mr. Flanigan: That would help in Vietnam, but not here.

Lt. Gen. Knowles: Changing the length of tour for men who are already over there would

hurt morale.

Dr. Tucker: It would be hard to do unless there were an enemy offensive.

Mr. Packard: One possibility would be to change the policy of early release for those with less than five months to serve.

Mr. Brehm: That adds warm bodies.

Mr. Kelley: The high potential shortfalls indicate we ought to get on with the volunteer force.

Dr. Kissinger: What is holding it up?

Mr. Packard: Nothing except our own planning.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not a budgetary problem?

Mr. Packard: It is entirely in our [DOD's] hands. We have a number of things under way.

Mr. Kelley: Our judgment on draft calls shouldn't be based on the expectation that the [shortfall] curve will be as high as shown in this chart.

Mr. Brehm: It is dangerous to quantify this. I think that any shortfall above 30,000 is serious.

Mr. Packard: We need some black magic.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what?

Mr. Packard: A big boost in enlistments.

Mr. Irwin: If you increase draft calls, increased enlistments will result.

Mr. Brehm: There is a second "hold" option [involving maintaining Army strength in Vietnam constant for three months after January 1972]. (Charts 20 and 21.)

Dr. Kissinger: Where do the [shortfall] peaks come from?

Mr. Brehm: They are the result of holding Army strength constant in early 1972.

Dr. Kissinger: The shortfalls are actually worse in combat units. They are as high as 45% among tank and artillery crews, on the basis of what you showed us about the situation in Europe.

Mr. Packard: A one-month extension in Vietnam would give us 18,000 people to apply

against the shortfall.

Mr. Brehm: Let me show a wrap-up chart. We don't want to seem presumptuous, but this gives the conclusions that can be drawn from the data we have presented. (Charts 23 and 24) If the President wishes to retain the current withdrawal plan in Vietnam, he must either accept sustained shortfalls in other areas of over 50,000, agree to draft call levels of over 15,000 per month during the first half of 1971, or agree to changes in established personnel policies, such as the twelve-month tour in Vietnam. If the President wishes to limit draft calls to about 10,000 per month, then he must either reduce Army strength in Vietnam below currently planned deployments, accept sustained shortfalls in other areas, or agree to changes in established personnel policies.

Dr. Kissinger: This shows what we have got to face. We can distribute the material contained in the briefing to this group.

Mr. Brehm: We have to decide whether we want to retain the original 203–115 Vietnam withdrawal plan or to limit draft calls to 10,000 per month.

Dr. Kissinger: What happens if we go to a level of 193,000 in Vietnam? We would still have shortages.

Mr. Brehm: That's right. The alternatives I cited are the extremes. Mr. Packard: Remember that in the briefing we did not take into account the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. As long as we have draft calls, we can proceed on the assumption that these services can continue to be manned with volunteers. However, this does not address the long-range situation.

Dr. Kissinger: This briefing answered about all of the questions I had expected to ask. However, I would like to know about the shortfalls in the next few months.

Mr. Brehm: In gross terms we will come out about even in December [1970]. There will be localized shortfalls because of shortages of specialized skills.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the following six months?

Mr. Brehm: There will be a peak shortfall of about 35,000 in March.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two problems to be put before this group. One is the impact of manpower policies on deployments. The other has to do with the broader question of what our manpower policies should be. Secretary Laird has written me to suggest an NSC study of the latter problem.[6] However, we can't address it without some staffing, and I propose to create a working group to undertake this. We would then come back to the DPRC and then go to the NSC.

It is obvious from today's briefing that we have been operating on two totally inconsistent

tracks. On the one hand we have the Presidential directive that there are to be no further withdrawals from Europe, Vietnam, or Korea beyond those he has approved for FY 71.[7] On the other hand we have manpower policies that force the President to make changes which make it impossible to carry out planned deployments. The President has to address this problem immediately. We should take into account any alleviating features, such as progress on the all-volunteer army.

Within a very brief period of time we should present the President with a summary of this briefing, with your [Brehm's] conclusions, which seem to me unchallengeable. We should also point out that Korea is in poor condition for any further reductions because of the political impact these would have on Korea. Further cutbacks also run counter to the conclusions of the NSC meeting last Thursday [November 19, on NATO strategy and forces].[8]

Even as the manpower situation stands, it gives us no latitude. We can continue withdrawals from Vietnam in the face of an offensive or undertake a drastic drawdown in Europe. Therefore, if you agree, we will submit this briefing to the President. The most elementary decision he has to make is whether to reduce draft calls or go below the established withdrawal program. One of them has to go. If we go below the planned withdrawal level, we run into the CINC's conclusion that this would mean jeopardizing the military situation and the Vietnamization program.

Mr. Irwin: There is another question it might be worth investigating, and that is how this all relates to the budget.

Dr. Kissinger: That is no problem. The budget relates to the 203,000 level.

Mr. Packard: Essentially it does although there may be some flexibility. The point is that the budget is not controlling. There are several things that might be done. The decision should be made on the basis of the discussion here.

As for the all-volunteer program, the best that we can achieve on that will result in only a marginal saving.

Dr. Kissinger: At least for FY 72.

Mr. Packard: For CY 71 and FY 72. It will give us some margin of safety.

Mr. Flanigan: With regard to FY 72 and the All-Volunteer Force, we want to make sure it is clear by the end of that period that the program is leading to success. We don't want to limit the enthusiasm for the All-Volunteer Force.

Mr. Packard: We are moving ahead. We have a firm commitment from the Army to put it on the front burner.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand the briefing, the shortfall in combat effectiveness is even worse than the overall shortfall. This under-cuts the NSC decision on Europe and the appeal we want to make to our Allies.

Mr. Johnson: That is an important point.

Mr. Schlesinger: Remember that combat personnel are made up of draftees. Everyone who fights is drafted.

Mr. Flanigan: The situation can be alleviated by changing the policy on letting returning Vietnam veterans out of the Army after five months. This might affect that draft profile. We would not have such a sharp sweep upward in early 1971.

Mr. Schlesinger: The problem is that we have arrears that have to be made up.

Mr. Flanigan: That is a big percentage increase if you look at the politics of it.

Dr. Tucker: We generally have low draft calls at the end of the year, followed by a surge at the start of the following year. This is the established pattern.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to have that memorandum for the President done this week. The facts are obvious. This has been one of the most uncontroversial, if depressing, meetings I have ever attended. This is one case where the facts really do speak for themselves.

We will need to elaborate a little on what they mean in a few cases when presenting this to the President. We should particularly explain about the impact on combat effectiveness and the possible effect if there is an enemy offensive in Vietnam.

To handle the long-term aspects, we will get the Working Group going.

This could affect NATO, Korea, and our whole basic defense policy. It will determine whether our policy is to be driven by draft calls.

Mr. Schlesinger: (to Brehm) What is your assumption as to Army loss rates?

Mr. Brehm: 45–50,000 per month.

Mr. Schlesinger: That is more than the previous figure. It shows the volatility of the loss rate. This affects the basic draft calls although it doesn't change the basic conclusion.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard) I have been pressing you for a long time to give us options, and the first time you do, I don't like them.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional

Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes Originals, '69–'73 [1 of 3]. Secret. All brackets are in the original.

[2] Left the meeting prior to completion of Mr. Brehm's briefing. [Footnote in the original.]

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[3] On December 10, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Laird, Shultz, and Tarr announcing that Nixon had "decided that draft calls over the period January–April 1971 should be at a rate of 17,000 a month." However, a handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was rescinded, at Haig's direction, two hours after its issuance. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Draft Reform [1969–1970])

[4] Laird sent Kissinger a memorandum on November 19 calling for a review of manpower issues directed by the NSC. (Ibid.)

[5] Not found attached.

[6] See footnote 4 above.

[7] Kissinger sent a memorandum on October 27 to Rogers, Laird, and Shultz announcing a Presidential decision that there were to be no additional withdrawals of U.S. forces from NATO, Korea, or Vietnam pending further analysis of manpower issues by the DPRC. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970)

[8] The record of the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

162. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, November 25, 1970.

SUBJECT
Secretary Laird's Proposal

Secretary Laird has provided you with his "view of the basic approach we should follow in seeking to implement your Foreign Policy and Strategy for Peace in the 1970's." (His book accompanies this memorandum.)[2]

The Secretary's Conceptual Approach

Secretary Laird defines our "basic defense goal" as:

—Transferring part of the U.S. security burden to our allies.
—Building up allied forces and emphasizing regional defense arrangements.
—Cutting the defense budget from 9% of our GNP to 7% and developing a volunteer army.

The Secretary believes this can be done if we adopt a new defense planning rationale. According to his rationale we would:

—Devise forces on the basis of their *deterrent* capability rather than their warfighting capability. This would mean we would rely on nuclear weapons to deter large-scale conventional threats such as that posed by Warsaw Pact forces.[3] If we adopted this strategy, sizable U.S. forces could be withdrawn from Europe.
—Rely on the Nixon Doctrine in Asia, Latin America, and Africa by supplying military assistance to strengthen indigenous friendly forces to meet the likely threats. The Secretary expects the Japanese to play a greater security role in Asia. Whatever the Japanese do, however, the Secretary does not believe the U.S. should maintain ground forces to meet what he judges is an improbable Chinese threat. If it turns out that indigenous forces do not deter a Chinese attack, the U.S. would rely on naval and air forces to conduct an island defense strategy.

The Secretary's Forces

The Secretary's conceptual approach leads him to propose major changes in our force posture for the 1970's:

—He would maintain 100 to 150,000 troops in Europe versus the presently authorized 323,000.

—He would withdraw additional U.S. forces from Korea.[4]
—All U.S. forces except advisors would be withdrawn from Vietnam by mid-1972, whereas you have not made any redeployment decisions beyond July 1, 1971.[5]
—The number of Safeguard sites would drop to 4 from the currently planned 12.
—Our carrier force would decline from 15 carriers to 12.

On the other hand, much of our currently planned force would not be altered. For example:

—We would continue to maintain a strategic posture of about 1050 land-based missiles and 41 missile submarines. It would be improved with the B–1 and ULMS.
—We would continue to maintain about 14–16 ground force divisions and 33–36 tactical air wings.

My Views

I have some serious doubts about the Secretary's proposed strategy:

—(1) Deterrence Versus Warfighting

The Secretary believes that our current policy of planning our general purpose forces on the basis of their warfighting capability has been in error. He contends that we should build deterrent forces instead.

> *This is a serious definitional mistake. The deterrent value of any force, nuclear or non-nuclear, cannot be substantially greater than its warfighting capability.*[6]

The crux of the matter of designing forces is to convince potential enemies of their warfighting capability. One cannot substitute doctrine and rhetoric for a force that will convince our enemies that an attack would not achieve its objectives.

The Secretary seems to believe that by building forces that have a warfighting capability we increase the likelihood of conflict because the enemy knows our specific capabilities. But the reverse is actually the case. If we have a warfighting capability, the enemy is deterred by the possibility that we will use it to defeat his attacks. If we had no such capability and we could not hide our deficiencies from the enemy, then the enemy would know we could not meet his attacks. Therefore our actions would become predictable, and since his capabilities would exceed ours, aggression would become more likely, not less.

Therefore, warfighting and deterrence are essentially the same thing.

—(2) Secretary Laird's National Security Versus Military Approach

Secretary Laird distinguishes between:

—a national security approach which relies on nuclear weapons to establish greater disincentives to aggression, and
—a military approach that designs forces to meet various threats but does not give particular emphasis to our possible first-use of nuclear weapons to exert downward pressures on possible conflicts.

The problem with this distinction really goes back to the question of warfighting and deterrence. NATO is a case in point.

Applying his approach to NATO, the Secretary believes that, if we used nuclear as opposed to conventional forces to deter large conventional attacks, we would enhance the deterrent value of our forces. We would be taking a "security approach" rather than a "military approach" that seeks to design forces to meet the conventional attack.

But the recent NSC meeting on NATO[7] showed that planning to use nuclear weapons in this NATO role would enhance our deterrent only if you are willing to run the risk of nuclear war *and* our nuclear warfighting capability and willingness to escalate exceeds that of the other side. As was pointed out at the NSC meeting, such a policy is of doubtful feasibility if the Soviets have an assured destruction capability. You rejected the idea that you be left with only two alternatives should the Warsaw Pact launch a large-scale attack: (1) giving up Europe, or (2) escalation to nuclear attacks on Soviet targets.

In sum, while Secretary Laird's security approach suggests a massive retaliation strategy for NATO, the defense (or warfighting) approach favors:

—our current short-term conventional defense option, and
—the possible use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield to halt a massive attack (our flexible response option).
—*(3) My Views of a National Security Framework*

My view of a national security strategy encompasses a different set of issues than Secretary Laird's. A true national security strategy should include our diplomatic posture, our economic assistance and trade policies, and our cultural and education programs as well as our military posture.

If all of these instruments are brought to bear in an integrated fashion, we will establish a broader and more lasting basis for national security than that obtainable by forces alone. There must be an overall design. Then the policies of our allies and friends will enhance our interests, and the options open to our potential enemies will be minimized.

Secretary Laird's concept of national security gives insufficient weight to our political posture in Asia and Europe.[8] Sudden changes in our force posture, not worked out with our allies, could upset the political balance in vital area of the world.

Considering the Secretary's proposals within a national security framework would entail examining:

—how our NATO allies would react to the withdrawal of 100–150,000 U.S. troops,[9]
—how Korea would respond to the withdrawal of more of the U.S. troops stationed there,
—the military and political implications of the complete U.S. withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Southeast Asia by mid-1972,
—how Japan would react to the proposed withdrawals from Asia. It is entirely conceivable that our actions could spur Japan to develop nuclear weapons.

These are the issues that must be addressed before the possible consequences of the Secretary's proposals will be clearly understood. As you know, the State Department holds firm views on many of the political assumptions behind Secretary Laird's views. Others would question his views about how countries such as Japan would use their forces and influence. We need to examine these issues at the same time we consider the Secretary's force proposals.

The Secretary's Contribution

While the Secretary's proposals need to be thoroughly examined within our overall security framework, among the very real problems he raises are the following:

—We do bear a disproportionate share of the burden of defending NATO. Our allies there do have the capability to improve their forces and if they did so, this could ultimately allow significant reductions in U.S. forces.
—We do have to make major improvements in the design and readiness of our own forces that will better enable us to cope with the contingencies that might arise in the Middle East and Latin America.
—We may want to reconsider the desirability of maintaining U.S. forces to meet a full-scale conventional Chinese attack on mainland Southeast Asia.

Your Response

I believe you should take advantage of Secretary Laird's initiative to ask him to help in a fuller development of his proposals and others that merit attention. At Tab A is a memorandum for Secretary Laird for your signature that is designed to obtain his cooperation in this effort.[10]

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 225, Agency

Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IX, 1 Oct 70–Nov 70. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

[2] See Document 157.

[3] Nixon underlined the portion of this sentence reading "…would rely on nuclear weapons to deter large-scale conventional threats…" and wrote, "not credible," in the margin.

[4] Nixon highlighted each of the first two points and wrote, "not now" in the margin next to each.

[5] Nixon highlighted this point and wrote, "*no*—leave air power" in the margin.

[6] The President highlighted this point and wrote, "I agree" in the margin.

[7] The meeting of November 19; see footnote 8, Document 161.

[8] Nixon underlined this sentence.

[9] President Nixon highlighted this and the following three points.

[10] Nixon signed the memorandum at Tab A on December 1 and sent it to Laird. Nixon wrote that he believed Laird's proposed strategy provided "new and useful thinking on the vitally important subject of national security." Nixon added that he shared Laird's view that the U.S. defense program should "rely more heavily on the contributions of our allies" and asked Laird to prepare a draft of his proposal for consideration by the DPRC and, later, by the NSC.

163. National Security Decision Memorandum 96[1]

Washington, December 14, 1970.

TO
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Nuclear Weapons Safety Rules

Under the provisions of NSAM–272 of November 13, 1963,[2] the Defense Department has been forwarding to the President information on all approved changes in nuclear weapons safety rules. In general these changes have been routinely noted. Such a system serves the prime objective of insuring that this important area receives the attention it deserves. There are, however, several problems:

—The changes described are usually highly technical and difficult to evaluate without a precise knowledge of the characteristics of the weapons involved.
—At this point the President does not have a clear idea of what the overall system for nuclear weapons safety is and how the approved changes relate to it.

In order to deal with these problems, the President has directed that:

—NSAM–272 be revoked.
—An annual report be forwarded to him at the beginning of each calendar year describing the nuclear weapons safety rules in effect for all weapons systems and noting changes in those rules during the past year.
—He be informed promptly of the rules approved for new weapons systems and of any significant changes with regard to existing systems.

The President requests that a proposed format for the annual report be forwarded to him for his review by January 15, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 51–96. Secret. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon on December 8 recommending that he approve the attached NSDM. The President initialed his approval. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–221, NSDM 96)

[2] NSAM 272, issued on November 13, 1963, by President John F. Kennedy, established certain safety rules for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems. It also directed the

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the AEC to inform the President about general safety rules for those weapons and systems then in effect. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 272)

164. Memorandum for Record[1]

Washington, December 15, 1970.

SUBJECT
DPRC Meeting on General Purpose Forces, 15 December 1970

1. Principal attendees at subject meeting were:
Dr. Kissinger, NSC (Chairman)
Deputy Secretary Packard, Defense
Under Secretary Irwin, State
Admiral Moorer, CJCS
Mr. McCracken, Economic Advisor
Dr. Schlesinger, OMB
Mr. Weinberger, OMB
Mr. Helms, Director, CIA
VADM Lee, ACDA
Dr. David, Science Advisor
Mr. Stein, CEA
Messrs. Spiers and Brown, State
Mr. Court, NSC Staff
Dr. Tucker, OSD
Dr. Christie, OSD (SA)
MG Elder, JCS
2. The meeting was introduced by Mr. Packard, who stated that Defense had not completed resolution of its Defense budget. He stated that he expected to have finished resolution of the major budget issues by the end of the week. He then turned the floor over to Dr. Tucker who presented a briefing along the lines of the 14 December memorandum to the DPRC Working Group.[2]
3. The discussion during the course of Dr. Tucker's briefing is keyed to the following pages of the 14 December memorandum:
—*Page 1*[3] —Dr. Tucker explained that the three forces reflected had to be considered as illustrative only since Defense had not finished the budget scrub. He noted that the low force for structure cost alone was about $.6 billion below the planned force and that the high force was about $1.4 billion above the planned forces. He also stated that related shifts in readiness would amount to about $1 billion in either direction.
—*Page 5*[4] —No significant discussion.
—*Page 7*—Major points developed in discussion on this chart[5] were that readiness was the limiting factor in land force reinforcement in NATO but lift was the limiting factor in reinforcement in the Pacific; that both factors, combined with airfield reception capability, were limiting in tactical air reinforcement; that the chart

indicated unopposed reinforcement capability and that no shipping, airfield and other losses were taken into account; that each area reinforcement capability was considered in isolation and that all CONUS-based forces were considered available; that no forces were withheld for minor contingencies, strategic reserve, or other purposes; that there were significant equipment shortages limiting the deployment readiness of reserve forces but that this situation should be improved by end-72 though not necessarily at NSDM 84[6] funding levels.

—*Pages 9, 10, and 12*[7] —No significant discussion.

—*Pages 13 and 14*[8] —Mr. Packard indicated that decisions within the last 24 hours would improve the indicated munition capability in NATO in the 30–60 day period and in Asia for the 30–270 day period. Dr. Kissinger indicated that we needed to apply pressure to our allies to improve their munitions position for both land and air forces. Admiral Moorer indicated that the situation was not as black or white as the chart portrayed since commanders would ration ammunition to avoid running out. There was considerable discussion of the meaning of the term "90 days" in NSDM 27[9] in respect to the NATO defense with no evidence of a clear and accepted understanding. In the course of the discussion, Dr. Kissinger stated the belief that any assumption based on operable strategic warning for Korea was in his view fallacious.

—*Page 16*[10] —Dr. Kissinger questioned setting aside 456,000 as a Soviet strategic reserve in M+30 and not counting them in the threat to NATO. There was also general discussion of Soviet readiness posture and a consensus that we had no "feel" for Soviet stockage beyond the 30 days in units.

—*Page 17*[11] —No significant discussion.

—*Page 19*[12] —Dr. Kissinger questioned the 28 North Vietnam divisions reflected as available on M+30 and received no satisfactory answer. (Dr. Tucker will attempt to explain this figure.) Admiral Moorer questioned the figure that showed Chinese reinforcement in either Northeast or Southeast Asia only after M+30, and received no satisfactory answer.

Dr. Tucker then explained the model used in Charts on pages 22 through 36.[13] Dr. Kissinger questioned the use of ratios, commenting that the Germans had met with no inconsiderable success in World War II in both the East and West despite a position of numerical inferiority. Dr. Tucker stated that the model was imperfect at best and that you could not compute the outcome with respect to Germany and World War II.

—*Page 22*[14] —Dr. Kissinger stated that the main conclusion to be drawn from this chart was that if the Soviets got a 15-day jump in mobilization this could be critical—the Soviets would achieve a tremendous advantage and if we then commenced to mobilize they would have a tremendous incentive to launch an immediate attack. Dr. Kissinger also commented that it seemed to him that the chart indicated a need for more mobility. Mr. Packard agreed but observed that there was an even higher initial payoff in added investments for readiness. In the course of a general discussion of

strategic warning and what would constitute a sufficient basis to order mobilization, Mr. Packard indicated that we might be paying insufficient attention to intelligence regarding Soviet general purpose forces. It was also observed that we probably would recognize after two weeks that we should have mobilized two weeks ago.

—*Pages 24, 26, and 27*[15] —No significant discussion.

—*Page 31*[16] —Dr. Kissinger and Admiral Moorer again questioned the threat basis and why Chinese forces were not shown as arriving prior to the M+60 period. Mr. Packard indicated that he felt this chart made a good case for providing ammunition and modernization for ROK forces since it appeared that ROK forces alone met the manpower requirements.

4. At this point, Dr. Kissinger halted the briefing and said he believed everyone had gotten the point and that he considered the briefing to be thoughtful, stimulating and illuminating. He then asked what conclusions were to be drawn.

Mr. Packard answered that first, more emphasis was needed on readiness, and second, that there might be a few force structure areas which needed building up. He stated that he thought we might find that the $74.5 billion provided in the NSDM 84 guidance could not do all that we needed to do. He stated that he was still working the budget and trying to find tradeoffs and hoped to be done by the end of the week.

Mr. Spiers stated that State was very interested in seeing what could be done at the $74.5 billion level.

Dr. David stated that he did not believe that there had been enough factoring of relative effectiveness in such areas as ECM.

Admiral Moorer stated that we are still fighting the war in Vietnam, that we have substantial requirements deriving from NSDM 95[17] that we must meet, that readiness was being severely eroded, and that it was his judgment we could not get there at the $74.5 billion level. He stated we would wind up non-ready, non-modern and without options and flexibility for the President.

Mr. Weinberger stated that he shared Admiral Moorer's concern and would like to see what $76.5 billion could do.

Mr. Packard stated that he agreed with Admiral Moorer and would be prepared at the end of the week to show what $76.5 billion would provide.

5. The meeting concluded.

John H. Elder, Jr.
Major General, USA
Chief, OP&MA Division

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, Admiral Moorer, 334, DPRC. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] On December 14, Tucker forwarded to DPRC Working Group members a package of materials in preparation for the meeting. The materials included some 43 pages of tables

and charts and a 32-page working paper, entitled "Fiscal Year 1972 General Purpose Forces." The paper comprises eight sections: Introduction, U.S. General Purpose Forces Planned for FY 72 and Possible Alternatives, Peacetime Deployments, Reinforcement Capabilities of U.S. and Allied Forces, Sustaining Combat Capabilities of U.S. and Allied Forces, Projected FY 72 U.S. and Allied Forces Needed to Meet Threats by Various Criteria, Relationship Between Forces to Meet Text Criteria and U.S. and Allied Force Capabilities and Needed Improvements in U.S. and Allied Forces. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, DPRC Meeting General Purpose Forces, 12/15/70)

[3] The preparatory materials distributed by Tucker on December 14 include at page 1 a table, entitled "Summary of U.S. Alternative Forces for FY 72," that outlined three program options: planned, low alternatives, and high alternatives.

[4] At the fifth page of Tucker's package is a table entitled "Sustained Peacetime Deployment Capability With Alternative FY 72 Forces."

[5] The chart at page 7 outlined "Alternative U.S. Reinforcement Capabilities" in Europe, Korea, and Southeast Asia and in the event of minor contingencies.

[6] Document 155.

[7] At these pages are three tables: "Approximate FY 72 European Allied Reinforcement Capabilities," "FY 72 Asian Allied Reinforcement Capabilities," and "FY 72 Allied Naval Inventories."

[8] At pages 13–14 are two separate charts representing the capabilities of the United States and its allies to provide sustaining materiel support in NATO and Asia (Korea). The charts estimated that the U.S. land forces in Europe could be sustained from 210 days to an indefinite period of time, European allies from 30 to 114 days, and U.S. land forces in Asia and Asian allies indefinitely.

[9] Document 56.

[10] The table at page 16, "Approximate Estimated Soviet Forces Available for Early Commitment," assumed that the Soviets withheld 456,100 ground forces for strategic reserves to be used against NATO in the event of hostilities.

[11] The table at page 17 is entitled "Total Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces Available for Early Commitment Against NATO."

[12] The table at page 19, "Approximate Asian Communist Forces Available for Early Commitment," estimated that North Vietnam had 28 divisions available for commitment within 30 days of mobilization.

[13] Pages 22–36 of the briefing materials included numerous tables, charts, and graphs regarding forces in NATO and Asia.

[14] The graph at page 22 plots total manpower in the NATO center region in FY 1972 against the number of days following mobilization day.

[15] At pages 24, 26, and 27 are three graphs: "Tank/Anti-Tank Summary—FY 72 NATO Center Region," "Aircraft Capability & Requirements FY 72—Europe—All Regions," and "Aircraft Summary—FY 72 Europe—Center Region."

[16] The graph at page 31, “Manpower Summary—FY 72 Northeast Asia,” plots available U.S. and allied manpower versus days after mobilization by Communist countries in the region.

[17] NSDM 95, “U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO,” issued on November 25, 1970, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

165. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

JCSM–572–70 Washington, December 16, 1970.

SUBJECT
Worldwide Posture of US Military Forces (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:
   a. JCSM–760–69, dated 11 December 1969, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."
   b. JCSM–288–67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."
   c. JCSM–221–68, dated 10 April 1968, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."[2]
   d. JCSM–548–68, dated 14 September 1968, subject: "US Military Posture Assessment (U)."
   e. MC 14/3, dated 16 January 1968, subject: "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area."[3]
2. (U) In reference 1a, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided an assessment of the worldwide US military posture as of end FY 1970 when all planned reductions, including those of Project 703, would have been completed.[4] Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that, when the force level decisions based on the FY 1971 budget were announced, they would reassess the capability of US military forces. Although the FY 1971 budget is yet to be approved and final force level decisions are still to be determined, the impact on US worldwide capabilities of force level reductions and fiscal restraints incurred to date are considered to be of such significance that this updated assessment is deemed appropriate.
3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff view with increasing concern the continuing degradation in the strength, disposition, and readiness of the worldwide US military posture when measured against national security objectives and the growing capabilities of Soviet and Chinese communist general purpose and strategic forces. They recognize, as a fact of life, that military resources will rarely be available in sufficient quantity to satisfy all requirements. However, recognizing limitations on resources does not change the nature of the threat nor eliminate the requirement to maintain capabilities to counter it. Forces should be developed at a reasonable cost, but US military capabilities must be maintained to support US interests and to counter the threats to these interests. This concern, expressed previously in references 1b, 1c, and 1d, has been intensified as additional force reductions and fiscal restraints have continued the degradation of the US military capabilities, an assessment of which is provided in paragraphs 4 through 19 below.
4. (TS) *North America.* Soviet strategic nuclear forces continue to pose the most dangerous threat to the United States. To counter this threat, the United States must

maintain strategic forces in sufficient strength to deal effectively with a direct, deliberate nuclear attack in a crisis. In addition, strategic forces, sufficient in numbers and quality, contribute to the total credible deterrence in support of national objectives worldwide. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously provided (reference 1d) their views on the declining trend of the US strategic posture relative to that of the Soviet Union. A discussion of the impact of subsequent force reductions follows.

a. *Offensive.* The numbers and target coverage potential of forces which can be made available for commitment to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) have been further reduced. The phaseout of B–58s and Mace and the phasedown in Titan missiles have resulted in a net reduction in the SIOP capability of [*number not declassified*] weapons. When viewed in light of the increases in Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities, the reduction in SIOP weapons has significantly reduced the weapon density on some preplanned targets, thereby lowering the desired damage expectancy, and has reduced coverage of Soviet hard intercontinental ballistic missiles.

b. *Defensive.* The United States is confronted by a continuing and significant threat from bombers and submarine-launched cruise missiles which can be engaged by air defense weapons. US air defense forces have been phasing down, while the Soviets have improved the survivability and capability of their bomber forces by the adoption of low-level penetration tactics and by the addition of air-to-surface missiles. The accelerated phasedown of the US air defense system has severely reduced the US air defense capability and enhances the strategic value of the Soviet bombers and submarine-launched cruise missiles by offering attack options which an effective air defense would deny. Any further reduction in US air defense forces would increase the risks to national security.

   (1) The density of Army CONUS air defense fire units has eroded from a maximum 134 Nike–Hercules fire units deployed in 1963 to the present force level of 82 units. The reduction of these fire units has adversely affected the overall defense of the United States. All Army air defense has been eliminated in the center of CONUS. Elimination of units in the perimeter has reduced the capability of those defenses. Although remaining units represent a significant factor in defense of the areas where they are deployed, there are other vital target areas where no missile defense exists and none is planned.

   (2) From a peak of 27 SAGE Combat and Direction Control Centers in 1962, command and control has declined to the present six CONUS region control centers; 12 BUICs providing backup. During the same period, the total US Active and Air National Guard (ANG) interceptor force has been cut from approximately 1,700 to about 550. During the last year, 110 US long-range radars and 17 gap fillers have been reduced to only 87 long-range radars. Indicative of Soviet expanded capabilities is that, since the beginning of 1969, almost 500 Soviet reconnaissance and bomber flights have penetrated the Alaskan and Greenland–Iceland–UK radar coverage. Some have approached as close as 40 miles off the Labrador/Newfoundland coast and 15 miles off the Alaskan coast.

(3) The reduction of interceptor squadrons, including the transfer of a number of squadrons from the Active force to the ANG, has reached the point that now ANG squadrons outnumber active squadrons. The consequence of this trend is a degradation of the ability to respond rapidly to an emergency, since ANG units have fewer aircraft on alert and must be recalled to further generate the force. The reduction of forces has also resulted in elimination of the airborne long-range radar input capability that previously existed on the east coast of the United States and has depleted severely the airborne early warning capability available for the west coast. Except for intermittent manning of the station between Florida and Cuba, there is no routine station manning on either coast of the United States such as existed a year ago. The radar reductions have not only denuded the central part of the United States but also have caused a severe loss of overlap coverage which is essential in the event that penetrating bomber forces attack and attempt to degrade the US ground environment. Furthermore, because of budgetary restraints, progress in developing US electronic counter-countermeasures capability has come to a standstill.

(4) Programmed reductions in weapon systems have resulted in the loss of 21 BOMARC launchers (13 percent) available in the northeast corridor, five active interceptor squadrons, 18 percent of the Active force air-to-air nuclear capability for air defenses, all surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense of Hawaii, and one-third of the SAM fire units in Alaska. Further, other SAM units in the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) have been inactivated, and a comparable number and type of units in the Army Air Defense Command have been redesignated as STRAF units to replace them. (They will remain under operational control of CINCONAD, unless required for employment elsewhere.)

(5) The United States presently has no capability for active defense against intercontinental ballistic missile/submarine-launched ballistic missile attack and has only a very limited capability to engage enemy satellites.

(6) Reductions of ships and aircraft dedicated to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and the stretchout of procurement of the P–3C patrol aircraft degrade US defenses against missile-equipped submarines. Furthermore, this threat has increased with the regular deployment of Soviet Yankee class submarines, each armed with 16 ballistic missiles. ASW forces are insufficient to provide an effective defense against this threat and simultaneously carry out other missions and tasks.

5. (TS) *Europe/Middle East/North Africa.* The most likely areas for Soviet military activity continue to be Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East.

a. The NATO military posture in Europe, already weakened by France's nonparticipation, is further jeopardized by the downward trend in numerical strength of NATO's immediately available forces. These forces are now marginal and, in the event of major aggression, would require early and large-scale reinforcement. This situation has placed an increased reliance on rapid augmentation of NATO's forward posture. US military forces are fully committed in support of worldwide requirements; thus, the reinforcement of NATO would require major redeployment

from PACOM and would substantially reduce operations in the Pacific area at the expense of US interests and commitments.

b. Soviet military strength and influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean area have steadily increased relative to that of the United States. The loss of Wheelus Air Base,[5] together with a substantial Soviet military presence in the UAR, continuing aid to certain Arab States, and increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, provides added opportunity for the USSR to extend its influence and to enhance its bargaining position in obtaining additional air and naval rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements on the southern Mediterranean littoral. Soviet Forces, especially naval and air forces, threaten essential sea and air lines of communication (LOC) and challenge the US ability to meet military contingencies in this area.

c. Eight Active Army divisions are committed to NATO; five are M-day divisions (four and one-third in Europe and two-thirds in CONUS). (The US reply to the DPQ for end CY 1970 indicates that nine additional divisions are maintained for national purposes and are considered as a potential source of reinforcement for SACEUR.) Budgetary and personnel restraints cause the four and one-third US European-based M-day divisions and their support to be organized at less than desired strength. Under REFORGER agreements, the two-thirds division in CONUS is required to be available in Europe within 30 days. It is currently projected that this unit can meet the 30-day objective availability in Europe. Two of the other three divisions required for NATO employment by M+30 could be available under full mobilization conditions by M+60 (the deployment times shown above assume ready pre-positioned stocks in Europe). The third division would not be available until the period M+60 to M+20. Because of the reduced readiness of one of the Active armored divisions, the United States has agreed to make a CONUS-based airborne division available to NATO in an emergency by M+45 days. However, this substitution does not provide an equivalent combat capability. The remaining Active divisions would require redeployment from PACOM. None of the Reserve divisions for reinforcement of Europe could be deployed by M+6 months. A maximum of five Reserve component brigades, with their initial support increments (ISIs), and six roundout maneuver battalions could be deployed to Europe prior to M+6 months.

d. With the decommissioning of one CVA in December 1970, 14 CVAs will be available, of which five are committed to NATO by M+2 and five more by M+30. Of three mission-capable CVSs, two are committed to SACLANT by M+2. This reinforcement of NATO would require major redeployment from the Pacific and would substantially reduce naval operations in the Pacific area, particularly west of Hawaii, at the expense of US interests and commitments. At the present time, Soviet naval forces are increasingly aggressive and continuously shadow the major units of the Sixth Fleet. However, the Sixth Fleet is unable, with forces presently committed to the Mediterranean, to maintain comparable surveillance of Soviet naval elements while concurrently meeting other mission requirements. There are insufficient ASW forces to provide other than marginal ASW protection for carriers, replenishment groups, and amphibious groups. In essence, the Sixth Fleet's ability to accomplish its

missions in the Mediterranean (such as control of the sea, surveillance, convoy protection, air support, and landing amphibious forces) is challenged.

e. Two Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF) are committed to NATO. The LANTCOM MAF is scheduled to arrive in Europe by M+30 days; however, reductions in amphibious lift will require greater reliance on a mix of amphibious and Military Sealift Command (MSC)/commercial shipping to meet this schedule. Actual arrival and configuration of the M+30 MAF depend on the timely arrival and loading of assault shipping from the Pacific Fleet. Capability to lift the assault follow-on echelons is limited by the capacity and availability of MSC/commercial shipping. The increased reliance on MSC/commercial shipping impairs the capability to make an opposed landing. This capability is impaired further by the shortage of naval gunfire support ships. The LANTCOM MAF provides the Special Mission Force–Guantanamo. The PACOM MAF, with three-ninths in CONUS/Hawaii and six-ninths on Okinawa/Japan, is scheduled to arrive in Europe by M+60 days.

f. Sixty-two Air Force tactical fighter squadrons are scheduled to be deployed to Europe by M+30. Of these, 21 are in-place, including four squadrons with the primary role of air defense. An additional four squadrons (Crested Cap) are dual based in CONUS. The 37 additional tactical fighter squadrons would be provided by M+30 days. However, of these 37 squadrons, only 15 active squadrons are available in CONUS; the remaining 22 squadrons can be provided only by redeployment from Asia at the expense of support in these areas and from the 26 ANG tactical fighter squadrons, most of which are still equipped with obsolete F–84/F–100 aircraft. It is also significant that delay in modernization of the Air Force tactical fighter squadrons impairs their ability to operate in a NATO/Warsaw Pact combat environment.

g. REFORGER/Crested Cap exercises are considered an essential element of US support. During the Trilateral Talks of 1967, in which the “dual basing” concept of US NATO Forces was established, the United States gave assurance to the NATO Allies that dual basing was not the first step in a long-term program of US force withdrawal from Europe.[6] The United States stated that it would annually exercise dual-based units in Europe. Despite such assurances, many allies doubted that dual basing was anything other than a US withdrawal plan. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, first priority was accorded to an immediate REFORGER/Crested Cap exercise as a demonstration of US resolve to support NATO. Failure to continue to exercise these units in Europe would not only abrogate the trilateral agreements but would tend to dilute their NATO orientation and reinforce the fears of NATO Allies that this is another step in a long-term program of US force withdrawals from Europe.

h. Reductions in US strategic forces are discussed in paragraph 4 above, and the command and control problems of SACEUR and USCINCEUR are discussed in paragraph 12 below.

i. The logistic problems of USCINCEUR are discussed in paragraph 14 below.

6. (TS) *Atlantic*. The strategic significance of the Atlantic stems from NATO’s reliance upon it for LOC for economic and military support and from the growing capabilities of

the USSR to use it as a missile launch area for attack against North America and Europe. US naval forces have two primary tasks in the Atlantic: to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, including defense against missile-launching submarines and protection of LOC, and support of the defense of NATO. Present LANTCOM forces are limited in their ability to perform all these tasks concurrently. Even with the redeployment of NATO-committed forces from the Pacific Fleet, surface ASW forces required for defense against missile-launching submarines and for convoy escort necessitate a drawdown on those normally assigned to protect carrier, replenishment, and amphibious groups, thus increasing the vulnerability of these forces.

7. (TS) *Latin America*. Latin America is important because of its proximity to the United States, the Panama Canal, and the availability of strategic routes through and around South America. The principal threat to Latin American nations is one of subversion and insurgency. In addition, Cuba continues to pose a threat to US security interests.
   a. Priority of US military efforts in Latin America will be given to defense of the Panama Canal. In addition, US Forces must be prepared to conduct military operations to meet contingency requirements, including combat, evacuation, surveillance, quarantine, and/or show-of-force operations.
   b. Soviet and Communist China objectives continue to be long range, emphasizing expanded presence and influence through diplomatic and trade relations, cultural activities, and cooperation with favored governments. Options to take advantage of favorable opportunities will be kept open, and covert participation and support of armed insurgence might occur if the prospect of success is sufficient to justify the risks involved. Recent USSR naval and air operations in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico and airlift operations to Peru offer additional evidence of Soviet interests in the area and of its growing capability to undertake distant deployments in support of political and/or military objectives.
   c. US Forces available will have a very limited reinforcement capability to assist in the defense of the Panama Canal and the US Naval Base at Guantanamo in the event of a major contingency outside the hemisphere.
   d. There is insufficient amphibious shipping to sustain the Caribbean Ready force at sea on a continuing basis; thus, its reaction time in response to contingencies is increased.
   e. The steady erosion of US influence, military advice, and assistance in this part of the hemisphere lessens the ability of the United States to project and promote national security interests in Latin America. In this regard, the ascendancy of a Marxist-oriented President in Chile offers particular opportunities for the expansion of communist influence in Latin America.[7]
8. (TS) *Pacific Area*. The commitments that the United States has with certain nations of the Western Pacific/East Asian area and the importance of the Pacific area to the defense of the United States make this area strategically important. Control of vital sea areas and protection of vital sea and air LOC are essential to meeting US commitments in the Pacific area and to the defense of North America. US Forces are presently deployed in a forward posture to assist allies to deter or contain communist aggression.

Assistance is being provided selected nations in the area to improve their ability to deal with subversion and insurgency as well as with external aggression.

a. The program of redeployment of US Forces from Southeast Asia was originally based on progress in Vietnamization. Accelerated redeployment could degrade the Vietnamization program and increase the tactical risks. This is especially true in Military Region 1 where the enemy can mass forces capable of inflicting a major defeat of Army of the RVN or US units and of seriously disrupting or reversing the course of Vietnamization.

b. Redeployment of combat forces from the Pacific to Europe in the event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war would leave remaining US Forces with reduced protection. With virtually all US surface and air transport and ASW capability dedicated to the movement of troops and equipment to NATO, residual US Forces in Asia would be hard pressed to defend vital areas of PACOM against attack and to maintain control of essential bases and LOC. The effect could be that the point at which nuclear weapons must be employed by the defending US Forces might be reached earlier.

c. Announced US troop reductions in the ROK have necessitated an overall modernization program for ROK Forces. The anticipated timelag between US withdrawals and completion of the ROK modernization program will result in decreased defensive capabilities in the ROK. Airlift and sealift resources are not presently available to meet the desired time phasing of forces required for the defense of the ROK. Phasing down of the logistic base in Japan and lack of funding for new construction in the ROK have degraded the US capability for augmenting and sustaining combat operations.

d. The Army portion of the PACOM reserve is one division and one separate airborne brigade. The separate airborne brigade and two-thirds of this division force are still committed to combat in the RVN. This impairs CINCPAC's capability to respond to contingencies, including reinforcement of the ROK. The adverse situation resulting from an insufficient reserve is aggravated by reductions in already marginal sea, air, and amphibious lift.

e. Reduction to three carriers in the Seventh Fleet has decreased the number and types of missions flown by embarked aircraft and has made it impossible to provide full-time carrier coverage of both the Gulf of Tonkin and Sea of Japan. Reduction of replenishment ships imposes restraints on ships providing naval gunfire support in the RVN. Limited assault shipping continues to restrict the flexibility of the amphibious forces. Inactivation of the Pacific Fleet's only heavy gunfire support ship will commence in December 1970. ASW forces have been reduced to the extent that adequate protection for LOC will be delayed until augmentation forces are made available.

f. The progressive reduction in tactical air sorties in Southeast Asia has eased the pressures against the enemy. The reduction of Arc Light sorties from 1,400 to 1,000 sorties/month has also significantly reduced the amount of firepower available to support US and allied forces. The redeployment of three of CINCPAC's four F–105 squadrons to CONUS has resulted in a loss of conventional and nuclear capability,

impacting on both contingency and SIOP planning.

g. The command and control problems of CINCPAC are discussed in paragraph 12 below.

h. PACOM logistic problems are discussed in paragraph 14 below.

9. (TS) *General Purpose Forces*. The concern of the Services over the diminishing capabilities of the already marginal general purpose forces continues to increase. While the United States reduces the size and effectiveness of its Armed Forces, the USSR continues its emphasis on improved capabilities for nonnuclear warfare and a growing Soviet capability to project its armed strength into noncontiguous areas. This situation supports the need for strong US general purpose forces for deterrence and to provide increased defense options. This concern is amplified as the USSR increases the tempo of political and military operations in support of its expansionist doctrine. Examples of circumstances which limit the availability and capability of US general purpose forces to meet contingencies are discussed below.

a. After presently directed reductions, there will be 13-2/3 Army divisions, with 11-2/3 ISIs, seven sustaining support increments (SSIs), and three MAFs (Marine division/wing teams). The disposition of some of these forces limits their availability for use in contingencies. Two and two-thirds Army division force equivalents will remain committed to combat in the RVN; one Army division, one ISI, and one-third SSI will be forward-deployed in the ROK; four and one-third Army divisions, four and one-third ISIs, two and one-third SSIs, and one-ninth Marine division will remain in Europe; and one-ninth Marine division force will remain in Guantanamo. In addition, three and two-thirds Army divisions, two and two-thirds ISIs, one SSI (including REFORGER), and two MAFs are NATO committed with attendant restrictions on their use.

b. In the area of air operations, reductions in tactical fighter and reconnaissance forces and the lack of modernization in tactical fighter forces, together with substantial cuts in research and development and in weapon systems and supporting equipment and services, have jeopardized the capability to accomplish air superiority and close air support missions. The basic design of the latest US fighter, the F–4, is over 15 years old. During this time, the Soviets have developed several prototypes; and one of their latest operational aircraft, the Foxbat, is far superior to the F–4. In addition, the curtailed procurement of the F–111 limits US offensive counterair and interdiction capability, particularly all-weather. The continuing phaseout of tactical electronic warfare support aircraft, without a programmed replacement, degrades this support for tactical air, ground, and naval forces.

c. Regarding sea forces, at a time when US Forces are being continuously reduced, the USSR is building a modern navy with greatly increased capability to challenge naval supremacy. An advanced submarine building program continues with the introduction of five new classes of submarines since January 1968. Out-of-area Soviet submarine deployments have quadrupled since 1965. Modern Soviet naval ships now deploy regularly to the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean; they also operate in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. By contrast, the US

naval building program is inadequate to update and/or replace aging ships, 45 percent of which are now 20 years of age or older.

d. Another major deficiency is the US tactical nuclear stockpile which, for the most part, is based on technology 10 to 15 years old, whereas the USSR has continued to improve in this area.

10. (TS) *CONUS -Based Army Forces*. Support operations in the RVN have lowered the readiness of CONUS-based Army forces.

a. The STRAF will have four divisions, three ISI and one and one-third SSI. One STRAF division with one ISI and one SSI has a worldwide commitment. The NATO reinforcing component of the STRAF consists of three divisions, two ISI and one-third SSI. The two-thirds REFORGER division with two-thirds ISI and SSI, while CONUS based, is not part of the STRAF. The availability of these forces for deployment ranges from 4 to 16 weeks. Although the eight Reserve component divisions have attained a training readiness of 15 to 20 weeks after mobilization, they cannot be deployed for approximately 18 months due to equipment shortages. Currently, these units have on hand approximately 26 percent of mobilization requirements.

(1) Readiness shortfalls in the Active and Reserve components and force inactivations preclude the conduct of sustained operations outside Southeast Asia without mobilization. Presently, the Army could deploy one division force equivalent in support of a contingency; however, the support of this force could cause further degradation of the already strained training/rotation/sustaining base.

(2) Considering major units (division and brigade) and total deployable assets, logistical shortfalls will preclude deployment of more than five Reserve component brigades within 180 days. Deployment of these five brigades assumes redistribution of the total Reserve component assets to high-priority units and a decision to deploy five brigades with major equipment shortages, including antitank weapons, communications equipment, and heavy engineer items which are currently in worldwide short supply.

b. Sustaining US Army deployments in the RVN, Thailand, and the ROK has been a major concern. Both the CONUS and long-tour areas, including STRAF and US Army, Europe, contribute to the training/rotation/sustaining base for Southeast Asia. The disproportionate distribution of skills between long-and short-tour areas, particularly in logistic units with long leadtime training and equipment problems, has resulted in a high level of personnel movement and turbulence throughout the sustaining base units of the Army. Continued reduction in the base during RVN redeployments will prolong the personnel turbulence problem.

11. (TS) *Airlift and Sealift*. As forward deployed forces are reduced, the requirements for mobility resources will increase, if the United States is to provide a credible deterrent by having the capability to reinforce or respond to contingencies. Current and projected airlift and sealift resources are insufficient not only to meet CINC-stated time-phased requirements for deployment of forces and resupply to reinforce NATO but also to

respond to a CPR aggression in Asia.

a. *Strategic Airlift*. C–133 and C–5 aircraft are presently the only available aircraft in the Active force capable of transporting outsized cargo (items too large to be transported on C–141 aircraft). The accelerated deactivation of 48 C–124 aircraft from the active inventory has reduced the active outside force from a total of 86 to 48 UE aircraft, including 10 C–5 aircraft. This creates an imbalance of forces, since movement of outsize items is more of an airframe availability problem than a total airlift capability problem. Therefore, the US capability to respond rapidly to contingencies and to provide airlift for this outsize as well as other cargo will be restricted until additional C–5 aircraft are available.

b. *Tactical Airlift*. The STOL (short takeoff and landing) (C–7 and C–123) force has been reduced by the cumulative attrition of Southeast Asia operations. This attrition, coupled with the programmed transfer of two C–123 and three C–7 squadrons to the RVN Armed Forces, will reduce the original 11-squadron force to four squadrons. The reduced force will not be adequate to support operations in a major contingency and constitutes a serious deficiency in the intratheater airlift force.

c. *Amphibious Lift*. The lack of sufficient amphibious lift for two MAFs, one each in LANTCOM and PACOM, limits forcible entry/reentry options. Assault lift is available to lift only two Marine amphibious brigades (two-thirds of a representative MAF) in each ocean. Augmentation from MSC/commercial ship resources is necessary to meet movement requirements. The use of MSC/commercial ships as a substitute for assault shipping impairs operational capability to project amphibious assault elements ashore because of the lack of landing craft, helicopter platforms, well decks, and communications capability in MSC/commercial ships.

d. *Sealift*. The MSC dry-cargo nucleus fleet is overage, with only three ships less than 25 years of age. It will be necessary to phase out the bulk of the fleet in the next several years. The numbers of break-bulk ships in the commercial fleet suitable for deployment of certain military equipment (e.g., wheeled and tracked vehicles and nonself-deployable aircraft) to a forward objective area is decreasing. The US Merchant Marine is replacing older ships with container ships which have limitations in supporting military operations. Attempts to modernize the MSC nucleus fleet by means of a “build and charter program” have not been successful, due to industry pressures in Congress and a lack of Maritime Administration support. Continued degradation of the MSC nucleus fleet and nonresponsiveness of US commercial ships because of configuration will result in a marginal responsiveness to meet critical time-phased sealift movement requirements.

12. (S) *Command and Control*. Reductions in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System will further reduce facilities and will continue the undesirable ground alert status of important airborne command posts, which degrades the potential flexibility and survivability of the system. This practice lowers the probability that the National Command Authorities could exercise strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including execution of the SIOP, under conditions of general war.

a. Inactivation of both of the ships comprising the National Emergency Command Post

Afloat has eliminated this alternate command facility directly supporting the National Command Authorities, thereby decreasing the survivability of the command and control systems.

b. SACEUR/USCINCEUR and CINCPAC have no hardened facilities capable of surviving a nuclear attack. Communications between SACEUR/USCINCEUR and CINCPAC and their subordinate headquarters and forces are dependent on ground and high-frequency transmission paths which are extremely vulnerable to nuclear effects. At present, this vulnerability problem can only be overcome, and reasonable assurance be provided that effective command and control of SIOP forces can be exercised, by means of the airborne command posts (when airborne). Ground alert status reduces the degree of survivability of these command and control elements to a dangerous degree.

13. (TS) *Intelligence.* Force level reductions and fiscal restraints have had the cumulative effect of sharply reducing the capability to acquire the intelligence data needed to deal with the major threats to US national security and objectives. Areas of particular concern are noted below.

a. There has been a reduction in the ability to monitor the nuclear threats to the United States/allies and the conventional threat to NATO Europe and to US interests worldwide. The United States must have as much strategic warning as possible of preparation for attack by hostile forces and must have reasonably accurate information on the enemy's capabilities.

b. Reductions in the General Defense Intelligence Program, including the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Attaché System, have reduced the US capability to collect and process intelligence information and to produce finished intelligence.

c. Budget cuts have also necessitated reductions in the intelligence resources organic to the forces assigned to the unified and specified commands. Their capability to conduct necessary intelligence activities is being degraded seriously in the areas of detection of early warning of attack and production of intelligence needed locally—especially electronic order of battle and air target charts in SAC.

d. During FY 1969 and FY 1970, there was considerable degradation in the Consolidated Cryptologic Plan (CCP) when US Forces overseas were reduced because of the US balance of payments problems and to lower the US profile. These reductions included manpower cuts of more than 7,000 and reduced the number of field stations in Europe and Japan by about one-third. The cryptologic reductions, which are to be achieved by end FY 1971, will further reduce the CCP manpower by more than 8,000, will close nine operational sites, and will seriously reduce the mission capability of at least nine others. The prospects of improving future capabilities will be jeopardized to the degree that research, development, test, and evaluation efforts are reduced and the modernization and replacement of mission equipment are deferred. These CCP resource cuts have eliminated current SIGINT coverage of research and development on the Soviet SS–9 and other strategic weapons and unique coverage of Soviet satellite photo reconnaissance efforts over Manchuria/East Asia. In addition, coverage has been reduced on CPR industrial/nonoperational military activities, East

European military/security forces, and Southeast Asia noncommunist political/military targets.

14. (S) *Logistics*. Currently imposed fiscal year constraints will impede improvement in this area. Several major programs are affected adversely by the reduction of resources for FY 1971. Most categories of reserve stocks are at a low level. Equipment replacement objectives for certain modernization items cannot be met at this time. Personnel strength readiness for logistic units is below desired standards. Some improvement in terms of increased asset availability for redistribution to worldwide claimants is expected as a result of reduced requirements in Southeast Asia as redeployment of US Forces progresses.
    a. FY 1971 budgetary constraints imposed for programming purposes constitute a major deterrent to the attainment of authorized Service acquisition objectives. Resultant major equipment procurement programs, which will serve to replace peacetime losses, will afford only limited progress in the support of overall modernization objectives and buildup of war reserve stocks.
    b. The tempo of operations during the past several years, reductions in personnel providing logistic support, the reduction in procurement programs for repair parts, and the increased requirements generated by the retention of overage equipment will further increase maintenance backlogs, thereby accelerating the deterioration of logistic readiness.
    c. By the end of FY 1971, the Army will have approximately $1.7 billion worth of equipment that cannot be repaired for issue to claimants because of insufficient depot overhaul funds in FY 1971 and prior years. The value of this equipment relates to an actual overhaul fund requirement of $435 million. Repair of equipment that is in a “not ready for issue” condition is the most economical and expeditious way to improve the logistical readiness of Active and Reserve component units.
    d. The current munitions management concept requires a production base with the ability to expand to meet post D-day consumption prior to depletion of war reserve munitions stocks. The Service-owned production base, as well as munitions loading and assembly facilities, have been operated intensely in support of three wars and, in many areas, are in need of rehabilitation and modernization. Decreased funding, associated with lower Southeast Asia requirements, is rapidly degrading the US ability to maintain a production base capable of providing the rapid expansion necessary to meet post D-day production requirements. An ancillary effect is a rapidly disappearing commercial base for the production of specialized components required for munitions.
    e. Readiness of Navy ships and squadrons has been adversely affected by unfunded requirements for stockage of repair parts and equipage and for component repair. The resultant impact is an inability to support ship and unit allowances properly in these categories.
    f. USEUCOM reports a marginally acceptable level of overall readiness. Major constraints to performing wartime missions are: (1) lack of an assured wartime LOC in Europe; (2) lack of adequate reception facilities and port clearance capability; (3)

concentration of logistic facilities near Kaiserslautern that increase vulnerability of stocks; and (4) inadequate POL storage located long distances from points of intended use. There are also critical personnel, supply, and maintenance deficiencies in all Services. Ammunition and POL war reserve materiel storage, distribution, and onhand deficiencies require additional funds and construction for a near-time-frame resolution. USAFE deficiencies in wartime basing, POL, and ammunition storage facilities degrade its capability to perform its wartime mission. Overall USEUCOM maintenance support of vital command and control communication is inadequate and has an overall deleterious effect on readiness. The current reduction in FY 1971 operation and maintenance funds below the austere FY 1970 level will have further impact on the USEUCOM readiness posture and mission capability.

g. PACOM reductions are resulting in a transition from a flexible supply and maintenance position to a vulnerable concentration of activities and a significant increase in intratheater logistical pipeline length. USARPAC current war reserves and operational project stocks are insufficient to meet existing requirements. War reserve levels are at approximately 60 percent and operational projects theaterwide are at approximately 34 percent fill. Buildup of war reserve stocks and prepositioned equipment in the Pacific will be deferred, pending reduced requirements in Southeast Asia. Inadequacies in POL, ammunition storage, airfield facilities, and LOC in the ROK will continue.

h. In USSOUTHCOM and ALCOM, low stocks of certain prepositioned equipment and war consumables are a serious problem. In addition, funding limitations have resulted in an increasing backlog of essential maintenance of facilities and equipment.

15. (TS) *Personnel*. The current posture reflects the extreme turbulence associated with the rapid US force phasedown dictated by austere funding levels. Without exception, the commanders of the unified commands have expressed deep concern over their readiness posture and ability to react. Past force level reductions and fiscal restraints have resulted in accelerated separation of skilled personnel and have created an acute personnel shortage in certain critical skills. A few examples depicting the seriousness of the personnel situation are as follows:

a. In the ROK, the 8th US Army has only 86 of 123 units which meet personnel readiness criteria. USAREUR was 17,000 men below authorization on 30 September 1970. Seventy-one percent of infantry and tank battalions are C–4 in personnel.

b. Within the Pacific Fleet, 108 ships and 37 aircraft squadrons have personnel deficiencies which significantly affect their ability to perform their primary missions.

c. In the Atlantic Fleet, there exists a quality deficiency in filling some 10,000 billets, and there are 144 ships and 47 aircraft squadrons that have personnel deficiencies which significantly affect their ability to perform their primary missions.

d. Significant reductions of uniquely qualified electronic intelligence analysis personnel have degraded electronic warfare intelligence support capabilities.

e. Recently, an Army CONUS-based division was alerted for possible Middle East deployment. The deployment strength of the division was 81 percent of full TOE at

the time of initial alert. Realignment of assigned personnel was necessary to facilitate deployment of the initial brigade at 85 percent strength. Deployment of the second brigade would have had to be at 70 percent and the remaining brigade left nondeployable until filled, processed, and trained.

16. (TS) *Reserve Forces*. The decision to rely upon the Reserves rather than draftees to provide the needed manpower in future crises has necessitated numerous studies to determine the time and costs involved to raise Reserve units to the required state of combat readiness. A summary of initial findings follows. Army Reserve components were discussed in paragraph 10 above.

[Omitted here are detailed discussion of reserve forces and paragraph 17 of the memorandum dealing with military assistance.]

18. (S) *Research and Development*
    a. The present overall lead held by the United States over the Soviet Union in military research and development is in danger of disappearing through lack of emphasis and support. The Soviet technological growth rate is greater than that of the United States, and Soviet research and development is devoted almost entirely to military capabilities. Immediate capabilities will not be affected as they would be in the event of a force structure decrease, but the lack of continuous programming for the development of weapon systems which would be qualitatively superior to those of the USSR could have disastrous effects in the long run because of long leadtimes involved. Basic research and some phases of exploratory development are essential in order to arrive at operational systems which will be required in the long term.
    b. The budget for research, development, test, and evaluation has declined sharply in the past several years, not only in the absolute sense but also particularly in terms of real buying power (on the order of 17 percent between FY 1969 and FY 1971). Soviet expenditures for defense and space technology now exceed those of the United States and are continuing to increase; this increase is not only in terms of funding but also in quality and quantity of manpower and facilities committed. Soviet expenditures for certain areas of atomic energy technology, such as controlled thermonuclear research and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives programs, rival or exceed those of the United States with no indications of diminishing effort in the future. The net result is a sluggish technological base in the United States which permits neither qualitative superiority over the Soviet Union nor the ability to correct quantitative deficiencies quickly.

19. (S) *Chemical and Biological*. Plans are being formulated to destroy the US stockpile of biological and toxin weapons and agents, in conformity with announced Presidential policy.[8] Although the actual size and composition of the Soviet chemical warfare stockpile are not known, evidence indicates that the overall capability of the Soviet Union substantially exceeds that of the United States. Budgetary constraints have reduced the level of effort applied to the development of binary munitions (combination of two innocuous substances to form a toxic chemical agent), and the

current estimate for the earliest availability of these munitions is late in the decade.

20. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that strategic concepts and force capabilities will be influenced by the actions taken relative to strategy studies now in progress and to possible changes in national priorities. Further, they caution that any changes in force capabilities conforming to changes in strategy guidance and/or priorities should be determined only after the political and military implications of such changes (e.g., the lowering of the nuclear threshold) have been assessed thoroughly.

21. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the current US military posture represents a continued degradation from that reported to you on 11 December 1969, in reference 1a, and that the capability of US military forces to execute the national strategy is being impaired seriously.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
T. H. Moorer
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0076, 320.2, Strategic. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to an attached note, this memorandum was intended for Packard in preparation for his December 18 meeting with Laird, Moorer, and the rest of the Joint Chiefs regarding the FY 1972 Defense budget. No record of the meeting has been found. Notes on both the JCS memorandum and the covering memorandum indicate that Laird saw them.

[2] Printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume X, National Security Policy, Document 202.

[3] References a, b, d, and e have not been found.

[4] During his press conference held on August 21, 1969, Secretary Laird announced plans to reduce FY 1970 defense expenditures by up to $3 billion, an effort dubbed Project 703; see Document 49.

[5] The United States vacated Wheelus Air Force Base, located on the Mediterranean coast near Tripoli, Libya, in June 1970.

[6] For the final report on the U.S.-U.K.-German Trilateral Talks held October 1966–April 1967, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XIII, Western Europe Region, Document 249.

[7] A reference to Salvador Allende Gossens, President of Chile, 1970–1973.

[8] See Document 104.

166. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, January 13, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Mr. John N. Irwin II
Mr. Richard Helms
Dr. Gerard Smith
Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

SUBJECT
Attached Paper on Safeguard

I would appreciate your handling the attached papers on a close-hold basis for now. They deal with the Administration posture on Safeguard for FY 72.

The reasons for including the Washington, D.C. site in our FY 72 proposed programs are three:

(a) It is the next logical step towards the area defense the President is committed to.
(b) It is a part of the U.S. SALT approaches and proposal.
(c) We need to find out whether Congress is willing to authorize a Washington Defense or not. If they will, we should proceed with it. If they won't, we must adjust our defense program and SALT approaches accordingly.

I would like to get together with the addressees on Saturday morning (1/16/71) to discuss the issue. Thereafter we can determine any further modification and distribution of the paper.

David Packard

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR ADDRESSEES

SUBJECT
Safeguard and Related Strategic Programs

In the FY 72 Defense Department Budget we are proposing the following key programs:

—Proceed with a hardening program to upgrade the Minuteman silos to 1000 psi.

—Continue the 4-site Safeguard program and add advanced funding for the Washington, D.C. site. Maintain the option to start area defense procurement in FY 73.
—Initiate Advanced Development of a Hard-Site Defense system to augment the 4-site Safeguard deployment in the late 1970s.
—Do concept formulation on mobile Minuteman as a further hedge to Minuteman survivability.

In coming to these proposals we have had to address four key issues:

1. *What do we do about the future of Minuteman?* We have the options of (a) leaving Minuteman to become vulnerable which raises crisis stability questions, (b) phasing it out, which compromises the President's "diplomatic" sufficiency criterion[2] (no conspicuous or apparent disadvantage) until an alternative force could be deployed, or (c) improving its survivability which improves the confidence in our deterrent.
2. *Do we want a U.S. area defense system?* There has been no decrease in the threat from accidents or Nth countries which could rationalize our eliminating the area defense component of Safeguard. Such a defense would meet our strategic sufficiency criterion against small attacks and provide protection for strategic bombers and command and control sites.
3. *Do we want an NCA defense?* An NCA defense would give added warning and decision time and could give effective protection against small or accidental attacks. Such a defense would be consistent with the latest U.S. SALT position.
4. *What is the relationship between the issues above and our latest SALT proposal?* There is a clear difference between the rationale for our planned strategic forces in the absence of an arms control agreement and the rationale for the forces permitted in our latest SALT proposal. The U.S. is committed to an area defense and survivable forces through the Strategic Sufficiency Criteria. Yet Option E[3] gives up area defense of the U.S. and precludes any option (except upgrading the hardness of existing silos) for improving Minuteman survival against Soviet threats which are feasible within the limitations of Option E. In addition, even though we have proposed an ABM defense of Washington coupled with offensive constraints in SALT, Congress failed to approve the Washington, D.C. site in the FY 71 budget.

The program we are proposing for FY 72 is based upon the following DOD assessment of the issues above and of the future direction for U.S. strategic forces:

—We need to maintain a survivable Minuteman force so long as we can effectively do so;
—We are committed to an area defense of the U.S.;
—We desire a defense of the NCA either as part of an area defense, as an addition to a Minuteman defense, or alone as a possible part of a SALT agreement; and
—We desire to reach an equitable and verifiable agreement on strategic arms limitations. Our current SALT position is subject to modification because of changes in the strategic situation since tabling of the U.S. proposal. Clearly a successful agreement could

modify the three directions above.

The attached paper on Safeguard planning and related strategic programs focuses in more detail upon these issues and the proposed programs.[4] We would welcome your views on the major issues affecting these programs.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–30, NSC Meeting, Safeguard, 1/27/71. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] NSDM 16, Document 39, established "strategic sufficiency" criteria upon which to base the U.S. defense posture.

[3] NSDM 74, issued on July 31, 1970, consists of a detailed statement of Option E. For the full text of NSDM 74, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 100.

[4] Attached but not printed is a 9-page paper, dated January 13 and entitled "Safeguard and Related Programs." It includes sections on the Threat, Technical Progress on Safeguard, SALT, Area Defense, Minuteman, NCA Defense, and the DOD Proposed Program and Rationale for FY 72.

167. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting[1]

Washington, January 16, 1971, 10:05–11:10 a.m.

SUBJECT
Safeguard

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
John N. Irwin
Ronald Spiers

Defense
David Packard
Gardiner Tucker

CIA
Richard Helms

JCS
Lt. Gen. John Vogt

ACDA
Gerard Smith
Philip J. Farley

OMB
James Schlesinger

NSC Staff K. Wayne Smith
Jack Merritt

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

—the NSC should meet on the subject of how to proceed with Safeguard. The meeting will be scheduled for January 27, 1971.
—the Verification Panel will meet again to discuss the issues to go before the NSC. At this meeting Defense will present a briefing on hard-site defense concepts and ACDA will present the implications of such defenses for the Soviets.

The meeting opened with Mr. Packard summarizing the essentials of the DOD paper on Safeguard and Related Strategic Programs.[2]

Mr. Kissinger: I understand what you propose is the 4-site defense either to defend Minuteman or as part of area defense and doing work on the NCA in order to shift to our

SALT position.

Mr. Packard: Also, the NCA is consistent with area defense.

Mr. Kissinger: Your paper tells me that we are building one kind of defense, justifying another and talking in negotiations about still another. Gerry (Smith), this has profound implications for SALT. What is your view?

(Ambassador Smith passed out a paper at this time which is attached.)[3]

Amb. Smith: I have put my thoughts into writing. In addition to the points on the paper, I have two others I want to make. First, our bargaining power depends on our program having bi-partisan support in Congress. If we get into a big fight, and the Soviets will certainly try to manipulate Congressional opinion, we may lose our bargaining power.

Mr. Kissinger: Dave, are you asking for money for site development?

Mr. Packard: For the NCA, only.

Amb. Smith: The implicit assumption in David Packard's paper is that they get Galosh and a Moscow defense and we get hard-site defense. I don't think that is a reasonable expectation.

Mr. Kissinger: I do not understand why our defending our Minuteman should bother the Soviets. I can see why an area defense might worry them, but not defense of our ICBMs. Why, in the theory of arms control, is not this the least escalatory thing we can do?

Amb. Smith: For the same reason we worry about the Soviets. They can expand a missile defense and they have located their missiles near their cities.

Mr. Kissinger: But we haven't.

Mr. Packard: I don't think they worry about hard-site defense. They worry about Safeguard. If you want hard-site defense, you wouldn't do it with Safeguard—Safeguard is not optimum for missile defense. One alternative would be to change to a dedicated hard-site defense.

Mr. Irwin: I think this is a logical program, but there are worries in SALT, and difficulties with Congress. It (the paper) says the reasons for Safeguard are inadequate.

Mr. Packard: No—the reasons for Safeguard are: defend Minuteman, area defense, Nth country and so on. The reasons are still valid.

Mr. Irwin: That is for the area defense.

Mr. Packard: One reason we asked for NCA planning was to put to the Congress squarely the issue—will they or will they not approve?

Mr. Kissinger: Do we want to know that? Seriously.

Amb. Smith: This is different from the Washington site we asked for last year. The NCA won't be a part of Safeguard. Congress may view it much differently in an arms limitation sense.

Mr. Packard: I agree. I think we can get support for NCA if we slow the 4-site defense. We would present it to the leadership that way.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me interject a question of timing. By when do we need Presidential decision? I doubt that we can get it before the State of the Union address.[4]

Mr. Packard: We can leave it in the budget and just not make an issue.

Mr. Kissinger: We can have an NCA meeting when the issues can be presented to the President. If we are low-key, we can leave the $1.4 billion in the budget without a specific discussion. The Russians will be more interested in our rationale and decisions than the amount of budget. We'll schedule the NSC for a week from Wednesday (January 27) and hope to get the President's decision by the following Monday.[5]

Mr. Helms: This is the most difficult problem I have seen us faced with.

Mr. Kissinger: We have two problems: what is sensible in Safeguard in the absence of an agreement; what is sensible this year in relation to SALT.

The 4-site defense saves only 60 Minutemen for $3–4 billion, but if it is an interim system of more value—

Mr. Packard: Safeguard gives an interim level defense.

Mr. Kissinger: What is most helpful for negotiations? Gerry's argument is that the Soviets view our actions as devious or that we are reaching a point where Safeguard is irreversible. But, if we give it up, why should they negotiate? If they worry about irreversibility, shouldn't they be more inclined to negotiate?

Mr. Irwin: I think the mobile ICBM is a separate issue. The Packard paper doesn't look at the effect of hard-site defense for both the U.S. and USSR, nor does it treat mobiles in this way.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we sum up the issues for the President? We need to determine our program for this year in relation to what Safeguard should be without a SALT agreement and in relation to what is helpful to SALT.

Mr. Packard: Option E[6] and the NCA are not consistent with area defense and not consistent with the President's strategic criteria.[7]

Mr. Irwin: Would you use Safeguard or hard-site defense for NCA?

Mr. Packard: Safeguard. It gives a better defense of Washington and would be cheaper. Hard-site defense is too localized in its defense.

Mr. Irwin: The problem with area defense or NCA is that they don't defend Minuteman. If you do not go to hard-site defense, you have a more unstable situation, but if you do, it is contrary to SALT. Silo hardening does gain time—but what happens later on?

Mr. Packard: I don't think NCA makes any sense at all. The only reason to go ahead is for an agreement. We will have trouble justifying it. Hard-site defense, like Henry said, is consistent with the theory of arms control.

Amb. Smith: Can we face the prospect of the Soviets doing the same thing?

Gen. Vogt: We operate now on the theory that we can't destroy their missiles.

Amb. Smith: If we saw the Soviets building a hard-site defense we would be concerned.

Gen. Vogt: I don't think the Soviets will feel compelled to build a hard-site defense. Our MIRV is low-yield and inaccurate. Our policy of not attacking their retaliatory force is public knowledge. On the other hand, the threat of SS–9s has increased.

Amb. Smith: Packard's paper tries to show the projected threat increased—that is untrue and misleading.

Mr. Kissinger: It makes no difference—if the threat hasn't lessened, then the logic still holds.

Amb. Smith: The Soviets can not rely on our *not* getting a counterforce capability. We know we can get one quickly if we want to. They have to plan on it.

Gen. Vogt: I think they plan on the basis of our programs which are public knowledge, just as we plan on the basis of their programs.

Mr. Kissinger: Gerry, why should we object violently to protection of their missiles?

Amb. Smith: Because of the potential it gives to upgrade to population defense.

Mr. Kissinger: We could let them have their NCA and we could have hard-site defense. Or, you could have both sides keep what they are building. That is an intellectually respectable position.

Mr. Irwin: But what about Minuteman?

Mr. Packard: It makes sense to go to a 3 or 4-site Safeguard and leave them the Moscow system. Another alternative is hard-site and NCA for both.

Mr. Irwin: And drop Safeguard.

Mr. Packard: Right.

Mr. Irwin: But you will have Congressional problems.

Mr. Packard: I'm not sure—the main interest is Minuteman defense. Of course, Gerry worries about SA–5 upgrade. Incidentally, there is a study showing SA–5s have a significant capability now.

Amb. Smith: There is another problem—the Soviets just accepted NCA—do I change our position now?

Mr. Kissinger: We don't want to just plod along building something we don't want, just because of a prior incorrect decision, if it was incorrect.

Amb. Smith: Don't forget zero.

Mr. Kissinger: Right, zero is attractive. We are building an area defense which we can't have, justifying a missile defense which won't work and negotiating an NCA defense we don't want. It seems that staying where we are or hard-site defense makes sense. Although, Gerry, I wouldn't want to be there when you tell Semenov.

Amb. Smith: Perhaps I won't be.

Mr. Kissinger: For next year's program, we should discuss issues of hard-site versus NCA versus zero. Area defense is not consistent with SALT—the President's decision on area defense was made in SALT. The price of SALT was giving up area defense. We would keep it open if SALT fails, but not in SALT. We have never in NSC looked at hard-site or NCA versus what we are doing.

Mr. Irwin: I keep coming back to Option D and reductions as the best solution.[8] Is "D" out of the question?

Amb. Smith: No—but the Soviets showed no interest in Option D.

Mr. Kissinger: These are the issues we can discuss in February. In the NSC meeting we need to talk about hard-site defense in three different ways: unrestrained defense and its implications; restrained and how you could define it; something which is more or less 'stay where you are.' If NCA is meaningless we might push for zero *or* trade zero on our

side for something else.

Mr. Packard: I can get a briefing together on hard-site defense.

Mr. Kissinger: Please do—we will have it next meeting.

Amb. Smith: I would also like to cover it from the Soviet view.

Mr. Kissinger: Fine, Gerry, good point. We will have one more meeting of this group before the NSC.

Mr. Schlesinger: I want to point out that the budget doesn't lock us in. There isn't anything specific and we can always amend it in view of a Presidential decision.

Amb. Smith: I would like to point out that every time I mention a 3 or 4-site defense, people say it is militarily meaningless.

Mr. Kissinger: Dave (Packard), would you get us the information on this for the next meeting? It is an important point.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 1969–3/8/72 [3 of 6]. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] See the attachment to Document 166.

[3] Smith's January 16 memorandum urged Packard, Kissinger, Irwin, Helms, and Vogt to take SALT negotiations and the possibility of a Soviet strategic reaction into account when reaching a decision on Safeguard. With those factors in mind, Smith recommended a "minimum rate of construction at Grand Forks and Malmstrom," that the initiation of construction at Whiteman be deferred, and that no additional sites be procured. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–221, NSDM 97)

[4] President Nixon gave the annual State of the Union message to Congress on January 22.

[5] February 1.

[6] See footnote 3, Document 166.

[7] See footnote 2, Document 166.

[8] NSDM 51, issued on April 10, 1970, established Options A through D as negotiating proposals for the U.S. SALT Delegation. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 68.

168. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting[1]

Washington, January 25, 1971, 3:40–5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT

Hard-Site Defense and the FY 72 Safeguard Program

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin
Ronald I. Spiers
Raymond Garthoff[2]
Seymour Weiss[3]

Defense

David Packard
Paul Nitze
Gardiner Tucker

CIA

Richard Helms
Bruce C. Clarke

JCS

Adm. Thomas Moorer
Gen. Royal B. Allison[4]

ACDA

Gerard Smith
Philip J. Farley
Spurgeon Keeny

OST

Dr. Edward David
Attorney General John N. Mitchell

OMB

James R. Schlesinger

NSC Staff

Col. Jack Merritt
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
K. Wayne Smith
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

—to formulate the issues for the President so as to get a decision on what our FY 72

Safeguard Program should be, and its relation to our SALT position;
—to put before him the full range of proposals, including Mr. Smith's views on the difficulties in changing our SALT position;
—to review our SALT position during the next month.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we could use this meeting to get from Dave Packard a sense of the meaning of a hard-site defense—what it is and how it differs from the four-site defense plan.

(Mr. Packard briefed from the outline at Tab A.[5] He was interrupted from time to time by the following questions.)

Mr. Kissinger: Why is hard-site defense cheaper? Is it because of the radar?

Mr. Packard: It would use smaller radars and local interceptors. The proposed hard-site configuration is spelled out on pages 14 and 15 (of Tab A).[6] Each pattern would include three radars and six interceptor farms with 16 missiles in each farm. This would give you 100 missiles and 21 silos defended. You could have a heavier defense against a higher threat since the modules and the concentration of interceptors in the modules could be built up.

Mr. Kissinger: I have heard the argument that the entry price for one MSR is the same as the entry price to saturate the system—that there is no difference between one radar and ten. Would these radars all be netted in the same general area?

Mr. Packard: They would operate autonomously.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose they should go after Whiteman and all the Sprints were controlled by one MSR. To get one radar they would pay the same entry price as to saturate the system. We don't solve the problem by putting in 10 radars.

Mr. Packard: But we would increase the number of interceptors and make it more difficult to saturate.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may be the devil's advocate—if the key element is the number of interceptors, why not increase the number of units in Safeguard?

Mr. Packard: It would be more expensive.

Dr. Kissinger: You can increase the number of interceptors at lower cost?

Mr. Packard: Yes, Also, they could operate to a reasonable degree without MSR. We would have 700 interceptors.

Mr. Kissinger: 700 interceptors to defend 100 Minutemen? In terms of SALT if we want

an agreement that would permit hard-site defense, we would have to have a high limit on interceptors.

Mr. Packard: We can't put a limit on interceptors.

Mr. Nitze: The number of radars and the number of interceptors are both important. We would have to have both.

Mr. Packard: (returning to the briefing outline) On page 16 we indicate what a four-site Safeguard would contribute to hard-site defense.[7]

Dr. Kissinger: You are proposing a combination of four-site Safeguard and hard-site defense?

Mr. Packard: We're showing what four-site Safeguard would contribute to hard-site defense.

Dr. Kissinger: If you take away these Safeguard things, you are vulnerable to pin-down,[8] for example?

Mr. Packard: You would be more vulnerable to pin-down. That and the next point on defense-in-depth of Minuteman are the most significant.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn't pin-down decisive?

Mr. Packard: Pin-down is determined in part by the frequency of the radar and the time involved. You could get some protection against pin-down with a dedicated system without Safeguard.

Dr. Kissinger: But if you can't, you've had it?

Mr. Packard: Some scientists say 'yes' and some say 'no'.

Mr. Nitze: The pin-down risk is largest for SLBM. A four-site system with Spartans gives you some defense of Minuteman against SLBMs.

Dr. Tucker: This is the point of the omni-directional defense. The proposed system for hard-site defense would defend only against the ICBM corridors. The four-site system would be a convenient way to defend against SLBMs from the ocean.

Mr. Packard: To summarize: if the defense of Minuteman is the only problem, in the interest of lower expenditure you could go to a dedicated hard-site defense directly. You remember Panofsky was critical of the Safeguard system for Minuteman and thought there were cheaper ways to do it.[9] I agree with him now. Also, the area defense capability of Safeguard adds to the effectiveness of hard-site defense. The Safeguard program is

already underway. Hard-site defense could be added in these terms.

Dr. Kissinger: If the essentials of a hard-site defense are a larger number of radars and interceptors, is it reconcilable with SALT? How would you specify what would be permitted and what prohibited?

Mr. Packard: We have presented two options on page 17 (of Tab A): set a finite time period for negotiation, after which we would begin deployment of hard-site defense, or a symmetrical agreement.[10] Asymmetrical agreements are not attractive. Dr. Kissinger: To us or to them?

Mr. Packard: To them.

Dr. Kissinger: How about an NCA defense for them and a four-site Safeguard for us?

Mr. Packard: It would be better than what we have now.

Dr. Kissinger: It would provide a base.

Mr. Packard: On page 18 (of Tab A) we have indicated that hard-site defense would be allowed only at launch complexes east of the Urals in the USSR and west of the Mississippi and east of the Rockies in the U.S.[11] This would mean roughly equal populations. On page 19 we discuss the effect of Soviet cheating. Even without hard-site defense, if 300 Minutemen survived, without cheating, they could generate 29 percent Soviet fatalities by themselves.[12] With cheating, this drops to 4 percent with 2500 Soviet interceptors and zero with 5000. The situation would be very bad if there were cheating without hard-site defense. If we had hard-site defense and the Soviets cheated, we would still have a reasonably livable situation. The question, of course, is whether the Soviets are more likely to cheat if we have hard-site defense? The program that we are recommending is derived from a combination of Air Force and Army studies. We might modify the details, of course.

Dr. Kissinger: What are you recommending?

Mr. Packard: We are recommending that we consider changing our SALT instructions and that we move along with our R&D program for hard-site defense.

Dr. Kissinger: Those are two separate questions. Should we stick with our current proposal for the next year?

Mr. Packard: Next year we should move into advanced R&D for hard-site defense.

Dr. Kissinger: Would you continue construction at all the authorized sites?

Mr. Packard: Our Safeguard alternatives are on page 28 (of Tab A).[13] 1) We could slow up

the program at the cost of approximately $1 billion per each year's delay. 2) We could maintain the four sites already approved by Congress which would maintain continuity, keep costs where they are and maintain momentum. 3) We could continue with the four sites plus advanced Washington preparation. We would have to include this in the budget. This has the same features as the four-site program but adds more. It is a logical step toward area defense, and it starts deployment around Washington which agrees with our latest SALT proposal. We think this is the best alternative.

Mr. Schlesinger: There wouldn't be much saving in FY 72.

Mr. Packard: We estimate about $100 million, which is of course, worth saving. I might say that the estimate of additional cost brought about by delay is a very general estimate.

Mr. Schlesinger: Don't you have another option: to go ahead with what is in the budget but not tie the construction money to the Warren site. If SALT goes in the direction of NCA, you could then use the money for NCA.

Mr. Packard: If we get agreement on NCA we could transfer some of the work to the NCA configuration if we could get it approved.

Mr. Schlesinger: Or you could go for authorization for a fourth site, that would not necessarily be Warren.

Dr. Kissinger: We have three things to consider: 1) what should our next year's Safeguard program be? 2) what is a sensible Safeguard program in the absence of a SALT agreement? and 3) what is a sensible Safeguard position to take in SALT? We don't have to answer (2) as long as we do not do anything inconsistent with our SALT objectives. We need to get a Presidential decision on the first question and how to relate it to our SALT position. We need to know what we really want in SALT. I know some of you will shudder at any change in our SALT position and we will certainly not undertake it lightly. If a move from our present NCA–ABM position would scuttle the negotiations, the President would obviously weigh it very seriously. But we should have a discussion before March 15 of what we really want from SALT.[14] Would the Russians buy a three or four-site system in exchange for NCA? We need to look at the problem. Our immediate problem is how to frame the issues for the President to decide. What we need to put before the President is the immediate issue of the FY 72 Safeguard Program, with enough of SALT to relate the two. (to Gerard Smith) Would you summarize your position, Gerry?

Mr. Smith: I haven't changed my position after listening to Mr. Packard's briefing. If I go back to the Soviets with limited radars and interceptors and then we decide on a new system—in General Allison's words, that dog just won't hunt. We would be kidding ourselves and the President if we presented this as a thing he would like to go before the world proposing. Some people might argue that we could take the line that the Soviets had accepted NCA but not as part of the package. Therefore, we could feel free to propose

X thousands of interceptors which would work to our advantage. This would raise a real question about the President's seriousness of purpose. Also, we might lose on the Hill on Safeguard. This would give added strength to Safeguard opponents.

Dr. Kissinger: If we adopted a stay-where-we-are on ABMs, this would mean three or four sites as against NCA. Each site would be keyed to the existing system.

Mr. Smith: We could say to the Russians, how about one or two sites. But four sites as against Moscow hasn't a chance with the Russians or with public opinion.

Mr. Kissinger: You know my hang-up; we are creating a rationale for an area defense, building a three or four-site defense and asking the Russians for an NCA defense. We have no authorization for NCA defense and don't really know why we want it.

Mr. Packard: The key issue is not hard-site defense. The key is to insure the survival of our land-based missiles. It might be possible by a mobile land system or by controlling or reducing their ability to attack and their accuracy. But we can't avoid facing the issue of survivability of our land-based forces. We could, of course, move to launch-on-warning, but I wouldn't recommend it. We could also go to a sea-based system which has some attractions and some advocates.

Dr. Kissinger: (to General Allison) What dog will hunt?

Gen. Allison: The question is whether or not the August 4 proposal in its totality permits the US to do the things necessary to protect the security of the US.[15] I think it does. If this is the case, we should proceed down a path which would not require a change in the August 4 proposal which would further diverge the U.S. and Soviet views. This might be to proceed with an NCA-type structure but slow down the full Safeguard program.

Mr. Kissinger: So you support which position? What does the President ask for next year? Does he ask for authority for a fourth site or for NCA?

Mr. Schlesinger: Authority for a fourth site is in the budget.

Mr. Packard: (referring to page 17 of Tab A) We don't need to change the present proposal. One of our options is the finite time limit. We could continue R&D in 1972. If we get what we ask for, we would modify the program.

Mr. Smith: You're talking about four or five years. That's a lot of money in the bank compared to 12 months. I wouldn't advertise this time period. I would recommend we go ahead with R&D but not commit ourselves to do something in four or five years.

Mr. Packard: We have to do something.

Mr. Smith: I agree, but we could keep our options open in R&D.

Mr. Kissinger: Gerry Smith wants to limit construction to two sites and continue R&D. Dave Packard wants to continue on four sites and advanced preparation for NCA. (to General Allison) What do you want the President to authorize? What does he decide on the program for next year?

Gen. Allison: I would shave off one site and go toward an NCA, or at least do something to show some interest in the NCA concept. I agree with Mr. Smith; it would be disastrous to SALT to change our proposal.

Mr. Mitchell: Don't you have the authority for four sites? It's a question of funding, isn't it?

Adm. Moorer: There's also a question as to whether Congress will go along with NCA.

(Mr. Irwin circulated the paper at Tab B)[16]

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) What is your rationale for this?

Mr. Irwin: We would do what we can under Option E; harden some Minuteman sites; continue construction on two sites; defer construction at Whiteman (approved in FY 71); request no authority for procurement or construction at Warren (site survey authorized in FY 71); carry out R&D for a hard-site defense; and carry out studies for NCA. We shouldn't commit ourselves to a complete program. We should slow down the construction of Safeguard sites. If we go NCA, we could go ahead with Warren and call off the work on Whiteman. This would keep our options open. I would go along with Gerry (Smith)'s position plus Dave Packard's point of Washington advanced preparation. I wouldn't go as far as the whole Defense proposal. My position is similar to General Allison's.

Mr. Kissinger: (to General Allison) I thought you said four sites plus advanced Washington preparation.

Gen. Allison: Mr. Irwin's proposal wouldn't stop the four sites. (to Mr. Irwin) You wouldn't plan to cancel construction, would you?

Mr. Irwin: Would you continue construction now?

Adm. Moorer: We would ask for authority for Whiteman and no authority for Warren.

Gen. Allison: It would be a difference in pace.

Mr. Helms: Has anyone taken any soundings on the Hill on NCA?

Mr. Packard: No, but I don't think there's much interest. There's more interest in Minuteman survivability. There would be a problem, though, if we back off from what we

asked for last year.

Dr. Tucker: But we have authorization for four sites.

Mr. Mitchell: But you only have authorization for a site survey at Warren.

Mr. Smith: We got construction authority for Whiteman last year and would ask for construction authority for Warren this year. I might cite a passage from the conference report on the authorization for the FY 71 appropriation in which Congressman Rivers made it clear that the House conferees considered protection of national command and control essential and that nothing should be done to prohibit programs to ensure the survivability of this vital element. This indicates the House sentiment on NCA.

Mr. Kissinger: This doesn't explain why we want NCA.

Mr. Smith: Central to any beginning of management of the Chinese threat is a hardened control center. This is central to any control system.

Mr. Kissinger: But last year we were told that Minuteman defense was bearable and area defense was out.

Mr. Smith: I have to have an effective system for bargaining purposes. This would give us ten minutes over Washington to decide.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose we said both sides could continue building what is already underway. Suppose the Soviets accepted or said they would discuss NCA or a three or four-site system. Which would we accept?

Mr. Smith: I would accept the four sites, but I don't think this is likely. The potential for expansion would be tremendous—it would be so easy to jump to a broader system.

Mr. Kissinger: Is it easier to jump from a four-site system to area defense or from Moscow to area defense? I thought their system was more expandable.

Mr. Smith: We won't have a hard-site defense in six years if we started to build it today. I think there might be a possibility of discussing one or two Safeguard sites, but not four sites.

Mr. Nitze: If NCA defense is authorized next year, we would not be spending more than $11 million. If we delay authorization for a year, we would delay a year in starting NCA.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we object to asking for authorization for NCA if we are proposing it to the Russians? How can we convince the Russians we're serious? If it's so important, why not ask for it?

Mr. Helms: We should get some feeling for the sentiment on the Hill. Mr. Kissinger: It would be a helluva thing to negotiate for it and then find out we can't get it. (to Ron Spiers) What do you think?

Mr. Spiers: If we plan to move away from the August 4 proposal, we shouldn't go beyond the design study for NCA. If we propose to reaffirm the proposal, we could go beyond this stage.

Mr. Garthoff: We would give a signal with a design study and would give a stronger signal if we undertook a site survey.

Mr. Kissinger: It would be even stronger if we go for authorization. I don't want to be stuck with an agreement and no authority to proceed.

Mr. Packard: If we can't change the SALT instructions, it is very important that we don't give on anything.

Mr. Kissinger: How would you change the instructions?

Mr. Packard: I recognize the practical matters of negotiation. Maybe we could put it in better terms. We could say that we are concerned about Minuteman survival. We need assurances on the reduction of their long-range, land-based missiles. If we can't get a satisfactory reduction, we will have to consider measures of protection, including hard-site defense.

Mr. Mitchell: What would be your Congressional approach?

Mr. Packard: We would tell Congress that we plan to move ahead on the same basis on construction of the four sites, since we have to protect ourselves if we don't get an agreement. We wouldn't accelerate the four-site construction, but would go ahead on the same basis and add a requirement for NCA.

Mr. Schlesinger: You ask for the fourth site and, if you get an agreement, put the money into NCA.

Mr. Spiers: Might this stimulate new Congressional interest in an ABM agreement? They might think this is money down the drain.

Mr. Packard: I don't think so, but I have no specific judgment. Mr. Weiss: If we can get an agreement under Option E, would we be prepared to forego Safeguard? Would we not be concerned about the threat to the survivability of our forces under those circumstances?

Mr. Kissinger: The answer is to change our instructions if the threat to survivability would be so large. Or we might take other measures under the agreement. We have to decide what we want if we can get it. For purposes of the immediate decision, we have to

put before the President the range of the proposals that have been made. We must consider a sensible ABM proposal and the question of survivability. During the next month we can take a look at our SALT position. We will draw the President's attention to Gerry Smith's views on the difficulties in changing our SALT position. Since it is the survivability of Minuteman that worries us and not the survivability of Washington, why not protect what worries us if it doesn't add to the dangers. This is our last chance to bring our thinking and our negotiations into line. We won't change our position lightly, but let's take a look at it.

Mr. Irwin: If we're going to change our instructions to something other than Option E this will affect the budget.

Mr. Kissinger: We would have to consider the impact on Congress and the impact on the negotiations. Are the Russians more likely to reach an agreement if they see it would take an agreement to stop our program? Or will they think we are locked into our program and the negotiations are just a cover? Gerry (Smith) thinks the Soviets may think we are just using the negotiations. On the other hand, if they can slow us down by talking about an agreement, might this give them an incentive to talk but not to settle?

Mr. Smith: Even if a four-site system were negotiable, we would need $16 billion.

Dr. Tucker: $8 billion for a four-site system; $16 billion if you include NCA.

Mr. Smith: It still wouldn't do what needs to be done. The Soviets could do it in. If we start with one site we could get operational experience and still have the potential to expand.

Mr. Mitchell: Isn't there a time factor? Could we just lay it on the table and say we would be willing to back up? We have an investment but we would be willing to scrap it to get an agreement?

Mr. Smith: That's our proposal. But we would be negotiating to let the Russians have Moscow and we would have the four sites and would be spending for a hard-site defense.

Mr. Mitchell: That's time insurance.

Mr. Kissinger: We can defer that decision. But we need a decision this week on: (1) which of the options for next year would be the most consistent with a basis for SALT agreement; (2) if we could, do we want to change our SALT position; (3) if the answer to (2) is yes, would the improvement be great enough to warrant upsetting the structure of the negotiations?

Mr. Packard: We might look further at the mobile option. Gerry (Smith) could accept that change.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. Let's make that part of the review.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 1969–3/8/72 [3 of 6]. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; member of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

[3] Member of the Planning and Coordination Staff.

[4] Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for strategic arms negotiations; JCS representative on the U.S. SALT Delegation.

[5] Tab A was not found attached. Another copy of the 28 page outline indicates that Packard's briefing dealt primarily with two issues: hard-site defense and the FY 72 Safeguard program. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–007, Verification Panel Meeting, SALT, 1/25/71)

[6] Pages 14 and 15 of Packard's briefing outline proposed a hard-site defense system that, using modified Sprint interceptors and integrated into the existing Safeguard command and control network, defended 10 to 40 Minuteman silos per radar module deployed.

[7] Page 16 of Packard's briefing outline listed seven ways in which Safeguard contributed to hard-site defense.

[8] Pin-down refers to the possibility that an opponent could destroy missiles still in their silos or soon after launch by exploding nuclear weapons in their paths.

[9] See footnote 4, Document 109.

[10] The referenced page detailed the two options. Under a "finite time limit," the United States would "continue to negotiate for an agreement that could involve reductions to limit land-based missile vulnerability, but formally state that if an agreement is not reached in a finite time period (say 4–5 years), we would begin deployment of HSD." A symmetrical agreement would "include provisions now for an HSD deployment by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union."

[11] Page 18 of Packard's briefing outline listed "HSD Constraints to Aid in Verification."

[12] A table, entitled "The Retaliatory Capabilities of Minuteman Alone With Soviet Cheating on ABMs," appears on page 19.

[13] Page 28 detailed the three Safeguard alternatives summarized by Packard.

[14] The next round of SALT talks was scheduled to begin in Vienna on March 15.

[15] On August 4, 1970, the U.S. SALT Delegation tabled a detailed "Description of the U.S. Proposal for an Initial Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement," which was based upon NSDM 73 and NSDM 74. For the texts of those NSDMs, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 97* and 100.

[16] Not found attached and not further identified.

169. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

ISSUES PAPER

NSC Meeting on Safeguard and SALT

January 27, 1971

Background

Last year we requested, in the FY 1971 President's Budget, funds for:

—*Construction* of an additional site at Whiteman, Missouri (in addition to the Phase I two-site construction at Grand Forks, North Dakota and Malmstrom, Montana).
—*Advance preparation* of five sites at: Warren, Wyoming, Northeast, Northwest, Michigan/Ohio, and Washington, D.C.

The Congress approved construction at Whiteman and advance preparation of Warren only.

In announcing the Safeguard Program,[2] you said your decision on subsequent deployments would be based on a review of:

—technical developments;
—changes in the threat; and
—the diplomatic considerations, including SALT.[3]

Review and Conclusions

In reviewing Safeguard, we had to take into account:

—our future plans for Safeguard in the absence of a SALT agreement;
—the implications of ABM alternatives in SALT, both those in our current proposal and other alternatives;[4]
—the effects of your ABM decisions on the future of SALT.

The following general conclusions were reached as the results of review and discussion:

1. *There are no significant technological problems*. Successful intercepts of ICBMs have been conducted by both Sprint and Spartan and there are no significant problems with other components. *However, there are significant increases in cost estimates since last*

spring. Last year we estimated total deployment costs of $12.3 billion; the estimate is now $14.8 billion, an increase of $2.5 billion.

2. *In the absence of a SALT agreement, we would want to continue to develop an Area Defense*. An examination of the threat shows that your reasons for initially deciding to deploy Safeguard remain sound. Indeed, the Chinese have tested a ballistic missile to a range in excess of 2200 miles. This indicates that they can have an ICBM capability in the early 1970s.
3. *As a result of our SALT negotiations over the past year, however, it would be inconsistent to request preparation of sites for the area defense*. In your decisions on SALT you decided you would give up area defense in return for the increased strategic stability of an agreement. The Soviets have indicated an interest in ABM limitations, proposing an agreement on NCA levels. Until it is clear we are not going to achieve a SALT agreement, it would be inconsistent to seek extensive deployment of an area system.

The U.S. ABM Position in SALT

In reviewing our ABM position in SALT, a number of issues were raised suggesting changes in our SALT position. Alternatives were discussed to provide background for the decision on the FY 1972 Safeguard Program. *We will make recommendations relating to SALT as appropriate prior to our return to Vienna on March 15; however, no decision is needed at this time.*

Alternative FY 1972 Safeguard Program

—*A high-level, full construction program* which involves construction at Warren and Whiteman in addition to Grand Forks and Malmstrom. Additionally, advance planning would be requested for the NCA. *This is the DOD recommended alternative.*[5]

—An intermediate level would be to begin the authorized construction at Whiteman, but make Warren contingent upon SALT (e.g., the Warren site *or* the NCA site, depending on the progress in SALT). As a practical matter, the DOD proposal would have this effect since we would stop work on Safeguard and continue the NCA work if we had an agreement. However, an explicit proposal of this nature might be more attractive to Congress and could facilitate negotiations. SALT>SALT (e.g., the Warren site *or* the NCA site, depending on the progress in SALT). As a practical matter, the DOD proposal would have this effect since we would stop work on Safeguard and continue the NCA work if we had an agreement. However, an explicit proposal of this nature might be more attractive to Congress and could facilitate negotiations. *OMB supports this proposal and Defense would probably not be opposed to it.*

—*A low-level program* which would continue minimal construction on the Grand Forks and Malmstrom sites, but do no construction at Whiteman or Warren. Advance planning for NCA would also be done. *This is Gerry Smith's proposal and he is supported by State.*[6]

Arguments Surrounding the Alternative Levels

In deciding how to proceed in the FY 1972 Safeguard program, we have to consider the effect on *negotiations* and the *political* problems we may encounter.

If the Soviets are concerned about the irreversibility of our ABM program, it can be argued that:

—We should give some signal of our seriousness in negotiations by proposing a lower level program for 1972, i.e., a slowdown in the work on the four-site Safeguard defense.
—If the recent slowdown in SS–9 deployments[7] is an attempt to give us a signal of Soviet intent, we should respond by slowing down our defense against the Minuteman threat.

On the other hand, it can be argued that, if the Soviets are seriously concerned about irreversibility, they should be all the more eager to make some agreement, perhaps at Vienna, which will limit Safeguard. Moreover, if they can get us to slow our ABM deployment by merely talking, they will continue to talk rather than negotiate. *Therefore, to slow the deployment at this time would be a serious negotiating error.*

The other major consideration in deciding on the FY 1972 Safeguard level has to do with Congress.

If we accept that it is inconsistent with our position in SALT to ask for any area sites in FY 1972, we have, to a great extent, de-fused our political problems.

—We have support in the Congress for the four-site Minuteman defense.
—If presented as a part of an arms control package, we could probably get support for initial NCA work. Although Congress rejected the Washington site last year, the rejection may have indicated opposition to an area defense, rather than to the idea of NCA defense.

To the extent we ask for less than full construction for the four sites for Minuteman defense, it can be argued that we will minimize Congressional opposition.

On the other hand, if we do not ask for full construction, it can be argued that:

—We are weakening our entire ABM position with the Congress and inviting the opposition to more determined efforts to kill ABM completely.
—We would, in effect, be denying our own arguments from last year concerning the importance of a “bargaining chip.”

We might soften some of the effects of asking for less than full construction by tying it to the SS–9 slowdown, but it may be dangerous to do so if we don’t have any assurance that the Soviets really intend to stop deploying SS–9s.

Failure to go ahead with the full construction would delay completion of the four-site defense *and* the area defense by a year. (Extends four sites from 1977 to 1978, area defense from 1980 to 1981. It costs about $1 billion in total costs for each year the program is stretched out.)

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–30, NSC Meeting, Safeguard, 1/27/71. Top Secret; Nodis. Kissinger sent the paper to Nixon as an attachment to a January 26 memorandum.

[2] See Document 25.

[3] In a November 28, 1970, memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Moorer, McCracken, Shultz, and Gerard Smith, Kissinger announced that Nixon had ordered a review of the Safeguard program covering these topics. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 842, ABM–MIRV, ABM-System, Volume VI, May 70–30 Jul 71)

[4] Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on January 9 and informed him that the United States was "prepared to make an ABM agreement, provided it was coupled with an undertaking to continue working on offensive limitations and provided it was coupled with an undertaking that there would be a freeze on new starts of offensive land-based missiles until there was a formal agreement in limiting offensive weapons." He added that there might be some special provision that would have to be made for submarines. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT) For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 124.

[5] See Documents 166 and 165.

[6] See footnote 3, Document 167.

[7] See footnote 3, Document 159.

170. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[1]

Washington, January 27, 1971.

SUBJECT
1972 Safeguard Program

I regret that my commitment to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee precludes my attending the NSC meeting today on the FY 72 Safeguard program. Dave Packard will represent Defense.

In my view, there is a clear contradiction between the strategic sufficiency criteria of NSDM–16,[2] and the SALT guidance of NSDM–74.[3]

The sufficiency criteria call for area defense of our population against Chinese or other small missile attack. This criteria can only be satisfied by deployment of the full 12-site Safeguard (area defense).

The criteria also require that we give the Soviets no incentive to strike first in a crisis, and therefore require that we assure the survivability of our deterrent forces. The currently authorized 4-site Safeguard system would perform this function. We have another system in development (Hard Site Defense—HSD) which may prove capable of supplementing Safeguard to handle projected qualitative improvements in the Soviet threat, or of replacing Safeguard as a missile defense of Minuteman only.

NSDM–74 specifies our willingness to forego area defense of the country and any defense of our deterrent forces against Soviet missiles, if the Soviets will agree to limit ABM's to Moscow and Washington and to accept numerical limits on offensive systems.

These are in contradiction because the provisions of NSDM–74 allow improvements in the Soviet missile threat which could by the mid-70's make Minuteman vulnerable, and because these provisions preclude our area defense without limiting the Chinese or other threats identified in NSDM–16.

Abandoning area defense may be, on balance, a proper price to pay to achieve a strategically acceptable agreement with the Soviets. I believe, however, that we cannot tolerate a vulnerable Minuteman force. Therefore, I recommend that NSDM–74 be modified to make clear that the agreement described is an initial agreement which must be followed before the mid-70's by a further agreement which adequately fixes the vulnerability problem (for example, by mutual reductions in offensive forces), or else the U.S. must then proceed to deploy defenses of Minuteman.

The immediate issue to be presented at the NSC meeting is the FY 72 Safeguard program. There are two options:

1. Continue with the 4-site program already authorized at our Minuteman fields, and add advanced preparations for a site near Washington, D.C.

2. Slow the program to deployment at only 2 Minuteman sites and add "design study" of the Washington, D.C. site.

I support the first option for the following reasons:

- The NSDM–16 criteria must be satisfied unless we have an arms control agreement. We need to proceed at least this fast to keep up with projected threat improvements.
- With a strategically acceptable agreement, we may still need 4-site Safeguard on this schedule for defense of our deterrent.
- We need to determine Congressional willingness to support defense of Washington, D.C. before proceeding further towards a commitment to it in SALT.
- This is not the time, before the next round of SALT in Vienna in March, to back down from the Safeguard program already authorized by Congress.

Either option includes advanced development of the Hard Site Defense system in FY 72 as a hedge against possible threat developments, but not a commitment to deploy the system.

There is no significant difference in FY 72 outlays between these two options.

Mel Laird

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. Top Secret; Sensitive. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum dated January 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–30, NSC Meeting—Safeguard 1/27/71)

[2] Document 39.

[3] See footnote 15, Document 168.

171. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, January 27, 1971, 10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting: SALT and Safeguard ABM

PARTICIPANTS
President Richard Nixon
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
General George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
John N. Mitchell, Attorney General
David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
John N. Irwin, Under Secretary of State
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. Edward David, Science Advisor to the President
Paul Nitze, Department of Defense
Ronald Spiers, Department of State
Philip Farley, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Dr. Wayne Smith, NSC
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, NSC

[The meeting began with a 15-minute briefing by Director Helms (attached) on Soviet ballistic missile forces, the Soviet ABM, and the Soviet attitude to Safeguard].[2]

RN: Thank you. As I understand it, the latest information is not clear about whether the Soviets are slowing down their SS–9 deployment purely for refitting them.

Helms: The information is not conclusive.

RN: It would take two years for them to develop a MIRV? Helms: Yes.

Rogers: What significance do you attach to their abandonment of the sites? Have they done this before?

Helms: They may be trying to see the effect on us.

RN: What is the significance of the testing they've been doing?

Helms: Our information on their testing is better now; thus our data over the past year may be a reflection of this. But the fact is that their testing has been heavy this past year.

RN: Would they know about our testing program?

Rogers: Yes.

Moorer: They have a trawler in the area.

RN: In sum they have not cut back their testing of new programs.

Helms: Yes. And with the 1400 launchers they have already, if they put in more it will cause us concern. They may be doing it.

RN: The submarine program continues?

Helms: Yes, they are going up to launching eight submarines a year. They have three on station now and we can expect an increase—they are about 1300 miles off our coast.

RN: What about Chinese testing?

Helms: There has been some. There have been some deployments of what may be an MRBM. They do it in the most secretive way; it's all hidden. Its range would cover Asia but they're mostly aimed at the Soviet Union.

RN: Henry, can you fill us in on where we stand?

Kissinger: The Verification Panel has discussed three issues,[3] Mr. President, though we need a decision only on one of them.

—What kind of Safeguard ABM system would we want in the absence of a SALT agreement?
—Whether our position in SALT should be changed because of flaws in it?
—What is the right program for us for next year to keep open your options?

There is no consensus yet for a change in our SALT position. Nevertheless our present position has the following anomalies: Our ABM was originally justified in SALT as an area defense. We are now building four sites to defend Minutemen. And we have proposed an agreement to the Soviets on NCA, which we are not building. We will put this before you in February. We have a defense concern as to Option 3[4] —it does little to defend our forces yet our forces become more vulnerable every year as Soviet numbers and accuracy increase. The Soviet threat is growing to the survivability of our Minuteman.

The problem we face today is what should we do in next year's programs. We asked last year for the construction of one site in Missouri and advance preparation at four other sites. Congress approved Whiteman in Missouri and one preparatory site at Warren but not the others. The alternatives are:

—Defense recommends we go ahead with the four sites approved and request authority for Washington—the NCA site.[5]
—The second choice is to ask for four sites but have Warren and NCA interchangeable and dependent on SALT progress.
—Third, we could go ahead with only three sites and ask for advance preparation at Washington.
—Gerry Smith's proposal is that we go ahead with construction of the original two sites, and with advance preparation at Washington.[6]

There are two issues: What effect will it have on our overall ABM program? And what effect will it have on the SALT negotiations? Anything other than the Defense proposal will mean a delay of a year in the program. If Safeguard is not the best system to defend Minuteman—which has been the justification to the Congress—Defense would prefer to go to different radars and missiles. If we slow down, one view says, the Soviets will see this as a sign of our serious intent in the SALT negotiations; it will show we are not sliding into the Safeguard program and instigate suspicion that we are using SALT as a means to cover Safeguard development. Others believe that the maximum incentive is given by a full program go-ahead until they agree; they have an incentive then to agree and not just to negotiate to hold us up. The judgment then is between these two assumptions. In either event we need another discussion of what the best ABM program is. These options keep your options open for another year. All here agree that we need to do something on Washington to make our position plausible.

RN: What is the timing of the talks?

Kissinger: March 15.

RN: Then we need not only a budgetary decision but also a position for the talks. We have to decide what we do and also how we package it for the talks.

Kissinger: One argument for going for NCA this year is to find out whether the Congress will approve it.

Rogers: The alternative Minuteman/NCA option looks like we are going ahead with confidence but it wouldn't commit us. The fourth site option is still open to the President.

Mitchell: But if we go for only three sites it's not.

RN: Dave [Packard], what is the status of our program? Packard: Our progress in testing has been good. Our computer capabilities are coming along well. The status is as follows: In the construction at Grand Forks, as of June 30 this year, 60% of the big radar construction will be complete, and 15% of the missile site. By 30 June 1972, it will be 95% complete.

We planned the schedule so that at Malmstrom the hard construction will be 10% along by June 1971. At Whiteman, there will be no construction by June 30 this year. About 5% of the hardware is under contract.

At Warren, there will be nothing by June of this year. The key dates are: At Whiteman, the main construction sites' contracts are to be let by August '71. At Warren, we have a full calendar year to decide; it's a March '72 contract date.

The cost picture looks like this: There's a $1.8 billion added cost, due to inflation and accounting. There's $0.6 billion added due to program changes, and $0.1 billion in other costs. We are spending $100 million monthly. 50–100,000 people are involved. Whether we go for four or three or four and NCA will make little difference in the fiscal costs in 1972. If you terminate the program here will be a significant effect in 1972.

The Defense Department recommends that we go ahead with the three sites already authorized; that we go ahead with the Warren site; and that we begin the advance preparation for the NCA site in Washington. We believe the original objectives of 1969 are still valid—that our own progress is good, that SALT is not moving, and that the threat continues to develop.

No decision is necessary now as to the hardsite program. The original plan could handle 1500 reentry vehicles, and this remains the goal. If the situation changes we can reevaluate it. We don't recommend going ahead with anything except hardsite components at this time.

Therefore, we believe we should go ahead on the program and we have provided funds for four sites and NCA plans and hardsite components research.

RN: How do you see the developments in the past two years? Packard: The program has been going well, and except for the SALT issue I would recommend we go ahead with the original 12-site plan.

RN: If Congress allowed.

Rogers: Will the Congress see hardsite component research as an expanded program?

Packard: No, it is a supplement if you have more reentry vehicles—but this plan was meant as an area defense against light attack, accidental launch and bomber bases. For defense of Minuteman you would need some more.

RN: Thank you. Gerry?

Smith: I think the best program from the SALT point of view is to go ahead with construction of two sites, don't construct the third, don't ask for the fourth, and do the design of an NCA. A moderate pace is desirable. This is the diplomacy of restraint. The

situation has changed since 1969 and we can afford a slower pace. Even a full SS9 program would be near 300, rather than the 420 as we earlier thought. They could turn it on again, of course—but a moderate pace would deter them.

RN: Is there a public point before the March talks?

Smith: Yes, the budgetary decision.

The Soviets have accepted our view of an ABM at a low level or zero. This is evidence that the SALT process is working. They don't have a new program but they have the R&D to do it. We don't want to push them into it.

If our program is a bargaining chip, we will pass the point of no return: if we get beyond three sites the Soviets will question whether we would demolish it. Thus I conclude that the program I suggest gives us a better chance of getting a SALT agreement.

RN: Paul Nitze, do you have anything to add?

Nitze: No, I think the issues have been put well.

RN: I think we understand the issues.

Lincoln: We have to bear in mind the relation to the continuity of the government program. We would probably need to improve it over the next year. If there is to be a defense of Washington, we need to prepare. It would have a major impact on what we need to do to improve the reliability of the current program.

Packard: The area defense consists of 100 interceptors, a combination of Sprints and Spartans, with missile site radars and perimeter acquisition radars. The Spartan components would cover a defense from the Canadian border to Florida. But we would have only 100—which could be overwhelmed. It could handle a few submarines. The incremental cost would be within reason and would be worthwhile.

Rogers: Can you get into an NCA as fast as Warren?

Packard: No. We couldn't let the contracts until April 1973. That would put a hiatus on the program in manufacture and would be difficult.

Moorer: The Defense Program gives the greatest flexibility. It gives the option over two years of moving in either direction.

RN: All of us are working to the same goals. We don't know what the results would be on the diplomacy. It has subtlety; it's a question of the thrust it would have.

Nitze: If the Russians would give us a real word on what they mean by slowdown, we

could have money in the bank.

Rogers: Why don't they tell us?

Nitze: They are not authorized to tell us anything now.

Rogers: If we could give some gesture not affecting our security, it would be helpful, but Packard says the program would be set back a year.

RN: Thank you, gentlemen.

[The meeting adjourned.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Minutes, Originals 1971 thru 6–20–74 [5 of 5]. Top Secret; Ruff; Umbra. The meeting, held in the Cabinet Room of the White House, ended at 11:13 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) All brackets are in the original.

[2] The text of Helms's briefing is attached but not printed.

[3] See Documents 167 and 168.

[4] Reference is to the third of the four alternatives listed below.

[5] See Documents 166 and 165.

[6] See footnote 3, Document 167.

172. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 3, 1971.

SUBJECT
Safeguard Review

Your decision is now needed on the options for proceeding with the Safeguard Program which were outlined in the NSC meeting on Wednesday, January 27.[2]

While Safeguard funds are included in budget documents in only the most general ways, it is important to obtain a decision and formulate our rationale prior to the appearance of Secretaries Laird and Rogers before Congress to defend the budget.

The Options discussed at the NSC Meeting were:

Option 1:

Continue construction on the existing two sites and begin construction already authorized for Whiteman. *Additionally*, request authorization for construction at the Warren site and for advance preparation for Washington, D.C.

This is the program proposed by Secretary Laird.

Option 2:

Continue construction at the existing two sites and begin construction already authorized for Whiteman. *Additionally*, request authorization *either* for construction at the Warren site *or* for advance preparation for the NCA defense at Washington, D.C., depending upon progress at SALT.

This program is supported by Director Shultz and would probably be acceptable to Secretary Laird. This option appears close to my understanding of Secretary Rogers' position.

Option 3:

Continue construction at the existing two sites and begin construction already authorized for Whiteman. Additionally, request authorization for advance preparation for the NCA defense at Washington, D.C. Do not request construction authorization for Warren.

There are no open advocates for this program, although Ambassador Smith would

probably prefer, for negotiating reasons, this program to Option 1 or Option 2.

Option 4:

Continue only *minimal* construction on the two existing sites but defer the authorized construction at Whiteman. Additionally, request authorization for advance preparation for the NCA defense at Washington, D.C. *Do not* request construction authorization for Warren.

This program is proposed by Ambassador Smith and would probably be acceptable to Secretary Rogers.

It is generally agreed that we should request authorization for advance preparation for the NCA defense. This should enable us, if we make the proper effort, to determine whether we can get Congressional support for NCA and relates our Safeguard proposal to our SALT position.

As discussed in the NSC meeting, *the decision as to the amount of construction undertaken* turns principally on judgments concerning Congressional attitudes and Soviet reactions to our moves during SALT.

The arguments concerning negotiations are summarized as follows:

—On one hand, it is argued that the Soviets may be concerned about the irreversibility and expandability of our Safeguard program, that they may have given a signal of restraint in the slowdown of SS–9 deployments,[3] and that we should return a strong signal by slowing our ABM program.
—On the other hand, it is argued that if the Soviets are concerned about irreversibility, they should be more inclined to negotiate at Vienna, that the SS–9 slowdown is not unambiguous, and that if we slow our ABM program without specific progress in SALT, they are encouraged not to reach an agreement.

The arguments concerning Congressional reaction are summarized as follows:

—On one hand, it is argued that the less we ask for in Safeguard the less opposition we are likely to get in the Congress. Moreover, the opposition is likely to use the apparent SS–9 slowdown and the Soviet ABM-only proposal as arguments to defeat our proposals. If our proposal is defeated in Congress, we will have lost, rather than maintained, leverage in SALT.
—On the other hand, it is argued that slowing Safeguard now will encourage even more opposition and that we would be unlikely to ever revive any ABM even in the absence of a SALT agreement. Moreover, asking for a reduced level of construction denies our "bargaining chip" arguments of last year unless we turn to the ambiguous SS–9 events for justification, a questionable course, unless we also get some constraint on Soviet

offensive systems.

My Recommendation

On balance, I think the most prudent course is to approve Option 2, which involves continuing construction at the two existing sites; initiating construction at Whiteman; requesting authorization *either* for construction at Warren or for advance preparation of the NCA defense at your discretion based on our progress in SALT.

This program would give an appropriate signal to the Soviets and relates our Safeguard program to SALT without sacrificing the impetus of the program or encouraging the Soviets to talk rather than to negotiate.

We would face more opposition in the Congress with this option than with Ambassador Smith's proposal. However, this is unavoidable. The alternative would be to risk weakening our principal bargaining card in SALT without getting limits on Soviet forces. One important aspect of proposing NCA *or* Warren is that it gives you a rationale, should you feel it prudent to do so, to withdraw the request for Warren before a Congressional vote, giving you important flexibility in working with the Congress.

You will note that I have not mentioned Gerry Smith's proposal for unilateral declaration stopping Safeguard as long as the Soviets stop offensive deployments. I think this is an important option but it needs more analysis and you can take that action at any time. I will send you a separate memorandum concerning this matter.

Finally, I recommend you direct the establishment of an inter-agency coordinating committee to prepare the legislation and rationale for our Safeguard program. This is essential to insure the Government speaks with a single voice on this issue.

Attached is a NSDM (Tab A) reflecting the above considerations. If you approve, please sign the NSDM.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–221, NSDM 97. Top Secret. Sent for action. A stamped note on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen." Wayne Smith and Sonnenfeldt sent this memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 29.

[2] See Document 171.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 159.

[4] Nixon initialed the approve option. Tab A as signed is Document 173.

173. National Security Decision Memorandum 97[1]

Washington, February 8, 1971.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Safeguard Review

As a result of the review of the Safeguard program conducted by the National Security Council, I have decided on the following Safeguard Program subject to Congressional authorization where required:

1. Continue construction at the sites at Grand Forks, North Dakota and Malmstrom, Montana.
2. Commence (in 1971) the construction already authorized for the site at Whiteman, Missouri.
3. Begin (in 1972) advance preparation on the National Command Authority defense at Washington, D.C. or construction on the site at Warren, Wyoming. I will decide between these alternatives based upon a review of developments in SALT.

To insure a clear and coherent presentation of my decision in connection with the budget I direct that an interagency coordinating committee be formed under the direction of a representative of the Secretary of Defense[2] with membership composed of representatives from appropriate agencies and appropriate elements of the Executive Office of the President.[3]

Richard Nixon

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 97–144. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Moorer and to Senior Members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

[2] Laird submitted a “Rationale for the FY 72 Safeguard Program” to President Nixon under a covering memorandum, March 1. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–207, 337, White House)

[3] During a telephone conversation on April 14, Nixon and Haldeman discussed the administration’s strategy for obtaining Congressional approval of this phase of Safeguard.

(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Record of Conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, Oval Office, Conversation No. 479–3) A conference of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees limited the administration's plans, however, when it adopted the Senate committee's plan to limit deployment of Safeguard to only two of the four previously authorized sites: Grand Forks and Malmstrom. The full Congress passed the defense procurement authorization bill (P.L. 92–156), which contained provisions for the two-site ABM system, on November 11. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. 3, 1969–1972, pp. 212–213)

The Defense Budget and U.S. National Security Policy

174. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

Washington, February 11, 1971, 10:15–11:15 a.m.

175. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 16, 1971.

176. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 16, 1971.

177. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, February 22, 1971, 3:15–4:10 p.m.

178. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, February 25, 1971.

179. Editorial Note

180. Editorial Note

181. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting

Washington, March 12, 1971, 3:08–4:40 p.m.

182. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, March 17, 1971, 3:23–4:34 p.m.

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183. Editorial Note

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184. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, April 26, 1971, 2:15–3:51 p.m.

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185. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, May 14, 1971.

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186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, May 31, 1971.

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187. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, July 16, 1971.

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188. Conversation With President Nixon

Washington, July 23, 1971.

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189. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, July 29, 1971, 3:15–4:45 p.m.

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190. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, August 5, 1971, 2:45–3:54 p.m.

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191. Memorandum for the President's Files by the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Washington, August 10, 1971.

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192. Paper Prepared by the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group

Washington, August 11, 1971.

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193. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 12, 1971, 10:03 a.m.

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194. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

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195. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 13, 1971, 10:05–11:50 a.m.

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196. National Security Decision Memorandum 128

Washington, August 16, 1971.

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197. Editorial Note

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198. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, October 21, 1971.

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199. Conversation With President Nixon

Washington, October 27, 1971.

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200. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, October 28, 1971.

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201. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 1, 1971.

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202. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, December 8, 1971, 3:10–3:50 p.m.

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203. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, December 22, 1971.

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204. Paper Prepared by the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group

Washington, January 11, 1972.

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205. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, January 26, 1972.

206. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, February 10, 1972, 3:08–3:57 p.m.

207. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 17, 1972.

208. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, March 4, 1972.

209. National Security Study Memorandum 147

Washington, March 4, 1972.

210. Editorial Note

174. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, February 11, 1971, 10:15–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Annual Review of Foreign Policy

PARTICIPANTS

President Richard Nixon
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense
General George A. Lincoln, Director of Emergency Preparedness
John N. Mitchell, Attorney General
John N. Irwin, II, Under Secretary of State
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William Safire,[3] White House
Colonel Richard Kennedy, NSC
Winston Lord, NSC

RN: I want to review the work going on on the Report that I will make on the 25th.[2] I have not yet gone into the final draft. I want to ask Director Helms to give a general briefing on the world and I will ask Dr. Kissinger to summarize the Report. Then I'll ask Mel [Laird] and Bill [Rogers] to note which sections we want to work on. I will be working on it this weekend. Dick [Helms]?[4]

Helms: Around the world we see a number of developments.

I'll start with the Soviet Union. The Soviets are deploying a third group of SS–9s. They have a new task group heading for Cuba.[5]

Laird: It will enter Cuban waters today.

Moorer: It's an N-Class submarine, not nuclear firing.

Helms: They are moving ahead with preparations for the Party Congress which was scheduled previously for February. They face serious problems of resource allocation in their economy, of reform, and whether to crack down on the East Europeans. Some in the leadership want to modernize the economy. Brezhnev and Kosygin are aging, so there may be some leadership changes but it is unlikely there will be major changes in policy.

Let me turn now to China. Their missile development is moving toward an ICBM, but there is no firm evidence of any deployment.

RN: What kind of missiles do the British and French have? Helms: Both the French and British missiles are IRBM's.

RN: Then China would be the third to have ICBM's. What about submarine missiles?

Laird: The British have Polaris.

Helms: China has a 1400-mile missile being tested. They could have an operational ICBM by 1973. They have an active nuclear test program and can deliver a 3-Megaton weapon with their IRBM.

They do not have a missile for their missile submarines. They are developing a new sub but we have no evidence of a nuclear-powered sub yet. Their submarines strictly stick to Chinese waters.

Their Cultural Revolution is still having an effect. There is no clear pecking order in their 25-main politburo. Mao is still in charge; the others are a mixture of groupings.

Their international relations have regained momentum. The image now given is one of stability and reasonableness. Peking is no softer on Southeast Asian issues but there is an indication they would see a negotiation as advantageous. There are still border talks going on with the USSR. There have been no more clashes. The Soviets have tripled their forces on the border; the Chinese have also moved forces to the border. There is now no contact between the Soviet and China Communist Parties. The Soviets attacked the Chinese over the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, claiming that the Chinese had alienated the peoples of Southeast Asia and the Chinese attitude was thereby detrimental to the anti-imperialist struggle.

RN: How new is this sort of attack?

Helms: It's a recurring theme but this is one of the most virulent instances. It evidences real distaste.

Rogers: It's interesting that the Soviets take the Laos invasion as an opportunity to take off on China. It's useful in noting to Congress that it's unlikely China and the USSR would team up against us; this rules out a conference on Indochina with Peking and Moscow.

Kissinger: Hanoi has a problem here, too.

Rogers: Hanoi can't go either.

Helms: Let me review the effects of recent developments in Southeast Asia. The Communist position in South Vietnam has deteriorated sharply in the last year. Cambodia is now denied to them as a sanctuary and port. In Cambodia they now have an

active opponent claiming further resources. The Laos invasion threatens their last logistics route. The fact that the Lon Nol[6] Government survives complicates Hanoi's problem. The odds favor the survival of a non-Communist government.

If successful, the present offensive will cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and prevent their reinforcement for a year. The Communists have real problems in the countryside. They concede in the Delta that only 12% of the people are under their control. The elections this year will be a demonstration of the viability and strength of South Vietnam. They are still strong and will fight in south Laos, and also will fight in the North. Hanoi must feel that things are coming to a head. They see an anti-communist coalition being formed and the United States shows no evidence of concessions in Paris. In short, Hanoi's strategy is not working.

In the Middle East, there is no evidence of a break in the fundamental deadlock. There has been no fighting—there's 30 days more ceasefire. In the long view all the issues boil down to the territorial problem. The Israelis insist on defensible borders and won't give up Jerusalem, Sharm el-Sheikh, Gaza and the Golan Heights. They are not specific on the rest. Sadat's[7] Suez proposal was trying to take some danger out of the situation. Mrs. Meir[8] insists on a peace treaty before any withdraw; she'll talk about Suez separately.

Jarring[9] is now more active. He made new proposals to the Arabs and Israelis. He's asked for simultaneous commitments. He's received no answer yet but there's not much hope. The level of armaments is rising throughout the area. Israel can defend itself against any or all of them but it's becoming more difficult. They would preempt, but the Arab air forces have increased their air defense. There are 13,000–14,000 Soviet military personnel in the UAR. This could result in their direct involvement if the fighting resumes.

Rogers: There is a report that the UAR sees 150,000 losses if they try to cross the Canal. That's certainly a stabilizing factor. Egypt knows it would get licked. Both sides are concerned.

RN: Thank you, Dick. Henry?

Kissinger: Let me briefly summarize the purpose of this Foreign Policy Report—the procedure, and what it attempts to do.

We started at the end of September by sending out a NSSM requesting the agencies' contributions.[10] These were received by the end of November. They were worked on by my staff, on the basis of comments and drafts we received from the agencies which were incorporated into the document and our general understanding of the President's approach. A draft then went out to the departments around January 20. We have received many comments. We are now incorporating the changes and we will take up any questions. So the final draft will reflect the agreement of all the senior advisors. Most of

the comments we have received improve the draft and do not change the philosophy. I am going to work with the President in Florida and then send the drafts to the agencies again for review.

What is the purpose of the document? It is to get beyond what happened to why it happened. It is to put to the American public, the bureaucracy and foreign governments a picture of the world as you see it, where you see us and the world going. That is the meaning of a generation of peace—to look beyond crisis-management toward a long view. This can make a contribution to the level of public debate. Debate will be in the framework of the document rather than just newspaper nit-picking of day-to-day actions. This can improve the understanding by the American people, foreign governments and the bureaucracy, of the major issues of foreign policy.

The thrust is that there have been major changes since the end of the war and up to the time this Administration came into office. Other countries, especially Europe and Japan, have grown stronger; the United States no longer enjoys a nuclear monopoly; the Communist world is no longer a monolith. All these developments have implications for our policy. One theme is a new partnership with a greater contribution to be made by others. This is known as the Nixon Doctrine.[11] It also means we need a new doctrine for our strategic and general purpose forces in a new strategic situation. Thirdly, there is a new approach to the Communist world, because of the new situation.

Thus the Report is organized into a section on relations with allies and friends, a section on relations with our adversaries, a long chapter on the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine, and a strategic section which includes a balanced description of strategic forces and a description of arms control—both of which are discussed in detail.

RN: Dobrynin always says “disarmament;” we use the phrase “arms control.” That’s their propaganda.

Kissinger: This is the general outline and the philosophy. I want to be brief; I want to allow some time for the others to speak. This has been a cooperative enterprise, and the whole government has been involved in it. It shows that our policy has had a coherent point of view since you took office.

RN: I will have to read it. I’ll do it this weekend.

Laird: I have one concern. I felt the Report last year[12] presented the three major points of the Nixon Doctrine. That was good. I see that the draft now says we were the ones who suggested an ABM ban; this is a problem for me. I want to fudge it a little. I want to avoid mention of the four options because then we’ll have to explain them in testimony.

RN: It’ll leak if we have too much detail. We’ll have to face a lot of questions.

Laird: During the 1960's we were sold the flexible response doctrine. This was the McNamara approach. The Nixon Doctrine got away from flexible response; we moved to the initiative with partnership and negotiation. This is the thrust of our initiative—we want to get away from "flexible response" and turn to "deterrence"—"realistic deterrence" tied to the Nixon Doctrine. We will sell to the Congress and the people the idea of deterrence and a policy of initiative rather than response. A policy of response is negative rather than the initiative we need for the 1970's. We should get this incorporated in the Report more fully.

The strategic section doesn't tie in with the SALT section. We can make the sections work together.

The section on the NSC System: Last year it emphasized the improvements we had brought about; this year it seems to emphasize [crisis] management. We want to emphasize that we still want to look at the long term.

Rogers: We fully support the idea of the Report. We will make a report to the Congress also, that goes into greater detail in many areas.[13] I think the idea of this Report is excellent. The coordination has been very good. We had an opportunity to make comments on the SALT part. I support Mel on this: I think we should drop the options. We can state our approach. Otherwise it's a target for attack. I'm sure we can work it out with Henry.

RN: On the SALT part: the pathetic idealism on arms control in this country means it would be best to speak on it often. We know that cosmetics have a lot to do with how people see this, regardless of the substance. It's important to people.

Rogers: There's no criticism of us in the public or any question whether we are forthcoming. But if too much is let out it gives the opposition fire.

Laird: Everybody knows what our position is. Gerry Smith's briefing leaked; the Soviets are putting out their side.

Rogers: It's well written and a good report, but it's too long. It's twice as long as last year's, particularly in light of the State and Defense reports[14] that are also coming out. Last year's was about right. There's some repetition. We must watch how we say that we thought of everything; we can make it more subtle, I think.

Kissinger: We're cutting it now by 15%–20%.

RN: I want it tight.

Rogers: We want to balance the length with the substance of the chapters. I think our report fits well together with this one.

[The meeting adjourned.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1971 thru 6–20–74. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum on February 10 briefing him on the purpose of the meeting. (Ibid.) The memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 84.

[3] Special Assistant to the President and speechwriter.

[2] The President transmitted his Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy on February 25. The report includes the following parts: The Nixon Doctrine, Relating National Interests, The Soviet Union, Securing National Interests, The World Interest, and The National Security Council System. For the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

[4] All brackets are in the original.

[5] Reference is to Soviet naval activity near the Cuban port of Cienfuegos.

[6] Lon Nol, Prime Minister of Cambodia.

[7] Anwar al-Sadat, President of Egypt.

[8] Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel.

[9] Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union and United Nations Special Representative for the Middle East.

[10] NSSM 102, issued on September 21, 1970, called for submissions from the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury and the CIA in preparation for the President's second annual review of United States foreign policy. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103 [1 of 2])

[11] For the origins of the Nixon Doctrine, see footnote 5, Document 98.

[12] Nixon's First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s was transmitted on February 18, 1970. For the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116–190.

[13] "United States Foreign Policy 1969–1970: A Report of the Secretary of State" was transmitted to Congress on March 26. The report includes an introductory statement by Rogers and sections on Relations Among States and The Common Concerns of Diplomacy. For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 5, 1971, pp. 465–477.

[14] Regarding the Defense Department report, see Document 177.

175. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 16, 1971.

Nixon: And the other thing is, my view is this: that we now have information that the SS–9 is MIRV warhead.[2] [unclear] I mean, MIRV in our sense.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Well, that's what we—

Kissinger: That we would be their [unclear].

Nixon: This is at best—intelligence people all agree, isn't that—

Kissinger: Yes.

Nixon: That's what [unclear] all along.

Kissinger: That's what—remember—I told you in May '69 about [unclear exchange].

Nixon: [unclear] talking about the MIRV footprints. [unclear] But now what you're saying is that this is independent, [unclear] what we think is an independent. Is that the point?

Kissinger: An independent target capability is—it depends on the release time and space.

Nixon: [unclear] six.

Kissinger: Well, no. They have three.

Nixon: Three?

Kissinger: The six they think they may be able to get [unclear].

Nixon: Now the other point that I make is this—

Kissinger: What they have [unclear] directed to vary the release time of those three things.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And that gives them an independent capability.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: Because defending as well as [unclear exchange].

Nixon: Now, is it your view that this whole [unclear]—that's why they're slowing down their SS–9. [unclear]

Kissinger: Well, that could be one reason, but the primary reason, I think, is that they're building a new silo, which I told you about over the weekend.

Nixon: Yes, [unclear]. Does that have to do with MIRV?

Kissinger: Well, we don't know what it has to do with. It might be an entirely new missile, a new warhead.

Nixon: Yeah, yeah.

Kissinger: But you can't mention that. That's very secret.

Nixon: Yeah, I know. Okay. But what are we—on this MIRV thing—

Kissinger: On the MIRV slowdown—on the SS–9 slowdown—I would say it might mean that they have the [unclear]. It might mean that they're putting on new warheads. And, if the evidence is very ambiguous—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And, if I were [unclear exchange].

Nixon: Take a quick look at the substance as you prepare [unclear].

Kissinger: [unclear] You're getting by too [unclear].

Nixon: Yeah, and spoil it. I don't want to say too much. The other thing about the arms control thing, I think the logic you should take there is that we have developed our own position with regard to—well first, without going into anything about ABMs, where they are—just say that we believe that there can be no meaningful arms control without the control of both offensive and defensive missiles.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: That's what we are—that is our objective. And, the arms—we've got to deal with the arms control allegation that will be presented in our position in Vienna in March.[3]

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: How's that sound to you?

Kissinger: [unclear] You can say we are reviewing our position. Not from the point—well, they've—in the light of what has gone on before at the negotiations. But, I would say there has to be a link between offensive and defensive weapons. And remember that the threat comes from the offensive weapons that are now deployed. I would hit that hard. That's what the danger is.

Nixon: I know.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation 450–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation that occurred from 10:49 to 11:03 a.m.

[2] See Document 159.

[3] The fourth round of SALT talks was scheduled to begin in Vienna in March.

176. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 16, 1971.

FROM

FROM
Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT
NIE 11-8-70, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack"[2]

Attached at Tab A is the intelligence community's latest effort at a comprehensive estimate of present and future Soviet strategic attack capabilities.

I.

The highlights of the NIE are:

ICBMs

—The Soviets have continued the numerical build-up of their ICBM force, but at a slower rate. (Subsequent intelligence indicates that the Soviets have started no new groups since June 1970 and have halted construction on two SS-9 groups (six launchers each) and one SS-13 group (ten launchers), which were among the last groups to be started.)
—The SS-9 is a real threat to Minuteman if the Soviets improve its accuracy and develop a MIRV system for it.
—A system evidenced in recent Soviet flight tests of the SS-9 Mod 4 could lead to a MIRV with initial operational capability by late 1971, but this would be no more accurate than the present SS-9 which means limited effectiveness against hard targets.
—The Soviets could develop a MIRV with three or six RVs and with the accuracy for hard targets [*less than 1 line not declassified*] by late 1972.
—Soviet R&D testing, which has been quite active, has concentrated on testing improved versions (i.e., better accuracy, penetration aids) of ICBM systems which are already deployed, rather than on new systems. The intelligence community believes this trend will continue.
—It is agreed that the Soviets will probably continue work on land-mobile systems. However, the one mobile missile program which has been suggested as being an ICBM appears to be in limbo or to have been cancelled.

SLBMs

—The Soviets are energetically developing SSBNs. The Y-class submarine is the mainstay of this fleet. Fourteen are now operational. At the present production rate—which shows no signs of slackening—the Y-class force will reach forty units (comparable in size to the U.S. Polaris fleet) in early 1974.
—Soviet SSBNs have started patrolling in the past year within missile range of the U.S. No particular pattern is yet discernable.
—The Soviets are developing a new SLBM with an extended range [*less than 1 line not declassified*] which could add greatly to the flexibility and survivability of Soviet submarines. (Subsequent intelligence estimates that the missile could have an initial operational capability by late 1971.) The missile is too large to fit in the Y-class submarine without major ship modification. It appears most likely that the missile will be initially deployed in one earlier model SSBN and ten diesel submarines, for a total of 66 launch tubes.

Bombers

—At present, the Soviets have only 197 heavy bombers and tankers operational, their designs dating from the 1950's.
—The Soviets are proceeding smoothly with flight tests of a new strategic bomber, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] which should be ready for operational use by 1974-76. Because of the relatively limited range of the bomber, all in the intelligence community, except [*less than 1 line not declassified*] believe that the aircraft is best suited for peripheral operations, though (especially with refueling) it could be used for intercontinental attack.

Overall

—The number of major Soviet strategic forces and projections for mid-1972 are shown in the table on the next page.[3]
—We know very little about the purposes of the Soviet force. All agree that the Soviets seek, at a minimum, a position of acknowledged strategic parity with the U.S. But how they are most likely to define "parity" and how likely it is that they might seek some quantitative edge is unclear. Moreover, little is known about Soviet perception of U.S. intentions, command and control, and war-fighting strategies.

II.

This year's NIE is a major improvement over last year's. As you might recall, that effort had serious defects:

—Most serious was a lack of sharply-defined, clearly-argued discussions of the characteristics and purposes of Soviet strategic forces.
—It was too often satisfied with reciting facts and reluctant to raised fundamental questions about their significance.

—Judgments and background which often underlie conclusions were not made explicit.

Recognizing the weaknesses in last year's product, Dick Helms asked for comments from intelligence consumers. After getting your reaction, I provided comments and had my staff work closely with the intelligence community. The result, as reflected by this NIE are encouraging:

1. There was some frank, clear discussion of the characteristics and purposes of Soviet forces. For instance,
   —Penetrating beyond the fairly obvious generalization that the SS-9 was (at least initially) intended for hard targets, there is an extensive discussion of possible roles and missions of the SS-9. (Pages 46-48)
   —Likewise, possible Soviet purposes behind deploying some SS-11s in MR/IRBM sites are examined carefully. (Annex E)
2. The discussion is backed by considerable detail which is presented in usually very clear ways (e.g., graphics) and which even spills over into a number of annexes. As a rough measure, last year's NIE (which also included peripheral attack forces) was 47 pages long with annexes versus 159 pages for this year's.
3. A wide range of sources is often used to advance the analysis. For instance,
   —[*less than 1 line not declassified*] is used to suggest a shift in SS-9 targeting strategy.
   —The Soviet SALT statements are used to support the conclusions that the Soviets will continue at least exploratory research on a mobile missile and will convert some diesel submarines to carry an extended-range SLBM.
4. One of the best improvements is the development of a wide range of alternative force models based on assumed differences in Soviet objectives, the pace of Soviet technological developments, and the resources which the Soviets are willing to apply. This approach forces everyone to remember that estimates rely heavily on underlying assumptions. However, to avoid the real danger that any point along the wide spectrum would be undifferentiated from any other point, the NIE designates certain assumptions and their accompanying illustrative force structures as most likely.

All the alternative force models are provided in considerable numerical detail which is essential for an understanding of the differences between the alternatives and for performance of some simple threat calculations—e.g., on the possible vulnerability of Minuteman.

III.

While this year's NIE is a major improvement over last year's, considerably more work is required. The present NIE suffers from two serious weaknesses:

1. It still fails to draw on all sources and research methods which could advance the analysis.

The greatest emphasis is still heavily on observed activity at test ranges, construction

sites, and operational bases. However, a variety of other material could be useful—e.g., Soviet doctrinal and strategic writings, economic information, analysis of Soviet institutions. The NIE includes a section on these approaches, but that section mirrors the weakness of the old NIE—it lacks detail and clear-cut differences in viewpoints. For instance, the NIE is almost fatuous when it ponderously concludes: "It can only be said that military policy is made as a result of a political process involving debate, hard bargaining, and bureaucratic infighting, in which the military interest plays a 'substantial' role."

2. The NIE often fails to estimate Soviet objectives and strategies, yet such information is fundamental to understanding present Soviet programs and estimating future ones. The NIE made a few attempts to improve its work here—notably with the discussion of the roles and missions of the SS-9—but the gaps are many.
   —How sophisticated is Soviet strategic thinking? How do various individuals and groups define "parity"?
   —What are likely Soviet war plans? What are Soviet views as to the possibility and outcomes of limited strategic war? Will the Soviets tend to hold many units in reserve?
   —How good is Soviet command and control?

IV.

I will commend Dick Helms for the improvement in this NIE. At the same time, I will indicate that more can, and must, be done.

I will also continue to work with the intelligence community over the next year to insure that improvements are made.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 405, USSR SS-9 Deployment. Top Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum bears a note indicating that the President saw it.

[2] Document 160.

[3] The one-page table is attached, but not printed.

177. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, February 22, 1971, 3:15–4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Defense Posture Statement

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Under Secretary John N. Irwin
Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
Mr. Seymour Weiss

Defense

Mr. David Packard
Dr. Gardiner I. Tucker
Mr. William J. Baroody, Jr.[2]

CIA

Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Bruce C. Clarke

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Maj. Gen. Richard F. Shaefer

OMB

Mr. James R. Schlesinger
Mr. Caspar Weinberger

ACDA

Mr. Philip J. Farley
Vice Adm. John M. Lee

CEA

Mr. Paul McCracken

OST

Dr. Hubert Heffner

NSC Staff

Dr. K. Wayne Smith
Mr. John C. Court
Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. The DPRC Working Group will review the draft Defense posture statement[3] to insure its consistency with outstanding guidance on strategy. For this purpose, the Working Group will make a compilation of existing guidance based on NSDMs and the

President's Annual Foreign Policy Review.[4] To facilitate this review, the Defense Department will distribute copies of the proposed posture statement to all appropriate agencies. In connection with the review, the State Department will submit comments on relevant political factors.

2. The DPRC agreed that it was important that the Defense Posture statement not imply any degradation in US readiness under FY72–76 defense programs. Specifically, the posture statement should make clear that GPF capabilities relative to those of the Eisenhower administration have been improved even though force levels have been reduced. The interdependence of deterrence and war-fighting capability should be recognized. Similarly, care should be taken to avoid appearing to abandon the 1½-war concept without making clear in other ways the contingencies under which the US is prepared to take military action.
3. It was agreed that the forthcoming State Department report on foreign policy[5] will be submitted for review under the NSC system.
4. The DPRC will review the FY73 Defense fiscal guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard) Do you want to have Bill [Baroody] present a briefing on the posture statement?

Mr. Packard: There are a few things I want to say first. In our defense planning we are dealing with two problems. We need to present our plan to the public and to the Congress. We also have to undertake detailed planning ourselves. What we are concerned with today is the first of these tasks, that is, presenting our plan to the public and the Congress. This must be done in a way that is consistent with the President's foreign policy address and also with the statement which the Secretary of State will be making. Since the Defense presentation will be fairly comprehensive, it is especially important that it be tied together with these other statements.

Mr. Baroody: (Mr. Baroody's briefing was based on a series of charts, copies of which are attached).[6] This first chart indicates the order in which the major administration statements on foreign and national security policy will appear. Last year it was decided to present a transitional one-year defense program to Congress.[7] However, at that time Secretary Laird committed himself to present a coherent five-year program the following year. Secretary Laird's statement will follow that of the Secretary of State, which we understand will be forthcoming about the first week in March. The chart also indicates the basic elements to be included in the Defense report and notes that the JCS Chairman, the service secretaries and the service chiefs will be making additional statements.

The next chart [Chart 2] lists the table of contents of the report. It is divided into two sections. I will not be dealing with Section II, which concerns management, in this presentation. The appendices include charts setting forth the Eisenhower, Kennedy–Johnson, and Nixon administrations' defense strategies and a number of statistical tables.

This chart [Chart 3] provides a comparative overview of the strategies of the three administrations. The budgetary figures are keyed to constant 1964 dollars.

The next two charts [Charts 4 and 5] provide more detail on the Eisenhower and Kennedy–Johnson strategies. The brackets are designed to give a rough indication of the types of conflict each of the various forces is designed to deter or respond to.

This chart [Chart 6] outlines the factors of change which have led to the new Nixon strategy. The quotes in our statement come from the comments which we submitted on the draft Presidential foreign policy report. They will be reviewed as necessary so as to be keyed precisely to the language of the President's statement.

Our next chart [Chart 7] sets forth the three pillars of our strategy: partnership, strength, and negotiation.

Here [Chart 8] we have depicted the Nixon strategy of realistic deterrence. The forces listed are the FY72 baseline forces. As noted on the chart, the Defense Department is most concerned with two of the three pillars of the Nixon strategy for peace, that is strength and partnership.

Mr. Schlesinger: Where do you show that many of the fourteen Eisenhower administration divisions were paper divisions? In other words, how do you convey the point that we are maintaining our conventional strength?

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good point. If you compare the Eisenhower assumptions and force levels, and if you consider that the Eisenhower administration was relying on nuclear deterrence, then it is difficult to explain why the Eisenhower administration had more forces in every general purpose force category than we do.

Mr. Packard: That is an important point.

Dr. Kissinger: If I were on a Senate committee, that is the first question I would ask.

Mr. Baroody: In the report we state the assumptions of each administration's strategy. We can show that the forces indicated for the Eisenhower administration were designed to serve as a trip-wire.

Dr. Kissinger: That is just the point. Despite the difference in strategy, the Eisenhower administration apparently had larger general purpose forces. We need to have something in the text of the statement that explains this apparent anomaly.

Mr. Schlesinger: Five of the Eisenhower administration divisions were essentially training units.

Dr. Kissinger: If you explained that, the statement would be fine. Otherwise, I don't know

what reasons you have for thinking that with a different doctrine smaller general purpose forces are adequate. There were more forces provided under the trip-wire concept.

Dr. Tucker: One factor is the possibility of simultaneous war in both theaters.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to get to that later.

Mr. Baroody: To continue the briefing, this chart [Chart 9] states the principles underlying Secretary Laird's report. These are Secretary Laird's interpretations of elements of the President's foreign policy report.

Mr. Irwin: What is the meaning of "decisive" with reference to strategic nuclear retaliatory capability?

Mr. Baroody: That is another word for assured destruction.

Mr. Schlesinger: What do you mean by stating that Free World deterrent forces should be "independent" of strategic nuclear forces?

Mr. Baroody: What we are talking about is the erosion that has taken place at the strategic level and the need for the President to have available to him the option of using these other deterrent forces.

Dr. Heffner: From what I have seen of the President's report, there is nothing in it that says that NATO forces are to be independent of our strategic forces. This statement could be taken as an indicator that we favor such independence.

Mr. Packard: This is designed to provide for deterrence independent of nuclear forces.

Dr. Heffner: As I read the President's statement that isn't what he said.

Mr. Packard: We will take a look at the wording.

Mr. Baroody: As shown in this chart [Chart 10], our planning is organized around the key elements of the strategic spectrum: strategic, theater nuclear, theater conventional, and subtheater/localized.

Dr. Kissinger: One wonders when seeing that chart why it is considered that our strategic forces can be sufficient but not modern whereas our theater nuclear forces must be modern and sufficient. The requirements seem to be less strict for our strategic forces. This is just a nitpick.

Mr. Schlesinger: What do you mean by stating that responsibility for theater nuclear forces can be shared with certain allies?

Mr. Baroody: This refers to the French and British nuclear forces. Mr. Schlesinger: Their

forces are essential for city-busting.

Mr. Packard: It all depends on how you define theater nuclear forces.

Adm. Moorer: They provide delivery vehicles. The phraseology can be rationalized on that basis.

Mr. Baroody: I am not implying that the French and British are to contribute to deterring a strategic nuclear attack on the US. Our forces are designed to be self-sufficient in that capacity. In preparing the Defense report we looked for a single new term to provide an umbrella of all of the elements that affect Defense planning. This we have called the total force planning concept.

It is important to distinguish between total force planning for US forces and that which takes place under the partnership concept involving Free World forces. For the US, the key elements [as set forth in Chart 11] are baseline forces, better utilization of existing forces, modernization of the reserves, improved readiness, and greater use of technology. Total force planning for the Free World can be summarized in the three categories [combined planning, complementary forces planning, and security assistance, shown in Chart 12]. This terminology is not used in the report but is a convenient way of summarizing what is involved.

Total forces planning in the broadest sense can be exemplified by our Vietnamization strategy, which seeks to combine diplomatic efforts, negotiations, economic and security assistance, and cooperation among the Asian nations. [Chart 13]

This chart [Chart 14] lists the major threats to free world security and keys them to the spectrum of possible types of conflict.

The last charts [Charts 15 and 16] give more information about how the concept of total force planning will be treated in the report. The material presented in the charts is, in effect, a table of contents for Chapter 4, which deals with force planning. The discussion of theater and subtheater forces is drawn from the presentation made to the DPRC on December 14.[8]

Dr. Kissinger: I take it this is not exactly the way you will present the material in the report.

Mr. Baroody: On the contrary, these charts I showed are the table of contents. This is precisely the way it will be organized in the report. The forces will be keyed to the type of mission each serves.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you gong to distribute a draft of the statement to interested agencies, particularly State and CIA?

Mr. Baroody: We will do that.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't want to spend time on nitpicking. I have had enough of that in preparing the Annual Review. To cite an example, in the text of the section dealing with species of animals in danger of extinctions, there was a statement that "animals do not recognize national boundaries". One agency wanted to change this to "some" animals. The only thing else that was needed was to add a footnote that "animals that don't recognize national boundaries don't deserve protection."

In connection with the Defense report, I want to raise two conceptual issues. I don't objective to the phrase "realistic deterrence". It is a great phrase. However, I do object to giving the impression that we are not interested in war-fighting, as opposed to deterrence. It is not easy to see how deterrence can be achieved when we are telling the other side that we are not interested in fighting. Deterrence has to be based on war-fighting capability. I am afraid that in our attempt to package our strategy differently, we are making a distortion that could lead us to appear to be following a policy that the other side will think is a bluff. We have to be careful about elaborating these distinctions in a government document. In the Presidential statement we have emphasized the deterrent.

Does anyone have any other views?

Mr. Packard: I generally agree with what you have said. I have had some doubts about the way some of these concepts are presented in our report. I would like to take another look at the language.

Mr. Baroody: The language in the Defense report has been changed to fashion the statement of our strategy in such a way that it will not be necessary to make further revisions to cover this point.

Dr. Kissinger: Rather than phrasing the statement negatively, would it not be better to make a positive statement of what we seek to achieve in the way of deterrence and war-fighting capability?

Mr. Packard: I agree.

Adm. Moorer: War-fighting capability comes first. Deterrence stems from that capability. Deterrence is a state of mind based on the enemy's evaluation of our war-fighting capability.

Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly the point. Could you look at the language in the report with a view to taking that into account?

Mr. Packard: Okay. We have already talked about this in Defense.

Dr. Kissinger: There is one other thing I want to bring up. The Mc-Namara 2½-war

strategy seemed bloodthirsty; on the other hand, we didn't ever have the forces required to carry it out. I understand that we don't want to nail ourselves to the wall on the subject of how many wars we want to fight simultaneously. Yet I wonder about the advisability of publicly abandoning our previously stated concepts. I understand the concern about the American public's reaction to the 1½-war terminology. The public is unhappy enough with our ¼ war. On the other hand, I am concerned about how the other side would interpret our giving up the 1½-war concept. Could we avoid phrasing this in such a way that it invites misinterpretation by the other side?

Mr. Packard: We can take a look at that. I think the 1½-war concept is not a very good way of defining what we want to do. But we don't want to give the impression that we are not willing to fight if necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. I don't want to stick on figures—2½ wars, 1½ wars, 1¼ wars, or what have you. But I don't want the other side to be saying: "Since they are engaged in Vietnam, by their own definition they can't take on anything more." I am concerned that by giving up the numbers game, we may unintentionally create the wrong impression.

Is this group particularly docile today? No comments?

Adm. Moorer: One solution might be to mention the 1½-war concept this year and then next year get away from it completely. It is really not too meaningful. We could use phraseology such as "the strategy referred to last year as the 1½-war strategy".

Dr. Kissinger: It wouldn't bother me if we failed to specify the number of wars we were going to fight as long as we list the contingencies under which we expected to take action.

Adm. Moorer: In his 2½-war concept McNamara was really talking about World War III, that is, a world-wide war involving general purpose forces.

Mr. McCracken: As a layman, I am not sure I understand what some of this terminology implies. Is a war a definable unit?

Adm. Moorer: We are really talking about the areas in which we are going to fight—the Pacific, the Atlantic, etc. The half-war concept originated with the Dominican Republic intervention. I would recommend we get away from these designations.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay, but we should retain some specificity about our capabilities.

Mr. Packard: I think we need to emphasize that we have smaller but more capable forces. The increased capability is achieved by better readiness, use of reserves, and application of technology.

Mr. Baroody: In discussing deployment capabilities in the report, we talk about those for Europe, Asia, and for contingencies. We also refer to the 2½- and 1½-war concepts in

order to make a transition in terminology. We state that in the FY71 budget we decided to harmonize our strategy with our forces and that we called the result a 1½-war strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: As long as we explain our objectives in terms of capabilities, we don't have to specify the number of wars. I think Paul McCracken's question is one the non-laymen should have asked five years ago. Nevertheless, we don't want to give the impression that such a large number of semantic changes are hiding a real degradation in our readiness.

I got the impression from your presentation that you are saying that in Asia we should never use ground forces. I think that is a dangerous thing to say.

Mr. Baroody: No, that is not what we say. We specifically state that we have to maintain a capability in both Asia and Europe, but that under the Nixon Doctrine we are looking to our Allies to improve their capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger: What exactly is the total force planning concept?

Mr. Baroody: I covered that in the last three slides. Total force planning is an attempt to take into account all the tools we have available to maximize the capability of our forces to fight.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you include allied forces?

Mr. Baroody: We consider US forces separately, including the capability for augmenting them through use of reserves.

Mr. Irwin: Is the total force planning concept directed more to our reserves or to our Allies?

Mr. Baroody: In the narrow sense, it refers to US forces, including augmentation via the reserves. In the broader sense, it takes into account Free World forces.

Mr. Helms: How do you handle the problem of shifting from the draft to an all-volunteer force? Do you phase one into the other, or do you plan to continue the draft until the transition to an all-volunteer force is complete?

Mr. Baroody: In the report we set a goal of zero draft calls by July 1, 1973. However, we also list the actions that will be required in order to achieve that goal. Most of these are not under our control. We are therefore seeking to extend the draft for two years beginning July 1. Whether we can dispense with it after two years depends on how things go in Vietnam, the support we get from Congress for the all-volunteer force, and how well we are able to improve manpower accessions.

Mr. Packard: In other words, we are going to give it a good college try.

Dr. Kissinger: The next step is for the principal agencies to see the draft Defense report. Then we need to have the DPRC Working Group under Wayne Smith summarize the existing strategic guidance based on the NSDMs plus what can be distilled from the Presidential statement. Then we can get together and see if the posture statement is consistent with the existing guidance. (to Irwin) We can also eventually get a crack at your [the State Department] statement.

Mr. Irwin: I think a draft ought to be ready shortly.

Mr. Weinberger: Is it by design that there is no mention of fiscal implications in the Defense report?

Mr. Baroody: The report makes some references to this matter. The Secretary states that the proposed forces and budget levels should require no more than 7% GNP and an active force of 2.5 million.

Mr. Packard: The report will also show five-year force levels.

Mr. Baroody: But not dollars.

Mr. Weinberger: In the budget we have seen the overall totals on a five-year basis. I wonder how consistent the report is with these figures.

Mr. Baroody: The only [five-year] figure in the report is that referring to 7% GNP.

Dr. Kissinger: I think a reasonable procedure would be to get together to see what the criteria of the various NSDMs dealing with strategy are. Then if we find any gaps, the President will have to modify the existing directives or the Secretary will have to change his speech.

Mr. Irwin: Can we feed in political comments at this point?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We will need to have a separate DPRC meeting in a couple of weeks to take a look at the FY73 fiscal guidance.

Mr. Packard: Yes, we need a meeting to confirm our guidance.

Mr. Schlesinger: What is the guidance you have put out?

Mr. Packard: It is just about right.[9]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, ‘69–’73 [1 of 3]. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.

[2] Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1969–1973.

[3] Laird's 143-page draft Statement on the FY 1972 Defense Budget and FY 1972–1976 Program, February 13, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, DPRC Meeting, Defense Strategy, 2/22/71. Laird released his second annual Defense Report to Congress on March 9. The 191-page posture statement recommended a policy of "realistic deterrence." A 1½ war strategy, drawing upon annual military expenditures equal to 7 percent of GNP, would require U.S. allies to bear a greater share of the defense burden and would eventually result in the elimination of U.S. ground troops assigned to Asia by the end of the 1970s. (*Washington Post*, March 10, 1971, pp. A1, A9) See also Document 180.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 174.

[5] See footnote 13, Document 174.

[6] Not found.

[7] Laird issued his first annual defense report to Congress on February 20, 1970. The report, excerpted in the *New York Times*, emphasized the military gains made by the Soviet Union and the need to keep pace by pursuing Safeguard and other measures. (*New York Times*, February 21, 1970, p. 14)

[8] The meeting was held on December 15, 1970. For the record of the meeting, see Document 164.

[9] In a February 24 memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Helms, McCracken, and Shultz, Kissinger reiterated and detailed the conclusions reached at the DPRC meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, DPRC Meeting, Defense Strategy, 2/22/71)

178. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–3–71 Washington, February 25, 1971.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Summary Conclusions

I. The Present Status of Soviet Strategic Defenses

A. Confronted for many years with a strategic threat from the US much greater in size and complexity than that which the US faced from the USSR, the Soviets have regularly expended greater resources on strategic defense than the US. Consequently, they have deployed the most extensive and, in some respects, most modern strategic defenses in the world. This Estimate treats mainly those Soviet forces designed to defend the USSR against manned bombers and their air-to-surface missiles (ASM), against ballistic missiles, and against ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean. Briefer treatment is given to Soviet capabilities to render inoperable or destroy satellites in orbit, and to civil defense.

B. As total Soviet outlays for military and space programs grew during the 1960s by some 50 percent, the proportion devoted to strategic defense remained constant at about 15 percent. (This compares to about 15 percent for intercontinental and peripheral strategic attack, 25 percent for general purpose forces, and 45 percent for command and general support, research and development (R&D), and space programs for the decade of the 1960s as a whole.) Of the share for strategic defense, about 75 percent went to air defense, 5 percent to ballistic missile defense, and the remainder to antisubmarine warfare (ASW).[2] Expenditures for these defenses in 1970 approximated 3 billion rubles (the equivalent of about $9 billion).[3] These figures, however, represent only the cost of producing, deploying, and operating already developed weapons systems. They do not include amounts allocated to R&D, which we cannot quantify, but which are very substantial, and are especially significant in the fields of ballistic missile defense and ASW.

Air Defense

C. As a result of this effort, we estimate that the Soviets had on 1 January 1971 a strategic air defense establishment with some 3,300 ground-based radars, 3,300 interceptor aircraft, and over 10,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers at 1,200 sites. During the past few years they have introduced new automated techniques in order to control these forces more rapidly and effectively. The airborne warning and control (AWAC) aircraft, Moss, is now believed to be operational and capable of limited overwater patrols for early

warning, and probably airborne interceptor control. Their integrated systems provide excellent defense against bomber attacks at medium and high altitudes. Defense against current air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) at these altitudes is almost as good.

D. The Soviets still have not solved fully the problem of intercepting aircraft coming in at low altitudes. Soviet capabilities against aircraft flying below about 1,000 feet remain limited, although gradual improvements have continued over the past several years. For example, in the Leningrad area ground-based radars on masts probably can now provide continuous tracking of an aircraft flying as low as about 200 to 300 feet. The SA–3 has been modified to permit intercepts down to about 300 feet, and deployed more widely. Some models of the SA–2 may also now be able to intercept at altitudes as low as 300 feet in favorable locations, although 500 to 1,000 feet is a more general low-altitude limit. The Firebar interceptor aircraft can attack targets down to about 600 feet, and perhaps somewhat lower over water and flat terrain. To engage penetrating aircraft at such low altitudes with a variety of weapons, however, puts a very heavy burden on the command and control network.

Ballistic Missile Defense

E. During the past eight years the Soviets have installed a ballistic missile early warning system on the periphery of the USSR and an antiballistic missile (ABM) system around Moscow. Additional early warning radars are still under construction, and an improved ABM system is under development at Sary Shagan. The Moscow ABM system is not yet maintained at a high state of readiness. Tests of the Galosh interceptor missile show that it can attack an incoming missile either outside the earth's atmosphere at long ranges, or within the atmosphere at much shorter ranges; the use of both modes against a single target allows a two-layer defense with an improved probability of success. But the system cannot discriminate between re-entry vehicles (RVs) and decoys and chaff outside the atmosphere. Moreover, since the interceptor missile does not have very high acceleration (unlike the US Sprint), it cannot wait for the sorting of RVs and penetration aids by the atmosphere before being launched.

F. Assuming optimum conditions, our theoretical calculations indicate that the Moscow ABM system, using a two-layer defense, could at best successfully engage about 45 ICBM targets before running out of interceptor missiles. Decoys and chaff puffs would appear as valid and separate targets, and their use could rapidly exhaust the missiles on launcher. The system could handle an equal number of submarine-launched ballistic missile targets if they arrived from sectors covered by large acquisition and tracking radars. In an attack from other directions, however, such as from the western Mediterranean, the defenses would have to rely on engagement radars at the missile sites for acquisition of targets and could be saturated by a relatively light attack.[4]

G. Because of its long range, the Moscow system has an inherent capability to defend regions outside the Moscow area, but it can protect such regions with only a single layer,

and therefore quite thin, defense. This area defense would be more effective against attacks by a small third country or an accidental or unauthorized launch, as the number of targets would be small, and several interceptor missiles could be sent against one target. The ability of the Moscow system to protect Moscow and its environs from a moderate, unsophisticated attack, and its ability to defend a much larger area against a light attack, make it well suited to the National Command Authority (NCA) type of defense which has been proposed at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

H. There is ample evidence that currently deployed Soviet SAMs have not been modified to provide them with a ballistic missile defense capability. It is technically feasible, however, for the Soviets to augment their ballistic missile defense by upgrading their SA–2 and SA–5 systems for such a purpose. The marginal effectiveness of additional ballistic missile defense which would result, along with the degradation in bomber defenses that almost certainly would result, make it a very unlikely Soviet course of action. It is agreed within the Intelligence Community that even in an arms control environment, in which Soviet opportunities to deploy ABM defenses would be limited, the shortcomings of upgrading SAMs for an ABM role would be recognized by the Soviets and would discourage them from following such a course.[5]

Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines

I. During the past three years the Soviets have deployed new surface ships, submarines, and aircraft with improved sensors and weapons which represent a concerted effort to deal with the problem of detecting, identifying, locating, and destroying nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean. There is general agreement that the sonars on new surface ships and submarines represent an improved capability to detect and maintain contact on target submarines, although the degree of improvement remains debatable. (See alternative views in Section IV.)[6] The Soviets are employing two new ASW Moskva-class helicopter ships, which operate as the leaders of a task force and greatly improve their capability for surface search for submarines. New nuclear-powered attack submarines have more powerful sonars, greater speeds, and operate more quietly. Two new ASW aircraft have much greater range and load carrying capability. The Soviets are also experimenting with fixed hydroacoustic arrays and with new types of moored and air-dropped buoys.

J. Despite these improvements, the Soviets are still a long way from developing an effective defense against ballistic missile submarines operating in the open ocean. For one thing, although two Moskva-type task forces may be able to place some constraints on Polaris operations in the Mediterranean, they do not constitute a significant threat to the survivability of Polaris submarines operating there. Because of the larger areas to be searched, the capability of these task forces against Polaris submarines in the relatively unrestricted waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Norwegian and Barents Seas would be even more limited.[7]

K. Lacking an open-ocean search capability, the Soviets might employ their new submarines to detect ballistic missile submarines at vulnerable points in their mission, while they are leaving port or passing through narrow straits, for example, and trail them to their open-ocean operating areas. Such trailing tactics might be either covert or overt. But present Soviet submarines still are unable to detect and trail covertly a Polaris submarine while it is on, or en route to, station. Their noise levels are still higher than Polaris. This not only degrades the performance of their sonars but also makes it virtually impossible for them to approach close enough to a Polaris submarine to trail it with passive sonar without being detected themselves. Elimination of the problem probably would require redesign of the submarines.

L. Overt detection and trail of patrolling or transiting Polaris submarines is a more likely possibility. The speed advantage and sonar performance of the new V-class submarine are such that they may have reduced the effectiveness of present US countermeasures in breaking trail. The theoretical Soviet capability of maintaining an overt trail does not now constitute a significant threat to the survivability of the Polaris deterrent, however, since there are not enough V-class submarines to conduct such trails on a sufficient number of Polaris submarines simultaneously, and since construction of the V-class is currently at a rate of only two a year. Moreover, the problem of initial detection remains.

Antisatellite Defense

M. The deployment of an extensive space tracking network and the development of an ABM system have provided the Soviets with an antisatellite capability as a by-product. We believe that a non-nuclear intercept capability has been demonstrated and could be used at any time against selected US satellites. The Moscow ABM system as located at Moscow and at the Sary Shagan test center has the accuracy and guidance to kill satellites with non-nuclear weapons at altitudes up to about 300 nautical miles (n.m.), at slant ranges of a few hundred n.m. The system could also be used in a ballistic intercept mode against satellites up to about 450 n.m. altitude, although this might require use of a nuclear warhead. The Soviets have also demonstrated a capability to perform orbital intercepts using maneuverable satellites. In tests, wherein the target and interceptor were launched so as to be in the same plane, the interceptor maneuvered in-plane to overtake and close on the target. A fully operational system would require greater flexibility than was displayed in these tests.

II. FUTURE PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES

N. The Soviets have traditionally been preoccupied with defense and willing to expend the necessary resources for nation-wide defense in depth. The momentum of existing programs will continue for at least several years and keep the commitment to strategic defenses high. Moreover, the forces capable of mounting a nuclear attack on the USSR will continue to grow in extent and complexity, as the US brings in new systems, its NATO Allies continue to develop their nuclear armaments, and the nuclear capability of

Communist China grows. The resources devoted to strategic defense will reflect such considerations as the status of technological development, bureaucratic competition for scarce resources, and general policy aims. Of these, technological development will probably have the most influence on future capabilities.

Technological Development

O. Since World War II, strategic offensive innovations have usually exceeded the capacity of defensive technology to counter them. The resulting defense lag is most acute in two areas: that of providing sensors—radars and sonars—to detect, identify, and keep track of targets, and that of providing the computers and associated equipment needed to process the information on which defensive systems operate. For without sensors and processing equipment to pinpoint the target accurately, the task of destroying it becomes very difficult, if not impossible. The principal defensive problems being encountered by the Soviets stem from the inability of current technology to provide sufficiently effective equipment at costs which permit widespread deployment.

P. *Air Defense.* The principal continuing problem in Soviet air defense is development of an effective capability to intercept low-altitude intruders. The major problem of low-altitude air defense lies in the fact that in most of the current radars, the echoes from attacking aircraft are lost in reflections from terrain features. An airborne radar system which can look down over land, as well as over water, and see targets against the background return from the terrain, would offer significant advantages over a vast proliferation of ground radars, however improved. The Soviets are undoubtedly working on the technology for an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) with an overland look-down radar, though apparently at a slower pace than estimated several years ago. As the required capabilities have not yet been demonstrated by the Soviets, its introduction before 1976 now seems unlikely.

Q. An interceptor that would work with the AWACS, utilizing a look-down air intercept radar and missiles with radar guidance that would enable them to engage aircraft penetrating at lower altitudes, is a Soviet requirement which will probably be met in the mid- or late-1970s. Such a system could be put on a further development of the new Mach 3 Foxbat interceptor just deployed, on a new interceptor specifically developed for this role or, more likely, on both.

R. Another defense problem for the future will be that of intercepting ASMs now under development to be carried by US bombers. These nuclear-armed ASMs will not only present extremely difficult targets to Soviet air defenses, but they will also pose a saturation problem to Soviet air defense command and control systems. In order to intercept these ASMs with SAMs—there will be too many to attempt to do so with interceptor aircraft—the Soviets would have to upgrade considerably their current SAMs or deploy widely a new SAM system, or both. The modifications required to the SA–2 (if such were to be made) would include substantial changes in—or even replacement of—

the radar, shortened reaction times, and faster interceptor missiles. These modifications, incidentally, might pose a serious intelligence problem because they might be confused with those for the upgrading of SAM systems for ABM use.

S. *Antiballistic Missile*. Soviet ABM development has been limited by the capabilities of radar systems to acquire a target, to tell whether the launch unit should shoot at it, and to do this in time if there is a large number of potential incoming targets. The development of new phased-array radars should provide significant increases in target handling capabilities for a follow-on ABM system in the mid-1970s or later. We believe that the Galosh missile of the Moscow system has sufficient propulsion flexibility for use in a loiter mode, i.e., a mode in which the interceptor is launched toward the general vicinity of the incoming objects, flies at reduced thrust until the target can be identified as it enters the atmosphere, and is then directed to the target at accelerated thrust. The loiter thus utilizes atmospheric sorting of RVs, but does not require a very high acceleration interceptor missile. There is still no firm indication of Soviet development of a high acceleration Sprint-type interceptor, or that launchers and radars are being hardened, as would be required; it is therefore unlikely that such an interceptor will become operational before 1975.

T. We believe a new defensive missile system is being developed in what may be a new complex at Sary Shagan. Galosh-type interceptor missiles are being tested at one launch site within the complex. The possibility of an air defense role cannot now be ruled out. The weight of our limited evidence indicates, however, that these components will probably have a significant ABM capability and that the system is probably intended to fulfill an ABM role. The Soviets may be developing a system utilizing a two-layer defense consisting of a modified Galosh in association with a new smaller missile and new radar. It might be used to increase the effectiveness of defenses around Moscow and may lend itself to rapid deployment.

U. *Antisubmarine Warfare*. The fundamental limitation of Soviet ASW remains the difficulty of detecting a submarine in the open ocean. We expect that Soviet sonars will continue to be improved during the 1970s, and that their submarines will be made more quiet. Even with the improvements projected for the end of the decade, however, a new submarine could not gain an advantage over Polaris sufficient to give any significant probability of maintaining covert trail for an extended period. The Soviet use of long-range acoustic detection systems is now limited by geographic and hydrogeographic conditions around the periphery of the USSR. Development of remotely emplaced acoustic detection systems may enable the Soviets to overcome this limitation in the next 10 years. To do this, however, would require significant improvements in their sensors and undersea cable technology. In any event, an open-ocean search or trailing capability, utilizing acoustic means of detection, and sufficient to neutralize the on-station force of Polaris submarines, appears beyond the reach of the Soviets during the 1970s.[8]

V. But we are not so confident in our judgments with regard to non-acoustic sensor

developments. Non-acoustic methods seek to exploit thermal or electromagnetic radiation from the submarine, disturbances of the earth's magnetic field caused by the submarine, or characteristic wakes created as it passes through the ocean. There is evidence that the Soviets are seriously investigating various techniques of non-acoustic detection. But we have almost no technical information about their programs. Indeed there is much uncertainty about technical feasibilities in this field, and little basis on which to estimate with confidence the contribution that non-acoustic systems might make to the solution of Soviet ASW problems in the coming decade. If significant Soviet progress should occur, the result might be a decidedly improved Soviet system for search of the open ocean. Though we might become aware that the Soviets were detecting US submarines with unexpected success, we might not be able at first to recognize the technical means by which they were doing so. In this sense, the development might come as a technological surprise.[9] There would, of course, still remain the problem for the Soviets of incorporating these techniques into an effective counter to the US fleet ballistic missile force.

W. *Antisatellite Defense.* Efforts made thus far indicate the Soviets will have in the coming decade a tested non-nuclear antisatellite capability based upon their maneuverable satellite and ABM programs. As these two programs grow in sophistication and to the extent that additional ABMs are deployed, antisatellite capabilities will grow. A reliable capability for non-nuclear disabling of satellites up to and including synchronous altitudes (19,800 n.m.) can be expected in the late 1970s, and any widespread deployment of ABM defenses will increase the opportunities for attacking satellites in low-earth orbit. In addition, a laser system capable of producing physical damage to the film, the optical system, and other components of a satellite, could be available for use by the mid-1970s.

Strategic Alternatives

X. Developments in Soviet strategic defense forces over the next two or three years are reasonably clear, as they result from construction programs now discernible. Thereafter the alternatives open to the Soviets in the planning of their future strategic defenses become increasingly varied. A major indeterminate factor at present is the possibility of a strategic arms limitation agreement. If one is agreed upon, explicitly or tacitly, it may be limited to an agreement on ABM deployment, or it may be more comprehensive, including means for intercontinental attack as well. In these cases the Soviets might at a minimum accept mutual deterrence as a basis for strategic defense and do little more than complete current deployment programs. Without an agreement, they might continue to develop their forces at rates consistent with past trends, or they might attempt to achieve a maximum defense posture through greatly expanded deployment of improved and new air defense, ABM, and ASW systems. As between the various defensive forces concerned, they might continue to emphasize air defenses, while concentrating mainly on R&D programs in the ABM and ASW fields in a search for better solutions before deploying new systems. Or they could deploy ABM and ASW systems widely, with less

emphasis on air defense. Within each of these general courses of action a large number of strategic force developments could take place.

Y. The various uncertainties summarized above make it evident that no exact estimate of the future Soviet force structure, at least after about the end of 1972, could be defended. We have therefore constructed in Section VII of this Estimate,[10] several illustrative force models to depict selected possibilities. The first, called Force Model I, represents little more than a completion of programs presently under way; it seems unlikely the Soviets would stop at this. Another model, Force Model IV, is representative of what we believe would be a rough upper limit, short of converting to a wartime basis, especially if it were to accompany extensive deployment of intercontinental attack forces; this also appears unlikely.

Z. Between these models we have set forth two others which we consider to be more likely, but under differing conditions. Force Model II illustrates the level of effort and technical progress that might obtain if there were to be a comprehensive arms control agreement. Force Model III illustrates an approximate level of effort and of technical progress we think likely in the absence both of an arms control agreement and of a significant step-up in the arms race. But we wish to emphasize that all of these models are strictly illustrative, and not to be regarded as confident estimates or as projections for planning. As one moves beyond the next two years or so, all projections become increasingly uncertain; beyond five years they are highly speculative.

[Omitted here is the 80-page Discussion portion of the estimate.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. The table of contents, a glossary, and an annex with tables of the estimated characteristics and performance of weapon systems are not printed. The full text of this NIE, excluding the glossary and annex, is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] The forces costed under ASW are multi-missioned naval forces. For the purposes of this Estimate we have included the entire cost of these naval forces under ASW although the specific portion of their cost which is dedicated to countering the US fleet ballistic missile force cannot be distinguished from those costs incurred in acquiring their other mission capabilities. [Footnote in the original.]

[3] The dollar figures (appearing in parentheses after the rubles) are approximations of what it would cost to purchase and operate the estimated programs in the US. [Footnote in the original.]

[4] Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, the Director, National Security Agency, believes that with respect to command and control, the performance of the Moscow ABM system on its first full-scale test—when actually under ballistic missile attack—is almost certain to be well below design level. The cumulative effect of its various weaknesses suggests that the Moscow system has little capability to defend Moscow, except against a small and unsophisticated attack. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] On June 14, PFIAB sent President Nixon a "Report to the President on Soviet Strategic Defenses." The report, which bears a stamp indicating that the President saw it, endorsed the findings of NIE 11–3–71 and noted the agreement in the intelligence community that the Soviets were unlikely to attempt to upgrade air defense missiles for an ABM role. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 276, Agency Files, PFIAB, Vol. VI, Chronological File)

[6] Section IV deals with Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines.

[7] Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not agree with judgments expressed in this paragraph. For his views, see his footnote to Section IV, page 50. [Footnote in the original.]

[8] Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not agree with judgments expressed in this paragraph. For his views, see his footnote to Section IV, page 50. [Footnote in the original.]

[9] Mr. Leonard Weiss, for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, the Director, National Security Agency; and Rear Adm. Frederick J. Harlfinger, II, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; believe US investigations of ASW applications of non-acoustic phenomena have been, and continue to be, sufficient to make the likelihood of technological surprise very small. Mr. Leonard Weiss further believes that the translation of such a development into an ASW weapon system capable of neutralizing the US missile-launching submarine force would still be a major undertaking extending over a period of several years, and doubts that such a capability would come as a surprise to the US. [Footnote in the original.]

[10] Section VII is entitled Future Forces for Strategic Defense.

179. Editorial Note

The National Security Council met on March 8, 1971, in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Attendees included, among others: President Nixon; Vice President Agnew; Secretary of State Rogers; Secretary of Defense Laird; Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs; Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard; Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of Central Intelligence Helms; Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and John J. McCloy, Chairman of the President's Disarmament Committee. The meeting was primarily held to discuss the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Relevant portions of the minutes are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 137.

Helms began the meeting by briefing the NSC "on the latest intelligence on Soviet programs." Helms's notes indicate that he briefed the Council on new intelligence regarding the construction of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos "of an entirely new type" by the Soviet Union. Notes of Helms's briefing are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–31, NSC Meeting, SALT, 3/8/71. Laird had informed Nixon about this new intelligence in a March 1 memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIV)

After Helms completed his briefing, the minutes of the meeting read as follows:

"President: It's clear there's a throw weight advantage to the Soviets. In nuclear submarines of the Polaris type, they will equal the United States by 1975. In aircraft, I see we still have a three-to-one advantage.

"Laird: They have superiority in air defense.

"President: In ABM, are the Soviets ahead of us or behind us in the technology?

"Helms: They're ahead in deployment but behind us in the technology.

"Rogers: What about MIRVs?

"President: The Soviets have or have they not tested MIRV on the SS–9?

"Helms: They have tried but they have not really tested a MIRV yet successfully. [*2 lines not declassified*]

"Laird: They don't really need MIRV's as long as they're targetting our Minuteman fields. But it is clear they can get MIRV if they want.

"President: In accuracy, are we far ahead?

“Laird: We’re not sure how far ahead we are. We can’t make a claim that we are far ahead. They can acquire accuracy. They have the technology to do it.

“Helms: We are ahead in MIRV accuracy.

“Laird: But our missile systems in general are much more accurate.

“Smith: In calculating the strategic balance we have to remember our forward-based systems in Europe. They add a great deal to our capability.

“Laird: We should not believe that all our forward-based aircraft with nuclears could hit the Soviet Union. They could hit the Pact area but not necessarily the Soviets unless they’re one-way missions. The Soviets have their IRBM’s targetted on Western Europe.

“Rogers: What would the penetration capability of the forward-based aircraft be?

“Laird: Their penetration could be effective.

“Smith: We have a calculation of producing 20% casualties in the Soviet Union by an attack with the forward-based aircraft. We have to take this as a plus.

“Laird: Let’s assess the threat. We have to be a little pessimistic in our assumptions. Their new silo work is a source of concern to us. So my recommendation is we have to be tougher in the negotiations. Success depends on the *kind* of agreement we get, not just that we get an agreement. I believe we need to modify our proposals. We must allow mobile sea-based and land-based systems. Because of new information we have on the Soviet momentum on their larger systems.

“On ABM, protection of the National Command Authority is important because their attack should not reach Washington, D.C. Our proposals should allow us to decide where we want to have our system. The decision on location should be up to us; the numbers should be negotiable.

“The major Soviet concern is our ABM system. They show some concern over the forward-based aircraft and other items but most of their concern is on our ABM.

“We should not bargain on less than 250 large missiles—preferably 300.

“There is little likelihood of approval of an NCA (Washington, D.C.) ABM system.

“We should modify our proposal. This is my position. If an agreement is entered into, there should be a termination date if this is a limitation rather than a reduction. We’ll never get funding if we are talking treaty. They can do it but we can’t. No President can take action—he won’t get support.

“Moorer: Our great concern is that the potential is high for changing the strategic balance by an agreement. So we must look at it in detail. We should use the negotiations to determine the sincerity of the Soviets. There is indication that they want to build a superior position while we talk. Our ABM and forward-based aircraft are our key leverage in the negotiation. We should look at the ABM in the broader context—what is the best way of protecting our systems?

“If we start negotiations on FBS posture, that will have a major effect on NATO. It will cause serious doubt among our allies. The nuclear capability we provide has been the cohesion to keep the Alliance together.

“Packard: We should keep the overall strategic problem in mind: The Soviets have built land-based missiles in greater numbers and bigger than ours. There is no need to debate whether their accuracy can be improved; they can do it. We must therefore decide to move to control the numbers both of their large missiles and of all their missiles. They are concerned about Safeguard—but this we should use this to get control of their numbers. An agreement limiting ABM only would be a mistake.”

After discussion of SALT, the meeting continued:

“President: When we announced our Safeguard ABM program in 1969, we said there would be three criteria for its continuation: the threat, progress in arms control, and developments in technology. How is the technology progressing?

“Packard: It’s coming well. We’ve had live intercepts in the past year. The test record is very satisfactory—in fact, above average. Construction is moving. There are no problems in the radar. The problem is to get the whole system working together with the computers. For this we’ll need one full year at Grand Forks.

“President: How about progress vis-à-vis other powers than the Soviets?

“Packard: If there is a weakness, it is in the inability to deal with a large number of warheads. It’s O.K. against a few incoming missiles. It would do O.K. against the Chinese threat.

“President: Are the Soviets O.K. against the Chinese, too?

“Packard: Yes, but their effectiveness is limited to a Chinese-type threat. We have many more interceptors. Despite all the criticism, our system is better than the Soviets’ in capabilities.”

After further discussion of SALT, the meeting continued:

“[President:] We must realize—Jack McCloy understands this—that when the American people and others who rely on the credibility of the American word and on our nuclear

deterrent—when they realize that we are only the second most powerful nation, there will be a serious effect everywhere. We must refer to the facts in 'who is first.' We are a sea power and they are a land power. They have land threats, we don't. What is sufficient for them is different from what is sufficient for us.

"It is important—I say this to Mel—that we have some advantages. In our NATO strength we are better off than the Pact. We look good; they have problems on the other side. We must have adequate naval power. Despite the Soviet Navy's growth we have an enormous advantage in naval power around the world. So we can't give the impression we are Number 2. Look at Japan, Germany, the Europeans—we must not talk in terms of superiority but must say that we have enough to deter any threat and to meet all our treaty commitments. And we must be sure our naval power is not eroded."

180. Editorial Note

Secretary of Defense Laird discussed his second annual Defense Report, issued on March 9, 1971, during his weekly staff meeting held on March 8, which began immediately after he returned from the National Security Council meeting held earlier that day (see Document 179). Others in attendance at Laird's staff meeting included Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard; Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of the Navy Chafee; Chief of Naval Operations Zumwalt; Tucker, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis; Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel; and Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff. The Defense Report, the topic of the Defense Program Review Committee meeting held on February 22 (see Document 177), drew upon Laird's proposed "Strategy of Realistic Deterrence." According to the minutes of the staff meeting, Laird stated that his report "recognizes that the period of the 1970s will be different from the 1950s and 1960s. In a position of relative strategic nuclear parity we do not have the same policy options as obtained under the 'assured destruction' strategy of the 1960s and 'massive retaliation' strategy of the 1950s when we possessed nuclear superiority. This situation makes the conventional deterrent of greater importance. It puts us in a position where the public needs to get a realistic portrayal of the situation."

Laird added that the new strategy "takes into consideration what our objectives are both as regards foreign policy and military forces. The strategy then tries to apply available resources in a realistic fashion to meet these objectives. Often times in the past, we have not paid as much attention to available resources, not only in the U.S., but also in the Free World. If we do not pay attention to this, we will not be able to develop a strategy that can be credible." He later added, "We must now show we have been realistic in our approach. We have to rely on our allies. Just as we here in the United States have problems, our allies have the same sort of problems with resources. We must, however, realistically consider the total resources we can expect to plan on during the next five years."

Laird stated that it was essential that the United States "use the most imaginative and best type of initiatives to put our resources together and to do the best job in the conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear areas. Recent information on [Soviet] efforts in the strategic field has been publicized. We know they are spending two times the amount that we are in the strategic nuclear area. We now see new missile construction starts which could change the whole picture in connection with our Minuteman forces. The budget we are defending is the best one we could work out and come up with. We know it will be cut by the Congress because of the atmosphere in which we operate. We have to use gamesmanship to sell it." (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–0028, Chronological File)

181. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting[1]

Washington, March 12, 1971, 3:08–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Asia Nuclear Policy (NSSM 69)[2] and China (NSSM 106)[3]

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Under Secretary John N. Irwin
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Marshall Green[4]
Mr. James M. Wilson, Jr.
Mr. Wreatham Gathright
Mr. Leslie Brown

Defense

Mr. David Packard
Mr. Armistead I. Selden
Col. Paul Murray

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Mr. Bruce C. Clarke

JCS

Gen. William C. Westmoreland
B/Gen. Adrian St. John
B/Gen. Foster L. Smith[5]
Col. Melvin H. Johnsrud

USIA

Mr. Frank Shakespeare[6]

ACDA

Mr. Philip J. Farley
Vice Adm. John M. Lee

NSC Staff

Mr. K. Wayne Smith
Mr. John H. Holdridge
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. John C. Court
Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Senior Review Group agreed that:

1. *Asia Nuclear Policy*. A working group will be established to revise and expand the analysis contained in the NSSM 69 study[7] in the following areas:
   a) *Projection of the Chinese threat over the next decade*. What is the likely rate of growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal? How will this affect the U.S.–Chinese nuclear balance and the feasibility of employing nuclear weapons against China? What range of conventional threats could realistically be posed by China taking into account constraints that prevent China from employing the full weight of its armed forces against neighboring countries?
   b) *U.S. strategic options*. How much reliance should the U.S. place on strategic forces to counter a Chinese conventional attack? on tactical nuclear forces? To what extent does employment of tactical nuclear weapons against China imply use of strategic nuclear forces? How would employment of strategic forces against China affect SIOP capabilities?
   c) *Force levels*. What specific force levels are required to carry out the strategic options open to the U.S.? How are required levels of general purpose, tactical nuclear, and other forces related?
   d) *Basing of tactical nuclear weapons*. What is the deterrent value of forward-basing? What political factors affect deployment in specific countries?
2. *Force levels on Taiwan*. The Defense Department will provide the following information regarding U.S. forces on Taiwan:
   a) A breakdown into two categories: (1) forces required for the defense of Southeast Asia and (2) forces maintained for the defense of Southeast Asia.
   b) Alternative arrangements which might be made for basing of forces in Category 2 above.
   c) Already planned reductions in U.S. forces on Taiwan.

The SRG agreed that there was no requirement for increasing U.S. combat or non-combat forces on Taiwan.

[Omitted here are summaries of the meeting's conclusions about Chinese representation in the United Nations and a possible agreement with China to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Straits.]

Dr. Kissinger: We have two subjects to discuss today—U.S. nuclear policy in Asia and the China paper.[8] The study of U.S. nuclear policy in Asia is about a year old and is essentially a Defense Department effort. It has a very interesting analysis which, however, does not branch out into policy recommendations because of differences among the various agencies.

I would like to see if I can group the issues in such a way that we can see what problems we need to address and where we go from here. There are three different questions to be considered. First is the degree to which we should rely on strategic forces to resist Chinese conventional threats. This is affected by two factors: our assessment of the

growth of Chinese strategic forces and the strategy we propose to pursue in the event we use our strategic forces to resist a Chinese conventional attack. Second is the degree to which we want to rely on tactical nuclear weapons to counter a Chinese conventional attack. This raises the issue of the mode of employment and where and in what numbers tactical nuclear weapons should be deployed. The third question is what general purpose forces posture we want to have in the Pacific in relation to foreseeable Chinese threats.

These are the three issues I have distilled out of the study. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Packard: Yes. The first thing we have to recognize is that with China we face a different problem than with the Soviet Union. Since there is nuclear parity between us and the Soviets, we have decided to place more reliance on conventional forces. At this time parity does not exist with China. We have superiority in strategic forces, whether or not our weapons are technically called strategic or tactical weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: I recognize that the distinction is fuzzy.

Mr. Packard: Furthermore, we are not likely to be in a position to address a Chinese attack with conventional forces. This suggests that we have more reason to think about how we use our nuclear forces in Asia. They can be used for deterrence, for a possible pre-emptive attack, or for addressing a conventional attack by the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you including the use of strategic forces in ways not contemplated in Europe?

Mr. Packard: I think that we can differentiate somewhat between strategic and tactical forces. However, as long as we have bases in Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, tactical forces such as the F–111 and B–52 can be employed with what we call tactical nuclear weapons in a strategic role. We can also use strategic weapons against China. We can use bombers alone more effectively against China than against the Soviet Union. There are a number of issues involved, which are not completely unrelated to our overall strategic posture.

Dr. Kissinger: The extent we want to use nuclear weapons against a Chinese conventional attack depends on the extent of our superiority over Chinese forces over a period of time. At what point do you think China would have enough nuclear weapons to make us think twice before launching a nuclear attack? At what point will the Chinese nuclear arsenal present a problem for our use of nuclear weapons?

Mr. Packard: This is an issue we are addressing in connection with Safeguard.

Mr. Cushman: The Chinese have a handful of nuclear weapons now. Perhaps by 1975 they might have a limited first strike capability against us.

Dr. Kissinger: One problem with your analysis is that it doesn't differentiate among the

categories of Chinese weapons that are likely to appear. Also, you speak of 300 warheads but 260 weapons in 1975. Why is there this disparity?

Mr. Packard: I don't know.

Mr. Clarke: It is because Chinese nuclear weapon technology runs ahead of that for delivery systems. We think they can build weapons for which they have not yet developed missiles. They will make up the gap over time.

Mr. Kissinger: Taking the composition of the Chinese nuclear forces as specified in this study—10–25 ICBMs, 80 MRBMs and 200 bombers—would there under conditions of zero Safeguard or the conditions presently being negotiated for Safeguard be any problem about the penetration of these 10 or 20 ICBMs? I know there is an extraordinary disparity between our nuclear strength and that of the Chinese. I take it we are assuming that we use nuclear weapons against these 10–25 ICBMs and can be assured of destroying them.

Mr. Cushman: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger: Why?

Gen. Cushman: [*3 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Irwin: [*1 line not declassified*]

Gen. Cushman: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you yet have an explanation for the mounds [that have been observed]? [9]

Gen. Cushman: We think they are a tactical type of defensive system.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't believe it. Would they be building a Pentagon-size system for only six firing elements?

Mr. Clarke: They are and they have.

Dr. Kissinger: It seems implausible, but I have no better theory.

Mr. Clarke: It is difficult to figure out. The emplacements seem to be for artillery. They are not big enough to hold nuclear weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: There are six openings for artillery?

Gen. Cushman: That is all we see.

Dr. Kissinger: What does it mean?

Mr. Clarke: The evidence suggests that the mounds are integral parts of an overall thick defense against overland attack.

Dr. Kissinger: It seems a tremendous investment for that.

Mr. Clarke: They are heaping up a lot of dirt, but it is not such a tremendous investment.

Gen. Cushman: They have the manpower.

Mr. Packard: For some reasonable period of time we will be in a position to attain a pre-emptive attack against China, but the situation will be continuously changing. If we decide that this is a viable option today, it will have to be re-examined continuously.

Dr. Kissinger: With existing and projected forces would it be possible for us to use battlefield nuclear weapons without strategic weapons? In the case of the Soviets, it is possible that we could be reasonably sure about the feasibility of using tactical weapons alone because the Soviets would have reason to think they could ride out a first strike. On the other hand, with the Chinese, if nuclear weapons are used, they might think that this was only the precursor of an attack upon China. Thus, they might decide to make a first strike. It is a paradox that because the Chinese strategic force is small, we might have to make a pre-emptive strike.

Mr. Packard: That would certainly be my view. With existing force levels, we could handle such a situation. What you are up against is that if you use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield, you have to neutralize the Chinese strategic force simultaneously. At some point this will no longer be a viable strategy, but we are not there yet. I think it should be our policy now.

Dr. Kissinger: I notice that the JCS have commented that whatever is done against China should not degrade SIOP. At what point will an effort against China inevitably degrade SIOP?

Mr. Packard: SIOP is already degraded now by the targeting against China [*2½ lines not declassified*]. That way we can provide the capability we need against China with less deterioration of SIOP.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) What do you think?

Mr. Irwin: I think the projection made by you and Dave [Packard][10] is a logical military plan. What we should do depends on what comes up. [*1½ lines not declassified*] and the Vietnam war winds down.

Mr. Johnson: It all boils down to whether we envision any circumstances in which we would use tactical nuclear weapons without a pre-emptive strike. We have to remember that the equation is not China vs. the United States. The equation is China vs. our allies in

Asia. We have to consider China's neighbors—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the countries of Southeast Asia. I don't know where we come out on this.

Mr. Packard: I don't know either. However, the issue we are addressing today is whether we have the capability to do these things—not whether we should actually do them. We are able to maintain the capability [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and to back this up with a neutralizing attack against the total Chinese nuclear force. As long as we can maintain this capability, we ought to do so. We ought to be prepared so that we can have this option available.

Mr. Johnson: No one argues about maintaining the necessary capability. The question is the relationship to the level of general purpose forces in the area. Do we increase or decrease our tactical nuclear deployments as the level of general purpose forces goes down?

Mr. Packard: There is a further problem. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Irwin: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Packard: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Gen. Westmoreland: Our war games show that if the Chinese do engage in aggression, [*1½ lines not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: The Korea study[11] showed that a modernized Korean army without American support could hold ninety days against a combined Chinese and North Korean attack. How much U.S. support would be required to hold indefinitely?

Gen. Westmoreland: Eight and one-third divisions.

Mr. Johnson: This analysis assumes that the Chinese strip themselves everywhere else. You have to consider whether this is a realistic assumption. We think it is not realistic for the Chinese to remove the forces they have along the Soviet borders.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Clarke) Do you have a point?

Mr. Clarke: The Chinese are likely to launch a pre-emptive attack if they are in danger of losing their strategic force. We know that one of their test sites now has a silo. At some point the Chinese ICBM capability will be ensiloed.

Dr. Kissinger: By that time our accuracy will be such that it won't make any difference.

Don't we have any projection of how the Chinese nuclear forces will develop over the next decade?

Mr. Clarke: The current estimate gives them 10 to 20 ICBMs by 1975. There are projections up to 1980, but the spread in the estimates is fairly wide, since we don't know what the Chinese pace will be once they really get their program rolling. A conservative figure would be 100 ICBMs by 1980.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Westmoreland) You say we can't resist a full-scale Chinese conventional attack [*1½ lines not declassified*]. In Southeast Asia the assumption is that the Thais would need the support of from four to six U.S. divisions.

Gen. Westmoreland: In the present time frame we would need 8-1/3 divisions to reinforce in Korea and 7-1/3 divisions to reinforce in Southeast Asia, that is, for both Thailand and South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me work backward at this. How many fewer divisions would we need if we were to use tactical nuclear weapons? Do your war games envisage the use of tactical nuclear weapons?

Gen. Westmoreland: No. If we used tactical nuclear weapons, there would not be any substantial reinforcements required. [*1 line not declassified*] Perhaps the level would be about half of what has been war-gamed. As for Korea, if the Korean forces are modernized according to present plans [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reinforcement by four U.S. divisions would be prudent although it might not be necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: What does this indicate about general purpose forces in the Pacific for the same period?

Gen. Westmoreland: [*2½ lines not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger: For what purpose? I thought [*1 line not declassified*].

Gen. Westmoreland: If the Korean armed forces are modernized. But I also said that a four-division U.S. force would be needed in Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: Then using tactical nuclear forces would cut our general purpose forces requirements by about one half.

Gen. Westmoreland: That's a rough estimate off the top of my head. The four divisions may not be needed in Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: How do you define tactical nuclear weapons?

Gen. Westmoreland: Those that are delivered by eight-inch howitzers, Honest John rockets[12] , or tactical aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger: These would impede a deep penetration?

Gen. Westmoreland: They would blunt the enemy attack.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin and Johnson) What do you think about this?

Mr. Johnson: I have no basis to question Westy's [General West-moreland's][13] judgment. He is talking about maximum Communist Chinese involvement. The question is how realistic this assumption is.

Dr. Kissinger: Maximum Communist Chinese involvement assumes the Chinese strip themselves on all fronts.

Mr. Irwin: The paper talks of an attack by 60 divisions (25 North Korean and 35 Chinese). It says this would seriously affect the Communist Chinese capability along the Soviet border.

Mr. Johnson: I think it is proper for the JCS to postulate the extreme case. However, it is up to the political side to say whether that is a reasonable postulate.

Gen. Westmoreland: We would get a lot of warning of such an attack.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, it would not happen overnight.

Gen. Westmoreland: It would tax their transportation system. It would take them three or four months to get their troops in position.

Mr. Johnson: Then why do you say we would need to forward-deploy nuclear weapons?

Gen. Westmoreland: We would have to study the practical implications of advance warning. Forward deployment would be worth the effort because of the deterrent value if nuclear weapons are known to be on the ground.

Mr. Johnson: I think we are arguing about degrees of the same thing.

(Mr. Shakespeare joined the meeting at this point).

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose there is an attack on Korea, the strategy calls for reinforcement with four U.S. divisions, and there is a tactical nuclear option. What would you do first? Would you use tactical nuclear weapons and then reinforce with conventional forces? Or would you reinforce with conventional forces and then use tactical nuclear weapons?

Mr. Johnson: [*1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger: I assume that it is a relatively easy decision if the Chinese have stripped themselves on all their borders. Then we would have a good idea that they couldn't be held. If they did something less, then we would have a choice between using conventional

forces or tactical nuclear weapons.

Gen. Westmoreland: Yes, if the South Korean Army is modernized.

Dr. Kissinger: What forces do we believe that a prudent Chinese leader would allocate to an attack?

Gen. Westmoreland: Are you assuming that Sino-Soviet tensions continue?

Dr. Kissinger: There are 36 Soviet divisions sitting on the border.

Gen. Westmoreland: The prudent Chinese leader would commit not more than 25 divisions.

Gen. Cushman: We have to remember that the Chinese Army is also engaged in governing the provinces.

Mr. Johnson: They would keep some forces opposite Taiwan.

Gen. Westmoreland: They would certainly have some problems.

Mr. Packard: The question is what would make South Korea worth attacking.

Mr. Johnson: Why would they want to do it?

Dr. Kissinger: It would certainly trigger a reaction in Japan.

Gen. Westmoreland: The worst case assumes a Chinese-Soviet military alliance. The figures that I quoted are based on that assumption.

Dr. Kissinger: Under those circumstances we would have real problems. Soviet forces could appear on the scene. In that case our general purpose forces projections would be inadequate. A pre-emptive attack against China would not be possible. We could have the two-sided nuclear exchange in Korea about which the Admiral has talked.[14] Has this been analyzed?

Gen. Westmoreland: It probably has, but I am not aware of it.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it that in all of these studies you have postulated that Chinese-Soviet relations are sufficiently good that the Chinese have nothing to fear from the Soviets.

There are two other questions we need to address. Assuming we need tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific, where should they be based? Why should they be based forward, and how large a force would be required? Just playing the devil's advocate, I would like to ask what the advantage in the situation we are postulating here would be if the tactical nuclear weapons were located on Taiwan rather than Hawaii or Guam.

Mr. Packard: The first answer is that we would get some visibility by having the tactical nuclear weapons forward deployed. This increases the deterrent effect because we assume that the other fellow thinks that we are more likely to use nuclear weapons, especially if we have aircraft sitting there on the alert. As far as delivery time is concerned, we could use carriers; [*3 lines not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that State takes a different view on political grounds.

Mr. Johnson: [*4 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Packard: I generally concur in your view. [*1 line not declassified*] However, the JCS disagrees.

Gen. Westmoreland: That's right.

Mr. Johnson: [*1 line not declassified*]

General Westmoreland: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Packard: Another factor to be considered is the Korean sensitivity about [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Packard) Is it correct that you are considering [*less than 1 line not declassified*]?

Mr. Packard: [*1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger: I thought the increase was several orders of magnitude.

Gen. Westmoreland: [*1 line not declassified*] The plan goes to the Secretary of Defense for decision next week.

Mr. Irwin: This is what gives us problems.

Mr. Packard: Here is what I am recommending. [*6 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Irwin: We have no problems [*1½ lines not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: Particularly in view of the issue we discussed the other day [getting GRC acquiescence in a change in U.S. policy on Chinese representation in the UN].[15]

I thought at first that we would have a NSC discussion on our nuclear policy in Asia. However, what would be helpful now would be to prepare an analysis similar to that which we did for NATO. It could relate levels of general purpose, tactical nuclear, and other forces. Obviously, we cannot tell the military the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] but we can make a judgment that deployment in certain countries would be preferable in

the light of political factors. We can also reach some conclusions on what emphasis should be placed on various types of forces.

Why don't I get in touch with Dave Packard about getting a working group set up? The JCS can devote some attention to analyzing the relationship between GPF and tactical nuclear requirements. CIA can take another look at the projections on the composition of the Chinese threat. Then we can have a NSC meeting.[16]

[The meeting concluded with discussion, omitted here, of issues relevant to NSSM 106.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes (Originals), 1971 [5 of 6]. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A memorandum for the recored of this meeting, prepared in the Department of Defense, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 108.

[2] Document 42.

[3] NSSM 106, which inaugurated a review of U.S. policy toward China on November 19, 1970, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 97.

[4] Not present at the beginning of the meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] Not present at the beginning of the meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

[6] Not present at the beginning of the meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

[7] An Interagency Group, including representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, CIA, and JCS, completed its response to NSSM 69 on May 14, 1970. The 69-page paper included an Introduction and the following sections: Factors Influencing U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia, Alternative Uses of U.S. Strategic Nuclear Capability Against China, U.S. Theater Nuclear Capability in the Pacific, Alternative Postures and Basing Arrangements, Nuclear Assurances, Nuclear Proliferation, Communications Requirements, and Issues for Decision. Packard forwarded the report on June 30 to Kissinger under a covering memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–161, NSSM 69) See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 108, footnote 3.

[8] A reference to the NSSM 106 response.

[9] See footnote 5, Document 153. Brackets in the original.

[10] Brackets in the original.

[11] An apparent reference to NSSM 34, entitled "Contingency Planning for Korea." The NSSM and the response to it are published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, Documents 4 and 26.

[12] The Honest John M31 was a long-range artillery rocket capable of carrying an atomic or conventional high explosive warhead. It was first deployed in 1954 and, after the introduction of the Honest John M50 in 1961, it was classified obsolete in 1982.

[13] Brackets in the original.

[14] Not further identified.

[15] Brackets in the original.

[16] In a March 30 memorandum addressed to Richardson, Packard, Helms, Shultz, McCracken, and Moorer, Kissinger instructed that additional analysis pertinent to NSSM 69 be developed to include an estimate of the Chinese military threat, U.S. strategic options and their associated overall force requirements, U.S. theater nuclear options, and U.S. general purpose force options in Asia. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–161, NSSM 69)

182. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, March 17, 1971, 3:23–4:34 p.m.

SUBJECT

Strategic Forces Survivability

PARTICIPATION

Chairman
Henry A. Kissinger

State
Under Secretary John N. Irwin
Mr. Ron Spiers
Mr. Seymour Weiss
Mr. Lee Sloss

Defense
Mr. David Packard
Mr. Gardiner Tucker

CIA
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Bruce Clarke

ACDA
Mr. Philip J. Farley
Vice Admiral John M. Lee

JCS
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
Rear Admiral Robert O. Welander

OMB
Mr. George P. Shultz
Mr. Caspar Weinberger
Mr. James Schlesinger

OST
Dr. Edward David

NSC Staff
Mr. Wayne K. Smith
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Lt. Col. Jack N. Merritt
Mr. Barry Carter
Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A further meeting of the DPRC will be scheduled to discuss the objectives of Triad, the

relationship between U.S. strategic forces and objectives, and the issues involved in employing U.S. strategic forces in support of allies.

To assist in DPRC consideration of these topics, the DPRC Working Group will prepare a table setting forth the various assessments of the developing strategic threat, the counter-measures which could be employed against these threats, and the lead-times required to develop such counter-measures.

A review of SIOP by a restricted inter-agency group will be scheduled within two weeks.

Dr. Kissinger: When we were going through the SALT question, we didn't have a chance for an adequate discussion of the survivability issue. I wanted to have a DPRC meeting to see where we stand on this question and to find out what is the basis for the differences of opinion that have developed. We also need to develop some framework for relating the growing vulnerability, if it exists, to remedial measures. I have noticed that many of the threats are being dismissed by citing what we *can* do, but in fact we *aren't* doing anything [to carry out remedial measures].

I have a number of questions I want to ask. However, I think it might be well to proceed as we did at yesterday's [WSAG] meeting.[2] To surface the issues, we will have one point of view presented. Gardiner Tucker or Dave Packard can lay out the views which led them to circulate their paper countering the net assessment paper.[3] Then we can hear a counter-argument and have some discussion.

Mr. Tucker: In considering vulnerability, we are talking about three elements of our strategic forces: Minuteman, bombers, and submarines. Particularly with regard to the first two there is not much disagreement about what is technically possible [in the way of a threat], but there is disagreement about the likelihood that some of the potential threats would develop and how serious the implications would be for us if they did develop.

With Minuteman there is good agreement about the threat that exists today. If the Soviets attack with SS–9s and SS–11s, they could destroy 200–400 launchers. There is further general agreement about the technical capability of the USSR to improve the SS–9 by giving it a six-MIRV capability in the next few years and by providing it with a 0.25-nautical-mile accuracy some time within the next few years.

With the current booster capacity of the SS–9 and .25 n.m. accuracy, a six-MIRV missile would kill a hard target. They would need higher accuracy in order to go beyond six-MIRVs. Thus, the next plateau for the Soviet threat would be six MIRVs plus 0.25 n.m. accuracy.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't understand the relationship between boost and accuracy.

Mr. Tucker: With a given accuracy you need at least a certain yield in each RV in order to have a good probability of killing a hard target. The number of RVs you can load depends on boost.

Dr. Kissinger: Then accuracy is not dependent on boost, but the number of warheads *is* dependent on boost. If the Soviets need a war-head of a certain yield, the maximum that can be put on the SS–9 is six.

Mr. Packard: That is not quite it. The point is that with six war-heads you have to have 0.25 n.m. accuracy in order to be effective.

Under Secretary Irwin: How difficult is it to increase boost?

Mr. Packard: It's a big job. The SS–9 is already a big missile. You would need to make the diameter or length much larger or find a more effective fuel.

Under Secretary Irwin: Generally speaking is it more difficult to improve CEP or boost?

Mr. Packard: It is easier to increase boost. You just make the missile bigger. However, the economics of such a step are costly.

Admiral Moorer: The number of RVs is determined by the force of the rocket.

Mr. Tucker: There is general agreement that the Soviets can achieve a plateau of six MIRVs and 0.25 n.m. between 1974 and 1976. Once achieved, they could deploy at a rapid rate, say, about 60 missiles per year. Whether they *would* do that is a different question.

Mr. Packard: Can we be sure of Minuteman in that situation?

Mr. Tucker: If the Soviets in 1974 have six MIRVs with 0.25 n.m. accuracy on the SS–9, they could kill 700 Minutemen by 1976.

Dr. Kissinger: No one has yet seen a six-MIRV warhead. How quickly could they deploy it after testing?

Mr. Packard: To put this in context, our Minuteman III has shown an accuracy of [*3 lines not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Packard: I don't know.

Dr. Kissinger: [*Less than 1 line not declassified*] Wouldn't it be a hard target killer?

Mr. Packard: The difficulty is that you have to dump them simultaneously.

Admiral Moorer: Of the three, one would hit closer than the others.

Mr. Packard: You would get a statistical improvement. We have made an estimate that with Polaris you could get [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: [*1½ lines not declassified*].

Mr. Tucker: Within a fraction of a second.

Dr. Kissinger: They would have to be released nearly simultaneously in order to get the same CEP.

Admiral Moorer: (to Mr. Tucker) Don't they have to follow the same trajectory?

Mr. Tucker: Yes.

Dr. David: Having all your warheads explode [on the same target] is not an effective way to increase kill.

Mr. Schlesinger: Do we have any estimate of the bias that may exist for Minuteman III as compared to Minuteman I and II?

Mr. Packard: I am not sure. They only point here is that this technology is within reach of the Russians. They could do it, too, if they wanted.

Dr. Kissinger: The OSD paper assumes that, without a strategic arms limitation agreement, there would be 90 Minuteman survivors after a Soviet strike in 1974, and 34, in 1977. The inter-agency paper puts the figure at 270 for 1974 and 50 for 1977. With a strategic arms limitation agreement, the OSD paper says there will be 190 survivors in 1974 while the inter-agency paper puts the figure at 700. Since everyone uses the same data, what is the reason for the difference in survivability estimates? What is the assumption underlying the OSD conclusion?

Mr. Tucker: The difference is not one of technical analysis. It rests on assumptions about what things the Soviets *will* do of those that they *can* do.

Mr. Farley: Such as how hard they will work at improving accuracy.

Mr. Packard: There are three questions: whether they will achieve improved accuracy, whether we should postulate a Soviet missile with three RVs (which they are now testing) or six, and when they would be likely to achieve either of these two improvements. This affects the number of Minuteman survivors.

Dr. Kissinger: No one has observed an SS–9 accuracy better than 0.4 n.m.

Mr. Packard: There is a little debate on that. Some suggest that the Soviet accuracy is

better.

Dr. David: Dick Latter did a statistical analysis[4] that showed the accuracy was better.

Dr. Kissinger: How can you measure accuracy if you don't know what they are aiming at?

Dr. David: In order to conclude that Soviet accuracy was better, Latter had to assume that some of the observed firings were out of the range; that is, they were failures.

Dr. Kissinger: Do your findings assume independent targeting?

Mr. Packard: Yes. The three or six RVs would have to be independently targeted.

Dr. Kissinger: Your papers assume the Soviets will equip their missiles with three or six MIRVs?

Mr. Tucker: That's right. Six MIRVs, 0.25 n.m. accuracy, with the SS–9.

Dr. Kissinger: The NIE[5] doesn't give them that.

There are two questions. One is Soviet capabilities. The other is the time frame in which they might exercise those capabilities. As I understand it, Dick Helms questions both the capability and the time frame postulated in the OSD paper. CIA questions whether the Soviets can put six MIRV's on the SS–9 by 1974 even if they do improve their accuracy.

Mr. Helms: That is quite correct.

Dr. Kissinger: Where do you differ from Ed David?

Mr. Bruce Clarke: The intelligence community does not accept Dave Latter's examination of the problem. The current judgment is that the Soviet missiles have 0.4–0.7 n.m. CEP in all mods now being tested. The likely figure is 0.5 n.m. There are some differences about whether they can refine their accuracy beyond 0.25 n.m.

Dr. Kissinger: Ed [David] says they already have 0.25 n.m.

Dr. David: It is important to understand that Dick Latter gives them this accuracy only by throwing out certain observations.

Mr. Packard: I don't think it matters where it is 0.4, 0.5, or 0.25. They don't have 3-RV missiles that are that accurate, and they don't have six-RV missiles at all. I can agree with CIA that it is unlikely they could make these improvements by 1974. I think they could do it if they wanted.

Dr. Kissinger: How will we know if they are doing it?

Mr. Packard: We can observe their testing.

Mr. Helms: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] we are not going to miss many tests.

Dr. Kissinger: First the Soviets have to improve the SS–9 with a single warhead to give it an accuracy of 0.25 n.m. All agree that they can do this. Next they have to attain an independent firing capability with that accuracy for three or six warheads. CIA questions that they have any independent targeting capability now.

Mr. Tucker: This is today. There is considerable agreement about what they can attain.

Dr. Kissinger: If they attain an accuracy of 0.25 n.m. with a single-warhead missile, is it a foregone conclusion that they can get the same accuracy with independently targeted warheads?

Mr. Tucker: There is a real question that they can do this with the system we have seen tested. The question is whether they can introduce a better system.

Mr. Packard: Both Minuteman III and Poseidon have better accuracy than the previous single-warhead missiles.

Mr. Schlesinger: They would need a new guidance system and new RVs. We have not observed that they are developing these today. Once developed, they would have to get them into production. These would be major problems. A force in being could be well off into the 1970's.

Mr. Helms: This is under optimum conditions.

Dr. Kissinger: As regards improved accuracy, the major difference is that OSD believes the Soviets can attain it by 1974, while the inter-agency study suggests 1976.

Mr. Helms: That is correct.

Dr. Kissinger: The same is true with regard to the time required for developing missiles with three or six warheads.

Mr. Tucker: I think we have about covered the threat to Minuteman. There is not much difference of opinion that whenever these improvements come, they would reduce the number of Minuteman survivors to 100–200.

Dr. Kissinger: They will also have to improve the accuracy of the SS–11 greatly.

Mr. Tucker: Another question concerns the survivability index. The figure of 300 about which we are talking is a canonical number. It comes from the calculation that 300 Minuteman missiles properly targeted would still be able to achieve our assured

destruction objectives: 25% of Soviet population and 45% of Soviet industry. A deeper question is the strategic desirability of having Minuteman, which is vulnerable.

Dr. Kissinger: When you give these survivability figures—for example, 90—in your report, do you mean a total of 90 survivors, or 90 plus 300?

Mr. Tucker: Ninety only.

As for bombers, the threat to them comes from SLBMs fired from Y-class submarines. We have observed that so far Soviet SLBMs have been flown on minimum energy trajectories. This means they take a longer time to reach target than would be technically possible if they were fired in a depressed trajectory. The depressed trajectory would sacrifice range in order to reduce delivery time. We have not seen the SLBMs fired in a depressed trajectory, but it is a technically feasible option.

If the Soviets use their present firing mode and bring 15 to 20 Y class submarines within 300 miles of the coast, they still can't hurt the B–52s; but if they change to a depressed trajectory using SS–N–6 missiles, they could decrease arrival time from 10–12 minutes to 6–8 minutes and destroy 50% of our bomber force with present bases. If they used the SS–NX–8 in this mode, they could cut warning time to six minutes and eliminate 80% of our bomber force as presently deployed.

Once again, we are discussing improvements that are technically feasible for the Soviets but which have not yet been demonstrated. The question is when these improvements might come to pass. There are a number of things we can do to protect our bombers. We can re-base them and can take various steps to improve take-off time, such as installing improved engines and speeding up alert procedures.

Mr. Packard: We also have the airborne alert option.

Mr. Tucker: That is very expensive. It is only a short-range solution.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we take these counter-measures in a time-frame that is relevant to the threat?

Mr. Packard: These measures can be implemented fairly quickly. We are already making the base changes.

Dr. Kissinger: Why would we not re-base the planes anyway?

Mr. Packard: We are looking at what we can do. But it costs money.

Admiral Moorer: At what range did you say the submarines would stand off the coast?

Mr. Tucker: 300 miles. It would be possible to postulate a closer position. The reason for

not doing so is that they can't separate the RVs early in the trajectory. If they solve that problem, they could come in closer. This would mean a zero warning time for us along the coast.

Admiral Moorer: Did you postulate 20 submarines?

Mr. Tucker: 10–20 submarines.

Mr. Packard: There are two problems. They have to get 15–18 submarines within 300 miles of the coast. That is difficult because of the protection provided by our navy. If they do get in that close, they have to neutralize Minuteman some way. If they fire the SS–9 at Minuteman first, we can get our bombers off the ground. If they attack the bombers first, we can launch Minuteman.

[*4 lines not declassified*] All of this would be quite complicated for the Soviets to do.

Mr. Schlesinger: The Russians would have to know the vulnerability of our warheads to EMP and have assurance as well that all aspects of the complicated attack would go properly.

Mr. Packard: When you add up all the things that would have to go right for the Soviets in order for them to take out both Minuteman and the bombers, it seems a questionable proposition.

Mr. Tucker: The next question is the capability of our bombers to penetrate Soviet air defenses. There is general agreement that there is a lot of uncertainty on this score. We don't know much about the threat or how well our systems work. There is a Soviet defensive system like our AWACS. It is technologically possible that an improved Soviet threat against our present bomber force could reduce penetration considerably, perhaps down to 20%. Once again we have available countermeasures, such as airborne attack missiles. Whether we take these counter-measures depends on how badly we need them. They are expensive.

Another issue is submarine survivability. This is difficult to evaluate because the threats are less specific. Survivability depends more on tactics, that is, on the ability to escape detection, than on specific calculations of CEP. We have not identified any current threat to the submarines while they are at sea. (55% of the force is customarily at sea.) One or two submarines might be killed in a pre-planned attack, and it is possible that a war of attrition could result in the destruction of more over time. However, this is not a very likely possibility. We have identified a potential threat on the basis of what we now have in R&D. The Soviets could develop such a threat. Nevertheless, we have also identified a number of counter-measures, and the economic advantage in all of this is in our favor.

Nevertheless, this is a rich and diffuse field compared to what is involved in threat estimation for the other two arms of the Triad. We cannot with real confidence predict

that no serious threat to submarines will develop in the latter part of the 1970's. We would have a limited period of time in which to develop counter-measures.

Admiral Moorer: We operate our submarines in places where the Soviets don't operate ASW forces. To get a complete threat estimate you must combine technical and operational capabilities. If the Soviets launch ASAs or ASVs, we could degrade this. We have a free ride as far as covering the Soviets with our ASW force is concerned. I don't see the Soviets' protecting their submarines 300 miles off our coast. Whether we sink their ASW ships is a political, not a military problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think we would do it. Just as we would not use the ten-minute warning time available to us. If a bomb exploded in Omaha, we would first try to assure that it was not one of our own. You don't go to general nuclear war in ten minutes. Under any realistic scenario, we would not make use of the ten minutes.

Admiral Moorer: I agree. What you are saying emphasizes the importance of assuring the survivability of our retaliatory force and command and control facilities.

Dr. Kissinger: With regard to the argument that a lot of things would have to go right for the Soviets to launch a successful attack on us, I believe this is correct. However, in an acute crisis they might nevertheless decide to launch an attack. Much depends on what the weaker side will think about how far it can push a confrontation.

Mr. Tucker: One last observation. Since command and control is such a difficult subject, we have not thrashed it out nearly enough. The main area of disagreement around town is what the significance is of having this much vulnerability.

Dr. Kissinger: I have one other factual question. Leaving aside the question of determining a useful criterion [for survivability], what about the steps that could be taken to increase the capability of surviving Minuteman missiles by facilitating shifts in targeting? Do we have a program for the Mark 18 warhead?

Admiral Moorer: No. It was stopped.

Mr. Packard: The situation is really much worse than that. We calculate that each element of the Triad should by itself have an assured destruction capability. The point is that with 300 survivors, we don't have the slightest idea where the 300 Minuteman would be targeted or what they should do.

We have two or three issues that need discussing. One is command and control and how it can be improved.

A second is how to improve the effectiveness of our present force through more careful targeting. We also need to make sure that targeting is consistent with our theory.

Dr. Kissinger: We also need to know what we want Triad to do.

To sum up our discussion so far, everybody agrees on the consequences of probable technical developments that could increase the threat. The disagreement is about the time frame in which these developments would become operational.

We do not yet have any evidence about the potential accuracy of a Soviet MIRV. We are projecting our own technology into an assessment of possible Soviet technology.

Dr. David: That is not quite right. There are actual estimates of MRV accuracy with the SS–9. These have been observed.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the accuracy?

Dr. David: Dick Latter says 0.25 n.m. Here we are saying 0.4–0.7 n.m. Those figures do apply to multiple warheads.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the accuracy for an MRV the same as for a single warhead?

Mr. Clarke: Yes, this is essentially the accuracy of the SS–9 system. Shifting to MRVs gets into the problem of dispersion.

Dr. Kissinger: The differences on the estimated accuracy of the SS–9 are from 0.25 to 0.5 n.m. All agree that the Soviets can eventually attain an accuracy of 0.25 n.m. As for a potential MIRV, we don't know about that. We haven't seen any tests. We have to assume, as Dave Packard says, that if they develop MIRV it will be more accurate than their single-warhead missiles.

Against hard targets is a single or multiple warhead better?

Mr. Helms: Under optimum conditions three warheads are better than one.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we assume that MRV without independent targeting could make Minuteman vulnerable?

Mr. Tucker: Yes. The MRV can be pre-set to go after the pattern of the Minuteman field.

In my previous discussion of the threat against Minuteman, I was assuming independent targeting.

Mr. Irwin: If it is MRV we are talking about rather than MRV, does that change the estimates of when the threat will develop?

Mr. Packard: Yes. They have MRV now. Thus, they could make this operational for the SS–9 more quickly.

Mr. Schlesinger: If the Soviets were to have 900 RVs plus increased reliability, we would have to go to 1500 RVs.

Dr. Kissinger: So much for missiles. I am just trying to identify the differences that exist. Defense is operating with the high threat, while CIA is using the probable threat. Are there any differences about the penetration capabilities of our bombers? Does everybody agree on this?

Dr. David: This is almost as hard to evaluate as the threat against submarines.

Mr. Packard: There is no hard evidence. There are some indications that the bomber capabilities will continue for a long time. The bombers have to be considered a one-mission force. Thus, losses up to 30–40% are acceptable.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two problems with bombers: their vulnerability on the field and the deployment by the other side of an air defense against a friendly low-level threat. A strategic arms limitation agreement will not affect the Soviet ability to deploy SAMs.

Mr. Irwin: When you speak of bomber survivability, how much effect on targeting do you anticipate there would be [at the postulated survivability level]?

Mr. Packard: Let me point out two or three facts about bombers. First, they can be protected by using decoys and electronic countermeasures, which generate confusion in the enemy radars. The low-level tactics we are now talking about can overcome almost any current SAM. No SAM is good at an altitude of 200 feet. One reason we want the B–1 is that low-altitude flying is hard on the B–52. Another possible tactic is to use missiles to destroy certain sites and then have follow-on waves of bombers. In my opinion a hell of a lot of bombers will be able to get through for a long time yet.

Mr. Weinberger: How does the B–1 compare in performance to the B–52?

Mr. Packard: It will take low-level flight better, it is somewhat faster, and it presents a low radar cross-section.

Admiral Moorer: Also it will be twenty years newer.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we get in tabular form the various assessments of the developing threat and the counter-measures that would have to be taken to defend against them? Such a table should set forth the relationship between the time when we must take counter-measures and the development of the threat.

With this information we will have some criterion to use when decisions come up on matters like SALT. Can we get this done by the Working Group? The information we have can be refined by CIA and by Gardiner Tucker's people.

I want to raise a number of conceptual questions. What is it that we want Triad to do? As I understand it, each element is by itself supposed to be capable of assured destruction. Therefore, in considering vulnerability, do we believe the whole force is vulnerable if one element of Triad is incapacitated? Why is this supposed to be so? Does our targeting reflect this?

A second issue is to find a way to bring the various strategic forces and objectives into some sort of relationship. We need to plan our strategic forces to serve the various criteria: assured destruction, crisis stability, etc.

A third question concerns the relation of our strategic forces to the support of our allies. Presumably, under certain conditions we would make the assumption that an attack on our allies without an attack on the U.S. may trigger some or all our retaliatory force. In that case, assured destruction is not our only criterion. This could be guaranteed suicide.

Finally there is the whole problem of targeting. How can improvements be made? We need improved command and control procedures, as well as better retargeting capability. For example, if 80% of our targeting is against Soviet strategic forces and we have almost no retargeting capability, we may be shooting at empty holes. Perhaps we should take up targeting in a smaller group.

Mr. Packard: I think a smaller group would be advisable.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we can do it in a smaller group. The first three issues I have mentioned should be raised again in this group once we have the factual analysis. I would like to schedule a meeting within a reasonable period of time. Can we have a threat chart by that time? (to Mr. Farley) Does anything that has been said here give you any pain?

Mr. Farley: No. I have one observation on the first of the issues you raised. We have thought of Minuteman survivability in terms of Minuteman alone. We could get bombers on alert even with the problem of Minuteman survivability.

Mr. Irwin: As for the question what Triad should do, has there in the past been any exact philosophy on this?

Dr. Kissinger: The present philosophy is that each arm alone should be capable of assured destruction. On the basis of this scenario we find that Poseidon by itself can achieve assured destruction and that there is no plausible threat to Poseidon throughout the 1970's.

Admiral Moorer: The idea behind Triad is to give credibility to the deterrent. NSDM 16[6] states that we should "maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces" and that we should also "maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike

the United States first in a crisis". Triad just provides added insurance.

Mr. Packard: It just makes the other fellow's job a lot more complicated.

Dr. Kissinger: If we are only worried about the primary retaliatory role of our strategic forces as set forth in NSDM 16, we could be sure that Poseidon would fulfill that role through the 1970's. However, if we are concerned about crisis stability, Poseidon is not enough.

Admiral Moorer: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: There are other figures that could be used to measure survivability. The estimate that 300 Minuteman survivors were required for assured destruction was devised during the days of single warheads. I don't know whether it has been re-analyzed in terms of multiple warheads and of possible revisions in targeting. These are issues that require analysis. Targeting can be taken care of in a smaller group.

Admiral Moorer: Would you like to have a briefing on targeting?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Perhaps we could arrange it in a couple of weeks.

Mr. Farley: There are other arbitrary figures in our strategic planning. For example, defining assured destruction as killing 25% of the Soviet population.

Dr. Kissinger: We want to look at this. I also have another question. I would hate to have the President in the position where his only option was to kill 25% of the Russian population when he knew full well that they would then kill 50% of the American population.

Mr. Tucker: We also have to consider the damage-limiting criterion of NSDM 16.

Dr. Kissinger: My list was not exhaustive.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, '69–'73 [1 of 3]. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets except those that indicate omitted material are in the original. Kissinger approved the minutes, according to a March 25 covering memorandum from Jeanne Davis to Kissinger. Wayne Smith advised Kissinger that the purpose of the meeting was "to clearly identify for the DPRC the issues surrounding the conflicting assessments of the survivability and effectiveness of strategic forces." (Undated memorandum; ibid., Box H–101, DPRC Meeting, 3–17–71)

[2] The Washington Special Actions Group devoted its March 16 meeting to intelligence on supply of North Vietnam. The record of the meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations,*

1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 154.

[3] An apparent reference to a February 25 Defense Department paper entitled "Major Strategic Programs and Policy Issues in Relation to SALT" that took a pessimistic view of long-term Minuteman survivability under an arms control agreement. The summary of the paper concluded that the SALT proposal established on July 31, 1970, in NSDM 74 and put forward by the United States on August 4 "would not constrain Soviet MIRVs and missile accuracy and, therefore, would not fully curtail the threat to Minuteman. The August 4 proposal would also ban the means of providing for long-term survivability of U.S. land-based ICBMs and thus would place this survivability in Soviet hands." The DPRC Working Group submitted another study of the issue, entitled "Net Assessment Paper on Survivability Issues in SALT," on March 1, 1971. The 46-page paper included seven sections: The Issue, The Triad, Survivability of Strategic Bombers and SSBNs, Implications of the August 4 Proposal, Modifications of the August 4 Proposal, Finite-Time Agreements, and No SALT Agreement. It states that there were two possibilities for Minuteman survivability under SALT: one in which "at least 300 Minuteman would survive a Soviet first strike" into the 1980s and another in which only "about 120 and possibly 240 Minuteman would survive through 1980, declining to 40–60 survivors by 1982." NSDM 74 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 100. Both papers are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, DPRC Meeting, Strategic Forces Survivability, 3/17/71.

[4] Not further identified.

[5] Document 160.

[6] Document 39.

183. Editorial Note

President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed the Soviet Union's strategic defense capabilities during a conversation held in the Oval Office on April 21, 1971. While discussing various negotiating options to limit strategic offensive and defensive weapons, Nixon agreed with Kissinger's comment that the "trouble" with defensive systems "is that they're not very good." Kissinger explained, "they will not be good enough to stop a fully coordinated first strike." Yet, if a side "has a very good defensive system and launches a first strike and then catches what's coming back with its defenses—I don't think the Russians, no matter how good their defenses, could keep us from getting through if we attacked first. But if all they had to worry about was our second strike, which would be ragged, uncoordinated, and small after they had launched a first strike, then their defense could be very effective. If we go first we will have about 4,000 warheads. If we go second, we're lucky to have 400." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 484–13)

184. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, April 26, 1971, 2:15–3:51 p.m.

SUBJECT

DOD Strategy and Fiscal Guidance

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Under Secretary John N. Irwin
Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Thomas Pickering
Mr. Seymour Weiss
Mr. Leslie Brown

CIA

Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Bruce Clarke

JCS

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
Maj. Gen. Richard Shaefer

DOD

Mr. David Packard
Mr. Robert Moot
Dr. Gardiner L. Tucker

ACDA

Mr. Philip Farley
Vice Admiral John M. Lee

CEA

Mr. Paul McCracken

OST

Dr. Edward David

OMB

Mr. George P. Shultz
Mr. Caspar Weinberger
Mr. James Schlesinger

NSC Staff

Mr. K. Wayne Smith
Mr. John Court
Lt. Cdr. John A. Knubel
Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

1. Work should proceed immediately under the auspices of the DPRC on the identification and preparation of major policy issues related to the FY 73 Defense budget for consideration by the NSC and decision by the President. This work should be related to ongoing studies, including the DPRC strategic forces review and the studies requested by NSSM 69[2] and NSDM 95.[3]
2. Pending the NSC policy review referred to in Paragraph 1, definitive status cannot be accorded to elements of the Defense Department interim strategy guidance that are inconsistent with Presidential policy.
3. In connection with the NSC review, special attention should be given to the problems posed by increasing Defense costs and the resultant requirement for trade-offs involving force size, modernization, and readiness.
4. OMB will provide by early June illustrative data on alternative tradeoffs between domestic and defense spending levels.
5. Special precautions must be taken to insure against leaks of the interim policy guidance, particularly the portion dealing with Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we might begin by having George Shultz tell us what the fiscal problems are.[4] Then we can have a briefing from Defense.

Mr. Shultz: The budget picture as we see it now is that in FY 71 we are likely to have a deficit of more than $19 billion. Nevertheless, we think outlays will be held barely within full-employment revenues. For FY 72 we now project being in the red by somewhat over $15 billion. Congress has already carried us $3.5 billion over full employment revenue. This means a big struggle is ahead. The President said he would veto the accelerated public works bill. A budget battle is shaping up.

In FY 73, we assumed a Defense budget of $79.6 billion. (I take it that is the figure you fellows in the Defense Department have generated.) We have also assumed that we will just be carrying on the programs projected in the President's budget. We see a full employment deficit of $6.5 billion. This is a very contingent kind of figure. Congress has hardly started work on the FY 72 budget. What work Congress has done has had the effect of increasing the budget.

The President has had three balanced full employment budgets including FY 71, and we think the FY 71 balance will hold. For FY 72 it will be more difficult to hold a full employment balance, but if it doesn't hold, it will not be our fault. I would be very much surprised if the President were willing to send up a budget that was out of balance at full employment. Therefore, you have to start with the premise that the budget submitted will be in balance at full employment.

From our standpoint, we are trying, in the process of the spring budget review, to get as good a line as we can on the various elements that must go into the FY 73 budget. In early

June we hope to have the first approximate reading on what the budget will look like. Then we can have a discussion with the President during the latter part of June and get his thinking on the basic decisions underlying the budget. These will correspond to the decisions made last July on the FY 72 budget. Those decisions turned out to be quite operative throughout the budget process.

One option that ought to be put in front of the President is a budget in balance at full employment with the current tax system. You can say this is not a feasible option. Full employment revenues under the current tax system are now estimated at $245 billion, but Congress is adding on outlays almost as fast as receipts. Nevertheless, this represents at least one option.

From what I hear about the Defense budget, the possibility of having budget higher than the current full employment revenue is certainly a possibility we will have to entertain. This would have to include a tax boost.

Dr. Kissinger: Would the tax increase have to pass next year?

Mr. Shultz: Yes, so as to be effective in FY 73. I am not saying we should rule out a budget above current full employment revenues, but everybody should have his eyes open about the implications. We have to have before the summer of 1972 something that people running for office can support.

As we have pondered the Defense budget process, it has seemed to us that the practice of having many decisions come late in the game is disruptive to the planning process. It is desirable to make these decisions as early as we can. At the same time, it is difficult to make them early. This counsels having a degree of flexibility, so that we can make effective decisions.

Everything must be related to what happens with the FY 72 budget. We know how desirable it is to have a posture of fighting for the President's budget the way it is. We won't know until June what the House mark-up on the FY 72 budget will be.

Thus, from an overall standpoint, the budgetary picture is very indefinite unless we are willing to go for a major tax increase. An element of flexibility in our approach is highly desirable.

Finally, our basic idea is to have the money produced for the kind of defense establishment that is in keeping with the strategy we have settled upon. The constraints we face are yours and ours. We share them.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we now get Defense's projections? Then we can have some discussion of what these imply and can see if we can meet some of George's [Shultz's] concerns.

Dr. Tucker: (Dr. Tucker briefed from a series of charts.)[5] I first want to show what our

planning cycle looks like. The internal Defense planning cycle involves three steps: issuance of the fiscal and strategy guidance, program decisions, and assembly of the FY 73 budget. The starting point is a summary of the decisions made as a result of last year's planning cycle.

The first step in the planning cycle for FY 73 has just been taken. We have issued guidance to the services for planning.[6] The services then have to come back with proposals, which the Secretary reviews.

Dr. Kissinger: Where does the President come in?

Dr. Tucker: He dominates the whole thing. The guidance issued this year is different in several respects from what we have had previously. It includes issues that are still up for decision in the DPRC or review by the President. It is, however, just interim guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: That is my question. What is the status of this proposal that we will have no conventional forces for wars in Asia after 1977?

Mr. Packard: It is just interim guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: If this strategy leaks, we will have a foreign policy problem. The President has to decide this.

Mr. Irwin: If this is just interim guidance, I hope the DPRC Working Group will have an opportunity to look at it.

Admiral Moorer: This [the strategy and fiscal guidance] has only been out since Thursday [April 22]. The Chiefs haven't reviewed it.

Dr. Kissinger: I am really worried about leaks. This would be a major change in our policy. (to Mr. Johnson) Don't you think so?

Mr. Johnson: There is no question about it.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn't there some way this can be handled prior to the time a decision is made so that the likelihood of a leak is reduced?

Dr. Tucker: It is classified top secret and labelled interim.

Mr. Packard: The only way to make sure is to keep it off a piece of paper.

Dr. Kissinger: Couldn't you call it a working paper?

Mr. Packard: It doesn't make any difference what you call it.

Mr. Johnson: There is a lot of dynamite in this as far as Asia is concerned, particularly as

regards [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: You could express the policy contained in this as being based [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Johnson: We have to have a discussion of this. This has to be resolved by the President.

Dr. Kissinger: And by the NSC. This is a profound national issue. If it kicks around and becomes part of a public debate before the NSC can act, we will have a real problem.

It is out now as interim guidance?

Dr. Tucker: Yes.

To continue with the briefing, three processes start now that the fiscal guidance has been issued. First, some internal clean-up takes place; the Joint Staff have to comment. Second, the service force planning starts. And third, the guidance goes to the DPRC for review and selection of the issues that should go to the NSC and the President for resolution.

This is different from last year in that the guidance provided to the services is more explicit and that the services and the Joint Staff in their replies are to provide not only programs but to submit an analysis of capability, rationale, and risk. During the next two months the services and the Joint Staff will be preparing their responses. The Chiefs will propose force structure, and the services will draw up programs. All of these inputs will be received by late June or early July. Then we can conduct a review and make decisions on program issues. By then we will have DPRC and NSC decisions to crank in.

Mr. Packard: (to Mr. Shultz) George, that is when we can come down more firmly on a final [budget] figure.

Dr. Tucker: This is consistent with your schedule.

Mr. Shultz: At that date we will need to have options that we can give to the President.

Mr. Weinberger: Will there be room for changes if, for example, the President decides to change the policy you are proposing in Asia?

Dr. Tucker: In practice, such decisions would have to be ground in this region (indicates on chart).

Mr. Shultz: Can't you get something out earlier in June?

Dr. Tucker: We will have some information available when we receive the Joint Forces

Memorandum. But we will still need to have more data.

To get back to the briefing, after the program decisions are made, the services come back in thirty days with programs. Then we make the budget estimates, and this is followed by two months of working with OMB on scrubbing the budget. We come out with a final budget that is almost always lower than what we initially proposed.

Mr. Johnson: Then it is between July 14 and August 31 that the NSC and the President will need to make decisions.

Mr. Irwin: No, they can be made from now on.

Dr. Kissinger: The conceptual decisions can be made right away. However, there will be no figures much before July 28. We need to start right now to obtain the foreign policy and arms control decisions. If the President decides against a policy of no ground forces in Asia or if he decides to redefine strategic sufficiency in a certain way, he doesn't have to wait until June 28.

Mr. Packard: Most decisions don't affect the whole budget. We can get on with our planning in the meantime.

Dr. Tucker: There is a very important calibration point. This could be stated as the kind of strategy that we could support with a certain kind of forces with reasonable risk and within the fiscal guidance. We find out here (indicates on chart) whether a given force will implement a given strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: All we will know on July 14 is that we can afford a strategy that is laid out within our budget.

Dr. Tucker: This strategy is less demanding than others [that might be considered], but even with this strategy we are straining.

Dr. Kissinger: However, this is not the only less demanding strategy that we can conceive.

Dr. Tucker: We have underway reviews of NATO strategy and forces, strategy and forces in Asia, and theater nuclear forces.

Mr. Irwin: How do you anticipate that the results of these studies (for example, in such matters as combat/support ratios) will be ground into Defense Department planning?

Dr. Tucker: The program decisions would reflect these factors. We asked the services to do the studies in the hope that the results of the studies would be reflected in the programs which the services recommend.

Mr. Irwin: Can this type of decision have much impact on force make-up?

Mr. Packard: It all gets down to three variables: manpower levels, readiness, and modernization programs. Thus, you can change the number of people you have and the proportion of active to reserve forces. You can modify your reserve and thus affect readiness.

Mr. Irwin: If you change the number of support troops per division, does that give us a real budgetary option?

Admiral Moorer: One other factor which affects what we can do should also be mentioned. That is enemy capabilities. This is not a flexible element.

(Mr. Shultz left the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Tucker: Let's take a look at comparative program levels. If you take out fixed costs, such as retirement pay and the Vietnam war, what remains is the discretionary budget area to which the fiscal guidance applies. However, we have further instructed the services not to make any changes in the dollar value of strategic programs because of SALT and the upcoming DPRC review. We have told them to leave out intelligence and security, which are being handled in other channels, and to omit support to other nations. We know that we may have to increase support and that the services naturally tend to cut it in order to have more money for their own activities.

Now let's look at the relationship between manpower and improvement. Under the current five-year plan, we are figuring on 2.37 million people. To keep our modernization program, we would have to cut that to 2.27 million. On the other hand, if we wanted to maintain the manpower level, we would have to cut modernization expenditures by 12%. A part of our outlay is determined by obligations from prior years. Only 25% is subject to decisions in FY 73.

It we were to keep manpower at the five-year program level, we would have to cut modernization to 50%. If we take out 100,000 men, the modernization program could go up to 80% of the planned level.

We asked the services to give us a quick illustrative estimate of the forces that would ft the fiscal guidance. We asked them to do this on the basis of two alternative assumptions: that we keep force levels intact or that we keep modernization intact. To keep modernization intact, we would have to cut these forces indicated here [on the chart].

Dr. Kissinger: For three army divisions, you would be getting 211 attack helicopters, 34 surface-to-air batteries and 87,000 anti-tank missiles. Is that the only trade-off possible?

Dr. Tucker: This is illustrative of two extreme. We would not necessarily end up with this.

Admiral Moorer: You should put emphasis on that word "illustrative". The last time we did this, the illustrative figures wound up in the budget.

Dr. Tucker: Here are some of the trade-offs. (indicates on chart)

Mr. Packard: The Army wants to make things look bad so they will not have to give up anything.

Dr. Tucker: This accumulates over five years. This is what you would have in FY 77 if you paid for it over a five-year period. The Army says we can't pay for it if we sustain 3-1/2 divisions over this period.

Dr. Kissinger: This certainly shows that materiel is going up in cost. We may price ourselves out of the market both as regards men and equipment. The same sort of argument [on manpower vs. modernization trade-off] can be made for the Navy and the Air Force. If the Navy sacrifices two carriers and 19 other ships, they can have ten high speed nuclear submarines. If the Air Force cuts 1073 tactical aircraft, they can get 324 new fighters. These are sombre projections.

Mr. Packard: It is a severe problem. For instance, if you get a nuclear carrier, you not only have the cost of the carrier but also of the F–14s that go on it and that cost twice as much as the old carrier aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to get a study on this explosion in defense costs.[7]

Mr. Packard: Of course, you have to consider that the new equipment usually has more capability than the old. So you are getting more for your money.

Mr. Johnson: What about capability in a limited war situation? These weapons have more capability against the Soviets, but do they contribute much to our limited war capability?

Mr. Packard: All of this has some effect on everything.

Dr. Kissinger: It also means that losses are more costly.

Admiral Moorer: This is the result of a combination of inflation plus technology.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Packard) Are there any trade-offs that would be effective in Southeast Asia. I know that Henry [Kissinger] is interested in this question, too.

Mr. Packard: We have a missile called the Condor which can hit a bullseye at 50 miles. If we had had this missile at the time we were bombing North Vietnam, we could have done more damage with no pilot loss and less damage to civilians at about 2% of what the bombing actually cost.

You can't go on just money costs alone. We are making some increases in capability.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's at least note that this is a problem.

Dr. Tucker: Remember that in the NSSM 84 study[8] we found that the big problem was the tank/anti-tank imbalance. This is what we are trying to remedy by developing these anti-tank weapons.

(to Mr. Johnson) Alex, to answer your question, our first priority is NATO and we design our forces to meet NATO requirements. We then design them to meet our lesser priorities.

Mr. Packard: The real option is manpower versus capability. We need manpower.

Mr. Irwin: Is there any possibility we could take this out of support rather than combat forces?

Dr. Tucker: That is the purpose of the [NATO] study.

Mr. Irwin: This again raises the question of the desirability of the all-volunteer army. Maybe we should look at that again.

Mr. Packard: The all-volunteer army is consistent with our guidance.

Dr. Tucker: This next chart shows our reinforcement capability. That is what we can mobilize and deploy by M + 90. The effects of maintaining force levels or programmed modernization are shown.

Admiral Moorer: The FYDP [Five Year Defense Program] doesn't necessarily reflect our requirements; it shows planned capabilities.

Dr. Tucker: Now we can take up the policy and strategy statements.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we ought to discuss strategy before we get into the fiscal statement. As I understand it, you define the sufficiency criteria to mean that we must be able to meet these criteria after a nuclear exchange with China. For that reason as well as because of SALT, you are against any cuts in strategic forces. (It would be interesting to see if we could find a projection that would require an increase in strategic forces.) You are planning to withdraw the second U.S. division from Korea in FY 73.

Dr. Tucker: It probably will be FY 74.

Dr. Kissinger: You make the assumption that no ground forces will be used for non-CPR threats after 1973 and that after 1977 no ground forces will be used against any threat. Our planning relies instead on Japanese naval and air forces and on our tactical nuclear weapons. This means we should rely on strategic deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons to restrict the level of conflict in Asia. These are assumptions that the NSC will have to discuss. This is bound to have the most profound consequences on our relations with Asia. Even if you can demonstrate by systems analysis that the Asian countries have a

marginal capability to defend themselves, we have to consider whether they would want to do so, given the level of support they can expect from us.

If Japan drives as hard a bargain on rearmament as on textiles, we may find that this [proposed Asia policy] is difficult to achieve. The ideas the Japanese have about their military role may not dovetail so neatly with ours, and there is also the question of whether the countries to be defended are willing to accept Japanese protection.

Mr. Weinberger: There is a tremendous divergence between the strategic guidance and existing policy.

Dr. Tucker: This column (indicates on chart) gives the view of the Joint Staff on what our proper strategy ought to be. This is the military's view of what is realistic.

Mr. Weinberger: Is it realistic to ask for strategic guidance that would mean taking away our capability to limit damage to the U.S. from a nuclear attack?

Mr. Packard: We have never had that capability.

Dr. Tucker: Even with the full Safeguard program, we won't have that capability.

Mr. Packard: There are only two ways to achieve such a capability. One is to have a first strike capability to neutralize the Soviet strategic force. The other is to have a suitable defensive force. We don't have either.

Dr. Tucker: The only way to defend our population is to deter a nuclear attack.

Dr. Kissinger: You say we do not have the forces to protect our population, but you also say that we do have the forces to deter China. That is not consistent. If we have some damage-limiting capability, we force an enemy either to go all out or not to attack at all.

Dr. Tucker: That is the argument for Safeguard.

Mr. Packard: What we are saying is that with these force levels, we will have to put more reliance on nuclear weapons in Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: How can we say at one and the same time that we have no damage-limiting capability and that we can deter a Chinese attack?

Mr. Schlesinger: This is the policy on China that is enshrined in NSDM 16.[9]

Admiral Moorer: We are not capable of preventing damage, but that is not the same thing as having no capability to limit damage. If the public thought we had no capability to reduce damage to the U.S., they would be upset.

Mr. McCracken: What do we mean by a damage-limiting capability? What is a significant limitation?

Admiral Moorer: When the phrase was first coined, it meant that we had a first-strike pre-emptive option. It used to be called counter-force.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Dr. Tucker) Your doctrine is an honest attempt to fit our concepts to the forces we have rather than to babble about what we don't have.

Admiral Moorer: We used to have a policy that there would in no case be a first attack by the U.S.

What we should do is decide what our policy is going to be and then devise a strategy to carry it out.

Mr. McCracken: I agree that we ought to articulate our policy and then set our strategy.

Dr. Tucker: We are trying to get consistency between our force structure and our strategic and fiscal guidance. We want to find out that we can carry out a given strategy within established fiscal guidelines with a specified risk. We will know what this is in July. Meanwhile, we have to consider what our strategy should be.

Admiral Moorer: I come back to the point that we don't have total flexibility because of the opposition.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to get this interim guidance out of circulation. Can't we find a way to deal with this before it leaks in the newspapers?

Dr. Tucker: We will never get a valid assessment of the guidance unless we get the views of all the people who are concerned.

Dr. Kissinger: If this were the British Government, I might not worry. This [damage-limiting capability] is the sort of issue that only experts and arms controllers understand. But the NATO issues could have a major impact.

Mr. Johnson: I am trying to think of another word we could use to describe the guidance. Perhaps working paper.

Mr. Irwin: Hasn't this been distributed too widely to pull back?

Mr. Johnson: That term "interim guidance" has too definitive a ring to it.

Mr. McCracken: One sure way to protect it would be to mark it "for immediate release."

Dr. Kissinger: How about putting out an alternative strategy? Then this just becomes one of several.

Dr. Tucker: It wouldn't be a very good cover unless we asked our people to prepare plans to carry out the alternative guidance, and that would just compound the chaos.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not get out a paper that puts out some alternatives?

Dr. Tucker: We could summarize the DPRC material and send it to all addressees.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem is that term "interim guidance" plus the fact that this is the only guidance extant.

Mr. Packard: We will take a look and see what we can do.

Mr. Irwin: I am interested in the rest of the budget outside the defense area. If we cut $2.4 billion from the defense budget, how would it relate to the rest of the budget?

Mr. Weinberger: In the FY 73 budget, we are including what we are now doing plus Presidential initiatives already made. Just with this, we need $16.5 billion more. There are a lot of items in the budget that are uncontrollable or close to uncontrollable. In order to have a margin to make reductions in domestic, non-defense items, we would have to cut down on income maintenance programs or abandon some of the President's initiatives.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn't there a little air in this?

Mr. Weinberger: No. There is only one way to keep a budget under control and that is to leave the agencies with no doubt that there are any more funds available. If they think there is some slack in the budget, they will increase their requests.

Mr. Irwin: If we get through 1972–73, is a tax increase a possibility?

Mr. Weinberger: It is an option. I don't think it would be acceptable in January 1972.

Mr. Irwin: But in 1973?

Mr. McCracken: Then you are talking about FY 74.

Dr. Tucker: (to Mr. Weinberger) For FY 72 will you be spending at the full employment level?

Mr. Weinberger: We plan to spend the amount of revenue that would be brought in if we were at full employment.

Mr. McCracken: Gardiner's [Tucker's] point is that certain program expenditures would go down if we reached full employment.

Mr. Weinberger: We have taken that into account.

Dr. Kissinger: When we did the NSSM 3 study,[10] we laid out on a chart various levels of defense and domestic expenditures. (to Mr. Weinberger) Could you do that for us in connection with this exercise? This group can't judge these issues, but they need to be laid out.

Mr. Johnson: After seventy years of having ground forces in Asia, we are going to make a decision to have no ground forces in the area. The President needs to see what the trade-offs involved are.

Mr. Weinberger: Last year we gave him early in August four bands of possible reductions in expenditures on domestic programs.

Dr. Kissinger: If you could give us this information [on domestic/defense trade-offs] in early June, it would be helpful.

Mr. Weinberger: All right. The problem is that we need reductions in both defense and domestic programs in order to balance the budget at full employment. Cutting domestic programs will generate a good deal of political heat.

Mr. McCracken: A tax increase to balance the budget will also produce political heat.

Dr. Kissinger: Aren't we doing a study on strategic forces?[11]

Mr. Smith: We have a major study that will integrate all the previous ones. It will be ready by June.

(Mr. McCracken left the meeting.)

Mr. Irwin: If we can somehow get through 1973 with a sufficient balance of forces and modernization ...

Mr. Weinberger: As regards modernization, there is another way of approaching this and that is to increase the productivity of the defense establishment.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Dr. Tucker) Can you get us a model showing an illustrative mix of modernization and force levels?

Dr. Tucker: I think we need to see what the services come up with. I would hate to do it until then.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. I am not going to insist on it.

From now on we have to give top attention in this group to the doctrinal aspects of the interim guidance so that we can put the issues before the NSC. This group can't make the decisions; they have to go to the NSC. (to Dr. Tucker) This has made a major contribution

to helping us visualize the issues.

The Asian strategy has to be protected. We cannot let that leak as interim guidance.

Mr. Packard: We will continue our planning on the basis of the fiscal guidance and will work to clarify the strategic guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: The Asia proposal has to be wrapped up in such a way that it is not the only guidance.

Mr. Johnson: Can we get the DPRC Working Group involved?

Mr. Smith: We have the strategic forces study which is due in June. The NSSM 69 study on Asia strategy and policy is already underway.[12]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, '69–'73 [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets except those that indicate omitted material are in the original. In an April 23 memorandum, Wayne Smith informed Kissinger that the meeting's purpose was to review Defense Department fiscal and strategic guidance and the economic outlook for FY 1973 and beyond. Smith advised Kissinger that his goal "should be to ensure that our strategic plans are not changed by Secretary Laird without any Presidential consideration of the issues involved and that the President is presented with a full range of alternative DOD budgets for his consideration" later that year. (Ibid., Box H–102, DPRC Meeting, Strategic and Fiscal Planning, 4/26/71)

[2] Document 42. Regarding the NSSM 69 response, see Document 181.

[3] NSDM 95, entitled "US Strategy and Forces for NATO," November 25, 1970, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

[4] Kissinger and Shultz discussed the meeting over the telephone the morning of April 26. According to the transcript of the conversation, Kissinger told Shultz that if the Defense budget went below $79.6 billion, "I want you to hear where we will be." Shultz assured Kissinger that he shared the goal of having a strong national defense, but that he was concerned about the overall budget picture, which was likely to put "a squeeze on Defense budget this year." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[5] Not found.

[6] Laird issued the "Planning and Programming Guidance for the FY 73–77 Defense Program" to the service secretaries and the Chairman of the JCS under a covering memorandum on April 21. The Guidance consisted of seven enclosures: Interim Defense Policy Guidance, Interim Forces and Resource Planning Guidance, Fiscal Guidance, Forces and Activity Levels for Southeast Asia, Materiel Support Planning Guidance,

Outline of Guidance for POM Preparation, and Subjects for Selected Analysis. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–102, DPRC Meeting, Strategic and Fiscal Planning, 4/26/71)

[7] On March 25, Wayne Smith sent Kissinger two studies about "the problem of cost escalation in weapons systems since World War II" and "the increasing costs of manpower." Kissinger wrote "Excellent" and "What can we do?" on Smith's covering memorandum. He instructed Smith to draft a memorandum for the President "if you can think of a remedy." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 238, Agency Files, DOD Budget)

[8] NSSM 84, entitled "U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO," November 21, 1969, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI*, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

[9] Document 39.

[10] Document 45.

[11] An apparent reference to NSSM 64, Document 41.

[12] On April 28, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Helms, Shultz, McCracken, and Moorer calling for additional studies: an analysis of the "major strategy and policy issues involved for immediate Presidential consideration;" the development of "two alternative DOD programs for the FY 73–77 period;" and an evaluation of the "economic, diplomatic, and strategic implications of these alternative DOD budgetary levels and mixes." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, 1971)

185. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 14, 1971.

SUBJECT
Military Manpower and the Congress

Congress has or may shortly enact a number of measures that will adversely affect our military capabilities and the foreign policies dependent upon them.

The Congressional Problem

As you know, the Administration's military manpower program, including the all-volunteer package, was passed by the House with only one significant change—the provision of about $1.2 billion more in pay increases than you requested.[2] However, the Senate is now considering a number of significant modifications, including:

—*A one-year limit to the draft extension*. The two-year extension passed the House by only a two vote margin and it may not survive on the floor in the Senate.[3]
—*A substantial reduction in U.S. forces in Europe*. Senator Mansfield has introduced a resolution calling for a ceiling of 150,000 on U.S. forces in Europe. If passed, this would mean cutting our forces there by 50 percent.[4]
—*An across-the-board reduction in manpower levels*. The Senate Armed Services Committee has reported out a 56,000 man year reduction in average FY 1972 force levels with a 50,000 man cut in the Army alone.

At this moment, however, the only serious manpower measure that seems certain to pass is the across-the-board reduction in our manpower levels approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Apparently, its justification was that:

—Given the planned withdrawals from Vietnam, many believed this cut did not represent a net reduction in our planned forces. In fact, it does since the forces we plan to withdraw would not be disbanded.
—Senator Stennis believed that a reduction in overall manpower levels by his Committee was essential to get the Administration's program approved by the Senate without either a one-year extension or cuts in Europe.

Regardless of this reasoning, however, *you should realize that even this apparently small reduction in our manpower will have important effects on our military capabilities*.

—To reduce its FY 72 strength by 50,000 man *years*, the Army will have to reduce its planned strengths in June 1972 by as much as 80,000 men.
—To accommodate this manpower reduction, our combat forces may have to be reduced by as much as two full divisions with their support. *This could result in a U.S. ground force of only 11 divisions compared to the 16 divisions we had in 1964 and the 13 now planned for FY 1973*. A smaller one division reduction in our combat force would be possible with greater reduction in support and non-divisional forces.

A reduction in our ground combat forces of this magnitude would have very serious strategic repercussions:

—It would severely limit our ability to carry out an initial conventional defense of Western Europe against a Warsaw Pact attack unless we received prior warning and reacted immediately to it. There will be no margin for error.
—It would greatly reduce our present capability to assist our Allies in Asia without substantial drawdowns in the forces committed to NATO.

Unless you are prepared to make major revisions in strategy, *I believe that it is critical to preserve the capability of our ground forces at about currently-planned levels. Defeat of the Senate's 50,000 man reduction is essential to that end*. This will not be easy since:

—*Senator Stennis apparently believes that this reduction is the best we can do in the Senate*. In turn, he is probably correct that a one-year extension *or* a substantial cut in Europe would be even more injurious than the across-the-board reduction already approved.
—*Secretary Laird and the JCS probably do not now plan to fight the reduction*. Besides agreeing with Stennis' political judgment, Secretary Laird may believe that this reduction is beneficial since it is consistent with his strategy proposal that we not support our Asian Allies with ground forces after 1975.[5] While the Air Force and Navy were not substantially reduced, and, therefore, have few objections to the Senate action. General Westmoreland is, I understand, strongly opposed to such a cut in capabilities.

In my opinion, the first essential step toward preserving our ground force capabilities is to ensure that the Administration takes a strong and unified stand against the Senate reduction. To start this process, I have prepared a memorandum to Secretary Laird (Tab A)[6] that:

—Points out your concern that our ground forces are now at a relatively low level.
—Enlists his active support in defeating this reduction or any other Senate action that will seriously reduce our ground force capability below planned levels.
—Asks him to investigate alternative ways in which the impact of manpower reductions could be lessened, such as spreading them more evenly among the Services or reducing support rather than combat forces.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 320, Subject Files, Draft Reform—1971. Top Secret. Sent for action. A stamped note on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen." Wayne Smith forwarded the memorandum on May 12 to Kissinger.

[2] On April 1, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution (H.R.) 6531, which approved a two-year extension of the military draft. The full Congress passed the military draft bill (P.L. 92–129) on September 21. In addition to extending the draft for two years, through June 30, 1973, the legislation authorized pay raises and improved benefits for armed service personnel totaling $2.4 billion a year and created a national lottery call that replaced the local board quota system of selecting draftees. (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. XXVII (1971), pp. 257–296)

[3] Nixon discussed the two-year draft extension during a May 11 telephone conversation with Haig. The transcript of the conversation reads in part as follows:

[President:] "Let's have a little gab fest on this, or a reassessment of the Volunteer Army thing. It may be that it won't float, but at any rate, we've got to get a two-year extension.

"Haig: Oh yes. If we don't have the two-year draft, you won't ever get the all-volunteer. We have been working intensively on this. We've got the picture on where everyone stands. There are about 10 or 12 floaters.

"President: I think we better have the NSC make another study on the Volunteer Army thing.

"Haig: It's difficult because of the way—

"President: But even with it [the Vietnam conflict] over it may not float. But maybe … of course with high unemployment maybe it will be better. It's tough to get people into the service, even though it gives a lot of people good lives." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons—1971)

[4] On May 11, Mansfield introduced an amendment to the military draft extension bill (H.R. 6531) that sought to impose a limit of 150,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe. The Senate defeated the amendment by a 36–61 vote on May 19.

[5] See Document 184.

[6] Attached but not printed is a draft memorandum from Nixon to Laird informing him that the force reductions recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee "would

almost certainly affect our capability to meet our responsibilities and treaty commitments in both Europe and Asia." Nixon signed the memorandum on May 24 and sent it to Laird instructing him to "lead an Administration-wide effort aimed at preventing any substantial reduction by the Congress in the levels of our ground force capabilities." A copy of the memorandum was sent to Moorer.

186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 31, 1971.

SUBJECT
Memorandum from Secretary Laird on New Soviet ICBM Silo Construction

Secretary Laird has sent you a memorandum expressing his concern over the new Soviet ICBM construction (Tab A). He reiterates some of the information with which you are already familiar.[2] Secretary Laird concludes that this construction "could have significant implications" for our weapons developments and SALT. Since Secretary Laird's brief memorandum deals only with new ICBM silos, I am providing below a summary of major recent developments in Soviet strategic forces.

I. ICBMs

A. *New Silos*. Satellite reconnaissance has revealed construction of a current total of 59 confirmed or probable and 9 suspected new missile silos at operational complexes. Of these 68 confirmed or suspected silos, 44 are at complexes where the SS–11 is now deployed and 24 are at SS–9 complexes.[3]

B. *Test Center Activity*. The latest photography indicates that the construction is not only at or near old SS–9 testing areas, but also SS–11 testing areas. Additionally, silo lining segments of two difference diameters have been observed; [*number not declassified*] in the SS–9 area and [*number not declassified*] in the SS–11 area.

Additionally, soft launch pads heretofore used exclusively for SS–9 R&D are being modified extensively.

C. *Type of Missile Involved*. Reasonable possibilities are:

—The Soviets are hardening silos for the SS–9 and SS–11. The extensive work at Tyuratam, even at the soft pads, suggests that there is at least a new variant of the SS–9, possibly with a MIRV warhead, in the works, which can be put in the SS–9-sized silos.

—The silos are intended for two new missile systems, one about the size of the SS–9 and the other about the size of the SS–11.

II. ABMs

A. *Moscow System*. Construction activity has resumed at two incomplete and previously abandoned ABM launch sites. One site faces the Mediterranean and the other faces China. There are suggestions of a new type radar at one of these sites. The Soviets have also begun construction on a second large ABM radar at the Chekhov site near Moscow. The new radar is oriented toward China.[4]

B. *Test Center Activity*. Work at the Sary Shagan test range clearly indicates follow-on modifications of the Moscow ABM system are under development.
—Try Add radar capabilities are being significantly improved by the addition of a phased-array antenna.
—A new, larger, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] ABM missile booster has been tested five times.

Also, a new ABM system is being developed at another complex at Sary Shagan. The Soviets are apparently developing a new, smaller interceptor than the Galosh and have erected an entirely new type of radar. A hardened ABM facility also being constructed nearby may be part of this same system. This new system may be intended to intercept incoming warheads at short range within the atmosphere.

If the new radar functions independently of large, long-range acquisition and tracking radars, it might be constructed and made operational (without hardening) in as little as six months. *If this is the case, it would sharply reduce the lead time we would have to react to a sudden Soviet ABM buildup.*

Conclusion

It is too early to state with confidence the full nature, extent and purposes of these recent new developments in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weaponry. Part of the motivation may be to keep pressure on SALT and part may be to gain a strategic advantage. In any case, there is no doubt that Soviet strategic forces are being qualitatively and quantitatively upgraded to as yet undetermined higher levels and capabilities.

Tab A

Washington, April 16, 1971.

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[5]

SUBJECT
Soviet ICBM Silo Construction

I continue to be concerned about the magnitude and evident urgency of the new Soviet silo construction program as revealed by recent satellite photography.[6]

The basis for my concern is simply the fact that there are now as many as 50 new missile silos under simultaneous construction in the Soviet Union. This total, which more than doubled our earlier count of the new sites, could and probably will go higher, as study of the latest mission is still underway at CIA and DIA, and as all potential construction areas were not covered by the latest mission. Of particular significance is the identification of at

least 30 confirmed and probable silos under construction at a single operational complex in Western Russia. All apparently were started since last August.

Although the missile for which the new silos are intended cannot be determined at this time, they could be for a large new ICBM or a highly modified SS–9. In any event, the new silo is designed to accommodate a large system.

The timing of this construction suggests that a decision, some time last summer, resulted in a slow down or suspension of construction at some of the SS–9 silos, and probably called for the major new silo construction program which we are now observing. This program is marked by unique construction and deployment techniques, as well as concurrent efforts at six operational complexes at least, and at one area at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Center.

From the preliminary examination of satellite photography now underway, it is evident that we are witnessing a major new Soviet ICBM silo construction program which, if followed through, could have significant implications for our own weapons development programs as well as the ongoing SALT negotiations.

Melvin R. Laird

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIV. Top Secret; [*codewords not declassified*]. Sent for information.

[2] On April 15, Helms sent Nixon the "President's Quarterly Report on Soviet Strategic Forces." The 9–page report is marked to indicate that the President saw it. Kissinger summarized the report in a May 4 memorandum to Nixon, which the President also saw. Kissinger drew Nixon's attention to recent intelligence about some 56 confirmed or suspected new Soviet missile silos started since October 1970. According to Kissinger, speculation was that the new silos "may be for a new and as yet untested ICBM or for a modified version of the SS–9." (Ibid., Box 429, Backchannel, President's Quarterly Report —Soviet Strategic Forces)

[3] Ray Cline, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, sent Rogers a memorandum on May 14 on the subject of "Implications of New Soviet ICBM Deployment." Cline stated: "The Soviet ICBM deployment recently entered a new phase with the initiation of construction of a new phase type of silo at seven deployed missile complexes." He added: "If the new missile is large, as now expected, it is likely to be a follow-on to the SS–9. We can expect the Soviets to try to provide it with increased range capabilities over the SS–9, improved accuracy and a new reentry system. We can also expect that the Soviets will try to develop a new reentry system with true MIRV capabilities and that this might lead eventually to a hard-target destruction capability. If these postulations prove correct, it will be this new system rather than the SS–9 which

will be central to future strategic arms limitation discussions." (Ibid., Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIV)

[4] Nixon circled the word "China" both times it appeared in this paragraph and wrote "note" above the first instance.

[5] Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*].

[6] Laird sent Nixon a memorandum on March 1 expressing concern about recent evidence indicating that the Soviet Union was constructing "a new type of silo at three known ICBM complexes." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII)

187. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[1]

Washington, July 16, 1971.

SUBJECT
Fiscal Year 1973 Defense Spending

We are continuing the critical review of the programs submitted by the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Fiscal Years 1973–77. On the basis of detailed earlier analysis, I had asked them to develop programs at a $79.6 billion level for FY 73. Although we will not complete a thorough assessment of the latest Service and JCS submissions until September, my preliminary review strongly suggests that the $79.6 billion level will not be adequate to support sufficiently your foreign policy objectives. I currently believe we shall need Defense outlays in the range of $82 to $83 billion in FY 1973.

My concern over the adequacy of the $79.6 billion funding level is derived in part from some of the specific force reductions the Services have proposed to take in order to bring their programs within the prescribed fiscal level, and in part from the judgments the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs have made about the capabilities of the proposed resultant forces.

An FY 73 Defense Budget of $79.6 billion would result in reductions from current Defense force plans such as:

- Reducing budgeted military strength by 225,000 from end FY 72 to FY 73.
- Reducing the strength of Marine infantry battalions by 25 percent.
- Reducing the active Army baseline strength another 1/3 division, plus a separate brigade and the support units needed to sustain a division in combat.
- Reducing the tactical sorties capability per aircraft 20 percent to save on crews and maintenance.
- Reducing Naval combat ships committed to NATO for availability on short notice (category A) from about 200 to 155.
- Retiring the amphibious lift ships needed to deploy one Marine brigade—a reduction of 25 percent in our amphibious lift capability.
- Reducing total Naval ships from 660 to 540.

The Services' and JCS comments, in addition, contend—based on a $79.6 billion FY 73 budget:

- We will be hard pressed to meet current NATO reinforcement plans and must put

unprecedented reliance on reserves to meet early deployment requirements.
- Our ability to control the seas would be seriously jeopardized in the event of a major Soviet effort to interdict the lines of communications in the Atlantic.
- We will have insufficient Naval forces to support sustained operations in the Mediterranean while providing protection for the sea lanes in the Atlantic.
- The United States is reaching a position where we may be unable to prevent nuclear coercion because of the growing nuclear strength of the Soviet Union.
- During a Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO, adequate tactical air forces will not be available for a strategic reserve, assistance to allies, or conducting minor contingency operations.

In my critical review of the proposed Service and JCS programs, I shall be seeking ways to improve the capability and readiness of the forces while preserving essential modernization programs. I shall carefully appraise the capability of the resulting forces and would hope to have an early opportunity to review the results with the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC).

My concern with the adequacy—or more to the point—inadequacy—of the $79.6 billion program is reinforced when we compare it with the real Defense buying power of the FY 64 DOD program, the last pre-Southeast Asia year. As a result of inflation and, in particular, the sharp increase in the cost of military and civilian manpower (7 pay raises in the last 8 years), over $90 billion in DOD outlays would be needed in FY 73 to buy the Defense forces and the rate of modernization we had in FY 64. Every Defense budget since FY 1968 has been below the FY 64 level, after the incremental costs of SEA are discounted. The cumulative deficits are in excess of $30 billion, yet the threat, particularly from the Soviet strategic and general purpose forces, is much greater today.

The $79.6 billion budget for FY 73 would give us about the same real Defense buying power we have in the FY 72 program. This accounts for added pay raises, inflation, the all volunteer force program, less the $3.5 billion reduction assumed in the incremental cost of the war in SEA.

If national security requires the forces, modernization and readiness corresponding to a $82–$83 billion program but the economy and the total Federal budget require lower Defense outlays, we may have to consider such steps as reducing or delaying the civilian and military pay increases (which will cost us $2 billion in FY 73); foregoing the planned increase of $1 billion in our FY 73 program to reach an all volunteer force (and as a result delay our achieving this goal); carrying out extensive base closures; and reducing our air and logistics support levels in SEA. Once the necessary Defense programs are established for the next five years, we would have some fiscal flexibility to shift expenditures from FY 73 into FY 74. But we must recognize that such actions only have a temporary effect, and in fact would complicate our Defense planning for FY 74 and the years beyond.

I understand the importance of meeting the national economic goals of full employment

and relative price stability. I will, of course, work with George Shultz and the DPRC to identify and assess the risks associated with Defense programs at various expenditure levels. I thought it essential, however, as you review the current FY 73 budget planning status, to let you know of my concern that $82–83 billion in outlays will be needed to provide adequate support for your foreign policy and the other Defense program goals you have enunciated.[2]

Melvin R. Laird

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 227, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. XII, Chronological File. Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] In a July 27 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig recommended that Kissinger discuss Laird's memorandum to the President during his breakfast meeting with Laird scheduled for the next day. Kissinger subsequently placed a checkmark on Haig's memorandum, indicating that he had discussed the matter with Laird. (Ibid.)

188. Conversation With President Nixon[1]

Washington, July 23, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion surveying the economy and the federal budget. Also omitted is Shultz's introductory presentation on the fiscal year 1973 Defense budget, during which he mentioned that, while he, Laird, Kissinger, Packard, and Weinberger had agreed on an initial fiscal guidance in the neighborhood of $79 billion, Laird subsequently had pushed for spending totaling $82 to $83 billion.]

Shultz: What we need to get is guidance from you about what we should strive for, basically with the domestic programs. We also have a tax discussion here. And if—I think we need to get a feel for what ballpark you want to shoot for [unclear]. Because if this, for instance, is going to go to [$]83 or 85 or 86 [billion] or something like that, then that's just not inside the box as far as the—

Nixon: Well let me—first, in terms of Henry's [Kissinger] question, of course we can wait two weeks, because we've got a couple of other fish to fry at the moment, so I—is that what you're talking about? Two weeks?

Shultz: At least. [unclear exchange]

Kissinger: Look, I think the 83 billion is nuts.

Nixon: But now it may be—because I think you're going to have—

Kissinger: We need about two weeks.

Nixon: Well, you think maybe we need to think a little differently too. Now, nobody's done a better job on defense than Henry has over the past 2½ years, and it has been a big reason that—not because of Henry's [unclear], but due to the fact that Henry has taken the Defense Department and shaken it up. We're doing a hell of a lot better than we've ever done. But on the other hand, in terms of what we have, we have the DPRC, or whatever it is. They sit down there. The sons of bitches sit down there, and it's the same old shell game. "Well, gee whiz, I can't get rid of these wings, and the Army's going to be all mad if they don't have these nice slots and so forth. And I know the West Point [unclear]." They don't tell you the number of people at West Point. The bastards have 4,000—1,000 new people at West Point, planned for the next year. They have 3,000 this year, which is too many officers to have right now. And the Air Force is worse. The Navy probably needs theirs for reasons of naval power that are going to be necessary as long as this nation is even a mini-power. We have got to shake up the goddamn Defense Department in a way that hasn't been done. In a way, as you and I have talked—we've been too busy, you've been too busy, but I'm not too busy now. Those bastards are going

to shape it down. If we don't need air defense, and we don't. We don't need those goddamn air wings up there. We don't need all those flyboys flying around. We don't need those Air Force generals. We're going to get rid of them. We're going to get rid of air defense. And we're going to get rid of some of this ground stuff. And we're getting rid of some of the Navy crap too. They got a lot of crap too, despite the fact that they talk about other things.

Now, the real problem here is that defense is not what Defense really wants or needs. God, I'd fight to the death for them on ABM, on their missile strength, on divisions and so forth, you know what I mean. Who would fight harder? You would fight harder. We're not going to let them cut into the real stuff. And it isn't just a question that—you know, McNamara [unclear] running it more efficiently. He ran it inefficiently. And as a result, the United States has become a second-rate power in defense. And that was what inefficiency did. We've been trying to run it more efficiently and maintain some credibility through our ABM, through our SALT thing. But we have not gotten a hold of them. Laird has not touched it. Packard has not touched it. You've gotten to the fringes of it. I mean, they've come in here and I've seen—I know a snow job as well as anybody around here. The goddamn Defense Department, the more it changes, the more it remains the same. It's the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force fighting for the slots for their generals and for their personnel and all the rest. So if it comes down, it must come down equally, rather than putting the emphasis where it needs to be put. As you and I both know, where it needs to be put where it's going to count. And I can't emphasize too strongly, I don't want to go over to Defense and say, "Look, almost 83 is a crazy figure. Now can't we compromise on 79½ or 81½?" Bullshit. We have got to make Defense now—but wait until you hear what I've got to say about revenue sharing and the environment, and family assistance, all of which are going to be trimmed right down to the bone or up, because I don't believe any of the goddamn things. But on these things, on Defense, Henry, we have got to shake those bastards up.

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: Now, you're the only man who can do it. I know you tried. But they haven't gotten it from the top yet. You've got to shake them up. It may be that half the Defense budget ought to be in the Navy. I'm inclined to think it probably should. I don't know. But, I—it may be that as far as the Army's concerned, they say—I know, Westmoreland says his Army's morale is terrible. I said, "Why's your morale terrible?" Is it because of My Lai and all the rest? No, it's not because of that. It's because, for Christ sakes, they don't have as many slots for as many generals and as many officers' clubs. You know why that is. That's [unclear] the Air Force. Why's their morale bad? It's because [unclear]. But for Christ sakes, we don't need those flyboys anymore. They're irrelevant. They're obsolete. And they're just obsolete as hell. All these guys, you know, the air defense—I've seen NORAD and I've seen all their planes out there. And, you know [unclear]. Are the Soviets going to come flying over the Pole with a bunch of planes? They aren't going to come flying over the Pole with a bunch of planes. You know that and I know it. Why in the hell doesn't

somebody tell them? That's my point. And that's what we're not getting in air defense. I don't want it. That's why, rather than in two weeks, let me say right now, take 30 days. I want you to take 30 days on Defense. I want you to take them in and shake that tree for once. And goddamn them, we want to do what this country needs, and we have got to cut in those areas where it's really going to help. Now that's what we're not doing. Because, the DPRC—I—it's basically a brokering deal. You have to broker in the [unclear] and look it over. Without that, we'd be doing nothing. We wouldn't even have ABM because ABM was fought by Defense, as you know. The Air Force fought it because they wanted [unclear]—why'd the Air Force fight it? Well, they wanted a new fighter, or a new bomber. Screw them. They're not going to get it. That's the way I feel about it.

Kissinger: Well, the DPRC is [unclear]. Laird just ignores them and brokers his own little enterprises [unclear]. The trouble is, if we put a ceiling up, whatever it is, 83, 79—

Nixon: They'll divide it three ways.

Kissinger: They'll slice it three ways.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: And they'll do it in terms—

Nixon: That we cannot do.

Kissinger: What we've got to get done in the DPRC and in the NSC is—actually, it's got to be in the NSC, because until they hear you say it, none of us can really make them do it—is a statement of what missions you want before [you]. And then, hold them to those missions and scrap all the others. That we can get done. But if we give them a figure, even a pie figure, they're going to split it up to protect their long-term slots.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: But if you tell them the only missions you're going to consider are A, B, C, and D, and everything else goes, substantially goes, then we've got a handle to operate on. And that's what I think. If you're going to have one NSC meeting the first week of August at which—we have one DPRC meeting, one NSC meeting in which they hear you say, "These are the missions I think we put our money on, and we'll scrap the others for a two [unclear] minimum." Then I think George [Shultz] has a way of squeezing them. Budget ceilings won't do it. They'll kill us with budget ceilings. I don't know what you think, John [Connally].

Connally: I've been [unclear]. First, they'll slice it three ways to begin with. Then within the services, [unclear] themselves the threat. No program. They'll divide up their one-third among all of their programs. They'll threaten again. [unclear exchange] You're going to have to scrap the missions.

Nixon: We have to determine at the highest level what the United States needs in the way of defense. Now, of course, all of this is complicated by the miserable problem we're faced with. And the fact that it's going to have, you know, [unclear] and the rest. But what I'm—what we've talking about here, you see, is the '73 budget. What we're talking about is what we do frankly after November. We may think of a lot. We can put all this stuff in, in terms of base closings and the rest, and close those goddamn bases, half of them the day after the election in November. I understand that. You can't do it before. You don't have to put all that stuff out, and the damn Defense Department's going to play ball. But believe me, I'm sick of those bastards because they are here squealing and squirming around, but when you finally scratch them enough, what do they want to do? Well, they want to keep a couple of acres down at Camp Pendleton, or they don't want to give up the Presidio, or something. When in the hell are they going to start thinking of the United States? Now, the other thing—

Kissinger: They will never give up a gold mine voluntarily. You can bet on that. So no matter what ceilings you put on them, they'll spread it over [unclear].

Nixon: Sure. [unclear] One place to start. This is going to be tough. For God's sake, they got to start in terms of their three service academies. You can't produce 4,500 officers every, without there having—1,000 graduates a year without expecting those poor bastards to want to have a command. Can you? We got too many college graduates and we got too many service graduates. Now, is the volunteer armed forces, is that thing too far down the road that we can't scrap it?

Ehrlichman: Well, [unclear] pay increases, of course, are in conference now [unclear exchange]. The conference is on the extension of the draft, so the pay increases in the volunteer armed forces bill are way above what we asked.

Nixon: Well, the pay increases, of course, do not speak to the subject of [unclear].

Ehrlichman: No.

Nixon: They speak to the subject of higher payments put into places where, by God, we should not have them. I mean, [unclear]. The fact that you're giving pay increases to a bunch of lieutenant commanders and majors and so forth, isn't going to bring me any more privates. And they damn well know that. And here's Defense again playing their goddamn shell game. [unclear exchange]

Kissinger: The pay increases in a way are killing us because it means that, I think 50 or 60 percent of the budget goes to pay. If we ever get into a war and have to expand it—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And the cost of [unclear exchange].

Unidentified speaker: We would also have freedom between civilian and military pay so that whenever the civilian employees go up, even the military pay—even increased by the volunteer armed forces—

Nixon: We're not going to go into that—we're certainly going to try to avoid that. My feeling is, Henry, that I would prefer to take a month. Now [unclear] this is the crack that we need. We haven't cracked them yet. Take a month. But believe me, we want to crack them. I don't want to fool around with this same business of having Laird come back in here and I sit down with the Chiefs and we make them all feel good. I mean, too bad, they don't feel good that night. But they're going to be shaken up. There's going to be change. The Air Force is going to be changed, by God. It's going to be changed or else. Christ, they're flying missions at the present time, as you know damn well. Even in Southeast Asia some of them. They don't need a damn thing. Just have a new command. And, a lot of the Navy commands, a lot of the rest. Look, I'm for paying all those that had to go to the hardware, the people where we need them. Fine. But the Defense Department has got to take a hard look at what the country needs. And then, they put it within that. Now, it may still be 83. Listen, that isn't what I'm talking about.

Kissinger: I know what you—

Nixon: What I am talking about is not [unclear]. To get it down to 78 is supposed to please the bastards. That's what we're talking about. We're talking about that never has a country spent more for less defense than the United States of America. Now that is true. It's just as true as it can be. It's true of—you compare us to the Russians, you compare us to another great power. And here we are. We spend a hell of a lot, and all we do is we waste 300 pounds on a 150–pound frame. [unclear] Now I suppose everybody's talked to this subject. But believe me, I know those—I love Moorer. I think he's a great guy, but he's got to broker. Laird and Packard aren't strong enough to do it, but we are. Now, that's why I want Henry to have the time to do it. But [you] must understand, Henry, what the job is.

[Omitted here is discussion of intelligence reform and the capabilities of the CIA.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Connally, Kissinger, Ehrlichman, Shultz, Weinberger, Cole, Harper, Haldeman, and Ziegler, Oval Office, Conversation No. 544–8. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation held from 10:25 a.m. to 1:03 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

189. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, July 29, 1971, 3:15–4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia NSSM 69[2]

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. John N. Irwin
Mr. Thomas Pickering
Mr. Leslie Brown
Mr. James Wilson

Defense

Mr. Gardiner Tucker
Mr. Paul Brands
Rear Adm. H.H. Anderson

JCS

Gen. William C. Westmoreland
Brig. Gen. William Burrows
Col. Robert Archer
Col. Linwood Lennon

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Mr. Bruce Clarke

OMB

Mr. George P. Shultz
Mr. Caspar Weinberger
Mr. Kenneth Dam

ACDA

Mr. Philip Farley
Vice Adm. John M. Lee

OST

Mr. John Walsh

NSC Staff

Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Wayne Smith
Mr. John Holdridge
Mr. John Court
Mr. John A. Knubel
Adm. Robert O. Welander
Mr. Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—A specialized nuclear force targeted on China was not needed in the next decade.
—Additional preparations were necessary before a summary of the NSSM 69 study[3] is prepared for NSC consideration on August 12.[4] Accordingly, the DPRC Working Group should conduct the following studies:
  —a projection of the forces required for a disarming strike on China's nuclear delivery capabilities in 1972 and 1976. The projection should include the cost of any qualitative improvements in our current capability and any potential degrading of our SIOP capability versus the Soviet Union. It should also estimate the effectiveness of the strike.
  —a refinement of the conventional force analysis, to include an estimate of U.S. force requirements against the most likely threat for each of the alternative conventional options, as well as an assessment of the implications of some level of insurgency. The requirements should also examine the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
  —an analysis of the political and diplomatic effects on our allies of a U.S. military presence in Asia through 1976. The analysis should discuss what deployment and basing structure we will need to meet our political and diplomatic objectives over the next five years.

Dr. Kissinger: Is Beecher (*New York Times* military correspondent) here? Are we going to have a briefing? How many charts do you have, Gardiner?

Mr. Tucker: We have about fifteen of them.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know if we need to take all that time. Everyone here has read every word of the study.

Mr. Tucker: If you want, we can skip the briefing.

Dr. Kissinger: How long do you think it will take?

Mr. Tucker: About ten or fifteen minutes. We can make it as long as you like.

Dr. Kissinger: I suggest we start the meeting off with a discussion of strategic nuclear forces. We can follow up with the tactical nuclear forces and then the land forces.

Mr. Tucker: We want to talk about the methodology and results of the ground force analysis. I think we should do this before we talk about tactical nuclear forces because the approach we take on tactical forces will to some extent depend on the ground force analysis.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Tucker) While we talk about strategic forces, you can plan the 10–

minute briefing on land forces. We need discussion of these issues more than we need briefings on them.

I have one general observation to make. George [Shultz] knows, I appealed to the President at a recent meeting[5] not to handle the DOD budget by setting up ceilings. He agreed to listen to a presentation which would cost out the objectives. Then he would make decisions in the middle of August. The meetings coming up between now and August 15 are, therefore, crucially important. I don't want the President to be put in the position where he has to rule on something like an extra aircraft carrier or a division. We should be able to relate what we do in various parts of the world to the strategies we should follow. We have to do everything we can to avoid making totally arbitrary cuts.

All of you worked hard on this paper. Our aim now is to get the NSC to consider this paper, and others, on August 12 or 13. We have to put choices before the President. We have to make it clear that at certain levels of operations, we will be giving up certain objectives. We also have to cost out the implications of the choices.

With this as background, let's go through the implications of the paper. The hidden assumptions in it remind me of the debate on Europe which took place in the early 1960s. Let's just see what the choices are.

We have a nice intimate group here. I hope every newspaper gets an equal shot at us. The *New York Times* get all the goodies.

Mr. Tucker: At least it's more legible in the *Times*.

Mr. Johnson: And more readable.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand everything better after I read it in the *Times*. Getting back to the paper, the first thing we have to consider is the Chinese strategic threat. I understand from the study that the Chinese could have 1,000 launchers late in the 1970s if they made an "all-out" effort. This force would include 200 ICBMs. If they made a token effort, they might develop a force of as few as 100 launchers. The most likely outcome, though, is that they will have about 400–500 launchers available in the late 1970s, with as many as 90–150 ICBMs directly threatening the U.S. I have some questions about the various assumptions supporting this threat analysis. We say the Chinese would not resort to nuclear blackmail against the U.S. or its allies because this would run counter to historical Chinese military doctrine. I don't know what historical military doctrine we're talking about. They did not build the Middle Kingdom without advancing from somewhere.

We are also assuming they will stick to their stated policy of "no first use." The Soviets said the same thing at one time. I remember that the Soviets said they would follow a "no first use" policy after they exploded their first nuclear weapons. They claimed they would

use their nuclear power to move mountains and do other peaceful things.

Are these assumptions, then, simply based on Chinese statements?

Gen. Cushman: The assumption that the Chinese would probably not resort to nuclear blackmail is based on the fact that they have overwhelming conventional military superiority over neighboring countries.

Mr. Clarke: This is the situation they find themselves in at the moment. Nevertheless, at this stage of their evolution, they are on the defensive.

Dr. Kissinger: But we should be talking about the time when they have a nuclear arsenal.

Mr. Clarke: Even ten years from now, when they do have a nuclear arsenal, they will still be on the defensive, compared to the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: What we are really saying, then, is that they will never engage in nuclear blackmail because they won't be able to. I have no problem with the assumption if it is stated that way.

Can anyone think of something else that would induce greater restraint on the Chinese? I'm just asking. We should proceed on the assumption that we will design a strategy against the Chinese the same way we would design a strategy against any country that had the same capabilities as the Chinese.

On the issue of a strategic deterrent, there are two problems. The first is should we plan to attack China after we have a large-scale nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union? If we decide to so this, do we do it with reconstituted forces, or do we establish a specialized Chinese deterrent in the Pacific? The other problem is what strategy do we propose to pursue vis-à-vis the Chinese? What capability do we think we need in order to deter them? (to Gen. Westmoreland) Westy, what do you think? Can we depend on residual forces after a large-scale nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union or should we earmark special forces?

Gen. Westmoreland: [*3 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Irwin: What kind of a response do we plan for China?

Gen. Westmoreland: Retaliatory. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Johnson: Even after a massive Soviet attack on the U.S. and a response from us, would we still retain the capability of destroying China?

Gen. Westmoreland: Not necessarily. The Soviets, for example, could launch a preemptive attack on us, and they have three times the megatonnage that we have. Anyway, I think

it's academic to talk about residual forces knocking out China because we would be in a very disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: Hence, we would not be able to knock-out China.

Gen. Westmoreland: No, not if we have been preempted by the Soviets. We should, however, have enough residual force to knock out the Chinese industry. But it would be academic for us to spend our remaining weapons on the Chinese when our industrial base has been crippled.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand it, if we are preempted by the Soviets, we can retaliate against the Soviets or the Chinese. But we can't attack both of them.

Mr. Irwin: What would we need in order to have the ability to respond to Soviets and still have something left for the Chinese?

Dr. Kissinger: The point is that we would not strike the Chinese without provocation.

Gen. Westmoreland: We would have enough residual force capability to destroy Chinese industry, if we chose to go after the Chinese instead of the Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: But not both.

Mr. Tucker: We could carry this a step further. If the Soviets preempted us and if we responded, we would still have the residual capability of attacking China. We would still have the submarines in the Pacific and the theater aircraft. But how would we choose to expend this residual capability? This is hard to judge.

Mr. Irwin: We would have no ICBM capability left.

Mr. Tucker: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to decide if we want to spend our residual forces on China. If we do, we will be totally at the mercy of the Soviet residual forces.

Is it fair to say that our strategic forces are not helpful in keeping China from moving? Our residual forces will approach their strategic forces in the late 1970s. Only then will we be close to nuclear parity.

Mr. Tucker: This might be true if we take into account our forward-based weapons. We would also come closer to parity if we take the more ambitious Chinese strategic force projection.

Mr. Irwin: The paper says that if we deliver 100 warheads, we can take out about 50% of the Chinese industry.

Dr. Kissinger: We went through these theoretical exercises for Europe. I don't believe that any political leader could order an attack on the industry without also ordering a disarming strike. Who would make that kind of decision when he knows the other side would still have weapons?

Mr. Tucker: I, frankly, find it hard to identify a post-exchange situation with the Soviets where we would be faced with the Chinese threat.

Mr. Irwin: Wouldn't that be the case if we were protecting Japan?

Gen. Westmoreland: It's hard to see the Chinese getting involved with a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange. It would be foolish for them to do so, and it would be more favorable for them to wait it out.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose we use our strategic weapons against the Chinese first. Would the SIOP be degraded?

Gen. Westmoreland: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Tucker: We wouldn't lose all our weapons. The submarine launchers, for example, would still be intact, and we could possibly use them again.

Mr. Weinberger: We could also use the aircraft stationed at our advanced bases.

Mr. Tucker: We have the capability in-theater.

Mr. Irwin: Is it reasonable to think the Soviets might attack China?

Mr. Tucker: That's not clear, Jack. If we were to have an exchange with the China first, this would not be a bad situation for the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: This would be in the late 1970s.

Mr. Tucker: Yes, when we've come close to nuclear parity with the Chinese. The Chinese, however, might not be prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: The Russians are more worried about China than we are.

Mr. Tucker: That's right. The Chinese have plenty of weapons trained on the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: It is your judgment, then, that in the next decade we do not need a specialized nuclear force targeted on China.

Let's look now at what we want to achieve with our forces in Asia. When we look back at the post-war period, we find that the nuclear parity we thought existed in the late 50s

didn't arrive until the 60s. I admit that I am one of the culprits. Our analysis was correct, but it was premature. Perhaps we are falling into the same trap once again.

As I see it, we have five strategic options in Asia. The first is the minimum retaliatory capability. Next is a continuation of the current retaliatory capability, in which about 600 weapons destroy 75% of China's industry but only 8% of her population. We have the development of improved capabilities, including special targeting of dikes, dams, etc. We also have the offensive damage limiting options, predicated on either Chinese first use of nuclear weapons or U.S. first use in the form of a disarming strike coupled with use of tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, we have the defensive damage limiting option.

The options boil down to two categories: disarming and retaliatory capabilities. Should we make the effort to achieve a disarming capability against China through the 1970s? If we choose retaliation, we must decide whether we want to destroy 40 or 75% of the enemy's industry, but that isn't something we have to argue about in this group.

We never had a force issue to decide in the past. The only choice was to rely on retaliation and decide if we wanted some other capability as well. If China comes through with the development of a nuclear arsenal, we must decide if we want to achieve a disarming capability. This capability would then become subject, of course, to the same inhibitions as the disarming capability directed against the Soviets. We have to put this main question before the President. Are there any views on this?

Mr. Irwin: How much of an inroad would be made in our normal strike force vis-à-vis the Soviet Union if part of that force were to be targeted against China?

Dr. Kissinger: We couldn't use ICBMs because they would have to overfly the Soviet Union.

Mr. Tucker: The Joint Staff, if I recall, has a disarming strike plan which calls for [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: But this is a current plan.[6] We need a projection for the 1970s. If a disarming strike couldn't be carried out with theater capabilities, we would have to do it with improved Polaris subs or B–52s. We have to determine how much this would degrade the SIOP.

Mr. Lennon: We can carry out a disarming strike against existing Chinese forces with [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. We can do this today because we have to hit only soft targets. When our Minuteman has been improved, we might be able to divert some B–52s to China.

[Johnson leaves meeting at this point]

Gen. Westmoreland: With modernization of our forces, we won't have any problem

delivering [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Dr. Kissinger: But [*less than 1 line not declassified*] may not be enough. We need a projection of what our side will need to overcome the Chinese forces. We also need to know what this will do to the SIOP. I don't want to pre-judge the situation. But we have to make a judgment about our disarming capability.

Mr. Smith: We can make a table. However, it will be complicated by the Chinese SLBMs.

Mr. Tucker: We also have to consider how effective this disarming strike would be.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Tucker) You're right. The President will certainly ask that question.

Mr. Irwin: We should also develop the philosophy of such a strike because the President will want to know this, too.

Mr. Tucker: The philosophy of it is that it is the most effective deterrent of the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me ask one other question just for my political education. The paper says that if we did develop a disarming capability, some countries might "loosen their ties" with us. Who says this? Which countries are we talking about?

Mr. Smith: We didn't write that.

Dr. Kissinger: Goddammit, Smith, my own staff. Let's disregard this argument. I think we have taken this issue as far as we can. (to Mr. Smith) You, Gardiner and the Joint Staff should prepare a projection of what we would need to achieve a disarming capability against the middle and high Chinese strategic threats. You should estimate what residual force we would have left after such a strike, and you should also see if such a capability is financially feasible.

Mr. Farley: What exactly does "disarming strike" mean? Can we achieve that capability with [*less than 1 line not declassified*]?

Dr. Kissinger: A "disarming strike" means that we substantially eliminate their ability to launch a nuclear attack on us. It means that they would have less of an incentive to attack us after the strike than they had before it.

[*1 line not declassified*]

Col. Lennon: About [*less than 1 line not declassified*] committed to be used against nuclear plants.

Mr. Tucker: We can work up a table of projected sorties in 1978 against military targets.

Dr. Kissinger: There's no dispute, then, about the disarming strike capability if we can

have it. Does anybody believe it is an undesirable capability to have?

Gardiner, can we have the chart presentation in 10 minutes or less.

(The following briefing was based on the attached charts)[7]

Mr. Brands: The object of the general purpose forces analysis was to examine the Asian Communist conventional threats and to assess the force and cost impact of alternative U.S. strategies for conventional defense in Asia. We also considered the impact of the Nixon Doctrine. Incidentally, we only treated the conventional aspect of the conflict in Asia. We did not focus on insurgency.

The four key military variables we considered were: (1) the theater, basically Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia; (2) the countries; (3) the threat levels and (4) the defense lines. We also considered the relationship of the two Nixon Doctrine variables—MAP levels and Asian regional security arrangements.

We have a methodology which we followed to put the various forces on a comparative basis. Basically, the methodology consists of four steps: (1) it converts all Asian forces (both allied and enemy) to U.S. infantry division equivalents, (2) it selects force ratios to be achieved along each avenue of attack, (3) it adds sufficient U.S. DFEs to the local, attacked forces in order to achieve the desired force ratios, and (4) it applies various combinations of military assistance options and regional security arrangements against the requirements for reinforcements to yield needs for U.S. forces.

Regarding the threat to Northeast Asia, we could expect a 25 division slice from the North Koreans. In 1976, the Chinese Army will have about 150 combat divisions. Under the maximum threat, constrained only by the geographical restrictions of the Korean peninsula, the Chinese contribution would be 35 division slices. This maximum estimate assumes that the Soviets are no longer putting any pressure on the Chinese and that the Chinese Army is not tied down with the political aspects of running the country. We figure they could have 1.1 million men on the DMZ in 30 days. For the moderate threat, the Chinese would commit 15 division slices, while the North Koreans would still contribute 25.

The situation in Southeast Asia is more uncertain and complex. There are five avenues of approach for the enemy, and he is more LOC constrained [monsoons, poor roads, rough terrain] than he is in Northeast Asia. The maximum effort would be a one dry season campaign—a “do” or “die” effort—employing about 20 Chinese division slices and 13 North Vietnamese division slices. If the Chinese didn’t succeed in this campaign, their troops in Southeast Asia would be vulnerable and difficult to support. If, however, the campaign were put on a year-round basis, the Chinese could only commit 16 division slices and the North Vietnamese 11.

Our analysis shows that U.S. forces would be needed in Southeast Asia to stalemate both the maximum and moderate Chinese threats. Against the maximum threat, about four U.S. division equivalents, assuming Burma is not defended, would be needed if the Thai regular forces are used to counter insurgent activity. If the Thai regulars are available for the conventional conflict, about two U.S. division equivalents are needed.

Assuming Burma is not defended, about two or three U.S. division equivalents are needed to stalemate the year-round Chinese threat, if the Thai are used to control insurgents. Less than one U.S. division equivalent is needed if the Thai regulars are available to fight the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: You think we can defend Southeast Asia with one and a half U.S. divisions? We have not been able to do this in Vietnam, with eight divisions.

Mr. Brands: When we add insurgency into the mixture, it changes the figures. We then need higher force levels.

Mr. Tucker: We also figured that Vietnamization was successful.

Mr. Brands: We attempted to show how each weapon is rated, relative to the comparable piece of U.S. equipment. This way we were able to get a force equivalent for a Chinese division.

Now we move on to look at the requirements for U.S. forces.

Dr. Kissinger: What does “no mutual defense” mean?

Mr. Brands: It means that we are the only other country contributing to the defense effort.

Dr. Kissinger: And what does “limited defense” mean?

Mr. Brands: In the case of Korea, it assumes that the Nationalist Chinese contribute 2 divisions, or in terms of DFEs, 2/3 of a U.S. division. When we get to the moderate threat for Korea, we need less than one U.S. DFE.

Dr. Kissinger: All of this analysis assumes that there is no insurgency.

Mr. Brands: We assumed that the police and local forces would be able to handle the insurgency situation. The RF and PF would control it in Vietnam and the police would control it in Thailand. We also assumed that Vietnamization worked.

Suppose there is an insurgency in Thailand, and all the Thai regulars are used to counter the insurgency. Then we would need 4 U.S. DFE’s to counter the maximum Chinese threat. If Vietnamization is not successful and if all of the ARVN forces are tied up in

counter-insurgency operations, then we would need 8 U.S. divisions to handle the situation.

This is a summary chart. As I said before, we assumed that Vietnamization works as defined—meaning that ARVN regulars are not needed to counter an insurgency.

Dr. Kissinger: Who would do it?

Mr. Brands: The RF and PF. If these local forces can successfully counter the insurgency problem, we won't need any U.S. ground forces to counter the non-Chinese threats. With the high MAP assistance and Thai regulars available, we can handle all moderate threats. With high MAP assistance, Thai regulars available and an enclave defense, we can handle the maximum Chinese threats in Southeast Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you agree, Westy?

Gen. Westmoreland: I think this overestimates the capabilities of our allies and underestimates the capability of the enemy. This is the first time I've seen this analysis. Is it realistic?

Mr. Brands: The threat panels assumed it was realistic in Thailand. They also assumed Vietnamization worked.

Dr. Kissinger: This analysis assumes no limit on MAP assistance.

Mr. Irwin: I don't understand why with the high MAP we can handle the moderate threat and with the medium MAP we can handle the maximum threat.

Mr. Tucker: In the latter case, we're also using an enclave defense. The charts merely show that with the maximum threat against Thailand and South Vietnam and with no U.S. ground forces, the best defense would be an enclave around Bangkok. If the U.S. puts in two divisions, the chart shows you what you could handle—forward defense against the maximum threat.

Mr. Irwin: What about the Thai regulars?

Mr. Brands: They would be fighting the Chinese and North Vietnamese. If they were absorbed in counter-insurgency, we would have to increase our forces to 3–2/3 divisions.

Dr. Kissinger: I heard Gen. Abrams[8] talk about the Thai when I was in Vietnam. Do we really think they can handle the Chinese by themselves? I don't care about systems analysis. They can't handle the North Vietnamese. How in God's name will they be able to handle the Chinese?

Mr. Brands: With an enclave defense and high MAP, you have a far different situation

than a forward defense.

Gen. Westmoreland: Before they even get to that point, they will reach accommodation with the Chinese.

Mr. Brands: Perhaps. But this analysis looks at the potential situation.

Dr. Kissinger: There will be no nuclear weapons, right?

Gen. Westmoreland: In Korea, we would defend south of Seoul, not at the DMZ.

Mr. Brands: When we were doing the analysis, the Joint Staff agreed to the DMZ.

Gen. Westmoreland: Our estimate is that we would need eight divisions to defend at the DMZ.

Mr. Brands: And what level of military assistance?

Mr. Tucker: That's another analysis. The one we're talking about right now is concerned only with conventional conflict. It did not consider the use of nuclear weapons or insurgency.

Dr. Kissinger: The analysis assumes: (1) no insurgency, and (2) Thai willingness to defend with no U.S. ground support. These things are not going to happen. They will not stand up.

Mr. Brands: We were trying to set up a relationship, to see how good one of their men is compared to one of ours.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Westmoreland) What do you think?

Gen. Westmoreland: As I said before, I think we're greatly overestimating our allies. The Thai are not going to fight the Chinese unless we are fighting with them. Half their battalions are not capable of combat now. I don't know if they can bite the bullet. In Korea, it's inconceivable to me that if the Chinese are involved, we can hold on the DMZ with five and a half divisions.

Mr. Brands: With the Joint Staff analysis, the figure was six divisions. In Southeast Asia, assuming there was insurgency, the figure was eight divisions.

Gen. Westmoreland: According to the JSOP study, we would fight south of Seoul.

Dr. Kissinger: All of this discussion is very helpful. How is the analysis affected by tactical nuclear weapons? We don't say that we can substitute tactical weapons for men. Therefore, what do we need the weapons for?

Gen. Westmoreland: We need them to help maintain the deterrent. We can't work a trade-off for them. We hope to stabilize the situation with men, but the weapons may be needed, and they should be on the scene. The weapons could also interfere with the enemy's LOC. When he lengthens his supply lines, the LOCs become more vulnerable.

Mr. Tucker: The tactical weapons can reduce the need for conventional forces. This analysis indicates that we have the capability of a conventional defense against a conventional attack. Under these circumstances, should we rely on tactical weapons?

Mr. Irwin: What is the scenario for the deployment of these weapons?

Mr. Tucker: [*1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger: The paper said that if we [*less than 1 line not declassified*], we would reduce our force requirement to 3-2/3 divisions. This was the JCS estimate.

Mr. Tucker: That was an earlier analysis.

Mr. Irwin: When the U.S. is at M-Day, where are the Chinese?

Mr. Brands: We assumed in the study that there was a 20-day period of rising tensions. M-Day is the same for both sides, but we give them a 20-day headstart.

Dr. Kissinger: Where would we keep the troops we would plan to deploy to Asia?

Mr. Tucker: Do you mean where would we keep them in peace time?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Tucker: We would keep them in CONUS.

Mr. Brands: There would be a Marine division on Okinawa.

Dr. Kissinger: Not Okinawa.

Mr. Brands: There would be 2/3 of a division there.

Dr. Kissinger: There would be no forces based in Korea or Southeast Asia.

Mr. Brands: There would be one brigade in Korea, but none in Southeast Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: The departing Indonesian Ambassador is not a warmonger, and he doesn't care about the Peking move. When he went in for his farewell call on the President, he said there would be a collapse in the Pacific area if the U.S. withdrew.[9] We should study the political factors in this whole situation and not just take a systems analysis approach. We have to look more closely at what the Thai would do. We also have to examine those

Vietnamese assumptions. If we withdraw from Thailand, the Thai won't fight. I may be wrong on this, but I don't think I am. Maybe we shouldn't want the Thai to fight. History will not stop if Thailand goes back to being a neutralist country.

Let me give you my candid impression on the tactical nuclear weapons. One group feels that an analysis of tactical nuclear weapons will show that we should depend on them and that we should decrease dependence on conventional forces. Another group is scared that an analysis of tactical weapons will support the rationale for conventional forces.

The paper had no discussion of the U.S. political presence in Southeast Asia. The President will not come up with zero conventional forces in Asia. Using that as a background, we should do an analysis with more realistic assumptions on tactical nuclear weapons, insurgency and the outcome for Vietnam. We should show the President what is implied under the less favorable assumptions.

If the U.S. pulled back to Hawaii, what would the impact on Asia be—no matter what we said we would do from CONUS? What would be the impact on Japan if we adopted zero forces for Asia?[10]

We can keep these charts and the favorable assumptions. However, we should also make less favorable assumptions and see what would then be required.

Let's also look at the tactical nuclear weapons again.

Mr. Irwin: From the political side, do you want to know where we would keep the troops earmarked for deployment in Asia?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. (to Mr. Smith) Wayne, can your group do this?

Mr. Smith: We will. But there isn't much time.

Dr. Kissinger: We will all have to work like hell. The President, as George [Shultz] knows, has held up decisions.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–73 (2 of 3). Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets except those that indicate omitted material are in the original.

[2] Document 42. See Document 181 for a previous discussion of the subject by the Senior Review Group.

[3] See footnote 7, Document 181.

[4] The NSC meeting on defense strategy and fiscal guidance was held on August 13; see Document 195.

[5] See Document 188.

[6] According to a May 10, 1969, memorandum from Wheeler, then Chairman of the JCS, to Laird, Kissinger had requested military plans to destroy China's nuclear capability 8 days earlier. Wheeler's memorandum outlined several conventional options, using B–52s only, and nuclear options, using some combination of B–52s and Polaris SLBMs. Laird forwarded Wheeler's memorandum to Kissinger on May 14. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Accession: 2001–NLF-020, Box 20, PRC)

[7] Not found.

[8] General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

[9] According to the President's Daily Diary, departing Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko met with Nixon in the Oval Office on July 27 from 11:05 to 11:32 a.m. Kissinger also attended. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

[10] In an undated handwritten note to Kissinger, Haig wrote: "I believe Asian strategy is a *disaster*. It will surface publicly and combined with recent events finish us in the region." (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–103, DPRC Meeting, DOD Budget (San Clemente), 7/15–17/71)

190. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, August 5, 1971, 2:45–3:54 p.m.

SUBJECT

Defense Strategy and Fiscal Guidance

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Ronald Spiers
Mr. Leon Sloss
Mr. Seymour Weiss[2]

Defense

Mr. David Packard
Dr. Gardiner Tucker
Mr. Philip Odeen

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Rear Adm. William R. St. George
Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander

CIA

Mr. Richard Helms

OST

Dr. Edward David

CEA

Mr. Herbert Stein

ACDA

Mr. Philip Farley

Treasury

Dr. Charls Walker

OMB

Mr. George P. Shultz
Mr. Caspar Weinberger
Mr. Kenneth Dam

NSC Staff

Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Wayne Smith
Mr. John Court
Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In preparation for the August 12 NSC meeting on the FY 73 Defense budget, the DPRC Working Group will identify basic issues for decision in terms of their implications for national security and foreign policy. The list of issues to be prepared by the DPRC Working Group will be submitted by COB August 9 for review by the DPRC.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Dr. Tucker) Do you want to go ahead with your briefing?

Mr. Packard: I would like to make a few introductory remarks. The purpose of this briefing is first to outline the procedures we use in force planning and budget preparation. Then we want to point out what the things we are planning to do will provide in the way of forces.

There are several budgetary levels that have to be looked at. One is the Five Year Defense Plan, which was prepared last year in connection with the FY 71 budget.[3] We thought this was on the high side, and in April of this year we gave the services strategic and fiscal guidance that was somewhat lower.[4] This guidance has now been developed into the JFM/POM; that is, it has been translated by the services and the agencies of the Department [of Defense] into specific forces and operating levels. The JFM/POM now have to be reviewed by me and by the Secretary's office. We will then have some scrubbing to do. We will then have to resolve questions of timing, and we will need to decide whether we are willing to accept the service recommendations and which funding estimates are appropriate.

Some of the material covered in the briefing was not included in the strategic and fiscal guidance. For instance, we have noted the relevant JSOP recommendations.

We have fenced certain areas, e.g. strategic forces. This means that the services were not allowed to modify the guidance provided them; hence, all of their strategic programs are similar. There are certain other areas that were also held inviolate.

I think that today it would be helpful to concentrate on what the forces proposed can do. The final budgetary figures will be the result of our [DOD's] review and the budget scrubbing. There are certain other steps which we can take that will modify the budget. The point is that we are not going to have hard budget figures today.

Gardiner [Tucker] can go ahead with the briefing. Then Tom [Moorer] can make some comments.

Mr. Shultz: If I may interject a comment, I have the feeling from the material that we [OMB] have seen that we are in danger of passing each other in the night and not coming anywhere near each other. There are severe problems with the overall budget. The President has come down hard in support of a budget balanced at full employment. All the numbers that we have seen point to a budget that is way beyond anything that would be acceptable.

Mr. Packard: I am not saying that our proposals present no problems. What the President wants to do about our proposals is his decision to make. What we [in Defense] are talking about is what [in the way of military forces] we are going to buy and whether we believe it is adequate.

(Messrs. Johnson, Sloss, Spiers, and Weiss joined the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Kissinger: We have another problem, which also came out of the preliminary budget discussions.[5] When George [Shultz] presented his fiscal concerns to the President, he [the President] asked me what substantive comments I wanted to make. I replied that I was not in a position to discuss budgetary figures. He said he wanted a presentation in terms of the overall issues presented by the budget. He has grave doubts about the procedure of allocating one-third to each service. He feels that every year he gets sucked into making decisions by line item.

(to Mr. Shultz) George, you were there. He said to try to get the budgetary presentation put in the form of alternative missions and objectives. He said, "I know you won't succeed." I have to admit that so far he has been correct about that. I have not been able to elicit a statement of objectives and missions.[6]

Mr. Packard: That's what we are going to give you in the briefing.

Dr. Tucker: First I would like to sum up what Dave [Packard] said. We started in FY 71 with the FYDP. Then we issued fiscal guidance that was $2.0 billion lower. We have received the services' answers based on the fiscal guidance and are beginning our assessment of those replies. The final program decisions will determine outlays. These numbers will likely be higher than what is [now] shown for the program.

[Dr. Tucker then displayed charts showing (1) alternative funding levels (JSOP, FYDP, and POM/JFM) and (2) a summary of general purpose forces at these three funding levels for FY 73–76.][7]

Notice that there is a significant decrease [from FYDP to POM/JFM] levels in such things as the number of army divisions, aircraft carriers, and in marine amphibious force sealift capability.

[Dr. Tucker showed a chart on peacetime overseas deployments.]

The FYDP involves some changes [from FY 72 to FY 73] in peacetime overseas deployments. We will be continuing the reduction of our land forces in Asia. We will be down to one-third of a division in Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: When?

Dr. Tucker: In FY 73.

Mr. Johnson: Do you mean at the end or the beginning of FY 73?

Dr. Tucker: The end.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it Systems Analysis has proved that this [one-third of a U.S. division] is enough to hold a full-scale attack.

Mr. Sloss: Are these army divisions only which are to be cut?

Mr. Odeen: These are just army divisions. The marine divisions should also be shown.

Mr. Packard: There will be considerable forces in the Pacific apart from these.

Mr. Odeen: There will be an army division in Hawaii.

Dr. Kissinger: What is one-third of a division supposed to do in Korea?

Mr. Odeen: This would in effect be a brigade. It would be in the Panmunjom area and would serve as a nucleus for reinforcement in the event of an attack.

Mr. Johnson: What about air forces in Korea?

Mr. Packard: They will remain just about the same as at present.

Adm. Moorer: We are modernizing the Korean armed forces so that they can take care of their own defense.

Dr. Tucker: This chart shows our capabilities in NATO and particularly how forces can be built up over time. It indicates the capability of our NATO allies to build up their land forces in NATO. It also shows the force requirements established by the Joint Chiefs. This is what the Joint Chiefs believe is required to meet a Pact attack. Finally, this chart also indicates the number of divisions required to meet the Pact Forces at a ratio of 1:1 on most fronts and a disadvantage of no more than 1.7:1 on the two main attack axes.

Mr. Johnson: Are Eastern European forces counted the same as Soviet forces?

Dr. Tucker: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: In World Wars I and II the Germans had inferior forces but beat the allies by concentrating their forces on the main axes of attack. It is misleading to discuss this in terms of overall ratios.

Mr. Packard: It depends whether you are looking at it from an offensive or defensive viewpoint.

Dr. Kissinger: To say that a ratio of 1.7:1 is safe runs counter to historical experience.

Dr. Tucker: On the basis of historical experience it is possible to find many trends going both ways. This ratio was derived from various World War II battles. Of course, the outcome in any given instance depends on non-quantifiable factors such as how the forces are used and the quality of leadership. This just indicates a range of force ratios.

Mr. Packard: That's right. These are just two calibration lines.

Dr. Kissinger: I see.

Mr. Sloss: Are the U.S. division equivalents calculated on the basis of both numbers and firepower?

Dr. Tucker: Yes, it is a combined calculation.

Adm. Moorer: We have a lot of comparative data on this.

Dr. Tucker: Against these force requirements, we have shown the NATO Allies' capability to deploy their forces. This is based on commitments that have been formally filed with NATO. The chart indicates that with U.S. forces available under the FYDP and POM, deployments will fall short of the JSOP requirement. To attain a 1:1 ratio would require from 90 to 120 days. This gives you some idea of the risk involved with these force levels.

We also have a chart that shows the corresponding deployment data for an attack from North Korea. It shows ROK capabilities and the JSOP stated requirements. It also shows the range of force requirements computed in the NSSM 69 study.[8]

Dr. Kissinger: Is this to defend against an attack by the North Koreans?

Dr. Tucker: Plus the Chinese. This assumes that the Chinese hold some forces on the Soviet borders, that they reduce troop densities, and that they are constrained by various factors which slow down their build-up.

Dr. Kissinger: You are saying that South Korea can resist a combined North Korean and Chinese attack if the Chinese maintain their troop deployments against the Soviets.

Dr. Tucker: They would not have the capability if the ratio of enemy to friendly forces were more than 1.3:1. Now if we assume that there has not been time to mobilize, then we can build up at these rates [indicates on the chart] with the FYDP and POM forces. If we build up in this way—without mobilization—then we have to draw down our NATO forces. Thus, we have looked to see what such a build-up would do to our NATO capability. This chart shows that to attain the required force levels in NATO under these circumstances would require until M + 80 with POM forces. This could possibly be well after D-day. Thus, there is a significant risk if we go into Korea without any advance mobilization.

We assume we can't go to Korea with all of our forces. We can build up to the level of our DPQ commitment (eight divisions) by withholding from any deployments to Korea a minimum force for NATO. That means we have to take another look at Korea to see what we would be able to do under those circumstances. This chart shows that with POM forces, we can't ever match the JSOP requirements in Korea. With FYDP forces, we can come close.

One of the consequences of going from the FYDP to POM force levels is that it affects Marine Corps readiness. It reduces Marine Corps manning from 90% to 75%, which means that the number of rifle companies is cut. Aircraft procurement is reduced, as is amphibious capability. This means that to deploy two Marine divisions to NATO, we will draw units from the third division and thereby decimate it. Or if we go first to Korea with two Marine divisions and then have to go to NATO, we can use the third division in NATO plus a reserve division, assuming FYDP levels. At POM levels, we can introduce the third active division but the other division can't come in until later. What this means is that we have a reduced capability to go to the NATO flanks.

Turning to the question of the capability of NATO sea-control forces, we find that with the POM levels, a Navy analysis shows that during the first few days there would be heavy shipping and submarine losses while we are attritting the Soviet submarine fleet. There would be a significant exposure to losses at sea which would have an effect on our ability to deploy to NATO.

Dr. Kissinger: We could run out of ammunition.

Dr. Tucker: That is true. That is why for our own forces we have prepositioned supplies for eight divisions.

Mr. Packard: We have looked at the total stocks. There is enough for several months.

Dr. Kissinger: I am just trying to get an agreed definition so that we would know what we are working against.

Mr. Packard: We won't run out of ammunition in 90 days if we get it shipped.

Dr. Kissinger: *If* we get it shipped. The question is whether we run out before we get the pipeline established.

Adm. Moorer: That's what the ninety-day supply is all about.

Dr. Tucker: We have stocks and equipment for our eight divisions for about 60 days. As for our Allies, that's a different story.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to repeat yesterday's discussion.[9] All I want is an understanding of the factual situation. No one wants to be shut off entirely after 90 days.

We need to have a picture of what is included in the 90-day supply. We should not take average figures based on consumption rates and think we are planning on a realistic basis.

Mr. Johnson: Have you weighed your deployment capabilities with likely shipping losses?

Dr. Tucker: For the U.S. forces, we have. We can sustain eight divisions for 60 days. For Allied forces, we can't assure that we can do so.

Dr. Kissinger: Would the ships be available right away.

Adm. Moorer: They would have to be assembled.

Dr. Tucker: There is currently a Joint Staff study underway on this issue.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we couldn't assume that we could start shipping on D-day.

Dr. Tucker: That is why we have prepositioned supplies: for use while we are building up our shipping and killing enemy submarines.

Mr. Johnson: This may sound like a Navy speech, but it is based on the material from the study, and the study certainly wasn't under Navy control. Given growing Soviet capabilities and given our growing shortage of naval sealift and protection capability, can we demonstrate that we can really deploy equivalent ground forces in Asia and Europe? There seems to be a serious shortfall in our sea forces, and our other forces have little meaning if we can't supply them.

Dr. Tucker: There is no quick way to fix this situation. By spending more money in FY 73 we can't make things come out any differently. There are ways of compensating, however: by prepositioning equipment and having redundant shipping.

Adm. Moorer: Don't forget that there are people on those ships that are being sunk.

Mr. Packard: That's what we have the C–5A's for.

Dr. Tucker: Exactly.

If we take a look at manpower, we find that from the FY 64 level there was an increase because of the Southeast Asia conflict. Now we are cutting manning levels, which reduces readiness, in the Marine Corps. We are decreasing some of our air forces, which means that we have 10–20% less initial air combat capability. We have also squeezed our general support.

Mr. Packard: This chart is important. It shows we are now below FY 64, that is, pre-Vietnam, strength.

Dr. Kissinger: With a much higher budget.

Mr. Packard: We would have to add $25 billion to have the same forces as in 1964. There is one thing that can be said, however. The forces we have today are more capable than those we had in 1964.

Mr. Johnson: That is also true of the other side's forces.

Dr. Tucker: That is why we have modernization programs. It is interesting to note that in making cuts required by shifting from the FYDP to the POM, the services opted for a 12% cut in RDT&E but only a 3% cut in procurement.

We have a final chart that shows the principal shortfalls and the amount of funds required to correct them. These shortfalls include the loss of Marine Corps readiness, of army NATO capability, and of tactical air capability, elimination of ASW carriers, and a reduction in the number of ships committed to NATO.

Mr. Packard: That last item is important. Both of the budget levels proposed involve a significant reduction to our present DPQ commitments.

Dr. Kissinger: Do these figures on funds required to correct the shortfall apply to the $81.7 billion budget level?

Dr. Tucker: No, they are what would have to be added to the budget at a $78.6 billion level.

There are other shortfalls that could be mentioned—reductions in naval repair facilities, a cut in research and development, the reduction from one division to one-third of a division in Korea, decreasing tactical air sorties below the 10,000 level in Southeast Asia, a reduction in MAP to Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you planning to cut Cambodian MAP?

Mr. Odeen: $200 million was allotted under the FYDP. Now the figure is $160 million.

Dr. Kissinger: On what theory?

Mr. Odeen: There are more demands on the funds.

Mr. Packard: This is part of the scrubbing.

Dr. Tucker: There are also various ways we could list to save money. We could make further reductions in tactical air.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you can't.

Dr. Tucker: We could also reduce the number of carriers more rapidly. We could go to 10

instead of 12. We could take out the Army brigade in Alaska and the division in Hawaii. We could reduce our air forces, phase out the B–52s, reduce Safeguard.

Mr. Packard: Cutting Safeguard wouldn't help us much in FY 73.

Mr. Johnson: In referring to these reductions, do you mean that they would reduce the budget below the $79.6 billion level?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have all got the point about what you want to do. It is beyond my absorptive capacity to hold any more of this sort of information. We are not going to discuss individual items here. (to Adm. Moorer) Tom, do you have anything to add?

Adm. Moorer: I would just say that since 1968 we have been methodically and continually reducing our military forces. At the same time, the Soviets have been building up all across the board. As far as the POM and FYDP are concerned, the Chiefs were worried even before these cutbacks were made. We are reducing Titan, we are making no improvements in our strategic forces, we are cutting our capability to protect the flanks of NATO, we are taking 3-1/3 divisions out of Asia, and we are faced with a serious threat to our shipping. The Soviets are in the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic. If we have to run to the Pacific, we could get flanked in Central Europe. Conversely, we can't leave Hawaii, Guam, and Alaska unattended. Today the Soviets are deploying Polaris-type submarines on the West Coast. We are cutting our tactical air squadrons by four. We have been talking for three years about rock-bottom defense budgets. No longer can I go to Congress and testify that this is rock-bottom. I think the risk is unacceptable. I make the plea that rather than devise some magic strategy, we say that we can't afford an adequate defense, that we are broke, and that we have to pull in our horns and move back to the U.S. With these reductions the President cannot have the flexibility required for a viable foreign policy in the light of the Soviet build-up. We cannot gloss over the fact that this [budget] carries very high risks and reduces the President's options.

(Mr. Shultz left the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Kissinger: When this whole issue first came to the President, it was formulated in terms of what the budget could stand. I took the position that I could make no contribution to such a discussion. Once it was formulated in terms of its impact on our national security, then I could comment. The President replied: "That's true, but I have yet to see a budget presentation that I can understand and that will give me a choice." If you give him a list like the last one [the chart showing possible additional reductions], he doesn't know what it means. He wants to know how all of this affects the security and foreign policy of the United States. The Defense Department staff works months on the budget, my staff spends weeks, but the President can devote only a few hours. That is the natural way for the decision-making process to work. I told the President: "Give us a week

to work this over." He said: "Take three weeks." He is going to be restless if the analysis that he receives is in military or budgetary terms.

Dr. Walker: Just before I came to this meeting I talked with Secretary Connally. I told him that as a newcomer to this group I planned just to listen and keep my mouth shut. He said: "Don't keep your mouth shut." He was at the meeting you [Kissinger] mentioned. If anything, I think you have understated the color of the language the President used. He felt extremely strongly about the formula of allocating one-third of the funds to each service.

Mr. Weinberger: I have known the President a long time, and I have rarely seen him so exercised. He said that talking about "pieces of horses" meant nothing. 72% of the budget is uncontrollable and 28% controllable, of which 70% is Defense. No one is out to get Defense, but that is the only area we can look at without asking Congress to make laws that we can't realistically expect them to make.

Mr. Packard: We can go to a lower budget. However, it could mean that we would have no ability to deploy ground forces in Asia, that we couldn't deploy in the Mediterranean, or that we couldn't go to NATO if necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: I am convinced that if we can present this to the President in terms of what is needed for national security, he will go for more than we can afford. However, if we give it to him as it has been presented here, he will take a whack here and there in order to fit it into the full employment budget. You will have to explain what these items mean. He doesn't understand why we are reducing our air defense when we can't handle a small attack and are not even trying for the capability to meet a large attack. If you don't give him the answers to these questions, he will just cut.

You talk about having one-third of a carrier in the Pacific. Yet Japan is thinking more about going neutral. The Indonesian Ambassador was just in to see the President and told him that what is important is that the U.S. retain a physical presence in the Pacific. Budget terms don't mean a thing to the President. We are facing a major readjustment in our Asia policy. The Japanese and Thais are watching us. We can say that we are not going to abandon our friends, but they want to see what we are doing.

Mr. Johnson: That is my speech.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Asians see that all American forces are leaving, it will trigger consequences that over time could cost us ten times as much as maintaining our forces. Japan might decide to go nuclear. The Koreans might make their own security arrangements. With these countries not so dependent on us, it would be more difficult to make headway with them on economic issues. This is the crude political argument.

When we talk about comparing today's forces with those we had in 1964 and 1968, we are

referring to a period when—in 1964—the U.S. had overriding nuclear superiority. Even in 1968 we still were in a very strong position.

I have often asked myself under what circumstances I would go to the President and recommend that he implement SIOP, knowing that this would result in a minimum casualty level of 50 million. I don't think you can find fifteen contingencies where we would wish to do so and where our opponents would believe that we would do so. Therefore, the whole strategic picture has changed. Other countries judge us by what we are capable of doing. It is not consoling to make comparisons with 1964 when the whole strategic situation was different. We haven't changed SIOP in fifteen years. Of course, we have been through all of this before in our discussions of the value of having a damage-limiting capability and whether we might just be hitting empty holes if we had one.

What we need is to tell the President what you [Defense] are trying to do and explain what the constraints are at a level of $79 billion. If we slide along making cuts here and there, we will wind up with an empty shell. Sooner or later we will have to pay the price.

The President doesn't picture the issues in terms of thirteen or fourteen or fifteen or twelve carriers. He wants to know the role of carriers in the emerging situation where every country is reexamining its position. I frankly don't think he would understand the presentation we have had here. He wants to know what the implications are for foreign policy and national security.

Mr. Packard: I think we can put this in simple terms. The basic questions are what we should deploy in Asia and whether we are to back off in NATO. Of course, we could save $11.5 million if you would let us close bases here at home without restraints.

Dr. Kissinger: That will have to wait until the day after the election. It would help if we could tell the President that if we make certain reductions in our NATO forces while providing more for Asia, there will be certain consequences. Or we should explain to him that if he wants to meet our commitments in NATO and Asia, then the Defense budget will have to go up by so much.

Mr. Packard: I am happy to give it to you in those terms. But here we have been discussing how we manage our ammunition supply.

Dr. Kissinger: For the NSC meeting this material should be presented in gross terms. The significant cuts should be explained not in terms of the budget but in terms of some mission.

Mr. Weinberger: The rule of one-third to each service brings out the President's strongest language. He believes there are other substantial dollar savings possible in the budget.

Dr. Kissinger: This is not an exercise in forcing the budget down. The idea is to present the issues in such terms that the principals can handle them at one meeting.

Mr. Weinberger: That's right.

Mr. Johnson: Aren't there three elements involved? The first involves our own forces in absolute terms.

Mr. Packard: We have provided some analysis in relative terms, for example, on losses at sea.

Mr. Johnson: The second element would be the relative position of our ground, air, and naval forces compared to Soviet forces. The third would be the foreign policy effects. This all has to be integrated. We would be glad to contribute.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not worried about which working group does it. I just want to know whether we can have it by Monday evening.[10]

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Packard) Do you think you can package the alternatives in terms of foreign policy objectives?

Mr. Packard: We can package the alternatives that way. The problem is in making judgments on such matters as the 1.7:1 force ratio [for a NATO defense]. (to Adm. Moorer) We have to reexamine the purpose of some of these forces, Tom.

Adm. Moorer: The President shouldn't have to bother about line items.

Dr. Kissinger: He doesn't want to. Let's aim for Monday as a deadline for having the issues paper prepared. We might have a quick meeting of this group to look it over before the NSC meeting.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–73 [2 of 3]. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Brackets are in the original. In an August 4 memorandum to Kissinger, Wayne Smith stated that the purpose of the meeting was "to review the state of our defense posture and the capabilities it makes available to meet our strategic objectives." (Ibid., Box H–104, DPRC Meeting, DOD Strategy and Fiscal Guidance, 8/5/71)

[2] Not present at the beginning of the meeting. [This footnote in the original referred to all four participants from the Department of State.]

[3] See Document 152.

[4] An apparent reference to "Planning and Programming Guidance for the FY 73–77 Defense Program," sent by Laird to the service secretaries and Moorer on April 21. See footnote 6, Document 184.

[5] See Document 188.

[6] Kissinger discussed his objective for the DPRC meeting with Shultz's deputy, Weinberger, during a telephone conversation on August 5. According to the transcript, Kissinger told Weinberger that he was "going to be brutal at the meeting this afternoon. I am saying I am ordered by the President not to accept this approach [by the Defense Department of allocating equal amounts of the Defense budget to the three branches of the armed services], that he wants alternative missions and wants to know what can be cut and what can't." Kissinger asked Weinberger to "back me up," by saying he too had attended the budget meeting with President Nixon on July 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[7] The charts referenced in the minutes were not found.

[8] See footnote 7, Document 181.

[9] On August 4, the DPRC met to discuss NATO force improvements. The minutes of the meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

[10] August 9. The paper was submitted on August 11; see Document 192.

191. Memorandum for the President's Files by the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, August 10, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
Admiral Moorer—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Westmoreland—Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Admiral Zumwalt—Chief of Naval Operations
General Ryan—Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
General Chapman—Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The President introduced the meeting by emphasizing that this year's budgetary problems are more complex and difficult than those of the preceding year. The President noted that it was ironic that a conservative President could do less in the defense area that what one would expect. He observed that Senator Proxmire[2] and other responsible leaders on the Hill are going over each Service budget with a fine-tooth comb and unquestionably cuts would be imposed through Congressional action this coming year. The President stated that the point he was trying to make is that despite the need for increased defense spending the environment in the Congress does not lend itself to a hopeful outlook.

In addition to the foregoing, the President continued, all concerned are aware that the military as a profession has been under a diabolical attack from every source. It is now fashionable to say that we've got too much in the way of defense and that the people that we have serving in our Armed Forces are of low caliber. The President noted that his Administration has been trying to reverse this trend in attitude. Nevertheless, Congress could be expected to reflect the public attitude. Congressmen no longer lead as they did 25 years ago but rather take their cue from what they consider to be the popular consensus. The President noted that when the question is asked of the American people in the right way their response is always strong and patriotic. For example, they would answer "no" if they were asked if they wanted the United States to slip into the second most powerful position. Unfortunately, however, the question is not posed in this black and white fashion.

Thus, the President continued, as with the previous two years, this year will be especially difficult in getting the Congress to support even the rock bottom minimum which the Executive will request. Nevertheless, the President emphasized, it is his job and the job of the Chiefs to lay out what is required and then to fight to see that these requirements are

met. It is obvious that these great tides frequently change and sometime in the future we will turn the corner when the American people will be willing to give far more for defense.

For all these reasons it is essential that the Executive Branch present its requirements in the most effective way. The President stated that his chief concern about our military posture was not its current state but rather the state that it would reach as a result of the decisions being made now. The President noted that the Joint Chiefs must harbor some considerable frustrations. Nevertheless, he wanted them to be aware that he was determined that the United States would remain first in military posture. He emphasized that his view is of the future, not of the past. At the same time he cautioned that pragmatism would indicate that the battle will be tougher this year than ever before.

The President then turned the presentation over to Admiral Moorer but Secretary Laird intervened, commenting that the defense posture and defense budget (the budget for FY 1972) will fare reasonably well this year. It was probable that all but 1.5% of the Administration's request would be cleared by the Congress. The Secretary stated that he had had outstanding support this past year from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and that this coming year's budget when priced out in requirements terms from a military viewpoint totalled some $94 billion after it was scrubbed by the Chairman versus the $117 billion JSOP requirement. Based on these reviews, the Secretary had put out guidance at a level of $79.6 billion which would be used as a baseline for discussions that day by the various chiefs. Thus we were talking about three fundamental planning figures. Secretary Laird's guidance at $79.6 billion, the strategic guidance baseline issued earlier by Defense which totalled $83 billion and the JSOP itself prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which anticipated requirements at a level of $117 billion.[3]

Admiral Moorer began his presentation by indicating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff greatly appreciated the support of the Commander in Chief. He also expressed the appreciation of the group that the President would take the time to hear their individual presentations. He noted that the professional military were well aware of the problems borne by the President. Nevertheless, they believed that it was essential that the President hear their considered military views since the strategic balance is the basis for the nation's security.

The Chairman commenced his briefing by showing a series of charts[4] covering the following subjects:

—A chart showing the increasing threat from Soviet ICBM's starting at a period when the Soviets had some 90 silos at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. He went then to a chart that showed the growth of Soviet submarines and next a chart showing the status of Soviet bomber aircraft. Finally in discussing strategic systems the Chairman showed a chart which indicated that the Soviets could have as many as 2,120 strategic weapons versus 2,710 for the United States by the year 1976. The Chairman noted that the U.S. MIRV provided the edge with the Minuteman III and Poseidon. This would continue to assure us a strategic edge providing the Soviets do not MIRV. The Chairman then

pointed out the differences between U.S. strategic forces and Soviet forces in terms of megatonnage, with the Soviets outstripping us by 11,700 megatons versus 3800 for U.S. strategic forces.

—A chart of strategic defense systems which showed a comparison of the full range of U.S. and Soviet strategic defensive systems. The Chairman made the point that all of the charts confirmed that we have now entered a period of strategic parity which was decidedly different than the period of former superiority. He noted that this year's budget provided less manpower, less ships and less aircraft than the U.S. has had since World War II. He noted that during the prior Administration the U.S. had purchased military end items from the viewpoint of attrition but not with the view towards modernization of our basic forces. This was further complicated in the Vietnam war period when we drewdown for war in the Pacific from our readiness in the Atlantic and NATO. The Chairman stated that the military had tried to reverse this trend by increasing the modernization of weapons but that these steps at today's inflated costs are most expensive.

The Chairman then commented that the Soviets have continued to build up all of their conventional forces and all of their services and then turned to a map of the world to graphically display the kinds of improvements the Soviets have undertaken. He noted the following:

—Submarines located between the U.S. and Hawaii.
—Submarines in the Florida straits.
—Attack submarines which threatened our water routes to Europe and elsewhere.
—Increased naval presence in the Cuban area.
—The threat posed by political events in Chile.
—Turning next to the Mediterranean he stressed that Malta was now in jeopardy and stated that the Congressional attitude on Greece was making our foothold there all the more difficult. He noted the increased Soviet buildup in Egypt and the fact that the Soviets were not overflying the Sinai Peninsula with Foxbat aircraft. He emphasized that the Soviets have provided to the Egyptians the latest in modern air defense equipment.
—The increased Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and the recent signature of a treaty with India.[5]
—The impact that reversion of Okinawa would have on our strategic posture in the Pacific and the need to relocate our tactical nuclear stocks.
—The question mark of Taiwan, the Philippines and the all important issue of the future orientation of Japan. He emphasized that Japan will most likely take its cue from its assessment of our own military resolve and capability.

For all the preceding reasons, the Chairman emphasized, the JCS have become increasingly concerned by the shift in balance in military power.

Turning to the budget, he stated that the 79.6 budget has been examined in detail by the

JCS. They have looked strenuously for areas that could be further reduced but the Congressionally imposed pay raise and the need to strive for an All-Volunteer force all contributed to the feeling that 79.6 was just enough for strategic force sufficiency but additional improvements are needed for command and control and accuracy. The budget provided for modernization but was weak in materiel support and relied too heavily on reserves.

The Chairman reported that the JCS have looked at a level of 81.7 billion which would provide increased air, more mobility and improved Army and Marine readiness. The Joint Staff also looked at the possibility of an 82.5 billion dollar budget level. This would provide greater improvement and demonstrate greater resolve on the part of the United States. Thus, 79.6 billion will provide the U.S. with only marginal capability. Above all, only one war could be fought—either NATO or Asia. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is also a Pacific power and a conflict in NATO would mean a conflict in Asia as well. The Soviets, for example, have over 94 submarines in the Pacific. Again, for these reasons the JCS feel that the 79.6 level is marginal with considerable risks which would deprive the President of the options he might require in future diplomatic problem solving. For all these reasons, the Chairman concluded, we should look carefully and list in realistic terms our commitments. If we cannot afford the level of spending outlined, then there is nothing left but to reduce our commitments.

The Chairman then turned the briefing over to General Westmoreland who handed a series of charts[6] to the President. General Westmoreland stated that the driving requirement of defense today is for a strong defense in Western Europe. He noted that NSDM 95[7] provided for a conventional initial defense. SACEUR considered that 17 Army divisions would be required for this purpose by M+90 in the central region. General Westmoreland then showed U.S. reenforcement capabilities under the budget level promulgated by Secretary Laird. This meant there would be some shortfall because of dollar and manpower constraints on our ability to meet NATO commitments by M+90.

General Westmoreland then turned to a chronological display of how Army forces had been reduced over the period 1948 through 1973. This chart reflected the fact that in practice the United States had been unable to employ or call up reserve forces in time of crisis. It also showed a precipitous decline in Army strength since 1968 with some 220,000 projected for deactivation this year alone and a total of 670,000 deactivated since 1968.

General Westmoreland noted that at either division level, that is a total of 13 divisions or 11 divisions, the Army would be at its lowest base since prior to the Korean War. He pointed out that this year's budget would only permit the Army to retain 11 combat divisions, with a crossover occurring in 1972. This reduction would result in a shortfall of four divisions in NATO alone and the assumption of significant risks for our overall ability to defend Europe. He stressed that this fact would be evident to the enemy and

also to our allies on whose support we must rely. With the retention of 13 Army divisions it would be possible to meet the NATO commitment by M+90. This would require a greater dependence on reserves but the shortfall would be far more manageable than with 11 divisions.

General Westmoreland then displayed a chart, showing that with a base structure of 13 Army divisions it would only be necessary to call up 290,000 reserves by M+90 in the event of war in Europe. But with 11 divisions it would be necessary to call up 350,000 reserves. He noted that past experience indicated the difficulty of obtaining a decision to mobilize in times of crisis. He also observed that during the Korean conflict it took 11 months to get a National Guard division prepared for combat. The budget projected for 1973 therefore demanded a greater requirement on reserves. Even if the Army were able to retain 13 divisions it would only have some 69% of its required force structure in the event of a conflict in Europe. General Westmoreland emphasized that the Army needed visibility and forces in being, for this is the essence of deterrence.

With an 11 division Army, General Westmoreland continued, four and one-third divisions would be in NATO, three and two-thirds would be in the Continental United States for deployment and only one division forward in the Pacific area, with one-third division reserve in Hawaii. In the final analysis, this would leave only one and two-thirds divisions in the United States to meet contingencies worldwide. It would leave the President with absolutely no flexibility for contingencies and would deprive the United States of its credibility for defense of the Asian area.

General Westmoreland emphasized that the Army needed 13 active divisions and wanted an additional $500 million to maintain this strength. He noted that such a structure would provide the basis for realistic deterrence with the ability to respond initially without mobilization. Dr. Kissinger asked why two divisions would cost $500 million.

General Westmoreland stated that the sum was needed for personnel and the operational and maintenance account. The President asked if the figure would assure the military pay raise and the steps necessary to achieve an All-Volunteer force. Secretary Laird replied affirmatively, noting that the budget assumed that the Congressionally approved pay raise would become law. The President then asked if the pay raise could be delayed. Secretary Laird replied that it had already been delayed from July until next October with some irritation to the Congress.

Admiral Moorer then turned the briefing over to General Ryan. General Ryan emphasized that the Air Force budget had been rock bottom in 1972 and was now projected at a lower figure in 1973. Using FY 1964 as a base, General Ryan noted the decline in Air Force manpower and emphasized that fewer people cost more money. Forty percent of the Air Force budget in FY 1973 would be allocated to pay and allowances. He stated that the Air Force would have 32% fewer squadrons in 1973 than in 1964. He reported that the Air Force had fewer people, fewer forces and increased costs and at the same time its

equipment was aging and the FY 1973 budget permitted the procurement of only 41 new aircraft.

General Ryan stated that he would avoid comment on strategic forces since that had been well covered by the Chairman but would instead concentrate on air defense. He noted that U.S. radars had drastically declined and that two-thirds of the U.S. intercepter aircraft would have to be met by reserve forces. He reported that Air Force readiness was declining with a reduction in numbers of crews. He noted the unsatisfied need for an aircraft shelter program in Europe.

In summary, General Ryan stated that the Air Force needed an additional $1 billion to be applied to increased sorties and therefore increased readiness, increased modernization and accelerated development of Minuteman III and the MIRV. With the improvement cited, the Air Force's posture would be greatly enhanced.

Admiral Moorer then turned the briefing over to Admiral Zumwalt. Admiral Zumwalt proceeded through a series of some 34 charts.[8] The CNO made the following points:

—He would attempt to answer the question as to why naval forces are needed, how plans are made to provide for these forces and how these forces meet the needs.
—The Nixon Doctrine demands a reorientation of U.S. military force structure. The briefing that followed would project the CNO's view.
—New constraints further underline the U.S. need to reorient its defenses.
—The question is how the military can provide the kind of power the President needs to make his diplomacy effective.

The President interrupted and stated that he had noted that Gerard Smith had discussed the possibility of a U.S. zero ABM proposal. Dr. Kissinger confirmed this and Secretary Laird stated that DOD was opposed. Secretary Laird stated that Defense was not happy with even the two-sided proposal but at least it would provide the basis for an ultimate expansion to 12. With zero ABM the whole strategic concept would have to be modified.[9]

Dr. Kissinger commented that the zero ABM proposal would only lead to discussion of a comprehensive agreement while the May 20 statement[10] was an effort to get a limitation on ABM plus a temporary bridge for offensive limitations. Dr. Kissinger emphasized that he agreed with the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs if a quick agreement is to be realized. Secretary Laird stated that he agreed with this thinking except for the cutoff date in NSDMs 117 and 120,[11] which would give the Soviets unnecessary numerical advantage. Dr. Kissinger assured Secretary Laird that the issue would be reviewed.

Secretary Laird stated that the United States Government cannot move off a position once it has been agreed to. The President stated that zero ABM plus a strategic freeze would only serve to put the U.S. in an inferior position. He instructed Dr. Kissinger to move Mr. Smith from that course of action.

Admiral Zumwalt then continued his briefing:

—We are observing increasing growth of neutralism of the Finnish type. The Soviet naval threat is increasing in Asia, the Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean.
—All the foregoing suggests that the U.S. should shift its defensive emphasis to that of a maritime power.
—The Middle East and Greece are no longer an assured base for land, air and ground forces and thus they are no longer relevant.

The President again interrupted and asked whether or not the Poseidon was working well since the Poseidon and Minuteman III with the MIRV are our most important strategic assets. The President asked Dr. Kissinger why the Soviets were not interested in a MIRV ban. Dr. Kissinger replied that it was because the Soviets are behind us in MIRV development. They want to catch up. Secretary Laird noted that he estimated that the Soviets will have MIRV's in CY 1972 or 1973. The President observed that most of our Congressmen wanted a MIRV ban at the very time when it is most crucial for our defense.

Mr. Packard stated that the MIRV is essential unless we get a specific agreement stopping total numbers of offensive systems. The Minuteman III with three MIRV's each is equal to one Minuteman I in accuracy and lethality. It is essential to our current strategic balance. It provides additional targetting flexibility and must not be given up.

The Vice President asked if there were an offensive limitation couldn't the Soviets merely move forward with the MIRV in the final analysis? Admiral Zumwalt replied that a crucial question was the number of MIRV's that are provided to each warhead—10 or 20. The Vice President stated that he thought that throw weight would be a key issue. Secretary Laird stated that this is the precise reason for his concern. He stated that the U.S. advantage is technology and that with appropriate research and development we can maintain our present lead. The President agreed that for this reason the U.S. must push research and development which is allowed within the provisions of the May 20 agreement.

General Ryan stated that we must continue to push for increased accuracy and that this is the very argument that opens us to accusations that we are going to a first strike. The President agreed that it was essential that the U.S. push research and development leading towards increased accuracy.

Dr. Kissinger stated that the China studies[12] confirmed that Minuteman is of no value against targets on the Mainland due to the need to overfly Soviet territory. Therefore, the emphasis against that target must be with aircraft and Poseidons. The study also confirmed that the U.S. will be able to pre-empt for perhaps the next 10 to 15 years. The President observed that this was also why bombers remain relevant. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Poseidon would not be good against Soviet hard targets but would be most effective against soft Chinese targets.

Admiral Zumwalt continued his briefing:

—He emphasized the continuing change in the conventional balance and noted that the Soviets were outbuilding the U.S. in missile platforms and merchant ships. The President asked whether the CNO was drawing his comparisons from just U.S. power or whether he was including allies as well. The CNO answered that he had included allied vessels also.
—The Soviets are moving towards a three-to-one superiority in submarines, to include superiority in nuclear vessels, while at the same time improving noise levels to approach our technology.
—The Soviets have a greater naval presence in the Mediterranean and will increase the margin in 1973.
—The Soviets have built bases near Libya, and Malta is now in doubt. The President noted that it was tragic that we lost the Malta election by only one vote.[13]
—U.S. naval ship days at sea are decreasing.
—Ten years from now the Soviets will have complete dominance in the Indian Ocean.
—The U.S. decline in naval power has been persistent and each projection of the Soviet buildup has underestimated their capabilities.
—At the same time the U.S. has declined 43% in combat vessels and 15% in personnel, and only in the shore establishments have we retained a large overhead.
—Admiral Zumwalt asked the President to view the budget of $79.6 billion from the perspective of "Jimmy the Greek."[14] In sum, our naval capability in NATO started to decline in 1970, became marginal in 1971, was worse in 1972, by 1973 the Navy cannot carry out its mission in the Pacific, Mediterranean or in NATO and there would be no guarantee of victory in a war at sea.
—The CNO presented his view of the relative priorities for force emphasis:
(1) Strategic forces.
(2) Control of Seas.
(3) Land forces.
—Talk of projection of land forces abroad using air mobility lacks factual basis since 94% of supplies must come over the water.
—In the event of the loss of our allies we can only survive through sea power.
—The following additional naval needs should be met:
(1) $102 million for new ship procurement.
(2) $106 million for new aircraft carrier procurement.
(3) A new nuclear carrier.
(4) A new nuclear frigate.
(5) Retain 107 ships scheduled for phase-out.
(6) Grant authority for additional base closures.
(7) Great authority for home-porting of naval vessels abroad.

The CNO concluded by emphasizing his own view of a war outcome, which suggested a less than 30% chance of victory at sea in a conflict with the Soviets.

Admiral Moorer then turned the briefing over to General Chapman, who made the following points:

—The Marines are in excellent shape with three divisions and three support wings and a peacetime strength of 206,000.
—All Marines are out of Vietnam with new modern equipment, both air and ground. The President asked if the Marines learned something in Vietnam. General Westmoreland answered that much was learned, especially in helicopter-borne operations and electronic warfare. The President observed that much of what was learned was for a specialized war. General Westmoreland replied that many of the lessons learned would be applicable in war with the Soviets. General Chapman added that all services had emerged with a reservoir of combat experience. Now it would be necessary to learn how to use the new equipment.
—The Marines would have two-thirds of a division in Okinawa, one division on the East Coast and one division on the West Coast.
—Additional needs would be met by reserves on M+60. Since July, however, reserve recruiting was only achieving 55% of its goal.
—The Marines are in excellent shape, ready to fight.
—In FY 1973 the new budget will require a reduction of 20,000 Marines and the cutting of 27 companies or one company per battalion on the ground and one squadron per air wing. To restore these cuts $178 million would be needed.
—The Marines are ready even with one company out of each battalion.

The President stated that he wished to have Secretary Connally and Presidential Assistant Shultz receive the briefing as soon as possible because he wanted all of our Government spokesmen to speak from the same frame of reference. The President then observed that military credibility is the essence of deterrence but more importantly is based on the forces that can be seen in the grey areas of India, Japan, the Middle East and Latin America. An effective foreign policy stems directly from a credible defense posture. Our relative strength vis-à-vis the Soviets and Chinese is actually less of a problem than the image we project to the grey areas and especially Japan. It is not a simple matter of merely withdrawing our forces because of no military need but the psychological impact of our withdrawal.

With respect to the Navy, the President continued, the picture is very disturbing. The real problem is modernization of the Soviet fleet both in numbers of vessels and missiles. Mr. Packard commented that for whatever the reason, the U.S. has not been as good as it should have been. There are now steps underway to provide for more modernization. Modernization of the fleet is far more important than the retention of outmoded ships.

The Vice President stated that he had been in the Pacific on three occasions and had noted that U.S. credibility is derived largely from what the small nations report about our presence. At present they suspect we are losing our military power. When this is reported to potential enemies it cannot but hurt. Thus they have concluded that the Nixon

Doctrine is merely a formula for bug-out. Admiral Moorer added that Prime Minister Sato[15] had told him the same thing.

Secretary Laird commented that the U.S. is not bugging out but is going to maintain its presence. The Vice President asked, "But at what levels?" He then reiterated the view that in any event our actions have caused the Asians to doubt this.

The President then asked Secretary Laird if the Congress would vote new taxes. Secretary Laird replied emphatically that it would not. Admiral Moorer observed that as in the past a crisis was needed to reverse the trend. Admiral Zumwalt interjected that it is the trend that will bring on the crisis. The Vice President retorted that he did not agree with this analysis since the erosion of American determination will continue and the weaker we are the less inclined we will be to react in time of crisis.

Secretary Laird stated that the Chief of Naval Operations' view is a good one. It is hard for us to retain our land-based air. Taiwan and Okinawa may not be available but a naval presence can be maintained. Our current strength is already down to one and one-third Army divisions spread between Korea and Hawaii. Thus our current strength is down to nothing. Navy and Air Force strength will continue to decline.

The President noted that the Indian Ocean remains a problem and in the Middle East at the time of the Jordanian crisis the Soviets were bluffed with little U.S. strength. Dr. Kissinger stated that he was a great believer in the importance of sea power but at the same time it should be noted that allies cannot be convinced with sea power alone. Evidence of this was the Korean conflict in the 1950s. Sea power is ambivalent and there can be no substitute for a visible ground presence in Southeast Asia.

Secretary Laird replied that the decision had already been made on ground power. Dr. Kissinger replied that that kind of a decision would have to come to the National Security Council. The President then commented that another factor would be air power. Secretary Laird commented that it then was obvious that we would have to have a 13 division force.

Admiral Moorer then observed that the Trust Territories were also an important problem area.

Secretary Laird then complained that much of the Defense budget was for national reconnaissance and CIA buried in the Defense budget. Unfortunately, the Air Force had to pay these bills. The real question now was how low the U.S. could go and remain credible. Morale was also a severe problem and retention of good men was most difficult during a period of declining expenditures.

The meeting then adjourned.

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 62, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room and lasted from 10:05 to 11:54 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) There is a tape recording of this conversation. (Ibid., Presidential Tape Recordings, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 68–7)

[2] Senator William Proxmire (D–Wisconsin).

[3] See footnote 6, Document 184 and 187. Laird discussed this meeting and the Chiefs' objectives with Kissinger during two telephone conversations, one on August 4 and another on August 9. Laird said that inter-service tensions had developed over the projected Defense budget. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[4] Not found.

[5] On August 9, the Soviet Union and India announced the signing of a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation.

[6] Not found.

[7] NSDM 95, "U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO," November 25, 1970, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

[8] Not found.

[9] The zero ABM option in SALT proposed elimination of all such systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The two-sided option proposed allowing each side to retain limited ABM capabilities, including systems to defend NCA.

[10] On May 20, Nixon and Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin issued a joint communiqué about SALT, stating that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to concentrate on working out one agreement limiting ABMs and another limiting offensive strategic weapons. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 160.

[11] For the texts of NSDM 117, "Instructions for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki," July 2, and NSDM 120, which gave further instructions for the U.S. SALT Delegation on July 20, see ibid., Documents 171 and 180.

[12] Reference is to the NSSM 69 study; see footnote 7, Document 181.

[13] General elections held in Malta June 12–14 resulted in a victory for the Labour Party, which by obtaining a one-seat majority in the new Maltese House of Representatives ended 9 years of rule by the Nationalist Party. (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1971–1972, p. 24709)

[14] Jimmy "The Greek" Snyder was a Las Vegas oddsmaker, sports expert, and television personality.

[15] Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan.

192. Paper Prepared by the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group[1]

Washington, August 11, 1971.

DEFENSE STRATEGY, FORCES, AND BUDGETS

I. The Problem

The President must consider major strategy and force issues in connection with the DoD budget for FY 1973. To assist in these decisions, this paper:

—delineates the national security objectives we design our forces to support,
—describes factors in the international situation which bear on the design of U.S. strategy and forces,
—assesses the capabilities of current and planned forces, and
—discusses alternatives to current and planned forces and assesses their costs and other implications.

Apart from the basic considerations of our security policy objectives, economic and budgetary factors bear importantly on decisions concerning forces and budgets for FY 1973. Budgets currently being developed within DoD which when added to planned domestic expenditures appear to involve expenditures above those consistent with a balanced full employment budget.

[Omitted here are Sections II and III, which recapitulate the objectives of U.S. military forces and the current national security situation.]

IV. U.S. Strategic Forces

In order to meet our national security objectives, the U.S. plans our strategic forces to meet the following criteria (NSDM–16):[2]

—Maintain high confidence that the U.S. second-strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
—Ensure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis.
—Deny to the Soviets the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the U.S. than they themselves would suffer in a nuclear war.
—Deploy defenses to limit damage from small attacks to a low-level.

In addition to this specific guidance, the following guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense is used to plan strategic forces:

—Numbers, characteristics and deployments of U.S. forces should not be interpreted by the Soviets as being intended to threaten a disarming attack.
—Forces should be adequate to prevent ourselves and our allies from being coerced.
—Forces should be sufficient to help our theater nuclear capabilities and the nuclear capabilities of our allies to deter nuclear attacks.
—We need to have available strategic alternatives (including command and control capabilities) appropriate to the nature and level of provocation.
—We should not plan strategic forces for the purpose of limiting damage to the U.S. in the event of a large nuclear attack.

In addition to the above planning criteria, our current force planning must take into account SALT. Unilateral actions to change our forces in a major way could affect our position in SALT.

A. U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Capabilities

Our presently planned strategic offensive forces have the following military capabilities:

—Following a surprise Soviet attack our mutually supporting bomber and missile forces could, if targeted solely against urban/industrial targets, destroy about 75% of Soviet industry and about 45% of the Soviet population. Each major force component currently has an independent "assured destruction" capability to destroy at least 25% of the Soviet population and about 40% of Soviet industry. While this is one measure of confidence in deterrence, our forces are actually targeted against a variety of military targets as well as urban/industrial areas.
—Our strategic forces have very little damage-limiting capability against the Soviet Union, since we have no offensive force that can destroy both time-sensitive and hardened targets and we do not have ABM defenses to protect U.S. population against large-scale attacks. On the other hand, against unhardened military targets we have a substantial offensive counterforce capability.
—Against China, our strategic offensive forces presently have a capability to substantially limit damage to the U.S., its Pacific bases and Asian allies through pre-emptive counterforce strikes. On the other hand, it is not clear that the U.S. could totally disarm China in a first strike since we cannot be confident of locating, targeting, and destroying all Chinese nuclear forces prior to launch. The uncertainties about the effectiveness of a disarming strike against China will grow in the future. However, the U.S. possesses and will continue to possess through the 1970s the capability to destroy about 10% of China's total population (about 70 million people in the 100 largest cities) and over 75% of her industry. This would not significantly affect our capabilities against the Soviet Union.

If not precluded by an arms control agreement, continuing growth in level and quality of Soviet strategic forces could have a major impact on U.S. strategic offensive force capabilities:

—Continuing improvements in the Soviet ICBM force could threaten the survival of the land-based Minuteman force by the midto-late 1970s, if we took no offsetting actions.
—Soviet SLBMs could threaten the survivability of the U.S. bomber force because of the short warning time, and
—Continuing growth and improvements in Soviet air defenses could threaten the penetration of U.S. bombers and raise uncertainty in the penetration capability of U.S. missiles.

Current force improvements and R&D on strategic offensive forces are designed to maintain our capabilities if these threats continue to develop. The JCS, however, believe the rate of modernization should be accelerated.

B. U.S. Strategic Defensive Force Capabilities

U.S. strategic defensive systems include the Safeguard ABM system, CONUS air defense, space surveillance and defense, and civil defense.

Current planning for strategic defensive forces emphasizes defense against small attacks and protection for strategic retaliatory forces.

In the absence of a SALT agreement, the United States is planning to deploy the 12-site Safeguard ABM defense which will provide a capability to:

—protect Minuteman against a limited range of Soviet threats;
—limit damage to U.S. cities, military targets and command and control centers from small missile attacks;
—provide added time during a large or small missile attack for safe escape of alert bombers and air defense interceptors and for moving command authorities to alternate command centers.

Our present strategic air defense forces are designed to defend strategic retaliatory forces and command and control centers; restrict unauthorized overflight of CONUS; and limit damage from small bomber attacks. The current force would have little capability if the bomber attack is preceded by a missile attack. In the future, the present forces would have a limited capability against the projected low-altitude threat, would continue to have almost no survivability against missile attacks, and would provide only limited bomber attack warning.

C. Strategic Command and Control Capabilities

An effective command and control capability is essential to provide the President with options to use the strategic forces during periods of crisis. Given our present capabilities, the preplanned strategic responses could be carried out but other more selective responses would be difficult if not impossible to execute.

D. Alternative Force Postures

Although our forces are sufficient today to satisfy our objectives we face problems in the future because of:

—the present and potential threats to the survivability of our strategic offensive forces;
—the possibility that an arms control agreement may limit the deployment of ballistic missile defenses;
—the expense of force improvements and modernization in the light of the increasing pressure to reduce Defense spending; and
—the need to improve the flexibility of our strategic forces against a wider range of contingencies.

These considerations lead to alternative programs for strategic forces in the future.

1. *Strategic Offensive Force Alternatives*

Our strategic offensive forces could be planned along the following range of alternatives which are undergoing further study prior to consideration later this year.

—Continue with the current Triad concept, improving its flexibility, to maintain a high confidence deterrent force against current and future uncertainties. This is the approach of the current defense program. It would require $6.9 billion in FY 73 outlays and about $44 billion in FY 73–77.
—Only rely on two of the force components to provide an independent retaliatory capability. This posture would have lesser confidence than the Triad since the force would be more sensitive to technological breakthroughs or major force failures. It would require $6.7 billion in FY 73 outlays and about $40 billion in FY 73–77.
—Maintain a posture wherein each of the three force components would provide a lower level and "non-independent" retaliatory capability. This posture would require $6.6 billion in FY 73 and $34 billion in FY 73–77.

2. *Strategic Defensive Force Alternatives*

ABM—The major strategic defensive force issue is what to do about Safeguard in FY 73 and beyond. The presently planned 12-site program (FY 80 completion) is essential if we are to retain the fourth NSDM–16 strategic sufficiency criteria. Many believe a light defense against China would have important strategic utility and political significance in extending deterrence to allies. On the other hand, a 12–site program is inconsistent with the position we have taken in SALT. There is little chance it will be approved by Congress unless SALT fails.

If we are to plan a smaller Safeguard system:

—Reducing the program to four sites would reduce FY 73 outlays by $130 million and FY 73–77 cost by about $5.6 billion.
—Reducing the program to three sites would reduce FY 73 outlays by $200 million and FY 73–77 cost by about $6.7 billion.
—Reducing to two sites would reduce FY 73 outlays by $460 million and save $7.6 billion over FY 73–77 compared to the 12-site program.

SALT could lead to a ban on ABMs, but R&D would continue on ABM defenses. An ABM ban would save about $1 billion in FY 73 and over $8 billion in FY 73–77.

Air Defenses—Because of the current and projected cost of our air defenses, several alternatives can be considered for this force:

—*Continue the current posture:* This would require $1 billion in FY 73 outlays and $5 billion in FY 73–77.
—*Modernized Posture:* This posture satisfies the air defense objectives against future threats and will improve air defense survivability against bomber attacks preceded by missile attacks. Major new systems include the Airborne Warning and Control System, the Over-the-Horizon Backscatter radar, improved interceptors and missiles. This is the current Defense program and requires $1.2 billion in FY 73 outlays and $8 billion in FY 73–77. An accelerated modernization program could be undertaken. Additional FY 73 funds would not be required, but an additional $1 billion would be needed by FY 77.
—*Reduced Air Defense Posture:* This posture would maintain the capability to provide only tactical warning of bomber attacks on the U.S. and to restrict the unauthorized overflight of CONUS. The improved radar would be deployed but all other modernization would be cancelled and air defense operations would be cut in half. This posture would have practically no air defense capability. It requires $800 million in FY 73 outlays and $3 billion in FY 73–77.

V. General Purpose Forces

Current Strategy and Capabilities

Our current strategy is based on NSDM–27 as modified by NSDM–95.[3] While deterrence is our prime objective, we plan with allied help to have the capability to:

—Conduct an initial defense in Europe *or* a sustained defense against PRC attack in one theater in Asia. In case of a simultaneous attack, NATO takes precedence.
—Aid an Asian ally in coping with a non-Chinese threat.
—Deal with a minor contingency.

DOD is presently developing its 5 year program which will serve as the basis for the FY 73 budget. However, Defense now has available two alternative programs based on different outlay ceilings:

—The FYDP program prepared last year within a ceiling of $81.7B in 73.
—Service prepared programs (POMs) within a ceiling of $79.6B.

In addition, the JCS have developed the forces they believe are needed to carry out national strategy at prudent risk (JSOP forces). Budgetary considerations are not a controlling factor.

The general purpose forces of these programs are shown on Table 1 and are compared with our forces in FY 64 and FY 72. In the discussion that follows all force and cost comparisons are based on the FYDP program and spending level.

Table 1

U.S. Active General Purpose Forces

				FY 73		
		FY 64	*FY 72*	*JSOP*[4]	*FYDP*[5]	*POM*[6]
Ground Forces						
	Army[7]	16-1/3	13-1/3	16 1/3	13-1/3	11
	USMC	3	3	3	3	3
	Total Divs.	19-1/3	16-1/3	19-1/3	16-1/3	14
Naval Forces						
	Carriers[8]	24	17	18	15	13
	Escorts	253	226	208	201	177
	Amphibious Ships	134	76	74	75	61
Tactical Air Forces						
	USAF	22	21-1/3	22	21-1/3	21-1/3
	USN	15	13	13	11	13
	USMC	15	13	13	11	13
	Total Wings	40	36-1/3	38	35-1/3	37-1/3

Capabilities for Europe

The judgment reached in NSSM 84[9] concerning NATO capabilities against the Pact remains valid for our planned forces. NSSM 84 states:

> "... if NATO and the Pact maintain approximately their present force levels in Europe, and if NATO makes some improvement to its forces, there is neither an assured forward defense against a Soviet breakthrough nor is a Soviet offensive assured of success in a relatively short conventional war. NATO could, of course, lose conventionally if it fails to act in the face of a Pact mobilization. ..."

Planned forces maintain current deployments to Europe which are indicated in the following table.

Current and Planned Deployments to Europe

Divisions	4-1/3

Separate Brigades and Regiments	3
AF Squadrons/Aircraft	22/492
Carrier Task Group	2
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)	1
[*less than 1 line not declassified*]	[*number not declassified*]

Our ability to reinforce and resupply NATO is critical—particularly in the early phase of a build-up—as indicated in NSSM 84. In this connection, the following are relevant considerations concerning the capabilities of FYDP forces:

—Substantial land forces can be deployed in NATO Europe rapidly. However, the forces that deploy during the 30 to 90 day period after mobilization arrive later than the JCS believe is essential and only 15 Army divisions are in Europe by M+90 compared to the 17 Army divisions the JCS state are required.
—The Air Force tactical air units can essentially meet the deployment targets.
—Given the large Soviet submarine threat, large shipping losses could be expected in the Atlantic. By relying on prepositioned equipment and airlift, we may be able to lessen the criticality of the problems during the initial stages of a conflict. If high losses do occur, our ability to sustain a continued high intensity conflict would be seriously degraded.
—The capability of our forces planned for NATO—land, sea and air—will be enhanced over next several years by qualitative improvements. The improvements include better anti-tank weapons, more modern aircraft, improved anti-submarine warfare equipment, and protective shelters for our aircraft.

Capabilities for Asia

Planned forces, together with those of our allies, appear adequate to deter conventional attacks but not insurgencies by the Asian Communist countries.

The following table illustrates the forces that can be maintained in the Western Pacific under the FYDP.

Current and Planned Deployments in Asia

(Excludes SEA)

	Current FY 72	*FYDP FY 73*
Divisions	1-2/3	1-2/3 or 1[10]
AF Squadrons	10	10
USMC Squadrons	5	5
Carrier Task Group	3	2–3

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] [*number not declassified*] [*number not declassified*]

NSSM 69 identified a wide range of potential wartime requirements for U.S. forces in Asia in the mid-1970s depending on judgments of the threat, allied capabilities and levels of insurgency.[11]

Potential U.S. Force Requirements for Asia

	U.S. Divisions	*U.S. Aircraft*
Korea	0–6	250–1800
SEA	1–9	200–1700

We can deploy forces to Asia up to the maximum postulated requirement if we activate the reserves and accept the following conditions:

—Our ability to deploy land forces to Europe would be degraded but would recover as the reserves are readied for combat.
—Air and naval forces are adequate but losses in Asia could degrade our forces available for NATO.
—If it is not feasible to activate the reserves to meet an Asian crisis, our land force capability would be more limited; we could deploy 4 or 5 divisions which may not be adequate to hold forward against a serious PRC challenge. Also this action would cut sharply into our NATO capability—7 rather than 8 divisions could be in place in Europe by M+30 and this force would not be augmented further until M+50.
—In the event of a NATO crisis, some air and a majority of the naval units in Asia would have to be redeployed and the intensity of combat in Asia reduced, a risky and uncertain action.

Capabilities for the Mediterranean and Middle East

The planned forces are adequate to maintain the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean at its current strength and augment it in a period of crisis. Together with present US air and ground forces in Europe, these forces are a strong, although not certain deterrent to major Soviet intervention in an Arab-Israeli conflict. If Soviet intervention on a scale threatening Israeli survival did occur, however, the US would have serious problems in bringing any but naval forces to bear. Deployments of US air or ground forces would require use of bases and overflight rights in Greece, Turkey, Spain, Italy and France, but there is a high probability that these rights would be denied by host governments for political reasons. Under these circumstances, there is a good chance that the Soviets, despite long and difficult lines of communications, could reinforce and operate more effectively than we could so long as the conflict were limited to Arab-Israeli territory.

Capabilities for War at Sea Against the Soviet Union

A war at sea with the Soviet Union would be likely to occur as part of a major NATO/Pact conflict and could develop during periods of high tension during a European or Middle-East crisis. It could also involve a conflict at sea in the Pacific. The capability of our air and naval forces to cope with a major Soviet effort to interdict shipping is uncertain.

—Under a "worst case" situation losses could be great. This could reduce our reinforcements to Europe and our ability to sustain intense fighting as our stocks are depleted. It might also lead to serious economic consequences for our allies.
—The major modernization effort that the Navy has underway should improve the situation, but this effort will not begin having an effect until the mid-1970s.

Alternative Land and Tactical Air Force Postures

In looking at variations in our force posture and their costs, one must first determine what we wish to be able to accomplish militarily in Europe and Asia. Then the interplay of options and forces for each theater must be considered.

NATO Options—Defense of Europe is the most demanding general purpose forces military mission. The sizing of our tactical nuclear and conventional forces are governed largely by the demands of this theater. The options below consider differing approaches to our basic objective of successfully defending NATO Europe should deterrence fail.

—We could provide an enhanced NATO capability. Given the judgment of many that present NATO forces have only a marginal capability to defend Europe without "early" recourse to nuclear weapons, steps could be taken to strengthen significantly NATO's forces. US actions could include buying more airlift, stockpiling more equipment in Europe, building additional aircraft shelters, and increasing the readiness of the forces based in the U.S. to speed up their deployment to Europe in the early months of a conflict. This might also serve as a carrot to encourage our NATO Allies to increase their forces and budgets, and would provide the Soviet Union greater incentive to negotiate a satisfactory MBFR agreement.
—We could emphasize the initial defense of Europe (i.e., the first 30 to 60 days) and cut back forces deployed later. The most critical period in a European conflict may be during the opening days and weeks. Even under the enhanced NATO capability option, we would be unlikely to have more than 8 divisions in place by M+30 and 10 divisions by M+45. Given the risks during the early weeks of a conflict and doubts about the sustaining capability of Pact and Allied forces, deployments after this time may contribute little to the outcome. For further buildup we would rely on the reserves which would be ready about M+90. The political impact of the option on NATO is uncertain. However, deployed U.S. forces and M+30 commitments would be maintained and these are the most important politically to the Alliance.

Asia Options—The second major mission of our general purpose forces is to deter a major PRC attack or with the help of our allies, defeat it if it occurs. Variations in our force

planning for Asia depend largely on judgments of the threat levels and capability of allied forces. We may be more willing to take greater risks in Asia since:

—The PRC may be deterred by our overwhelming strategic and tactical nuclear capability. Continued Soviet threat to the PRC and internal difficulties also may reduce the likelihood of Chinese military adventurism.
—Our Allies—particularly Korea and SVN—have made great military strides and their need for direct U.S. military involvement is lessening. Depending on our assistance levels and their ability to absorb it, we may be able to move them much further toward self reliance by the mid-1970s.
—Regionalism also may by 1975–1980 offer a way to reduce the need for U.S. involvement in Asian conflicts. However, this is not a short term option, given the internal and international constraints operating in the countries in the area.

All of the options suggested below could include a significant U.S. presence in Asia, which may be important for political as well as security reasons:

—The most demanding option would be to plan to counter high PRC threats which include insurgency, with only a modest dependence on allied forces. This option could require the commitment of 9 Army and Marine divisions, 20 tactical air wings, and supporting naval and mobility forces. These forces cannot be provided under the FYDP without serious degradation in our NATO-oriented forces.
—We could plan a capability to counter only moderate PRC threats in either Northeast or Southeast Asia, with only modest reliance on allies and regional cooperation. This would involve forces on the order of 3 divisions and 10 to 15 tactical wings and supporting naval and mobility forces. They could be provided from the present force structure. If a greater threat materialized, we would have to make a more significant drawdown on our NATO capability until Reserves could be mobilized.
—We could plan only to counter major conventional PRC aggression in Northeast Asia on the assumption that this is the most probable threat and our interests in that region are more critical. This would reduce the number of land forces needed for Asia.
—We could plan against the moderate PRC threat in one or both theaters, and rely increasingly on allied capability—especially land forces—during the 1970s. We might also anticipate a significant regional response in the event of a major PRC aggression. U.S. air and naval forces would be required but land forces might not be needed later in the decade. This option involves a significant level of risk in view of its dependence on the capability and willingness of our Asian allies.
—We could rely primarily on tactical nuclear weapons and the conventional forces required to deliver them to deter overt PRC aggression.

Combined Options—To determine force postures and costs, combinations of Asia and NATO strategies must be made. Three illustrative combinations are outlined below and summarized on the enclosed table. The costs are based on required changes to the FYDP Program ($81.6 billion).

1) A full two theater option assuming mobilization only for NATO. It would provide the capability to counter a moderate PRC threat in Asia while maintaining a major NATO reinforcement capability. In the event of a crisis only in Europe, we would have an enhanced capability and be able to meet or exceed the current JCS requirement. Even against the high PRC threat, our NATO reinforcement capability would only be slightly reduced. This option would require about 3 added Army Divisions, 4 Air Force tactical air wings and 1 carrier in addition to the FYDP. The added annual costs would be $2.5 to $3 billion.
2) Assuming we would mobilize for an Asian contingency as well as for NATO and that there would be a 60 to 90 day lag between major contingencies in Asia and NATO, we could meet two major contingencies with fewer forces than option 1. Under these assumptions, the FYDP levels can meet a high Asia threat and once the reserves are ready we would have a major NATO reinforcement. If no mobilization were assumed for Asia, the force could meet a moderate Asian threat, but could only provide limited NATO reinforcements until M+90, when reserve forces become combat ready.
3) If we assume a major conventional conflict in Asia is improbable, and that lesser threats can be met by allied capabilities, we may be willing to accept the risk of a major degradation of our NATO capability should an Asian crisis occur. This option would permit reductions in the FYDP forces. The Army could be reduced by 2 divisions and tactical air levels by 4 Air Force wings and 3 Navy carriers. The savings would be about $2 billion annually. Some limited forces would be retained to meet peculiar Asian needs, but generally, NATO-oriented forces would have to be used in the event of an Asian crisis. Some reductions in war reserve stocks would also be feasible. Once the reserves were mobilized we would again have a capability to reinforce NATO, but it would be below present levels.

Illustrative Alternative General Purpose Forces

	Five Year	*Alternative Postures*		
	Defense Plan	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Ground Forces[12]				
Army Divisions	13-1/3	16-1/3	13-1/3	11
USMC Divisions	3	3	3	3
Total Ground Force Divisions	16-1/3	19-1/3	16-1/3	14
Tactical Air Forces (Active)				
USAF (Wings)	21-1/3	26	22	18
USMC (Wings)	3	3	3	3
Total Tactical Air Forces	24-1/3	29	25	21
Naval Forces				
Carriers	15	16	15	12
FY 73 Costs[13]	$23B	$26B	$23B	$21B

Naval Missions and Options

Naval forces normally keep the sea lanes open and support land and air forces in a conflict. They also play a key foreign policy role, demonstrating our commitment and potential military capabilities. The principal Navy missions can be grouped in two categories—Sea Control and Force Projections.

The Navy's sea control forces consist of its anti-submarine warfare ships and aircraft. Their mission is, with the help of allies, to keep the sea lanes open to Europe and Asia in time of a major war, reducing shipping losses to acceptable levels, so that our forces can be resup-plied and reinforced. In addition, we would try to provide a minimum level of economic shipping for our allies. The primary areas of operation would be the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The Navy has a sea control mission in the Mediterranean although political/military objectives flowing from the Arab-Israeli crisis are the dominant peacetime concern. Soviet submarines are the primary threat to the sea lanes. In areas closer to the Soviet Union, Soviet missile carrying aircraft also pose a serious threat. The tactical air forces of the Air Force and Navy would be used to counter the air threat.

The Navy's projection forces consist of its carriers and tactical aircraft and the amphibious shipping for the Marines. These forces have a peacetime and limited war mission as well as a major conflict mission. The sea control mission would be the most critical Navy mission during a major war with the Soviets. In peacetime or lesser conflicts, the projection mission may be more significant.

Naval Force Posture Options—There are no near term ways to improve significantly the abilities of our sea control forces to carry out their missions. The Navy has a large scale modernization effort underway that will improve its capabilities significantly by the late-1970s. The primary issue at the moment is whether to continue retiring the older, World War II vessels in order to make additional funds available for the Navy modernization effort. Alternatively we could retain these older ships for a longer period and reduce the rate of modernization. This would permit us to maintain a larger naval presence and defer reductions in our naval commitment to NATO. Finally, we could retain the present ship inventories while modernizing at the higher rate. This would meet our European political requirements at an added cost of $60 to $370 million in FY 73, depending on the number of ships retained.

A number of optional force postures for the Navy's projection forces could be considered:

—Relying on the carriers primarily for limited conflict in the Mid-East and peacetime political influences. The 6th Fleet could be augmented with a third carrier in the event of a major Mid-East crisis. But in a war with the Soviet Union of necessity we would use the carriers for sea control missions in the Atlantic, and make land-based tactical air available to support the southern and northern flanks.
—Redesigning our forces in the Mediterranean over the next several years to rely

primarily on submarines and smaller naval vessels in lieu of carriers. This option has certain military advantages, providing adequate land based air would be available for a conflict. Withdrawing carriers from the Mediterranean could cause serious foreign policy difficulties.

—Increased reliance on Navy tactical air in some areas in lieu of land-based air. Under this option we would emphasize the Navy's tactical air role in the Pacific and place reduced reliance on Air Force tactical air forces. The Air Force would orient its mission primarily to NATO, retaining only limited forces for use in an Asian conflict.

—Amphibious lift is costly to maintain (over $500 million per year). If it is assumed that amphibious assaults may not be needed in a major war with the Soviets or the PRC, or that in light of the reductions in mine sweeping forces and naval gunfire, a major amphibious assault would be difficult and costly to accomplish, we might consider reducing amphibious lift or assign it to the reserves. Given the value of our Marines afloat in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the Pacific to react to minor contingencies, we might wish to retain sufficient amphibious lift to support these missions. This latter option would save about $250 million a year.

Other Factors Influencing Forces and Budgets

Forward Deployments—Political as well as military factors bear on the design of our forces and their deployments. Forces deployed abroad play a key role in buttressing our influence in various regions, in giving allies the confidence necessary to resist accommodations adverse to our interests, and in intra-regional stability and cooperation. From the standpoint of military effectiveness, however, a given deployment may be inefficient or may even pose serious military risks. For example, under current Army planning, the division in Korea would be reduced to a brigade. Equivalent forces based in Hawaii or the U.S. would be available for a wider range of crises and the savings could be put to better use militarily. Yet the larger presence in Korea may lend stability to the region and encouragement to our allies.

Quality or Quantity—A small modernized force may in many cases be more effective militarily than a bigger less modern force. It is difficult to convince allies (or perhaps even potential adversaries) of this fact. Force size is the most visible and easily understood measure of military power and may have a disproportionate impact on allies' (and perhaps adversaries') view of our capabilities and the military balance. Therefore, to deter our enemies and maintain allied confidence, it may be necessary to allocate a greater share of our resources to quantity as opposed to quality.

Capability Today Versus Tomorrow—The present Defense program gives priority to modernization programs at the expense of numbers of forces. In FY 72 Defense plans to spend $8 billion on research and development and $17 billion on the procurement of new weapons and equipment. There are cogent reasons for this emphasis.

—The Soviet Union continues to modernize its forces. We must be prepared to cope with

the threat its forces will pose in the late 1970s.
—The rapid increase in manpower costs and All Volunteer Force program place a premium on ways to get more effectiveness out of our forces while reducing the number of men in uniform.
—Modernization was neglected in selected areas during Vietnam. Nonetheless, we might consider reduced emphasis on modernization in order to maintain larger forces in the near term. This action would not affect force capabilities today or over the next 2 to 3 years and would provide more immediate deterrence and permit us to maintain larger deployments abroad. But there is a real risk that we would find ourselves at a serious qualitative as well as quantitative disadvantage to the Soviets in five or ten years.

Reduced modernization emphasis would not reduce outlays significantly in the near term because of the lag between program commitment and spending. Thus a sharp cut-back in the modernization component of the FY 73 program would not significantly alleviate our outlay problem until FY 74.

However, a commitment now to a high rate of modernization builds up a high expenditure rate in later years. The effects of inflation and cost growth in sophisticated weapons systems, with long development and production times will, under fixed budgets, cause enormous pressures to cut force levels. This factor should be considered in our program planning.

Low Modernization and Readiness Program—If it is desirable to maintain larger forces and budget pressures preclude providing added resources, a low modernization and readiness program could be developed. The risks of this approach are great, but it would preserve forces with their attendant foreign policy/deterrent impact. This would provide deterrence and presence in the early 1970s at the cost of warfighting capability and effectiveness in the mid-to-late 1970s.

—By cutting back on manning levels of units, maintenance, and operating levels, FY 72 outlays could be reduced by about $500 million.
—Cutting back on modernization is another way to reduce outlays, but because of the many months required to develop and produce weapons, reducing the FY 73 program would not reduce outlays significantly until the next year. However, if steps were begun in FY 72 to cancel or postpone R&D and procurement programs, outlay reductions of $1 billion in FY 73 would be possible.

VII. Budgetary Implications of the Defense Program

There are a wide range of estimates of the force and funding levels required to implement the current national security objectives set by the President. At the same time, overall Administration fiscal policy and the increasing demands of other federal programs require consideration of the trade-offs involved in the choice of possible defense program levels.

Overall Fiscal Policy

In approaching the FY 73 budget, the Administration is guided by the President's decision to achieve a full employment balance with outlays of $249–251B, to provide fiscal stimulation toward planned economic recovery without additional inflationary pressures. Defense outlays at the higher levels being proposed would lead to a full employment revenue deficit unless offsetting cuts are made in non-Defense spending.

Defense recognizes that difficulties would be caused by full employment deficit; however, given the grave risks that would be entailed by large reductions in Defense spending, believe that a deficit, or alternatively, a tax increase should be considered. Defense also points to the positive impact the deficit would have on employment levels and the fact that it would stimulate a higher level of economic activity.

Defense Options

DoD is still developing its five-year defense program that will serve as the basis for the FY 73 budget. However, DoD has prepared two tentative alternative programs based on different outlay ceilings. Neither program has been subjected to a careful program or budget review.

—The FYDP program prepared within a ceiling of $81.7B in FY 73.
—Service prepared programs within a ceiling of $79.6B.

In preparing the detailed programs at the $79.6 billion level, the Services were directed to use the following assumptions:

—No further manpower or force adjustments in FY 72.
—No FY 73 adjustments in strategic or intelligence programs.
—No base structure reductions.
—Vietnam withdrawals continue at current rates.

OMB believes that, recognizing declining SEA costs, anticipated Congressional FY 72 actions and projected pay and price increase in the coming year, a considerably lower FY 1973 Defense budget will continue to support the end FY 1972 force structure, readiness and modernization levels. Therefore, following a budget review, Defense programs priced at $79.6 billion and $81.7 billion can be supported at significantly lower levels.

Defense agrees that the proposed programs require careful review and some reductions may be possible. Also Congressional action may reduce FY 73 outlays, but the scope of these costs cannot be estimated at this time. At the same time some of the reductions made by the Services in getting outlays down to the $79.6 billion level are not acceptable and unprogrammed additions such as SEA air sortie levels have imposed unexpected costs. Therefore, it is premature to state at this time that the FYDP or POM programs can be supported at outlay levels significantly below $81.7 or $79.6 billion.

If adjustments in Defense spending must be made, the following list suggests illustrative reductions as well as additions to the $81.7 billion FYDP level.

Non-Force Reductions	*FY 73 Outlays*
Budget Scrub	−1.0
Defer Military/Civilian Pay Raises	−1.4
Reduce Civilian Manpower 10% and Close Bases	−.3 to 1.0
FY 72 Congressional Reductions	−.5 to 1.0
Modernization	
R&D Reduction to FY 72 Level	−.5
Procurement Reductions (Includes Safeguard)	−.5
Readiness	−.4
Force Reductions	
General Purpose Forces (Option 3)	−1.0 or 1.5
Intelligence	−.3
Program Increases	
FY 72/73 SEA Sorties	+.4 to .6
Project Transition	+.3
General Purpose Forces (Option 1)	+1.0 to 2.0
General Purpose Forces (Options 2)	+.2

Defense Choices and Overall Fiscal Strategy

Within the constraint of balanced full employment budget, alternate Defense funding levels will have a direct impact upon the resources available for non-defense programs. In this context:

—the proposed FY 73 Defense budget options of $81.7 billion and $79.6 billion would require major reductions in current non-Defense programs (about $5 B).
—lower FY 73 Defense budget levels would accommodate continuance of a broader range of non-defense programs.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–32, NSC Meeting, DOD Program [Part 2], 8/13/71. Top Secret. The NSC Secretariat distributed the paper to NSC members on August 12.

[2] Document 39.

[3] NSDM 27 is Document 56. Regarding NSDM 95, see footnote 7, Document 191.

[4] These are objective levels which JCS consider to be necessary, in consideration of reasonable attainability and prudent levels of risk, without regard to fiscal constraints. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] This program is based on FYDP budget levels ($81.7 billion). [Footnote in the original.]

[6] Service-prepared programs based on a DOD budget of $79.6 billion. [Footnote in the original.]

[7] Does not include Army separate regiments and brigades. [Footnote in the original.]

[8] Includes attack and ASW carriers. [Footnote in the original.]

[9] NSSM 84 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

[10] Level depends on Presidential decision regarding withdrawal in FY 73 of 2/3 of one remaining division in Korea. [Footnote in the original.]

[11] See footnote 7, Document 181.

[12] Separate and independent brigades not included. [Footnote in the original.]

[13] Includes all general purpose forces. Excludes support. [Footnote in the original.]

193. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 12, 1971, 10:03 a.m.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to national security policy.]

K: As long as I have you on the phone, what the President would like to do is on the Defense budget he will not make a decision tomorrow. He would like you, Shultz, and I to get together next week and tell you what he wants in capabilities and you work it out. If army can get two divisions out of [$]500 million and if they are important if we can get more divisions by _____ other things.

P: The air sorties level to the requirements. On presentation, yesterday Mel and I talked and he thinks he should make the presentation tomorrow. Broader strokes than I outlined to you. If you and George and I could get together after that. We can lower figures after force level [is determined]. Budget scrub and shifting we can do from first of year to ? ? ? ? ? .[2] We ought to come out at the level we start from in terms of planning for (about) [$]79.6 [billion]. Get it below. Not 75 but perhaps 77.

K: I think the President will go along with 79.6. With _____[3] George has of 2 billion he can move from one year to the other.

P: Where we should come out in terms of force levels or 79.6 or 80 or 81. Make adjustments with 79.6.

[Omitted here is a brief closing exchange unrelated to national security policy.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 11, Chronological File. No classification marking. All blank underscores are omissions in the original.

[2] As in the original.

[3] Omission in the original.

194. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
The Defense Program for FY 1973

An NSC meeting on defense strategy and fiscal guidance is scheduled for Friday, August 13, 1971. The strategic and diplomatic framework in which the decisions on the FY 1973 defense program must be made are developed below.

I. Strategic Considerations

Despite the hopeful prospects for SALT, MBFR, and your impending voyage to China,[2] the military power of the United States remains an essential underpinning to your foreign policy. That power, as you have previously indicated, must consist of balanced, mobile, land, sea and air forces with both nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.

The changes that have occurred in the strategic nuclear balance—with the USSR approaching parity with us, and with China in a position to deploy medium-range nuclear capabilities—means reduced political and military dependence on the strategic nuclear forces for the attainment of your objectives. Nonetheless, SALT requires that we negotiate from a strong nuclear posture and that we not give the impression of being willing to make major reductions in our forces without concessions from the other side. At the same time, in this period of transition, the doubts and fears of our allies in Europe and Asia make it essential that we continue to give them confidence in our nuclear assurances.

In these circumstances, the strategic nuclear forces have three essential missions to perform:

—Deterrence of the USSR by the assurance of a second-strike capability which will cause unacceptable damage.
—Deterrence of China by the prospect of highly effective disarming strikes.
—Reassurance of our allies with the knowledge that, with our large and growing number of deliverable warheads, we can exercise options other than urban/industrial attacks in the event of threats to them or to the United States itself.

Offensive forces, and particularly missiles, are the main instruments for the fulfillment of these missions. Bombers are substantially less important, and anti-bomber defenses, without a highly effective ABM defense, have very little role to play at all.

In Europe and Asia, we now have a considerable history of maintaining deployed theater nuclear forces. These forces continue to represent an important symbol of our commitment to the host countries and an extension of our main nuclear deterrent as well as an extension of conventional capabilities. Their military missions inevitably vary, depending on the theater of their location.

—In Europe, their primary function is to deter a first use of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw Pact in a land war. However, they also represent a hedge against the failure of our conventional forces in NATO.
—In Asia, as long as Chinese nuclear capabilities are limited and vulnerable, they may be able to serve as a partial substitute for U.S. ground forces.

However important the strategic and theater nuclear forces, the general purpose forces have become central to the support of your foreign policy and strategy. Moreover, major land forces are the sine qua non of their effectiveness. As the British have discovered, time after time, a peripheral strategy which depends primarily on seapower cannot by itself influence events on the great continental land masses. Our situation now is no different unless we forsake a major role in Europe and Asia. In Europe, a great part of our influence stems from our presence on the ground and our ability to provide SACEUR with large and timely reinforcements. Without these two elements, our allies in NATO would feel vulnerable and insecure; short of these hostages to fortune, the Warsaw Pact might be tempted to press against the boundaries of Western Europe. Sea-based air and surface power simply cannot totally substitute for ground forces.

In the Mediterranean, the 6th Fleet plays an important role. But it is vulnerable [and] if we depended only on it to affect the Arab-Israeli conflict, we could find ourselves suddenly without influence. At a time of transition in Asia, it is not enough for China and Japan to know that the 7th Fleet is over the horizon. With the knowledge of Korea and Vietnam still in mind, it is the fact of U.S. ground forces in Korea itself, in Okinawa, and in Hawaii which lends the most specific gravity to U.S. commitments and its presence in Asia.

To emphasize the importance of land forces to your objectives is not to depreciate other essential components of the general purpose forces. The four main missions around which we must plan our general purpose forces for the foreseeable future have already occupied much of your time.

—Deterrence of a Warsaw Pact conventional attack on NATO Europe.
—Prevention of any dangerous shift in the balance of power in the Middle East.
—Deterrence of an attack on the Republic of Korea.
—An honorable withdrawal from Vietnam combined with the capability for a continued or renewed presence in Southeast Asia.

All four of these major missions require us to maintain a mix of land, sea, air, and

mobility forces.

—We need strategic mobility so as to move long distances with our central reserves and respond to rapid enemy deployments.
—We need ground forces to engage in the forward defense of friendly territory in conjunction with our allies.
—We need tactical air forces to support the progress of our forces on the ground.
—We need naval forces primarily to protect our sea lines of communication against enemy attack.
—We need amphibious forces to project our power to those areas where a permanent garrison on land may be infeasible or undesirable.

I am convinced that within this framework of missions and functions, it should be possible to provide the forces necessary to support your foreign policy objectives and to do so without any major sacrifice in your domestic objectives or undue risk. Unfortunately, however, I do not believe that you are being presented with a range of options which enables you to make your own judgments on this score.

II. Strategy, Forces and Budgets

The dilemma that has been constructed for you has three horns.

—A balanced, full employment budget for FY 1973, combined with fulfillment of your domestic commitments, will allow a residual of $77 billion for defense.
—DOD, however, takes the position that the forces required to support your policies, as they are currently formulated, will entail outlays of $81.7 billion.
—In fact, when Secretary Laird provided fiscal guidance of $79.6 billion—only $2 billion below the DOD preferred figure—the JCS and the Services produced a severely reduced force structure and indicated that, in light of your policies, it would involve unacceptable risks.

You, therefore, face the issue of whether your foreign policy objectives can be supported at the necessary levels of military strength within budget outlays of about $77 billion for FY 1973. To assist you in resolving this difficult issue, let me summarize the performance of the current forces and some of the savings you could effect without jeopardizing the essentials of political and military strength.

A. The Strategic Nuclear Forces

As of now, the strategic nuclear forces—after having absorbed a full first strike from the USSR—could retaliate against urban/industrial targets and destroy 45 percent of the Soviet population and 75 percent of its industry. Under the same conditions, but in retaliation against China, the forces could destroy only 10 percent of her population (because of its dispersed nature) but over 75 percent of her industry.

In a first strike, we would have very little counterforce capability against the Soviet offense and could not significantly limit damage to the United States (or its allies) by offensive or defensive means, assuming that populations become targets. Against China, provided that our target information is precise, we have the offensive capability to destroy most Chinese land-based offensive forces. As a consequence, even without the full Safeguard deployment, we should be able substantially to limit damage to our allies and the United States in a first strike—at least for the next several years.

Depending on the outcome of SALT, we will have a very limited defensive capability to limit damage to population from either large or small attacks throughout the 1970s. Our ABM coverage from Safeguard is likely to be limited, at best, and if a bomber attack were preceded by a missile attack which targeted the air defenses themselves, they probably would not even survive to exact any bomber attrition.

In light of these capabilities, it should be possible to reduce selectively some of the less essential forces committed to the strategic offense and defense.

—If we are satisfied with conservatively designed retaliatory forces which give us the capability for assured retaliation and specialized non-urban options, we could phase-out a part of those strategic forces that presently give us a limited but late arriving capability to destroy Soviet offensive capabilities. These reductions would include about a quarter of our B–52 bombers. We could also hold funding for programs such as the B–1 at FY 1972 levels.
—If we acknowledge the inability of our anti-bomber defenses to limit damage to the United States, we could greatly reduce our interceptor and missile (SAM) forces at little loss in real effectiveness—an action which you approved last year. Under present circumstances, a reduction from 12 to 3 Safeguard sites would be consistent with our current SALT position, Congressional preferences, and our ability to add more sites later should SALT fail.

None of these reductions would weaken our negotiating stance at SALT. Nor would they affect our ability to engage in large-scale urban/industrial strikes and more selective non-urban attacks against soft targets of high value in the USSR. Against China, our capability for disarming strikes on soft, land based missiles and bombers should be more than sufficient for the next five years.

B. General Purpose Forces

A brief review of the major general purpose forces proposed by the JCS and the Services in response to Secretary Laird's fiscal guidance of $79.6 billion may be in order.

—Active ground forces are reduced to 11–12 Army and 3 Marine divisions. This capability is not sufficient to meet an all-out Warsaw Pact attack on NATO's Center Region. Nor could we commit much of the capability to assist allies in Asia against a Chinese attack

without substantially weakening—or even eliminating—the conventional option in Europe. A good case can be made that we need larger ground forces than we now have—probably 14 Army and 3 Marine divisions—if we are to meet a large-scale NATO contingency without relying heavily on nuclear weapons.

—Tactical air wings are actually increased from 44–2/3 to 46–2/3, including 21–1/3 Air Force wings. Despite this, the contribution of our tactical air forces to the outcome of any large-scale conflict is, at best, uncertain. Moreover, we now maintain four separate air forces—one in each Service, plus the Marines—that collectively absorb more resources and manpower than our ground forces. Reductions are possible here with little risk to our strategy or the effective performance of essential missions. Sea-based as well as land-based tactical air could be profitably cut back.

—Naval forces are reduced to about 550 ships (including 13 carriers) ostensibly designed for "sea control" and the "projection of forces." Yet the Navy faces serious problems with both of these missions. Our sea control (ASW) forces in the Atlantic are intended to protect our lines of communication to Europe during the first 90 days of a conventional conflict. But recent Navy analyses suggest that the mission cannot be adequately performed during the critical first 30 days of the war, either by these forces or by larger capabilities. These studies, I believe, are unduly pessimistic, but they do not oblige us to ask whether we are overinvesting in ASW. Amphibious forces, on the other hand, seem to be increasingly a capability without a credible mission. Some reduction in them, as well as in selected ASW capabilities would have little or no effect on the support of your foreign policy.

C. Support Programs

In general, it seems clear that you can maintain your strategy and thus support your foreign policy without major reductions in the overall performance of the general purpose forces. However, to do so will require selective and carefully directed cuts.

Furthermore, significant reductions in our combat forces could well be avoided entirely if we could acquire better control over the non-force or support areas of the DOD program. Whereas the DOD budget assumes that no reductions are possible in intelligence, support, pay increases, and R&D, it is quite clear that major savings can be made in these areas, and that they will not affect the combat forces that you need. For example, while support costs consumed only 25 percent of the DOD budget in FY 1964, they now absorb some 30 percent. The result is that our combat capabilities suffer. If we can bring our support costs down to previous rates, savings of $3–4 billion in FY 1973 will be feasible. Savings of this magnitude, in turn, will lower pressures to reduce the combat forces and their readiness which are so essential to your purposes.

III. Recommendations

In light of this analysis, I recommend that you take the following two positions at the NSC meeting:

—Defer any decision on a specific outlay figure for the FY 1973 defense budget.
—State that, after deciding on the appropriate figure, you will state your own priorities for shaping the defense posture in accordance with your budgetary guidance.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–32, NSC Meeting, DOD Program, 8/13/71. Top Secret. The memorandum bears a note indicating that the President saw it.

[2] In a televised address to the nation on July 15, President Nixon announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit the PRC. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819–820.

195. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 13, 1971, 10:05–11:50 a.m.

SUBJECT
Minutes of NSC Meeting on Defense Strategy

PARTICIPANTS
President Nixon
Vice President Agnew
John N. Irwin, Under Secretary of State
Melvin E. Laird, Secretary of Defense
General George A. Lincoln, Director, OEP
John N. Mitchell, Attorney General
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, JCS
George P. Shultz, Director, OMB
Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Col. Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Dr. K. Wayne Smith, NSC Staff

The President: With regard to the meeting, we'll have a presentation first from Dr. Kissinger on the issues, then we'll hear from Mel [Laird] and the Chiefs. I have already met with the Chiefs to get their views and get their presentations.[2]

Dr. Kissinger: I will present some of the issues that were discussed in the DPRC.[3] Mel presents the budget and some aspects of these issues. The President asked that the Defense budget be presented in terms of missions, but the most fundamental questions are still unanswered. Substantial work needs to be done to define the purposes of our forces.

There has been an extraordinary shift in the strategic balance since the mid-1960's. Until the late 1950's we could win a general war whether we struck first or not. Our general purpose forces could deal with any local conflict—Cuba, for example. But today Soviet strategic forces are far stronger. If a country has superiority, one doesn't have to worry about a disarming first strike. Local situations therefore take on added significance.

Most of our strategic doctrine reflects decisions under the conditions of previous periods. Thus there are some anomalies and questions that are not yet resolved.

Let me review some of the types of forces and questions we have. This is not intended to be all-inclusive.

First, strategic nuclear forces. What are the missions of these forces? They are: deterrence; second-strike assured destruction; to save American lives; a China ABM against small attacks; some counterforce capability (particularly against Communist China); also strategic interdiction against non-urban targets.

In fact we have no disarming capability against the USSR but we do have some against China. But we cannot use our land-based missiles against China (over USSR); we have to use our bombers and submarines. Thus we must decide whether to dedicate a part of our force. And do we have the intelligence capability to define the targets? As long as we have a disarming capability we can use it to regulate their actions in local situations.

We still confront SIOP problems. We are still targeting silos without a retargeting capability. Thus we risk firing at empty holes. Why should we use bombers to go after missiles that are already fired? The approach of the SIOP hasn't changed much in 10 years. Our strategic forces are inferior in numbers but still carrying functions that are the same as when we had superiority.

As for strategic defensive forces: Our fighters are superior in numbers to theirs, but when we send them they fight their offensive fighters. The question is why would the USSR conduct small air attacks against the U.S. when it can do it with missiles? There are other issues here also—what about Safeguard and SALT?

Then we come to theater nuclear forces: We still don't have a clear doctrine for their use. Thus we can't define how many are needed. Why do we depend on vulnerable short-range artillery to deliver them? How would a war progress after the use of nuclear weapons? We have the same problems in the Pacific. Thus the problem is not resolved as to the types and numbers of forces that we need.

Then come our general purpose forces. Their mission is forward defense in Europe and elsewhere to maintain a credible posture of defense. In NATO the problem has been to provide a capability of 90 days or more of conventional defense in response to an all-out Warsaw Pact attack. Thus the missions of the three forces—Soviet, U.S., and NATO allies —are different.

We can't get the allies to define what selective use of nuclear weapons means.

I have seen no evidence of how we will get to M+60, let alone M+90—but our allies' supplies probably won't last that long. The problem is how the three approaches can be taken at the same time.

There is some progress here, but we still have many unsolved problems in NATO.

In other parts of the world, there is less of a problem of having a war-fighting capability; it is more a matter of the political presence of the United States. In Korea, our forces are important to the political context and their withdrawal would have a political impact in

Korea and Japan. If our forces in the Pacific drop precipitously, some will see this as a move—misinterpreting the Nixon Doctrine—to withdraw. Air and naval forces are not enough. In the Middle East we have a similar problem. In September 1970, the possible projection of our ground forces was the key.

If the Army goes to 11 divisions, we will be short six divisions for our plans in Europe and will have no strategic reserve. At 13 we are still short of a strategic reserve.

These are some of the issues we are trying to discuss in the DPRC. Some involve our allies, some have an impact that is psychological. If we don't come to grips with them, the consequences will be serious. The Soviets are not building missiles to be nice. Somewhere their umbrella will be translated into political power. Thus we want to continue this study.

The President: The main purpose of our forces is diplomatic wallop. The possibility of nuclear conflict is remote, because the fear of it is so widespread. We can't separate diplomatic power from the ability to deny to the other side an ability to win a war without irreparable losses.

General purpose forces are irrelevant in a nuclear war. Carriers and ground forces have a psychological effect in areas where nations depend on the US. That's the reason for NATO strength in Europe; that's why, if it was only a trip wire, at some point it becomes incredible that the US would support them. Our military plans are probably irrelevant but it is important that our presence be there because people see the US continuing to play a role in the world. This supports our diplomatic posture generally. They know the minimums are political minimums.

While we are negotiating with Soviets and we may negotiate with China, those in Europe and elsewhere who are under the US defense umbrella get nervous. They think we may change the power balance, and they will look elsewhere for their guarantees. Germany and Japan both look to the US guarantees for their defense.

Mel and Dave are well aware that many in the Congress applaud our negotiating for the wrong reasons. They think negotiating means no need for forces. This is clearly the wrong trend. Jackson was attacked by Lowenstein.[4]

We are in a position to have in effect a two-stage policy: To give hope that we are negotiating and maybe in the long-run can reduce our military burden. But at the same time we know we couldn't have come this far without a credible military posture—nor could we bug out in Vietnam. Any possibility for continued progress in the future with the USSR and China—who are continuing to build their military strength—will depend on our military strength.

We have a problem of public relations. Many don't care what position we have. We must

explain our attitude and that of the unilateral disarmers. What will the people and the Congress support? We also have economic, budget and balance of payments problems. But I can't accept the argument that these must govern. There is a level beyond which defense can't be reduced—it is most important for diplomatic and psychological purposes.

Secretary Laird: Our forces have the mission to deter an aggressor and assure that the allies can fight a war. Flexibility is essential to our diplomatic posture.

As we constrain our defense dollars, our foreign policy options are limited.[5] There are two budgets: the planned budget of $81.7 billion and the programmed budget of $79.6 billion. I'll show the differences and what each one buys.

The issues that Henry raised don't bear on FY 73—because there are no changes in the strategic field. The JSOP budget would be $94.6 billion. We'll also have a look at budgets of $75 and $77 billion.

The first chart[6] shows a comparison of the $79.6 billion and $81.7 billion expenditure rates.

—We are not reducing strategic forces. We are at parity, and uni-lateral cuts would give it up. There is a modernization factor in the strategic force figures. Any cut in strategic forces would signal a change we don't want. Therefore we have frozen it.
—Support for allies: We also have frozen this in both the planned and programmed budgets.
—Modernization: This program must go ahead. We have been behind. If we cut it, it would have very little effect. The program is already moving. Thus most reductions have to come from General Purpose Forces.

Chart II shows 11 rather than 13 Army divisions. This reduces our flexibility in Asia and our NATO commitment. Marine manning would be reduced, naval forces reduced. Air Force wings would be kept at the same level but their readiness is cut. And it would mean a 10% reduction of Marine Air Wings.

Chart III shows that NATO requires about $14 billion, which covers forces in the US and all support in the area for support.

Sea lane control requires $9.5 billion, and swing forces $14 billion—these are also important to NATO. The Asia force cost is $5.6 billion; Vietnam operating costs are $1.8 billion.

Soviet naval activity is of concern. There is a great increase in their capability, with modern ships.

Sorties rates in South Vietnam will cause a $.5 billion increase in FY 73.

Naval reductions reduce our ability to show the flag, and they reduce the commitment to NATO. Air reductions would cut our ability to fly sorties and cut training flights.

The priority additions to the $79.6 billion would be:

—2 Army divisions—$390 million, which is less than Westmore-land wants.
—100 Navy ships—$370 million, which is less than Zumwalt would like.
—Naval and Air Force readiness—$190 million.
—Marine Corps crews and aircraft—$100 million.
—Southeast Asia sorties—$500 million.

In summary:

—For our strategic forces, if we seek to fulfill the requirements of strategic sufficiency, there should be no change.
—In general purpose forces, for our presence and deterrence in NATO, and our capability to deploy them in strategic reserves in Asia and for sea lanes protection, I believe there is a risk in $79.6 billion because of the shortfalls. The problems will come in base structure, in volunteer force incentives, and in military and civilian pay increase. We could make savings of $250 million in cutting bases and $600 million if we defer the all volunteer Army. We save $2.5 billion if we defer the military and civilian pay increases. We must either fund at the levels needed or change our strategy. A decrease in the forces will limit our flexibility; further cuts below that will mean serious effects. There are Congressional problems, but expenditures will be higher because of Congressional changes in pay, et cetera.

This is not the time to show we are backing away from our military strategy. If we do, we must make a conscious decision.

The charts show our active ground forces:

	Proposed	*Planned*
In Europe	4-1/3 divisions	4-1/3 divisions
Earmarked for Europe	4-2/3 divisions	4-2/3 divisions
In Asia	2 divisions	2 divisions
Swing	3 divisions	5 divisions

If we decide to keep a division in Korea, it adds only $20 million. It's mostly a manpower problem and a slight balance of payments problem.

Here are other charts:

—Strategic forces (two charts)
—NATO war
—Vietnamization costs $4.3 (does not include .5 air add-on.)

—North East Asia war

Dr. Kissinger: Where do we get the six divisions from?

Secretary Laird: The two US divisions in Asia and the four in strategic reserve. This means a drawdown on forces for NATO. The Presidentially-approved strategy permits it. The JCS recommend eight. This assumes no war in Europe at the same time.

Here are further charts showing:

—Strategic defense forces
—Naval force comparison

The President: As I understand, the Soviets have 10,000 aircraft to defend against our aircraft.

Secretary Laird/Admiral Moorer: Yes.

The President (to Director Helms): Are the Soviets increasing their air defense?

Director Helms: Yes, and also against the Chinese.

Admiral Moorer: Yes. They have improved their systems.

The President: This is all against aircraft?

Director Helms: Yes.

Secretary Laird: We have little in air defense.

Mr. Packard: The Soviets moved into Egypt more air defense missiles than we have.

Director Helms: They are developing better and improved interceptor aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger: In the planning for Asia, if we have two divisions: If 1-1/3 divisions are in Korea, we have no reserve; if we have 1/3 division in Korea, we have only 1-2/3 in reserve.

Secretary Laird: We have one division in Okinawa and one in Korea and 1/3 of a division in Hawaii now.

Dr. Kissinger: Also four in South Vietnam.

Secretary Laird: We don't go below 44,000 in South Vietnam. The Marine division on Okinawa is committed to NATO.

Dr. Kissinger: So we can't use it for Asian contingencies.

Secretary Laird: But we have to make the best use of our resources.

Admiral Moorer: The Secretary of Defense's presentation was good.

The NSSM 3 strategy[7] assumed we would have swing forces. The Soviets are a Pacific power. Thus we have to realize we would have a problem in the Pacific if we had any problem in NATO. Thus it is not realistic to have swing forces. The JCS figure of $91 billion is a computation based on two operations—one in NATO and one in the Pacific as well. It is based on enemy capabilities. Our forces should be balanced to make it possible for us to react to what they can do, not what they might do. The $79.6 program is based on an either/or capability—either operating with a NATO commitment or an Asian commitment, not both.

The President: The Chiefs' presentation is worth seeing. I am not going to make a decision today. I want all who haven't seen it to do so next week.

Mr. Irwin: You emphasized our concern: the diplomatic and psychological effects of budget reductions. We understand the problem. In strategic forces, sufficiency must be believable to all. In NATO, we also must maintain our commitment. Any Navy cuts should be elsewhere than in the Mediterranean. We have been pursuing the interim Suez agreements and our diplomatic effort must be supported by naval and air power in the region.

In East Asia, the political and psychological factor is the most important.[8] All our friends are concerned about the possible outcome of the war in Vietnam and the effects on them of our China initiative. They see a change in the power balance—our allies are watching us closely. Therefore it is essential to maintain our flexibility and our deployments. Under either of Mel's budgets we would be cutting one division in the Pacific. We need to maintain the divisions, the air wings and two carrier task forces; to move any of them would unhinge our allies there. In Japan, they are already nervous; they could be pushed to rearm, even to nuclear armaments.

I don't rule out reductions in the future but not in FY 73. It would be the wrong time. Secretary Rogers called me to emphasize this. This is his strong view.

Secretary Laird: There will be no difference in Asia in these programs. If we keep one division in Korea, then we will keep a swing division in Hawaii. If we cut Korea, then we would have a swing division in the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger: But the point is visibility. They can't see paper earmarking. Secretary Rogers also called me.

Mr. Irwin: He agrees with that.

The President: We have to see Asia now as we saw Europe earlier. The establishment supported our Europe/NATO policy and we defeated the Mansfield Amendment.[9] If there is need to maintain 4-2/3 divisions for the Europeans' reassurance, we must have some for assurances for our Asian allies—particularly the Japanese. We won't lose many of the others; they can go anywhere else but the name of the game is Japan. They all matter, but Japan matters most. If Japan now loses confidence in the credibility of our deterrent and our protection, they could change.

Matak[10] said that naval and air presence in Asia is not enough; we've got to have ground forces. It's the same problem as in Europe; it's psychological. We must find a way not to draw down the US presence to the point where our friends say the US is finished in South Vietnam and is now finished in Asia. The most important is Japan, and how they see it.

The whole nature of the issue has changed. The relationship of interceptors, for example, is so irrelevant. Nobody in his right mind thinks the Soviets are going to attack the US with bombers some time—even China. Why not attack with missiles? The Air Force case here is the weakest. We need to work out the posture problem in Asia.

Secretary Laird: Holding a division in Asia is not difficult. The problem is 11 versus 13 Army divisions. This needs to be done.

Mr. Irwin: We support that.

The President: The Trust Territories are very important. We may not be welcome any place. We need to keep this in mind.

Admiral Moorer: We want to look hard at locations for bases we can keep.

The President: Okinawa is a case in point.

Thank you. We will discuss this again. I will give Mel some public guidance later.

Admiral Moorer: Please consider that we need balanced forces in our general purpose forces for mutual support.

[The meeting adjourned.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971–6/20/74 [3 of 5]. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) All brackets are in the original.

[2] See Document 191.

[3] See Document 190.

[4] Reference is to Senator Jackson (D–Washington) and to Representative Allard K. Lowenstein (D–New York).

[5] At his August 2 staff meeting, Laird commented "on the status of the economy. It is not growing as anticipated and is less than its full potential. This is causing considerable problems, like the projected deficit and a trend toward 6.8 percent unemployment next year." "With such a budget deficit and with inflation continuing," Laird continued, "there will be pressures on the Hill, in the press, and even in the executive branch to curtail Defense spending. Though that may make little sense from a national security standpoint and from an economic standpoint, the net effect will be to make final formulation of the FY 1972 and FY 1973 Defense budgets all the more difficult." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–0028, Secretary of Defense Staff Minutes, Chronological File)

[6] The referenced charts were not found.

[7] See Document 45.

[8] In an August 10 memorandum to Rogers through Johnson, Spiers expressed the State Department's view "that we should not make further reductions in Asia (except Vietnam) in FY 1973 if we are to avoid undesirable political reactions in countries such as Japan and Thailand." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 US)

[9] See footnote 4, Document 185.

[10] Sisowath Sirik Matak, Cambodian Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense.

196. National Security Decision Memorandum 128[1]

Washington, August 16, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

FY 1972–1974 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The President has approved the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for end FY 1973 and end FY 1974, except for the production of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] 155–mm projectiles in FY 1974, and the proposed adjusted stockpile for end FY 1972, submitted by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on May 20, 1971. A decision to proceed with the 155–mm projectile production program is deferred pending the results of the current NSC studies concerning tactical nuclear weapons requirements and rationale.

Accordingly, the President approves a total stockpile of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for the end of FY 1973 and a total stockpile [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for the end of FY 1974. The President also approves a total adjusted stockpile [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for the end of FY 1972. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and a planned retirement of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during FY 1973, a resulting net increase of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during FY 1973 from the adjusted FY 1972 stockpile. It further means a planned production of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and a planned retirement of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during FY 1974, resulting in a net increase of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during FY 1974 from the end FY 1973 proposed stockpile.

The President directs the production and retirement of those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapon parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved stockpiles, as well as the production of the additional parts of nuclear weapons necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the agreement for cooperation.

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long lead-time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1975 production of warheads required to support approved and planned Department of Defense forces.

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to produce and transfer to the Department of Defense parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special nuclear material, as may be agreed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

These parts may be used in nuclear weapons, training programs, research and development, or production.

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY 1972–1974 as may be necessary to reflect changes in Atomic Energy Commission material availabilities, production/retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements, or as a result of related changes in military requirements, so long as the quantity of warheads involved in any single action does not exceed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for FY 1972, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for FY 1973, or [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for FY 1974. The President further authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to make changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY 1972–1974 as may be necessary to reflect changes (not to exceed [H11006]10%) in each year in strategic offensive, strategic defensive, tactical and fleet anti-submarine/anti-air warfare warheads totals as may be required by the Department of Defense because of changes in military requirements or adjustments in delivery assets. Any such changes above indicative of a major or a significant shift in defense policy, force capability, or Atomic Energy Commission production capabilities will be submitted for the President's approval.

The President authorizes the Department of Defense to designate as retired and to retain custody of nuclear warheads for a period of up to one year from the date the designation is made if necessary to reduce Atomic Energy Commission requirements for weapons storage during periods of high production workload at Atomic Energy Commission assembly facilities.

The FY 1973–1975 stockpile approval request should be submitted with the Department of Defense nuclear weapons deployments request in February, 1972. In addition to the information and displays of the type contained in enclosures 1, 2 and 3 of the FY 1972–1974 stockpile approval request,[2] the following information should be included:

—The number and general type of nuclear weapons required to support approved U.S. and NATO war plans, including the SIOP, SACEUR's General Strike Plan and U.S. contingency war plans involving the possible use of nuclear weapons.
—The number and type of nuclear-capable delivery forces (bomber, fighter, missile, artillery, etc.) in approved Department of Defense force structure plans associated with each general type of nuclear weapon. This information should be in sufficient detail to indicate loading factors of specific weapon delivery systems.
—The rationale for nuclear weapons stockpile components in terms of the number and type of threat targets, the number and type of weapons required to attack these targets and the results expected to be achieved against enemy capabilities.
—Rationale for the production of new weapons to be introduced into the stockpile during the time period of the request. Total program costs and production schedule should be included.

Several National Security Council studies are underway concerning future strategic and tactical nuclear weapons postures and requirements.[3] When completed, these studies may lead to decisions that will result in changes to the size and composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile. Therefore, the stockpile requests herein approved for FY 1973 and FY 1974 may be subject to change in the future.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 97–144. Top Secret.

[2] Packard and Seaborg's undated memorandum to President Nixon regarding the FY 1972–1974 nuclear weapons stockpile includes the following three enclosures: Proposed FY 1972–74 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Warheads Required to Support Quality Assurance and Reliability Testing Programs, and Summary of Special Nuclear Materials Requirements for FY 1972–FY 1974 Nuclear Weapons Program. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–226, NSDM 128)

[3] NSSM 64, "U.S. Strategic Capabilities," July 8, 1969, is Document 41. NSSM 65, issued on July 8, 1969, and entitled "Relationships Among Strategic and Theater Forces for NATO," initiated studies of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons capabilities and rationale in the European theater. NSSM 65 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972. NSSM 69, issued on July 14 and entitled "U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia," is Document 42.

197. Editorial Note

On August 19, 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a memorandum to holders of National Intelligence Estimate 11–3–71, "Soviet Strategic Defenses." (Document 178) The memorandum provided updated intelligence regarding those sectors of Soviet strategic defense where significant new developments had occurred, including anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite defenses. According to the memorandum, "major new construction has been identified at two of the four previously dormant launch complexes of the Moscow anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, and at the site of one of its two large acquisition and target tracking radars." Moreover, construction continued "at a high level" at a major ABM research and development launch facility at Sary Shagan, including assembly of an engagement radar capable of tracking incoming targets and interceptor missiles and testing of a faster exoatmospheric, long-range ABM interceptor.

As for anti-satellite defense, the memorandum reads as follows: "The Soviet program to develop and test an orbital interceptor system has progressed significantly. In addition to the increased pace of intercept testing—two satellite intercept tests were conducted in the first half of 1971, bringing the total to six—we now believe that the scope of the program is much broader than previously estimated. The 1971 tests have demonstrated progress in attaining mission flexibility." CIA analysts, though unsure when an orbital interceptor system would become operational, believed "that satellites which pass over the USSR at any inclination and below altitudes of 1,000 miles could now be vulnerable to this system."

The memorandum continues, "In the light of the recent acceleration of orbital intercept testing, we have reviewed the bases of our judgment concerning the likelihood of Soviet interference with US satellites. We still believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets would undertake widespread and continuing destructive attacks against US satellites in peacetime. We rate the chances for selective or sporadic attacks nearly as low. We doubt that the Soviets would launch attacks against US satellites prior to the initiation of hostilities. The repeated demonstration of a non-nuclear anti-satellite capability against targets up to about 500 miles, however, gives the Soviets an option on which they can rely should they ever decide to take such action." (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A) The text of the memorandum is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

198. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–8–71 Washington, October 21, 1971.

SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK

The Problem

To assess the strength and capabilities of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, to estimate their size and composition through mid-1976, and to forecast general trends thereafter.

Summary and Conclusions

I. Present Status of Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces

General

A. The intercontinental attack forces considered in this paper include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. In the course of the past 10 years, the Soviets have engaged in a vigorous and costly buildup of these elements of their military establishment. As a result of this effort, the Soviets had operational on 1 October 1971 an estimated 1,375 launchers at regular ICBM complexes, 440 SLBM launchers, and 195 heavy bombers and tankers. To this may be added (1) 120 SS–11 launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk which, though possibly intended for use against European targets, are nevertheless capable of reaching the US, and (2) 88 ICBM launchers at test or training sites. When all construction now under way on currently operational systems is completed by late 1973, the Soviets will have 1,407 launchers at regular ICBM complexes, including 288 of the large SS–9 type; about 750 SLBMs, including about 650 on Y-class submarines; and 190 heavy bombers and tankers. During the past year, it appeared that the large-scale deployment programs of the 1960's had run their course and that no further deployment of existing ICBMs was planned. Construction of new types of silos which we believe to be underway, however, may indicate a new phase of deployment.

B. We believe that construction of two, possibly three, new types of silos is underway at the test center at Tyuratam and at some complexes in the field. The purpose of the new silos is not clear. They may be intended to house wholly new missiles, variants of present missiles, or existing types in a program aimed at increased survivability. Some may not be intended for missiles at all. We believe that at least one new missile system has been under development for some time and is probably nearing the flight test stage; it may be intended for one of the new types of silos. It would require about two years of testing to reach initial operational capability.

C. Production of the Soviets' 16–tube Y-class ballistic missile submarine has continued apace. We estimate that these submarines are now being built at the rate of about nine per year. There probably are now 23 operational, five or perhaps six in various stages of fitting-out and sea trials, and another 12 on the building ways. Besides the nuclear-powered Y-class, there are missile submarines of earlier design which could contribute to the intercontinental attack mission.

D. The USSR has not, in recent years, shown equal interest in manned bombers of intercontinental capability. No heavy bombers are currently in production, and the design of types now in service—the Bear and Bison—dates from the 1950s. Testing of a new strategic bomber—the Backfire [*less than 1 line not declassified*]—is probably well under way, however, and the first units could be operational by late 1973 if equipped with existing weapons. All but the Air Force believe that this aircraft is best suited for use against Europe and Asia; the Air Force believes that it is suitable for both intercontinental and peripheral operations.

E. The Soviet system of command and control has been considerably improved over the past decade, and it is now flexible, reliable, and highly survivable. It permits Moscow to exercise highly centralized control over the Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. Soviet writings have considered a number of circumstances under which the order to fire might be given; there is little evidence from these or other sources that the Soviets consider a bolt-from-the-blue first strike a workable strategy, or that they think a US first strike likely. In the event of war, the primary mission of the Soviet strategic attack forces would probably be the classic one of destroying the enemy's war making potential: ICBM launchers and launch control facilities, submarine and bomber bases, command posts, communications and power facilities, and industrial centers.

The Principal Types of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

F. The SS–11 Mod 1, by far the most numerous of Soviet ICBMs, is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) at intercontinental range of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and a yield [*less than 1 line not declassified*] range. Thus it is a weapon best suited for use against soft targets—cities, industrial installations, and some military targets. It can reach all parts of the US, but has also been tested to ranges as short as 500–600 n.m., indicating much flexibility in its possible uses. In 1969, testing began on two versions of a modified SS–11 having greater throw weight and increased range. One, the Mod 2A, has a new re-entry vehicle (RV), a warhead probably yielding about [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and what are probably one or more exoatmospheric penetration aids. The other, the Mod 2B, has three RVs which are not independently targetable. Each RV has a warhead with an estimated yield [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The SS–11 remains a soft target weapon; the two new versions are most likely intended to improve the system's ability to penetrate antiballistic missile defenses.

G. The SS–9 exists in four variants: Mod 1, which carries an RV weighing about 9,500 pounds; Mod 2, whose RV weighs about 13,500 pounds; Mod 3, which has been tested

both as a depressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) and as a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS); and Mod 4, which carries three RVs. Leaving Mod 3 aside for the time being, our analysis of evidence on the capabilities of Mods 1, 2, and 4 turns up some perplexing problems.

H. There is general agreement that the SS–9 was developed, early in the 1960s, to provide better accuracy and a larger payload than the SS–7, presumably for use against hard targets—i.e., the US Minuteman system. The Mod 1 appears reasonably well adapted for this purpose. In 1965, however, the Soviets began to test the Mod 2, which, with its heavier payload, was estimated to have a yield [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. These tests were pursued with great vigor, and the Mod 2 was actually deployed before the Mod 1. [*4 lines not declassified*] But the Mod 2 has never in its numerous flight tests actually demonstrated enough range to reach any Minuteman complexes. We believe that its demonstrated range could be increased sufficiently to cover all of them by using up more of the available propellant, removing telemetry packages, etc. Yet it remains curious that the Mod 2, alone among ICBMs except the SS–13, has never been tested to what we would presume to be its intended operational range.

I. The kill probability of a missile against hard targets is more sensitive to accuracy than to yield. The accuracy of the SS–9 cannot be ascertained from observations. It must be deduced [*2 lines not declassified*]. Depending upon the assumptions used and the statistical techniques employed, various results may be obtained. In the Intelligence Community, opinions as to the CEP of the SS–9 range from a low of 0.4 n.m. to a high of 0.7 n.m. The significance of these differences is considerable.[2] It is generally agreed that in actual operational employment, accuracies in the force as a whole would be somewhat poorer.

J. In sum, with respect to the capability of the SS–9 Mod 2 against Minuteman, we have estimated that it can have sufficient range to reach all targets even though such range has not been demonstrated in tests. We see no reason to doubt that in the event of general war the Soviets would use it for whatever it could accomplish against the Minuteman system. But, the Soviets would have to deploy several times the present number of SS–9 Mod 1s and Mod 2s, with their present capabilities, before achieving a force which would pose a serious threat to the Minuteman force as a whole. This brings us to a consideration of the Mod 4.

K. In August 1968, the Soviets began testing the SS–9 Mod 4, carrying three RVs. By April 1970, they had conducted 17 tests, about the usual number for a missile before it goes into operational deployment. In these tests, the three RVs [*2 lines not declassified*] were not independently targetable, and the weapon as tested was not a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and there was no evidence that the Mod 4 had been operationally deployed.

L. In October 1970, tests resumed, and by 5 November there had been four more. One of these was like the earlier tests; one was a failure. The two others exhibited [*2 lines not declassified*]. This led us to point out in NIE 11–8–70, “Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack”, dated 24 November 1970,[3] Top Secret, Restricted Data, that a system of the type implied by preliminary analysis of these tests could have the

capability of attacking independently three separate targets, [*2 lines not declassified*]. In-depth analysis of the four latest tests has cast doubt on the preliminary judgment of last year that the Soviets appeared to be testing a MIRV. There are now divided views: some agencies believe that the Mod 4 is and will remain a soft target multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV); others believe that it could be either an MRV or an MIRV with limited targeting flexibility; still others think that it was intended to be an MIRV, but that development may have been discontinued.[4] No further tests of the Mod 4 have taken place since last fall. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] there are indications that the Mod 4 is being deployed at one SS–9 complex. All are agreed that if this is so, what is now being deployed is an MRV.

M. Returning now to the SS–9 Mod 3, as observed above it has been tested both as a DICBM and as a FOBS. In neither form does it have sufficient accuracy to attack hard targets effectively; its apparent function would be to attack soft strategic targets, avoiding early detection by the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. (New US warning systems give promise of reducing or eliminating this advantage.) The Mod 3 appears to have limited capability as a FOBS. It is agreed that it has been deployed only to a very limited extent, and that its future deployment, if any, will also be limited.

II. Soviet Policy and Future Programs

N. The broader reasons for the USSR's energetic buildup of intercontinental attack forces are neither complex nor obscure. In the early 1960s the Soviet leaders, politically and ideologically hostile to the US, and thinking and behaving as rulers of a great power, perceived that in this particular respect their military forces were conspicuously inferior to those of their most dangerous rival, the US. Consequently, they set themselves to rectify the imbalance—to achieve at a minimum a relation of rough parity. Parity in this sense cannot be objectively measured; it is essentially a state of mind. Such evidence as we have, much of it from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), indicates that the Soviet leaders think that they have now generally achieved this position, or are about to achieve it.

O. Many aspects of the present force structure are also susceptible to simple and probably correct explanation. The Soviets built a large number of ICBMs in order to match—and now to surpass—the number of US ICBMs, and also to increase the probability that many would survive an initial US attack. They built missile-launching submarines which are highly survivable when deployed, and they retained a manned bomber force as yet another option. The intercontinental attack force is obviously capable of being used in war, but there is no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders intend deliberately to make nuclear war. The force is an attribute of power, an instrument to support policy, a deterrent to the US.

P. Certain features of the Soviet system have affected the way in which decisions are made, and by whom. In the case of military policy and programs, decision-making is probably centered on two key elements—the military and military-industrial authorities who formulate new programs, and the top political leaders. The latter have the final

say, but they must operate in a context of other forces and take them into account. Decision-making appears to involve clusters of advisory and executive bodies which are likely, at times, to be in competition with one another. Bureaucratic pressures, conflicts, and constraints may be heavy on occasion. We think it unlikely that observed Soviet programs are the product of a carefully thought out strategy or rationale which is undeviatingly executed. It is probably fair to say that the system is characterized by conservatism, both in making new proposals and in disposing of them.

Q. Looking to the future, we have little basis in evidence for estimating the content of specific decisions on strategic policy or particular weapon programs. It seems clear that the Soviet leaders intend to maintain at a minimum such forces as will continue to give them—in their own phrase—a sense of "equal security" with the US. One method of doing so might be through an arms limitation agreement; they appear seriously interested in this possibility. We do not know whether an agreement will be reached, or on what terms. If it were indeed concluded, the development of Soviet intercontinental attack forces would be subject to its terms. While we have given consideration in this Estimate to possible effects of a SALT agreement, we confine ourselves mainly to a consideration of the situation in the absence of agreement.

R. With the general attitudes and policies of the USSR being what they are, it might seem obvious to infer that the Soviet leaders will strive to achieve marked superiority over the US in strategic weaponry. We do not doubt that they would like to attain such a position. The question is whether they consider it a feasible objective—whether they believe the chances of success good enough to justify allocation of the necessary resources, adjustment to the political implications of an allout arms race, and acceptance of the risk that instead of surpassing the US they might fall behind, especially in the technological competition. They might, in any case, think it feasible to seek a strategic posture that, while falling short of marked superiority, makes clear that the Soviets have advantages over the US in certain specific areas. For example, they can now claim an advantage in numbers of ICBM launchers. Whether or not such advantages are significant militarily, they help to dramatize the strategic power of the Soviet Union.

S. But even if Soviet intentions go no further than maintenance of "equal security", their arms programs are bound to be vigorous and demanding. This is in part because Soviet leaders must have an eye not to what forces the US has at present, but to what it can have, or may have, in future years. In this respect, they are likely to be cautious—to overestimate rather than underestimate the US threat. Moreover, the weapons competition nowadays is largely a technological race; the USSR is impelled to press forward its research and development lest it be left behind. Soviet weapon programs also tend to attain a momentum of their own; the immense apparatus of organizations, installations, personnel, vested interests, and so on, tends to proceed in its endeavors unless checked by some decisive political authority.

T. On the other hand, there are constraints upon Soviet arms programs. The most obvious is economic; resources are not unbounded; the civilian economy demands its share; one weapon system competes with another for allocations; and intercontinental attack

forces compete with strategic defense and general purpose forces. The various bureaucracies with interests in one or another area compete partly with rational argument and partly in sheer political infighting. Soviet leaders must also consider how far they may wish to press their own programs lest they provoke countervailing programs in the US. And they must assess not only the present and future US threat, but also that from China, and elsewhere.

U. While the foregoing considerations probably govern the nature of Soviet decisions as to future weapon programs, they provide us with little or no basis on which to estimate in detail what these programs will be. We have never had solid evidence on the problem, and there is no reason to expect that we shall have such evidence in the future. Moreover, in the present era the rapidity of technological advance tends to produce especially vigorous action and reaction between military programs of the USSR and the US.

V. Yet the possibilities are not unlimited, certainly in the next five years or so. For one thing, intercontinental weapon systems are of such complexity that their development, testing, and deployment take a long time. We can observe the testing phase, and thus project potential deployments. It usually takes about two years from the time we observe the first flight test of a new ICBM until that system becomes operational in the field. The interval for SLBMs is about the same or longer, and for bombers it is much longer. We can therefore estimate with much confidence that the kinds of weapon systems deployed by the Soviets during the next two years or so will be those already in operation or in the late stages of development. Even in the period from two to five years from now the force will be composed largely of existing kinds of delivery vehicles, but it could change substantially by the end of the period of this Estimate.

W. Because of the lead times involved in construction and deployment, we can also be highly confident of the number of launchers of intercontinental weapons which will be operational for periods up to about two years from now. Thereafter uncertainty increases as the time period of projection increases. Some reasonable limits to this uncertainty can nevertheless be derived from our knowledge of past deployment rates, especially those obtaining at a time when the Soviets appeared to be making a particularly vigorous effort.

X. The most significant developments in Soviet forces for intercontinental attack during the next several years will probably lie in qualitative improvements to the ICBM force. The most important of these are likely to be in accuracy of missiles, in MIRVs for them, and in survivability.

1. *Accuracy*. There is still no direct evidence that the Soviets are taking the steps that would be required for them to improve significantly the accuracy of their ICBMs. Improvements sufficient to give system CEPs of about 0.25 n.m. could come about through normal advances in present technology, but an improvement to say 0.15 n.m. would require the Soviets to go to wholly new techniques of guidance. Whether they decide to do this will depend on their future targeting requirements and particularly on how much stress they place on improving capabilities to attack land-based ICBMs.
2. *Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles*. We continue to believe that

the Soviets will develop MIRVs for their ICBMs. We expect a flight test program to start soon involving a new missile with MIRVs and with better hard target capabilities than the SS–9. About two years of testing would be required for this missile to achieve an initial operational capability. The Soviets probably could develop MIRVs based on the technology of the SS–9 Mod 4 with only one year of flight testing, but such MIRVs could not, in so short a time, be made more accurate than the present SS–9—that would require an improved guidance system and about two years of flight testing. Although there are differences of opinion on the future of the SS–9 Mod 4, all agree that it is unlikely to be developed as a hard target weapon if a new missile with hard target MIRVs is in fact to become available in the next two years or so.

3. *Survivability*. The USSR's concern about the survivability of its ICBM force is likely to increase, as the US deploys increasingly large numbers of independently targetable RVs. In addition to the employment of active defenses, survivability can be achieved through hardness and mobility. The new silos which are believed to be under construction will probably be harder than existing types. The Soviets may also pursue development of land-mobile ICBMs, but we believe this less likely than we did a year ago.

Y. With respect to ballistic missile submarines, the Soviets already have about 40 Y-class units in service or under construction, and may continue this program for some time. By the end of 1973 the Soviets will have as many launchers on Polaris-type submarines as the US, and these launchers will constitute a substantial portion of their forces for intercontinental attack. A new missile, the 3,000 n.m. range SS–NX–8, has been undergoing flight testing since June of 1969. Although this missile would be a substantial improvement over the 1,300 n.m. SS–N–6 now carried by the Y-class, the SS–NX–8 appears too large to be carried by Y-class submarines as they are currently configured, and we have yet to identify a new submarine class which might be designed to carry this missile. If the Soviets do in fact deploy a new submarine for the SS–NX–8, the first units probably could not reach operational status until about 1975, by which time the Soviets could have SLBMs equipped with penetration aids or multiple warheads, possibly including MIRVs. As an alternative to a new class of submarines, the Soviets might develop a new missile of extended range (at least 2,000 n.m.) for the present Y-class. If so, the first retrofitted Y-class unit probably could not be operational before late 1974, even if testing of a new missile began soon.

Z. The present fleet of intercontinental manned bombers will probably remain about the same size or diminish only slightly up to the mid-1970's. In time, however, increasing numbers of aircraft in the current inventory are likely to be phased out. We believe that the Backfire is best suited for peripheral operations, but that it may have some capability for intercontinental attack. If so, it could be used to replace or augment existing elements of the intercontinental bomber force, provided a suitable tanker force were also developed. All but the Air Force, however, believe that our knowledge of this aircraft is still too limited to justify a confident judgment of its capabilities and future employment. The Air Force believes that the capabilities of the Backfire indicate a

Soviet intent to employ the aircraft in both intercontinental and peripheral operations.

[Omitted here is the 60–page Discussion section of the estimate, which includes the following parts: Deployment of ICBMs, the SS–9, SS–11, SS–13, Dimensions and Directions of R&D on ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers and Tankers, Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces: Concepts for Use, Decision-making in the USSR, and Illustrative Future Forces. Also omitted are two annexes: a glossary of missile terms and the Estimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Intercontinental Weapon Systems.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] See paragraphs 32, 33, and 34 for a discussion of the effect of differences in accuracy and yield. [Footnote in the original. Paragraphs 32–34 discuss the SS–9's accuracy and yield in terms of its projected ability to disable Minuteman launch silos and launch control centers by rendering them incapable of launching a missile, with the probability of achieving the desired result improving with increased accuracy.]

[3] Document 160.

[4] See paragraph 52 for a detailed presentation of the positions of the various agencies. [Footnote in the original. According to paragraph 52, the CIA and the State Department believed that the Mod 4 was a soft target MRV; DIA and the Air Force held that it could be either an MRV or an MIRV with limited targeting flexibility; and the NSA, Army, and Navy maintained that it was intended to be an MIRV, but that development may have been discontinued.]

199. Conversation With President Nixon[1]

Washington, October 27, 1971.

Nixon: What I'm only interested in is the figure that the Defense Department is asking for, and the figure that [unclear] is asking about for guidance and what comes out of it. Just take a couple of minutes and say whatever it is so that John [Connally] is aware of the choices, like you did the other day.

Shultz: Well we have had four things going on. Mel Laird has been talking publicly about a budget of [$]80 billion plus, and encouraging the Chiefs more or less in that direction.

Nixon: Let me ask you, is that authorization to spend any more gold?

Shultz: I believe he is talking in terms of outlays, but he just talks about an $80 billion budget.

Nixon: All right.

Shultz: And so that gives us some room for maneuver there. But, that's one thing. The second thing that's going on is the traditional joint review involving the Secretary's staff and the OMB staff is going through the items to try to get—as they do every year. That's David Packard's process over on the Defense side. And the third thing that's going on is something that David, Henry, and I got started after the last meeting we had with you back in, [I] can't remember my times anymore, back in August some time,[2] and there we have three staff people taking up significant issues, such as the air defense issues, which is the one that's furthest along, and trying to get a joint decision being reviewed on a major policy issue. That decision will sort of underlie what goes under the budget. Then, because it seems that the public posture of the Defense budget was moving so fast, at such a high level relative to what we had thought. You remember your guidance of last summer was [$]75 billion, although that was, you specified, subject to review and so on. In the NSC staff and the OMB staff, Henry and I put a study in place trying to estimate what we thought was a Defense outlay number compatible with the foreign policy objectives as you set them and as Henry interpreted them to us. The Laird process is going on within the number, the two in between processes are starting, they are spinning away on particular issues, they don't have an outcome. Although our own OMB–NSC–Defense staff group is fairly well along. The exercise that Henry and I conducted that was reported to you last week when we discussed that, sees a content in the neighborhood of $77 to 77.5 billion as compatible with the foreign policy objective. I would suggest talking about [the] content side. We have, at the same time, an ability through the management of outlays during the year, starting now, and what we did in the '71 budget, to move the actual number that can be put in the budget you send out. We can move the outlays down

by a billion and a half to two billion or we can move them up just by sheer outlay management that is not going to affect the content of what is bought or the force structure, or anything of that kind. It can have an impact on the cosmetics of the budget. If we desire to have the budget get down into the full [unclear]. We always have that flexibility.

Nixon: What is the situation in regard to what we can say? I think we have here, as much as anything else [unclear]. Now Laird, having moved out [unclear], which, of course puts us in a position that if you go substantially below that, the indication is that, well, we are short-changing on defense for budgetary reasons. Now we're [unclear—interested?] not only in what can we get to, get within the full point of reference and all that business. How is it going to affect the economy? But we are also extremely interested [unclear] the defense budget and so on. [unclear] And it also will give us a strong bargaining position with the Soviet as we go forward with the arms talks. Now on that score [unclear]. And having asked that question, let me say, as I understand it, in any event what we're doing is going to be involved, cutting back on air defense and some of the obsolete stuff that we are doing—

Shultz: I think that is the way, which, as we talk about it, we would get down below the Defense level. I think that is the primary way in which we can do it.

Kissinger: I don't think we would help ourselves, Mr. President, if we, in order to get to a certain level, maintain forces for which we have no rationale.

Nixon: Henry, I couldn't agree more.

Kissinger: I must say on the trip,[3] having had a chance to do some thinking, and I worked with George on these figures, and they're good figures. They are all defensible figures. But as I think about the strategic buildup of the Soviet Union at this moment, of which the facts are going to become more and more known as the year goes on, and some of its aspects worry me even more than the publicized ones. For example, we always used to think that we ran no risks in ABM limitations because it would take them three years to build radars and then it would [unclear] the radar development. We could then—

Nixon: Catch up.

Kissinger: Catch up. Well, they've now developed a radar which is transportable so [unclear]. So we might even find ourselves confronted with a very rapid radar—ABM radar development—some day. So while [unclear] a year in which you have to talk to them, whether we shouldn't keep in mind some additional radars, and also, of course, when you see the Chinese they have [unclear] and sense of purpose. For all these reasons, and this is, George, I hate to say, not in accord with what we discussed before, I was wondering whether the President wants to give us another week to look at this again, not in order to restore things, which ought to be out in any event, such as the [unclear].

Nixon: There it's out.

Kissinger: But what if you wanted to go into the [$]80 billion vicinity? Whether we could rationally do something that would really be helpful and would particularly help us in these negotiating situations, which we'll be confronted with next year.

Nixon: Well, let me say this, that just simply having [$]80 billion on a ledge means spreading it as we always have among the three services, so that the Army [unclear] more and more stars, and the Air Force, of course, will have more people going to the Academy. I know what it all involves.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: No. Never. I mean, goddamnit, we've got to use the budget process for the purpose of shaping that service violently into some rational strategic concept—air defenses, what are they? I mean, it's a waste of money. You know it. Everybody knows it. Nobody—the Soviet Union is not going to attack the United States. Not at this time, when they're putting all their eggs in the missile basket, with a few bombers coming across the Pole. You know? Correct?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: And that naturally is much better for the flyboys just like it was great for the battleship admirals. They hate to give up those things. The flyboys love to have those marvelous interceptors. Well, what the hell good are they?

Kissinger: [unclear] against a massive bomber attack coming across the Pole, which is the only one they've used.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: If they do use a bomber attack. But it's 100 percent irrational.

Nixon: The second thing is with regard to the Army [unclear], the NATO forces and all the rest. [unclear] I don't think it's going to influence the Soviet one damn bit to have another army division. Not one damn bit. [unclear] On the other hand, if out of this could come, if out of the additional money—this is the thing I want to know—out of whatever additional money [unclear], we're going to get some real added strength to our strategic capability, either on the defensive or offensive side, something that we can negotiate with, that to me would make a hell of a lot of sense at this point. But I've never seen anything proposed that way. Nobody has ever proposed building more Polaris. Nobody has ever proposed building more Minuteman. Nobody, as I understand, is proposing that we add to our ABM force, correct? So how does all this, I don't see how all of this is going to be relevant, Henry, to our bargaining position and also to the problem. Now let me just add one point [unclear], this miserable intelligence community, which, of course, two years

ago said there was no threat at all from the Soviet [unclear]. And they've had television commentators on showing hundreds and hundreds of new holes all over the Soviet Union and just scaring the living bejeezus out of the people who seem to be saying, "What's going to go in those holes?" Something will. And one day we'll wake up and the Soviet will be looking down our throats. That was on four weeks ago. CBS after all [unclear] normally is on the peacenik side.

Kissinger: It's not hundreds, but it's close to a hundred.

Nixon: Well, whatever it is, whatever it is, you see my point is we confront two different problems. First we confront the reality of what we really need. That's one thing. But if what we really need is not enough to give the American people the assurance that they have an adequate defense, and therefore we become vulnerable on the political side, forget it. It's not enough. And if what we really need is not enough to give us the proper bargaining position with the Soviet, in these very important talks—

Kissinger: And the Chinese.

Nixon: Well the Chinese, yes, that's right. Even though they are far away from us from a strategic standpoint. They're quite aware of the fact that they're—

Kissinger: But that's where the infantry divisions have some—

Nixon: Well I suppose, yes, you've got to have something over there. That we're not getting out of Asia and that sort of thing. Those are the things, John [Connally?], that I'd like. Now assuming that we go this way, with a higher budget, we run two risks. One is, of course, that, well, let's face it, either you unbalance the budget more, but we're only talking, basically as I see it, by $2 or 3 billion. That's the number. Or, and unless you do this anyway, we have to tax more. As far as the inflationary effect of $2 or 3 billion [unclear]—and incidentally, let me say that all of this may be totally moot, because if you get it down to that silly Congress, they're very likely to cut it back anyway, despite all—particularly as we go over the arms talks and so forth. You see, John, we have this interesting thing. Our very good right wing friends are yakking their heads off about our defense budget not being adequate.[4] And yet, on the other hand, when we fought the battle for ABM, we fought the battle against the Mansfield amendments,[5] the ones that would involve NATO and the rest, they were nowhere to be seen. They don't understand. But nevertheless they fight [unclear]. We have to realize, the general trend insofar as support for defense is down. That could change. Could change. Could. I don't know. Looking at it from the political side, we do have people at least with the good sense [unclear]—Jackson. Good to have him and the other Democratic candidates [unclear] about this issue. If they thought we were vulnerable—hell, Kennedy talked about a missile gap. I was the "hardliner" and he was the "softliner." [unclear] Those weren't true. Now in this case, what we have to deal with, [unclear]. People just want to be able to scare the bejeezus out of people. [unclear] So what I'm thinking of is, maybe the present

number is all right, but I'm thinking of a budget number that could defuse the domestic opposition. If there is a hell of a lot of domestic opposition expressed, that will have a very detrimental effect on the attitudes of the Russians and the Chinese too because if they hear American television and so forth and the Senate saying, the United States is bare-assed for an attack, they're going to believe it, right?

Kissinger: Well, that was the case in the late '50s when actually we had a crushing superiority.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And we talked ourselves into a missile gap.

Nixon: That's right.

Shultz: Just to round out the picture with a number, we have built up the force structure above, in a sense, what the Defense process is carrying, in a sense that, I think beefing up the divisions, Al [Haig], if I'm not mistaken, the Army divisions, bringing the Marine divisions to full strength. It is also the case that the obligational authority, that would be the equivalent of this [$]77½ or so budget, would be in the [$]80 billion category.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. The obligational authority. So you could talk about that.

Shultz: I think if we were to—if you want to build up, say, the Navy ships to a greater extent, build more ships, that's the kind of thing that tends to build the obligational authority faster. [unclear exchange] Takes awhile to actually spend it up.

Nixon: For example, we could build more Polaris.

Kissinger: Well, I think we should push the ULMS development.

Nixon: The ULMS, as I understand—what the hell is that? That's the quietest?

Kissinger: No, the ULMS is the larger boat with larger missiles that can operate farther out, which therefore makes a larger area of the world available to you for [unclear]. A big drawback of the Polaris now is that they draw a circle from their target. And knowing the range and [unclear].

Nixon: [unclear] Is there some reason why [unclear]?

Kissinger: Well, that's what I wanted to—

Nixon: You want to find out.

Kissinger: [unclear] For example, the Soviets have just doubled their capacity for Polaris building. I thought what George and I could do is—by the same proposition which came

up to this figure, if he agrees—whether we would look at some of these things like strategic programs to see what could be done to emphasize those areas like ULMS, that might need some strengthening.

Nixon: Well the Navy, of course, is interested in that.

Kissinger: The Navy program.

Nixon: They want more officers' clubs. What the hell are they really after?

Kissinger: [unclear] Whatever you're interested in. [unclear]

Nixon: What I mean is, what do they really get out of it? I mean, in terms of what [unclear]. You've got to say with regard to the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army, I didn't hear one damn word in their presentation except what was totally selfish. Totally. [unclear] very effective in terms of what they needed and so forth. But nothing with regard to strategic armament. Zumwalt was clever enough to talk a little about that. But insofar as what he was going to do he had some sort of fuzzy thing, "Well, we ought to modernize the ships."

Kissinger: His was actually the trickiest.

Nixon: That's what I meant. He made it appear that he was talking about strategy [unclear].

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: I mean, it was a sad, sad performance.[6] And the poor Chiefs knew even less—I mean, the service secretaries. Of course they [unclear].

Kissinger: So if we could have a few more days, say until early next week, for George and —

Nixon: Well, you can have the days all right. I wanted to know before you go what your gut reaction is.

Connally: I have several reactions, Mr. President.

Nixon: All right.

Connally: First—

Nixon: But you see now people will be making this decision before you get back. When do you get back?

Connally: Get back the 14th. November.[7]

Nixon: Well, it won't be beyond the point of no return. But, we'll try to aim for next week. But the 14th [unclear]. Go ahead.

Connally: Well first, I speak from a lack of information, as you well know, about the details. All I can do is give you general observations. The first is, I think the spending—the lower figures just on the theory that [$]79.95 is just less than 80. But the obligational authority I wouldn't worry too much about. I would, as a matter of fact, probably go further than anybody here would go with respect to obligational authority provided it's in the proper areas of increasing real strategic capability or defense—either offense or defense. As I recall in statements, about 60 percent of your costs in the military are manpower.

Nixon: Correct.

Kissinger: That's what's so shocking.

Connally: So, I would cut manpower wherever I could. Not destroy any of the services, but I'd cut them as much as I could and put that money into the acquisition of ABM, Polaris missiles, or whatever to enhance your strategic capability. [unclear] You're not going to get action by the Congress before your meeting with the Russians and the Chinese. But you need to go into this new year with a strong military posture. And a lean, but effective, military posture, it seems to me. And I'm not even sure you shouldn't go in, and this will sound paradoxical, recommending we close bases. But you have a very substantial budget. It sounds like to me [unclear] election year. I'm not at all sure it is. Then what you really are prepared to go for. But this would be both convincing at home and abroad that you are really going to enhance your capability. We have to say that to the world. You have to say it to the Soviets. You have to say it to the Chinese. More than that you have to say it to all the lesser-developed countries. Because you're moving into an era of economic warfare and it has to be bolstered by an effective military strength—not just manpower, but an effective military strength where they're not afraid to go with us on an economic basis. Now, so far as the spending is concerned, I'd again direct it toward procurement, whether it's ABM, whether it's missiles, whether it's a new ship or ship modernizations, or longer missiles, or research and development. I'd do it in the procurement field, which both revitalizes the jobs and, to some extent at least, the defense plants of this country in an election year. And yet it gives you what you want. I wouldn't do it just to do that. But I'd do it because it gives you what you want. And I'd cut back on manpower in all the services if I could. And I think you have to just be, you're going to have to make the decision in concert with Henry and George, and Cap [Weinberger]. You're just going to have to make the tough decisions about what you're going to fund and what you're not. The services are not going to do it. They're not going to make those choices. And the Defense Department is not going to make those choices. So those are just general observations. But I think if you have to go beyond the [$]75 or 76 [billion], I'd do it. I wouldn't worry too much about

it. I think you're probably going to have to wind up with new taxes anyway. And if we talk about $2 or 3 billion, that's peanuts in terms of what you're going to be confronted with for this budget, in terms of your social programs and all these other things that we give money to. And you're going into a ballgame that you know better than I. But you're opening up whole new vistas of opportunity here, and you have to lead through strength. You can't lead through weakness. You can't lead from a position where you think everybody's going to be a good guy, as you well know. You just cannot do it. You have to maintain military strength, but you have to do it in a credible fashion and that's not going to be just maintaining a lot of riflemen.

Nixon: All right, well, let's leave it at this point until we have [unclear exchange]. That represents my general view too. I think that we [unclear], hanging out there though, something that would really raise concern among the people. But on the other hand, I don't want to go the Laird, which I fear is—would try to keep—I suppose any Secretary would [unclear], well, just keep the budget high so that we keep the services happy. The hell with them.

Kissinger: No, we'll prefer that the cuts be made, and we'll use what we've got at the tables to see whether we can find some rational programs that would support your policies next year. I don't think—if the choice were to go back to the [$]80 billion that Laird submitted to you that wouldn't be worth it—

Connally: No, no. Oh, no.

Kissinger: I think actually, what we came up with gives you a better force for less money. But, if George and I can work it over, and we won't even tell the other services that you're considering this—

Nixon: Oh, no, no. They'll all be in with their hats out as to how they can spend the money. But you understand, I have a feeling—I also want you to—well, the intelligence community isn't worth a tinker's dam, with regard to this thing. But, can you take into consideration, Henry, what the [unclear] American people have been reading for the last —

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: And, because that comes into this thing, and I don't know. Maybe—how much of this is true and how much it is—I don't know. I want—let me say, John, I make the decision. I'd like to see a couple of pages on what really our analysis of the intelligence is as to what they are doing. Because we damn well, even if we have to go in an election year and raise taxes substantially, are not going to be in any position of falling behind the Soviet. That's not going to happen.

Kissinger: What they're doing is extremely worrisome, not yet in terms of numbers, but

in terms of the mentality it reveals. That even while they're talking SALT, even while you're going to a summit—if we—imagine reversing it. If you pushed new radar developments, built lots of new holes, all the liberals here would be all over you. While you're going into SALT talks and [unclear].

Nixon: They're all over me anyway.

Kissinger: So in terms of the mentality it reveals, it shows that they have, that they believe they must be able to translate this either into military or political advantage. However, [what] we might think to look at is what counters we have available to show them that this is being noticed.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Shultz: Can I say one more thing before we're—?

Nixon: Sure.

Shultz: Just on the overall picture, I believe that it's true that even if the military outlays go up, say by a billion, given our ability to manage these outlays, with the posture that we talked about and I felt you went along with, on the revenue sharing. And with a reasonably tough, but not unreasonable, posture on the budget, we can bring the total in within a range that doesn't put you in the posture of needing to go for new taxes, for that reason.

Nixon: [unclear]

Shultz: That's right. I think we can still do that. It's not easy, but we can do that. So, I think that while it may be that you'll want to do some things by way of initiatives that will make it necessary to go for new taxes, I don't think that's forced by a billion or so on the military, or by the impossibility of the domestic budget, given your decision about what to do on some of these Presidential [unclear—negotiations?].

Nixon: Okay.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Record of Conversation among Nixon, Connally, Kissinger, Ehrlichman, Shultz, Weinberger, and Haig, Oval Office, Conversation No. 604–6. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. This conversation was part of a longer one that took place from 3:07 to 3:40 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] An apparent reference to President Nixon's July 23 meeting on the budget. See Document 188.

[3] Kissinger traveled to China for the second time October 16–26.

[4] President Nixon discussed conservatives' increasingly vocal criticism of his national security and foreign policies with New York Senator James Buckley (R) on August 5, Senator Barry Goldwater (R–Arizona) on November 10, and California Governor Ronald Reagan on November 17. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation Nos. 555–10, 14–17, and 620–12)

[5] See footnote 4, Document 185.

[6] See Document 191.

[7] Connally traveled to Asia October 28–November 14.

200. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 13–8–71 Washington, October 28, 1971.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S WEAPONS PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

[*Section heading and 3 paragraphs* (*28 lines*) *not declassified*]

Summary and Conclusions

The Stage and Direction of the Chinese Effort

A. After some 15 years of effort, China is now beginning to deploy strategic weapon systems. Starting from scratch with a limited industrial, technical, and scientific base, and denied Soviet assistance after 1960, the Chinese had to proceed on their own with the development of requisite skills, the construction of basic facilities, and the design and testing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

B. China clearly intends to attain the status of a major nuclear power, accepting the economic burden involved and the risks of slowing basic economic development through diversion of scarce resources and skills to specialized defense tasks. This is evident on the China scene today where activity in both general purpose and strategic military programs is at an all time high. Though any forecast of China's future must allow for additional periods of disruption and upset, it seems reasonable to assume that the existing high priority for strategic programs will endure in the years ahead.

C. Obviously, China's efforts in the military field will be limited by available skills and resources. But we lack the data to place any useful ceiling on the level of the Chinese effort.[2] Based on the pattern of Chinese military programs to date, the Chinese seem sensitive to the dangers of trying too much too fast in their strategic programs in a country whose population growth threatens continuously to outstrip economic growth. While stressing the wide-ranging and ambitious nature of China's present effort, we should also stress its relatively moderate pace. The Chinese have been deliberate in testing weapon systems and in no apparent rush to undertake costly and large-scale deployment of weapon systems of limited capabilities. No doubt the large issues of priorities and costs serve to trouble Chinese internal politics at the highest levels, [*1½lines not declassified*].

D. No elaboration of the rationale for developing a strategic force nor any discussion of strategic doctrine has appeared in China. Evidently some principles other than Mao's "peoples' war" doctrine guide the costly and wide-ranging strategic weapon programs now underway in China. It seems most likely that Peking seeks through the development of a

substantial nuclear force to enhance its claim to great power status, to deter the USSR and the US from the resort to force against China, and to insure for China a leading and dominant political role in Asia.

Strategic Missiles

E. It is probable that China has now deployed some CSS–1 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), [*1 line not declassified*]. This missile has a range of about 600 n.m. and probably uses non-storable liquid propellants. We estimate that there might be about 10 units deployed [*1 line not declassified*].

F. A second missile, the CSS–2, has a range of at least 1,400 n.m. and probably uses storable propellants. We believe that the development stage of this system is well advanced and that it probably has reached the point of deployment, although there is uncertainty about this. While the CSS–2 is superior to the CSS–1 in range and reaction time, it probably does not incorporate any great improvement in accuracy [*2½ lines not declassified*].

G. The Chinese are developing another liquid-propellant missile. This missile, which appears to have sufficient range to provide full coverage of the USSR, could be ready for deployment by late 1973 or early 1974. This system, referred to as the "Ching-yu" missile, is a two-stage vehicle with the first stage probably incorporating the design and technology of the CSS–2. Its maximum range is unknown, but our calculations, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] suggest that any capability against the continental US would be marginal at most.

H. Further down the road, China is almost certain to deploy a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of full coverage of the continental US. China could have a large, liquid propellant ICBM ready for deployment as early as 1974 but more likely a year or two later. When full range testing into the Pacific or the Indian Ocean occurs, we should be able to learn more about the performance of the system and to make more confident estimates of its probable initial operational capability.

I. In addition to these four liquid-propellant missiles, China has a large and ambitious program underway for the development and production of strategic missiles using solid propellants. If flight testing begins within a year, solid-propellant strategic missiles—most likely in the MRBM or IRBM class—might be ready for deployment as early as 1974, but 1975 or 1976 is more likely in view of the special problems involved.

Submarines

J. China has also shown an interest in nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and it is building shipyards which appear capable of producing and servicing such submarines. We judge that China could have SSBNs equipped with solidor liquid-

propellant missiles as early as 1976. But this would require a crash effort and early success in overcoming a multitude of support, training, and operational problems. Thus, even if they now have a prototype under construction, the first Chinese SSBN probably will not be operational until after 1976.

Bombers

K. Production of TU–16 medium bombers began in late 1968 and has reached a level of two per month. About 30 of these aircraft are now operational. The TU–16 can carry a 6,600 pound bombload to a radius of about 1,650 n.m., but it is relatively slow and highly vulnerable to sophisticated air defenses. While there is no doubt that some TU–16 crews are now sufficiently trained to deliver thermonuclear (TN) bombs to designated targets, it will be at least a year and probably longer before the Chinese have two or three regiments with crews trained to perform coordinated missions against modern air defenses.

Nuclear Bombs and Warheads

L. To arm its delivery systems, China has concentrated successfully on the development of a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] TN device and could now have bombs and warheads with this yield in stockpile. It could also have fission weapons [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. It is likely that the Chinese are working to expand production of fissionable materials, and although there is a broad range of possible error in estimating the output of these materials, it seems clear that China will have ample fissionable material, particularly after 1973, to arm the strategic delivery systems it is likely to deploy.

Space

M. The two earth satellites launched by China over the past 18 months marked the beginning of what probably will be an ambitious space program. Over the next few years, we expect continued launches involving larger and increasingly sophisticated payloads, partly in response to urgent military needs for targeting and geodetic data.

Projected Forces

N. We expect whatever strategic forces China now has deployed to be augmented gradually over the next two years, principally by a build-up of CSS–2 units and by the continued series production of TU–16 medium bombers. Beyond 1973 and for the period five years ahead, there is much uncertainty (Section VI attempts to project to that period).[3] But one thing is certain: the force will be weighted heavily on the side of systems capable only of reaching targets in Asia (including US installations there) and the USSR. Acapability against the continental US may begin to emerge, however, toward the end of this period.

[Omitted here is the 37–page Discussion section of the estimate.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject matter was outside his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] Wayne Smith sent Kissinger a 7–page memorandum on September 16, explaining that U.S. intelligence about the extent of the PRC's strategic capabilities was limited. Kissinger wrote "Excellent Paper!" on the first page. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–161, NSSM 69)

[3] The 12-page section VI, entitled "Projected Strategic Forces," included sections on Strategic Concepts; Constraints on Future Forces; Deployment Through Mid-1972; Projecting Chinese Communist Weapon Systems to Mid-1976; and Force Structure, Mid-1973 Through Mid-1976.

201. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 1, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of topics—including foreign aid, Vietnam, and United States relations with the Soviet Union and West Germany—unrelated to national security policy.]

Nixon: Also, I think it's important, as you—that we have new regard for all these budgetary considerations. [unclear]. Now, since you [Laird] left, I had a meeting with Shultz [unclear]. Yeah, with Shultz and with Weinberger.[2] And I said, "Now look. Now I know that what you've said—and I know [unclear]." And I said, "Now, I want you to go back and look over these figures. And see what we can come up with." One area that I feel very strongly about after hearing that briefing the other day[3] —I do think we can make some adjustments in terms, let's say, looking at the things that you've been emphasizing. The ICBMs, [unclear], et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. [unclear] in terms of air defense, conventional air defense, that's an area—you could trim that area to make more available in this area. The key point that I would really like to get out [unclear], is what—is how we could do any more with the Defense budget now that would delay the strategic weapons. Now on that score, you see, I'm not thinking about modernization of the Navy or more Army divisions. That's—but, you really get down to the fact that should we build more ICBMs? I mean, should we build more Minuteman? Should we have a bigger program on ABM? A proposal you can negotiate on. [unclear] Now, if the recommendation had come up [unclear], even though [unclear], it would be my inclination to lean very strongly in that direction. I think that could be quite a help in our negotiations with the Soviets. Do you agree, Henry?

Laird: Well, I have a memorandum to you [unclear exchange]. I sent Henry a memorandum[4] with the seven things that I think we should do for SALT. It will increase our position there. And one of—

Kissinger: [unclear]

Laird: Well, no I won't. But I think it's a good idea to give you a little [unclear].

Kissinger: But he has made some recommendations on how to keep up the strategic forces and [unclear] proposals. And it runs parallel to what you were discussing with SALT the other day. Also pushing ULMS, for example. Putting them [unclear]. Putting several more of the Polaris [unclear].

Laird: Yes. And we think we could—

Nixon: We could do that?

Laird: Yes. We can step up—[unclear].

Nixon: That'll be done this year.

Laird: We could do a couple more submarines. See, and we could—

Nixon: You know what—

Laird: Conversions.

Nixon: Conversions. And could that work go forward immediately?

Laird: Yes.

Nixon: I'm speaking of the job [unclear].

Laird: Well. It'll take—

Nixon: [unclear]

Laird: It'll take us about six months to get the thing in the docks.

Nixon: They could start then and—

Laird: But it would show us a movement—

Nixon: Yeah.

Laird: —because [unclear].

Nixon: Maybe by July and then we could get going.

Laird: Yes. But this was in the memorandum, which I sent to—

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: On the way.

Nixon: We're all on the same—we're all the same—

Laird: Well, I sent it to you, Henry. I think I did.

Kissinger: Yeah, but I didn't [unclear]. I know—

Nixon: I haven't seen it.

Kissinger: Well I'm summarizing it. [unclear exchange]

Laird: You know, I sent it to Henry.

Nixon: On defense now, I am not—I just want to be sure to get [unclear]. It is my view, which is just as strong as anybody could possibly be, that we not be in a weak position when we go to deal with the Soviets, or, for that matter, the Chinese. They must not think, the Chinese, that we're getting the hell out of Asia, or we don't have any bargaining position. And, by the same token, the Russians must not think that regardless of what they do on arms control, that we're going to, you know, piss it away anyway. So my view is that we have—that [unclear]. Could be right for domestic and political reasons that we have some pretty tough critics that say, "What the hell are we doing here?" I think that's important. On the other hand, the numbers are important.

Laird: This won't affect our expenditure program. The problem we had in '73 [unclear]. There's very little money involved [unclear].

Nixon: Well, that's the thing. Remember I told you I didn't want it. Well that's this. But on the other hand, another thing I want you to go out and explore is what could we spend, speaking just of [unclear], what could we spend? But suppose they wanted—suppose they gave me a billion dollars more or something. Does it help the defense? Even marginally? Does it have a considerable impact on jobs [unclear]? Got anything like that?

Laird: Oh, yes. We had that—we're looking—

[Omitted here is an exchange about scheduling meetings to discuss the Defense budget and discussion of Vietnam, particular weapons systems, and German financial support for United States forces in Europe.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Laird, and Kissinger, Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 302–32. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation that occurred from 2:54 to 4 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[2] See Document 199.

[3] See Document 191.

[4] In an October 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Laird argued that it was time for the United States to demonstrate its will to react to the continuing buildup in Soviet strategic offensive weapons by deploying new SSBNs. For the text of Laird's memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 208.

202. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, December 8, 1971, 3:10–3:50 p.m.

SUBJECT
Asia Strategy and Forces

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
U. Alexis Johnson
Charles Whitehouse
Ronald Spiers
Robert McCallum

Defense
David Packard
Gardiner Tucker
Paul Brands

JCS
Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
B/Gen. William C. Burrows

CIA
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman [*name not declassified*]

CEA
Ezra Solomon

OMB
Kenneth Dam
Caspar Weinberger

ACDA
Philip Farley
Vice Adm. John Lee

NSC Staff
Philip Odeen
John Court
Lt. Cdr. John Knubel
R/Adm. Robert Welander
John Holdridge
John Walsh
James Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The Working Group will conduct a study of the ground and air force requirements and

division estimates to cover various contingencies in Northeast Asia. In connection therewith, the JCS should provide clarification of their force requirements estimates.
—The Working Group will prepare a briefing to explain the various views on how a combined PRC/NVN threat would be handled in Southeast Asia and the number of U.S. forces required.
—The DOD will undertake a review of alternative doctrines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Asia.[2]
—The CIA should conduct a review of our intelligence capabilities against China with the purpose of finding measures to improve them.[3]
—The State Department is authorized to inform our Asian allies of our plans for deployment of forces in Asia in FY 73, as soon as they have been approved by the President.
—Another meeting will be scheduled for about mid-January.

Dr. Kissinger: Some specific proposals have been submitted by State and DOD, but what I would like to do today is have a general discussion of our Asian strategy, keeping in mind that we will want to have an NSC meeting on this subject later. I see three general issues here; the first is what kind of threat should we be defending against and what general purpose forces are required to deal with it. A secondary aspect of that issue is what forces should be withheld from NATO.

Mr. Johnson: Withheld from NATO?

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps I'm not using the right term. What I mean is which of our forces should be held for use in NATO if we become involved militarily in Asia. Is withheld the right word?

Dr. Tucker: Yes, U.S. forces withheld for deployment to NATO in an emergency, called "NATO withhold."

Dr. Kissinger: The second issue is what should be the role of nuclear weapons in our Asian strategy and against what threat should they be directed. The third is a number of subsidiary issues, such as what level of PRC threat should we be protecting against. Now turning to the first issue, the nature of the threat, the question is whether we should plan to use U.S. forces to cover the contingency of an attack in both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. With regard to Northeast Asia, an OSD systems analysis study[4] concludes that under the present MAP the South Koreans can defend against a North Korean attack and also against the lesser of the potential Chinese threats, which is described in the study as a 15 division attack. Do we agree on this? (Mr. Packard showed Dr. Kissinger a chart[5] containing a DOD assessment of this threat).

Do I understand correctly that you (DOD) do not think that U.S. forces would be required to support a South Korean defense against North Korea and fifteen Chinese divisions?

Gen. Vogt: Some U.S. divisions would be necessary to cover the Chinese threat, but not for the North Koreans alone.

Dr. Kissinger: How many U.S. divisions?

Gen. Vogt: We estimate four, but it could be as low as two, depending on the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought 4 to 5 U.S. divisions were required to handle a maximum Chinese threat.

Gen. Vogt: We have talked about six U.S. divisions for a maximum Chinese threat. If we have more air support, we can scale that figure down.

Dr. Kissinger: If six U.S. divisions are needed for a Chinese threat of 35 divisions, why would you need four to cover just 15? Please explain that to me.

Gen. Vogt: They are needed as backup reserves, and we would need enough to cover the entire front. The estimate could be reduced if we had more air power.

Mr. Packard: Our tactical air capability is now much better than it was in Korea. It is much more effective and with adequate tactical air support we may be able to contain a minimum Chinese threat in Korea without using U.S. ground forces.

Dr. Kissinger: The Air Force is always telling us the weather is so bad it takes them two weeks to carry out the missions we want. Have we studied the basis for these JCS figures on the number of divisions needed?

Mr. Odeen: Not so far as I know.

Dr. Kissinger: We should study them, can we do it right away?

Mr. Odeen: Yes, of course.

Dr. Kissinger: These figures are important; they bear directly on how many forces we should deploy in Northeast Asia. I would like to ask the CIA if they assume the Soviets will maintain large forces on the Chinese border.

Gen. Cushman: We assume that they will.

Dr. Kissinger: Then I would like to ask this question—if the Soviets remain on the Chinese frontier, can the Chinese spare fifteen divisions for use in Korea? It's not just a question of detailing fifteen divisions to a certain area. For the Chinese to send any number of divisions to Korea would mean that they would become embroiled with the United States. They would see themselves being sucked into a war in Korea while a large Russian army stands on their borders. So we have to assume that if they were to go into

Korea again they would either have to be willing to do so despite a large Soviet force on their borders or with the idea of finishing the affair quickly. Our mechanical figures of opposing force levels must be based on these considerations.

Gen. Cushman: We assume that the fifteen divisions would not be taken from the Russian border.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course not, but wouldn't they think of defense in depth? Certainly they don't intend to deter the Soviets with just the forces they have on the border. In the event of trouble with the Russians, they would dispatch units from all over China to border areas. So if they had to send units to Korea, these would come out of the forces they would otherwise have available for the Russian front.

Mr. Johnson: This is the basic point. The Chinese don't want to get involved with the United States. They will have enormous inhibitions against getting involved with us while they have the Soviets on their borders.

Dr. Tucker: Deterring the Chinese from intervening in Korea really means that we must be able to defeat the forces they could afford to commit to Korea while they maintain adequate defensive forces on the Soviet border. The other alternative for us is to defend against all of their forces.

Dr. Kissinger: For the purpose of our projections, we may want to assume that they will not want to attack in Korea if they have to use any of the forces that otherwise would be committed to the Russian front. The force ratios we have discussed are not important if the PRC does not want to get involved with the U.S. In that case, either a minimum U.S. presence or a clear commitment would be an adequate deterrent.

Mr. Johnson: Having lived through 1950, I maintain that a mere U.S. presence is a major deterrent.

Mr. Packard: The logical position for us to take is to plan on a lesser force level in Korea on the assumption that the Chinese-Soviet confrontation will continue. That confrontation is the current political reality and we should base our projections on it. If the Sino-Soviet dispute ends, it will be a whole new ballgame anyway.

Dr. Tucker: As I understand the purpose of this meeting it is to discuss force levels and not political projections.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. We are talking about force levels. We agree that a U.S. presence is necessary for deterrent purposes, but we need an analysis of the force levels and division estimates. (to Mr. Odeen) Will you get to work on that? Now what is the OSD position, that no U.S. forces are necessary?

Dr. Tucker: Ground forces are not necessary, but American air and logistics support are

required. This is strictly a military and not a political assessment.

Mr. Johnson: Won't our MAP meet the air need? What about when modernization is completed?

Dr. Tucker: It may be adequate for the North Korean threat, but not the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: Does our present 13 division army permit us to meet the four to six division requirement in Korea without drawing down our NATO forces?

Dr. Tucker: Assuming we can mobilize our reserves, we will be able to put five divisions into Korea with no NATO drawdown. Otherwise, we have only our 1-2/3 ready divisions for quick deployment. This might be increased to three divisions, but without full support. The availability of reserves is critical in this projection.

Mr. Packard: The necessity to mobilize reserves is the key point.

Mr. Johnson: Then it becomes a domestic political problem.

Dr. Tucker: The 1-2/3 ready divisions provide U.S. participation and minimum support. They might be enough in the event of a minimum attack. If not enough, they could be increased by the addition of reserves.

Dr. Kissinger: I hope the reserves are better than they were when I was in the reserves. I wouldn't want to depend on the unit I was in for anything.

Dr. Tucker: We think they're better than they used to be.

Dr. Kissinger: There is a systems analysis study over at DOD that concludes that only one U.S. division is needed in Southeast Asia to defend against both North Vietnam and the PRC. This was prepared by (Philip) Odeen before he came to work for me. Now, I have him doing close order drill every day, and he is developing some new ideas.

Dr. Tucker: This assumes that the South Vietnamese can hold them.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't believe that the South Vietnamese and Thai can hold the North Vietnamese and Chinese. The North Vietnamese, yes, but not the PRC.

Mr. Packard: No, you will need some U.S. forces, but how many depends on the amount of tactical air you introduce.

Dr. Kissinger: The analysis makes me uneasy. Can we have a briefing on how a combined PRC/North Vietnamese threat would be handled? By the time our projections are finished, the bloody Indians may be in the picture, too.

Gen. Vogt: We already have an analysis of this threat, which assumes that a minimum of

six divisions will be needed.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Odeen) Let's do a study on this.

Dr. Tucker: We'll help out, we'll get you two different briefings.

Dr. Kissinger: That's what I'm afraid of. I would like to turn to the subject of tactical nuclear weapons. There are two schools of thought on tactical nukes; some say they can be used extensively to replace ground forces and others argue that they can't be used at all because they may trigger strategic retaliation.

Mr. Packard: We have a position on tactical nukes, but if we don't get something better out of the SALT talks than we appear to be getting, if we don't get some control on offensive weapons, then we will have to use all of our nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet offensive threat.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it all that bad?

Gen. Vogt: They have added 200 new offensive weapons since SALT started.

Mr. Packard: We can use tactical nuclear weapons in Korea without retaliation, provided we can deter or take out their strategic weapons. We can give you a paper on tactical nukes.

Mr. Johnson: Would you deter them or take them out?

Mr. Packard: We should be ready to take them out if we have to.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we know where they are?

Mr. Spiers: We haven't found any yet.

Mr. Johnson: Their MRBM's are hard to find.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the CIA doing a study on improving our capability for detecting these weapons? I understand that such a study was underway.

Gen. Cushman: I don't know. I'll check into it.

Mr. Packard: We've found out a lot of things. We've discovered things that people thought we couldn't. The new radars and other devices are providing much better technical data. Give us a little time and we'll find out a lot of things for you.

Dr. Kissinger: But we have found none of their missiles at all so far? Are they hard to find?

Mr. Johnson: They are soft sites. They may be in these mounds[6] we have seen pictures of, but we don't know for sure.

Dr. Kissinger: Has anyone found anything else these mounds can be used for?

Mr. Johnson: They could be used for artillery, but we just don't know.

Dr. Kissinger: I flew over one of them.

Gen. Vogt: Did you get a picture of it?

Mr. Johnson: We have pictures of them, but they don't tell us much.

Dr. Kissinger: Getting back to the paper on tactical nuclear weapons, can we set a deadline of the first week in January for a paper from DOD?

Dr. Tucker: Would the 15th of January be acceptable?

Dr. Kissinger: That's okay. We'll have another meeting then.

Mr. Packard: I don't see any real difference between State and Defense on these issues. The letter from Secretary Rogers (of Dec. 6, 1971)[7] contains positions that we are essentially in agreement with, but I don't see any reason to go to the Asian leaders with this kind of information.

Mr. Johnson: We have a problem of confidence. We are withdrawing from Vietnam and our Asian allies are watching that closely, wondering where else we will withdraw from and when. Without agreed projections, we have been unable to tell our Asian allies that we will stay.

Dr. Kissinger: Haven't we told the South Koreans that we will stay there until 1963 [*1973?*] and consult with them thereafter?

Mr. Johnson: No, we haven't been able to tell them that.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't see why not.

Mr. Johnson: We are waiting for approval of the FY 73 program. The Thai are concerned, too.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we are about to make our FY 73 decisions. We are still waiting for the paper from DOD ...

Mr. Packard: You will have it in a few days.

Dr. Kissinger: The President will make his decision within two weeks on our FY 73 plans,

after which you (Johnson) can convey those plans to our Asian allies and tell them that we will consult with them later on projections beyond FY 73.

Mr. Johnson: That will be a big help. If we can assure them through FY 73, it will take the heat off.

Dr. Kissinger: Our discussion today has been addressed to the long range issue. The FY 73 plans will be decided in about ten days.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–73. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] In a December 14 memorandum addressed to Irwin, Packard, Helms, Shultz, and McCracken, Kissinger instructed the Defense Department to review alternative doctrines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Asia and to list and evaluate planned U.S. deployments in FY 1973. Kissinger also directed the State Department to prepare a scenario for notifying U.S. allies of expected changes in American deployments in Asia. (Ibid., Box H–104, DPRC Meeting, U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia, 12/8/71) Laird and Rogers sent a memorandum to President Nixon on February 9, 1972, recommending FY 1973 U.S. force deployments in Asia and outlining a scenario for notifying allies. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 US)

[3] Kissinger sent Helms a memorandum on December 14 requesting that Helms "investigate alternative means of improving our capability to detect and locate PRC nuclear weapons missile launchers and bomber aircraft." The analysis, Kissinger wrote, should consider costs and the capability of alternative U.S. surveillance systems to "detect and locate various types of likely PRC delivery systems." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–104, DPRC Meeting, U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia, 12/8/71)

[4] Not further identified.

[5] Not found.

[6] See footnote 5, Document 153.

[7] Not found.

203. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, December 22, 1971.

Dear Mel,

The President has reviewed carefully your recent memorandum on the FY 73 Defense Budget.[2]

As you know, he fully shares your view that it is essential that we preserve a strong defense posture during this period of new diplomatic initiatives. For this reason, the Defense budget to the Congress should, as you suggest, clearly demonstrate a substantial increase compared to previous years' requests.

In this regard, the President has decided that a FY 73 budget authority request of approximately $82 billion and outlays of $78.6 billion will meet our security objectives while permitting us to attain our economic objectives.[3] These amounts include the effect of the President's decision to defer the pay raise scheduled for October 1972 until January 1973. Thus, you will be able to allocate additional outlays (estimated at about $360 million) to highest priority needs.

The President has reaffirmed the detailed FY 73 program decisions outlined below and shown on the enclosed tables.[4]

—Planning a four-site Safeguard program pending the outcome of SALT. Following the successful completion of SALT, further reductions may be in order.
—Reductions in our Strategic Air Defense interceptor and missile forces consistent with providing a defense against a small Soviet bomber attack with one to two days' strategic warning and surface-toair missile defense of Washington, D.C. only.
—Reductions of about $350 million of additional All Volunteer Force funds pending assessment of the effects of the recent military pay raise[5] on enlistments and identification of most productive programs to attract added recruits. If needed to attain our All Volunteer Force objectives, a request for additional funds will be favorably considered later.
—Reductions in intelligence funding consistent with the savings the President directed in his memorandum on Intelligence Community Improvement.[6] Some reductions will also be necessary in research and development as well as other support programs.

The President's earlier decision on funds for air operations in Southeast Asia is revised to reduce the funds by about $100 million instead of the $190 million he approved originally. With the additional funds the President wishes to ensure we have the needed

forces to fly at least 8,000 sorties monthly during FY 73 thereby providing adequate forces to react to unexpected threats. However, he has decided that planning for lower actual sorties levels during periods of poor weather and reduced enemy activity should enable us to achieve budgetary savings. FY 73 budget decisions should not limit the President's later consideration of a wide range of FY 73 programs.

In view of the estimated savings of $360 million from the pay raise deferral, the $78.6 billion level will permit you to finance new initiatives or programs you consider to have high priority. From these funds you should provide for any employment support actions. Also, you should provide $135 million for the strategic submarine building initiative. The specific submarine program to be pursued will be determined later by the President based on a careful review of the issues.

I recognize that you may have to make some further changes to the Defense Program to reach the $78.6 billion outlay target. As you know, however, the President is deeply concerned over the force reductions we have had to make over the past three years. Therefore, further budgetary reductions should not reduce significantly our current forces or their readiness.

In approving this Defense Program for FY 1973, the President wishes to reaffirm his conviction that such a substantial budget increase should provide for a strong defense posture fully capable of supporting his foreign policy. I know that he can count on your full support in ensuring that this capability is provided.

Warm regards,

Henry

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–207, 110.01, Budget. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The letter bears a note indicating that Laird saw it on January 6, 1972.

[2] Laird sent Nixon a memorandum on December 8 recommending FY 1973 Defense Department outlays in the range of $79.5 to $80 billion. (Ibid.: FRC 330–77–0094, 337, White House)

[3] During his telephone conversation with Shultz on December 24, President Nixon confirmed these figures and discussed the budgeting process. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Shultz, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 17–5)

[4] Two page-length tables are enclosed but not printed. The first details the adjustments to the FY 1973 Defense Department budget approved by the President. The second, "The FY 73 DOD Posture," outlines the strategic and general purpose forces purchased by that budget.

[5] See footnote 2, Document 185.

[6] On November 5, Nixon issued a memorandum ordering a reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 242.

204. Paper Prepared by the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group[1]

Washington, January 11, 1972.

U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND FORCE POSTURE

SUMMARY OF ISSUES FOR DECISION

I. Issues for Decision

The DPRC has directed a review of strategic force policy[2] in order to provide a basis for more refined, comprehensive, and integrated Presidential guidance which will supplant the NSDM 16[3] criteria in future planning of strategic forces. A series of interagency studies were integrated and summarized in the Executive Summary.

The many issues that emerged about U.S. strategic nuclear policy objectives, their relative priorities, and how to attain these objectives are so interrelated that most decisions on individual issues should be made within a framework of basic choices regarding overall U.S. strategic nuclear policy. Consequently, the study group developed a set of "General Strategic Alternatives" which deal primarily with strategic offensive forces, concepts for their employment, and command/control. A second set of decisions concerns strategic defense alternatives. A third set relates to our strategic offensive force posture vis-à-vis the PRC. This paper focuses on these issues and their interrelations.

Decision A. General Strategic Alternatives.[4] Should U.S. strategic force planning vis-à-vis the USSR be primarily based on:

1. A well-hedged urban/industrial (U/I) retaliatory capability;
2. Alternative 1 plus planning and organization changes to provide greater flexibility for employment of U.S. strategic nuclear forces than currently exists;
3. Alternative 2 plus improvements in command and control hardware, or missile counterforce capability, or both, to provide even greater flexible response capability; or
4. Improvements in the numbers and qualities of strategic forces designed to achieve outcomes favorable to the United States in any nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union?

Decision B. Strategic Defense Alternatives.[5] Should the strategic defensive posture be:

1. Minimum defense to provide warning and surveillance;
2. Nationwide defense against small attacks (our current policy in NSDM 16);
3. Defense of strategic retaliatory forces and the NCA;
4. Nationwide defense against small attacks and hard-site defense of land-based missiles;

or
5. Heavy defense to enforce favorable war outcomes?

Decision C. China Alternatives. Another important policy issue concerns the U.S. nuclear posture vis-à-vis China. This issue is analyzed in detail in the NSSM 69 study;[6] aspects of our nuclear posture in Asia which are directly related to our posture vis-à-vis the USSR are discussed here. Specifically, should our strategic force planning vis-à-vis the PRC provide for improvements in the capability of U.S. missiles to destroy hardened time-urgent targets, if such improvements are not called for by our posture vis-à-vis the USSR?

Other Issues. There are other important strategic programs issues which were not analyzed in this review because (a) they are not broad policy issues and (b) they are either being dealt with through other means or are more properly handled through the normal planning process. These include:

—What R&D and procurement programs should be pursued to improve pre-launch survival, penetration, and defense capabilities? A broad policy issue (crisis stability) is discussed below in Section II, that is related to whether we should plan to ensure the continuing high survivability of *each* element in our current mix of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, or whether our planning should consider other alternatives that do not include such a requirement?
—What specific command and control improvements, if any, should be made to support the General Strategic Alternatives?
—Specifics of U.S. SALT proposals.
—Whether new initiatives in the deployment of strategic weapons are necessary at this time in response to continued growth in Soviet strategic forces and, if so, what these initiatives should be. A broad policy issue (diplomatic sufficiency) related to this question is, however, discussed in Section II below.

II. Factors Bearing on Evaluation of Alternatives

Decisions on the above policy issues depend on judgments regarding many factors. Four factors seem particularly important:

—Strategic nuclear policy objectives and their relative priorities.
—Hedging strategic force capabilities against uncertainties.
—Support of U.S. allies.
—Views on the strategic balance.

A. Strategic Nuclear Policy Objectives and Their Relative Priorities.

The basic U.S. policy regarding strategic forces "is to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority."[7] The President has further stated that, while he is committed to keeping U.S.

strategic forces strong, he is equally committed to seeking a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union through arms limitation negotiations.

NSDM 16 provides that, insofar as attacks on the United States are concerned, we should:

1. Maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
2. Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis.
3. Maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer.
4. Deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.

The members of the interagency study group agree that we have the following specific objectives for U.S. strategic forces, based on NSDM 16 and the President's first and second Foreign Policy Reports:

—Deter strategic nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies;
—Prevent coercion of the United States and its allies with threats from nuclear powers;
—Contribute to the deterrence of tactical nuclear and conventional attack on vital U.S. security interests.
—Maintain strategic stability with the Soviet Union, both in terms of discouraging a first strike during a crisis and in minimizing the incentives for an arms race.
—If deterrence fails, limit damage to the United States and its allies to the extent possible. Moreover, support termination of nuclear warfare as quickly as possible, prior to the onset of widespread devastation, on terms that are not unfavorable to the U.S.[8]

There is, however, disagreement about adding the following objective:

—Maintain the obvious capability to ensure that the United States would emerge in a position of relative advantage from any level of strategic nuclear warfare.

The first two of these objectives take priority over the others. The remaining objectives may compete or conflict. For example, maintenance of strategic stability may conflict with measures designed to limit damage to the United States and its allies if deterrence fails. Policy judgments are required to strike a balance in the actions we take to achieve competing objectives.

In order to simplify matters, the objectives are grouped, in subsequent discussion of the General Strategic Alternatives, into four categories—*deterrence, support of allies, strategic stability*, and *goals if deterrence fails*.

Currently, strategic sufficiency is defined by NSDM 16. But many areas of strategic force planning are not addressed by NSDM 16. Moreover, there have been serious questions of interpretation of some of the original NSDM 16 sufficiency criteria:

—There is agreement that the first criterion (second-strike capability) is a necessary element of U.S. strategic policy, but there is no consensus as to what, if any, additional capabilities are essential for deterrence of hostile Soviet actions.[9]
—There is agreement that the second criterion (crisis stability) is an important policy element, but there are differing views as to its planning implications.
—With regard to the third criterion, there is agreement that, with prudent planning of offensive force hedges, the U.S. can maintain a capability to deny the Soviets a significant relative advantage in fatalities (in the absence of effective Soviet civil defense measures) and industrial damage. There is some question, however, about the interpretation of the term "significant relative advantage" and about the extent to which this criterion affects the planning of strategic defensive forces.
—The fourth criterion (defense against small attacks) may not be consistent with current U.S. SALT positions. The President's decision leading to these positions indicate a willingness to forego an area ABM defense if necessary to achieve an equitable SALT agreement.

The fourth NSDM 16 criterion, the Secretary of Defense Policy and Planning Guidance,[10] and Administration decisions not to fund programs for improving missile counterforce capabilities all imply that limiting damage from large nuclear attacks is not a current planning goal. But the third NSDM 16 criterion raises ambiguities in this regard.

Decisions on the major policy issues will depend on judgments about the priorities and feasible means to attain our strategic objectives.

There is little general disagreement about what our objectives are; there are wide differences in perceptions about their priorities and about what it takes to support them. The complexity of these questions can be reduced by identifying issues that could result in significant changes in our strategic posture:

—Is some absolute level of U/I retaliatory capability a sufficient deterrent of nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies or should deterrence be strengthened by a capability for ensuring relative advantage in war outcomes?
—If an absolute level of U/I retaliatory capability is adequate, is greater flexibility for the employment of U.S. strategic offensive forces necessary to meet our objectives?
—If so, can adequate flexibility be provided by adding more attack options to U.S. nuclear weapon employment plans? Or is more extensive flexibility needed, with greater demand on survivability of command/control under limited exchanges?
—Should flexibility be extended to include substantial improvements in missile counterforce capabilities to support additional attack options or war-fighting goals?

The General Strategic Alternatives are organized to cover these issues.

B. Hedging

A dominant factor in the size, capabilities, and cost of our strategic forces is hedging against future threats to these forces. Maintenance of the strategic force capabilities of any of the General Strategic Alternatives in the face of future uncertainties depends upon four hedging elements:

—The degree of conservatism used in estimating future threats and their effects on U.S. capabilities.
—Appropriate R&D programs to develop knowledge of new threat technologies and to reduce the leadtime to deploy new countermeasures.
—The size and characteristics of various components of U.S. strategic forces.
—Appropriate diversity in the mix of strategic offensive systems to compound Soviet first strike problems, to hedge against unexpected degradation of weapon systems, and to hedge against unexpected threats. These complex considerations are regularly addressed in the normal defense planning process.

All the General Strategic Alternatives contain, at a minimum, a well-hedged urban/industrial retaliatory capability, without specifying a particular hedging policy or blend of the above elements. The evaluation of these alternatives does, however, recognize that an adequate hedging policy provides substantial numbers of forces for targeting against military targets as well as against U/I targets.

There are a variety of alternative approaches to diversifying the offensive force mix. The costs of the General Strategic Alternatives shown in Table 1 below[11] are given as a function of these force mix categories:

—We could maintain a high level of pre-launch survival and penetration capability in each of our current systems, ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber (triad).
—We could keep three systems, but maintain high pre-launch survival and penetration capability in only two components (reduced triad).
—We could phase out one force component, maintaining high pre-launch and penetration capability in the remaining two (diad).
—We could have three components, but stretch out our modernization programs by, for example, modernizing only one component at a time (mini-triad).

Although a decision on strategic offensive force mix policy is not required at this time, there is a widely held but erroneous view on the current policy. Some assume there is a force planning requirement to maintain an independent retaliatory capability in each force component. Although our forces currently have this characteristic, *there is no agency which takes the position that we must maintain an independent retaliatory capability in each component against future threats*.

The current policy is expressed in the President's Second Annual Review of Foreign Policy. "*The mix of forces*. For several years we have maintained three types of strategic forces—land-based ICBMs, bombers, and submarine-launched missiles. Each is capable of inflicting a high level of damage in response to a nuclear first strike. Taken together they have an unquestioned capability of inflicting an unacceptable level of damage. This concept takes advantage of the unique characteristics of each delivery system. It provides insurance against surprise enemy technological breakthroughs or unforeseen operational failures, and complicates the task of planning attacks on us. It complicates even more the longer range planning of the levels and composition of the opposing forces. If the effectiveness and survivability of one element were eroded, the Soviet Union could choose to concentrate its resources on eroding the effectiveness and survivability of the others. This would confront us with serious new decisions, and we will therefore continue to review our forces in the light of changing threats and technology to ensure that we have the best possible mix to meet the requirements of sufficiency."[12]

A policy issue is the interpretation of the second NSDM 16 criterion on crisis stability. Of particular importance is the significance for crisis stability if Minuteman became very vulnerable to a first strike. This is because our current SALT positions would preclude the major means (hard-site ABM defense and land-mobile ICBMs) of attempting to ensure Minuteman survivability against future Soviet threats.

The term "crisis stability" refers to the degree to which the United States and the Soviets would tend to avoid the use of strategic nuclear weapons in a severe crisis or military conflict. While many factors bear on such incentives, the planning issue focuses on the characteristics of the U.S. posture that might increase or decrease any Soviet incentive to strike first.

—All agree that a principal contributor to stability in a crisis is a well-hedged U/I retaliatory capability. With such a U.S. capability, the Soviets could not significantly reduce the damage they would suffer in retaliation or substantially affect the relative balance of U/I damage. This, however, assumes that the Soviets did not evacuate their cities prior to U.S. strikes.
—All agree that confidence in control of U.S. strategic forces and acquisition of information on the status of forces and damage in the United States is important.
—All agree that some level of flexibility for the employment of strategic forces contributes to stability in a crisis situation by increasing our confidence in handling any situation in a measured, appropriate way.
—All agree that rapid, direct communications between governments and agreed procedures for dealing with nuclear accidents are important.
—There is wide disagreement on whether a largely vulnerable Minuteman force would be destabilizing in a crisis.

One view is that an excessively vulnerable Minuteman force could be destabilizing in a crisis, even if we had strong bomber and SLBM forces, because the threat to our cities

might deter us from using these forces after an attack on Minuteman. At the very least, it is argued, the President's options for diplomatic and military actions in a crisis would be more constrained if Minuteman were highly vulnerable, since a vulnerable Minuteman could suggest that we intend to launch our ICBMs in a first strike. In this view, Minuteman would have to be either kept survivable or phased out (or possibly reduced to a low level, say 100 or less). Proponents of this view argue as follows:

—If the United States allowed Minuteman to become excessively vulnerable (say, 90% or higher attrition from a Soviet first strike), the Soviets would be convinced we intended to use Minuteman primarily for first-strike counterforce attacks.
—During an intense crisis, our primary leverage on the Soviet Union is the implied threat of military action. Thus, resolute U.S. actions in a crisis could heighten their fears of a first strike by Minuteman. In such a situation, the Soviets might decide that their only alternative short of general nuclear war would be to launch an attack on Minuteman, seek to forestall retaliation by threatening to attack U.S. cities, and negotiate with the United States.
—The likelihood of a strike on Minuteman and the credibility of the Soviet threat to U.S. cities might be increased if they could destroy Minuteman with only part of their ICBM force (possible in the mid-to-late 1970s) or if they provided their ICBM launchers with a rapid reload capability.

Others believe that a vulnerable Minuteman force would not invite a Soviet first strike even in a severe crisis. They argue that our overall retaliatory capabilities would preclude any significant gain by the Soviets in such an attack. They further assert that with appropriate U.S. response options, a Soviet first strike on Minuteman would guarantee some form of U.S. nuclear retaliation, with severe risks to their whole society. Thus, they argue that the Soviets would face a choice between striking first, with near certain retaliation, or accepting the risk of U.S. preemption, but with some probability that the crisis would be resolved without nuclear war. Proponents of this view counter the earlier arguments as follows:

—It is clear Minuteman was planned as a survivable force. The fact that in changing times and circumstances it became vulnerable would not signal a dramatic U.S. shift to a first strike policy. Furthermore, the Soviets could not be certain that we would not launch on warning, nullifying their whole attack.
—In a crisis, resolute or threatening U.S. actions would heighten Soviet fear of a U.S. first strike whether or not Minuteman is vulnerable. It is most difficult to imagine the Soviets risking 100 million lives and most of their industry for some objective that would test U.S. resolve to act.
—An attack on Minuteman would be a large scale attack, with substantial collateral fatalities and political repercussions. Soviet hopes to deter any form of retaliation would be unrealistic.

This crisis stability issue—in particular, the necessity for ensured survival of our ICBMs—

has a direct bearing on the variey of acceptable hedging alternatives, how they are evaluated in the normal planning process, and on the decisions made for SALT, including the acceptability of the current U.S. proposals.

It should be noted that the issues of crisis stability and the stability of the long-term strategic balance are not related only to force postures, but also involve political questions, since major asymmetries in vulnerability could invite coercion.

C. Support of Allies

The General Strategic Alternatives reflect various perceptions about the role of strategic weapons in supporting our allies. There are several problems underlying these issues—the nature of our commitments, the objectives to be supported, and maintaining the confidence of allies in this support.

Commitments. This study did not attempt a reexamination of U.S. policy on commitments. It did conclude that existing commitments vary widely in their specificity, in the likelihood of real threats against various allies, in the degree of vital U.S. interests involved, and in the problems of U.S. credibility. Some deliberate ambiguity preserves our range of options for response to a particular situation. However, our allies (e.g., NATO and Japan) depend heavily on the U.S. nuclear shield for their security. Our support also reinforces U.S. efforts to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Objectives. How to attain our objectives regarding the allies—deterring attacks on or coercion of our allies, and dealing with such attacks if deterrence fails—depends on the relationship of our strategic forces to our theater nuclear forces and conventional forces:

—All agree that U.S. strategic forces *alone* cannot provide a credible deterrent to attacks on our allies (particularly non-nuclear attacks) because of doubts that the United States would risk retaliatory strikes on U.S. cities. The Soviets have had the capability to retaliate directly against the United States for many years. China is expected to have such a capability in the future.
—Some believe that strategic forces have little direct utility as an extended deterrent. Apart from posing uncertain risks that an attack on U.S. allies might lead to general war, they believe our support rests on theater capabilities, nuclear and conventional, and that they must be planned independently of our strategic forces. Strategic forces should then be planned on the basis of deterring general war.
—Others believe that our strategic forces have significant utility as an extended deterrent. They argue as follows: Strategic forces form part of a continuum of responses at each level of provocation. Our theater nuclear and conventional forces couple and extend our strategic nuclear commitment down to any level of aggression. With appropriate planning, our total force capabilities can demonstrate a clear path of escalation to all-out war, coupling loss at one level to the risk of U.S. escalation to a higher level. Strategic forces, coupled with theater nuclear forces, create substantial uncertainties—

risks of seriously underestimating potential U.S. responses. With appropriate attack options the large gaps between levels of conflict, which might tend to decouple them, can be precluded.[13]

These differences in perception and issues about what measures are necessary are reflected in the General Strategic Alternatives. They also bear on the larger questions of confidence.

Confidence. The confidence of our allies in U.S. commitments is a most important element of our diplomatic and military posture. A decided weakening in allied confidence could have many undesirable effects, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the seeking of political accommodation with the USSR. Of immediate concern is the possible erosion of allied confidence in light of the continued buildup of strategic armaments.

—Some believe that allied confidence is already starting to erode, and we must take action to restore confidence.
—Others argue that there have been problems of confidence for many years, evidenced by emergence of the British and French nuclear forces, multilateral force issues, and the necessity for intensive consultations within the NPG. Recent erosion, if any, is a matter of readjustment to the meaning of the new circumstances, but includes worries over U.S. conventional withdrawals, MBFR, and uncertain effects of détente. Only if such an erosion leads to a concrete perception that our allies were decoupled from the U.S. nuclear shield, would major action be necessary. In this view, we are nowhere near that point; we still have room for lesser confidence measures. Such questions of confidence are related to issues about the strategic balance.
—Others believe that U.S. involvement in a strategic nuclear exchange for the "defense" of our NATO allies, involving nearly certain destruction of the United States, is unthinkable. They argue that allied perceptions of this fact cannot be prevented.
—Still others argue that it is not clear that procuring new or additional weapon systems (including defenses) will in itself alleviate allied concern about the U.S. nuclear guarantees which, in turn, is related to the broader issue of future U.S. commitments to their security. They believe it is unclear whether any of the General Strategic Alternatives considered in this study will improve allied confidence in the U.S. commitment.

D. The Strategic Balance

One issue, common to all General Strategic Alternatives is the relative balance of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. Under some alternatives it is possible that we could have numerically inferior forces, even if they fully met our strategic requirements. Thus, there is an issue about the further, explicit requirement for the "diplomatic sufficiency" of our strategic force posture.

—Some hold that large visible imbalances in U.S.-Soviet strategic force levels which favor the Soviets, such as their currently projected lead in ICBM and SLBM launchers (about 1-1/2 to 1), could undermine allied confidence in the U.S. will and ability to honor its commitments, and could make the Soviets more inclined to exercise military coercion in theater crises. They argue that such imbalances must either be prevented by SALT or that the United States should deploy more strategic forces.
—Others believe that a well-hedged posture designed to support our military objectives precludes any significant Soviet superiority, i.e., any credible form of first strike capability. They believe that excessive imbalances in numbers of launchers (5 to 1) are clearly politically and psychologically unacceptable, but that it is difficult to interpret close ratios (between 1 to 1 and 2 to 1). Many other measures of relative power can affect perceptions—technological quality, numbers of war-heads, megatonnage—as well as numbers of launchers. They believe that there is therefore an adequate basis for educating our allies about our own evaluation of real sufficiency and about the complexities of defining the balance with simple numerical indices.

At issue, then, apart from the alternatives discussed below, is whether or not we need to buy more forces to restore an apparent imbalance in weapons inventories with the Soviets as a political and/or military requirement.

III. General Strategic Alternatives

The major policy elements characterizing the four General Strategic Alternatives are discussed in this section.[14] A more detailed discussion of these policy elements is presented in the Executive Summary, pages 65–92.[15] The costs of forces to support these General Strategic Alternatives are illustrated in Table 1 on page 21 below.

Following is a State Department Footnote on an Additional Strategic Alternative:[16]

The State Department representative believes that this paper should provide a broader spectrum of alternative strategies for consideration by decision-makers. In particular, while not advocating this posture, consideration should be given to the pros and cons of a partial damage-limiting strategy as one possible means of achieving a more stable deterrent, and providing options in the event deterrence fails.

The State Department representative believes there are additional options that should be considered in a study of this nature. There is, for example, the option of having a partial damage-limiting strategy which some argue would strengthen deterrence and provide the President with a broader range of options should deterrence fail. Such an option can be derived from the strategic offense and defense alternatives presented in this study. A partial damage-limiting posture in the shorthand of this study would combine strategic offense alternative 3c (counterforce and hard target kill capability) and strategic defense alternative B (a light area defense). However, such a posture should be presented as a distinct alternative rather than a derived one. This would help to fill the gap, noted in

several prior staff comments by State, between a well hedged U/I capability and a war fighting posture. It illustrates an alternative concept of deterrence not covered by the other General Strategic Alternatives.

A partial damage-limiting posture has several purposes. In the view of some, it reinforces deterrence in a manner different in kind from Assured Destruction because it provides a balanced force, which could provide the President broader options in a crisis than Assured Destruction. The capacity to limit damage has value in itself and has never been explicitly rejected as a goal for U.S. strategic forces (e.g., the fourth criteria of NSDM 16 provides for a defense against small attacks). Such a posture also could serve to reinforce nuclear guarantees to allies.

While some see such a posture as destabilizing, others argue that an offense-dominant deterrent force based on Assured Destruction could fuel an offense-offense arms race, lead to vulnerabilities and thus, greater instabilities (political and military), may not effectively serve as an extended deterrent to our allies and could lead to uncontrolled escalation in the event deterrence fails. This posture would reduce the need for extensive hedging of assured destruction capabilities which tend to provide excessive counter-value capabilities. Instead, such a posture would combine elements of offense and defense in order to bring into balance our strategic force posture and employment policies.

Alternative 1. Well-Hedged Urban/Industrial Retaliatory Capability

Policy. This alternative would provide a high confidence second-strike capability against Soviet and Chinese cities and industry. With hedging to maintain this capability with high confidence, we would expect to have additional warheads to use against Soviet and Chinese military targets. Command and control systems would be designed to ensure our ability to execute a large retaliatory strike. A limited degree of flexibility would exist as a by-product of these policies to provide for a small number of pre-planned attack options and a limited capability for selective release of weapons.

Capabilities. The capabilities of forces under this alternative are similar to those of our current strategic program. These forces would have extensive capabilities for the following:

—a high confidence retaliatory capability against Soviet U/I complexes and political centers and a separate capability to destroy PRC U/I complexes and political centers without overflying the Soviet Union.
—Denial to the Soviet Union of the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer.[17]
—Large, pre-planned attacks against soft Soviet and Chinese military targets.

The number of weapons resulting from our hedging policies would probably also provide

some limited capability to destroy hard missile launchers, but programs intended to improve this counterforce capability would not be pursued.

Relation to Objectives

1. *Deterrence.* Under this alternative we would seek to deter nuclear warfare by the threat of a high level of assured damage to Soviet cities and industry and the threat of extensive destruction of Soviet soft military targets.

This alternative is consistent with the perception held by some that the threat of high absolute levels of U/I damage are sufficient to deter nuclear attack on the United States and that relative levels of U/I and military target damage are unlikely to affect any decision to start a general nuclear war.

It is also consistent with either of the following perceptions concerning deterrence of less than general war: Either strategic weapons have little utility in deterring lesser wars or strategic weapons, together with tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces, pose an unacceptable risk of escalation to general war so that lesser wars are also deterred.

2. *Support of Allies*. This alternative would seek to deter attacks on our allies by posing a risk of escalation to general nuclear war through the coupling of our strategic nuclear forces with the forward-deployed nuclear and conventional forces of the United States and its allies. This posture would provide warheads for targeting against soft and some hard military targets in support of our theater forces and those of our allies.

3. *Strategic Stability*. This alternative is consistent with the views that crisis stability can best be achieved by the threat of U/I retaliation, by avoiding postures that seem to give the United States an effective first strike disarming or damage limiting capability, and by maintaining forces that ensure the Soviets could not gain significant advantage in U/I damage by striking first.

4. *Goals if Deterrence Fails*. Damage-limiting would be a low priority objective in force planning. Some damage-limiting capability would probably exist as a by-product of our hedging policy to achieve a high confidence U/I retaliatory capability.

If nuclear war occurred, the most important goal under this alternative would be the termination of conflict without the loss of U.S. cities. This goal would be sought by providing the ability to retaliate, under certain SIOP options, against Soviet and Pact military targets while withholding forces to threaten U/I damage. Additional flexibility in use of nuclear weapons would not be sought.

Key Issues

The following issues have been raised concerning General Strategic Alternative 1:

1. *Is a U/I retaliatory capability a sufficient deterrent of nuclear attack?* Some maintain that the ability to inflict a substantial absolute level of damage in retaliation is sufficient to deter. Others argue that it is also necessary that the Soviet Union not perceive a significant advantage in surviving U/I and military assets. Still others assert that, even given the capability to inflict high absolute levels of damage, we need a capability to respond selectively to deter less than all-out nuclear attacks.
2. *Would U.S. responses in a crisis be adequate?* Some argue that the present options are sufficient to ensure an adequate response, others hold that more options are necessary.
3. *Is the extension of the U.S. deterrent to our allies credible under this posture?* Some maintain that the condition of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union causes our allies to doubt that we would risk our own destruction to defend them. Others assert that the risk of escalation posed to the Soviets by the overall capabilities under this posture is a sufficient deterrent and is credible to U.S. allies. Still others believe that extension of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent to our allies cannot be credible under any posture alternative.
4. *Are U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities adequate if deterrence fails?* Supporters of this alternative argue that the ability to withhold urban attacks is the only practical strategic capability which can help terminate a nuclear war before all-out city exchanges. Others argue that the large nuclear strike options of this alternative would make early war termination difficult to achieve and would risk unacceptable damage to the United States. Still others maintain that we must have the capability to terminate nuclear conflict under military conditions advantageous to the United States.

Alternative II. Alternative I Plus a Flexible Response Capability (*Emphasis on Planning and Organizational Changes*)

Policy. This alternative would supplement the well-hedged U/I capability of Alternative I with changes in planning staffs and organizations to provide a capability for the flexible and limited use of strategic nuclear strikes on a scale much lower than the current SIOP attack options.[18] The force levels and characteristics would be the same as in Alternative I (e.g., there would be no improvements in missile counterforce capability). Except for changes in staffs, data bases, and command post displays there would be no improvements in command and control beyond those needed to support a high-confidence U/I retaliatory capability.

Capabilities. In addition to the capabilities inherent under Alternative I, this alternative would provide: (1) options for the limited use of strategic weapons by which the National Command Authorities (NCA) can signal the linkage of local conflict (involving our allies) with the most vital U.S. interests, and (2) a broader range of responses to less than all-out nuclear attacks on the United States.

Relationship to Strategic Objectives

1. *Deterrence*. A well-hedged U/I retaliatory capability would remain the cornerstone of

the U.S. deterrent, but this alternative would reinforce that deterrent by providing limited responses or counter-threats to less than all-out Soviet nuclear attacks on the United States. In particular, we would seek to deter Soviet attempts to coerce the United States with threats or attacks designed to force a U.S. choice between mutual destruction of cities and submission to Soviet demands.

2. *Support of Allies*. Alternative II would be intended to reinforce the credibility, to both the USSR and our allies, of the U.S. extended deterrent by increasing Soviet uncertainty regarding U.S. responses to attacks on our allies and demonstrating the possibility of early introduction of strategic nuclear weapons in a conflict involving our allies.
3. *Strategic Stability*. Greater flexibility in the employment of nuclear weapons could contribute to stability in a crisis by reducing the advantages the Soviets might perceive in less than all-out nuclear attacks on the United States and by providing more deliberate, measured procedures and options for responding to Soviet actions and threats in a crisis.
4. *Goals if Deterrence Fails*. In the event deterrence failed through accident or miscalculation, this alternative could provide limited strike options which demonstrate restraint combined with resolve to defend our vital interests.

Key Issues

Issues arising out of an assessment of the risks associated with a strategic nuclear flexible response capability are as follows:

1. *Would this flexible response capability weaken the U.S. deterrent?* Some argue that the Soviets would interpret U.S. interest in limited nuclear strikes as a signal that we would not go to general nuclear war in order to support our allies and that this would broaden the range of hostile actions open to the Soviets without undue risk of general nuclear war. Others maintain that our well-hedged U/I capability, coupled with an appropriate conventional and theater nuclear force posture in Europe, would still pose grave risks of escalation to the Soviets and that greater flexibility for employment of nuclear weapons would reinforce Soviet perceptions of those risks, making our deterrent more credible.
2. *Would there be increased pressure for use of nuclear weapons in a crisis?* Some argue that the existence of a systematically planned and institutionalized capability for limited strategic nuclear strikes would make it more “tempting” to use that capability in a crisis which might otherwise be resolved by less violent means. Others argue that there will always be pressures for use of nuclear weapons in a crisis, that a systematically planned capability for limited nuclear strikes would facilitate dispassionate judgments in a crisis, and that careful development of the institutional structure would reduce the risk of creating a strong pressure group.
3. *Would this flexibility lead to unwanted escalation to general nuclear war?* Although this issue relates to the *use* of limited nuclear options, it is also relevant to the question of *whether to have such options*, since it bears on their utility in a crisis. Soviet doctrine regarding the use of nuclear weapons is one critical factor in assessing this risk. The

evidence is limited and ambiguous. The Soviets have long maintained that a U.S.–USSR military conflict, even if it began with conventional forces, would rapidly escalate to general nuclear war. There is, however, no reliable evidence concerning whether or not the Soviets plan for limited nuclear strikes (although they have the capabilities for such attacks). On the other hand, at SALT the Soviet leaders have placed a high premium on being able to communicate with U.S. leaders during a crisis (e.g., accidental launches or provocative attack by a third country), with the putative aim of precluding general nuclear war. Some argue that achievement of parity may increase Soviet interest in limited nuclear exchange options.

Another important factor in assessing the risk of escalation is whether U.S. limited strategic options include plans for first strikes, or are intended only as responses to a Soviet limited nuclear strike. If the United States were the first to use nuclear weapons in limited strikes, there is no sound way, based on currently available intelligence, to predict the Soviet response, which could be to negotiate, to launch limited nuclear strikes, or to escalate to larger nuclear attacks. On the other hand, if the Soviets first executed a limited nuclear strike, there would be a strong presumption that they were willing to limit the conflict.

Some maintain that such first use by the Soviets is unlikely, that the risks of escalation would be too great to permit U.S. first use of limited nuclear strikes and, therefore, that a strategic flexible response capability would either be of limited utility to the United States or could equally well be the trigger of a strategic exchange which could destroy the United States.

Others stress the possibility that the Soviets would launch limited strikes and argue that, to deter such strikes, we must have appropriate responses. They also argue that the risks of escalation through miscalculation would be greater if we found it necessary to use limited nuclear strikes for resolving a crisis, but had not carefully planned them in advance.

4. *Would organization and planning changes provide sufficient flexibility?* Some who support more flexibility argue that improvements would be needed in command and control and/or missile counterforce capabilities. Others argue that planning and organizational changes are sufficient. These issues are considered under Alternative III. Still others note that a choice need not be made at this time between Alternatives II and III. Alternative II plus further study or R&D on command/control improvements or counterforce improvements could be implemented in the near term. These improvements could be deployed at some future time if required.

Alternative III. Alternative I Plus Flexible Response Capability (*Including Command and Control and/or Counterforce Improvements*)

The following discussion highlights the additional considerations which arise if a greater degree of flexibility is desired than provided by Alternative II. This posture would include the well-hedged U/I retaliatory capability of Alternative I and the planning and organizational changes of Alternative II. In order to provide greater flexibility than

Alternative II, however, there would be improvements in command and control (Variant 3A), increased missile counterforce capability (Variant 3B), or both (Variant 3C).[19] Variants 3B and 3C would result in force changes directed towards a nuclear warfighting capability over a wide spectrum of conflict if large portions of the U.S. missile force were given improved hard-target counterforce capability.

Variant 3A (C^3 *Improvements*). Improvements would be made in the survivability and responsiveness of strategic command and control systems beyond the capabilities needed for a well-hedged U/I retaliatory posture. These improvements would be made in order to provide for flexible responses throughout a series of limited, but escalating, nuclear exchanges.

Variant 3A could provide the following capabilities:

—Greater capability for rapid ad hoc generation of nuclear strikes (including missile retargeting) than provided by the planning and organizational changes of Alternative II.
—Protracted crisis management and Presidential control, in a survivable mode, of U.S. forces.
—More survivable and near real time collection and processing of information on the results of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strikes, to assist in decisions about diplomatic moves and further U.S. strikes.

Variant 3A implies a greater emphasis on Presidential survivability during a crisis or during limited nuclear exchanges. Moreover, it stresses close and continuous control of strategic forces and a capability for detailed crisis management in a survivable mode.

If the U.S. strategic posture is to place greater emphasis on flexible responses (i.e., either Alternative II or III) then the key issue connected with Variant 3A is whether the utility of the command and control improvements is commensurate with their costs (at least $1–2 billion in FY 73–77 over the costs of Alternative I or II, and quite possibly more). If there were an endorsement of—or at least interest in—the policy inherent in Variant 3A, then a detailed study of the costs and benefits of specific command and control improvements for support of strategic flexible response should be carried out in order to produce refined cost estimates and further issues for decision.

Variant 3B (*Counterforce Improvements*). Improvements would be made to the hard-target counterforce capability of some or a major portion of U.S. ballistic missiles in order to broaden the range of flexible response options available to the President. The counterforce improvements would not be so extensive as to be capable of significantly limiting damage from large nuclear attacks or to ensure a relative U.S. advantage in surviving military capabilities after a large nuclear conflict. But the President would have options for efficient strikes on ICBM or IR/MRBM silos—that is, for responses in kind to Soviet attacks on Minuteman. There are, of course, other possible responses to an attack on Minuteman than attacking Soviet ICBMs. As an example, we could attack Soviet

defenses, submarine bases, and airfields, which would not require U.S. missiles to have a hard-target kill capability.

The key judgment concerning Variant 3B is whether the benefits of flexible response strikes against hardened, time-urgent targets like missile silos outweigh the possible effects this capability might have on the strategic balance.

Some argue *against* these counterforce improvements on the grounds that the study was unable to identify scenarios in which limited strikes on hard military targets would have clear utility for deterrence or early war termination, that improvements in missile counterforce capability could be destabilizing in a crisis, and that offsetting Soviet weapon deployments could be stimulated. They emphasize the possibility that the Soviets could not distinguish between limited counterforce improvements for flexible responses and improvements which were an initial step towards a disarming strike capability.

Others who argue *for* counterforce improvements maintain that we may otherwise not be able to deal effectively with all of the situations which we might face (for example, less than all-out attacks on military targets). They maintain that, given the size and diversity of Soviet strategic forces, limited U.S. counterforce improvements would not be destabilizing either in a crisis or in the long-term and, in addition, would signal resolve to extend our nuclear deterrent to cover U.S. allies.

Variant 3C (C^3 and Counterforce Improvements). This variant would provide improvements in both command and control and missile counterforce capability. If the counterforce improvements were limited to a small portion of the missile force then this combination would not produce additional issues beyond those identified above. Some hold that if a large portion of the U.S. missile force were given a hard-target kill capability to support war-fighting over a wide spectrum of conflict, this would provide an additional measure of deterrence. Furthermore, they hold that these qualitative improvements would give the President options for discrete attacks which would provide the capability to strike a wide range of targets and still limit collateral fatalities in keeping with his stated policy against indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians. Others believe that counterforce improvements to a large portion of the missile force may upset the strategic balance or affect the kind of SALT limits the Soviets might otherwise agree to accept. Furthermore, they believe that such improvements are not required in order to achieve the President's stated policy against indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians.

Alternative IV. Relative Advantage to the United States in any Strategic War

Policy. This alternative would provide a nuclear warfighting capability designed to attain for the United States a position of relative advantage after any level of strategic nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union.

The concept of relative advantage in war outcome is not well-defined; the definition itself constitutes an area of interagency disagreement. Relative advantage in war outcome should include measures of surviving population, industrial resources, and military (nuclear and conventional) capability. But, in a general nuclear war, deaths and industrial damage are likely to be very high on both sides, leaving residual military capability as the major determinant of relative advantage.

U.S. strategic forces would be planned to provide a favorable balance of surviving population, industry and military capability. As a by-product, these forces would have a well-hedged U/I retaliatory capability. Extensive improvements in missile hard-target counterforce capability and protracted nuclear warfighting capability would characterize this posture. Command and control systems would be designed to have greater survivability, damage assessment capability, and responsiveness for battle management throughout a spectrum of large and small nuclear exchanges than in the other alternatives. Balanced strategic defenses and vigorous R&D efforts on damage limiting systems would be necessary characteristics of the posture.

Capabilities. In addition to the capabilities described in the previous alternatives, our strategic forces would be planned for an extensive capability for attacking locatable soft and hard Soviet and Chinese military targets, including hard ICBM and IR/MRBM sites.

However, without major advances in technology, there would be a limited capability to destroy Soviet mobile forces such as ballistic missile submarines at sea and land-mobile missiles.

Relationship to Objectives

1. *Deterrence*. This alternative is consistent with the view that our ability to inflict a high absolute level of damage in retaliation is important, but is not a sufficient deterrent. In this view, a credible deterrent also requires a clear capability to ensure that any nuclear war would result in a relative outcome favorable to the United States.
2. *Support of Allies*. This alternative is consistent with the view that strategic nuclear forces that provide for relative U.S. advantage in war outcomes are the most certain deterrent to Soviet initiation of attacks on U.S. allies.
3. *Strategic Balance*. This alternative is consistent with the view that in a crisis the Soviets would have no incentive to strike first, if a preemptive strike against the United States would clearly leave them in an unfavorable relative military position.
4. *Goals if Deterrence Fails*. This alternative is consistent with the views that, if deterrence fails, the United States must be able to emerge from the conflict in a position of relative advantage over the Soviet Union and that limiting damage to the United States and its allies is an essential factor in achieving this relative advantage.

In this view, U.S. war termination efforts would be effective only if we were in a position of relative advantage after any level of nuclear exchange. Otherwise, the USSR would be

in a position to dictate terms of termination or to threaten escalation.

Key Issues

1. *Should we seek relative advantage in war outcomes rather than absolute level of damage?* Opponents of this alternative argue that at high absolute levels of damage, relative damage is no longer a factor in any political decision to start a war. They assert that efforts to build forces to achieve any significant relative advantage in surviving military resources are infeasible. They further argue that these efforts would cause the Soviets to take counter-actions that would prevent us from achieving this goal and could leave us worse off.

Supporters of this policy maintain that relative post-war position is an important factor in deterrence and is essential if deterrence fails; that Soviet strategic programs would not necessarily be reactions to U.S. programs; and that our past and current emphasis on a U/I retaliatory capability has precluded imaginative investigation of the feasibility of such a policy.

2. *Could this alternative be consistent with SALT?* If SALT constrains offensive forces to current levels and limits ABM defenses to low levels, it is doubtful that a posture ensuring a favorable relative balance can be achieved. The Soviet Union will undoubtedly not agree to a SALT agreement that provided the U.S. with a clear capability to achieve a relative advantage in a nuclear conflict with the USSR.

Some assert that certain actions (e.g., improve missile hard target counterforce capabilities and our strategic ASW capabilities) could be taken to improve our relative position that would be permitted under the SALT agreement.

Others argue that a SAL agreement which limits ABM defenses to low levels would effectively preclude achievement of a relative advantage posture for the United States or the USSR.

Costs

Table 1 shows the cost of past and current U.S. strategic programs (as represented by the FYDP) and the FY 73–77 costs of the General Strategic Alternatives. These latter are displayed as a function of the strategic offensive force mix.

IV. Strategic Defense Policy Alternatives

Except in the case of General Strategic Alternative IV (Favorable Relative War Outcomes), the choice of a strategic defense policy alternative depends primarily on factors distinct from the choice of General Strategic Alternative. These factors include our hedging policies, SALT outcomes, and our posture towards the PRC. General Strategic Alternative IV would require strong defenses (Level E below).

Five alternative defense levels, including ABM defense, air defense, strategic ASW, and

civil defense, are summarized below. Table 2 shows their costs.[20] Table 3 relates the defense levels to the General Strategic Alternatives and to the China options.[21]

There is some ambiguity in the current U.S. strategic defense policy. There are Presidential statements of record supporting an area defense system to protect the population against light attacks. There are also the Presidential decisions in SALT indicating a willingness to forego area ABM defenses as part of an equitable SAL agreement.

Defense levels C, D and E all include hard-site defense of Minuteman; Levels B, C, D and E also imply active defense of bomber bases. If one of these alternatives is chosen, the decision is tantamount to a hedging policy aimed at maintaining an *independent* retaliatory capability in those strategic force components protected by active defense.

Level A. Minimum Defense to Provide Warning and Surveillance

This level would provide defensive forces sufficient for surveillance and warning of attacks on the United States. It could include the following elements:

—Two Safeguard ABM sites and associated radars to provide a protected surveillance system for warning and attack assessment against ballistic missiles. These sites would also protect some Minuteman launchers and bomber bases against small missile attacks. This defense level is also compatible with zero level ABM or defense of the NCA, since we have no other means of supporting these warning and surveillance functions.
—Air defenses sufficient to provide air space surveillance and restriction of unauthorized overflight of U.S. air space.
—Use of general purpose ASW forces (including SOSUS) to maintain surveillance of Soviet and Chinese submarine deployments.
—Civil defense emphasizing population warning.

Level B. Defense Against Small Attacks

Level B would provide balanced defenses designed to limit damage to U.S. cities and military forces from small (deliberate or unauthorized) attacks. Against large attacks it also would secure additional time over that provided by Level A for safe escape of alert bombers and tankers and for relocation of the NCA to a survivable command center. The following forces could be included:

—Twelve Safeguard ABM sites, including a light area defense.
—Air defenses to provide protection against small bomber attacks by the USSR or third countries.
—Augmentation of general purpose ASW forces to locate and, if necessary, destroy a small Chinese ballistic missile submarine force (2–4 submarines).

—Civil defense as in Level A or perhaps increased to provide more fallout protection and evacuation plans for use in a crisis.

Level C. Defense of Strategic Retaliatory Forces and the NCA

Level C would provide balanced defenses of strategic retaliatory forces and the NCA, including a hard-site ABM defense of Minuteman and perhaps active defense of bomber bases. There would be no effort to defend U.S. cities, except insofar as they receive protection from defenses of the strategic retaliatory forces and the NCA.

There is an issue concerning the effect of hard-site defense deployment on the long-term strategic balance. Some believe extensive deployment of hard-site defense would raise Soviet fears that this defense would be a basis for ABM defense of U.S. cities, would cause further proliferation of Soviet strategic weapons, and would in turn result in deployment of more U.S. hard-site defenses. Others note that deployment of hard-site defense would not protect U.S. cities and would indicate only an effort to preserve the U.S. land-based missile deterrent; they argue that such a deployment need not stimulate proliferation of Soviet weapons if the USSR is sincere about leveling off strategic armaments.

Level D. Defense Against Small Attacks Plus Hard-Site Defense of Minuteman

Level D would add to the defenses of Level B a hard-site ABM defense of Minuteman in order to provide defense of population against small attacks and defense of retaliatory forces against large and small attacks.

Level E. Defenses to Ensure Favorable War Outcomes

In order to ensure that the United States has a favorable balance of surviving military resources after any level of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, extensive defenses of both strategic and general purpose forces would be needed. Moreover, even though defenses could not limit U/I damage from large attacks to a low level, they could, inconjunction with U.S. strategic offensive forces, contribute to achieving a favorable balance of surviving population and industry as well as military assets.

The size and cost of strategic defenses to enforce favorable war outcomes are difficult to project since they would depend on the future Soviet threat (including any measures the Soviets might take to offset a buildup in U.S. strategic defenses), as well as on the precise interpretation of the term “favorable outcomes”. Defense Level E could, for example, include the following defensive forces: 16 ABM sites using Safeguard-type components, hard-site ABM defense of Minuteman, sea-based ABMs for mid-course intercept, and augmentation of the current air defenses with improved manned interceptors, OTH–B, SAM–D and AWACS.

V. China

The emerging Chinese nuclear weapons capability raises a number of questions beyond those which arise from considering the U.S. strategic force posture vis-à-vis the USSR. These include the following:

—Should we deploy an ABM defense of CONUS against PRC attacks or other similar small attacks?
—What range of hostile PRC actions can be deterred by U.S. strategic forces and what U.S. force characteristics and deployments are needed for deterring these hostile actions?
—What changes, if any, should be made in our strategic forces to reduce the risk that, during a U.S.-Soviet crisis, a PRC attack could provoke nuclear war?
—How would alternative U.S. force postures and deployments in Asia affect the perceptions of our NATO allies regarding U.S. support with nuclear weapons? Similarly, how does our posture in Europe affect the perceptions of our Asian allies regarding U.S. support with nuclear weapons?
—How would alternative U.S. force postures and deployments in Asia affect achievement of our policy goals regarding Japan?
—How would alternative U.S. strategic force postures toward China affect the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship?

These issues have been analyzed in varying degrees of depth in the NSSM 69 study and in analyses conducted in support of the study of U.S. strategic objectives and force postures. These analyses suggest there are two major *policy* issues regarding the U.S. strategic force posture towards the PRC which are ready for decision now.

The first is whether we should deploy an ABM defense of U.S. cities against Chinese attacks. The President's decision leading to the current SALT position indicates a willingness to forego such an ABM defense if necessary to achieve an equitable SAL agreement.

The second issue is whether we should take actions designed to maintain throughout the 1970s a capability to deny (or limit to a low level) damage from PRC nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies. These actions would be intended to maintain a disarming strike capability against the PRC. A complete analysis of this question must also consider issues about the U.S. conventional and tactical nuclear force posture in Asia. These are discussed in detail in the NSSM 69 study (U.S. Strategy and Forces in Asia). This section focuses on the disarming strike issue relative to overall U.S. strategic objectives and postures. Decisions on our strategic force posture vis-à-vis the PRC should be made after considering both the NSSM 69 study and the issues set forth here.

There are two broad strategic nuclear options vis-à-vis China which differ in regard to a disarming strike capability.

Option A. U/I Retaliatory Capability Plus Limited Counterforce Capability

This option would provide those capabilities against China which result from a posture designed primarily for a well-hedged U/I retaliatory capability against the USSR. There would be no improvements in missile counterforce or ASW capabilities for the purpose of limiting or denying damage from PRC attacks on the United States or its allies.

We would have the capability for destruction of 70% of Chinese industry, 70% of the urban population (about 60 million people or 7% of the total population), most soft military targets, and most hardened, non-time-urgent military targets. Although we currently have a disarming strike capability against known Chinese nuclear threats, this would be seriously eroded under Option A as the Chinese increase the number and survivability of their nuclear forces or develop a launch-on-warning capability. We expect the PRC to improve the survivability of their nuclear forces in the future by deploying missiles in silos and in nuclear-powered submarines. They may even now be deploying MRBMs in a concealed mode.

The key issue relative to this option is whether the threatened destruction of PRC cities and soft military targets, in conjunction with U.S. tactical nuclear forces and U.S. and allied conventional forces, would be sufficient to deter PRC attacks on the United States (when they acquire such a capability), its bases overseas, and its allies. Evaluation of this issue depends in part on issues concerning our tactical nuclear and conventional force posture in Asia (see the NSSM 69 study); the following would be implied by Option A.

—For deterrence of PRC *conventional attacks* on our allies, we would depend primarily on either (a) a combination of U.S. and allied conventional forces or (b) threat of battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons. Without a disarming strike capability the latter carries greater risk that the Chinese would escalate to higher levels of nuclear exchanges than does the former.
—For deterrence of PRC nuclear attacks on our allies, we would depend on U.S. theater nuclear weapons in conjunction with the threat of strategic nuclear attacks on PRC cities and soft military targets.

Option B. U/I Retaliatory Capability Plus Enhanced Counterforce Capability Designed for Damage Denial

This option would add to Option A an improved missile counter-force capability (probably the Poseidon accuracy and yield would be improved and Poseidon missiles deployed in the Pacific) and a strategic ASW capability against Chinese ballistic missile submarines in order to extend the time during which we could threaten China with a disarming strike.

There are two major uses for a U.S. disarming strike capability:

—To contribute (in concert with tactical nuclear weapons) to deterrence of Chinese conventional attack on our allies and to reduce the credibility of Chinese nuclear threats to our allies.

—To limit damage to the United States, its overseas bases, and its allies from PRC nuclear attacks. In particular, if the United States made use of tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield to support U.S. or allied troops fighting PRC forces, a disarming strike might be executed in an attempt to prevent or limit Chinese nuclear responses.

Key Issues. Evaluation of Option B has identified the following issues.

—*Would the above missile counterforce improvements significantly affect the U.S.-Soviet relationship?*

Some assert that they would, resulting in further proliferation of Soviet strategic weapons and to complications in SALT and other U.S.-Soviet diplomatic efforts. They believe that, if improved guidance and larger yield warheads were in production, the Soviets would have to assume they were or would be deployed in all Poseidon missiles, not just those in the Pacific.

Others maintain that, if Poseidon with improved counterforce capabilities were deployed only in the Pacific, the Soviets would be able to accurately monitor the deployment through various sources (e.g., logistics indicators and procurement quantities) and thus would not have grounds for viewing a disarming strike capability against China as a major threat to the USSR. Only about 25% of Soviet ICBM and IR/MRBM launchers could be reached by Poseidon from the Pacific.

Still others assert that Soviet proliferation of weapons and diplomatic positions are determined by factors other than the capabilities of U.S. weapons and that the possible impact on the U.S.-Soviet relationship should not be a consideration in evaluating the disarming strike issue.

Other key issues bearing on a decision regarding a disarming strike are discussed in the NSSM 69 study. These include (1) the technical feasibility of maintaining a disarming strike capability against the PRC throughout the 1970s, (2) the political inhibitions against using a disarming strike, and (3) the possible political benefits of even an imperfect disarming strike capability.

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0095, 334, DPRC. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the paper, but it was apparently prepared by the DPRC Working Group. Odeen sent the paper on January 11 to DPRC Working Group members, including Spiers; Clarke; Tucker; Dam; Stein; Lee; Lawrence S. Eagleburger of the Department of State; and Major General John H. Elder, Jr., Deputy Director, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, JCS. The paper summarized a lengthier study, entitled "U.S. Strategic Objectives and Force Posture" and completed by the DPRC Working Group on January 3. That study included a 108–page Executive Summary. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-

Files), Box H–105, DPRC Meeting, Strategic Objectives Posture, 6/27/72)

[2] See Document 182.

[3] Document 39.

[4] The State Department representative believes that this paper should provide a broader spectrum of alternative strategies for consideration by decision-makers. In particular, consideration should be given to the *pros* and *cons* of a partial damage-limiting strategy as one possible means of achieving a more stable deterrent, and providing options in the event deterrence fails. See p. 12. [Footnote in the original. The State Department text of an additional strategic alternative is in Section III below.]

[5] The State Department representative does not believe the strategic defense alternatives are adequately related to the objectives which are stated on pages 3–4 or to the strategic offensive alternatives. This results from separating the offense and defense alternatives, rather than integrating them into a single set of strategic alternatives. [Footnote in the original.]

[6] See Document 181 and footnote 7 thereto.

[7] "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s," A Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 18, 1970, page 92. [Footnote in the original. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 115–190.]

[8] While not a matter of public policy, the study group agreed that early war termination is an objective. [Footnote in the original.]

[9] The JCS representative believes that a credible and realistic deterrent posture requires U.S. strategic forces which have a warfighting capability such that they can respond selectively, in concert with other forces, to the full range of nuclear confrontation and conflict and contribute to U.S. capabilities across the warfare spectrum to terminate hostilities under conditions advantageous to the United States. Furthermore, strategic forces must be flexible and sufficient in their combined capability to provide the President with alternatives appropriate to the level and nature of the provocation and make credible the U.S. commitment to employ its forces as may be necessary for the successful defense of NATO and other allied territories. [Footnote in the original.]

[10] On November 13, 1971, Laird sent Kissinger the draft Defense Policy and Force Planning Guidance for FY 74–78, a 36–page paper that included two sections: Defense Policy Guidance and Interim Force Planning Guidance for the FY 74–FY 78 Five Year Defense Program. No reference to improving missile counterforce capabilities was found in the guidance. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 230, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. XVI)

[11] Attached but not printed is Table 1, a page-length chart that compares the costs of past and current U.S. strategic programs and the anticipated costs of alternative strategic offensive postures and mixes.

[12] "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s," A Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress (February 25, 1971), pp. 133–134. [Footnote in the original. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.]

[13] The JCS representative believes that our capabilities for support of allies should not be

incredible and that a counterforce capability to support our commitments reinforces credibility. [Footnote in the original.]

[14] See State Department footnote on p. 12. [Footnote in the original.]

[15] Pages 65–92 of the Executive Summary discusses the four general strategic alternatives in detail.

[16] According to a typed notation on the original, this text was revised on January 14. See footnote 4 above.

[17] The JCS representative notes that the Soviets' capability for evacuation of civil population from urban areas could change the relative balance of fatalities. [Footnote in the original.]

[18] The SIOP now consists of five attack options, which have provisions for withholding strikes against China and the Far Eastern and East European communist nations and against government controls in Moscow or Peking. The smallest attack option, however, involves about 2500 nuclear warheads launched against Soviet nuclear threat targets. It is possible, without executing any SIOP attack option, to employ selective nuclear strikes using theater or strategic weapons or to execute pre-planned nuclear attacks against China. [Footnote in the original.]

[19] In this regard, the President in his Second Annual Review of U.S. Foreign Policy (February 25, 1971) stated that he "must not be … limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges." (p. 131) He also stated that "it would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning on some finite—and theoretical—capacity to inflict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side." (p. 131) [Footnote in the original.]

[20] Table 2, which is attached but not printed, indicates that the current U.S. strategic defense program cost $17 billion. Estimated costs for alternative programs were as follows: Level A, $6 billion; Level B, $16 billion; Level C, $16 billion; Level D, $20 billion; and Level E, $25 billion.

[21] Table 3 is attached but not printed.

205. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon[1]

Washington, January 26, 1972.

SUBJECT
New Ballistic Missile Submarine Program

On January 4, 1972 I wrote to you that after reviewing alternative SSBN programs I concluded that an acceleration of the Underseas Long-range Missile System (ULMS) was the best alternative.[2] I have attached a brief summary and comparison of the alternatives considered.[3]

I believe it is clear that we need an overt step to enhance our strategic posture in response to the continuing Soviet offensive buildup and the long delay in achieving an arms limitation agreement. The step must signal to the Soviets, our Allies and the Congress that we have the will and the resources to maintain our strategic posture in the face of a growing threat. It should appear deliberate rather than suggesting panic. It must receive strong Congressional backing to be effective.

The alternatives we have considered include the stretching of the present Poseidon boats to carry 24 rather than 16 launch tubes, the conversion or diversion of present and programmed nuclear attack submarines to ballistic missile submarines; and the construction of additional submarines using the basic design of the more recent Poseidon boats with a number of improvements. These options offer the possibility of a more rapid increase in the number of missile launchers at sea than the ULMS acceleration and at a lower initial cost per launch tube, although the additional launchers could not be populated with a new missile until about one year before the accelerated ULMS, and the cost per pound of payload deliverable a given distance averaged over the life of the submarine can be lowest for ULMS. Each of these options could carry the new ULMS–I missile when it becomes available, and so be able to operate from CONUS ports and throughout large ocean areas. Only the ULMS, however, can carry the larger ULMS–II missile with its greater range-payload capacity.

I am convinced that any of the alternatives to ULMS would face serious Congressional opposition. In addition there are other strong reasons for rejecting these alternatives:

Stretched Poseidon

- Does not provide new submarines, thus weakening the message we want to communicate.
- Makes a major new investment in submarines which have already served 1/3 of their

useful lives.
• Involves major modification to an effective operational force.

Conversion of Attack Submarines

• Gives the appearance more of panic than deliberation in our response to continuing Soviet programs.
• Temporarily reduces the level of our attack submarine force at a time when increasing that submarine force has one of our highest priorities.

Construction of New Improved Poseidon-class Submarines

• Many important aspects of the submarine design would be based upon the technology of the early 1960s, for boats expected to be in operation beyond the year 2000.
• This boat could enter the fleet only one year sooner than the accelerated ULMS, but could not carry the larger ULMS–II missile.

I am convinced that acceleration of the ULMS is the correct step for five reasons:[4]

1. It is the only step for which we can confidently get Congressional authorization.
   • There would be very strong opposition to any new land-based systems. We cannot even get R&D approved for land-mobile ICBMs.
   • There would be very strong opposition to interference with present programs, such as stretching Poseidon submarines or converting or diverting attack submarines. Such opposition was encountered during the first two years of the Polaris-to-Poseidon conversion program.
   • There would be considerable opposition to resurrecting a design of the 1960s, even if technological improvements were incorporated, for a boat to be operational from 1978 on past the year 2000.
   • The ULMS program has already been funded by Congress and initiated. It is intended as the next generation successor to the present fleet.
2. Accelerating ULMS is the most effective signal to the Soviets, our Allies and the Congress that we intend to counter the continuing Soviet buildup of strategic offensive forces with a buildup of our own.
   • It is a well planned and deliberate implementation of a major step forward in submarine capability.
   • It accelerates the submarine which was in any case intended to be the follow-on to the present fleet. It therefore is clearly not just a "bargaining chip," but is a program we intend to carry to fruition, either to add to or to replace the present fleet, depending in part on the evolution of the Soviet threat and the outcome of SALT.
3. The ULMS makes the best sense strategically.
   • A strategic offensive arms limitation agreement is likely to limit the number of SLBM launchers rather than the capacity of the launchers. The ULMS gives substantially larger capacity launchers than any other alternative.

- Any new SSBN we build now will be operating in the year 2000 against unknown ASW and ABM threats. Therefore, new SSBNs should be as quiet as possible and should be capable of carrying a large missile. A capability to carry the larger ULMS–II class missiles maximizes the submarine's flexibility for:
  —operating in a very large operating area while covering targets in the USSR to hedge against advanced ASW threats in the next 30 years;
  —carrying advanced penetration payloads (e.g., 16 MIRVs per missile or maneuvering RVs) to hedge against advanced ABM threats in the next 30 years.
- All alternatives could carry the 4000 n.m. ULMS–I missile, which would allow operation from CONUS ports with very short transit times to SSBN operating areas. This allows the submarines to operate under CONUS-based ASW and surface protection. It allows us to be independent of overseas basing. The ULMS–II missile allows the largest payload at this range.

4. The ULMS helps to alleviate the severe problems of retaining qualified SSBN crews we expect in the future.
   - The capability to carry the larger ULMS–II class missiles means that a given payload can be deployed with fewer boats and crews.
   - The ULMS class SSBN will be larger than the submarines of the other options, and so permit the most habitable shipboard environment for these crews.
5. The ULMS offers the lowest cost per pound of deliverable pay-load over the life of this system.

We expect to be presenting these reasons as we testify in support of the FY 72 supplemental request and the FY 73 budget request before Congress.

Melvin R. Laird

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 230, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. XVI. Top Secret.

[2] Laird's memorandum to Nixon is ibid., Vol. XV. It responded to a January 3 memorandum from Kissinger requesting the preparation of an SLBM option paper for the President, who had included additional funds in the FY 1973 Defense budget for strategic submarines but had yet to determine exactly which program to support. (Ibid.)

[3] Attached but not printed is a 10-page paper, "Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Deployment Options," that included the following sections: Current SLBM Programs, Missile Options, Submarine Options, and Major Factors Bearing on the Selection of an SLBM Deployment Option.

[4] Moorer agreed. In a March 20 memorandum to Kissinger, he wrote that accelerated construction of the ULMS offered "the only suitable and viable option" to rapidly add SLBMs to the U.S. inventory. The ULMS, he argued, "provides a weapon system with very significant advantages in performance and operational flexibility over anything available to either side. From a negotiation point of view the ULMS program, which can be further

accelerated if desired, provides leverage which can be used to ensure approximate ‘equivalency’ of offensive systems. From the ‘world image’ point of view, the important thing is not delivery rates per se but, rather, the existence of a modern ongoing system.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 245, Agency Files, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. II)

206. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, February 10, 1972, 3:08–3:57 p.m.

SUBJECT

DOD Budget and Five Year Defense Plan

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. John N. Irwin
Mr. Leon Sloss
Mr. Seymour Weiss

DOD

Dr. Gardiner Tucker
Mr. Robert C. Moot
Dr. John Christie[2]

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
R/Adm. William St. George

CIA

Mr. Bruce Clarke

OMB

Mr. George P. Shultz
Mr. Kenneth Dam

CEA

Mr. Ezra Solomon

ACDA

Mr. Gerard Smith
Col. Ira B. Richards

OST

Mr. John Walsh

NSC

Gen. Alexander M. Haig
Mr. Philip Odeen
Mr. John Court
Lt. Cdr. John Knubel
Mr. Jim Hackett

It was agreed that:

—DOD will follow the President's guidance on force levels, particularly with respect to air defense forces and army divisions.[3]

—OMB and DOD will reconcile the budgetary differences in their projections between $82 billion and $84 billion.
—DOD will submit an interim report on the strategic implications of the increasing procurement cost of new weapons systems and means of controlling those costs.
—DOD will put out policy guidance that, in general, follows the fiscal guidance agreed upon.[4]
—DOD will issue Fiscal Guidance for FY 74–78 based on the FY 73 program as projected.

Dr. Kissinger: Our primary purpose today is to decide a preliminary approach to the five year defense program. If Defense will present its views first, we will then hear what OMB has to say.

Dr. Tucker: I want to remind everyone that we are just entering the process of review of our five year defense program. Last year we began the five year program for the period FY 72–76 with the basic fiscal and program guidance, then went into the program decision cycle and considered specific programs at a series of DPRC meetings, got presidential guidance and then added 4-1/2 billion dollars. Next, the services submitted their detailed budgets for the first year, we scrubbed them with OMB and took out 2-1/2 billion dollars, after which we put back one-half of a billion, then extended the decisions reached during the budget scrub through the whole five years of the program. By that time, we had in fact produced a new five year program.

Dr. Kissinger: So what you are saying is that every year we will have a new five year program.

Dr. Tucker: Yes, that's true. Congress cut us 700 million, we then adjusted our estimates for the whole period to include estimated congressional cuts at the same ratio. What we want to do now is review this program, consider OMB projections and views, include any new policy guidance and then begin work on the next new program.

Dr. Kissinger: In several areas the trends you have followed have been different from the guidance you were provided; for example, in Air Defense, anticipated savings have not been realized and the Army division level we contemplated has not been reached. Why do we go through this elaborate planning process if you aren't going to carry out the guidance you have been provided?

Dr. Tucker: We have followed the guidance. With regard to Air Defense, we reached a decision on Continental Air Defense that was more modest than our original idea—to defend the Continental U.S. against bomber attack with limited warning.

Dr. Kissinger: You have given existing forces a new mission instead of changing the forces.

Dr. Tucker: We have changed the forces.

Adm. Moorer: We've had trouble in Congress because of the cuts in forces. A plane flew into New Orleans from Cuba last year and some people on the Hill were very excited about it.[5] They're not anxious to cut Air Defense forces with this sort of thing happening.

Dr. Kissinger: That has nothing to do with your force levels. When you had higher levels of air defense, a Cuban plane flew into Miami while the President was at Key Biscayne.[6] I don't think anyone is worrying about an air invasion of the southern United States.

Dr. Tucker: You are raising questions about specific numbers of interceptors, but what we are discussing is the implementation of budget cuts. It is a matter of allocation of both cuts and resources.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the decision to have 13 divisions? We only have 11-1/2.

Dr. Tucker: We are carrying 13 in the structure of the Army, but with the drawdown of Army strength and the Vietnam cuts, they are not at full strength.

Adm. Moorer: The Senate has arbitrarily cut 50,000 men from the Army force structure[7] and we are having trouble maintaining the units fleshed out.

Dr. Christie: We will reach our goal by the end of FY 73 but not in FY 72.

Dr. Kissinger: Is this your (DOD's) decision?

Dr. Tucker: No. We have been cut by Congress 50,000 men more than we want to be cut.

Adm. Moorer: The shortfall actually is in the strategic reserve. We're suffering turbulence from the draw downs in Vietnam and the cuts by Congress occurring at the same time.

Dr. Kissinger: You (Mr. Shultz) sold us the CIA reorganization[8] to save money and now we find we're not saving any.

Mr. Shultz: That's not true! We never argued for the reorganization for that purpose, we did it to increase efficiency.

Dr. Tucker: We have reduced 32,000 positions in the intelligence community. You won't realize any savings from that in the first year because it costs more to terminate or transfer people than to keep them on the payroll, but over the long run there will be a substantial savings.

Adm. Moorer: We're closing intelligence bases in Japan, Turkey, everywhere. We're cutting our intelligence forces all over.

Dr. Tucker: There are a lot of problems involved in going from an eleven to a thirteen division Army, switching from earlier to subsequent guidance. We want to change an

infantry division to a mechanized division for NATO, reduce the speed of retirement of ships and now we're getting involved in pollution control problems. Our strategic forces are down from 2.7 to 2.3 million for FY 72–73, which will be less than pre-Vietnam, nevertheless, the budget continues to go up. Research and development is up 700 million, support to other nations is down significantly, unit costs per weapon are up sharply, all at the same time.

Dr. Kissinger: We sent you a memo on the cost of weapons about six months ago.[9] When can we have an answer?

Dr. Tucker: These are very complex issues and difficult questions.

Dr. Kissinger: I know they're complex, but at least give us an interim answer.

Dr. Tucker: O.K., in about a week. Right now we are in the early part of the five year program. We are getting hit with the initial costs of the large and expensive items of hardware. Near the end of the five years the unit cost will be much lower.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn't a lot of the increased cost caused by inflation and pay raises, in addition to the rising cost of weapons? Costs that we can't do much about? Can we maintain the force structure we want and have modernization too?

Dr. Tucker: Costs are above last year's fiscal projections, but we can do it. Modernization of the force structure will cost less in the future. We will have fewer ships but more expensive ones, and also our tactical air is getting old and will need some attention soon.

Adm. Moorer: When you reduce the volume of purchases to save money, the unit cost goes up.

Mr. Shultz: Well, if you try to maintain a larger base than you need, you then get into these problems of high unit costs. Now if we start with the FY 73 budget as the latest expression of the President's fiscal thinking and go on from there ...

Mr. Moot: From an outlay point of view, you come out with about the same expenditures in FY 76 as in FY 73, so in the end you find that reduction of forces is the only solution.

Mr. Shultz: Do you all agree with that?

Mr. Dam: Then you (Mr. Moot) are suggesting the (OMB) paper[10] is wrong? Is it wrong?

Mr. Moot: In the real world—I'm not suggesting you (OMB) don't live in the real world—but this planning figure of 82 billion is just not realistic. You can only reduce these levels of expenditures by cutting forces.

Dr. Kissinger: I hope Jack Anderson[11] doesn't get the minutes of this meeting.

Mr. Shultz: If you project the FY 73 budget, we (OMB) arrive at 82 billion while you (DOD) figure 84 billion. We should be able to reconcile that difference.

Mr. Moot: In reaching our (DOD) estimate of 84 billion, I assumed that we would only be able to get the Vietnam pipeline and support costs down to about three billion per year, not to the 2 or 2-1/2 billion you estimate.

Mr. Shultz: You may be right about that.

Mr. Odeen: There is a six billion increase in TOA.

Mr. Moot: But there are no outlays there, while the cost of arms goes up one billion.

Mr. Shultz: Are you saying that the FY 73 budget figures extended to FY 74 and the years beyond can be used as a base?

Mr. Moot: I think we can agree on a figure for planning purposes that way, but not for the specifics of the force structure. When you consider force structure you have to get into force levels, research and development, manpower and modernization. But I don't think we will have any trouble reaching a figure we can agree on for planning purposes.

Dr. Tucker: This figure and the contents of the plan is what we have agreed upon; now we must study any proposed modifications of programs and their costs. The easiest approach is to put out fiscal guidance that closely matches these projections, and then to put out the force levels later.

Dr. Kissinger: If we are to make any changes in fiscal guidance, will we be forced into a change of policy guidance?

Dr. Tucker: Yes, we will. Or if we change the policy guidance, we will have to adjust the fiscal guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't change policy without discussing it. Do you have any objections, George (Shultz)?

Mr. Shultz: No, as I understand it, it's all right with me.

Mr. Odeen: What about the R & D levels?

Dr. Tucker: We are figuring 700 million more for R & D.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Dr. Tucker) So you will put out policy guidance that in general follows the fiscal guidance, but which will not be locked in concrete and can be changed as developments require?

Dr. Tucker: (nodded agreement)

Mr. Shultz: The one thing I want to stress is our need to keep the Defense budget in its proper context as part of the overall federal budget. This is absolutely essential. When our projections of revenues are too high, we not only have no margin to do anything additional that may be needed but we also find ourselves having to take out of the budget large chunks of money that you have already planned to spend.

Mr. Moot: This year is going to be a little different. We will look at the trend of budget planning harder than before.

(Dr. Kissinger was called from the meeting at this point)

Adm. Moorer: As a result of Congressional actions on the present budget, we will have to make changes in some of our plans.

Mr. Odeen: We also have to discuss the five year defense budget.

Mr. Irwin: I hope we have the answers on the FY 73 Asian deployments[12] before the trip to Peking.[13]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–73 [2 of 3]. Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. In a February 9 memorandum, Odeen informed Kissinger that the meeting was to address three issues: the inconsistency between Presidential decisions and Defense Department strategic guidance, the overall level of defense spending needed to support the Five Year Defense Plan for FY 1974–1978, and the relationship between planned defense spending and the Nixon administration's long-term economic and budgetary goals. (Ibid., Box H–105, DPRC Meeting, DOD Five Year Program, 2/10/72)

[2] Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis).

[3] On November 13, 1971, Laird sent Kissinger the draft Defense Policy and Force Planning Guidance for FY 74–78. According to Laird's covering memorandum, the paper translated Presidential decisions into "definitive guidance" to the Defense Department for planning and evaluating its forces and programs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 230, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. XVI) In a February 28, 1972, letter to Laird, Kissinger expressed concern that the guidance was inconsistent with Presidential decisions in several areas: U.S. assistance to Asian allies in the event of a massive PRC attack, reserve forces, and strategic air defense. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Accession 2000–NLF–045, Box 1, Memorandum to Laird from Kissinger—Planning Guidance FY 74–78)

[4] See Document 203.

[5] On October 26, 1971, an airplane with 22 Cubans aboard landed without warning at the

New Orleans International Airport. (*The New York Times*, November 3, 1971, p. 16)

[6] See footnote 7, Document 149.

[7] See Document 185.

[8] See footnote 6, Document 203.

[9] Nixon sent Laird a memorandum on May 28, 1971, expressing concern about the increasing costs of new weapons systems and the rising portion of the Defense budget dedicated to manpower costs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 227, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. XII) That memorandum followed Kissinger's May 26 memorandum to the President apprising Nixon of the situation. (Ibid.) On January 15, 1972, Kissinger sent Laird a memorandum reminding him of Nixon's "deep concern over the impact on future force levels of the 'excessively high unit costs of new weapons compared with the cost of the weapons they replace or the weapons of our potential enemies.'" Kissinger asked the Department of Defense to assess the trend toward more costly weapons and to complete its evaluation by February 1 in time for a DPRC meeting. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–105, DPRC Meeting, DOD Five Year Program, 2/10/72)

[10] Not further identified. Kissinger's preparatory materials for the meeting include "Federal Budget Projections (FY 74–77)," a paper prepared by representatives from several agencies, including the OMB. The 19-page report assessed the 5-year federal budgetary outlook and outlined alternative policies to promote consistency between U.S. defense and economic planning. It estimated FY 1974 defense expenditures to be $82 billion. (Ibid.)

[11] *Washington Post* columnist.

[12] See footnote 2, Document 202.

[13] President Nixon, accompanied by Kissinger, left Washington for China on February 17. He returned on February 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

207. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 17, 1972.

SUBJECT
The Strategic Initiative

Last fall, you decided that we should plan improvements to our sea-based strategic deterrent forces in light of the continuing Soviet build-up.[2] Accordingly, Secretary Laird was asked to evaluate the alternative approaches to achieving this improvement.[3]

The Problem

As you know, the essence of the problem is as follows:

—Our strategic retaliatory capability is and will remain secure provided that a strong sea-based deterrent force is retained.
—There is no strategic threat to the survival of our sea-based force for the foreseeable future. Given the potential vulnerability of our land-based bomber and missile forces, however, there is a good reason to have solid hedges against new developments.
—We have adequate numbers of weapons in our current Polaris/Poseidon force to satisfy fully in sufficiency criteria. But the rapid Soviet submarine building pace and the likelihood that they will have more SLBMs than we do in two years may raise questions of the diplomatic sufficiency of our forces.

Therefore, our purpose in undertaking to improve our sea-based forces should be to convince the Soviets that they have nothing to gain by further increasing their strategic forces.

The DOD Proposal

In light of this problem Secretary Laird prepared two alternatives worthy of serious consideration (see Tab B).[4]

—*Building an improved version of our most modern submarine*—the 640 class boat.
—*Accelerating the development of an entirely new submarine*—the ULMs. It would be initially deployed in 1978 instead of 1981 as currently planned.

Under either option, a new extended range missile would also be developed that itself would enormously increase Soviet difficulties in tracking or destroying our missile submarines.

In assessing these alternatives, the DOD study raises the following points:

—The new submarine (ULMs) would require more development time with the first boat not ready until 1978. Also the building rate in the first few years would be slow, with only 2 or 3 per year being feasible. In contrast, a modified 640 system could be ready by 1977, and we could build 7 to 10 annually.
—Consequently, the most effective means to increase our capabilities quickly is with the 640 class. By 1980, we could have up to 6400 additional re-entry vehicles while the ULMs could yield 2240 at most.
—Neither system is a perfect hedge since the nature of the threat, if any, to our submarines is unknown at present. However, we would be "locking up" the design of this new boat before an anti-submarine threat has appeared.
—Neither system would enable us to match a Soviet build-up of their sea-based strategic forces for many years, though either would provide a credible signal that we would not be content to fall behind.
—The ULM submarine will cost about 50% more over the next five years.

In my judgment, while you faced a difficult decision, the modified 640 class boat deserved the edge because it permitted us to expand capabilities more rapidly.[5] Dr. David shared this view in the conviction that the ULMs program involved such substantial technological risk that the probability of failure, delay, and cost growth was high.

Unfortunately, however, your freedom to choose among these alternatives has been effectively precluded by Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer who both support the ULMs proposal. In particular, Secretary Laird:

—Delayed submitting the SLBM options paper for nearly a month, thus preventing you or your staff from carefully assessing the alternative.
—Informed Congress that you had approved the ULMs program before submitting alternatives for your consideration.
—Publicized the FY 73 budget request for ULMs authority even though specifically asked to forego public discussion until you had reached a decision. Your State of the Union message has been left deliberately vague.[6]

Regardless of the substantive merits, therefore, I believe you have no choice now but to publically support Secretary Laird. If there were a fight within the Administration, the likely effect would be for Congress to kill the initiative.

In the longer run, however, I think that there are compelling strategic reasons to reconsider ULMs initiative and reshape it in terms of the difficult situation we face with the Soviet Union particularly in the SALT talks.

Accordingly, I have prepared a memorandum for Secretary Laird advising him that you wish to review the ULMs program in the NSC next summer considering questions arising

from the above discussion.

Recommendation

That you approve my signing the memorandum for Secretary Laird (Tab A).

Decision

Approved, sign the memorandum to Secretary Laird.[7]

Other, see me.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 230, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. XVI. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which bears a stamped note indicating that the President saw it.

[2] President Nixon concluded an NSC meeting on November 12, 1971, devoted to SALT proposals to limit ABMs with the following statement: "I want to see what we can do on building subs. I see the arguments against but we still need to look at this. We've been frozen so long in all areas. There is lots of steam and concern that we are going to a position of inferiority. We just may have to go the sub route. Please give me the numbers." The minutes of the NSC meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 211.

[3] See Document 205, footnote 2.

[4] Attached at Tab B is Document 205.

[5] Odeen sent Kissinger a memorandum on January 28 questioning Laird's recommendation to accelerate the ULMS submarine. Odeen questioned the recommendation on the following grounds: the ULMS submarine was relatively expensive and technologically uncertain, it would dictate a new boat design before the Soviet sea-based threat was entirely clear, and it offered "the least effective solution for rapidly deploying more submarines." In response, Kissinger indicated that he wished to review the issue "with a select group." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 880, SALT, SALT Talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIV)

[6] In his Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union delivered on January 20, President Nixon called for "an increase in defense spending" directed particularly toward improving, diversifying, and dispersing U.S. "strategic forces in ways which make them even less vulnerable to attack and more effective in deterring war." Accordingly, he requested "a substantial budget increase to preserve the sufficiency of our strategic nuclear deterrent, including an allocation of over $900 million to improve our sea-based deterrent force." (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 45–46)

[7] President Nixon initialed his approval. See Document 208.

208. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, March 4, 1972.

SUBJECT
Strategic Missile Submarine Program

The President has received your study of ways to deploy quickly additional ballistic missile submarines[2] and has tentatively approved your decision to accelerate the ULMS submarine.

The President is concerned, however, that we are not achieving his principal goal of being able to quickly deploy additional submarine-based ballistic missile launchers. Also we are giving up an important hedge against possible future Soviet ASW threats by fixing now on a design for the submarine. Accordingly, he would like you to re-examine your decision, over the next several months, considering the following:

—The difference in size of our SLBM force by 1980 under ULMS and other options as well as the length of time required to achieve parity with the Soviets in SLBM launchers if they are not included in a SAL agreement. Both launchers and RVs should be considered. How might these factors affect our strategic and political relationship with the Soviets?
—The extent of the risks in the decision to rely heavily on concurrency in order to accelerate ULMS. What are the possible schedule slippage, cost overruns, and technical problems?
—The specific technical and design features we are sacrificing by fixing the ULMS design some three years earlier than would be required for an IOC of 1981.
—The reduced hedge against Soviet ASW breakthroughs resulting from fixing the ULMS design before the nature or extent of the threat is known. What is the range of possible threats and how will we hedge against them?
—The design improvements that could be made in an improved 640 submarine without sacrificing the 1977 IOC. If the IOC were slipped one year, what improvements could be made?
—The opportunity costs of proceeding with the most costly option, ULMS. What other strategic or general purpose force options will we have to forego to finance ULMS rather than the 640 submarine?
—The impact on personnel retention and morale of the longer time at sea planned for the ULMS boat. Since both ULMS and the 640 boats would carry long-range missiles, won't the ULMS boat crews be separated from their families more?
—The impact on total available RVs if we later decide to proceed with the ULMS II missile

and not develop ULMS I.[3] How much would this increase the vulnerability of our current submarines?

The President would like your re-appraisal to form the basis for NSC review this summer.

The President has directed that, in the interim, you insure that no irrevocable actions are taken concerning the design of the ULMS submarine that would not be required to meet an IOC of 1981.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 230, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. XVI. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] Document 205.

[3] The ULMS I was an SLBM then under development with a range of about 4,000 nautical miles that could be fitted either onto existing Polaris submarines or onto a new ULMS submarine. The ULMS II was conceived of as an advanced model of the ULMS I with a longer range of some 6,000 nautical miles.

209. National Security Study Memorandum 147[1]

Washington, March 4, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategy and Projection Forces

The President has directed a comprehensive review of the U.S. capability to project its military capabilities overseas and support its strategic objectives. The purpose of this evaluation shall be to assess the adequacy of currently planned forces and to develop alternative force postures for the President's consideration in light of growing Soviet capabilities.

Drawing upon previous interagency work, this review shall cover:

—An identification of U.S. and allied forces and resources related to the force projection, mobility, sea control, and logistical support missions. In turn, these broad missions should be further evaluated in terms of the specific tasks and the air and naval as well as ground forces associated with them.
—An evaluation of the objectives and comparative effort of the Soviet Union and its allies. This comparison should provide, among other things, a net assessment of the U.S. and Soviet naval balance in various areas. The size and composition of resources required to support our respective force postures and capabilities shall also be evaluated.
—An examination and identification of U.S. requirements for force projection, mobility, sea control, and logistical support, and for missions and forces in relation to specified U.S. foreign and strategic policy objectives. This should include a thorough assessment of the present Soviet threat and the capability of the U.S. and its allies to carry out the missions noted above in a manner consistent with the U.S. strategy in Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia, and elsewhere. This should examine, among other things, the possible situations in which the U.S. might become engaged in a conflict confined to the sea, and the implications of such an engagement.
—The development of alternative objectives and related force postures for each of these major missions with their associated resource requirements through FY 1977. The alternatives shall also incorporate, where appropriate, forces of modified design and capabilities. The strategic implications of the alternative postures should be evaluated. The Department of State should contribute an assessment of the political and diplomatic implications of the alternative postures, including prospective allied reactions to the use of U.S. forces under the circumstances postulated.

This review shall be prepared by the Department of Defense in cooperation with other interested agencies under the guidance of the DPRC Working Group. The review should be completed no later than May 1, 1972, for consideration by the Defense Program Review Committee.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to McCracken, Shultz, and Gerard Smith.

210. Editorial Note

President Nixon met with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on May 5, in advance of his trip to Moscow, where he was expected to sign accords with Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev limiting strategic arms. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House and was attended by Nixon, PFIAB members Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Dr. William O. Baker, Gordon Gray, Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr., Dr. Franklin D. Murphy, Frank Pace, Jr., Nelson A. Rockefeller, Dr. Edward Teller, and Gerard P. Burke, and Thomas Latimer of the National Security Council Staff. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

Following introductory remarks by Nixon, Anderson stated, "The members hoped to be able to discuss certain matters that might be helpful to the President in preparing for his forthcoming trip to Moscow. The Board has followed closely the developments in Soviet weaponry as a result of the President's specific charge upon it three years ago to monitor and assess the Soviet capabilities in this field. [Anderson] said that the members were impressed with the continuing, across-the-board growth of Soviet forces in intercontinental ballistic missiles, in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), in various defensive weapons, and, most recently, in the emphasis that the Soviets are placing on improving their command and control system. This emphasis is illustrated by their efforts in hardening command and control facilities, in creating redundant communications, and in conducting live exercises of the system which involve direct participation by the top leaders of the Soviet Union."

Other PFIAB members discussed the quality of United States intelligence on Soviet capabilities, including overhead reconnaissance, signals intelligence, human clandestine intelligence, and economic intelligence. Teller then "briefed the President on certain calculations he had made regarding comparative US-USSR nuclear capabilities in the 1975 timeframe. These projections raise the question as to whether, by 1975 and certainly no later than 1980, the U.S. will have the numbers and kinds of weapons sufficient to prevent nuclear blackmail by the Soviet Union. Dr. Teller said that there are certain measures which, in his view, can be adopted to preclude economically this eventuality in the short term. The U.S. should, first of all, renounce its intentions to conduct a 'first strike,' while at the same time we should assure the Soviets of the inevitability of our nuclear retaliation. We should abandon the counterforce doctrine that characterizes our present Single Integrated Operations Plan planning, in favor of a strategy centering on destruction of Russian cities. As interim steps, we can redeploy our SLBM force to make it safer and we can disperse our nuclear weapons in Europe differently so that they will be less vulnerable. Dr. Teller also believes that the U.S. should begin to engage in a more open dialogue with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in regard to limited nuclear warfare in their territory and that the American people should be informed of the dangers of the growing Soviet strategic threat and advised to plan for civil defense against

the threat."

President Nixon concluded the meeting by commenting upon the need for American leaders "to maintain their moral strength and courage in the face of the corrosive attitudes which seem to be pervading many segments of our culture." He "noted that the real strength of America inevitably resides in the average citizen; whether this strength, in turn, becomes greater or lesser is dependent to a critical degree on the ability and willingness of leaders of our society in discharging the moral obligations which have been placed upon their shoulders. The President expressed the hope that the members of the Board, who have such a unique vantage point from which to view the external threats of the United States, will seek in their daily contacts to remind American leaders in all walks of life of the enormous responsibilities they carry, especially in impressing youth on the need to preserve the nation's strength and moral fiber." (Memorandum for the President's File; ibid., White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 88, Memoranda for the President, Beginning April 30, 1972)

Taking Stock

211. Editorial Note

212. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the Secretary of the Army (Froehlke)

Washington, May 26, 1972.

213. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 22, 1972.

214. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 26, 1972.

215. National Security Decision Memorandum 172

Washington, June 27, 1972.

216. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, June 27, 1972, 3:14–4:04 p.m.

217. National Security Decision Memorandum 174

Washington, July 7, 1972.

218. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

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219. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, July 21, 1972, 3:10–4:06 p.m.

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220. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, July 24, 1972, 3:09–3:45 p.m.

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221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, August 2, 1972.

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222. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

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223. National Security Decision Memorandum 184

Washington, August 14, 1972.

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224. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, September 19, 1972.

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225. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, October 26, 1972.

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226. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 2, 1972.

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227. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, November 29, 1972.

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228. National Security Study Memorandum 165

Washington, December 3, 1972.

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229. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, December 12, 1972.

211. Editorial Note

The United States and the Soviet Union signed two strategic arms limitation accords on May 26, 1972: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The former limited each signatory's deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, including the national command authority. The latter limited the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. For the full text of the agreements, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 316, 317, and 318.

212. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the Secretary of the Army (Froehlke)[1]

Washington, May 26, 1972.

SUBJECT
ABM Development and Deployment Programs

Today, President Nixon signed Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements with the Soviet Union.[2] As a result, we must take certain immediate actions with regard to our ABM programs. Further actions will be required at the time of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

You should implement the following actions now:

1. Suspend construction of the Safeguard site at Malmstrom AFB, Montana.
2. Suspend all future work at the remaining Safeguard sites.
3. Suspend all ABM R&D programs which are prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
4. Begin preparation for dismantling the Malmstrom site commencing on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. You should avoid any irreversible actions until that time.
5. Initiate planning to (a) cancel the 12–site Safeguard Program and (b) deploy an ABM defense of the NCA at Washington, D. C. within the provisions of the ABM Treaty, on the fastest reasonable schedule. The configuration of the NCA defense will be selected prior to Treaty ratification.
6. Continue the Safeguard deployment at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, as planned.

A detailed statement on the specific impact of these actions on the Safeguard and ABM R&D programs should be prepared and submitted to me as soon as possible.

I will issue further guidance regarding actions to be taken at the time of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Melvin R. Laird

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. No classification marking.
[2] See Document 211.

213. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, June 22, 1972.

SUBJECT
War Powers Legislation

The Javits–Stennis bill on war powers passed the Senate 68 to 16 despite our strong opposition on grounds of its being unconstitutional and unwise (Text at Tab A).[2] It provides:

1. The President can deploy U.S. forces in areas where hostilities are taking place or are threatened only under the following conditions:
   a. To repel attack on U.S. territory; to retaliate for such an attack; or to forestall direct and imminent threat of such an attack.
   b. To repel armed attack on U.S. forces outside the U.S.; or to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack.
   c. To protect U.S. citizens while evacuating from a foreign country.
2. Congress may terminate all such Presidential actions by Act or Joint Resolution.
3. All such actions will be terminated after 30 days unless Congress takes positive action to extend such authority.

The Zablocki bill (Tab B)[3] has twice passed the House with our tacit support. It is a moderate sense of the Congress resolution that provides that the President should consult with Congress before acting—if circumstances permit. If that is not possible then the President must report to Congress promptly. Justice, State and NSC agree that this bill presents no problem.

A conference committee will soon meet to reconcile the two bills. The Senate Conferees, Fulbright,[4] Javits and Symington,[5] backed by their wide vote margin will almost certainly not yield enough to make the bill acceptable. While Doc Morgan[6] and Zablocki oppose the Senate version they do want a bill, and there is a real danger that they will accept a compromise that you would still have to veto. Apart from the political disadvantages of vetoing a war-powers bill, it is quite possible that the Senate might override, and an outside possibility that the House might do the same.

Decision

We must now give the House conferees some clear signals and the options seem to be the following:

Option 1.

The Secretary of State recommends (Tab C)[7] that you approve telling Zablocki that you could accept the compromise resolution at Tab D[8] as a final fallback position. It includes a specification of presidential war-powers and endorses a thirty-day cutoff, both from the Javits bill; but both merely sense of Congress and non-binding. It includes the requirement to report in writing taken from the Zablocki bill.

Pro

—Zablocki is critical to the outcome in the House. He is accorded deference on the issue by Morgan. He has said that he wants a bill of some kind. Whatever bill he brings back to the House will pass, and he could possibly muster enough to override a veto. He believes that the two bills are so far apart that there is no hope that his will prevail. If we show willingness to compromise he will be more likely to hold firm against the absolutely unacceptable elements of Javits.
—The Senate Conferees will be unlikely to accept any compromise that is only sense of Congress, thus hanging up the conference and precluding any bill—the best possible outcome.
—If it is finally passed, the reporting requirement presents no real problem, and the remainder is sense of Congress and not binding.

Con

—Although not binding the President would be giving approval to a constitutional position that Justice and State agree is not valid and seeks on its face to curtail the powers of the Presidency.
—Final passage of such a bill would have the same adverse diplomatic impact abroad as the Javits Bill.
—Although not legally binding, passage would erect formidable political constraints to observe the letter of the restrictive measures.
—Signalling compromise now weakens the Executive position of strong opposition and makes an ultimate veto a less credible threat.

Option 2.

Inform Zablocki that no compromise is acceptable if it includes a specification of the President's War Powers or a time limitation on their exercise.

Pro

—Will demonstrate that the Administration is determined and should stiffen the House Conferees.
—Makes veto threat credible and agreement in conference most unlikely.

—Does not compromise the President's constitutional prerogatives or the reliability of U.S. commitments to allies.

Con

—If Zablocki is told that there will be no compromise on those points, he may feel he is being used to prevent any bill from emerging and he *wants* a bill. He may therefore agree to the Javits formula as a last resort and work in the House for a 2/3 majority to override.

Recommendation:

That you approve Option 2. Clark MacGregor and John Dean concur. Colson[9] concurs also.[10]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 316, Subject Files, Congressional, Vol. 6. No classification marking. Sent for action. Haig initialed on Kissinger's behalf. The memorandum also bears a stamped note indicating that the President saw it and a handwritten note indicating that Kissinger saw it. John F. Lehman, Jr. of the NSC Staff sent a draft to Haig on June 20 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

[2] Attached but not printed. On December 6, 1971, Senators Jacob K. Javits (R–New York) and John C. Stennis (D–Mississippi), among others, introduced a bill (S.2956) establishing a 30-day limit on the President's authority to use armed forces before obtaining specific Congressional authorization. The Senate passed the measure on April 13, 1972, marking the first time that either House of Congress had undertaken to codify the war powers left vague by the Constitution. The House passed an amended version by a 344–13 vote on August 14. The proposed legislation later died in conference. (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, vol. XXVIII (1972), pp. 842–852)

[3] Attached but not printed. Representative Clement J. Zablocki (D–Wisconsin) sponsored a joint resolution, H.J.Res.1, which the House passed in 1970 by a 288 to 39 margin and by a unanimous voice vote the next year. However, on April 20, 1972, seven days after the Senate had approved S.2956, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent H.J.Res.1 to the Senate floor with a recommendation that it not be passed. (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, vol. XXVIII (1972), pp. 851–852)

[4] Senator J. William Fulbright (D–Arkansas), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

[5] Senator Stuart Symington (D–Missouri).

[6] Representative Thomas E. Morgan (D–Pennsylvania), Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

[7] Attached but not printed is Tab C, a 2-page memorandum from Rogers to the President,

April 28.

[8] The proposed compromise Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of the Congress and the President at Tab D is attached but not printed.

[9] Clark MacGregor, Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations; John W. Dean III, Counsel to the President; and Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel to the President.

[10] The President initialed his approval of Option 2 on June 28. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers on July 29, informing him that Nixon had "decided that Congressman Clement Zablocki should be informed that any compromise on this legislation that includes a specification of the President's war powers or a time limitation on their exercise would be unacceptable." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 316, Subject Files, Congressional, Vol. 6)

214. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, June 26, 1972.

SUBJECT
DOD FY 73 Budget Amendment

On June 9, Secretary Laird submitted a budget request for about $3.6 billion in added FY 73 funds.[2] It included $4.2 billion to cover the additional costs resulting from increased Allied and U.S. operations in SEA. These added requirements were offset by a net reduction of about $550 million to reflect the SALT agreements.[3] The SALT changes include cutting back Safeguard to two sites and adding some new strategic program initiatives.

The added SEA requirements assumed the intensified activity levels and operations would continue at current rates through December. At our request DOD developed a revised budget requirement which assumes a September 30 cutoff date. This reduced the SEA totals to about $2.8 billion, and the net requirement to $2.25 billion. The two requests are summarized in the enclosed table.[4]

The issues that remain to be decided are discussed below.

SEA Timing Assumptions

The first issue is how long we should assume the intense combat activity as well as our augmented forces will continue at current levels. Assuming the effort will continue through the end of December has clear advantages. It provides a hedge to let us maintain the current effort another six months without going back to the Congress for more funds. It also signals the firmness of our intentions to NVN and its allies. However, the drawbacks are significant.

—It may appear to the Congress and public that we have doubts about the success of our efforts.
—The cost of the amendment is increased by about $1.3 billion.
—These funds may not be needed since the intensity of the conflict is most unlikely to continue at recent levels more than a few months, given weather patterns and limitations on NVN staying power.

Assuming a September 30 cutoff date would not force us to stop our intensified operations at that date. Another supplemental request could be submitted to the Congress

or we could operate on the assumption added funds would be requested either after the election or early next year. Moreover, there is some hedge built into the request, especially for ground combat operations since activity levels are unlikely to continue at the high April rates assumed in developing the budget request.

Secretary Laird still supports the December cutoff, but I understand he will not strongly object to a September 30 cutoff date. We believe this shorter timeframe makes sense. Chuck Colson and Clark Mac-Gregor concur.

Your decision:

September 30[5]

December 31

Offsetting Reductions to the DOD Program

The remaining issue is whether DOD should be directed to submit offsetting reductions in the baseline budget now before Congress to cover the added SEA costs. You have directed other agencies to submit offsets for any increased programs, even those forced on them by the Congress, in order to live within your spending ceiling. Director Weinberger believes DOD should agree to offsets because he believes some reductions can be made without serious risk by recognizing what Congress is almost certain to do, and by deferring some low priority programs. He also believes that if we do not adhere to your policy of offsets, we would set a bad precedent for other agencies and could not maintain our posture that neither spending increases nor additional taxes will be tolerated. He also feels that asking a big increase in spending for the escalated Vietnam activity may upset a currently reasonably positive state of public opinion. He is worried that submission of a large budget amendment may undercut a long-range veto strategy for big spending bills.

Dr. Kissinger feels it would be most inappropriate to apply this policy to DOD in this case. The added SEA effort was largely forced on the Department by the White House and it would be unjust to expect Defense to absorb the costs. Also it will lead DOD to make renewed efforts to reduce the scope of operations in SEA and cut back on our support to the RVNAF.

An illustrative list of offsets is shown on the enclosed table.[6] The list contains two types of items.

—Programs that the Congress has already indicated it will cut or, based on known Congressional views, are likely to be cut. The danger in accepting likely Congressional actions and reducing the Defense budget requests accordingly is that the Committees will then look for other areas to cut and these reductions could have a serious impact

on our military posture.

—Reductions in low priority programs which we do not expect Congress to cut. The examples on the illustrative list are in weapons procurement programs, not cuts in current forces or their readiness; DOD would of course be free to make substitutes. These reductions would have some future impact on our forces and their ability to support your foreign policy.

Secretary Laird is strongly opposed to DOD being forced to make offsetting reductions. Dr. Kissinger fully supports the Secretary on this matter. Director Weinberger recommends that you affirm your policy on offsets and direct DOD, the NSC and OMB to arrive at an agreed upon list of offsets in the total amount you direct.

Your decision:

No offsets[7] (MacGregor recommends)

Direct offsetting cuts (Colson recommends)

Other

Recommendations

Two draft NSDMs are enclosed for your approval. Both direct DOD to assume a September 30 cut-off date for intensified SEA operations. They also cover some minor aspects of the request that we have agreed on and will not be objected to strongly by DOD.

The first NSDM (Tab A)[8] does *not* direct offsetting reductions to cover the added SEA costs. Dr. Kissinger recommends this decision.

The second NSDM (Tab B)[9] *directs* DOD to submit offsetting reductions. Director Weinberger recommends this decision.

Your decision:

No offsets[10] (Dr. Kissinger's recommendation) (MacGregor concurs)

Require offsets (Director Weinberger's recommendation) (Colson concurs)

Henry A. Kissinger
Caspar W. Weinberger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 237, Agency Files, DPRC & Defense Budget, Chronological File. Secret. Sent for urgent action. The

memorandum bears a note indicating that the President saw it. Nixon added a handwritten note on the first page that reads: "Be sure K[issinger] concurs." Odeen of the NSC Staff sent a draft to Kissinger on June 24 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

[2] Not found.

[3] See Document 211.

[4] The table, entitled "DOD FY 73 Budget Amendment," is enclosed but not printed. It itemized the savings resulting from the SALT agreement, funding for Laird's proposed strategic program initiatives, and the two proposed additions to cover costs incurred in Southeast Asia. The new strategic programs envisioned by the Secretary of Defense included bomber rebasing; additional intelligence resources to enhance SALT verification capabilities; improved command and control; and the development of hardened missile sites, a new SLCM, and RVs with greater yield and better accuracy.

[5] Nixon initialed the September 30 option. He added the following handwritten notation: "(if K[issinger] concurs)".

[6] The table, entitled "Offsets to Achieve a Zero Budget Amendment," is enclosed but not printed.

[7] The President initialed this option.

[8] Document 215.

[9] Not printed.

[10] Nixon initialed this option. He added the following handwritten notation: "*But* Laird while not *directed* to submit offsets is to submit a list of those cuts which he would consider *least* damaging to our security. We must have this ready on a confidential basis—since Congressional action on our budget may *require* this." Accordingly, Kissinger sent Laird a memorandum on June 28 directing him to "prepare a list of items which if cut from the DOD budget, you would consider least damaging to our security posture. In your consideration of these items, every effort should be made to assure that our current forces and their readiness are maintained." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0094, 337, White House) On July 12, Laird sent a memorandum to Kissinger declining to list the requested items as any additional cuts would have a harmful "impact on essential forces and readiness." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 237, Agency Files, DPRC & Defense Budget, Jan–Jul, 1972)

215. National Security Decision Memorandum 172[1]

Washington, June 27, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT

FY 73 DOD Budget Amendment

The President has directed that an Amendment to the FY 73 Defense Budget should be submitted to include:

—An additional $2.77 billion to cover the cost of U.S. and Allied operations in Southeast Asia assuming the intensified activity continues through September 30, 1972. In addition, $25 million will be provided to cover additional cost of repairing highways and bridges destroyed during the offensive.
—The reductions in Safeguard funding proposed by the Secretary of Defense in light of the SAL agreements.
—An additional $155 million for the additions to strategic programs recommended by the Secretary of Defense. The President indicates he is only approving research and development on the new strategic programs and is not approving either full systems development or procurement. He also desires to review these programs in detail as part of his review of the FY 74 budget later this year.
—An additional $13 million to improve verification of the SAL agreements. These funds should be used to enhance DOD's verification capability under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Funds not required for this purpose shall be used to improve national means of verification.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 237, Agency Files, DPRC & Defense Budget, Chronological File. Secret.

216. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, June 27, 1972, 3:14–4:04 p.m.

SUBJECT
Strategic Policy

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
U. Alexis Johnson
Leon Sloss
Seymour Weiss

DOD
Kenneth Rush
Dr. Gardiner Tucker
Archie Wood

JCS
Vice Adm. John P. Weinel[2]
Major Gen. John H. Elder, Jr.

CIA
Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters
Bruce Clarke

OMB
Caspar Weinberger
Kenneth Dam

CEA
Ezra Solomon

ACDA
Vice Adm. John Lee
Dr. David Leestma

AEC
James Schlesinger

NCS
Philip Odeen
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Col. Jack Merritt
David Aaron
Jim Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The Working Group will prepare before the end of summer a paper which describes conceptually and practically what our strategic policy should be. It should include a discussion of targeting policy, force levels, possible differences from present force levels and technical developments that may be necessary. It should also address the question of whether our strategic forces can play a role in the defense of our allies.
—The JCS will submit a paper explaining and justifying its support of strategic objective No. 6, which states that the United States should maintain the capability to emerge from nuclear warfare in a position of relative advantage.
—The Working Group will prepare a study of our counterforce capability against the PRC.

Mr. Kissinger: This meeting is dealing with a paper[3] that has been somewhat overtaken by events, but I thought we should have a preliminary meeting to see what the various views on this subject are before the paper is updated. Some aspects of the paper have been overtaken by the SALT agreements and require no further discussion, however, we have two key issues to address: 1) to see if we can refine the strategic objectives defined by NSDM 16[4] and, 2) to see if we can narrow the range of choices of alternative strategic objectives in light of the SALT agreements. Now much of this involves targeting information and targeting policy, which I don't want to discuss here in detail, but rather in general policy terms.

There were four criteria laid down by NSDM 16. They are listed in the executive summary[5] and you may want to refer to them if you have it with you. The four criteria are:

(1) Maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
(2) Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis.
(3) Maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer.
(4) Deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.

Number four is no longer applicable in light of the SALT agreements. Now has everybody agreed to the six principles of U.S. policy regarding strategic forces? Does everyone have them?

Mr. Rush: Where are they listed?

Mr. Odeen: Everyone has them. There is a list of strategic objectives on page three of the executive summary.[6]

Mr. Kissinger: Alex (Johnson), have you had a chance to review them?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, I have. The first five present no problem for us, but we disagree with the sixth, the one that reads "Maintain the obvious capability to ensure that the United States would emerge in a position of relative advantage from any level of strategic nuclear warfare." We have had a fundamental disagreement with Defense on that issue for a long time.

Mr. Kissinger: What I would like someone to tell me is what "relative advantage" means. Does anyone know what it means? Can anyone give me a definition of that term?

Mr. Johnson: I'd like to hear that definition, too.

Mr. Kissinger: The JCS supports this objective, can you (Adm. Weinel) give us a definition?

Adm. Weinel: Well, I don't know that there is a specific definition of that term. The view of the JCS is that after a nuclear exchange some life will continue and that it is important who would have a relative advantage at that time, or how fast one side could recoup vis-à-vis the other.

Mr. Johnson: The value of that advantage would be for deterrence, not for actual planning for a post-exchange resurgence.

Mr. Schlesinger: Of course, the whole idea is deterrence. If we have the ability to recover faster, it helps deter our opponent.

Mr. Kissinger: If I understand the President's instincts, he would not object to this kind of policy objective, providing you can give it some operational meaning. For example, how much will it cost? What does it mean for our next defense budget?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, the cost is the real key to this objective.

Mr. Schlesinger: It means $50 to $100 million a year for a civil defense program. We would have to revive the whole issue of civil defense, which has been dormant for years.

Adm. Weinel: That's right.

Mr. Schlesinger: In any case, we should now reconsider the whole civil defense question in light of the SALT agreements. If the Soviets' capabilities both offensively and defensively are frozen by SALT, we have an opportunity to make important progress in the civil defense area.

Mr. Johnson: They're not that frozen! We're talking here about strategic forces, not civil defense. How does civil defense translate into strategic forces?

Adm. Weinel: It translates into a second strike capability.

Mr. Kissinger: You can't translate civil defense into a second strike capability! Item No. 6 says you must emerge from a nuclear assault in relative advantage to the other side. How do you translate that into anything? Since the JCS has wanted this point, let's have the JCS explain it to us, rather than have Jim (Schlesinger) invent answers for them.

Mr. Rush: Your suggestion is a good one. Let's have the JCS do a paper explaining it. The implication of item No. 6 is that we would be going for superiority rather than sufficiency. Are we prepared to do that?

Mr. Kissinger: Sufficiency means superiority.

Mr. Johnson: Let's not overlook item No. 2, which reads: "Prevent coercion of the United States and its allies with nuclear threats." The reference to our allies is very important. Sy (Weiss) do you want to comment on this?

Mr. Weiss: This is important. The credibility we can convey to our allies concerning our defense commitment and the possible use of nuclear weapons in that connection diminishes as Soviet strength, particularly in ballistic missiles, continues to grow. The credibility of our willingness to rush to their defense is being eroded by the growth of the Soviet missile force.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you think we should do about it?

Mr. Weiss: Well, for the sake of conversation, we might develop in our strategic forces elements that are not targeted toward urban/industrial targets. Our commitments to our allies might seem more credible if we had an enhanced counterforce capability. I'm not arguing for it; I'm merely stating a view that is gaining currency in Europe.

Adm. Lee: It's important to remember that the urban/industrial city-busting concept is not just an anti-population strategy. It includes all kinds of targets; military installations, air bases, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to make clear that the SALT talks did not create this situation. It was caused by the continuing development by the Soviets of their strategic forces. Now we must ask ourselves if our strategic forces can play a role in defense of our allies under objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4. If we decide that they can, we will have one range of answers, while if not, we will have another. But this is a key question that we must consider.

Mr. Tucker: If we talk about the defense of our allies with nuclear weapons, we must expand the scope of the study.

Mr. Kissinger: I've been trying to find out for years precisely what tactical nuclear weapons are and why we need 7,000 of them in Europe. 200 might be enough.

Mr. Tucker: Sure, it might. But it would be a signal to the Soviets if we were to reduce

them.

Mr. Kissinger: I accept that premise.

Mr. Weiss: Even if we are persuaded that it is in the U.S. national interest to go to war in Europe with nuclear weapons, could we persuade the allies that it would be in their interest? They may not feel that it is.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm worried that we are sliding along with our strategic forces without a clear picture of where we are going or even where we want to go. We are building up on one side and at the same time may be moving policy-wise in another direction. We may suddenly find that we don't have the political support we need to do what we have been planning for. I can only say that we are lucky that we have never been really close to the threshold of nuclear confrontation. The same question was asked in the Kennedy Administration and it was resolved in favor of CONUS based forces.

Mr. Weiss: We have to look at the configuration of strategic forces with these questions in mind.

Adm. Weinel: I don't see any big problem of political support. The President is the Commander in Chief and has the authority. If he wants to shoot one at a cathouse in Murmansk he can go ahead and do it.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, but then what scenario do you follow? How do you limit the exchange? How do you control it? I have never seen a study of how this would be done. I don't think anyone knows how it would be done. Do we have the best forces to do this sort of thing? Is that what we should have? Just what are we trying to do with our strategic forces?

Adm. Lee: Much more planning needs to be done in this area. Most nuclear planning has concentrated on the tactical forces.

Mr. Schlesinger: The Soviets are not restrained by an ACDA, as we are.

Mr. Kissinger: Gen. Grechko[7] told me his ACDA is under his direct control.

Mr. Schlesinger: You may want to include in your discussions with the Soviets at SALT II the point that piling up payload at a limited number of points may permit us to knock out 65% of their payload with one strike.

Mr. Kissinger: Then where would we be?

Mr. Schlesinger: I'm not saying we should do it. This is not something to be implemented, but rather an illustration to present a position of relative strength to the Soviets in the negotiations.

Mr. Weiss: If we are considering an increasing scale of nuclear activity, Jim's (Schlesinger) option, i.e., his scenario of taking out a large chunk of their missile force, would be better than hitting cities. Some people will argue that a force targeted against cities is the best deterrent, but others will claim that it is so inconceivable to do so that it is really no deterrence at all.

Adm. Lee: You don't have to hit cities. Instead of hard targets, you can hit other military and industrial targets.

Mr. Kissinger: What is your point?

Adm. Lee: It is a matter of record that we are not going against hard targets, so I am saying that population centers are not the only alternative.

Mr. Schlesinger: We ought to have a counterforce force if the Soviets continue developing the SS–9.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, I can see that we won't settle this today, but we should review these various positions. We need some idea of the level of forces each position requires and a general strategic posture for it. Until recently, we had such superiority that we had a series of options and were not forced to seriously consider these various postures. Now we have to do it.

Mr. Johnson: I agree. Until you see how these concepts translate into forces, they really don't mean much.

Mr. Kissinger: What we are talking about is targeting and the doctrinal issue of what we are going to use these forces for. The Soviets must now realize that there is a changed strategic situation, but it took them a long time to reach that realization. We have had a free ride for years now on their memory of the previous strategic situation.

Mr. Johnson: We can't leave the PRC out of our consideration.

Mr. Kissinger: That's the next question on the agenda. How long do we want to maintain a counterforce capability against the PRC? We wrote off our superiority over the Soviets much too early. In 1961–62 we were talking of parity with the Soviets when we still had superiority and they in effect acknowledged our superiority for years thereafter. We don't want to make the same mistake with the Chinese. What we have to do regarding the PRC is determine how long we can go without a counterforce targeted against it. Should we target our missiles to overfly the Soviet Union against the PRC, or to overfly the PRC against the Soviets? We have to consider these issues.

Mr. Johnson: That would mean no more summits.

Mr. Schlesinger: We have [*less than 1 line not declassified*] warheads, but we are going to

need larger warheads for the PRC. We could start with the Trident missile and back-fit to Poseidon.

Mr. Weinberger: A year ago I heard that a lot of our missiles were targeted against empty holes. Do we know how many of them really are?

Mr. Kissinger: I don't believe we have any more precise information on that than we did a year ago. The question hasn't been resolved, so far as I know. We probably would be hitting some empty holes.

Mr. Clarke: The previous comments suggested that we have a counterforce capability against the PRC. Do we have a counterforce capability against them right now?

Mr. Kissinger: That's a good question. Would you please address it in a paper for us?

Mr. Clarke: Yes, I will. I think the question here is whether we can get all of the Chinese TU–16s and missiles. If not, it is then a question whether we really have a counterforce capability against them.

Mr. Kissinger: As I said before, we were wrong in figuring our counterforce capability against the Soviets. If one side has only ten missiles and the other has overwhelming force, the side with ten missiles has no counter-city deterrent for all practical purposes. It would be nuts for such a country to strike against a power with overwhelming force, or with an effective ABM defense, for that matter.

Adm. Lee: It hasn't inhibited the French. With a Force de Frappe of ten subs Pompidou takes a tough line.

Mr. Kissinger: Maybe so, but I don't think anyone takes his Force de Frappe seriously. What we must do in preparing our papers is avoid the liturgical line such as I was writing when I was doing work on this issue. (to Mr. Odeen) Do we have enough now to do a working group paper?

Mr. Odeen: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Now, I don't want any waffling. Let's get together your pristine versions in detail; targeting policy, force levels, differences from present force levels, what technical developments are necessary—let's try to get it done this summer, before we get into another budget. I would like to have it finished at least by the end of the year.

Mr. Weinberger: I understand that Scoop Jackson is fighting the ABM and the National Capital Defense tooth and nail.

Mr. Kissinger: Secretary Laird says that's all under control. The Secretary of Defense wouldn't mislead us.

Mr. Tucker: I believe it is not as bad as it may appear.

Mr. Kissinger: You should put down on paper conceptually and practically what you think should be done, avoiding any watered-down agreements.

Mr. Johnson: Are you (Mr. Schlesinger) going ahead with the new warheads on Poseidon?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes, we are.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–73 [2 of 3]. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. On June 24, Odeen sent a memorandum to Kissinger informing him that the "basic purpose of the DPRC meeting on Strategic Policy is to force the bureaucracy to face the consequences of the SALT Agreements for the kind of strategic objectives and alternative force posture we can realistically plan for." (Ibid., Box H–105, DPRC Meeting, Strategic Objectives Posture, 6/27/72)

[2] Member of the Strategic Planning Staff, JCS.

[3] See Document 204.

[4] Document 39.

[5] See footnote 1, Document 204.

[6] Page 3 of the Executive Summary of "U.S. Strategic Objectives and Force Posture," January 3, 1972, listed the following six U.S. strategic objectives: deter strategic nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies; prevent coercion of the United States and its allies with nuclear threats; contribute to the deterrence of tactical nuclear and conventional attack on vital U.S. security interests; maintain strategic stability with the Soviet Union, both in terms of discouraging a first strike during a crisis and in minimizing the incentives for an arms race, thereby reducing the likelihood of nuclear war; if deterrence fails, limit damage to the United States and its allies to the extent possible and terminate nuclear warfare as quickly as possible on terms favorable to the United States; and maintain the obvious capability to ensure that the United States would emerge in a position of relative advantage from any level of strategic nuclear warfare. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–105, DRPC Meeting, Strategic Objectives Posture, 6/27/72)

[7] General Andrei Antonovich Grechko, Soviet Minister of Defense.

217. National Security Decision Memorandum 174[1]

Washington, July 7, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

FY 73–75 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The President has approved the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for end FY75, and the proposed adjusted stockpiles for end FY73 and end FY74, submitted by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on May 23, 1972.[2]

Accordingly, the President approves a total adjusted stockpile of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for the end of FY73 and a total adjusted stockpile of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for the end of FY74. The President also approves a total stockpile of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for the end of FY75. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and a planned retirement of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during FY75, resulting in a net increase of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during FY75 from the adjusted FY74 stockpile.

The nuclear weapons stockpile levels and composition approved by the President represent authorized ceilings, not to be exceeded except as provided below or otherwise approved by the President. The ceilings are subject to change due to unforeseen circumstances, budgetary actions or policy decisions which could affect our future nuclear weapons posture.

The President directs the production and retirement of those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapons parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved stockpiles, as well as the production of the additional parts of nuclear weapons necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the agreement for cooperation.[3]

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long lead-time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY76 production of warheads required to support approved and planned Department of Defense forces with nuclear warhead systems approved by the President.

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to produce and transfer to the Department of Defense parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special nuclear material, as may be agreed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

These parts may be used in nuclear weapons, training programs, research and development, or production.

The President authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY73–75 as may be necessary to reflect changes in Atomic Energy Commission material availabilities, production/retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements, or as a result of related changes in military requirements, so long as the quantity of warheads involved in any single action does not exceed [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The President further authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission, in coordination with the Department of Defense, to make changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY73–75 as may be necessary to reflect changes (not to exceed ± 10 percent) in each year in strategic offensive, strategic defensive, tactical and fleet anti-sub marine/anti-air warfare warhead totals as may be required by the Department of Defense because of changes in military requirements or adjustments in delivery assets. Any changes indicative of a major or significant shift in defense policy, military capability or Atomic Energy Commission production capabilities will be submitted for the President's approval.[4]

The President authorizes the Department of Defense to designate as retired and, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, to retain custody of nuclear warheads for a period of up to one year from the date the designation is made if necessary to reduce Atomic Energy Commission requirements for weapons storage during periods of high production workload at Atomic Energy Commission assembly facilities.

The FY74–76 stockpile approval request should be submitted with the Department of Defense nuclear weapons deployments request in February 1973. In addition to the information and displays of the type contained in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 of the stockpile approval request, the rationale should be presented for any new weapon systems to be introduced in the stockpile during the period of the request. Total program costs and production schedules should be included.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 145–264. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

[2] On July 3, Kissinger forwarded to Nixon, under a covering memorandum, a May 23 memorandum from Schlesinger and Rush outlining their plan for the FY 1973–1975 nuclear weapons stockpile. Kissinger asked Nixon to approve the recommendations contained in Schlesinger and Rush's memorandum. Nixon initialed his approval of Kissinger's memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–235, NSDM 174)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 141.

[4] On July 18, NSDM 178, entitled "FY 1973 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization," specified the overseas deployment of the nuclear stockpile. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 145–264)

218. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

Washington, undated.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

The purpose of this study (NSSM–69)[2] is to evaluate the broad range of policy questions and issues we face over the next 5–6 years in Asia. The key areas discussed are:

—U.S. interests, objectives and commitments in Asia.
—The nuclear and conventional threats posed by China through 1978 as well as the form and likelihood of a conventional attack on our allies. The threats posed by North Vietnam and North Korea are also considered.
—The possible uses for U.S. strategic nuclear and tactical nuclear weapons as well as the possibilities of planning for selective and limited use of nuclear weapons as a substitute for U.S. manpower in a mainland war.
—U.S. and allied capabilities against a conventional attack by the Chinese (and their allies) as well as illustrative U.S. military forces and costs of forces required to implement alternative conventional strategies.
—Present allied military capabilities and potential for future improvements, is considered along with the prospects for military cooperation between allies. The role of Japan is given special attention.

There has long been a drastic need for this attempt to resolve in a coherent way differences between Presidential and DOD guidance that now exists with regard to our long term military planning for Asia.

U.S. Asian Interests

By all criteria, the paper concludes that our interests in Asia are most affected by Japan and China:

Aside from three major powers, the study also considers the importance of the lesser powers in terms of two geographical groupings:

—The mainland countries of Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Malaysia).
—The outer ring including South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

To the extent our interests in these two groups are differentiable, the outer line of countries and especially South Korea are most closely linked to our other Asian interests because:

—They embody the majority of the population, economic wealth and military potential, and U.S. trade and investment.
—Their strategic position makes them supportive of our other Asian interests and limited to our general access to the region.

While the study notes that the U.S. has "significant interests" in the Asian mainland countries, its obvious implication is that the future of Asia will be determined largely by the great powers, and that the lesser powers, particularly in Southeast Asia, are significantly less important. While overemphasized, this judgment does lend perspective to the study.

Chinese Nuclear Capabilities

Our knowledge of Chinese nuclear capabilities and the objectives of their nuclear development program is incomplete. The study, therefore, postulated three strategic postures based on alternative Chinese strategic objectives the Chinese might pursue.

—A regional emphasis of force based on a Chinese objective aimed towards deterring Soviet nuclear capabilities and bringing significant forces to bear on other Asian nations.
—An *intercontinental emphasis* force aimed towards development of a capability to strike CONUS and deep into the Soviet Union, *and*
—*An all out strategic effort* to build a large Chinese nuclear force even at the expense of general purpose force modernization and requirements of economic growth.

The study finds that the Chinese are probably planning to build a capability balanced between regional and intercontinental emphasis but does not detract from conventional force modernization or economic demands.

The most important characteristics of this effort are projected to be:

—*A medium bomber force of about 30 TU–16s* capable of carrying bombs with yields of some 25 KT and 3 MT respectively. The TU–16 has an unrefueled combat radius sufficient to reach most U.S. Asian bases and industrial complexes on the periphery of China (inflight refueling, radius about 2300 nm). A force of about 200–300 bombers is expected by 1978.
—*The beginnings of a missile force.* A few MRBMs may already be operationally deployed and by 1972 about 10–20 (range about 600 nm). [*As you know, there is good reason to doubt the validity of this and subsequent intelligence community estimates. For detail see the enclosed memo on our strategic intelligence.*][3]
—Deployment of an IRBM with a 3 MT warhead and a range of about 1500 nm which might already be deployed.
—A missile tested to 2000 nm which probably would go farther—perhaps 3000 to 4000 nm—when fully developed. *This missile could be operational by about 1974 or 1975. By*

1978, about 20–40 ICBMs could be deployed.
—A ballistic missile submarine with diesel power as early as 1975. It is more likely a nuclear powered missile submarine with the earliest IOC 1976.
—A limited strategic defense composed of jet interceptors supported by improving air surveillance. There is no evidence of a ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) program.
—A possibility that some tactical nuclear weapons—perhaps a fission weapon suitable for IL–28[4] delivery—already exists or will be developed.

Under the alternative assumption that the Chinese would emphasize their strategic programs and neglect their conventional forces and domestic economic objectives, the study concludes that they could conceivably have as many as 1030 regional and intercontinental delivery vehicles by 1980 compared with a maximum estimate of 670 under the most likely postulation. The maximum emphasis on strategic weapons required to reach the 1030 is judged highly unlikely, but under any of the projections China will have a significant nuclear capability by the later part of the decade.

The table below compares the three projections of Chinese nuclear delivery capabilities.

	Delivery Vehicles in: 1974	Delivery Vehicles in: 1978			
		Most Likely	ICBM Emphasis	All Out Effort	
Regional	160–250	330–480	240–350	600	
Intercontinental	0–5	20–90	90–150	350–410	
Grand Total Delivery Vehicles	160–255	350–550	330–500	950–1030	

Elements of a Nuclear Deterrent Against China

Planning a deterrent against China requires a different set of criteria than those generally used versus the Soviet Union. This is true because Chinese population is dispersed and the top 1000 cities contain only 11% of her total population (but 80% of her industry and 70% of her urban population). *That makes it impossible to strive for the same destruction capability we have against the Soviet Union.* (25% of Soviet population and 35–40% industrial destruction) The table below illustrates the relative vulnerability of Chinese industry and the effects of her dispersed population.

[*Table heading not declassified*]

	U.S.	USSR	China
% Population	14%	12%	5%
% Industry	45%	28%	40%

% Urban Population	23%	28%	51%

1. *Current Capabilities*

The execution of the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] versus China could destroy:

—About [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of Chinese industry and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of her urban population as well as 8% of her total population.
—Virtually all of her [*less than 1 line not declassified*] warfighting capabilities.

The attack could be executed without overflying the Soviet Union and would be delivered by a mix of missiles, and bombers. In addition, [*1½ lines not declassified*].

The deterrence value of this capability is enhanced by the fact that China faces our entire nuclear capability and cannot be certain of what portion would be delivered against itself.

2. *Our Soviet Deterrent and SALT considerations*

There is general agreement that our Chinese deterrent should:

—Maintain a capability to satisfy the sufficiency criteria against the Soviet Union after an attack on the PRC. Current DOD planning will double the warheads available by 1978 and give us ample capability to fulfill this requirement.
—Include some damage limiting capability. *There is wide disagreement regarding the emphasis we should place on this damage limiting capability.*
—Continue to plan on a capability that does not involve overflight of the Soviet Union. This means bomber, SLBMs and Pacific based tactical nuclear delivery systems only can be used.
—Incorporate the constraints which will probably be imposed by a SAL agreement with the Soviets. This means planning both our Chinese and Soviet deterrents with the currently planned number of war-heads without an area ABM defense.

Since our planned nuclear forces are more than sufficient to deter PRC nuclear attack, the central question concerns our planned counterforce capabilities. This question is also related to our tactical nuclear force planning. In particular:

—*The effectiveness of a disarming strike against Chinese delivery capabilities* and the extent we can, therefore, base our overall strategy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to reduce U.S. ground force requirements. Our capability to locate Chinese missiles is important in this regard.
—*The improvements, if any, we should plan to preserve our disarming capability in the mid-1970s* when the Chinese could deploy missiles in silos.

JCS analysis shows that our capabilities to destroy known Chinese nuclear delivery

systems will be high until the late 1970s, provided that they can be effectively targeted. The table below illustrates that we will be capable of destroying most of the known Chinese launchers throughout the decade:

Disarming Strike Against China

Requirements and Surviving Warheads[5]

(No Force Improvements)

	FY 72	FY 73	FY 78/79
Known Targets	—	—	—
Warheads Required	—	—	—
Surviving Warheads[6]			
Bombers[7]	—	—	—
IRBM	—	—	—
ICBM	—	—	—
SLBM	—	—	—
Megatons	—	—	—

The warheads necessary to implement this strategy will be available under the current plans throughout the 1970s but there will still be significant risk associated with planning a disarming strike including:

—*Possible failure to detect Chinese missile sites* and determine hardness and other characteristics with sufficient confidence.
—Once the Chinese deploy hardened missile silos (1975/6) we would need a time urgent hard target kill capability. Current plans for the ULMS missile (IOC 1975/6) includes accuracy sufficient for a hard target kill capability but large scale deployment might be interpreted to the Soviet second strike capabilities.
—If the Chinese develop an SLBM (1978 but possibly by 1975) the difficulty of preventing retaliation would be sharply increased. Mobile concealed ICBMs are also possible.

[*9 paragraphs (30 lines) not declassified*]

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Although there is general agreement regarding the deterrence value of our tactical nuclear deployments, a wide divergence of opinion exists regarding:

—*The extent we can rely upon these weapons to cope with a conventional attack*, and in particular to supplement a conventional defense and substitute for the commitment of large U. S. land forces in an Asian land war.

—Our capability to terminate a conflict once nuclear weapons have been introduced without unacceptable collateral damage and adverse political effects. This depends upon the Chinese reaction to our use of these weapons.

Our current tactical nuclear posture probably provides a warfighting tactical nuclear option in each theater that could involve only minimal reliance on conventional forces. The issue here is whether to plan a tactical nuclear posture designed to reduce the need for conventional forces.

Alternative Uses

To understand the effectiveness of theater nuclear weapons in Asia, the study considered a number of possible uses for these weapons designed to combine the necessary resolve and restraint to induce the enemy to halt aggression. These include:

—*Demonstration use* in which one or more weapons are detonated to demonstrate U.S. determination. This tactic would be combined with a threat of future attacks and its value results from increased deterrence and not from warfighting effectiveness. *It would not be relied upon to reduce U.S. manpower requirements for any Asian strategy.*
—*Defensive use* which includes the detonation of atomic demolitions to slow the rate of enemy advance and also perhaps the use of nuclear tipped air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles.
—*Battlefield use* which would result in some reduction in manpower needed to defend against a PRC attack.
—*Full-scale interdiction* of Chinese supply and communication lines and staging areas which would result in some reduction of U.S. manpower.

Mixed Conventional and Tactical Nuclear Posture

The actual relationship between manpower required for defense using tactical nuclear weapons as opposed to requirements for a purely conventional defense is difficult to determine analytically because:

—the effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons depends upon the dispersal of enemy troops as well as our target acquisition and communication capabilities in a nuclear environment.
—the effect of enemy retaliation with nuclear weapons is extremely difficult to predict.

However, estimates were made for the study assuming [*less than 1 line not declassified*] weapons would be required to destroy each attacking division and the Chinese do not retaliate with nuclear weapons themselves. Results are:

Illustrative Asian Manpower Requirements With and Without Use of Tactical Nuclear

Weapons[8]

(High PRC Threat)

	— — —[9]
Theater Defended	— — —
Korea Divisions	— — —
Southeast Asia Divisions	— — —

This analysis is deficient because it considers only direct destruction of enemy divisions and therefore requires high numbers of nuclear weapons. It does not for example, consider effects of nuclear interdiction on enemy supply lines and depots or other possible uses.

Since PRC nuclear forces will be small compared to both the U.S. and USSR over the next five years, alternative uses for a small number of tactical weapons should be further pursued. *No analytical basis has been developed, however, and good evaluations of these uses will not be available for some time.*

Systems Analysis has started a renewed analytical effort which should bear some results in six months or so. Meanwhile, the conclusion of the work done for the last DPRC meeting was that the analysis was sufficient to support a decision on the broad role we plan for tactical nuclear weapons in Asia. Uses such as (a) *primary means* of deterring and if necessary responding to large conventional attacks, (b) *back up* for U.S. and allied conventional forces, (b) *no role* in deterring or responding to conventional attack except through the threat of escalation to nuclear war.

On the other hand, none of the agencies recommended that our Asian planning be based on substantial reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons for the following reasons:

—OSD (ISA) believes that our experience and knowledge of use of these weapons is so limited that it is "not possible to make a fairly precise measure of the savings in ground combat manpower that can be made because of their use." This analytical deficiency does not mean we should completely reject this strategic option, however.
—State believes the "political implications of using nuclear weapons make it unwise to base a strategy on their use." This judgment is not further developed by State.
—JCS believe tactical nuclear weapons are not a substitute for manpower but provide "increased firepower for conventional forces." But if "increased firepower" does not increase combat effectiveness, there is little justification for the substantial investment we make in conventional forces to increase our firepower.

Our limited analytical capability to deal with nuclear weapons does not justify these extreme agency positions. I have previously forwarded a memo to you on this subject. A

copy is in your book.[10]

General Purpose Forces

Planning an overall general purpose force strategy involves analysis of:

(a) The countries and regions to be defended as well as the form and level of threat to be defended against.
(b) Allied capabilities and the degree we wish to plan upon allied capabilities.
(c) The role we might plan for tactical nuclear weapons.

Size and Likelihood of the Chinese General Purpose Force Threat

Because the preferred Chinese tactic for aggression is projected to continue to be the low risk, low cost strategy of sponsoring subversion or "peoples war," an overt Chinese conventional attack in Asia is considered unlikely.

Three alternative levels of threat have, however, been projected for *Korea* based on:

—A *minimum threat* (25 divisions) which includes North Korea attacking South Korea with only logistical support from China.
—A *moderate combined* NK/CPR threat (40 divisions) assuming that the present Soviet concentration along China's borders and the continuing internal demands on the PLA limits the number of troops and aircraft China would commit to a Korean conflict.
—*A maximum threat* (60 divisions) which assumes only a minimal Soviet threat and that Peking would be willing to commit as large a force as physical constraints on the Korean peninsula would allow.

Force Requirements for Korea

In 1950, a North Korean force of about 140,000 men attacked and drove into an enclave a ROK force of 65,000 men. About 50,000 U.S. troops supported the ROK troops in the enclave.

In 1952, a combined CPR/NK force of about 890,000 men were stalemated by a total U.S./ROK force of about 600,000 men.

In assessing current capabilities both the JCS and OSD (SA) concluded that the current 570,000 man ROK forces (without the assistance of the U.S. divisions in Korea) could successfully defend against the 405,000 man NK army and might stalemate even a moderate Chinese attack. U.S. logistical and naval support would of course be required.

These estimates are shown below:

Force Requirements for Korea (1976)

		Combined NK/PRC Attack	
	NK Attack	Moderate Threat	High Threat
U.S. Divisions			
OSD (SA)	0	0-1/3	5-1/3
JCS	0	4	8
U.S. Tactical Aircraft			
OSD (SA)	670	1100	1220
JCS	1160 (not estimated)		3060

Southeast Asia Situation

The situation in Southeast Asia in 1976 is much more difficult to predict and U.S. force requirements are a good deal less certain because:

—The level of insurgency we can expect is not known. The intelligence estimate is that insurgency levels should be within the capabilities of allied police forces and militia alone but the uncertainty associated with this estimate is high.
—The success of Vietnamization is still to be determined and varying outcomes could affect the military situation in Asia, perhaps radically.
—The threat is believed to be logistically constrained in Southeast Asia, but the road capacity to move supplies is uncertain.

Threat to Southeast Asia

Three alternative threat levels are estimated for Southeast Asia. In all cases, the total ground threat is limited by logistical constraints which produce the spread of figures noted below:

(a) If the Communists mounted an all-out, one dry season campaign throughout SEA, it would be limited by logistical constraints to about 20–26 PRC and 13–14 NVN division slices (630,000–760,000 troops).
(b) If the Communists did not count on a one season victory, but planned to fight year-round, they could support only an estimated 16–21 PRC and 11 NVN division slices (515,000–610,000 troops) as a portion of their logistics capability would have to be used to stockpile supplies for wet season combat.
(c) The threat posed by the North Vietnamese acting alone with only logistical support from the PRC is considered.

Force Requirements for Southeast Asia

Estimating force requirements for Southeast Asia is also made difficult by uncertainty regarding the type of war which we might expect. If Vietnamization succeeds and allied capabilities improve, we might plan for a war with a well-defined front and no insurgency.

If these optimistic assumptions do not materialize, U. S. force requirements will be sharply increased.

To allow for these uncertainties, we have made the following alternative assumptions:

—An optimistic assumption that Vietnamization is completely successful and Thailand builds an effective military force. Both the Thai (two U. S. division equivalents) and Vietnamese regular armies (six U. S. division equivalents) are free to meet the external attack.
—A pessimistic assumption that Vietnamization is less than successful and although the government survives, the South Vietnamese and Thai forces are completely absorbed in counter-insurgency.

These force requirements estimates are shown below:

Force Requirements for Southeast Asia (1976)

		Combined CPR/NVN Attack	
Land Forces (Divisions)	NVN Attack	Maximum Threat	Moderate Threat
OSD(SA)			
Optimistic	0	1–2	0-1
Pessimistic	Not estimated	8	6-1/3
JCS[11]	4	8-2/3	Not estimated
Tactical Aircraft			
OSD(SA)	550	1220	1100
JCS	1160	3060	Not estimated

Current Capabilities

Based on these force requirement estimates, the presently planned force structure of 13 Army and three Marine divisions could:

—Satisfy OSD(SA) requirements for a Chinese attack on Korea (4 divisions) and still withhold sufficient forces to honor our NATO DPQ commitment, but
—Based on JCS estimates of four to eight full divisions for Korea would require us to drawdown our NATO capabilities as many as four full divisions.

In Southeast Asia, the OSD(SA) optimistic requirements of only two U.S. divisions could, of course, also be satisfied, but:

—Meeting the JCS requirements of 8-2/3 divisions would require drawing upon those forces listed in our NATO DPQ listing by about five full divisions, while

—Meeting the OSD(SA) estimate for SEA would require a draw-down of 2-1/3 divisions.

In view of these large force requirements and the uncertainty surrounding improved allied capabilities in SEA, the key question is the form of hedge we will plan against failure of allied capabilities to improve as planned. Two options have been considered which would not significantly increase budgets.

—plan on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to substitute for U.S. manpower—this would reduce U.S. manpower requirements in support of the NSDM–27[12] strategy to 4–5 divisions—within the capabilities of our 16 Army and Marine divisions without significantly drawing down NATO.
—plan on no defense of our allies in SEA against a PRC attack. Since the situation in Korea is more stable, and force requirements are less, we could also support this strategy at little increase in cost.

Issues for Decision

Several issues are highlighted for Presidential decision in the context of our overall strategic planning for Asia.

Deterrence/Warfighting Use for Nuclear Weapons

While there is general agreement that our nuclear superiority vis-à-vis the Chinese is an adequate deterrent to Chinese nuclear attack on the U.S. or our allies, there is no consensus on whether we should rely on our nuclear superiority to deter Chinese conventional attack as well.

The issue which must be decided is, therefore, (a) whether we want to plan a conventional defense and rely on nuclear weapons to deter the Chinese use of nuclear weapons and or a back up to the conventional defense, or (b) plan on a lower level of conventional forces complemented by tactical nuclear weapons which would constitute the primary response to conventional attack, or (c) plan no conventional or tactical nuclear defense against a Chinese attack and rely on strategic nuclear weapons to deter a Chinese conventional attack on our allies.

Counterforce Capability Versus China

There is agreement that use of tactical nuclear weapons as a supplement for ground forces in defense against a Chinese conventional attack, would be reliable only if the Chinese did not retaliate with nuclear weapons. There is disagreement regarding the likelihood of Chinese retaliation.

The study found that we might use tactical nuclear weapons without launching a disarming strike but that we may wish to combine the *planned use* of tactical nuclear weapons to reduce U.S. manpower requirements with *planning* a disarming strike

capability.

Our planned nuclear *force capabilities* are sufficient to target all known Chinese nuclear launchers for the next 8–10 years. However, when the PRC deploys hardened missiles we will need to make missile accuracy improvements in order to have high confidence capability to destroy PRC missiles on the ground.

The issue concerns the steps we should take, if any, to improve our counter force capabilities vis-à-vis China principally by improving the accuracy and yield of our sea based missiles. Since these improvements will not be needed until the Chinese deploy hardened missile sites (1975/6) and the ULMS missile development program will incorporate sufficient accuracy, a deployment decision need not be made now. Deployment would affect U.S.-Soviet relations which are being addressed in the DPRC study on Strategic Objectives and Forces.[13]

Theaters to be Defended

Present NSDM–27 strategy calls for defense against a Chinese attack in either Northeast or Southeast Asia plus simultaneous aid against a non-Chinese attack in the other theater. If we do not plan to continue with this regional strategy, we should decide what Asian theaters we plan to defend (i.e., NEA, SEA, both or neither). This will have a significant impact on the forces maintained for Asia. *For example, against the higher of the two Chinese threats, 4–6 U.S. divisions are needed to support a strategy defending in Northeast Asia versus 8–9 divisions in Southeast Asia.*

The Level of Chinese Threat

The study concludes that the most likely form of Chinese aggression over the next five years will be continued covert support for insurgencies. Overt military moves outside the PRC's borders are not likely unless the Chinese feel their security immediately and directly threatened. Nevertheless two estimates of the PRC conventional threat were made based on:

—the willingness of the PRC to commit troops to an attack on Korea in face of Soviet troop concentrations on its northern border, and
—in SEA whether or not the PRC/NV would plan on a one season campaign or plan for a year round campaign and therefore stockpile their supplies for use during the rainy season. Under the later assumption, the PRC/NV would commit less troops to the attack.

Although differences in the threat have a major effect on force requirement estimates, this does not seem to be an issue that we should determine for our force planning five to six years into the future. Instead, we should continually re-evaluate our force capabilities relative to both threats as they change over time.

Planning on Allied Participation

The extent we base our force planning on the availability of allied forces and improvements in their military capabilities will significantly affect the U.S. forces and costs, and risk associated with supporting our Asian strategy.

Analysis shows that with continued security assistance, our allies in both Northeast and Southeast Asia will be increasingly capable of providing for their own defense against non-PRC attacks. However, especially in Southeast Asia considerable uncertainty surrounds this estimate. *If our military planning is based on a high level of allied participation and this participation fails to materialize, we run the risk of being unable to support our planned Asian strategy without significantly drawing down our capability to deploy forces to NATO.*

A second issue involves an assessment of the level of insurgency which will accompany a Chinese attack in Southeast Asia. There is a difference of about six U.S. divisions needed to counter a PRC attack if our planning is based on an assumption that Vietnamization does not meet its intended goals and on an assumed high level of Thai insurgency activity rather than upon successful Vietnamization and low level insurgency assumptions.[14]

The threat estimate conducted for this study concluded that: (a) the insurgent activity in Thailand is not expected to increase significantly in the next few years, and (b) that if Vietnamization meets its intended goals, allied police and militia forces should be capable of controlling insurgent activities. There is considerable uncertainty associated with these assessments and risk is associated with planning our forces based on these favorable assumptions. On the other hand, about 15–17 Army divisions would be required to support the NSDM–27 strategy unless we were to plan to seriously draw down our capability to deploy troops to NATO.

Force to be Set Aside for NATO

Previous planning decisions have given NATO a priority if a simultaneous conflict should arise in both NATO and Asia. To honor this priority, we would plan on withholding a certain quantity of forces from Asia to have them available if a conflict should start in NATO after we have committed our forces to Asia. Two levels of forces that we might plan to withhold for NATO have been examined by the study. The highest withhold approximates our DPQ submission to NATO while the other level follows the Secretary of Defense's interim planning guidance for FY 1974–1978. *Both assume full mobilization of reserve component forces at the outset of an Asian conflict so that active NATO-earmarked forces could be deployed to Asia and replaced by mobilized reserves.*

A second aspect of this issue is that if we accept greater risk in planning our Asian strategy under optimistic assumptions which may not materialize, we increase the probability that those forces withheld for NATO will have to be drawn upon if an Asian

conflict occurs. Thus, the risk we accept in planning our Asian strategy directly affects the risk we accept in our capability to defend NATO after an Asian conflict has started.

Like the threat issue, this does not appear to be an issue we should determine in our force planning five to six years into the future. Each force structure should be analyzed under various assumptions regarding the NATO withhold.

The Level and Location of the U.S. Asian Presence Required to Make Our Security Commitment Credible to Our Allies

A separate but parallel issue from the force structure required to support any given strategy involves the size, type and locations for force deployments (including tactical nuclear deployments) necessary to provide political credibility and enhance the deterrence of any strategy for Asia. It is conceivable, for example, that we might want to retain ground force deployments in Asia for political reasons even if our strategy did not call for a U.S. conventional defense against a Chinese attack. Detailed deployment decisions will be made when the ongoing study of basing and deployment options is complete late this spring.[15]

Alternative Overall Asian Strategies

Four broad illustrative strategy options have been structured to reflect the range of views held within the government regarding the proper course for our Asian strategy over the coming five years.

These strategies include:

—Planning a high confidence conventional defense against a Chinese attack in NEA or SEA while aiding our ally in the other theater. Planning would not be based on substantial improvement in allied capabilities and on a PRC attack which included insurgency. Nuclear weapons would be relied upon to deter Chinese use of nuclear weapons.
—Planning a conventional defense against a Chinese attack in Korea only plus aid to our allies against a non-Chinese attack in SEA. In addition, a variant to this strategy option has been included at the request of State/ACDA which bases our planning on the lesser of the two Chinese threats.
—Planning a conventional defense with the same regional coverage as NSDM–27 and strategy one. Count on improved allied capabilities[16] or failing this, the use of tactical nuclear weapons to keep U.S. manpower requirements for defense of our allies against a PRC attack to a low level.
—Planning on nuclear weapons to deter, and, if deterrence fails, defend our allies against Chinese attack.

A summary of these strategies, costs and force requirements is attached.[17]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–106, DPRC Meeting, U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia (NSSM 69),7/21/72. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, but internal evidence indicates that it was drafted by the NSC Staff. According to a July 19 memorandum from Wayne Smith to Kissinger, the summary was included in Kissinger's briefing materials for the July 21 DPRC meeting. (Ibid.) This paper summarizes an executive summary of the response to NSSM 69; see footnote 7, Document 181. On October 29, 1971, the NSC Secretariat distributed the executive summary, prepared by an interagency group, including State, Defense, CIA, JCS, OMB, ACDA, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to Iwrin, Packard, Helms, Moorer, McCracken, Shultz, and Farley. The 64–page executive summary included the following sections: Introduction, Devising Alternative Asian Strategies, The Chinese Nuclear Threat and Alternative Strategies to Deter Chinese Use of Nuclear Weapons, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, General Purpose Forces, Alternative Asian General Purpose Force Strategies, and Selection of Overall Strategy for Asia. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 69) The executive summary, first requested at the July 29, 1971, meeting of the DPRC, served as the basis for the group's meetings held on December 8, 1971, and July 21, 1972, to discuss NSSM 69. See Documents 189, 202, and 219.

[2] Document 42.

[3] Brackets in the original. The NSC Staff's undated memorandum, entitled "Summary of Projected Capabilities to Detect and Locate PRC Nuclear Delivery Systems," summarized a January 1972 CIA memorandum, which was not found. The summary detailed the limited U.S. intelligence about the numbers, locations, and capabilities of Chinese bombers and missiles. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–106, DPRC Meeting, 7/21/72)

[4] The IL–28 was a jet bomber of Soviet origin.

[5] The tabular data were not declassified.

[6] In addition, there might be warheads surviving on delivery vehicles which could not be located for targeting. [Footnote in the original.]

[7] Does not include attrition due to air defenses. [Footnote in the original.]

[8] From a JCS analysis based on PACNUC 68–72 study. Assumes no Chinese nuclear retaliation. [Footnote in the original. The referenced study was not found. The column headings and tabular data were not declassified.]

[9] Forces are required to deliver the weapons required (assumes conventionally configures forces.) [Footnote in the original.]

[10] Reference is to an August 9, 1971 memorandum from Wayne Smith to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–106, DPRC Meeting, U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia (NSSM 69), 7/21/72)

[11] JCS states that under similar assumptions, JCS estimates would be similar to OSD(SA) but that force planning should not be based on optimistic assumptions. [Footnote in the

original.]

[12] Document 56.

[13] See Document 204.

[14] For purposes of this analysis, “Successful Vietnamization” is defined as improvement in South Vietnamese military capabilities such that insurgency is controlled by police/militia forces and the regular forces are available and competent to face the external attack. [Footnote in the original.]

[15] Not found.

[16] Specifically, South Vietnam would be counted on to supply six U.S. division force equivalents while Thailand supplied two U.S. division force equivalents. [Footnote in the original.]

[17] A page-length table, entitled “Summary of Illustrative Asian Strategies,” is attached but not printed.

219. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, July 21, 1972, 3:10–4:06 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSSM 69—Asia Strategy and Forces

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Alexis Johnson
Ronald Spiers
Les Brown
Michael Armacost
James Wilson

Defense

Kenneth Rush
Gardiner Tucker
Paul Brands

JCS

Adm. Thomas Moorer

CIA

Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
[*name not declassified*]

CEA

Ezra Solomon

OMB

Kenneth Dam

ACDA

Vice Adm. John Lee
Capt. Charles Allen

OST

Edward David

NSC

Philip Odeen
Col. T.C. Pinckney
Cmdr. John Knubel
Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—Defense, JCS and CIA should prepare a joint paper, plotted over a ten-year period, on a

nuclear disarming strike of the PRC. The paper should show growing numbers of weapons on both sides during the ten-year period. It should also indicate what weapons the Chinese would have left after the strike and what targets the Chinese would hit with these weapons.
—A briefing will be held within the next two weeks for the DPRC principals to discuss the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
—The Defense deployment study should be sent to the White House and State for comment. No action on deployments will be taken until the White House and State have reviewed the paper.

Mr. Kissinger: This discussion grows out of a session we had last December,[2] which grew out of a session some time before that[3] —when you [Mr. Tucker] tried to prove that South Vietnam and Thailand could defeat China. Let's try today to pull together some of the basic issues. The starting point is NSDM 27,[4] which calls for a strategy of defending against a PRC attack in NEA or SEA, while providing some aid to our Asian allies against a non-PRC attack.

Mr. Johnson: What NSDM is that?

Mr. Kissinger: NSDM 27.

Mr. Johnson: That's right. I had forgotten about it.

Mr. Kissinger: There are several major questions we have to discuss. First, what ground force capability should we plan for to support our Asian strategy through the 1970s? What tactical nuclear strategy should we plan against a large-scale Chinese conventional attack? We should also consider how these questions relate to our strategic nuclear strategy. For example, should we seek an improved capability to limit damage from PRC retaliation or to initiate an attack on the PRC, if necessary?

All of the questions depend on the considerations we make at the outset of the study: for example, the likelihood of war, the capabilities of our allies and the risks of using nuclear weapons. The major strategy options, as I understand them, are:

1. No land forces for any Asian contingency.
2. Plan land, sea and air forces against a PRC attack in NEA only. We would follow this option because we assume that a Chinese attack in SEA is too unlikely.
3. Plan land, sea and air forces against a PRC attack in SEA or NEA.
4. Plan land, sea and air forces against a PRC attack in NEA or SEA, plus aid to Asian allies against a non-PRC attack.

I think it was also agreed that with our current Security Assistance levels, our allies in both SEA and NEA could resist a non-PRC attack—if no insurgency accompanied the attack. But the allies would still require our air and naval support. (to Mr. Tucker) Is that

a correct presentation of the strategy options?

Mr. Tucker: Yes. I should point out, though, that if a major insurgency accompanied a non-PRC attack, up to four U.S. divisions might be required. And against a PRC attack, substantial U.S. ground forces would be required.

Mr. Kissinger: Have I identified the issues?

Mr. Tucker: Yes.

Adm. Moorer: You should realize that each one of these strategy options calls for air and naval support.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, I realize that. I'm going to ask Gardiner [Tucker] and Tom [Adm. Moorer] to comment on the study.[5] But before I do that, I want to say that the force-level decision we are facing is theoretical. We're really talking about a deployment decision because no matter which option we choose we will still maintain 13-2/3 divisions, and we will have the capability to intervene if we want to, especially if we have withdrawn forces from the forward defenses in Asia. And even if we do not deploy from Asia, no one is advocating that we reduce our total ground forces. So what we're really talking about is a deployment decision, not a force-level decision. Is that right?

Mr. Tucker: Yes, it is. We might choose a strategy which would call for reductions in our military deployments in Asia. But we might not want to make those reductions for political reasons. We might feel, for example, that the reductions would result in our allies losing confidence in us. So we have to think about both considerations, political as well as military.

Mr. Kissinger: Okay. Gardiner, do you want to brief us on the study?

Mr. Tucker: After the last meeting, you called for more work: to explain the methodology used in determining how many ground forces would be needed for the SEA and NEA contingencies; to understand the differences between the JCS analysis and ours; to review the tactical nuclear weapons concept, in order to see whether we should plan to use these weapons as part of our defense against a conventional PRC attack. You also wanted us to look at the strategic nuclear strategy—at the possibility of a disarming strike. Finally, you wanted us to look at a deployment plan so that we could tell our allies where we are going as we withdraw from Vietnam. These are the political and military requirements you tasked us with. We've done all of them except the long-range deployment study, which is still in the works.[6]

Mr. Kissinger: Is State involved in that study?

Mr. Tucker: No, not yet.

Mr. Kissinger: State should be involved in it because the political impact may be more important than the military impact in some of the Asian countries.

Adm. Moorer: I agree. State will get a chance to work on the study. But we first wanted to establish the military requirements, and we have just about done that now.

Mr. Kissinger: Okay.

Mr. Tucker: First we had to get the facts. JCS is looking at these now so it can determine what the military requirements will be to implement the various strategies. When that's done, State and ISA will look at the political implications of the strategies. I expect this whole process will take another couple of months.

On the other studies, we've gone over the requirements and done the analysis. The analysis, as you said earlier, depends on the assumptions you start out with, especially the assumption about insurgency. When JCS starts out with the same assumptions we do, the difference in our net result narrows.

I have a table[7] here which summarizes all the results. [Hands out table to the principals.] After we take a look at it, we can talk about the capabilities we need to meet each of the requirements. At the left, we show the situation in NEA. First we show the threat from North Korea alone, and then the threat from North Korea and the PRC.

Mr. Kissinger: What is a DFE?

Mr. Tucker: That's a Division Force Equivalent. You can also see that we show moderate and high attacks with the Korean/PRC threat. The moderate threat, which CIA thinks is the most probable, postulates an attack of ten to fifteen Chinese and North Korean divisions on South Korea. We also assume in this case that most of the Chinese troops on the northern border remain there during the attack on Korea. The high threat, which DIA classifies as the maximum threat, assumes that the Chinese are able to take many of their troops away from the Soviet border and that they are able to overcome the mobilization constraints which affect them in the moderate threat.

Mr. Kissinger: In the high threat the Chinese will be pulling many troops away from the border area, right?

Mr. Tucker: Right.

Mr. Johnson: In all of these cases, our divisions are supplementing the local forces. Isn't that correct?

Mr. Tucker: Yes, it is. And we're talking about one to four U.S. divisions. JCS used a different methodology, and it concluded that we would need four to eight divisions.

In SEA, we have the pessimistic and the optimistic approaches. In the pessimistic approach, there is no improvement in the capabilities of our allies, and insurgencies tie down all the local forces. The U.S. is left, therefore, to face the conventional threat alone. In the optimistic approach, we assume the RF/PF in Vietnam and the National Police in Thailand can handle the insurgencies. We also assume the Security Assistance programs bring the ARVN and Thai regular forces to a point where they equal six and two DFEs.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the combined North Vietnamese-PRC threats to SEA?

Mr. Tucker: The total ground threat in SEA is limited by the logistical constraints for the enemy. If an intense effort were made, we think there would be one dry-season campaign throughout SEA. On the other hand, if the Communists planned a year-round campaign, they would build up a big enough logistical base during the dry season to support their forces during the rainy season. I want to emphasize that the constraint is from logistics, not men.

Mr. Johnson: And you are assuming they will launch a general attack throughout all of SEA?

Mr. Tucker: That's right. In this analysis we would not plan to defend Burma, either. If all the local forces are tied down with insurgencies, the U.S. force requirement would be four divisions. The Chiefs agree with us on that. With the high threat, we believe the requirement will be for eight divisions, while the Chiefs think the requirement will be for 8-2/3 divisions. The JCS did not address the best case in either SEA or NEA because they only deal with worst case analysis. They did say, however, that if they made a best case analysis and used the same assumptions we did, they would come out with the same figures we did. There are no divergent figures on SEA.

Once we came up with these force requirement figures, we compared them to the current plans for force levels. We refer continually to our ability to deploy 16-2/3 divisions to NATO if nothing is going on in Asia by M plus 113 days. That is an arbitrary figure which we arrived at by adding 90 days of combat to 23 days of warning. If we are at peace and we want to go to Asia, we could call up the reserves and deploy seven divisions to Asia, while still getting seventeen divisions to NATO on schedule. If we don't want to call up the reserves, we can still deploy 3-2/3 divisions to Asia and get 15–2/3 divisions to NATO by M plus 113. But we would have a harder time supporting these forces if the reserves were not called up. By sharing the support burden, we could probably get some more divisions to Asia, to give a total combat capability there roughly equivalent to five divisions with full support. However, if we did that, we would be reducing our NATO deployment capability to about twelve divisions by M plus 90.

In each Asian theater, we will have adequate Tac Air without calling up the reserves. If greater threats were to develop, we could always call on the reserves or temporarily drawdown NATO-oriented forces in CONUS.

Even if we are faced with the worst case in Asia, a case where we would need 8 or 8–2/3 divisions, I think we'll be able to meet the crisis pretty well with our current force levels.

Mr. Dam: That's encouraging.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Moorer) Tom, do you agree?

Adm. Moorer: I'd like to make a few comments on this study when Gardiner is done with his presentation.

Mr. Kissinger: Fair enough. Go ahead, Gardiner. But first let me ask you if we would have any forces left in CONUS if we go ahead with the deployments you suggest in the worst case analysis?

Mr. Tucker: No, not if we make these deployments without calling up the reserves.

Mr. Kissinger: Does Mel [Laird] have a division earmarked for NATO stashed away on Okinawa?

Mr. Tucker: There is a division on Okinawa which has at certain times been earmarked for NATO duty.

Mr. Johnson: I never heard that before.

Mr. Tucker: We would be faced with a number of questions in deployment terms if we moved that division to CONUS. Besides, it's good that we keep the division on Okinawa because it shows that we are maintaining a presence out there.

Mr. Kissinger: But we count it as part of NATO. How would we count the division if it were stationed here? Would it be part of the 3-2/3 divisions scheduled for deployment to Asia if it were stationed here?

Mr. Tucker: Yes, it would be. A mobile division would take its place in the NATO count. Let me outline, if I may, the positions we took in our planning guidance. First, we said that we had to have the capability to conduct a forward defense, as put forth in NSDM 27. Second, we said we would run the Security Assistance program with the top priority of giving our allies the capability for handling indigenous threats by themselves. Then we would give the allies the ground capability for handling, with U.S. air and naval support, non-PRC attacks. Then we would give them the balanced capability for handling all aspects of a non-PRC attack. Finally, if all that were done, we would give the allies the initial capability for defending against a Chinese attack.

It's not rational to think that we can do all of this. As I said, it's just planning guidance. We say that we want to have the capability to implement the NSDM 27 strategy of a forward defense in Asia against a moderate threat. And we want to do this without undue

drawdown of our NATO-oriented forces. In addition, we would like to do all of this without calling up the reserves. If the threat is more serious than we had anticipated, we could do a number of things: call up the reserves; drawdown our NATO-oriented forces, and call on our allies for help. In other words, we have additional resources to bring to bear on the problem if the NSDM 27 strategy does not work out.

We want to maintain all our ties to NATO, but we also want to help our Asian allies. As our Security Assistance program succeeds, we hope to reduce the forward deployments in Asia.

Mr. Johnson: I take it that these requirements are what we need for a conventional war.

Mr. Tucker: That's right.

Mr. Kissinger: Of course, we could also decide to have more divisions.

Mr. Tucker: Yes, that's possible. But the first investment we make in reserve divisions should be for an increase in readiness so that our NATO effort can be improved. And we have a problem in creating more active divisions now because we are trying to rely on an all-volunteer army. The guidance I outlined is well-hedged to our current posture.

In the theater nuclear study, I think we have clarified some of the issues, but there are still several questions which were not analytically and systematically answered. The Secretary told us he had agreement on this as a policy matter. His guidance was that we should maintain the theater nuclear weapons. He said we should have adequate conventional forces to defend against a conventional attack and theater nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a nuclear attack. We are not relying on nuclear weapons to offset a conventional attack. The consensus of the people working on the study was that this policy is preferred and feasible, but we didn't go very far in analyzing its effects. We didn't want to give the President a plan where he would have to choose between going nuclear and losing an ally in Asia.

Mr. Kissinger: You have never given the President the option to choose. I've never even seen a plan where the President is given the choice of using tactical nuclear weapons or losing an ally.

Mr. Tucker: That's right.

Mr. Kissinger: You've never given the President the choice.

Mr. Tucker: I know. We're convinced we can't do that with a high degree of confidence. We don't want our policy to go in that direction, but we still want to analyze it.

Concerning the strategic nuclear strategy, we had CIA study the possibility of locating all the Chinese nuclear weapons.[8] The consensus was that in the next decade it would not be

technically feasible to mount a disarming strike against the Chinese. There will be some weapons what we won't be able to find. For example, some weapons could be on aircraft moved to different bases. Other weapons could be on submarines, and some missiles could be hidden at clandestine sites. Since a complete disarming strike would not be available to us, we didn't feel it would be very fruitful to make extensive changes in our strategic nuclear weapons. We already have a substantial capability to disarm and deter the Chinese.

Mr. Kissinger: With all due respect, isn't that the answer you were looking for?

Mr. Tucker: Yes, in a way. But we looked hard for other answers, too.

Mr. Kissinger: We went through this exercise in the 1950s, and I was in charge of much of the work. First, we said that we couldn't destroy all the other side's nuclear weapons. Given that fact, we then said we couldn't use our weapons. Even if the other side had two or three weapons left after a disarming strike, these weapons would be delivered over here. We didn't want that, and we concluded that we couldn't take the risk of using our weapons first.

There are two aspects to this problem. First, as I was telling Dick Helms yesterday in regard to a Vietnam study,[9] there is no time element in the analysis. I would like to see how the analysis would go over a period of time.

Second, what decisions do the Chinese leaders have to take over a period of time? Those men are not irrational. In fact, they are very calculated. Right now they are drawing drastic consequences from the number of Soviet divisions on their border. How many Soviet divisions are there? Forty-two?

Gen. Walters: Forty-four.

Mr. Kissinger: What we have to analyze right now is the percentage of the Chinese nuclear force we can take out with a disarming strike. Then we have to find out where they would retaliate with the remaining missiles. We also have to analyze how the Chinese leaders would be affected by the possibility of facing a disarming strike. It's not all important that we destroy every one of their nuclear weapons in a disarming strike. If we base our thinking on that condition, we won't even be able to consider the possibility of launching a preemptive strike in the next decade.

Mr. Tucker: I didn't mean that we couldn't launch a pre-emptive strike. I said that we could probably not carry out a complete disarming strike. During the next decade, we won't be able to take away their ability to retaliate.

Mr. Kissinger: You are saying the Chinese will be able to retaliate with something, however ineffective it may be.

Mr. Tucker: That's right. But we will be able to take out most of their weapons. We also think our disarming capability will improve if we get better detection of the enemy's weapons, as well as improvement in our weapons.

Mr. Kissinger: It would be interesting to plot over a period of time what percentage of the Chinese nuclear weapons we can take out with a disarming strike. What improvements do you think we should make in our strategic weapons?

Mr. Tucker: For one thing, we should try to get better accuracy.

Mr. Kissinger: By what degree would the percentage of weapons we can take out with a disarming strike be increased if we had more accurate weapons?

Mr. Tucker: I don't know for sure. It's clear, though, that the final result will be more sensitive to improvements in detection than to improvements in weapons.

Mr. Kissinger: That may be true. What about our Minutemen over-flying the Soviet Union? Would we want to do that?

Adm. Moorer: It would make the Soviets happy if we were hitting China.

Mr. Kissinger: But the Soviets would see the missiles coming at them first.

Adm. Moorer: We could tell the Soviets that the missiles were going on to China. Anyway, the Soviets would see that we were in a tension-filled period with the Chinese.

Mr. Johnson: Quite frankly, I wouldn't want to rely on doing that.

Mr. Tucker: We assume that the Minutemen would not overfly the Soviet Union. We would rely on Polaris and the B–52s. We will also have an overwhelming edge over the Chinese during the next decade. And, if need be, the number of warheads, particularly on the submarine-carried missiles, can be significantly increased.

I've just given you the status of the work we've done so far. I would be pleased to pursue the strategy question further, if you wish.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, please do. If I may, I would like to sum up your conclusions, as I understand them. With our present forces, we could meet at least the moderate threat in SEA and almost the high threat in NEA (we would be one division short if we are willing to drawdown NATO-oriented forces). But that part of the discussion is doctrinal rather than force level since nobody is advocating that we cut our forces.

If we decide to defend against the high threat, we wouldn't necessarily add to overall force levels. On the other hand, if we decide not to defend against the moderate threat, we wouldn't necessarily reduce force levels because our active force levels are determined

principally by NATO needs. Is that correct?

Mr. Tucker: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Moorer) Tom, do you want to make any comments now?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. First of all, Gardiner's study needs further refinements. We are going to look at it, and then State will have a chance to go over it.

Mr. Kissinger: You are talking about the deployment study, right?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. One major point I want to make is that if we are fighting a NATO war, we will be fighting the Soviets. But remember that the Soviets have a large force in the Pacific. Therefore, it's impossible for me to think that we will be fighting a NATO war without engaging in heavy air and sea activity against the Soviets in the Pacific. It doesn't work the other way around. If we are fighting the Chinese, we won't necessarily also have to be engaged in Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: Isn't it possible that the Soviets could decide to keep the war confined to Europe?

Adm. Moorer: I wouldn't count on that. Among other things, they have 108 submarines in the Pacific, and I don't think they would let us move about as we wish.

Mr. Kissinger: That depends on the assumptions we make. If a NATO war is going to lead to a general global war, then we would expect to engage the Soviets in the Pacific. However, if a NATO war is confined to Europe, it may be in the Soviets' interest not to sink our ships in the Pacific—or even the Atlantic. If the Soviets think they can win a conventional war very quickly—if they think they can do to France what Germany did to France during World War II—they may use restraint with us, so as not to trigger off a general war.

Adm. Moorer: If the Soviets give us a Pacific sanctuary, that would be great. But I just don't think they would do it.

Mr. Kissinger: Would it really be great if the Soviets attacked Europe with ground forces and said they didn't want to go on to general nuclear war? Suppose they suggested to us that the outcome of the war be determined by the battle in Europe. Would that be great?

Adm. Moorer: No, that wouldn't be great. Still, I feel it would be disastrous to think that we wouldn't have to contend with the Soviets in the Pacific.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with you that we should plan to contend with them. I'm just saying that it might be in their interest not to go to general nuclear war if a NATO war starts.

Adm. Moorer: I knew I shouldn't have gotten into this discussion with you. I was just rereading *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*[10] last week.

Mr. Kissinger: Do you know what a British reviewer said about the book when it was published? He said, "Dr. Kissinger may not be a good writer, but anyone who finishes the book is a good reader."

Mr. Tucker: NSDM 27 doesn't mention anything about a forward defense in Asia, as it does about a forward defense in Europe. I understand the President doesn't want to fight a forward defense in both theaters.

Mr. Johnson: What about fighting in Alaska?

Mr. Tucker: We obviously fight to defend Alaska and Hawaii. But I was referring to Asia proper. The defense of Asia is not primarily a question of ground forces.

Adm. Moorer: We have two divisions in Korea, and we would find it very difficult to abandon them. We would have to get involved. That in turn would mean that we have to contend with Soviet air and naval forces.

Mr. Kissinger: What is your conclusion?

Adm. Moorer: When we consider the force levels involved in re-deploying troops to NATO from Asia, we don't have the flexibility assumed in the studies. I am confident that we will have active opposition from the Soviets.

Mr. Kissinger: But the opposite case is not necessarily true.

Adm. Moorer: That's right.

Mr. Kissinger: We can send the European troops to Asia, but we can't do it the other way around.

Mr. Tucker: That's correct. In fact, we assume the forces already in Asia will stay there.

Adm. Moorer: Concerning the tactical nuclear weapons, I see them primarily as a deterrent. But we can use them following certain developments and if we are in extremis. On the strategic aspects of the study, I agree that we can take out a large percentage of the Chinese nuclear capability. Our capability will also grow greater as time goes on.

Mr. Kissinger: The strategic study should be a joint DOD–JCS–CIA paper, plotted over a period of time with growing figures of weapons on both sides. What will the Chinese have left after a disarming strike? What targets would they then hit? Plot all this out over a ten-year period.

Adm. Moorer: Finally, I agree with our current deployments and force levels. At this time, NSDM 27 still fills the bill. It is compatible with the JSOP and the Nixon Doctrine. Now is not the time to burden the President with changing strategies again.

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone else have other observations to make?

No observations.

Mr. Kissinger: I've been trying to get a handle on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia since my first week in office. I've never seen anything about the timing of their use—so that they will make a plausible difference in the outcome of the battle. I'm not saying, though, that we won't consider using them.

In NATO, the [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. But why do we have so many nuclear weapons in Europe? After we are defeated in a conventional war, can we still turn the tide with the use of tactical nuclear weapons? On the other hand, if we use the weapons before we are defeated, who is hurt more—the defender or the attacker? I've never seen a concept about the use of these weapons. I don't know what they are designed to accomplish. Accordingly, I think this is a big lacuna in our plans. Perhaps you don't want to talk about this subject before such a large group.

Adm. Moorer: Why don't we schedule a meeting on this subject for the principals?

Mr. Kissinger: I can't conceive that the Chinese will attack anybody in the next two or three years. It's not conceivable, unless there is a drastic change in the leadership, that they will move troops away from their northern border. Therefore, I think we have some time to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Adm. Moorer: You can make the same statement about Europe. The Russians are watching the Chinese, too.

Mr. Kissinger: But one side may be getting ready to jump the other.

Adm. Moorer: I agree that we have the time to talk about how we would use these nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger: Okay. Let's schedule a meeting on this for the principals. Let's have the meeting within the next two weeks.

Mr. Johnson: Good.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Odeen) Phil, will you take care of this?

Mr. Odeen: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Rush) Ken, do you agree that there will be no unilateral defense deployments until the White House and State have a chance to review the study?

Mr. Rush: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: We've already talked to some of our allies about the FY–73 decisions.[11]

Mr. Kissinger: I believe that the President should not make any strategy decisions before the election. But we should do the work now so that we can be prepared to go forward with it after the election.

On deployments, we want no unilateral decisions. We'll set up a meeting on tactical nuclear weapons within the next two weeks, but we won't make any decisions on their use during the meeting.

Does everyone agree?

All agreed.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–73 [2 of 3]. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets except those that indicate omitted material are in the original.

[2] See Document 202.

[3] See Document 189.

[4] Document 56.

[5] A summary of the interagency response to NSSM 69 is printed as Document 218.

[6] The referenced studies have not been found.

[7] Not found.

[8] See footnote 3, Document 218.

[9] An apparent reference to a Washington Special Actions Group meeting held on July 20 to discuss Vietnam. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972, Document 210.

[10] Kissinger published his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, in 1957.

[11] On July 26, Johnson reported to Secretary of State Rogers that, during the meeting, he had "emphasized the political importance of our Asian general purpose force deployments and our interest in discussing FY 74 deployments with allies" as had been done the previous fiscal year. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 69)

220. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting[1]

Washington, July 24, 1972, 3:09–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

FY 1974–78 Defense Program

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John Irwin
Ronald Spiers
Leon Sloss
Seymour Weiss

Defense

Kenneth Rush
Dr. Gardiner Tucker
Robert C. Moot

JCS

Vice Adm. John P. Weinel
Rear Adm. William St. George

CIA

Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
[*name not declassified*]

OMB

Casper Weinberger
Ellis Veatch

OST

Dr. Edward David

ACDA

Gerard Smith
Vice Adm. John M. Lee

CEA

Ezra Solomon

NSC

Philip Odeen
Col. T. C. Pinckney
Lt. Col. George Riedel
John Knubel
James Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The Department of Defense will prepare a paper for consideration by the DPRC by early September[2] on the strategic implications of various FY 74–78 programs in terms of general mission categories.
—DOD will be responsible for the details of its budget, once the DPRC has defined the broad strategic objectives and their budgetary and political implications.
—The DOD budget for FY 74 should not exceed $84 billion. Consideration should also be given in its preparation to the President's order to reduce the proposed federal budget by an overall total of $20 billion, with an emphasis on the more efficient use of manpower.[3]
—DOD should review the policy of planning to reinforce NATO to D plus 90 and consider the heavy dependence of NATO strategy on the use of tactical air power, assuming that it may be rendered less effective than expected by bad weather.
—ACDA will review the DOD budget to consider possible implications of either conventional or strategic arms reductions.

Mr. Kissinger: I called this preliminary meeting to first get the views of the Defense Department and the OMB and then to have a brief general discussion of the major issues. (to Mr. Rush) Would you like to begin?

Mr. Rush: We are shooting for a budget of $84 billion for FY 74, with an average of $86.2 billion projected for the five year period from '74 to '78. This has been suggested to the Services and they all have complained about inadequacies at that funding level. The JCS has suggested a budget of $102 billion as the amount necessary for adequate national security.

Mr. Weinberger: Well, that has the distinction of being the highest figure I have ever seen proposed.

Mr. Kissinger: Does the JCS consider $84 billion an imprudent amount for the defense budget?

Adm. Weinel: I would say marginal. It would be prudent in some areas, imprudent in others and marginal overall.

Mr. Rush: I wouldn't say it would be imprudent. We are going to review these figures in detail and scrub them down. Then we'll be back in September with a package that will run to $84 billion for FY 74 and $86.2 billion for the five year period. We believe we can cut our projections by $400 million as a result of the SALT Agreements and Congress undoubtedly will make some reduction in the '73 budget which will result in reduced proposals for '74. However, we may have alternative strategic programs that will cost more.

Mr. Kissinger: One senator told me he didn't know how many SALT agreements we could afford.

Mr. Rush: The effect of the Southeast Asia amendment[4] will be to increase DOD spending by $2.3 billion, even after reducing it by the savings from SALT. If SEA activity continues at a high rate, we will also need an additional $450 to $500 million for arms, ammunition and equipment. The Services also have submitted POMs (Program Objectives Memoranda) for an additional $250 million in urgent items. Another problem is that our tactical fighter force is aging rapidly. We have hundreds of fighters over ten years old and some over fifteen years old. We need replacements soon for these obsolescent aircraft.

Mr. Kissinger: I like that fighter that can only operate effectively over the desert at 45,000 feet.

Dr. Tucker: Those are the ones that are over ten years old.

Mr. Rush: We want to keep the age of our fighters under fifteen years. There are a whole host of modifications that are underfunded by some $100 million in the FY 74 budget. We want to try to fund these as best we can. Whether the funds we can find will be adequate for this purpose remains to be seen. I just want to point out that the defense budget has been consistently declining as a share of the total budget and as a share of the GNP. We have taken substantial reductions in recent years. Since the peak defense budget, we have reduced our personnel by 30%, industrial purchases by 40% and dollar expenditures by $33 billion.

Mr. Kissinger: We know you have done your share. But tell me, what are you spending all this money on?

Mr. Rush: Increased personnel costs and inflation eat away at everything we try to do. The cutbacks we have made in the last several years have reduced defense spending in real terms to the lowest level since 1951. Non-defense spending has increased rapidly during this same period.

Mr. Kissinger: The lowest since 1951? I suppose you could say the lowest since 1948. What are the 1951 figures based on?

Mr. Rush: I am talking about real dollars, not inflation dollars. In those terms, our budget is the lowest since 1951.

Mr. Moot: All of the real increase in our expenditures can be found in the personnel figures.

Mr. Weinberger: What was the 1951 Defense budget?

Mr. Moot: Something over $13 billion in 1951 dollars.

Mr. Weinberger: It depends on what base year you use for figuring the value of the dollar.

Mr. Kissinger: When the Defense Department is finished with its explanation we won't have an ally left in the world.

Dr. Tucker: These figures are only for the DPRC.

Mr. Weinberger: You mean only for the OMB.

Mr. Rush: No, these figures are accurate. While we are reducing our defense expenditures, our allies are all increasing theirs.

Mr. Kissinger: But they are doing so with inflated marks.

Mr. Rush: No, in dollar equivalents. I'm talking in terms of dollars.

Mr. Moot: If we use constant dollars, we end up with a figure of about $51 billion, which is what McGovern[5] has been suggesting.

Mr. Kissinger: That's probably what he will say he meant all along; that he was talking in terms of constant dollars.

I would like to ask at this point the basic question of how we can best handle this matter. I know that the Services would prefer to argue the Defense budget out among themselves. They have had some bad experiences with systems analysts telling them what to do and their concern is justified. However, I am afraid that if that course is followed we will have a program presented to us in September that will be worked out in detail and we will be stuck with it, whether or not it is responsive to our overall strategic objectives. NATO is a case in point. We have been talking about reinforcing to D plus 90, while studies show that the allies cannot fight for more than thirty days. This NATO concept of reinforcing over a period of 90 days is convenient because it gives us a cushion of forces for other purposes as well. Another issue is the dependence of our strategy on effective utilization of air power. In reading these situation reports from Vietnam day after day I am constantly struck by the number of days our tactical air power cannot operate fully or effectively in Vietnam because of poor weather conditions. What does that mean for our European strategy? Have we fully considered the number of days of bad weather in central Europe? I am not concerned here about the details of numbers. The number of cruisers versus the number of destroyers in the fleet, or whether an Army of 11-2/3 divisions or 11-1/3 divisions is most appropriate to our needs, are matters for you (Defense) to decide. That is not our role here. What we want to do is determine the overall strategic objectives and then let you (Defense) shape the forces you require to perform the role that is decided upon.

Mr. Rush: We don't have a budget prepared as yet. We are working on it.

Mr. Kissinger: We don't want your budget now. What we want to do is discuss alternate strategies and then decide which to follow. I prefer to avoid the obfuscating details of the

DOD budget and to keep out of nitpicking your proposals. I would like to lay out a work program today.[6]

Dr. David: (to Mr. Kissinger) How does R & D fit into your picture of the Defense budget?

Mr. Kissinger: What do you have in mind?

Dr. David: R & D is a special category. It represents only 10% of the budget, but it has implications for the future composition of our strategic forces, for example.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to get our strategies clearly in mind before we go into budget details.

Dr. David: That's fine. That's just what I was driving at.

Mr. Kissinger: Cap (Weinberger), would you like to give us your thoughts?

Mr. Weinberger: I'll preface my comments by repeating what I've said before, that none of this urban crap that seems to be so popular is going to do any good if our borders are not secure. Now having said that, I will also say that I can't encourage anyone to pursue a Defense budget of $102 billion. The President has made it very clear that he wants to avoid new taxation and anything that might get us into a situation like that of the mid-60's, when we tried to fight a war while continuing domestic spending unchecked and without new taxation, which of course produced inflation. It now looks as though the federal budget for FY 74 might show a deficit of $20 to $30 billion. The President feels that would be inflationary and he wants to bring it down by $20 billion. This will require reductions across the board. I know you (Defense) have taken cuts in recent years and we now plan to cut the domestic portion of the budget. But a reduction of the magnitude of $20 billion will necessarily require some cuts in defense spending. So I suggest that you consider this requirement in your budget planning, which means that some portion of that cut will have to come out of your $84 billion. We have to get the budget back up to a full employment balance.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought the full employment deficit theory was ingenious. Now you're retreating from it and talking of a full employment balance.

Mr. Weinberger: It was a good theory, but now we have to turn the deficit around before we get into either a new round of inflation or new taxes, neither of which is acceptable to the President. We will be pleased to work with the agencies to help review their budgets and suggest ways the necessary reductions can be made without endangering our borders.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the borders of our allies?

Mr. Weinberger: We include them, too. We are also looking to see what cuts can be made in the domestic budget. I just had a long discussion about this with George (Shultz), who

doesn't think it can be done. But the President is determined and has told us to do it. I know Defense has already made cuts, but the personnel costs are so high now that you must seek new reductions in manpower. We must have more efficient use of our expensive manpower; this is where we can save money. I know it would be easy if we could all agree on a budget of $102 billion and then go home.

Mr. Kissinger: They'll take $90 billion.

Mr. Rush: We'll take $84 billion.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Weinberger) See, you've won already. They've come down from $102 billion to $84 billion. Gerry (Smith), are there any aspects of arms limitations proposals or possibilities that we should consider in this review?

Amb. Smith: I think I'll just stay out of this.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm serious. We must consider these factors. (to Mr. Rush) Gerry should have an opportunity to review the specifics of your proposals to consider the implications for the budget of any arms reductions, conventional as well as strategic. Would you send him an advance copy of your budget proposals?

Mr. Rush: O.K.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) Do you have any comment?

Mr. Irwin: We have a number of general questions, but this is not the time to raise them.[7]

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Rush) Well, why don't you go ahead and prepare a budget outline in terms of general categories and the strategic implications of various programs, rather than in terms of specific weapons, for our consideration. Can you have it ready by early September?

Mr. Rush: Yes, we'll have it ready by then.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, 1969–73 [3 of 3]. Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. On July 22, Odeen informed Kissinger that the primary purposes of the meeting were to: "assess the capability of the DOD program to support the President's strategy; review the force levels and modernization programs planned for FY 74–78 as well as funding requirements; consider the implications for our defense programs of the very large full employment budget deficits projected for FY 74 and subsequent years; define the policy and major force structure issues which should be analyzed for Presidential decision later this year." (Ibid.,

Box H–106, DPRC Meeting, FY 74–78 Defense Program, 7/24/72)

[2] No meeting was held. A DPRC meeting rescheduled for November 15 was also cancelled.

[3] Nixon sent a special message to Congress on July 26 urging a $250 billion ceiling on FY 1974 federal spending, which at the time was expected to be $20–30 billion in excess of that figure. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 741–744) During several telephone conversations held on August 2, 3, and 5, Kissinger discussed the ceiling and its effect on the Defense budget with Laird, Ehrlichman, and Weinberger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[4] See Document 214.

[5] Senator George S. McGovern (D–South Dakota), the 1972 Democratic nominee for President.

[6] During a July 25 telephone conversation, Kissinger discussed with Laird his preferred method of determining the Defense budget and the military posture. The Defense Department, he told Laird, should first "work out its plans" according to "national objectives rather than forcing us into nitpicking every individual item." Then, with that plan in hand, representatives from the NSC, the OMB, and DOD would reach a tentative spending agreement before submitting the budget to the DPRC. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[7] Irwin raised some concerns about the foreign policy implications of the Defense budget in an August 18 memorandum to Rush. According to Irwin, the Department of State was concerned that contemplated reductions in naval forces and deployments to Asia, especially Korea, and possible troop shortfalls resulting from the transition to an all-volunteer armed force would negatively affect U.S. relations with its allies. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 US)

221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, August 2, 1972.

SUBJECT
FY 74 Defense Budget

Secretary Laird has sent you a memorandum (Tab B)[2] that states he is planning the FY 74 Defense Budget at an outlay level of $84 billion. In his judgment, reducing the FY 74 budget below $84 billion would force DOD to:

—Make cuts in the current force structure;
—Reduce the readiness and capability of our forces below adequate levels;
—Cut back on essential modernization programs.

Secretary Laird says he recognizes that very serious fiscal problems face the federal government in FY 74 and beyond but feels Defense has contributed its prudent share to alleviating these problems, citing the sizeable manpower and procurement reductions made since 1968. He cautions against accepting some of the current simplistic panaceas being bandied about for controlling "out of control" defense budgets.

Secretary Laird points out that since 1968 real spending for defense has decreased (because of the cutbacks in our involvement in SEA). During this same period, the $74 billion *increase* in federal non-Defense spending has nearly equalled the *total* Defense budget.

He concludes that only long term curtailment of the rate of growth of non-Defense expenditures, including those for currently legislated programs, can solve the annual budget deficit problem. Continued preoccupation with the annual budget process diverts us from addressing the more fundamental problem. It also puts national security in continuous jeopardy since the DOD budget frequently becomes the prime target to achieve short term fiscal goals.

Evaluation of Secretary Laird's Comments

This is the opening volley in the FY 74 budget debate. As you are well aware, you face some very difficult choices if you are to submit a balanced, full employment budget for FY 74. I anticipate that OMB would like to hold the FY 74 DOD budget to $79–80 billion instead of the $84 billion proposed by Secretary Laird.

It would be a serious mistake to let OMB set a target and then force Defense to fit their

program to it. The need for adequate forces to support your foreign policy and implement your Defense strategy overrides short term economic considerations, especially as Defense spending has become a decreasingly smaller part of the problem.

However, the Defense budget cannot be completely insensitive to our economic and fiscal problems. Moreover, there are areas where cuts can be made with minimal impact on essential forces and capability. Therefore, I propose that through the DPRC we examine the Defense program for possible areas that provide only marginal contributions to our Defense strategy and consider the economic and strategic implications of reductions. Our effort should not, however, only consider cuts. We should also examine our forces, readiness, and modernization programs to ensure those areas most supportive of your foreign policy are adequately funded.

Recommendation

I recommend you avoid giving support to a particular level for the FY 74 Defense budget at this time. Instead, I suggest you ask Secretary Laird for his whole-hearted cooperation in debating in the DPRC the economic and strategic implications of alternative programs so that you might arrive at a carefully developed defense program and budget in December.

I have enclosed a memorandum to Secretary Laird for your signature conveying these directions (Tab A).[3] Ray Price[4] concurs.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 237, Agency Files, DPRC & Defense Budget, Jan–Jul, 1972. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum bears a stamped note indicating that the President saw it. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Odeen sent a draft to Kissinger on July 20 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

[2] Laird's July 18 memorandum to Nixon is attached but not printed.

[3] Nixon sent the attached letter to Laird on August 8, stating that, while "we must have strong armed forces with which to support our foreign policy and carry out our Defense strategy," we "must also recognize that the health of our economy is an essential element of national strength." The President directed the Department of Defense to cooperate fully in the review of its proposed FY 1974 program "to ensure that we have adequate military capability at the lowest feasible cost."

[4] Raymond K. Price, Jr., Special Assistant to the President.

[5] On January 29, 1973, Nixon presented his FY 1974 budget to Congress. Of $268.7 billion in total outlays and $288 billion in overall authority, the President called for a defense budget of $79 billion in spending and $85 billion in authority. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1973*, pp. 32–48; *New York Times*, January 30, 1973, p. 19)

222. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
US Civil Defense Policy

Background. In 1969, we undertook an interagency review of our civil defense program options.[2] Our current program costs about $84M and, besides increasing emphasis on our capability to deal with natural disasters, it is geared to provide fallout protection, warning systems development, public training and emergency hospital programs. Its major deficiencies are the maldistribution of the over 190M shelter spaces (mostly in downtown urban areas) and the still limited planning for dealing with crises.

We need a decision on the general level of our civil defense effort for the next few years to provide guidance to the agencies for 1974 budget preparations.

Options and Agency Views. The study presents six alternatives beginning with a minimal program and adding basic new program elements to each successive option. (Options are detailed in the analytical summary at tab.)

In brief, *Option 1* is a low protection minimal program supported by ACDA; *Option 2* is a status quo program supported by State; *Option 3* would add a major crisis planning and management program; *Option 4* would add more and better distributed fallout shelter protection (OEP, Defense and JCS support this option to improve our life-saving potential in nuclear attack and our capability to deal with natural disasters); *Option 5* would add more advanced R&D, particularly on the feasibility of extensive blast shelters (AEC supports this spending level but wants more emphasis on such programs as rapid urban evacuation and longer-range population dispersal); *Option 6* would add prototype development and deployment of blast shelters.

My View. Major new programs would have high political visibility and require substantial cost increases over several years. More importantly, our strategic posture for the foreseeable future does not necessitate an expanded civil defense effort. Today's program provides some life-saving potential for nuclear attack or natural disasters and a valuable infrastructure extending into 50 states.

Therefore, *I recommend* maintaining the current level of effort. I also recommend that you endorse the objective of increasing emphasis on our capability to deal with natural disasters. This would not entail any major program reorientation or cost increases.

OMB concurs.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached NSDM[3] which reflects the foregoing recommendation.[4]

Tab

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[5]

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY (NSSM 57)

US Civil Defense Program

Our civil defense posture resulted from the Eisenhower Administration's National Fallout Shelter Policy initiated in 1959. Civil defense programs were accelerated briefly during the Kennedy Administration, but not sustained at the accelerated level because of inadequate funding and political support.

The program is geared to provide fallout protection. Fallout protection for everyone is not yet provided. The major effort today is locating and equipping shelters (but not constructing them). The program also includes warning and communication system development, public training programs, and emergency hospital programs. *Current annual federal expenditures are about $80M*, including $5M HEW funds. State and local governments spend an additional $50–60M annually. (Civil defense programs involve local authorities and must command public support or acceptance to be effective.)

The major deficiency in today's program is the maldistribution of the over 190M fallout shelter spaces, which are mostly located in downtown urban areas. Our plans for dealing with crises in attack or natural disaster situations are also limited and do not include selective evacuation/relocation plans.

Blast shelter systems development is also not included in our program. *Blast shelter systems are considered escalatory* within today's context (while increasing fallout shelters is not) because blast shelters aim to deny one's urban population and industry as hostage. The study concludes that before any decisions are made on an extensive civil defense program including blast shelter systems, more planning and R&D are needed to resolve uncertainties regarding relative efficiency and possible impact on strategic objectives and force postures.

Today's program would have some utility in the event of nuclear attack. It is estimated that a Soviet nuclear attack on the US without a formal civil defense program would produce fatalities ranging from 20M in a medium counterforce attack to 150M in a heavy countervalue attack. The current program could save an estimated 10–20M more lives under certain heavy attack situations, with effectiveness depending inter alia on warning times and attack intensity and targetting.

Soviet Civil Defense Program

It is estimated that the USSR devotes 1–2% of its overall defense spending to civil defense (a much higher percentage than the US) and has been increasing its program in recent years. The USSR has extensive public training programs and some blast shelter programs for key industries and services. Operationally, it emphasizes evacuation of urban areas.

On balance, the study tends to discount the seemingly impressive Soviet civil defense effort because its reliance on evacuation makes strategic warning critical and it is doubted that the Soviets actually possess a rapid and orderly evacuation capability for their large cities.

Current Situation

There is a need now for a decision on what should be the general nature and level of our civil defense effort for the next few years. Program objectives and budget levels must be established and Congressional interest is growing. A special subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has been established to conduct hearings on our civil defense programs, possibly this fall. The existence of our study is well known.

Options and Agency Positions

The study presents six program options beginning with a minimal program and adding new program elements and concomitant costs with each successive option. Options 1 and 2 are considered low protection options; Options 3 and 4 are improved protection options; and Options 5 and 6 are improved protection plus investigating more comprehensive protection.

Option 1 is a minimal program concentrating on warning and education, including medical services and emergency operations, discontinuing the fallout shelter program and reducing funds for aid to states. It would cut costs in half to $40M in 2 years and still provide some capability for dealing with natural disasters and light attack recovery. *Advantage:* would reduce expenditures. *Disadvantages:* would reduce life-saving potential of current program and complicate initiation of possible expanded or improved program later.

ACDA favors this option and questions both the effectiveness of passive defense measures in massive nuclear attack situations and the value of pre-attack measures (e.g.,

evacuation) even in light attack situations. Noting that the effectiveness of programs depends on public and local authority participation and cooperation, ACDA suggests that these are not likely to be forthcoming for more effective civil defense programs.

Option 2, a status quo program (costs around $80M), would keep today's limited fallout protection (in caretaker status) and operational capability and not reduce aid to states. *Advantages:* would keep present life-saving capability and continue support for state and local emergency capabilities useful for natural disasters. *Disadvantages:* would *not* remedy deficiencies in the fallout shelter program, nor provide for increased crisis planning and R&D, nor reverse the trend of declining state and local interest upon which effective civil defense relies heavily.

State favors this option and opposes initiation of any new or higher programs pending further results in SALT and the Defense Program Review Committee's strategic posture review.

Option 3 would add a *major crisis planning and management program*, including selected evacuation plans and ranging from preparatory measures to rapid shelter construction. Average annual costs over 5 years would be $123M. *Advantages:* could increase life-saving potential, provide an evacuation option to Soviet evacuation, and increase our natural disaster preparedness capability. *Disadvantage:* benefits may not outweigh costs since evacuation is highly dependent on the availability of strategic warning and expedient sheltering.

Option 4 would add *more and better distributed fallout shelter protection*. Average annual costs over 5 years would be $161M. *Advantages:* same as for Option 3, plus a greater increase in life-saving potential because of the upgraded fallout shelter program. *Disadvantages:* high costs for fallout shelters which might more usefully be spent on crisis planning, other R&D, or other missions.

OEP, OSD and JCS favor this option to upgrade significantly today's program. OSD estimates that crisis planning for selective evacuation and more and better distributed shelters would increase the life-saving potential by 10–70M persons over today's program. Though the study costs this option out at $150M for FY 73, General Lincoln states that the funding need be only $100M because the study's estimates are based on outdated analysis. His and Defense's goal now is to get a commitment to these two new program objectives (major crisis planning program, including evacuation plans, and an upgraded shelter program).

Option 5 would add a *planning/R&D program to explore the feasibility of* augmenting a fallout/evacuation system with *extensive blast shelters*. It would double costs in FY 73 and rise to $300M in FY 76 if deployment arose out of R&D. *Advantages:* same as for Option 4, plus would provide a basis for deciding within a few years on a more comprehensive civil defense program including blast shelters. *Disadvantages:* high costs

over Option 4 while providing no additional life-saving potential unless considerably more money were spent on blast shelter system deployment.

AEC supports the spending level for this option, but believes that the program needs to be revamped to differentiate clearly between and provide for the following new elements: (1) plans for rapid evacuation of urban areas and temporary sheltering; (2) plans for longer-term population dispersal in a crisis; and (3) plans laying the groundwork for more urban area protection later and for more consideration given to population/industry dispersal in our national planning.

Option 6 would add *prototype development and deployment of blast shelter systems*. It would more than double costs in FY 73 and rise to $500M in FY 76 if deployment continued. *Advantages:* same as for Option 5, but would provide a better foundation for deciding on a comprehensive nationwide civil defense program. *Disadvantages:* would presage a new policy with high costs causing public and Congressional opposition, and could be interpreted by the Soviets and some Western European countries as provocative since blast shelter systems are considered escalatory.

Strategic Implications

Civil defense has strategic implications. Though it does not contribute directly to the first two criteria of strategic sufficiency[6] —namely, (1) high confidence in our deterrent, and (2) sufficient assurance against an incentive to strike the US first—civil defense relates directly to the third criterion of denying significant advantage to the Soviets in the event of nuclear war, as well as to the fourth criterion of limiting damage from small attacks or accidental launches. The Soviets would likely take counter-measures, either in offensive weaponry or expanded civil defense, and their views toward SALT could be affected if a US civil defense program seemed to jeopardize their deterrent capability.

The study concludes that undertaking a comprehensive protection program beyond Option 6 would be imprudent and escalatory within today's context. Effective protection for our urban population and industry would probably lead the USSR to question its damage inflicting capability.

My View. I agree with OEP and Defense that there could be substantial increases in our civil defense program without likelihood of adverse affects on strategic force postures or the SALT negotiations. This may not be the case with AEC's recommendation because it borders on high level urban population/industry protection.

However, even relatively small increases (e.g., $15–25M) would appear substantial in comparison to the size of the program today. Any major new programs or substantial upgrading of current programs would require significant cost increases over several years. This means high political visibility and Presidential endorsement to gain Congressional support and funding, which would be difficult to achieve particularly in the atmosphere of

the ongoing SALT negotiations.

More importantly, our strategic posture today and for the foreseeable future does not necessitate expanding our civil defense effort and the benefits of the new programs presented in the study are not clear. The effectiveness of evacuation in a nuclear attack, for example, remains doubtful because it relies heavily on strategic warning. (Evacuation could have some utility in natural disaster situations, but this utility would be limited to specific geographic areas.) Also, while more fallout shelters would increase our life-saving potential, they would not protect either urban industry or population (unless combined with evacuation planning and blast shelter systems).

Development of blast shelter systems (Options 5 and 6) would not only involve high current costs but also imply commitment to continued deployment at higher costs and signal a new and possibly provocative policy to the Soviets.

On the other hand, we should avoid any substantial program decreases which would make improvements later more difficult and also result in some flak from Congress. Today's program provides some life-saving potential in a nuclear attack and a capability to deal with natural disasters. It has a valuable infrastructure extending into 50 states. Moreover, the study presents an analysis, not accepted by OSD and JCS, that the least cost US response to a large Soviet civil defense program or Soviet force improvements would be a program of direct defense of our urban population. Such unresolved issues argue for keeping our future options open.

Therefore, I recommend maintaining the current level of effort, including if necessary funding increases to hold the existing program levels which would otherwise decrease because of higher costs. This course would provide a useful program with low political visibility and keep our options open.

The program should also include the objective of increased emphasis, within the limitations of existing authority, on dual-use plans, procedures and preparedness to increase our capability to deal with natural disasters. This would include improvements in our plans for dealing with crises without any major program reorientation or cost increases. OEP and Defense accept the objective of increasing emphasis on dual-use aspects. The objective deserves Presidential endorsement.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–236, NSDM 184. Secret. Sent for action. Michael Guhin of the NSC Staff sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum of August 7. (Ibid.)

[2] See NSSM 57, Document 28.

[3] Document 223.

[4] Haig approved the recommendation on behalf the President.

[5] The summary of the response to NSSM 57 was apparently prepared by Guhin of the NSC Staff, who sent it to Kissinger on April 11 under a covering memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–236, NSDM 184) Lincoln, Chairman of an Interagency Ad Hoc Group, submitted the group's response to NSSM 57 to Kissinger on June 26, 1970. Lincoln's covering memorandum reads in part as follows: "An important conclusion of this study is that an extensive civil defense program should not be undertaken at this time." (Ibid., Box H–151, NSSM 57) In an August 18, 1971, memorandum to Kissinger, Guhin and Richard T. Kennedy of the NSC Staff explained that the Ad Hoc Group's response had since been scheduled for review by the SRG on several occasions, but was each time "displaced by higher priority issues." (Ibid., Box H–152, NSSM 57)

[6] See NSDM 16, Document 39.

223. National Security Decision Memorandum 184[1]

Washington, August 14, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

United States Civil Defense Policy

The President has reviewed the Ad Hoc Group's response to NSSM 57,[2] U.S. civil defense policy, and the views of the interested agencies.

The President has:

—Decided that the U.S. shall maintain the current overall level of effort in its civil defense activities.
—Directed that there be increased emphasis on dual-use plans, procedures and preparedness within the limitations of existing authority, including appropriate related improvements in crisis management planning.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 364, NSDMs, Nos. 145–264. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Helms, Gerard Smith, Moorer, Weinberger, and David.

[2] See Document 222.

224. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–12–72 Washington, September 19, 1972.

SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Note

This Estimate addresses the potential of Soviet military research and development. It first appraises the general magnitude and rate of growth of resources available for this purpose—i.e., the facilities, men, and money, and how efficiently these are used. It then assesses how effectively Soviet military research and development meets military requirements. It does not attempt to predict specific Soviet technological advances. This aspect of the problem is addressed in part in the series of NIEs on the various components of the Soviet military forces.[2]

Summary and Conclusions

A. The USSR has long accorded high priority to research and development (R&D) on military weapon systems and related supporting technologies, including space programs. It has made substantial increases in the resources devoted to such R&D and has maintained a relatively satisfactory level of efficiency with which the resources are used. Comparable results have not been achieved in R&D related to civilian pursuits, but the Soviet leadership now appears to be giving it greater emphasis and attention.

B. Concerning resources, we have made estimates of what the Soviets are spending each year on their military R&D programs. But we recognize that such estimates cannot be compared, except very roughly, with estimates for similar expenditures in the US because of myriad problems including different currencies, price structures, economic priorities, and strategic goals. Paragraphs 15 to 26 of the text pages 7 to 10, present our approach to the estimates, which involves two complex and independent methodologies, and the results that it yields.[3] The results could understate or overstate the true magnitudes by a wide margin. Nonetheless, the two independently-derived estimates are broadly consistent; they indicate that during the 1960s the growth in Soviet expenditures for military R&D plus space has been predominantly in support of the space effort. In this same period the estimated rates of increase in R&D facilities and manpower slowed; these rates of growth are now less than that for R&D expenditures as a whole.[4]

C. It is virtually impossible to measure the effectiveness of Soviet military R&D. Although the Soviets have demonstrated the ability to solve advanced technical problems, we do not know whether their end products reflect fully the original requirements for performance or not. We believe that the Soviets have established their own approach to military R&D which seems to emphasize the expeditious development of systems that

will do a job simply and reliably.

D. This expeditious approach is followed within a vast R&D bureaucracy which tends toward conservatism. New ideas and concepts are subject to a variety of planning constraints and must be justified through numerous levels and agencies. And the Soviets often rely upon redundancy of effort, judging that the hedge against failure outweighs the greater expense involved.

E. We foresee little change in the way the Soviets go about carrying out their military R&D. The success that they have enjoyed will probably work against any major changes in procedures, at least in the near future. The various systems we expect them to introduce in the future will, for the most part, continue to represent improvements on present systems through subsystems upgrading or the continuation of established developmental trends. In general, the Soviets appear to favor this approach as contrasted with the search for radically new and untried concepts.

[Omitted here is the 15-page Discussion portion of the estimate, including the following four sections: The Soviet View of Research and Development, Approaches to Quantifying Resources, Efficiency in Use of Resources, and The Approach and Performance of Soviet Military Research and Development. Also omitted are four annexes: Soviet Scientific and Engineering Manpower, Estimating Soviet Expenditures for Military Research and Development, Organization for Soviet Research and Development, and Soviet Performance in Key Technological Areas.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; [*codewords not declassified*]. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained on the grounds that the subject matter was outside their jurisdiction. According to a Post Mortem, approved by the USIB on December 13, NIE 11–12–72 resulted from an urgent request from the Director of the DIA for such an estimate. (Ibid.) The table of contents and four annexes are not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] See Documents 38, 46, 52, 105, 160, 178, and 198.

[3] According to the Post Mortem of December 13, analysts used two approaches to gauge Soviet military R&D: "one started with Soviet financial data, and the other relied wholly on costing Soviet military R&D directly in dollars." Because each rested upon numerous "assumptions" and "uncertainties," chief among them ruble/dollar ratios, analysts lacked "sufficient confidence in the data, assumptions, or analysis used in either one to rely on it alone. It was hoped that if the results of the two methods were roughly the same, confidence in the analysis would be increased. There was disagreement about whether and to what extent this was accomplished."

[4] For the views of Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, USN, the Director, Defense Intelligence

Agency; Maj. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Rear Adm. Earl F. Rectanus, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, on estimates of Soviet expenditures for military R&D, see their footnotes to paragraph 20, page 9 of the text, and to paragraph 65, Annex B, page 45. [Footnote in the original. These officers, according to the first referenced footnote, did not "believe that the general consistency of results obtained from the two methodologies should encourage the presumption stated above. They believe that neither methodology produces very credible results, but they have considerably more confidence in the direct-costing approach."]

225. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–8–72 Washington, October 26, 1972.

SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK

Scope Note

This NIE assesses the strengths and capabilities of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, discusses questions of policy with respect to those forces, and estimates their size and composition over the next several years.

Summary and Conclusions

I. Present Status of Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack

General

A. An estimate on Soviet forces for intercontinental attack is subject to some special difficulties this year. For one thing, the strategic arms limitation (SAL) agreements concluded in May have profound implications both political and military. They create a new milieu, and affect both the choices open to the Soviets and the way in which they will be exercised. In addition, the Soviet forces for intercontinental attack are in a kind of interim phase technically, and there is much uncertainty about the characteristics of new systems being developed. The issues involved are taken up in depth in the body of the paper, but only some can be resolved on present evidence. This summary sets forth (1) essential facts about present Soviet forces for intercontinental attack (2) considerations bearing on Soviet policy choices and (3) some likely changes in the characteristics of these forces. It concludes with a brief description of the illustrative future forces contained in the body of the paper and brief comments on the likely future shape of Soviet forces.

B. In the course of the past decade, the Soviets have engaged in a vigorous and costly buildup of the various elements of their forces for intercontinental attack. As a result of this effort, the Soviets had operational on 1 October 1972 an estimated 1,527 ICBM launchers, including 120 SS–11 launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk which, though possibly intended for use against European targets, are nevertheless capable of reaching the US, 516 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and 195 heavy bombers and tankers.

C. The large-scale deployment programs for ICBMs which began in the 1960s have now run their course, but the construction of new types of silos and certain activity at the test ranges indicate that Soviet ICBM programs are entering a new phase characterized by emphasis on qualitative improvements. The new silos are found at the Tyuratam

missile test center and at several missile complexes. Two basic sizes are involved—one large and one small. The new silos probably will be harder to disable than existing silos. There is evidence which suggests that silos at operational ICBM complexes will be converted to the new configurations.

D. It appears that two new liquid propellant missile systems are under development at Tyuratam which are to be used both in new silos and in reconstructed silos. Launch phase tests of these missiles have already taken place; down range flight testing of the smaller of the two probably has begun as well. The smaller missile is in the SS-11 class, and we think it will be deployed in reconstructed SS–11 silos. It may also be deployed in 60 new small silos at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, but there is evidence that these silos will house the SS–11 Mod 3, at least initially. The larger missile is in the SS–9 class; the available evidence suggests that it could be either the size of the SS-9 or somewhat larger. We expect this missile to be deployed in the 25 new large silos located at SS–9 complexes and in reconstructed SS–9 silos. In addition, flight tests have begun at the Plesetsk missile test center on a solid-propellant missile which could be entirely new or a highly modified SS–13.

E. Twenty-seven Y-class submarines, each equipped with 16 launch tubes, are currently operational, and an additional 4 are fitting out or conducting sea trials prior to entering service. The Soviets have launched a modified Y-class submarine which differs from all previous units of that class. This submarine, which has been designated the D-class, is longer than the Y-class and has 12 launch tubes rather than 16. We believe that it will carry the SS–NX–8 missile, which has a much greater range than the SS–N–6 missile carried by Y-class submarines.

F. The Soviet force of intercontinental bombers and tankers consists of 110 Bears, 70 of which carry air-to-surface missiles, and 85 Bisons, including 50 tankers. The first units of a new strategic bomber—the Backfire—could become operational by late 1973. All but the Air Force continue to believe that it is best suited for use against Europe and Asia. The Air Force believes that it is suitable for a variety of missions including intercontinental attack.

The Principal Types of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

G. The SS–11 Mod 1, by far the most numerous of Soviet ICBMs, is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) at intercontinental range of [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. There is disagreement about its yield,[2] but whichever view is correct, the missile is still suitable only for attacking soft targets. In 1969, testing began on two new versions of the SS-11, both apparently developed to help penetrate antiballistic missile defenses. Testing on one version ceased in December 1970 and the program has almost certainly been terminated. The other version, now called the Mod 3, has three re-entry vehicles (RVs) which are not independently targetable. There is disagreement about the yield of this weapon as well,[3] but again it is clearly suitable only for attacking soft targets. Testing of the Mod 3 continues, and deployment is likely to begin later this year.

H. The SS–9 exists in four variants: Mod 1, which carries an RV weighing about 9,500 pounds; Mod 2, whose RV weighs about 13,500 pounds; Mod 3, which has been tested both as a depressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) and as a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS); and Mod 4, which carries 3 RVs.

I. There is general agreement that the SS–9 was developed to provide better accuracy and a larger payload than the older SS–7, presumably for use against hard targets—e.g., the US Minuteman system. The Mod 1, carrying a warhead estimated to have a yield [*less than 1 line not declassified*] appears reasonably well adapted for this purpose. In 1965, however, the Soviets began to test the Mod 2, which, with its heavier payload, is estimated to have a yield of [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The Mod 2 actually reached operational status before the Mod 1, and we estimate that three quarters or more of all operationally deployed SS–9s are Mod 2s. But the Mod 2 has never actually demonstrated enough range to reach any Minuteman complex. We believe that its demonstrated range could be increased sufficiently to cover all of them by using up more of the available propellant, removing telemetry packages, etc. It remains curious, however, that the Mod 2, alone among the ICBMs except the SS–13, has never been tested to what we would presume to be its intended operational range.

J. The accuracy of the SS–9 must be deduced from evidence on certain aspects of the guidance system, and from estimates and assumptions about other factors. Depending upon the assumptions used and the statistical techniques employed, various results may be obtained. In the Intelligence Community, opinions as to the CEP of the SS–9 Mod 1 and Mod 2 under flight test conditions range from a low of 0.4 nm to a high of 0.7 nm; all are agreed that under operational conditions the CEP would be degraded somewhat. The significance of these differences is considerable, but the Soviets would in any event have to deploy several times the present number of SS–9 Mod 1s and Mod 2s, with their present capabilities, before achieving a force that would pose a serious threat to the Minuteman force as a whole.[4]

K. As to the SS–9 Mod 3, it would not have sufficient accuracy in either the DICBM or FOBS mode to attack hard targets effectively; its apparent function is to attack soft strategic targets, negating or delaying detection by the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. (New US warning systems give promise of reducing or eliminating this advantage.) The Mod 3 appears to have limited capability as a FOBS. It may be deployed in very small numbers; future deployment, if any, will probably also be limited.

L. The Soviets have also developed the SS–9 Mod 4, which carries three RVs. [*1 line not declassified*] For several years, there has been controversy within the Intelligence Community about whether the three RVs could be targeted independently and there is still some disagreement on this point. Some agencies believe that the Mod 4 is and will remain a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) for use against soft targets; others believe that the Mod 4 could have represented either an MRV or a multiple-independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) with limited targeting flexibility but that the development program has been terminated; still others think it was intended to be a MIRV and also believe that the development program has been terminated.[5] There is

also disagreement about the probability that the Mod 4 has been deployed, but all agree that if now deployed, it is as an MRV and in small numbers.

II. Soviet Policy and Future Programs

M. The broader reasons for the USSR's energetic buildup of its forces for intercontinental attack are neither complex nor obscure. In the early 1960s the Soviet leaders, politically and ideologically hostile to the US, and thinking and behaving as rulers of a great power, recognized that in this particular respect their military forces were conspicuously inferior to those of their most dangerous rival, the US. Consequently, they set themselves to rectify the imbalance—to achieve at a minimum a relation of rough parity. Parity in this sense cannot be objectively measured; it is essentially a state of mind. The evidence available, including Soviet statements at the SAL talks, indicates that the Soviet leaders think that they have now generally achieved this position.

N. Many aspects of the present force structure are also susceptible to simple and probably correct explanation. The Soviets built a large number of ICBMs in order to match—and then to surpass—the number of US ICBMs, and also to increase the probability that many would survive an initial US attack. They built missile-launching submarines which are highly survivable when deployed, and they retained a manned bomber force as yet another option. The intercontinental attack force is obviously capable of being used in war, but there is no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders intend deliberately to make nuclear war. The force is an attribute of power, an instrument to support policy, and a deterrent to the US.

O. Decisions about military policy and programs are probably centered on two key elements—the military and military-industrial authorities who formulate new programs, and the top political leaders. The latter have the final say, but they must operate in a context of other forces and take them into account. Decision-making appears to involve clusters of advisory and executive bodies which are likely, at times, to be in competition with one another. Bureaucratic pressures, conflicts, and constraints may be heavy on occasion. We think it unlikely that observed Soviet programs are the product of a carefully thought out strategic plan or rationale which is undeviatingly executed. It is probably fair to say that the Soviet system gives considerable weight to military claims and interests, and that it is characterized by an inertia which favors large established bureaucratic interests in general and tends to work against sharp changes in direction.

P. Looking to the future, we have little basis in evidence for estimating the content of specific decisions on strategic policy or on particular weapon programs. Soviet strategic policy will of course be affected by the specific provisions of the SAL agreements, and by the manner in which these agreements alter or appear to alter the strategic, political, and economic conditions and opportunities confronting the USSR. Decisions about future forces will also be influenced by Soviet perceptions of the US strategic threat, and by what weapons they are able to develop and the feasibility of procuring and deploying them.

Q. It seems clear that the Soviet leaders intend to maintain at a minimum such forces as will continue to give them a sense of equal security with the US. The general attitudes and policies of the USSR being what they are, it might seem obvious to infer that they will strive to exceed that minimum and to achieve marked superiority over the US in strategic weaponry. We do not doubt that they would like to attain such a position, but the question is whether they consider it a feasible objective, particularly in the light of the arms limitation agreements. They might think it feasible to seek a strategic posture that, while falling short of marked superiority, makes clear that the Soviets have advantages over the US in certain specific areas. Whether or not such advantages are significant militarily, they would help to dramatize the strategic power of the Soviet Union.

R. But even if the Soviet intention is to go no further than maintenance of "equal security", their arms programs are bound to be vigorous and demanding. This is in part because Soviet leaders must have an eye not only to what forces the US has at present, but also to what it can have, or may have, in future years even within the framework of arms control agreements. In this respect, they are likely to be cautious—to overestimate rather than underestimate the US threat. Moreover, the weapons competition nowadays is largely a technological race; the USSR is impelled to press forward its research and development (R&D) lest it be left behind. Soviet weapon programs also tend to attain a momentum of their own; the immense apparatus of organizations, installations, personnel, vested interests, and so on, tends to proceed in its endeavors unless checked by some decisive political authority.

S. In some respects, these tendencies will be reinforced now that the SAL agreements have been concluded. For military and political reasons, the Soviet leaders will wish at least to keep pace with the US. Also the leadership has a personal and political stake in insuring that the USSR suffers no real or apparent erosion of its relative position. It will want to maintain a strong bargaining position for the follow-on negotiations, and to develop new options in the event that future talks break down.

T. On the other hand, there are constraints upon Soviet arms programs beyond those imposed by the terms of the SAL agreements. The most obvious is economic: resources are not unbounded; the civilian economy demands its share; one weapon competes with another for allocations; and intercontinental attack forces compete with strategic defense and general purpose forces. The various bureaucracies with interests in one or another area compete partly with rational argument and partly in sheer political infighting. Soviet leaders must also consider how far they may wish to press their own programs lest they provoke countervailing programs in the US. And they must assess not only the present and future US threat, but also that from China, and elsewhere.

U. In the context of arms control, other pressures for moderation will be at work. The SAL agreements have been hailed in the USSR as a successful manifestation of the current Soviet policy of détente; consequently there will be incentives to avoid actions which, though not actually violating the agreements, might jeopardize them. Many of the top political leaders, and most notably Brezhnev, have identified themselves personally with the accords, and would have much to lose politically if they came unstuck.

Similarly, various groups in the USSR now have a stake in the agreements, as a consequence of a long and difficult process of negotiation which undoubtedly required a delicate balancing of individual interests. Any step which might constitute a threat to the agreements would probably disturb this balance.

V. While the foregoing considerations probably govern the nature of Soviet decisions as to future weapon programs, they provide us with little or no basis on which to estimate what these programs will be and, in particular, their features in detail. We have never had solid evidence on these matters, and there is no reason to expect that we shall have such evidence in the future. Moreover, as the past 10 years have shown, technological advance can produce vigorous action and reaction between military programs of the USSR and the US.

W. Yet the possibilities are not unlimited, certainly in the next five years or so. For one thing, intercontinental weapon systems are of such complexity that their development, testing, and deployment take a long time. We can therefore estimate with much confidence that the kinds of weapon systems deployed by the Soviets during the next two years or so will be those already in operation or in the late stages of development. Even in the period from two to five years from now the force will be composed largely of existing kinds of delivery vehicles, but it could change substantially by the end of the period of this Estimate.

X. As a result of the SAL accords, the main questions about the future of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack center more than ever on the pace and scope of technological change. Also as a consequence of the accords, and of the opportunities and risks they present, future strategic programming decisions will probably be even more directly influenced than in the past by the Soviet leadership's sense of stability or change in its strategic relationship with the US. To be sure, as China moves closer to establishing a credible nuclear force, the need to counter Chinese capabilities will also affect Soviet plans. For many years to come, however, Soviet planning of strategic offensive weapons is likely to be concerned primarily with the US arsenal, in terms both of the strategic threat it poses and the diplomatic and political leverage it affords.

Y. The next few years should see significant qualitative improvements in Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, as the USSR pushes ahead with its R&D and exercises options open to it under the SAL accords. The most important of these improvements are likely to be in accuracy of missiles, in MIRVs for them, and in survivability.

1. *Accuracy*.[6] We have for some time thought that the Soviets would incorporate greater accuracy in follow-on missile systems, and we now have some positive indications of this intent. The Soviets appear to be moving toward less blunt RVs for their missiles. Such RVs pass through the atmosphere more quickly, and are thus less subject to deflection while in the atmosphere. Improvements in the components of present Soviet guidance systems and a continuation of the recent trend to less blunt RVs could result in CEPs as low as about 0.25 nm for ICBMs. The Soviets could achieve significantly smaller CEPs but this would require, in addition, wholly new techniques of guidance. It is too early to tell what methods of guidance are being employed in the new ICBMs described earlier, [*2 lines not declassified*].

2. *MIRVs*. We continue to believe that the Soviets will develop MIRVs, including some with the yields and accuracies necessary to attack hard targets. We estimate that it would take at least two years of flight testing to develop a MIRV system, and at least an additional year if wholly new techniques of guidance, designed to achieve very high accuracies, were also involved.
3. *Survivability*. The USSR's concern about the survivability of its forces will surely continue strong as the US deploys increasingly large numbers of independently targetable RVs. In addition to the employment of active defenses, survivability can be achieved through hardness and mobility. The new silos under construction promise to be considerably harder than present types, and so do reconstructed SS–9 and SS–11 silos. The Soviets could also deploy mobile ICBMs, an option not actually barred by the SAL accords; we continue to think this unlikely, the more so because of the unilateral US statement opposing this development.[7] We do expect the Soviets to replace their older ICBMs with SLBMs as permitted by the agreements, in part to achieve greater survivability.

Z. We have little evidence concerning the qualitative improvements to be incorporated in the three new ICBMs. We are fairly confident that the new large missile will carry a heavier payload than the SS–9, and the new small liquid-propellant missile a heavier payload than the SS–11. Although there is as yet no evidence on the point, we believe that one or more of these missiles will carry MIRVs, in due course if not at first, and that all will incorporate at least some improvements in accuracy. More definitive judgments on these missiles cannot be made until more data become available.

AA. As to ballistic missile submarines, in two years or so the Soviets will have as many launchers on their Y- and D-class submarines as the US has in the Polaris force, and these launchers will constitute a substantial portion of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. We expect the current SSBN production program to continue for some time, with most if not all future units consisting of the 12–tube D-class carrying the SS–NX–8. There is no direct evidence of another new class of ballistic missile submarines, but we believe that one will appear in the next five years or so. A new construction hall is being built at the Severodvinsk shipyard, which may be for a new class. A new submarine with more launch tubes than the D-class would permit the Soviets to come closer to the combination of 62 modern ballistic missile submarines and 950 launchers allowed by the SAL agreements.

BB. We have judged for the past several years that as their ICBM and SLBM forces grew, the Soviets would come to rely less and less on their intercontinental bombers. Those missile forces have now reached significant proportions, but there has been no phase-out or appreciable attrition of the heavy bombers and tankers in Long Range Aviation for several years, or any significant reduction in their training activity. Thus, it appears that current Soviet leaders believe that the advantages afforded by an intercontinental bomber force, for the present at least, are worth the cost of retaining one. If they persist in this view, they must decide whether to put their rapidly aging aircraft through more difficult and costly rehabilitation programs than in the past, or, alternatively, to go for a new heavy bomber which would give them greater capabilities for intercontinental

attack than their present force does.

CC. It is evident that there are many uncertainties regarding the future makeup of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. In order to depict a range of possible developments, we present in Section V of this Estimate[8] five illustrative forces representing different levels of effort by the Soviets and different degrees or rates of technological advance within the constraints of the interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons.[9] Three of them postulate that the Soviets do *not* introduce new and highly accurate guidance systems for their missiles within the period of this Estimate. Force 3 represents about the most the Soviets could achieve under this postulate; it assumes that new missile systems reach initial operational capability in the minimum possible time. Force 2 illustrates what could happen if some difficulties and delays were encountered during development. Force 1 postulates, in addition, less ambitious technological goals than those of Forces 3 and 2. Two other forces postulate that the Soviets *do* introduce new and highly accurate guidance systems for their missiles, providing accuracies of the order of 0.15 nm CEP. Force 5 postulates the introduction of such accuracies and other improvements later in the decade. Force 5 constitutes a limiting case, and, in a sense, an artificial one, illustrating what the Soviets could theoretically achieve under the interim agreement if they have highly ambitious programs already well under way and encounter no significant setbacks or delays.[10]

DD. On the whole, we think the Soviets will probably head into the next round of SAL talks with something like the goals of Force 3. They probably will be forced to settle for some slippages and delays of the sort illustrated on an across-the-board basis in Force 2. The outcome would then be something between Force 3 and Force 2. We wish to emphasize, however, that these and the other models are strictly illustrative, and not to be regarded as confident estimates. As one moves beyond the next two years or so, all projections become increasingly uncertain; beyond five years they are highly speculative.

[Omitted here is the 64–page Discussion portion of the estimate, which includes the following sections: I. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, II. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, III. Heavy Bombers and Tankers, IV. Soviet Decision-Making on Military Policy and Programs, and V. Illustrative Future Forces. Also omitted are an Appendix to Section V, a Glossary of Missile Terms, and Annex A: Estimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Intercontinental Weapon Systems.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except for the representatives of the FBI and Department of the Treasury, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE, excluding the appendix,

glossary, and annex, is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] See paragraph 24. [Footnote in the original. [*3½ lines not declassified*]]

[3] See paragraph 27. [Footnote in the original. [*3½ lines not declassified*]]

[4] See paragraph 13 for a discussion of the differing views on accuracy and paragraph 14 for a discussion of the effect of differences in accuracy and yield. [Footnote in the original. [*5½ lines not declassified*]]

[5] See paragraph 19. [Footnote in the original. According to paragraph 19, CIA and State held the first position, DIA and Air Force the second, and NSA, Army, and Navy the third.]

[6] Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, the Director, National Security Agency, and Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believe this Estimate overstates the improvements in ICBM accuracies the Soviets might achieve during the period of this Estimate. For their views, see footnotes to paragraphs 54, 57, and 58 in Section I. [Footnote in the original. Phillips and Keegan, in the referenced footnotes to Section I, which dealt with ICBMs, maintained that a flight test program of at least 5 years would be required for the Soviets to achieve a CEP significantly better than 0.25 nm.]

[7] Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not agree with this judgment. For his views, see his footnote to paragraph 49 in Section I. [Footnote in the original. According to the referenced footnote, Keegan believed "that the Soviets would deploy mobile ICBMs if they considered it to their advantage. Noting the Soviets' refusal to include mobile ICBMs in the SAL Agreement, he believes it unlikely that the unilateral US statement on mobile ICBMs will deter the Soviets from deploying them."]

[8] Section V, not printed, dealt with Illustrative Future Forces, including ICBMs, SSBNs and SLBMs, and strategic bombers. The section includes five alternative force deployments.

[9] Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Maj. Gen. William E. Potts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, are in fundamental disagreement with several aspects of Section V. For their views see their footnotes throughout that Section. [Footnote in the original.]

[10] Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that Forces 2–5 overstate the missile accuracies the Soviets could achieve in the time periods reflected in those models. For his reasons, see his footnote to paragraph 54 in Section I. [Footnote in the original. See footnote 6 above.]

226. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 11–3–72 Washington, November 2, 1972.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Summary and Conclusions

A. Despite a sustained and costly effort over the past several decades, Soviet progress in developing strategic defenses has not matched progress made in offensive capabilities. The Soviet agreement to the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missiles (ABMs), in effect, indicated recognition of this situation. The Treaty will, of course, have a major impact on future Soviet defensive developments, and, as we point out below, we do not expect the Soviets to develop systems or forces capable of overcoming the offensive lead.

B. Soviet defenses against ballistic missile attack are negligible and show no prospect of becoming effective against a major attack; the Treaty specifically limits missile defenses. There is no evidence that the Soviets will in the next decade be able to negate the threat posed by Western nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). And Soviet air defenses, which already have problems in dealing with low-altitude attacks, face the prospect of further degradation as the US deploys new air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) on present and proposed aircraft.

Air Defenses

C. Soviet air defenses had, as of 1 October 1972, some 4,000 ground-based radars at 1,000 radar sites, 3,000 interceptor aircraft, and over 10,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers at some 1,100 sites and complexes. These defenses are deployed in barriers, across the main approach corridors, and around key centers. The defenses are integrated into an air defense system which increasingly uses automated techniques for faster and more effective control.

D. These integrated forces provide a formidable defense against aircraft and large radar cross section aerodynamic ASMs penetrating at medium and high altitudes in all weather conditions. This capability could, however, be degraded by use of electronic countermeasures, defense suppression, and proper selection of penetration routes and altitudes. Capabilities are extremely limited against low-altitude (below 1,000 feet) penetrations and almost non-existent against attacks by higher velocity, low radar cross section ASMs like the US short-range attack missile (SRAM).

E. Defense against low-altitude attack is made difficult by the fact that the attacking aircraft or ASMs are hard to detect and track, particularly against the background of ground clutter. Soviet air surveillance below about 1,000 feet is spotty at best. We expect the Soviets to continue to improve their low-altitude radar coverage by

increasing the number of ground radar sites and by installing more mast-mounted radars. In addition, we continue to believe that they will develop an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) with an overland look-down radar in the late 1970s or thereafter.

F. We also believe that the Soviets could develop an advanced long-range, all-weather interceptor with a look-down, shoot-down capability by the late 1970s. Such an aircraft would complement the overland AWACS. But they may not wait until the late 1970s before deploying a new fighter. While unlikely, they could bring in a new low-altitude fighter, based on an existing model, in the mid-1970s.

G. At the present time the Soviets have no defensive system which could reliably engage an ASM such as SRAM. Only the SA–5 utilizing a nuclear warhead could have a very limited capability against SRAM. To meet this threat the Soviets may attempt further to improve SAM systems already deployed, although this does not appear to be the most effective option for them. However, if attempted, it would have to be done without giving the appearance that the SAMs were being upgraded to perform a ballistic missile defense mission as prohibited in the Treaty. On the other hand, the Soviets might design a completely new SAM system which would be capable of engaging both ASMs and aircraft penetrating at low altitudes. To be effective, such a weapon system would have to be widely deployed and would require integration with new, more efficient surveillance and command and control systems.

Ballistic Missile Defense

H. The Soviets have installed a ballistic missile early warning system on the periphery of the USSR and an ABM system around Moscow. This ABM system would be susceptible to saturation and exhaustion. It cannot discriminate between re-entry vehicles (RVs) and penetration aids outside the atmosphere, and the lack of high acceleration missiles prevents it from waiting for atmospheric sorting after the threatening objects enter the atmosphere.

I. The Moscow System's nominal 300 nautical mile (nm) range gives it an inherent capability to defend regions outside the Moscow area. With only 64 launchers and no provision for rapid reload, the defense would be thin. Used to protect the immediate Moscow area, and utilizing a shoot-look-shoot technique, the system could probably be effective against about 45 targets—including RVs and penetration aids. Thus, the defense would at best be effective against an accidental or unauthorized launch or against a small, third country attack.

J. The present limitations of the Moscow System and continuing ABM research programs at Sary Shagan suggest that the Soviets will want over the next decade to improve and fill out the Moscow defenses to the 100 launchers allowed under the Treaty. If such improvement starts soon, a new exoatmospheric system (ABM–X–2) under development at Sary Shagan would be the most likely candidate. It would provide a greater target handling and engagement capacity, but would, of course, still be of limited capability.

K. The Soviets are also developing another ABM system (ABM–X–3) at Sary Shagan. The first sites could be deployed rather quickly (on the order of a year from start of construction to initial operational capability), although widespread deployment might require 5 years or more. This system could, without the addition of an appropriate long-range acquisition radar, provide a thin defense against RVs which exhibit large radar cross sections and re-enter the atmosphere relatively slowly (such as Polaris or postulated Chinese RVs). Defense against more sophisticated weapons (e.g., Poseidon or Minuteman) would require an interceptor with much higher acceleration. Even so, if deployed in the near future, this system seems at present to be the best candidate for defense of an area containing intercontinental ballistic missiles as allowed under the Treaty.

Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines

L. The Soviets have demonstrated no capability to detect US SSBNs on patrol in the open ocean. The USSR has no equivalent to the US sound surveillance system and thus cannot keep track of patrolling SSBNs by this method. Further, Soviet submarines are not able to trail US SSBNs covertly (using passive sonars) because of the noise advantage enjoyed by the US submarines. The Soviets have not attempted to maintain overt trail (using active sonars) on patrolling SSBNs, and we believe that if they did they probably could not maintain it for extended periods. Nor is open ocean search by Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft effective against SSBNs.

M. We do not anticipate that the Soviets will arrive at any fundamental solution to detecting US SSBNs within the decade. The basic difficulty of detecting SSBNs on patrol in the open ocean will remain. We do, however, expect the Soviets to improve their acoustic detection devices, to install them on ships and submarines, and perhaps to deploy, in limited areas, some improved fixed acoustic arrays and moored buoys. Even though the Soviets will reduce the noise levels of their submarines, the noise advantage enjoyed by US SSBNs is such that, as a force, they will not be vulnerable as a result of these improvements during the 10 year period of this Estimate.

N. We expect the Soviets to improve their magnetic anomaly detection capability and to develop other non-acoustic detection methods. However, they would still face the problem of integrating the non-acoustic detection techniques into their antisubmarine warfare forces, and none of the better understood methods appears to offer a solution to the problem of submarine detection in the open ocean.

Antisatellite Defense

O. Since 1968, the Soviets have been conducting an active orbital intercept program. They have demonstrated on at least seven different occasions that they are capable of engaging satellites in orbit at altitudes between 100 and 600 nm. On the basis of these tests, we believe the Soviets can conduct non-nuclear attacks on satellites below about 1,000 nm. Use of a powerful enough launch vehicle might permit them in the future to engage satellites at geostationary (19,300 nm) altitudes. Another approach available to

the Soviets would be to use the Galosh ABM interceptor to conduct non-nuclear attacks on satellites up to 300 nm and perhaps as high as 450 nm, although at this altitude a nuclear warhead might be required.

P. Considering the importance of space reconnaissance to the viability of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements, we continue to believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets would actively interfere with US satellites. They have agreed in the Treaty to Limit ABMs and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles not to interfere with national means of verification. They also would not wish to cause US retaliation against their own considerable satellite reconnaissance program.

Future Force Development

Q. The development of the future Soviet strategic defense force structure will be heavily influenced by the Treaty on Limitation of ABMs and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles. The ABM Treaty has the more immediate and direct impact, but the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles is particularly significant to this Estimate in that it does not limit aircraft or missiles delivered by aircraft. The agreements at one and the same time simplify and complicate estimates of future Soviet strategic forces. They simplify by permitting force projections in line with the agreements, as in the case of ABMs. But they complicate by raising the question of under what conditions the agreements might be terminated, and what force deployments might occur after such a break. And future Soviet defensive forces will not only be affected by the interaction of momentum and constraints in the USSR on the development, production, and deployment of successive generations of new weapon systems, they will also be sensitive to the course of negotiations with the US. The developing Chinese strategic threat to the USSR is also a complicating factor in assessing the future developments in Soviet strategic defenses.

R. If the Soviets believed the prognosis to be favorable for further agreements between the US and USSR to limit strategic arms, they would probably build their strategic defenses more slowly than in the past. In fact, if they judged that the US would eventually reduce its forces, they might do little more than complete programs underway and continue essential R&D activities. More likely, they might feel impelled to continue to improve their defenses across the board within the limits of the present agreements in order to enhance their security vis-à-vis the US and the People's Republic of China and to improve their bargaining position in the strategic arms limitation negotiations.

S. The Soviets might, of course, be prepared to stop negotiations and terminate existing agreements if they came to believe that their security or position of equality with the US were threatened. In this case, the Soviets might build up permitted systems while the Treaty was in effect and prepare to deploy additional systems after 1977. Or negotiations might deteriorate to the extent that they or the US would withdraw from the Treaty prior to 1977 and embark upon a more intensive buildup.

T. We have, in Section IX of this Estimate,[2] postulated four force models which illustrate

a range of possible defensive deployments under differing conditions during the remainder of the decade.[3] Force Models I and II illustrate deployments the Soviets might undertake within the terms of the ABM Treaty. Model I represents a minimum effort in which little is done beyond completing programs already in progress. Force Model II illustrates a greater level of effort, but deployments are still within the limits of the ABM Treaty. Force Models III and IV illustrate different postures the Soviets might adopt if the Treaty were terminated. Model III is representative of a continuation of the arms competition as it was before the limitation agreements, while Model IV illustrates a maximum defensive effort short of actual war.

U. Force Models I and IV represent a low and a high level of effort, respectively; both are quite feasible under the assumptions given, but we consider them to be unlikely extremes. We believe that Force Model II represents a likely level of effort and technical progress. It assumes that the US and the USSR would continue present strategic arms limitation agreements and reach new ones, and that neither country would have to contend with a third country threat so great as to cause withdrawal from the agreements. On the other hand, if further agreements are not reached, and the ABM Treaty were to be terminated in 1977, the Soviets might build defenses roughly equivalent to those shown in Force Model III. But we wish to emphasize that these models are strictly illustrative, and not to be regarded as confident estimates or as projections for defense planning. As one moves beyond the next 2 years or so, all projections become increasingly uncertain; beyond 5 years they are highly speculative.

[Omitted here is the 65–page Discussion portion of the estimate including the following sections: I. The Soviet Approach to Strategic Defense, II. Strategic Air Defense, III. Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, IV. Strategic Defense Against Submarines, V. Antisatellite Defense, VI. Soviet Civil Defense, VII. The Framework of Future Soviet Strategic Defensive Policy and Planning, VIII. Development and Deployment of New Defensive Systems, and IX. Illustrative Future Forces. Omitted also are a Glossary and 28 pages of Tables of Estimated Characteristics and Performance.]

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained on the grounds that the subject matter was outside their jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE, excluding the glossary and tables of characteristics, is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

[2] Section IX discusses Illustrative Future Forces.

[3] Vice Adm. Vincent de Poix, USN, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Maj. Gen. William E. Potts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army;

and Rear Adm. Earl F. Rectanus, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, are in fundamental disagreement with several aspects of Section IX. For their views see their footnotes throughout that Section. [Footnote in the original.]

227. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, November 29, 1972.

SUBJECT
Standby Draft

There is a need for Presidential guidance to cover planning for the Selective Service System after July. The last guidance covering the Selective Service System (NSDM 53)[2] came out in 1970 and deferred a decision on the standby draft. Nothing has been done since.

Current Status

Selective Service is planning on the assumption that the system will continue essentially unchanged after July. Potential draftees would be classified, examined, and a pool of 100,000 will be ready for induction within 30 days. A wide range of other alternatives are being suggested by other agencies but the government has no study which integrates these suggestions and considers strategic requirements such as likely future mobilization requirements or the capacity of the training establishment to accept personnel during mobilization.

There is clear need to coordinate planning for the future of the Selective Service System. I have, therefore, drafted a memo to interested agencies which directs a short study to consider:

—Future mobilization needs in terms of manpower requirements and the capacity of a mobilized training establishment to expand and accept new recruits.
—Alternative standby draft arrangements that would be capable of delivering required personnel on schedule. These will be evaluated in terms of their cost and other relevant factors.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to sign the enclosed memo (Tab A)[3] setting out terms of reference for the study.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, NSSM 165. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum bears a stamped note that reads: "The President has seen."

[2] Document 139.

[3] Document 228.

[4] The President initialed his approval. A typed postscript indicates that Flanigan and Cole concurred in recommending approval of Kissinger's recommendation.

228. National Security Study Memorandum 165[1]

Washington, December 3, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Selective Service
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Standby Draft

The President has directed the preparation of a study of the standby draft. The purpose of the study is to investigate potential manpower mobilization needs in future crises and alternative ways of fulfilling those requirements.

The study should consider requirements for non-volunteer military manpower in (1) a national emergency requiring large scale manpower mobilization, and (2) a more limited mobilization requiring significant increases in projected military manpower strengths but not total mobilization. The demand for non-volunteer manpower should be investigated under the assumptions that needs are met primarily through (a) call-up of Reserves and the National Guard, and (b) through conscription and draft motivated enlistments. Insofar as possible, specific requirements for non-volunteer manpower in terms of both quantity and timing should be developed which take into account the capacity of the training establishment to effectively train the arriving personnel.

Based on these mobilization schedules, the study should consider the alternative standby draft arrangements capable of fulfilling these requirements in terms of (a) changes required to the Selective Service System as it now exists, (b) implementing legislation needed (if any), and (c) cost. The study should also consider organizational and legal factors that influence system capabilities under each alternative arrangement.

The study should assume that:

(1) The President will not request extension of draft induction authority beyond July 1973.
(2) The Regular and Reserve forces will be maintained at about current levels and meet manpower requirements by voluntary means.

The study should be prepared by an NSC Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the NSC staff, chaired by the representative of the Secretary of Defense. The study should be submitted for the President's consideration by

December 20, 1972.[2]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, NSSM 165. Confidential.

[2] Laird sent the interagency response to NSSM 165 to Kissinger on December 22 under a covering memorandum. The 28–page study, endorsed by Laird, Tarr, and Lincoln, reached the following recommendation: "The Selective Service should be structured at reduced strength to register and process personnel including giving pre-induction physical and mental examinations. This option requires neither changes in the Selective Service Act, nor additional legislation." Weinberger dissented, believing "that a more rapid induction procedure can be developed which would shorten delivery time under a more austere Selective Service System to meet or reduce the induction time of the recommended option." (Ibid.)

229. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

CM–2362–72 Washington, December 12, 1972.

SUBJECT
Taking Stock

1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 3 November 1972, which requested comments on those Department of Defense programs that are within my area of cognizance.[2]
2. (U) The past four years have been a period of gradual adjustment of our Defense planning and operations in support of the concepts of the Nixon Doctrine, Realistic Deterrence and Total Force Planning. A summary of the key issues, objectives, and accomplishments is included in the enclosure.[3]
3. (TS/RD) Although much progress has been made during this period, there are several continuing and new problems that have not been solved and require attention:
   a. Worldwide politico-military trends will make it increasingly difficult to maintain the world power balance and the solidarity of our present alliance structure. As we begin a new round of negotiations, our national security must be insured by guaranteeing at least equivalence with the USSR. Also, the nation's overall military strategy must be under continual review as relative military strengths and alliance relationships change.
   b. If we are to retain our leadership role in the NATO Alliance, we must take into consideration the legitimate concerns of our Allies regarding their security and the cohesiveness of the NATO Alliance and take action to counter Allied suspicions that the United States is reaching secret understandings with the Soviets.
   c. Qualitative improvements and a balanced force must be optimized to avoid any decrease in our present relative capability. There must be assurance in the survivability of our deterrent forces. Qualitative improvements should provide our strategic retaliatory forces with a hard target kill capability.
   d. Urgent efforts are needed to modernize the tactical nuclear weapon stockpile. Modernization will overcome certain inadequacies of the present stockpile such as slow reaction times, unwanted collateral effects, delivery inaccuracies and other deficiencies attributable to the technical age of the systems. Unless prompt and vigorous action is taken at the highest level of government to restart reactors, the United States could be faced with a national security problem of major proportions.
   e. Modernization and upgrading of equipment while remaining within fiscal constraints will continue to be difficult. Research and development and the acquisition of new systems face an inflationary economy and the realization of a significant increase in Soviet capabilities.

f. Continued emphasis is needed to improve the survivability, reliability, standardization and interface of the WWMCCS to insure adequate command and control of our forces by the NCA. Recent reorganization should improve management in this area.

g. Timely, reliable and adequate intelligence is needed to provide rapid military response, flexible options, and the capability to monitor technological achievements of our increasingly strong potential enemies. The status of posthostilities intelligence arrangements in Southeast Asia remains of concern to the defense intelligence community.

h. Regarding our strategic mobility, any further reduction of forward deployed forces places potentially greater demands on strategic mobility forces in the event of a requirement to reinforce and resupply US forces committed overseas. We have instituted improvements in strategic mobility planning and movement control which provide for greater involvement of the transportation operating agencies in the planning process. These improvements have resulted in more efficient utilization of strategic mobility assets. Although we continue to experience difficulty in convincing the international community that strategic mobility is vital to the security of all nations, progress is being made, particularly in the NATO community. Also, we must continue to maintain our sealift and airlift capability for the rapid deployment of forces in a reinforcement role or for a potential "forcible entry or reentry" mission if necessary.

i. Adequate Lines of Communication (LOC) for wartime support of US forces in Central Europe by means of the UK/BENELUX LOC are not yet a reality. Although approved as a concept in September 1969, Congressional opposition to the concept for the positioning of LOC/PORT equipment remains. In addition, the equipment for the LOC/PORT has not been available and essential country-to-country agreements and technical arrangements have not all been consummated. As a result, in the initial stages of a conventional war, the United States would be unable to support sustained combat operations in Europe without degradation to its reinforcing and combat capability. Therefore, all arrangements required to establish a wartime LOC in Europe, particularly the pre-positioning in Europe of essential LOC equipment, must be aggressively pursued.

j. Management of Security Assistance is a continuing problem. Proposed programs must be credible and supportable, if we are going to avoid criticism by Congress with the resultant reduction of funds. In addition, DOD should continue to support the traditional relationships between the Chief of MAAGs and Diplomatic missions and resist any initiative that would eliminate the military chain of command in the MAAG system.

k. There is a definite need to recognize the potential dangers to our national security posture created by the increasing US dependence on foreign energy sources and to recognize this energy gap in our Foreign Policy and national security interests.

4. (TS) Perspective comments are provided on the following items:

a. It should be possible to decentralize management control in still more areas as

programs stabilize. Where possible, eliminate redundancy among the Services by vesting management of like functions in a single Service as has been done in some procurement and R&D programs.

b. Continued efforts are needed to overcome the problems associated with the attainment of an all volunteer armed force to include improvement of housing, stability, equal opportunity for advancement, job satisfaction and an equitable retirement benefits program. Improvements in these areas will enhance our ability to obtain and retain the quantity and quality of personnel required. A key to attainment of our goals is Congressional approval of the Uniform Services Special Pay Act (USSP) which provides bonus authority to attract the selected military occupational skills needed to meet our mission requirements. Our effort to achieve equal opportunity for minority personnel and women must continue. Race relations education and equal opportunity programs can and must be implemented without compromise of disciplinary or performance standards.

c. The definition of objectives for strategic forces has given new direction to our strategic force planning. The development of the Presidential sufficiency criteria has provided a clearer understanding of force requirements and helped to establish priorities for developing proposed defense programs. We are in complete agreement that flexibility should be incorporated into defense programs to hedge against failures in negotiations, increased threats, or unexpected failures in US systems, and to preserve the ability to capitalize on opportunities that arise. However, additional emphasis and clarification of guidance for strategic forces are required to insure that proposed programs satisfy our national security objectives. We believe that the capability to successfully terminate nuclear war at the lowest level of nuclear conflict is vital. If our national authorities are to have the options necessary to deal with all levels of crises, we should develop both an assured destruction capability against urban/industrial targets and the capability to selectively destroy an enemy military target system.

d. Guidance for general purpose forces has appropriately stressed the priority importance of deterring conflict in the NATO area and providing capabilities for joint defense should deterrence fail. A prime prerequisite of these forces is that they be versatile, capable of operating in a nuclear or non-nuclear environment with realistic and effective employment options.

e. Substantial progress has been made in implementing the Total Force Concept. Reserve and National Guard forces are being built up to strength slowly and first line equipment is being provided as it becomes available. However, a more realistic method of appraising the actual capabilities and limitations of Reserve forces as a part of the Total Force Concept should be undertaken to avoid the possibility of over dependence on these forces in time of crisis. Also, security assistance programs to strengthen our allies should be selectively tailored for allies capable of assuming major roles in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine.

f. Regarding General Support or Overhead as related to mission accomplishment, it is anticipated that additional areas will be found for improving combat to support

ratios. Also, approval of base reductions/closures consistent with reduced funding and force levels is essential if any significant overhead savings are to be made.

g. The readiness of our existing forces to meet a contingency was adequately demonstrated during the recent surge effort in Southeast Asia. As redeployment is completed, reduced personnel turbulence, and improved stabilization of unit assignment should result. However, readiness will require continued emphasis because of its greater significance in the post-Vietnam period when lower force levels will require maximum effectiveness from the resources available.

5. (C) A key impediment experienced in carrying out our tasks is the annual requirement to operate for several months under a continuing resolution until the Congress acts on the budget. This decreases the effectiveness of our management efforts. When budget reductions occur after several months of the fiscal year have already passed, severe actions are required in the remaining months to meet the budgetary constraints.

6. (S) In summary, there has been much progress in the past four years. However, there is much remaining to be accomplished. The next few years will be especially challenging because of the significant effort which will be required to convince all elements of our society that we cannot afford to let down our military guard. Strategic realities must continue to predominate in providing for our common defense.

T. H. Moorer

[1] Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 28, Taking Stock. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

[2] Laird's November 3 memorandum to Moorer, the military service secretaries, and select Defense Department officials, asked them to review "the past four years, in terms of the key issues, objectives, accomplishments and failures that from your perspective reflect the effectiveness of the Administration's stewardship." He also asked that recipients "identify those continuing or perhaps new problems that lie ahead." (Ibid.)

[3] Attached but not printed is a 10-page paper entitled "Summary of Past Four Years."

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Nixon Tapes: Executive Office Building Tape no. 332 Nixon and Kissinger, April 25, 1972, White House Tapes

CLICK BELOW TO PLAY TAPE



Finding Aid for content of this tape is on the following pages

A six-hour and six-minute Nixon White House audio tape recorded at the Old Executive Office Building. Included on this tape is an April 25, 1972 exchange between President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, in which Nixon breaches the subject of the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Although not considered by Nixon scholars to a serious proposal for the use of nuclear weapons, the exchange shows Nixon's frustration with the Vietnam War days before he launched an escalation of the war. "I'd rather use the nuclear bomb," President Nixon told Kissinger. "That, I think, would just be too much," National Security Advisor Kissinger replied. Nixon responded, "The nuclear bomb. Does that bother you?" Later Nixon remarked, “I just want you to think big."

Other subjects mentioned on this tape recorded between April 20 at 3:09 PM and April 25, 1972 at 3:35 PM include public opinion and the Vietnam War, the strategy of increased bombing of North Vietnam, the progress of the war and U.S./Soviet relations. Other participants on this tape include Alexander M. Haig, H. R. Haldeman, Alexander P. Butterfield and Ronald L. Ziegler.

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Date: April 18, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:05 pm and 8:18 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 2s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 8:18 pm.

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:05 pm and 8:18 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 26s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 8:18 pm.

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:05 pm and 8:18 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with the White House operator.

[See Conversation No. 23-26]

Conversation No. 332-4

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:05 and 8:18 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The White House operator talked with the President.

[See Conversation No. 23-27]

Conversation No. 332-5

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: 8:18 pm - 8:24 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

[See Conversation No. 23-28]

Conversation No. 332-6

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:24 pm and 8:25 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with the White House operator.

[See Conversation No. 23-29]

Conversation No. 332-7

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:24 pm and 8:25 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 53s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 8:25 pm.

Conversation No. 332-8

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: 8:25 pm - 8:45 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Charles W. Colson.

[See Conversation No. 23-30]

Conversation No. 332-9

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:45 pm and 8:51 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 19s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 8:51 pm.

Conversation No. 332-10

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 5s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:46 pm.

Conversation No. 332-11

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 7s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:46 pm.

Conversation No. 332-12

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

Tapes for dictating machine

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:46 pm.

Conversation No. 332-13

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 5s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:46 pm.

Conversation No. 332-14

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 16s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:46 pm.

Conversation No. 332-15

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President dictated a memorandum for the file.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 5s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Conversation No. 332-16

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: 2:46 pm - 2:48 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Ronald L. Ziegler.

[See Conversation No. 23-52]

Conversation No. 332-17

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 2:48 pm and 3:08 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President dictated a memorandum for the file.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 4m 16s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Conversation No. 332-18

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 2:48 pm and 3:08 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with the White House operator.

[See Conversation No. 23-53]

Conversation No. 332-19

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: 3:08 pm - 3:09 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Charles W. Colson.

[See Conversation No. 23-54]

Conversation No. 332-20

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: Unknown between 3:09 pm and 3:10 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

Dictated memorandum
-Private file

Delivery of unknown article

Sanchez's departure

Delivery of unknown article
-Location

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 3:10 pm.

Conversation No. 332-21

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: 3:10 pm - 4:10 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Charles W. Colson.

Democratic caucus
-Meeting
-Results
-Resolution on Vietnam War
-Amendments
-Samuel S. Stratton
-Thomas P. (“Tip”) O'Neill, Jr.
-Sam M. Gibbons
-Results of vote

-Carl B. Albert
-Motives for actions
-Absentees
-Substantive votes
-Results
-Election year pressures

Vietnam
-Change in public opinion
-Support for the President
-Mail
-Ronald W. Reagan
-Bary M. Goldwater
-Democratic caucus
-Administration counterattack
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Lack of condemnation by Democrats
-Brown University
-George P. Shultz
-Colson
-Nicholas Ruwe

Brown University
-Shultz
-Subsidies
-Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT]
-Laser beam
-Curtailment
-Reserve Officer Training Corps [ROTC]

The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 3:10 and 3:15 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-21A]

[See Conversation No. 23-55]

[End of telephone conversation]

Economy
-Latest news
-Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] report
-Consumer Price Index [CPI]
-Food prices
-Marina von N. Whitman
-Views

The President talked with Caspar W. Weinberger between 3:15 and 3:19 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-21B]

[See Conversation No. 23-56]

[End of telephone conversation]

Education

-Cuts
-Weinberger

Vietnam
-Democratic caucus
-Results of vote
-Press coverage
-Vote on floor
-Support for the President's opposition
-Democrats
-Republicans
-Albert
-Support for vote
-Veterans of Foreign Wars [VFW]
-Mailings to Congress
-Mobilization
-Pressure on Congress
-Labor
-Frank E. Fitzsimmons's statement
-The President's policies
-Frank L. Rizzo
-Support
-The President's appreciation
-Note
-Statement
-Richard J. Daley
-Call from David E. Bradshaw
-Possible call from the President
-Democratic party
-Charge of defeatism
-John C. Stennis
-George H. Mahon
-Noel Cook [?]
-Jack F. Kemp
-Statement in House
-Elford A. Cederberg
-Republican supporters
-Mobilization
-News reports
-*Washington Post*
-Hawks
-Clark MacGregor

International Telephone and Telegraph [ITT] case hearings
-Vote in Congress
-Byrd Amendment
-Possible outcome
-Peter M. Flanigan testimony
-Flanigan
-Testimony
-Questions
-Refusal to answer
-Prior agreement
-Public relations sense
-Testimony

-Executive session
-Questions
-Birch E. Bayh, Jr.
-Edward M. Kennedy
-Executive privilege
-Public relations
-MacGregor
-Executive privilege
-Invocation
-Flanigan
-Advisory role to the President
-Executive privilege
-Compared with Henry A. Kissinger's use of executive privilege
-Problems
-Jack Gleason
-Questions
-Handling
-Perjury
-Harold S. Geneen
-Edward J. Gerrity, Jr.
-Cash
-Answers
-Perjury
-Geneen
-Testimony
-Impact on ITT Company
-Republican counterattacks
-Editorials
-Defense of administration's integrity
-Richard G. Kleindienst
-Editorial support

Vietnam
-Editorial support for the President
-Extent
-Washington Star

-South Vietnam
-Success against North Vietnam
-North Vietnam
-Losses
-Negotiations
-Timing of election
-Advantages with administration
-Prisoners of War [POWs]
-North Vietnamese invasion
-US counterattacks
-Intensity
-North Vietnamese miscalculation
-Lyndon B. Johnson
-Air attacks
-Thomas H. Moorer
-Creighton W. Abrams
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.'s briefing

-White House staff

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 3:19 and 3:36 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-21C]

Message to Haig
-Forthcoming meeting with Colson
-Staff briefing on trip to South Vietnam
-Arrangements

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-Colson's call to William P. Rogers

The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 3:19 and 3:36 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-21D]

[See Conversation No. 23-57]

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-Unknown Lieutenant Colonel's remarks
-Press coverage
-Haig's comments

The President talked with Rogers between 3:36 and 3:43 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-21E]

[See Conversation No. 23-58]

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-Rogers
-Support
-Administration's efforts
-Melvin R. Laird
-Appraisal
-Timing
-The President's posture
-Courage
-Public recognition
-John B. Connally's assessment
-Public opinion
-Hugh S. Sidey editorial
-Kleindienst
-The President's posture
-Rowland Evans and Robert D. Novak appraisal
-Trip to Moscow
-Disregard for politics

-Publicity
-Impact on US foreign policy
-Sidey
-Press recognition
-Compared with Cuban missile crisis
-John F. Kennedy's handling
-Soviets
-Press coverage
-Praise for courage
-Soviets
-Position
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Considerations for US
-People's Republic of China [PRC] Army
-Soviet Summit
-Berlin
-Results
-Destruction of Presidency
-The President's successors
-Democrats
-Weaknesses
-Hubert H. Humphrey and Edward M. Kennedy
-Soviets
-Actions in Middle East
-Democratic weaknesses
-Presidency
-Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew
-Degree of understanding
-Connally
-Command decision
-Political risks
-Determination
-Protection for South Vietnam
-Priority over election
-PRC trip
-Benefits
-Cambodia operations
-Benefits
-Al Capp
-Aftermath
-Hardhat demonstration
-Number
-James L. Buckley
-Nelson A. Rockefeller
-Conservatism
-Kissinger
-Rockefeller
-Attica Prison riot
-The President's call
-Impact on morale
-Press coverage
-Reagan
-Conservatism
-Campus unrest
-Columbia University

-Peter J. Brennan
-Protests
-Jewish students
-Percentage
-Black students

Rizzo
-Attitudes toward Jews and blacks

Minorities
-Jews and blacks

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 12m 49s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

****

Vietnam
-Current campaign
-Administration's strategy
-Air strikes
-Hanoi
-Haiphong
-Flow of battle
-South Vietnamese performance
-Abrams's views
-Losses
-North Vietnam
-Ultimate failure
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Cabinet
-Capitol Hill
-Mood
-Support for the President
-Public opinion
-Support for the President
-Appreciation of the President's efforts
-PRC Trip
-Defense of US Troops
-Dependence on South Vietnam
-South Vietnamese casualties
-Rate
-Issue of self-defense

Economy
-Consumer Price Index [CPI] reading
-Latest figures
-Impact

-*New York Times* and *Washington Post* reports
-The President's conversation with H. R. Haldeman
-Distortions
-[William B.?] Dale's story
-*Post* story

The President's meeting with Leslie T. (“Bob”) Hope

Economy
-Latest CPI figures

The President and Colson left at 4:10 pm.

Conversation No. 332-22

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 8:53 am - 10:05 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and Alexander P. Butterfield. The recording appears to have begun while the meeting was in progress.

The President's schedule
-Dinner for retiring Senators and Congressmen
-Guest list
-Release to press
-Fred R. Harris
-Toast
-Senior Republicans
-Clark MacGregor
-Selection
-John Sherman Cooper
-Carl T. Curtis
-John W. Byrnes
-William M. Colmer
-Cooper
-Remarks
-Marine Corps Band
-Col. Albert Shoepper, leader
-Tribute
-The President's recognition
-Army Chorus
-Coffee
-Starting time
-Attire
-Number
-Tables
-Shape
-Seating
-Seniority
-Cooper
-Colmer
-Retirees

-The President's table
-George H. Mahon

Butterfield left at 8:59 am.

Pentagon Papers
-Leaks
-Daniel Ellsberg
-Preparation
-Departments of State and Defense
-Conclusions

Vietnam
-Situation in 1969

The President talked with H. R. Haldeman at an unknown time between 8:59 and 9:01 am.

[Conversation No. 332-22A]

Meeting in Old Executive Office Building [EOB] office

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-Winston Lord
-Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-The President's remarks
-John K. Andrews, Jr.
-William L. Safire
-Strengths
-Work with Kissinger
-Andrews
-Lord
-Miller [first name unknown]
-Work with Kissinger

Speeches and speechwriters
-Safire

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 8:59 and 9:01 am.

[Conversation No. 332-22B]

Meeting in Old Executive Office Building [EOB]office

[End of telephone conversation]

Speeches and speechwriters
-Safire
-Independence
-Andrews
-Haldeman

Pentagon Papers
-Leaks

-Ellsberg
-Secretary of Defense

Haldeman entered at an unknown time after 8:59 am.

Meeting with Andrews and Lord

Haldeman left at an unknown time before 9:02 am.

Andrews

Washington Post
-Story

Haldeman entered at an unknown time after 8:59 am.

Vietnam
-US bombing
-Effectiveness
-*Post* story
-Distortions
-Soviets

Rose Mary Woods entered at 9:02 am.

Taped messages and letters
-Typing
-Instructions
-Return to the President
-Format
-Instructions

Memorandum to Safire
-Delivery to Andrews
-Rough outline
-Revisions for Andrews
-Work with Lord
-Completion

Kissinger
-Location over weekend
-Soviet Union
-Arrival
-Sergei Antonov, State Security Head
-Offers to Kissinger
-Joseph W. Alsop
-Schedule
-State security
-Masseuses

Woods left at 9:05 am.

-Antonov
-Security
-The President's forthcoming trip

-Moscow film studio
-American actresses
-Soviet women
-Meeting with First Deputy Foreign Minister, Vasily V. Kuznetsov
-Andrei A. Gromyko's schedule

Andrews entered at an unknown time after 9:05 am.

Meeting with the President
-Lord's arrival

Andrews left at an unknown time before 9:06 am.

Soviet Union
-Kissinger's previous trip
-Kuznetsov's parting remarks
-Antonov's remarks
-KGB
-The President's forthcoming trip
-Translators
-Leonid I. Brezhnev
-Comments to Kissinger
-Earl L. Butz

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 9:05 am.

Andrews and Lord
-Meeting with the President

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:06 am.

Soviet Union
-Visit by Butz
-Butz's comments

Stephen B. Bull and Andrews entered at 9:06 am.

Greetings

Bull left at an unknown time before 9:07 am.

Speech by the President
-Work by Andrews and Lord
-Haig's assistance

US-Soviet relations
-Kissinger's trip
-Announcement

Lord entered at 9:07 am.

-Time

Vietnam

-The President's speech
-Time
-Current appraisal of situation
-The President's outline/rough draft
-Revisions by Andrews and Lord
-The President's guidelines
-Rhythm
-Phrases
-Order
-Suggestions
-Considerations
-Vignettes
-Lord's suggestions
-Andrews's suggestions

US-Soviet Relations
-Kissinger's trip
-Accommodations

Vietnam
-The President's speech
-US military role
-Conclusion
-Situations in 1969 and present
-Conciseness
-Losses
-Helicopter
-The President's speech
-Peace offers
-Generalities
-Cease fire
-Prisoners of War [POWs]
-The President's guidelines
-North Vietnamese build-up
-US restraints
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Figures
-Number of troops
-US response
-The President's report
-South Vietnamese performance
-Report from Abrams
-Casualties
-US air strikes
-Necessity
-Future trials and eventual victory
-Wording
-Caution
-The President's morning report
-An Loc
-*Washington Post*
-Abrams's report
-Advice from Ellsworth F. Bunker, William J. Porter and senior advisors
-Future actions
-Reduction of troops

-Number
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-Negotiations
-Porter
-Air and naval strikes
-Prevention of takeover
-Length
-Phrasing
-Soviet interpretations
-Conclusions
-Wording
-Completion of draft
-Speed
-Woods
-Andrews's and Lord's review
-Kissinger and Haig
-Deadline for the President
-Woods
-Drafts
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Laos and Cambodia
-Figures
-US bombing
-Continuation
-Conditions for cessation
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Wording
-Simplification
-Directness
-Revisions
-Importance
-The President's style
-Time limit
-Deletions from draft
-An Loc
-Sanctuaries
-Wording
-Description of North Vietnam
-Revisions
-Time element

Andrews and Lord left at 9:25 am.

Pentagon Papers
-Tactics
-Public opinion
-Indifference
-Ronald L. Ziegler's statements
-*Washington Post*

Vietnam
-Abrams
-Defense Information Office [DIO]
-Report to the President
-Laos operations

- -Problems
- -Benefits

-North Vietnamese invasion
- -Reaction of American public
  - -George H. Gallup poll
- -US bombing
  - -Poll results
- -Deployment of forces
  - -Initial successes
  - -Instructions to Haig
  - -World War I
    - -German victories over Russians
  - -South Vietnamese failures
    - -Abrams
    - -Coordinations of strategy
    - -An Loc
  - -South Vietnamese retreats
    - -B-52 strikes
  - -Mistakes
- -South Vietnamese defensive line
  - -Kontum
  - -Initial losses
    - -News reports
      - -Kissinger's briefing
  - -Highlands
    - -Lon Tien [Sp?]
- -Initial successes
  - -III Corps
  - -Kontum
  - -Pleiku
  - -Hue
  - -Pessimism
- -South Vietnamese withdrawals
  - -South Vietnamese refusal
  - -Kissinger's conversations with Moorer
- -US military
  - -William C. Westmoreland
  - -Abrams
    - -Advice to South Vietnam
- -Thieu
  - -Political problems
- -Defensive line
  - -US air strikes
    - -Location
      - -II Corps
      - -North Vietnamese armor
      - -Bridge
        - -Destruction
    - -Reports
- -News reports
  - -Henry Bradsher
    - -Retaliation
      - -Military Press Information Officers [PIOs]
  - -Abrams
    - -Handling of press

-Reporters
-Abrams, Bunker, and Melvin R. Laird
-Thieu's stance
-Hostility to administration
-Photograph
-Caption
-North Vietnamese invasion
-South Vietnamese strength
-Capabilities
-Reports
-Horror stories
-Haldeman's efforts
-John A. Scali and Herbert G. Klein
-North Vietnamese atrocities
-Need for publicity
-Publicity for US side
-Pentagon
-State Department press office
-Pentagon
-Size of Public Information Office
-Mobilization

US foreign policy
-Execution
-Kissinger and Rogers
-Lack of public relations
-Dwight D. Eisenhower
-"Open Skies" proposal
-Charles D. Jackson
-Public relations efforts
-Success
-Public relations efforts
-Safire
-Richard A. Moore
-Scali
-Press corps
-Hostility
-Bias for John F. Kennedy
-Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
-Significance
-Press black-out
-Public relations efforts
-Lack of effort
-Kissinger's briefing
-Arrangements
-Rogers
-Announcement
-Rogers
-Public relations efforts
-Meeting with unknown Ambassador
-Kissinger's briefing
-Ziegler's statement
-Timing
-Briefing of Congress
-Notification

- -Kissinger
- -Rogers and Laird
  - -Role
- -Formality of briefing
  - -J. William Fulbright
  - -George D. Aiken
  - -Congressional opposition
  - -Supporters
    - -Leslie C. Arends
    - -Gerald R. Ford
    - -Mahon
    - -F. Edward Hebert
    - -Charles M. Teague
    - -Barry M. Goldwater
    - -John G. Tower
    - -John C. Stennis
    - -MacGregor
    - -Edward J. Gurney
    - -Aiken
      - -Encouragement
  - -Opponents
    - -Fulbright
      - -Rogers's briefing
        - -Hiram L. Fong
- -Time
  - -Television news
  - -Kissinger’s announcement
  - -Rogers's briefing
    - -Foreign Relations Committee
    - -Bob Morgan
- -Attendees
  - -Fulbright
    - -Exclusion
  - -Supporters
- -Leaks
- -Briefing of Laird, the Vice President, John B. Connally,
- -Ronald W. Reagan and Nelson A. Rockefeller

Vietnam
- -Peace talks
- -Negotiations
  - -Aleksei N. Kosygin
  - -Conditions
    - -End of North Vietnamese invasion
    - -US bombing
      - -Conditions for cessation
  - -Ziegler's briefing
    - -Kissinger's views
    - -Time
    - -Call to the President
- -The President's speech
  - -Announcement
    - -News programs
    - -Timing

Haldeman and Haig left at 9:50 am.

-Public relations efforts
-Intensification of efforts
-Cambodia
-Haldeman, Haig and Scali
-SALT agreement
-Deficiencies
-Secretary of State
-Attack on Edmund S. Muskie
-D. Kenneth Rush's [?] statement
-US bombing
-Gallup poll
-Support
-The President's speech
-Increase in support

-Soviet response
-The President's speech
-Rough Draft
-Kissinger's meeting with Brezhnev

US-Soviet relations
-Summit
-Brezhnev
-US value
-Vietnam
-Results of US defeat
-Left-wing contrasted to right-wing factions
-Necessity of victory
-Kontum

Rose Mary Woods entered at 9:52 am.

Typed document
-Completion
-Time

Woods left at 9:54 am.

Vietnam
-US strategy
-All-out attack
-Conditions for cessation
-Targets
-Dikes
-Railroads
-Docks
-Use of massive force
-Soviet Summit
-Need for credibility
-Brezhnev
-US conditions
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Conversation with Kissinger

- -North Vietnamese assessments
- -Chance of breakthrough
- -Negotiations
  - -Conditions for resumption
    - -Cease-fire
      - -US responses
  - -Gromyko
    - -Comments to Kissinger
      - -Soviet Summit
        - -Compared with People's Republic of China [PRC] Trip
- -North Vietnamese invasion
  - -US retaliation
    - -Power plant
    - -Dock area
  - -Dobrynin
    - -Brezhnev
    - -Report to Kissinger
      - -Kissinger's response
- -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with Yuli M. Vorontsov
  - -Hanoi and Haiphong

US-Soviet relations

- -Kissinger's meeting with Brezhnev
  - -Soviet Summit
    - -Conditions
      - -Cessation of North Vietnamese offensive
- -US ships in Vietnam
  - -Blockade
- -Soviet Summit
  - -Cancellation
    - -Dobrynin and Brezhnev
      - -Influence in Central Committee
  - -Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
  - -Announcement
  - -Kissinger's conversation with Gromyko
    - -Dobrynin's role
  - -US air strikes
    - -Impact
  - -Possible cancellation
    - -Laird

Vietnam

- -Laird's statement
  - -Troop levels
- -US successes
  - -Necessity
    - -The President's trip to Moscow
  - -Risks
- -Chou En-Lai
- -US determination
  - -1972 election
- -Negotiations
  - -Cease-fire
  - -William J. Porter's line
  - -Porter

-Abilities as negotiator
-Soviets

Kissinger left at 10:05 am.

Conversation No. 332-23

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:05 am and 10:40 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President dictated a memorandum.

Vietnam
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Changes in text of speech
-Revisions
-John K. Andrews, Jr.

Conversation No. 332-24

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:05 am and 10:40 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with an unknown person.

Meeting with the President

Conversation No. 332-25

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:05 am and 10:40 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President dictated notes for a speech draft.

Vietnam
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Failure to win over South Vietnamese people
-Creighton W. Abrams's views
-Gamble
-Military victory
-US response
-Test
-Frustrations of war
-North Vietnamese invasion
-US response
-Necessity
-Alternatives

-South Vietnam defense
-Evacuation of US forces

Conversation No. 332-26

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:05 am and 10:40 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with an unknown person.

Vietnam
-The President's speech
-Additions and changes
-John K. Andrews's revisions

Conversation No. 332-27

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:05 am and 10:40 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with an unknown person.

The President's speech
-Changes in text

Conversation No. 332-28

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:05 am and 10:40 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President dictated notes for a speech draft.

Vietnam
-Stakes of war
-People of South Vietnam
-World peace
-Power of the US
-US policy
-US withdrawals
-Air sorties
-Peace offers
-North Vietnamese response
-Invasion of South Vietnam
-War escalation

The President replayed portions of the recording.

-Stakes of war
-World peace
-Power of the US

The President resumed dictation.

-US policy
-Aid to South Vietnam
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Aid from Soviet Union
-Consequences of success
-Future invasions
-Risks of war elsewhere
-Negotiations
-US peace offers
-Respect for independence
-The President's speech
-Instructions
-US policy
-Determination
-Consequences of North Vietnamese success
-Risks of war
-Conditions for peace
-Success of US policy
-Withdrawal of US troops
-Resistance to aggression
-Air and Naval forces
-1972 election
-Peace in Vietnam
-Possible failure
-Impact on the President's successors

Conversation No. 332-29

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 10:40 am - 10:45 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield.

The President's schedule
-Dinner for congressmen
-Melvin R. Laird
-Invitation
-Guest list
-Donald H. Rumsfeld
-Former congressmen
-Clark MacGregor

Butterfield left at 10:45 am.

Conversation No. 332-30

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:45 am and 10:50 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President resumed dictation of notes for a speech draft.

Vietnam
-1972 election
-Winning the election at the price of losing the war
-Impact on presidency and US foreign policy
-Review of US uses of power
-Defeat of US
-Consequences
-The President's trips to People's Republic of China [PRC] and Soviet Union
-Respect for the Presidency
-Henry A. Kissinger's report
-Necessity to maintain credibility
-US defeat
-Impact
-Loss of credibility
-Danger to peace

Conversation No. 332-31

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:45 am and 10:50 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with an unknown person.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Conversation No. 332-32

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:45 am and 10:50 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Rose Mary Woods.

The President's speech
-Tape
-Delivery by Manolo Sanchez

Conversation No. 332-33

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:45 am and 10:50 am

Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

Delivery of an unknown item to Rose Mary Woods

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 10:50 am.

Conversation No. 332-34

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:45 am and 10:50 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with an unknown person.

Vietnam
- -The President's speech
  - -Deletions
  - -Troop withdrawals
    - -Previous troop levels
  - -Passage
    - -Insertion

Conversation No. 332-35

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 10:50 am - 12:50 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with H. R. Haldeman and Ronald L. Zielger.

News story
- -Impact

Refreshment

US-Soviet relations
- -Henry A. Kissinger's trip
  - -Helmut (“Hal”) Sonnenfeldt
  - -Ronald L. Ziegler's inability to reach Sonnenfeldt

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 10:50 am.

Refreshment

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 11:06 am.

US-Soviet relations
- -Kissinger's trip
  - -Drama

-People's Republic of China [PRC]
-Secrecy
-Success
-Speculation as to Kissinger's location
-Paris
-Camp David
-Ziegler's briefing
-Time
-Possible questions
-Gerald L. Warren
-The President's decision on Vietnam policy
-Announcements
-Impact
-White House morale
-Opposition confusion
-The President's statement
-Time
-Announcement on television
-General situation in Vietnam
-Announcement
-Kissinger's trip
-Soviet summit
-Ziegler's statement
-Vietnam
-The President's television address

Vietnam
-The President's supporters
-Barry M. Goldwater
-Attacks on Democrats
-Madam Nguyen Thi Binh's letter to Congress
-Advantages for administration
-Reaction of doves
-Rhetoric
-Congress
-Charge of support of enemy
-Winston Lord
-Robert A. Taft, Jr.
-Attacks on Democrats
-Repudiation of North Vietnamese and Madam Binh letter
-Reports in *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and news networks
-National Broadcasting Company [NBC], Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS], and United Press International [UPI] reports
-The President's challenge to opponents
-Demand for repudiation of Binh letter
-Charles S. Gubser's statement

<u>The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 10:50 and 11:06 am.</u>

[Conversation No. 332-35A]

Dinner for congressmen
-Call to Clark MacGregor
-Invitation to Gubser

-Statement on Vietnam

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-Binh letter
-Comments
-Wayne L. Hays
-Alexander [first name or surname unknown]

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 10:50 and 11:06 am.

[Conversation No. 332-35B]

Dinner for congressmen
-Invitations
-Hays
-Refusal to issue invitation
-MacGregor
-Number

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-Binh letter
-Comments
-Taft
-Challenge to Edward M. Kennedy
-The President's speech
-Ziegler's announcement
-Contents
-Appeal to hawks
-Press reactions
-*Washington Post* editorials
-Soviet summit
-Risks
-The President's decision
-Time
-Warren
-Camp David
-Kissinger's meeting in Moscow
-Time
-Camp David
-Ziegler's announcement
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin's statement
-Change of wording
-Leonid I. Brezhnev
-Andrei A. Gromyko
-Kissinger

Ziegler left at 11:06 am.

-White House staff
-The President's conversations with Charles W. Colson and MacGregor
-Colson's analysis of Kissinger's trip

-Negotiations
-US bombing of North Vietnam
-Justification
-Publicity
-Colson's concern
-Publicity
-Continuation of bombing
-Publicity
-Conditions for cessation
-Wording
-Handling of critics
-MacGregor
-Colson
-Strategy
-The President's speech
-Discussion with Kissinger
-Rhetoric
-Length
-Compared with November 3rd and Cambodia speeches

Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 11:06 am.

Tobacco

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 11:17 am.

Vietnam
-The President's speech
-Approach
-Previous speeches
-Binh letter
-Reaction
-A. Eric Sevareid
-Contents
-Peace proposal
-Colson's reaction
-Kissinger
-The President's speech
-Conclusion
-Formulation
-Secrecy from staff
-US bombing
-Wording of statement
-Quotability
Compared with Lyndon B. Johnson's wording
-Follow-up
-Haldeman's role
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Public release
-Congress
-Resolutions
-Marches
-Calls to networks
-Poll
-George H. Gallup and Louis P>Harris

-Trial heats
-Questions
-Bombing
-Compared with Gallup-type questions
-Support for the President
-Release
-Other polls
-Gallup
-Harris
-Albert E. Sindlinger
-Questions
-Moscow summit

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 11:17 am.

-Ziegler's announcement of the President's speech
-Kissinger's concern
-Soviets
-Brezhnev
-Delays in announcement
-Time

Ziegler left at 11:20 am.

-Kissinger's concern
-Speech
-Drafts
-John K. Andrews, Jr.
-William L. Safire
-Methods of review
-Kissinger
-Raymond K. Price, Jr.
-Leonard Garment
-Problems
-Ziegler
-Desire for concensus
-Problems

Kissinger
-Press briefing
-Trip to Florida with the President

-Unknown actress
-Haig
-Schedule
-Fontainebleu Hotel
-Publicity

The President's schedule
-Trip to Florida
-Time
-Meeting with Kissinger

-The President's speech
-Lord
-Accuracy of certain points
-Creighton W. Abrams's report
-Trip to Florida
-Arrangements
-Time
-National Basketball Association [NBA] playoffs
-The President's speech
-West Coast time
-Announcement
-Interruptions
-Reception
-NBA playoffs
-Audience
-Size

Kissinger's trip
-Sonnenfeldt
-Ziegler's knowledge
-Secrecy
-Cover story
-Sonnenfeldt
-Trip to Camp David
-Paris
-Sonnenfeldt
-Activities
-Summit
-Liberals' views
-Risks from bombing
-Risks of future in Vietnam
-The President's reelection

Vietnam
-Public relations efforts
-Colson
-Attacks on media
-The Vice President
-The President's speech
-Media reception
-Attacks on networks
-Contents
-Kissinger’s trip
-Melvin R. Laird
-Troop withdrawals
-Peace offers
-Soviet summit
-The President's speech
-*Washington Post*
-Reaction of opponents
- *Washington Post*
-Phone calls
-John D. Ehrlichman's call to Katharine L. Graham
- *Washington Post* editor
-Calls from Congressmen and Senators

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 57s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6

****

Vietnam
-Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-Timing of announcement
-Colson's and MacGregor's concern
-Goldwater's speech
-Bombing
-Goldwater's speech
-Timing of information given to Goldwater
-Rejection of North Vietnamese demand
-The President's statement
-Kissinger's briefing
-Colson and MacGregor
-*Washington Star*
-Support
-Current situation
-The President's speech
-Announcement
-Timing
-Bad news
-Abrams
-Support of South Vietnam
-Binh letter

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 8
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 1m 42s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 8

****

-The President's domestic position
-Diplomacy
-Kissinger's upcoming trip
-Summit
-Resumption of bombing

- -Kissinger
- -Congressmen
- -The President's supporters
  - -William F. (“Billy”) Graham

US-Soviet relations
- -Kissinger's trip
  - -Cover
    - -Camp David
    - -Discovery

The President's schedule
- -A graduation
  - -Julie Nixon Eisenhower
  - -Ceremony
    - -Location

Vietnam
- -Binh letter
  - -Patrick J. Buchanan memorandum
  - -Inclusion in speech
    - -Haldeman's advice
- -The President's speech
  - -Length
  - -Troop withdrawals
  - -Bombings
  - -The President's policies
  - -Kissinger
  - -Justification for actions
    - -Leslie T. (“Bob”) Hope's comments

The President's forthcoming speech
- -Trip to PRC

Vietnam
- -The President's speech
  - -North Vietnamese invasion
    - -Failure
      - -Abrams's views
    - -Impact on Congress and public opinion
  - -South Vietnam
    - -Evacuation of US forces
  - -North Vietnamese invasion
    - -Stakes in war
    - -Aid of Soviet Union
    - -Success
      - -Consequences
      - -Risks of other wars
    - -US goals
      - -Peace offers
      - -Consequences of failure
    - -Risks
      - -1972 election
        - -Costs of failure
  - -US foreign policy goals

-South Vietnam
-Trips to PRC and Moscow
-Respect for US and the presidency
-The President's successors
-Dangers of defeat in South Vietnam
-Text
-Haldeman's opinion
-Tone
-The President's goals
-Victory
-Impact on critics
-Desire to surrender
-The President's supporters
-Encouragement
-Trip to Moscow
-Peace talks
-The President's speech
-Safire
-The President's mark
-Revisions
-Andrews

H. R. Haldeman talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 11:20 am and 12:00 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-35C]

[See Conversation No. 23-59]

The President conferred with Haldeman at an unknown time during the conversation.

Ziegler
-Press briefing
-Press reaction

Haldeman talked with an unknown woman at an unknown time.

The President talked with Ronald L. Ziegler at an unknown time.

[End of telephone conversation]

Press
-Ziegler's briefing
-Question
-Kissinger's trip
-Credibility
-Public opinion
-Support for secrecy
-Ziegler's answer
-Plausibility

Vietnam
-The President's leadership
-John B. Connally's views
-Lyndon B. Johnson

-Contrast in styles

The President's schedule
-Dinner for congressmen
-Reward for supporters
-Laird
-[Thomas S.?] Kleppe
-Invitation

H. R. Haldeman talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 11:20 am and 12:00 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-35D]

-Rogers C. B. Morton
-Invitation

[End of telephone conversation]

Kissinger and Ziegler entered at 12:00 pm.

Press
-Ziegler's handling
-Secrecy of Kissinger's trip
-Kissinger's veracity
-Ziegler
-The President's call
-Ziegler's response
-Haldeman
-Publicity
-Scali
-Anecdote
-Ziegler's announcement
-Reading of statement
-Kissinger's briefing
-Press reaction
-The President's contacts with Brezhnev
-Brezhnev's title
-Mao Tse-tung's title
-William P. Rogers
-Reception for Kissinger
-Cordiality
-Discussion of Vietnam
-Benefits of meeting
-Rogers
-Vietnam
-Speculation
-Proper approach
-The President's goals in Vietnam
-Use of secret channels
-Meeting with Brezhnev
-Results
-Peter Lisagor
-Press reactions
-Compared with PRC trip briefing
-Kissinger's call to Graham

- *Washington Post* editorial
-Moscow summit
-Mistakes
-Moscow summit
-Reception for Kissinger
-Graham
-Philip L. Graham
-Death
-*Washington Post* editorial
-Views of eastern establishment
-*Washington Post,* New York *Times, Time, Newsweek,* and networks
-Call to Rogers
-Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-Discussions
-North Vietnamese delegate's trip
-Kissinger's briefing of press
-Laird and Connally
-Notification
-Connally's reaction to Kissinger's trip
-Soviets
-Naval strikes
-Preparations
-Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
-Attacks
-Shore batteries
-Haig
-Range of guns
-Destroyers
-Zumwalt
-Destroyers
-Number
-Air strikes
-B-52s
-Targets
-Accuracy
-Intensity
-Destruction of targets
-Warehouses
-Docks
-Power Plant
-Accuracy
-Message to Brezhnev
-Binh letter
-Air strikes
-North Vietnamese losses
-Men
-Figures
-Laotian operation
-Military Region Three
-Military Region Four
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Units in south
-Army Of The Republic Of Vietnam [ARVN] units
-Losses
-North Vietnamese losses

-Saigon and Hanoi
-US attacks on north
-Power plants
-Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants [POL] dumps
-Docks
-US strikes
-Nuclear weapons
-South Vietnamese chances
-Kissinger's meeting with Brezhnev
-Significance
-Statements on bombing
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Soviet aid
-Brezhnev's reaction
-Soviet knowledge
-Extent of offensive
-Soviets
-Willy Brandt
-Soviet Summit
-Importance for Soviets
-Politburo meeting
-Kissinger's meeting with Yuli M. Vorontsov
-The President's message
-The President's trip to Moscow
-Divisive issue
-Kissinger's meetings in Moscow
-Reception
-Press reaction
-Kitchen Cabinet
-Trips to Moscow
-Books and articles by reporters
-Clarence Fickiue [sp?], editor
-*Cleveland Plain Dealer*

-Press
-Kissinger's briefing
-Duration
-Press reaction
-The President's speech
-Announcement
-The President's decision on something
-Kissinger's report

Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-List of those who went
-Release

<u>Ziegler left at 12:28 pm.</u>

US-Soviet relations
-Kissinger's trip
-Meetings with D. Kenneth Rush and Connally
-Connally's reaction
-The President's speech
-Kissinger's briefing

-Points to make
-Rejection of North Vietnamese terms
-Appeal to hawks

Vietnam
-Negotiations
-Cease-fire proposal
-Reaction
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-Negotiations
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Conditions for resumption
-Kissinger's briefing
-Haig
-Zumwalt
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Richard M. Helms
-Rush
-Helms
-Response to Soviet trip
-Soviet trip
-Significance
-Negotiations
-Soviet transmittal of US messages

The President's schedule
-Trip to Florida
-Kissinger's presence
-Necessity
-Itinerary
-Arrangements
-Kissingers visitors
-Itinerary
-Dinner
-Publicity
-Unknown person
-Gifts to Kissinger
-Kissinger's presence
-Necessity
-Itinerary
-Return trip
-Weekend
-Publicity

Vietnam
-The President's efforts
-Air strikes
-Targets
-Soviet Union
-PRC
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Soviet Summit
-Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] agreement
-Benefits
-Possible cancellation

-Kissinger's call to Graham
-Kissinger's call to Ronald W. Reagan
-Air strikes

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 21
[Privacy]
[Duration: 7s]

REAGAN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 21

****

-Call to Nelson A. Rockefeller
-Kissinger's call to Reagan
-The President's courage
-Soviets

Kissinger left at an unknown time after 12:28 pm.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 22
[Privacy]
[Duration: 7s]

REAGAN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 22

****

-Possible call to Barry M. Goldwater
-Bombing
-Polls
-Public approval
-Gallup
-Wording of questions

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 19
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 2m 57s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 19

****

The President's schedule
-Possible meeting with Richard and Karen Carpenter [singing group]
-Lunch with Ken [surname unknown]
-Support for the President
-Tour of Oval Office
-Tricia Nixon Cox, Julie Nixon Eisenhower and Thelma C. ("Pat") Nixon

H. R. Haldeman talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 12:40 and 12:46 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-35E]

-Arrangements
-Tricia Nixon Cox, Mrs. Nixon and Julie Nixon Eisenhower
-Tour of White House
-Oval Office
-Rose Garden
-Greeting by First Family

[End of telephone conversation]

-First Family
-Meetings with celebrities

Vietnam
-Negotiations
-The President's strategy
-Bombing
-Intensity
-Purpose
-North Vietnam
-Negotiations
-Cease-fire
-Thieu's resignation
-Cease-fire
-Conditions
-Withdrawal of US Troops
-Muskie's Comments
-Soviet Summit

Andrews entered at 12:46 pm.

Andrews's meeting with the President
-Time

The President's speech
-Andrews's revisions

Haldeman left at 12:47 pm.

-Length
-Further questions
-Figures and facts

-Verification
-Lord
-Distribution of draft
-Limitations
-Lord
-Ziegler
-Haldeman
-Kissinger
-Draft
-The President's review
-Time
-Preparation

US-Soviet relations
-Kissinger's trip
-Secrecy

Andrews left at 12:50 pm.

Conversation No. 332-36

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 12:50 pm and 1:09 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with the White House operator.

[See Conversation No. 23-60]

Conversation No. 332-37

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 1:09 pm - 1:10 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with John K. Andrews, Jr.

[See Conversation No. 23-61]

Conversati
on No. 332-38

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 1:15 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

The President's speech

-Work of Winston Lord and John K. Andrews, Jr.

The President's meeting with Kissinger
-Schedule
-Review of speech
-Time

Conversation No. 332-39

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 1:15 pm - 1:33 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Winston Lord and John K. Andrews, Jr.

The President's speech
-Revisions by Lord and Andrews
-Evaluation of work
-Henry A. Kissinger's review
-Copy
-Further revisions

Lord [?]
-Education
-Career choices
-Teaching career
-Work in White House
-Mother
-Law school
-Law school
-Value
-Training
-Discipline
-Value
-Stock and bond issues
-Kissinger

The President's speech
-Review
-Conclusion
-Madame Nguyen Thi Bihn
-Bombing
-Intensity
-Tehran

The President read his speech draft.

[A transcript of the speech in its final form appears in Public Papers of the Presidents, 1972, pp. 553-554.]

[End of speech rehearsal]

The President's speech
-Revisions
-Changes in wording
-Discussion of People's Republic of China [PRC] and Soviet trips
-South Vietnamese performance
-Insertion of passage
-Conclusion
-US goals in Vietnam
-Peace with honor
-Cambodia speech
-Election year risks
-Office of the President

The President talked with an unknown person [Kissinger?] at an unknown time between 1:15 and 1:33 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-39A]

The President's speech
-Meeting with the President
-Time
-Draft
-Typing

[End of telephone conversation]

The President's speech
-Conclusion
-Wording
-End of war
-Imminence
-Revisions
-Length
-Cambodia speech
-Kent State University
-Election year
-Risks
-Soviets
-The President's determination
-North Vietnamese miscalculations
-Work of Lord and Andrews

Lord and Andrews left at 1:33 pm.

Conversation No. 332-40

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:33 pm and 1:38 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with an unknown person.

[See Conversation No. 332-40A]

The President's speech
-John K. Andrews Jr.'s work
-Compared with William L. Safire
-Conclusion
-Allusions to Cambodia speech
-Risks for election
-Soviets

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 1:33 pm and conferred with the President.

President's schedule

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 1:38 pm.

[End of telephone conversation]

Conversation No. 332-41

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:33 pm and 1:38 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with the White House operator.

[See Conversation No. 23-62]

Conversation No. 332-42

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 1:38 pm - 1:39 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Ronald L. Ziegler.

[See Conversation No. 23-63]

Conversation No. 332-43

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:39 pm and 1:45 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 54s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:45 pm.

Conversati

on No. 332-44

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:39 and 1:45 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with the White House operator.

[See Conversation No. 23-64]

Conversati

on No. 332-45

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 1:39 pm and 1:45 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 28s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

****

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:45 pm.

Conversati

on No. 332-46

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 1:45 pm - 1:46 pm

Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with Charles W. Colson.

[See Conversation No. 23-65]

Conversation No. 332-47

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 1:48 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President talked with the White House operator.

[See Conversation No. 23-66]

Conversation No. 332-48

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 1:55 pm - 2:25 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Charles W. Colson.

The President's speech
- -Contents

Vietnam
- -Bombing
  - -Intensity
- -Soviet Summit
  - -*Washington Post* editorial
    - -Possible cancellation
  - -Meetings with Henry A. Kissinger
    - -Soviets
      - -Colson's conversation with H. R. Haldeman
- -John B. Connally's backgrounder
  - -Publicity
    - -*Los Angeles Times*
    - -Richard G. Valeriani
  - -The President's determination
    - -Legacy for future
    - -Risks to reelection and summit
    - -Credibility of foreign policy
  - -Valeriani's report
  - -Image of the President
- -Kissinger's trip to Moscow
- -North Vietnamese invasion
- -Hawks

-Colson's conversation with Barry M. Goldwater
-Support for the President
-Goldwater's speech
-Democrats' support
-Madame Nguyen Thi Binh's letter
-Call for repudiation
-William E. Jenner

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 32s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

****

The White House operator talked with the President at an unknown time between 1:55 and 1:59 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-48A]

[See Conversation No. 23-67]

[End of telephone conversation]

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 35s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

****

-Bombing
-Geroge H. Gallup poll
-Approval rating
-Gallup reaction
-Louis P. Harris poll
-Increase in approval
-Colson's conversation with Harris
-Impact on public
-Increased support

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 1:55 pm.

Refreshment

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:59 pm.

Vietnam
-Bombing
-Harris poll
-Haldeman's poll
-Confidentiality
-The President's speech
-Impact on approval
-Polls
-Harris
-Colson's conversation with Harris
-Timing
-Methods
-Questions
-Sensitivity to public mood
-Gallup
-Questions
-Bias
-Proper wording

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 55s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

****

-Success of the President's policies
-Creighton W. Abrams's report
-Public approval

Economy
-Cost of living
-Bad news
-C. Jackson Grayson, Jr.
-Corporate profits
-Decline
-Rebound
-Grayson's statement
-The President's speech
-Stock market
-Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-Volatility

White House staff
-Jews
-Kissinger, William L. Safire and Herbert Stein

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 1:55 pm.

Refreshment

Vietnam
-Colson's views
-Sanchez's reaction

Press corps

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:59 pm.

Vietnam
-Clark MacGregor's work

The President talked with MacGregor between 1:59 and 2:01 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-48B]

[See Conversation No. 23-68]

[End of telephone conversation]

MacGregor
-Work
-Colson's evaluation
-Knowledge of Congress

Vietnam
-The President's speech
-Colson's conversation with Harris
-Harris poll
-Albert E. Sindlinger
-Gallup poll
-Bias
-Polls
-*Sindlinger Newsletter*
-*Newsweek*
-Public support
-Compared with Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953
-Solidity
-News reports
-*Time* and *Newsweek*
-Kissinger's trip
-Colson's conversation with Sindlinger
-Support from the President
-Harris
-Poll taken after the President's speech
-Competition with Gallup

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 39s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6

****

Campaign practices
-George S. McGovern
-Pennsylvania primary
-Edmund S. Muskie
-Pennsylvania primary
-Colson's conversation with Frank L. Rizzo

Vietnam
-Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-The President's stay at Camp David
-Press suppositions
-Leonid I. Brezhnev
-Soviet Summit
-*Washington Post* editorial
-Kissinger's trip
-Benefits
-Robert J. Dole's reaction
-End of war
-Negotiations
-Failure
-Resumption of Bbmbing
-Public support
-The President's policies
-Credibility since January 25
-Public support for efforts
-White House support
-Morale
-James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
-Bombing
-Kissinger's trip to Paris
-Private talks
-Kissinger
-Brezhnev

Richard G. Kleindienst
-Confirmation
-Filibuster
-Chances
-Charles H. Percy
-Public pressure
-Edward M. Kennedy
-Opposition
-Filibuster
-Mistakes
-Aides
-Investigation of Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] files
-William J. Casey

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 9
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 57s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 9

****

Kissinger’s trip
-Secrecy
-Briefing
-Camp David
-Sense of intrigue

US-Soviet relations
-Kissinger's trip
-Secrecy
-Press
-Discovery
-Location
-Paris
-Colson's discovery
-Camp David

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 10
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 1m 33s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 10

****

-*Washington Post*
-Kissinger's trip
-Reaction
-Kenneth W. Clawson
-Vendetta

Press
-*Los Angeles Times*
-Story on Soviet trip
-*Washington Post*
-Coverage of Soviet trip

The President talked with Kissinger between 2:13 and 2:15 pm.

[Conversation No. 332-48C]

[See Conversation No. 23-70]

[End of telephone conversation]

Press
-Reston

Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 2:15 pm.

Refreshment [?]

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:25 pm.

Vietnam
-The President's policies
-Public support
-Kissinger's trip
-Contacts with the President
-Brezhnev
-Press
-Misinformation
-Kissinger's trip
-Bias
-Clawson
-Hostility to press
-Reaction to Kissinger's trip
-Kissinger's trip
-Democrats
-Timing
-Phases of struggle
-North Vietnamese invasion
-Miscalculation
-Robert C. Byrd
-Opposition to antiwar resolution
-Binh letter
-Binh letter
-Senators

****

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 12
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 5m 44s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 12

****

Colson left at 2:25 pm.

on No. 332-49

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 2:25 pm and 3:35 pm
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Manolo Sanchez.

The President's meeting with Henry A. Kissinger
-Time

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 3:35 pm.